Analysis of the Durrand Glacier Avalanche Accident

Analysis of the Durrand Glacier
Avalanche Accident
January 20, 2003
A report completed for
Peter Millar and Annie Polucha Millar
Reno, Nevada, U.S.A.
89523-9501
by
Baumann Engineering
#2-1160 Hunter Place
P.O. Box 1846
Squamish, B.C., Canada
V0N 3G0
March 15, 2004
Copyright: no part of this report may be reproduced without the written permission of the author.

Executive Summary
On January 20, 2003, seven of 21 ski tourers under the leadership of Mr. Ruedi Beglinger, a
Swiss-trained mountain guide, owner and chief guide of Selkirk Mountain Experience Ltd., and
member of the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) and the Canadian Avalanche
Association (CAA), died when they were buried by a large (Size 3-4) avalanche in the Durrand
Glacier area, 35 km north northeast of Revelstoke, B.C., Canada.
Guide
310 m (1017 feet)
37° upper slope
Durrand Glacier
Chalet
Uphill track
June 19, 2003
Figure 1: looking east at the site of the fatal avalanche accident in the La Traviata couloir.
For several weeks prior to the accident, warnings of the presence of a widespread persistent
weak layer of faceted crystals in the winter snow pack, and an overlying snow slab that could
produce large avalanches, were being widely reported in public avalanche bulletins issued by
the Canadian Avalanche Association, and the Avalanche Control Section of Parks Canada at
Rogers Pass. The Canadian Avalanche Association’s private data exchange system (InfoEx)
was also warning of the hazard; however, Selkirk Mountain Experience did not subscribe to
InfoEx and therefore was not able to obtain this detailed, daily information on avalanche hazard.
After the accident, all nine snow profiles dug in the vicinity of the fatal avalanche by
investigators, and other tests, confirmed the widespread presence of the persistent weak layer
and overlying snow slab. This means that the dangerous avalanche conditions in the Durrand
glacier area should have been detected in standard snow profiles, and by doing stability tests,
as described in the Canadian Avalanche Association’s Observation Guidelines and Recording
Standards for Weather, Snowpack and Avalanches (2002).
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Executive Summary page 2
The destination chosen for this fatal ski tour first required going down into the narrow valley of
Cairns Creek, and then up to a sub-alpine area called Swiss Meadows. This part of the route
required crossing potentially high risk and unavoidable avalanche terrain on the south face of
Tumbledown Mountain during a period of considerable avalanche hazard. The overall slope of
this face is about 38° to 40°, which, statistically, is within the most common range of slope angle
where avalanches occur. An avalanche occurring on this face would carry skiers down over
bluffs or through gullies and into the terrain trap at the confined bottom of the Cairns Creek
valley.
From Swiss Meadows, the group originally intended to go up low-angled and relatively safe
slopes to the summit of Fronalp Peak, as shown on Selkirk Mountain Experience’s guiding map.
Instead, they toured up below the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain on a route that was so
close to the base of the slope that it was subsequently overrun by the avalanches that occurred
later that day.
The La Traviata couloir, where the fatal accident occurred, is a steep, wind-loaded, 310 metre
long shallow gully with a 37° upper slope where the avalanche started. All the avalanche
reference books and other sources consulted warn that such couloirs have a high probability of
being potential sites of avalanche activity. According to the references, the specific features of
this couloir that were indicators of high avalanche hazard are:
(a) The slope steepness. Avalanche accidents most commonly occur on slopes of 31° to 35°;
this one is even steeper at 36° to 37°.
(b) Lee slope build-up and cross-slope loading. Most avalanches occur on slopes where
winds cause snow to accumulate and build up to form dense and potentially dangerous
snow slabs. In this case, more than a metre of additional snow was present in the gully.
(c) A convex upper slope. At such places of convex curvature, a snow slab resting on a
persistent weak layer would be in tension due to the difference in the rate of snow creep
above and below the break in slope. A skier crossing over such a convex slope is more
likely to trigger a release compared to other slopes.
(d) Relatively smooth underlying terrain. This would not provide the anchors that a more
coarse, rocky slope would have, and means that the slope would have a relatively small
surface roughness depth. Compared to other areas, this slope would be more prone to
slide with lesser amounts of snow.
(e) Connectivity to an area of shallow snow. In such areas, the weight of a person skiing over
into the more shallow snow pack can set-off a skier remote triggered avalanche. This is
more likely to happen if the snow slab rests on a persistent weak layer, such as a layer of
faceted crystals, as was the case at Durrand.
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Executive Summary page 3
By taking his entire party up the La Traviata couloir at the same time, the guide was
unnecessarily exposing his group to a higher avalanche risk, and not following generally
accepted safety procedures described in the avalanche references consulted. Specifically, the
following features or actions increased the avalanche risk:
(a) The presence of the whole group in the couloir at the same time. This exposed the entire
party to avalanche hazard, and reduced the number of potential rescuers available. It also
meant that a rescue would likely involve the difficult task of tracking down several
transceivers buried in a small area. Finally, the large group size meant that a greater weight
of skiers (surcharge) was present on the unstable snow slab, especially at the convex top of
the couloir, and on the thinner snowpack above.
(b) The presence of a terrain trap at the base of the La Traviata couloir. The abrupt change in
slope and flat area beyond caused rapid deceleration and deposition of snow, allowing an
initial 310 metre long moving snow slab in the gully to cascade over itself and form a deep,
65 to 85 metre long debris deposit. This deeply buried many of the victims and greatly
decreased their chances of survival.
(c) The location of the guide some distance ahead of his group. This did not allow him to track
their progress and well-being, or immediately notice that a large avalanche had occurred.
(d) The remote location of the accident site and poor weather conditions. This did not allow
outside rescuers to arrive at the accident scene until nearly an hour after the avalanche
happened, at which point all but one of the totally buried victims had been recovered, and
were dead.
