Download in PDF (2MB) here - Foreknowledge

Yet this same example also illustrates
a common weakness in applying
theory to analysis of
political phenomena. Theoretical
propositions frequently fail to specify
the time frame within which developments
might be anticipated to
occur.
The analytical problem with respect
to Saudi Arabia is not so much
whether the monarchy will eventually
be replaced, as when or under
what conditions this might happen.
Further elaboration of the theory
relating economic development
and foreign ideas to political instability
in feudal societies would
identify early warning indicators
that analysts might look for. Such
indicators would guide both intelligence
collection and analysis of sociopolitical
and socioeconomic data
and lead to hypotheses concerning
when or under what circumstances
such an event might occur.
But if theory enables the analyst to
transcend the limits of available data,
it may also provide the basis for
Former US Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette, who has written a controversial
book detailing the Abbotabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden,
has credited a ‘feisty’ female CIA analyst for leading them to their target,
after spending five years hunting him. Bissonnette said that he
and the other SEALs asked the young agent, "What you do think?
Think he's there? "She's like, ''One hundred percent. One hundred
percent he's there,” he said. Read more here.
Top 5 Things Only Spies Used To Do (But Everyone Does Now)
Kris Wheaton
1. Use satellites: even our cell phones have capabilities that were not
even dreamed of by spies 10 years ago!
2. Have an agent network: sure, that's not what we call twitter,
LinkedIn etc, but that is what they are!
3. Use passwords and encrypt data: buying/selling on the internet,
007?!
4. Shake a tail: we are all using sophisticated tools to help us navigate
the internet without being followed.
5. Have a cover story: we all have multiple email accounts for various
aspects of their lives or different social media platforms for different
purposes.
Theory enables the
analyst to transcend
the limits of available
data, but it may also
provide the basis for
ignoring evidence that
is truly indicative of
future events
ignoring evidence that is truly indicative
of future events.
When evidence is lacking or ambiguous,
the analyst evaluates hypotheses
by applying his or her general
background knowledge concerning
the nature of political systems and
behavior.
Logic-of-the-situation analysis also
draws heavily on theoretical assumptions.
How does the analyst
select the most significant elements
to describe the current situation, or
identify the causes or consequences
of these elements, without some
thinking
implicit theory that relates the likelihood
of certain outcomes to certain
antecedent conditions?
For example, if the analyst estimating
the outcome of an impending
election does not have current
polling data, it is necessary to look
back at past elections, study the
campaigns, and then judge how
voters are likely to react to the current
campaigns and to events that
influence voter attitudes. In doing
so, the analyst operates from a set
of assumptions about human nature
and what drives people and
groups.
These assumptions form part of a
theory of political behavior, but it
is a different sort of theory than
was discussed under theoretical
analysis. It does not illuminate the
entire situation, but only a small
increment of the situation, and it
may not apply beyond the specific
country of concern. Further, it is
much more likely to remain implicit,
rather than be a focal point
of the analysis.
A part-time army of civilian spies is set to be recruited
by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ to
help in the war against cyber crime. Hundreds of
computer experts will work one or two days a
week at the agency’s Cheltenham headquarters
and they have already been dubbed “iPlods”, under
plans being discussed by ministers. The move
is part of an ongoing drive to harness the best
skills in the private sector to combat the growing
threat of hackers. Read more here.
Snippets
Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Common
Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab have
embarked on several innovative programs that allow both
intelligence analysts and tactical operators to visualize the battlefield
as never seen before. The lab’s staff is comprised of an
eclectic group of researchers that includes interdisciplinary
faculty partnered with seasoned special operators with years
of boots-on-the-ground experience. Together, they aim to
illuminate the “human terrain” by utilizing advanced analytical
methodologies. Read more here
October 2012 Foreknowledge 21