(e) The lack of the most efficient equipment to find and dig out buried victims. Specifically, the
group members did not all have dedicated avalanche probes and full-sized, robust shovels.
The September 23 rd , 2003 Coroner’s Inquiry report on the Durrand accident has numerous errors
and omissions and does not, in our opinion, fulfill the objectives of a coroner’s inquiry report, as
described in the British Columbia Coroner’s Act and related documentation. Specifically, the
Coroner’s Inquiry report does not establish the full body of facts that led up to this accident, and
therefore allow a thorough set of recommendations, to prevent a reoccurrence, from being
developed. Some of the errors and omissions are as follows:
(a) The location of the accident site is incorrectly reported as being 25 km north of Revelstoke,
when in fact it is 35 km north northeast of Revelstoke. The Universal Transverse Mercator
(UTM) grid location is also not correctly stated.
(b) The report inconsistently reports the steepness of the slope, and does not give the correct
elevation of the avalanche’s starting zone (crown).
(c) The report does not say anything about what was done by the guide to evaluate snow
stability in the weeks prior to, or on the day of, the accident.
(d) There is no mention of what training the group received with regard to dealing with an
avalanche, or conducting an avalanche rescue, especially one with multiple burials.
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Executive Summary page 4
(e) There is no comment on the destination and route finding choices that were made by the
guide. Specifically, there is no mention that the group had to cross the high risk south face
of Tumbledown Mountain before even getting to the La Traviata couloir, and that they
toured up so close under the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain that their uphill track
was subsequently overrun by the avalanches that occurred.
(f) There is no description of how the guide’s route finding decisions, and other actions,
compare with commonly accepted principles for traveling safely in avalanche terrain, as
described in numerous textbooks and other literature on the subject, including the
Association of Canadian Mountain Guide’s guide training manual.
(g) There is only a brief mention of the rescue efforts, and no description of how the remote
location, poor weather conditions, deep burials, large number of buried transceivers, and
available probes and shovels affected the rescue efforts, and how efficient those rescue
efforts were.
To more thoroughly establish the body of facts related to this accident, and develop meaningful
recommendations to avoid a similar tragedy, a Coroner’s Inquest should be convened as soon
as possible.
The Association of Canadian Mountain Guides should work with an independent third party to
complete a thorough investigation of this accident, develop recommendations that will improve
the safety of guided trips, and determine whether action should be taken against the guide.
The British Columbia Government should work with the professional mountain guides to
establish a guiding association, similar to other professional associations, that would set
minimum standards for guides, codes of conduct, establish an investigation and disciplinary
process, and have requirements for on-going professional development.
To warn backcountry users of potentially hazardous conditions, the Provincial Government
should work with the Canadian Avalanche Association to develop a protocol that would provide
for an immediate preliminary analysis and public report when an avalanche accident or near
miss occurs. This should then be followed by a more thorough analysis and report.
Commercial recreation companies and guides should be required to report all accidents and
near misses. This information should then be made available to prospective clients so that they
can make informed choices about what activities they participate in, and where they go on
backcountry excursions.
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Table of Contents
Section A Introduction page 1
Section B Public avalanche bulletin and other warnings of avalanche hazard page 1
Section C Formation of slab avalanche hazard page 4
Section D Relationship of avalanche activity to slope angle page 5
Section E History of the winter snowpack in the Selkirk mountains page 6
Section F History of wind activity in the Columbia mountains page 7
Section G History of avalanche activity in the Columbia mountains page 8
Section H Snowpack and other records at Durrand Chalet page 8
Section I Chronology of events on January 20, 2003 page 9
Section J The La Traviata couloir page 11
Section K The avalanches page 14
Section L Relationship of avalanche accidents to slope angle page 15
Section M Wind loading in the La Traviata couloir page 16
Section N Size of the fatal avalanche page 17
Section O Alpha and beta angles page 17
Section P Nature of the underlying ground in the La Traviata couloir page 18
Section Q Initial response to the avalanche page 18
Section R The avalanche rescue page 19
Section S Probability of death with burial time and burial depth page 19
Section T Textbook advice on how to travel safely in avalanche terrain page 21
Section U Police statements on the accident page 22
Section V The Coroner’s Inquiry report page 22
Section W Information in the ACMG mountain guide’s training manual page 25
Section X The Association of Canadian Mountain Guide’s Code of Ethics page 26
Comments and Conclusions page 27
Recommendations page 32
Illustrations
Figure 1 Overview picture of the accident site Executive Summary
Figure 2 Location of the Durrand Glacier in British Columbia page 1
Figure 3 Canadian avalanche hazard classification system page 2
Figure 4 Rogers Pass snow profile page 3
Figure 5 Formation of slab avalanche hazard page 4
Figure 6 Frequency of avalanche occurrence relative to slope angle page 5
Figure 7 25° avalanche shadow zone in the vicinity of the La Traviata couloir page 6
Figure 8 The upper Cairns Creek valley page 9
Figure 9 Slope profile of Tumbledown Mountain’s south face page 10
Figure 10 Overview picture of the south face of Tumbledown Mountain page 10
Figure 11 South face of Tumbledown Mountain in winter page 11
Figure 12 Overview picture of the La Traviata couloir page 12
Figure 13 Upper portion of the La Traviata couloir page 13
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Table of Contents page 2
Figure 14 Looking westerly across the top of the La Traviata couloir page 14
Figure 15 Avalanche accident occurrence versus starting zone slope angle page 15
Figure 16 Percentage of accidents by wind exposure page 16
Figure 17 Alpha and beta angles and other features in the La Traviata couloir page 17
Figure 18 Top portion of the La Traviata couloir page 18
Figure 19 Probability of death with burial time page 20
Figure 20 Survival rate versus depth of burial page 20
Figure 21 Route options available to the touring group page 26
Figure 22 Probable triggering mechanism of the fatal avalanche page 30
Tables
Table 1 General description of wind activity page 7
Table 2 History of avalanche activity page 8
Table 3 Canadian snow avalanche size classification page 17
Appendices
Appendix 1 Slope profiles at accident site. appended
Appendix 2 Routefinding options and slope features. appended
Appendix 3 Contour map and additional site information appended
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A. Introduction
Analysis of the Durrand Glacier Avalanche Accident
1. On January 20, 2003, seven ski tourers, under the leadership of Mr. Ruedi Beglinger, a
Swiss-trained mountain guide, owner and chief guide of Selkirk Mountain Experience, Ltd.
and member of the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) and the Canadian
Avalanche Association (CAA), died when they were buried by an avalanche in the Durrand
Glacier area, 35 km north northeast of Revelstoke, B.C., Canada.
0 100 km
Vancouver
DURRAND
GLACIER
Revelstoke
Fig. 2: Location of the accident site near Revelstoke, British Columbia, Canada.
2. The victims were part of a group of 21 skiers that had departed that morning from the
Durrand Chalet, a remote, helicopter-accessed mountain lodge located at the headwaters
of Cairns Creek, on the west side of the Selkirk Mountains, and owned by Ruedi
Beglinger’s company, Selkirk Mountain Experience Limited.
B. Public avalanche bulletin and other warnings of avalanche hazard
1. For the day of the accident, the Canadian Avalanche Association’s Public Avalanche
Bulletin (PAB) for the North Columbia Mountains (which includes the Durrand Glacier area)
was warning that a deep seated instability was present in the snowpack, and that natural
avalanches were possible, and skier-triggered avalanches were probable. Overall the
hazard in the mountains was rated as being “Considerable”, which is the mid-point of the
five class hazard scale.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 2
Danger Level Probability and Trigger Recommended Action
Low
Moderate
Considerable
High
Extreme
Natural avalanches very
unlikely. Human triggered
avalanches unlikely.
Natural avalanches unlikely.
Human triggered avalanches
possible.
Natural avalanches possible,
human triggered avalanches
probable.
Natural and human triggered
avalanches likely.
Widespread natural or human
triggered avalanches certain.
Travel is generally safe. Normal caution
advised.
Use caution in steeper terrain on certain
aspects.
Be increasingly cautious in steeper
terrain.
Travel in avalanche terrain is not
recommended.
Travel in avalanche terrain should be
avoided and confined to low angle terrain,
well away from avalanche path runouts.
Fig. 3: Canadian avalanche hazard classification system. Key phrases are highlighted.
2. The Bulletin for January 17 to January 20 th provided the following additional information;
key phrases have been highlighted.
NORTH COLUMBIA REGION
WEATHER: The strong ridge of high pressure over the south coast and interior BC will persist
through Friday and Saturday, bringing mainly clear skies in the alpine and extensive valley fog. The
ridge will begin to give way on Sunday. Expect cooler temperatures in the valley and temperatures
above freezing in the alpine. Winds will be light to moderate from the NW throughout the weekend.
SNOWPACK: The 15-30 cm of new snow that fell early in the week continues to settle and bond to
the previous surfaces. This new snow has formed windslab in exposed areas. Moderate to hard
shears are still occurring on two surface hoar layers down 70 and 100 cm. Watch for cornices failing
with forecasted warm temperatures, particularly as they can be a trigger for a deep instability, which
we certainly have this year.
AVALANCHES: Several size 1 to 1.5 natural and human triggered avalanches, at treeline and
in the alpine, were reported as recent as Wednesday. These occurrences are now becoming
isolated as the recent storm snow continues to bond. A few remotely triggered size 2.5 avalanches
failed in the Eastern Selkirks, some triggered from over 100 metres away. Widespread
whumpfing continues to be observed in all areas.
FORECAST OF AVALANCHE DANGER UP TO MONDAY EVENING (JANUARY 20 th )
ALPINE – Considerable
TREELINE – Considerable
BELOW TREELINE – Moderate
TRAVEL ADVISORY: It is important to remember that this El Nino year is producing a
complex and unusual snowpack for the mountains of BC. We have two deeply buried problem
layers that are slow to heal and need our continued attention. Be alert for remote triggering and
continue to be vigilant about avoiding those tempting big steep alpine faces. Any avalanche
triggered on the older weaknesses may propagate extensively into a large and dangerous
avalanche event. Be aware of how stresses penetrate deeper into the snowpack as you group up.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 3
3. At Rogers Pass in Glacier National park, about 30 km east of the Durrand Glacier, the
Avalanche Control Section of Parks Canada was also warning of considerable avalanche
hazard. Besides public avalanche bulletins, the Avalanche Control Section also produces
and releases snow profiles for study plots at Mt. Fidelity and Mt. MacDonald. For example,
the Mt. MacDonald snow profile for January 20, 2003 is shown below; another profile
showing similar conditions was produced at the Mt. Fidelity plot on December 31, 2002.
Fig. 4: Snow profile at the Mt. MacDonald study plot near Rogers Pass.
4. The snow profile shows the presence of a weak layer of faceted crystals between about 45
and 50 cm, resting on an ice crust; this is probably the same layer on which the fatal
avalanche in the La Traviata couloir ran.
5. Both the Coroner’s Inquiry report, and a March, 2003 report prepared for the Coroner by
Larry Stanier, a mountain guide and avalanche authority, also describe the presence of this
persistent weak layer of faceted crystals buried in the snowpack. Specifically, Larry Stanier
found that this weak layer was present in all nine snow profiles dug in the vicinity of the La
Traviata couloir area by investigators working after the fatal avalanche.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 4
6. In addition to the Public Avalanche Bulletin and the publicly available information from
Rogers Pass, the Canadian Avalanche Association’s private Information Exchange system
(InfoEx) provided a considerable amount of additional information about the avalanche
hazard, specifically, the nature of the deep seated and reactive early season facet layer.
This information is described in general terms in the September 23 rd , 2003 Coroner’s
Inquiry report on this accident, and in more detail in the March, 2003 report for the Coroner
prepared by Larry Stanier. According to the Coroner’s Inquiry report, Selkirk Mountain
Experience was not a subscriber to the InfoEx system at the time of the accident.
C. Formation of slab avalanche hazard
1. To understand the significance of the avalanche warnings given above, and why the
presence of a persistent weak layer and overlying snow slab creates an avalanche hazard,
one must understand the forces that act on a unit of snow resting on a slope.
weak
layer
force of
gravity
old
snow
force of
gravity on
snow slab
shear
force
snow
slab
normal
force
37°
snow shear
force
normal
force
Shear force = force
of gravity x sin 37°
Fig. 5: Formation of slab avalanche hazard. An avalanche occurs if the shear force
component of gravity pulling the slab down the slope is greater than the forces (mainly
friction) holding it up. Adding a person to the snow will increase the shear force.
2. A layer of snow that forms a cohesive (bonded) unit is called a snow slab. When such a
slab sits on a slope, the only force acting on it is the force of gravity, which can be broken
down into a component acting perpendicular to the slope (the normal force), and one that
acts to try and pull the block down the slope (the shear force).
3. The normal force creates friction between the snow slab and the underlying layer, and this
frictional force keeps the snow slab from moving down the slope; that is, it acts to counter
the shear force. There are other forces that act to keep the snow slab from moving (shear
forces on the sides, a tensional force at the top, and a compressional force at the bottom),
but the frictional force is usually the greatest, and therefore the most important.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 5
4. The frictional force (Ff) present is equal to the coefficient of friction (µ) multiplied by the
normal force (Fn); that is Ff=µ x Fn. The coefficient of friction is a measure of how smooth
or rough the boundary between the snow slab and the underlying snow is. Persistent weak
layers, such as a buried layer of faceted crystals, have a relatively low coefficient of friction,
and do not bond well to surrounding snow. Snow slabs resting on them will therefore have
a relatively low frictional force.
5. There are several ways in which the shear force may become greater than the forces
resisting motion, and cause an avalanche to release. For example, adding new snow or the
weight of a skier to a slab increases the shear force and may cause a release. Once a
failure is initiated, it can rapidly spread out into other unstable areas, where the
combination of a persistent weak layer and a snow slab is present.
6. The presence of a persistent weak layer is a warning sign that an avalanche hazard may
develop. If the weak layer is covered with a snow slab, then an avalanche hazard is
present. The hazard increases as the slope angle increases, or as the thickness and
density of the snow slab increases. It also increases if the coefficient of friction decreases.
D. Relationship of avalanche activity to slope angle
1. Avalanche occurrence is directly related to slope angle. For example, according to
Tremper (2001), the following relationship applies:
Number of avalanches
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
n=809
25-28 29-31 32-34 35-37 38-40 41-43 44-46 47-49 50-52 53-65
Starting slope angle (degrees)
Fig. 6: Frequency of avalanche occurrence relative to slope angle.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 6
3. In this specific case, measurements taken off the 1:20 000 Terrain Resource Inventory Map
(which is the best available contour map of the Durrand glacier area; see Appendix 3),
indicate that the overall slope of the Tumbledown south face above the group’s traverse
route out of Cairns Creek valley is about 38° to 40°. This would place this face in the slope
category most likely to experience avalanche activity.
4. Note that very few dry slab avalanches start on slopes of less than 25°. Also, information
from both the Canadian Avalanche Association (2004) and from Weir (2002) indicate that
avalanches very rarely run-out beyond a 25° shadow zone, as measured from the starting
point of an avalanche (see below and Appendix 1).
37°
slope
Starting Zone (Crown)
25°
Avalanche shadow zone
Avalanche debris
0 50 m
Fig. 7: 25° avalanche shadow zone in the vicinity of the La Traviata couloir.
E. History of the winter snowpack in the Selkirk mountains
1. In his March, 2003 report to the Coroner, Larry Stanier provided a succinct description of
the history of the winter snowpack. The key elements of his description are given below,
and are mainly based on data obtained from the Mt. Fidelity remote weather station,
located about 20 km east of Durrand Glacier, at an elevation of about 1905 metres.
(a) Winter started in the North Columbia mountains on about November 1, 2002 and by
November 19, there were 118 cm of snow on the ground at the Fidelity study plot.
(b) On November 20, 21, and 22, temperatures remained above freezing and significant
amounts of rain, and rain mixed with snow at higher elevations, fell.
(c) On November 23, temperatures dropped, and a melt-freeze crust formed on the surface of
the snow. This crust was extremely widespread geographically, and was particularly
pronounced in the Northern Selkirk Mountains.
(d) Temperatures remained cold from November 23 until December 6, when light snow fell and
was deposited on the crust. The cold, clear conditions prevailed until December 10, which
allowed the crust and the light snow to change and develop faceted crystals. Faceted
crystals are inherently unstable, and do not bond well to surrounding snow.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 7
(e) When new snow started to fall on December 10, winds were light, and the faceted crystals
were left intact, and were then covered by the new snow that fell between December 10
and 27 th (including 40 cm between December 25 th and 27 th ). The preserved facet layer is
believed to have formed the failure plane on which many subsequent avalanches, including
the ones in the Durrand Glacier area, ran.
F. History of wind activity in the Columbia mountains
1. Winds are an important element that factor into the formation of avalanche hazard. Winds
take snow from windward slopes and deposit them on downwind, or lee, slopes. This may
cause a build-up of snow (lee slope deposition) to occur in some areas, such as below
ridges or in couloirs. The greater the wind speed, the more lee slope deposition occurs,
and the denser is the slab that is formed. The wind direction and terrain determines on
which slopes, or aspects, lee slope deposition occurs. Note that lee slope deposition may
occur, and produce avalanche hazard, even during clear weather when no snow is falling.
2. According to Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner, significant winds (those with velocities of
more than 25 km/h) were reported on eight separate occasions between January 1 and 19
on the InfoEx system by ski operations in the Northern Selkirks. Moderate winds are those
with wind speeds of between 26 and 40 km/h, and strong winds are those with wind
speeds of greater than 40 km/h. The significant wind events noted were as follows:
Date Wind Description
Jan 2 Strong southwest winds.
Jan 3 Strong south and southwest winds.
Jan 4 Moderate southwest winds.
Jan 7 Strong southwest.
Jan 8 Moderate northwest.
Jan 12 Moderate west.
Jan 19 Moderate to strong southwest.
Table 1: General description of winds, North Columbia mountains, January 2 to 19, 2003.
3. The La Traviata couloir, where the fatal avalanche occurred, faces approximately
southwest, and the snow pillows and wind rolls present indicate that it would most heavily
be loaded by southeasterly winds that blow across the southerly face of Tumbledown
Mountain. In this specific case, the snow profiles recorded immediately after the accident,
show that a considerable amount of lee slope build-up occurred. Specifically, it was found
that snow in the La Traviata couloir (2475 m elevation) was up to 260 cm deep. By
comparison, a 148 cm depth of snow was recorded in a sheltered study plot at Durrand
Chalet (1940 m elevation), and windward slopes above the La Traviata couloir only had
about 50 cm of snow.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 8
G. History of avalanche activity in the Columbia Mountains
1. According to Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner, widespread avalanche activity was
reported in the Columbia Mountains (which includes the Selkirk mountains) on the InfoEx
system between January 2 and January 19, 2003. A summary of the events is given below:
Jan 2 Widespread natural and explosive-triggered avalanches up to Size
2.5 on all aspects. This included one size 2 skier remote triggered
slide (a slide that was triggered by the skier’s weight, but released
some distance away).
Jan 3 Widespread natural and explosive triggered slides to size 3.5.
Jan 4 Widespread natural and explosive triggered slides to size 3.
Jan 5 Widespread natural avalanches, including skier and helicopterremote
releases (a slide that was triggered by the weight of the
skier or a helicopter, but released up to 500 metres away).
Jan 6 Widespread natural and explosive triggered avalanches to size 3.5.
Jan 8 Widespread natural avalanches to size 3.
Jan 9 Widespread natural and explosive triggered avalanches to size 2.5.
Jan 10 to 12 Light avalanche activity.
Jan 13 Widespread natural and explosive triggered avalanches to size 2.5.
Jan 14 One size 2.5 skier-remote triggered avalanche.
Jan 15 Two size 2.5, skier-remote triggered avalanches.
Jan 16 to 18 Light avalanche activity.
January 19 Widespread explosive triggered avalanches.
Table 2: Avalanche activity in the North Columbia mountains between January 2 and 19, 2003.
Of significance are the numerous remote triggered slides reported, which Larry Stanier
notes is good evidence of the lingering, widespread nature of the avalanche hazard related
to the facet layer that formed between December 6th and December 10th, 2002.
H. Snowpack and other records at Durrand Chalet
1. According to Larry Stanier’s report, Selkirk Mountain Experience started operations for the
season at the Durrand Glacier chalet (1940 metres elevation) on December 28, 2002. On
that date, they reported a total snow depth of 161 cm, including 20 cm of new snow. An
additional 11 cm of snow was recorded between December 28 and January 4, 2003, 12 cm
between January 12 and 14, and one centimeter of snow on January 20 (the accident day).
2. On January 20, 2003, the total snow depth at Durrand Chalet was measured to be 148 cm,
indicating that a considerable amount of settlement and consolidation had taken place
since weather and snowpack observations were started on December 28, 2002.
3. There is no indication in either the Coroner’s Inquiry, or Larry Stanier’s report to the
Coroner, that standard snow profiles were prepared by Selkirk Mountain Experience at
Durrand Chalet, or that any stability tests, such as Rutschblock tests, were done. Also,
Larry Stanier did not find any standard snow profiles when he stayed at the Durrand Chalet
immediately after the accident.
4. There is also no indication in either the Coroner’s Inquiry Report or Larry Stanier’s report
that Selkirk Mountain Experience reviewed any of the publicly available avalanche bulletins
for the North Columbia mountains. It is therefore not known what, if anything, was done by
the guides to evaluate snow stability before the group left the Durrand Chalet on the
morning of January 20 th , 2003.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 9
5. Finally, there is no indication in either the Coroner’s or Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner
of whether the guides at Durrand discussed snow conditions and stability with other nearby
operations, such as neighbouring Selkirk Tangiers Heli-skiing, and how their risk
management and approach to the hazard differed from these other operations.
I. Chronology of events on January 20, 2003
1. At about 8 am on January 20, 2003, two groups of skiers (12 led by Ruedi Beglinger, and a
second group of 7 skiers led by assistant guide Ken Wylie), left the Durrand Chalet (1940 m
elevation) and headed north down into the headwaters of Cairns Creek.
2. There is no indication in either the Coroner’s Inquiry report or Larry Stanier’s report to the
Coroner of whether the guides checked the avalanche transceivers of their guests before
leaving, and what, if anything was done to provide them with instructions in what to do if an
avalanche occurred, and how, if necessary, to carry out an avalanche rescue, especially
one involving multiple burials.
Chalet
Cairns Creek
Swiss Meadows
Run-up
Bluffs, gullies
Tumbledown
South Face
June 19, 2003
Fig. 8: Looking northwest at the upper Cairns Creek valley, and the route from the Chalet to
Swiss Meadows. See also the map on Appendix 3.
3. At the bottom of the valley (about 1620 m), they put on climbing skins and then ski toured
up across the south face of Tumbledown Mountain, heading for a relatively low-angled
wooded area at timberline known as Swiss Meadows (about 1900 m). Both the headwaters
of Cairns Creek, and especially the south face of Tumbledown Mountain, are areas where
the lack of trees indicates that frequent snow avalanche activity occurs.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 10
4. Natural avalanches on Tumbledown Mountain (2747 m) probably occur numerous times per
year, and run down across discontinuous bluffs to the confined bottom of the valley.
Based on vegetation patterns, some avalanches cross the valley and run for hundreds of
metres up the opposite slope. The vegetation damage and amount of run-up is good
evidence of the immense size and destructive power of some of the avalanches that
periodically descend off the large south face of the aptly named Tumbledown Mountain.
Tumbledown Mountain (2747 m)
38°
Approximate location
of skier’s uphill track
Cairns
Creek
(1550 m)
0 200 m
Fig. 9: Slope profile of Tumbledown Mountain’s south face, looking easterly (upstream). This is
based on contours given on the 1:20000 map of the area (see Appendix 3).
Fronalp Peak
Glarona Peak
Fatal
Avalanche
June 19, 2003
Fig. 10: Overview picture looking north at the south face of Tumbledown Mountain, and the
approximate route from the Durrand Chalet to the La Traviata couloir.
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25°
Tumbledown Mountain
Chalet

Durrand Avalanche Report page 11
5. One of the skiers reported that the group had to cross debris left by a recent avalanche on
the ski tour up to Swiss Meadows. Such a slide would carry anyone trapped in it over
bluffs or through gullies, and then into the narrow valley of Cairns Creek.
Fig. 11: The south face of Tumbledown Mountain in early winter. On their way up to Swiss
Meadows, the 21 ski tourers crossed almost the entire slope below the bottom of this
picture. The overall slope of this face is between about 38° and 40°.
6. From Swiss Meadows, the touring group continued up through relatively gently sloping and
open terrain at the base of the steeper slopes that go up to the long west ridge of
Tumbledown Mountain. The ascending route was so close to the base of the slope that it
was subsequently overrun by the avalanches that occurred later that day.
7. At about 2240 metres, the lead group took a rest break near the base of a shallow gully (the
La Traviata couloir) that goes up to the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain. Apparently,
the objective up to this point had been to tour up to Fronalp Peak, a small 2500 m high
summit near the west end of the Tumbledown west ridge. At this juncture, however, Ruedi
Beglinger decided to go up the La Traviata couloir instead.
J. The La Traviata couloir
1. The La Traviata couloir is a trough-like feature that starts on flat-lying glacial till deposits
located at about 2300 m elevation. The base of the couloir consists of a concave talus
apron that is about 71 metres long, and is sloped at an average angle of about 27°. Above
this, the slope is steeper and more uniform and consists of colluvial deposits (scree) that go
up for 204 metres at an angle of about 36°, and then an additional 36 metres at an average
angle of about 37°, to a convex roll-over (see Appendix 1; attached).
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 12
2. The couloir itself is located between rock outcrops on the west side, and a broad rocky
ridge on the east. It is about 310 metres long in total (slope distance), about 160 metres
wide at the bottom, and about 90 metres wide at the top.
June 19, 2003
Fatal avalanche
Fig. 12: Overview picture of the La Traviata couloir showing the approximate uphill track of the
21 skiers, and the approximate outline of where the avalanche occurred.
3. Above the convex roll-over at the top of the couloir, the angle of the scree slope decreases
slightly to 34° for 26 metres. Above this, the ground consists of broken rock and bluffs that
continue up to the ridge crest for 16 metres at an average slope of 51°. The top of the
ridge is located at an elevation of about 2500 metres. All told, the slope from the ridge
crest to the flat valley bottom is about 350 metres long, and is inclined at an average angle
of about 35° (see the profile on the attached Appendix 1).
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 13
June 19, 2003
Guide’s
Position
Fatal
Avalanche
Durrand Glacier
Fig. 13: Upper portion of the La Traviata gully, looking easterly. The dashed blue line is the
approximate uphill track of the ski tourers.
4. The two groups of ski tourers first traversed across the base of the couloir, and continued
up as far as they could to under rock bluffs on the west side of the La Traviata couloir (see
Figure 12 above). They then kick turned, and traversed back across the couloir to the
rocky ridge on the east side. At this point, they continued to zigzag up the couloir, making
several more kick turns before they reached the top. According to Larry Stanier’s report to
the Coroner, they were told to stay two metres (five feet) apart as they ascended the
couloir.
5. To the east (ascender’s right) of the top of the La Traviata couloir, the slope angle
decreases to an average angle of about 23° (see Profile 2 on Appendix 1). This means that
once they left the top of the couloir, the guide and the first seven skiers were on much more
gentle ground (see Figure 14 below). This windswept area near the top of the slope is an
open slope on the windward (east) side of the prominent rocky ridge that borders the top of
the La Traviata couloir. According to snow profiles prepared immediately after the
accident, the snow in the windswept area above and to the east of the couloir was in the
order of 50 cm deep.
6. At the top of the couloir, Ruedi Beglinger exited to the right (east) crossing from deep,
wind-deposited snow in the couloir to more shallow and low angled snow on his right.
Seven other members of his group soon followed him onto the shallower snow.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 14
K. The avalanches
1. At about 10:45 am, according to Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner, the eight ski tourers
who were above the La Traviata couloir heard a sudden “whumpf” and noticed an
adjustment of the snowpack. Then a slab avalanche, estimated to be about 50 m wide,
400 m long, and 50 cm deep, moved down the approximately 39° slope to the southeast of
where this upper group was located. At the bottom of the slope, it spread out across flat
ground, crossing the uphill track of the group from earlier in the day.
2. At about the same time, a second smaller slide started lower down on the slope, in rocky
ground halfway between the first avalanche and the La Traviata couloir. A crack also ran
across the entire top of the La Traviata couloir to the southwest. Where it crossed through
the wind-deposited snow in the gully, it broke out a 65 metre wide snow slab that varied in
depth from 63 cm to 260 cm, and had an average depth of about 150 cm.
June 18, 2003
Fronalp Peak
SME route 19
(safer route)
Glarona Peak
Convex roll
Fatal Avalanche
Gully
Uphill track
23° slope
Fig. 14: Looking in a westerly direction across the terrain above and to the east of the La
Traviata couloir. Note that it is not possible to look down the couloir from this position.
Also notice the safer routes, identified on Selkirk Mountain Experience’s maps, that go
up to Fronalp and Glarona Peak, and the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain. From
Glarona, one can easily tour along the west ridge to the top of the La Traviata couloir.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 15
3. Note that the exact sequence of avalanching is not known. Larry Stanier’s report suggests
that the southeasterly slide occurred first, but it is possible that all three slides occurred at
approximately the same time. It is also not certain where the fatal slide was triggered.
Although the Coroner’s Inquiry report claims it was started by the first eight ski tourers
above the La Traviata couloir, it is also possible, although unlikely, that it was started in the
couloir itself by the rest of the ascending ski tourers.
4. Larry Stanier found that the November rain crust and facet layer was present in every one
of the nine test pits that were dug in the vicinity of the avalanche crown, and was noted in
all locations while probing. The facet layer formed a persistent weak layer, as described by
Johnson (2000). Johnson found that such weak layers “can persist for weeks and even
months in the snowpack, providing a potential failure plane for avalanches and whumpfs”
(page 6, Johnson, 2000).
5. Once mobilized, the avalanche in the couloir moved rapidly down the slope, overwhelming
the last five skiers in the upper group, and all eight skiers in the second group. It ran for a
total of 310 metres to the base of the slope, and then for another 65 to 85 metres across
flat ground beyond.
6. According to Larry Stanier’s report, the avalanche debris was about 185 metres long
across the slope, and about 85 metres wide, and appears to have had an average depth of
about 300 cm. If these figures are correct, the debris contained a total of about 47 000
cubic metres of hard snow. If a typical avalanche snow density of 0.4 tonnes per cubic
metre is used, the slide would have contained a total of about 19 000 tonnes of snow.
L. Relationship of avalanche accidents to slope angle
1. Avalanche accident occurrence is directly related to slope angle. According to the
Canadian Avalanche Association (2004), for dry slab avalanches, like that which occurred
at Durrand, the following relationship exists between slope angle and accident occurrence:
Number of accidents
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
45°
Fig. 15: Avalanche accident occurrence versus starting zone slope angle.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 16
2. According to this data, most avalanche accidents start on slopes of between 31° and 35°
The overall slope of the La Traviata couloir is about 36°, and the top 36 metres has a slope
of about 37°, which means that it is even steeper than slopes on which most avalanche
accidents occur.
M. Wind loading in the La Traviata couloir
1. The presence of large cornices on the west side of the ridge between Fronalp and Glarona
Peaks, the lack of pronounced cornices on the north side of the Tumbledown west ridge,
and the configuration of a pronounced wind roll on the east side of the La Traviata couloir,
all indicate that the predominant winds in this area are easterly ones that blow across this
slope and would cause lee slope deposition to occur in the La Traviata couloir.
1. The depth of snow as measured at the crown (up to 260 cm), is a good indication of how
much wind-loading had occurred in the La Traviata couloir, compared to nearby wind-swept
slopes where there was only about 50 cm of snow. Note that the snow depth in a study plot
at the Durrand Chalet at this time was about 148 cm.
21%
2%
Fig. 16: Percentage of accidents versus wind exposure (n=55; source: CAA).
3. This graph indicates that when traveling from one place to another through avalanche
terrain, ski tourers can improve their margin of safety by selecting windward slopes. In this
case, the group was exposed to both lee slope and cross slope wind loading.
67%
Lee Slope
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Cross-loaded
Windward

Durrand Avalanche Report page 17
N. Size of the fatal avalanche
1. If the area of snow that became mobilized is used, the volume of snow involved in the
avalanche would be about 52 500 cubic metres (125 m wide on average x 280 m long x 1.5
metres deep). If a typical avalanche snow density of 0.4 tonnes per cubic metre is used,
the mass of snow in the slide by this calculation would have been about 21 000 tonnes.
2. The Canadian avalanche size classification system uses mass, typical path length, and
typical impact pressures to define size.
Size Description Typical
Mass
(tonnes)
1
Relatively harmless to people
2
3
4
5
Could bury, injure or kill a person
Could bury a car, destroy a small building, or
break a few trees
Could destroy a large truck, several buildings,
or a forest with an area up to 4 hectares
Largest snow avalanches known. Could
destroy a village or a 40 ha forest
Typical Path
Length

Durrand Avalanche Report page 18
2. Dry slab avalanches rarely move beyond a 25° avalanche shadow zone (that is, they rarely
have less than a 25° alpha angle). This means that ski tourers can stay reasonably safe by
staying outside of this shadow zone. In this case, much of the uphill track was within the
25° avalanche shadow zone below the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain, which would
explain why all the avalanches that occurred crossed the skier’s uphill track.
P. Nature of the underlying ground in the La Traviata couloir
1. From limited exposures observed during a site visit in June, 2003, it appears that the
underlying ground in the La Traviata couloir is covered with colluvium, derived from the
rocks above. Most of this material is relatively fine textured, suggesting that the surface
roughness depth would be less than 50 cm, and probably less than 20 cm. There are no
trees, bluffs, large rocks, or other features that would provide obstacles to the flow of snow
down the slope. A shallow draw running east down the slope (perpendicular to the fall line)
is located about 70 metres from the base of the slope. Some avalanche debris appears to
have cascaded into this draw, but most of it stopped just before it.
Q. Initial response to the avalanche
1. Ruedi Beglinger was above the La Traviata couloir, and some distance off to the east side
when the avalanche occurred. It was not possible to determine exactly where he was, but
most likely, it was about 70 metres north northeast of the slide scarp. One skier estimates
that he was about 20 metres from the next person in the track, and that person was about
50 metres up beyond the avalanche head scarp at the top of the couloir.
Crown at convex
roll-over
Fatal avalanche
Dominant wind direction
Guide’s
position
June 19, 2003
Fig. 18: Top portion of the La Traviata couloir, and lower angled ground at the top east.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 19
2. From the guide’s position, it would not have been possible for him to see the avalanche
crown, or look down the couloir and see the slide path, or even the debris field where his
clients were buried. This may explain why, according to at least one participant, there was
some initial disbelief and hesitation by the guide when he was first told that an avalanche
had occurred, and that people were buried. Once the full impact of the situation was
recognized, the eight survivors above the avalanche scarp removed their climbing skins,
made their way over the scarp, and then down the 36-37°, 310 metre long, smooth and icy
bed surface of the avalanche to where the victims were buried.
R. The avalanche rescue
1. After the avalanche occurred, Ruedi Beglinger radioed the Durrand Chalet, and asked for all
available assistance. But personnel in the lodge were too far away to offer any direct
assistance, so all they could do was call Selkirk Mountain Helicopters (SMH), who initiated
the main outside rescue response. There is an incomplete record of the response, but the
following times were reconstructed from various sources:
10:45 am: The fatal avalanche occurs (there is no independent corroboration of the exact
time). Ruedi Beglinger radios the Durrand Chalet and asks for all available help.
10:50 am: Durrand Chalet personnel radio Selkirk Mountain Helicopters, who initiate the main
outside rescue response.
11:05: Selkirk Tangiers Heli-Skiing (STHS) personnel overhear radio conversations related
to the accident, and volunteer to send three of their guides in to help.
11:20: Revelstoke RCMP are notified that an avalanche has occurred in the Durrand
Glacier area. It is not clear why it took about 35 minutes to alert the police.
11:23: The three STHS guides are picked up by Selkirk Mountain Helicopters and flown to
the accident area. However, due to bad weather, they cannot land at the accident
site until 11:41, just in time to help dig out the last victim.
11:38: Thirteen Provincial Emergency Program personnel in Golden are mobilized to help
in the rescue effort. It is not clear if they were flown to the accident site.
11:41: The first helicopter arrives at the accident scene with three outside rescuers (the
STHS guides).
11:45: The last victim is pulled from the avalanche debris.
S. Probability of death with burial time and burial depth
1. Statistically, the probability of finding buried avalanche victims alive diminishes rapidly with
time. A recent compilation is summarized in the graph below and indicates that less than
50% of buried victims are pulled out alive after about 30 minutes. Note that many (by some
estimates up to 35%) totally buried victims die due to trauma, the rest through asphyxiation
that occurs as an ice mask forms around their face.
These statistics emphasize the urgent need for speed, and an efficient rescue operation,
when an avalanche accident occurs.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 20
100%
80%
Survivors
60%
50%
40%
20%
n = 638
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 m
Burial Time (minutes)
Fig. 19: Survival rate versus time before rescue (minutes) for buried avalanche victims.
2. In this case, the data suggests that, given the deep burial of the victims, and the delay in
getting outside rescuers to the site, the totally buried victims had a very low probability of
survival. This may explain why all but one of the fully buried victims died.
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0.0-0.4 m 0.5-0.9 m 1.0-1.4 m 1.5-1.9 m 2.0 m
Fig. 20: Survival rate versus depth of burial (n=252; source: CAA).
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 21
3. At the accident scene, there were initially only seven survivors available to carry out the
rescue. There is no record of whether all of the rescuers had proper dedicated avalanches
probes and shovels, and whether they were able to efficiently use their avalanche
transceivers to locate the buried victims. Some reports suggest that some of the rescuers
only had ski poles to use as probes, and small, less effective plastic shovels. There is also
some indication that the rescuers coming down the couloir initially walked over the first two
fully buried victims without picking up a transceiver signal, which suggests that they may
not have been effectively using their avalanche transceivers at this time. One client claims
that the group received only an hour and a half of transceiver and rescue practice when
they arrived at the chalet. It is also not known what brand of transceivers were being used,
and whether they were all in good working order.
4. Of the 13 skiers who were caught in the slide, six survived and seven died. There is some
inconsistency about how many people were totally buried; most likely eight were fully
buried, and five were partially buried. Only one of the eight skiers who were totally buried
survived; he was found 280 centimetres down after 30 minutes. According to Larry
Stanier’s report to the Coroner, those who died were buried from 130 to 280 cm deep.
T. Textbook advice on how to travel safely in avalanche terrain
1. Numerous avalanche books describe weather, snowpack and terrain features likely to
increase avalanche risk, and also how to travel with relative safety in avalanche country.
The most common edicts noted are as follows:
(a) Before heading out into the backcountry, check and heed the advice in Public Avalanche
Bulletins, and from other information sources.
(b) Be aware of how smooth the underlying ground is on a potential avalanche slope (assess
ground roughness), and what depth of snow may create an avalanche hazard.
(c) Track the history of the winter snowpack so that potentially unstable layers, or conditions
that might cause unusual avalanche activity, can be recognized and managed.
(d) Be extra cautious about avalanche hazard immediately after a storm, especially if more
than 25 cm of snow has fallen in a short period of time, strong winds have been present,
temperatures are rising, or other unusual weather or snowpack conditions have occurred.
(e) In winter, be extra cautious of lingering hazard during cold conditions, or on colder, shaded
slopes where processes that create unstable snow crystals, or retard the stabilization of
new snow, may be present.
(f) Be aware of exposures, especially in spring and summer, where the effects caused by
increasing temperatures or radiation may destabilize the snow and increase avalanche
hazard.
(g) Be aware of wind loaded lee slope areas where winds have caused larger amounts of
denser snow to accumulate. Lee slope build-up may occur below ridges, or any place on a
slope where the presence of undulating terrain, such as a couloir, causes snow to
accumulate.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 22
(h) Be extra cautious in areas where stresses in the snow may be greater, such as steep
slopes (especially those greater than about 30°), convex slopes, and wind-loaded slopes.
(i) Be sure to consider not only whether a slope may slide, but also what would happen if it
does. Gullies, large slopes, slopes above cliffs, crevasses, flat valley bottoms, narrow
valleys, bodies of water, and other terrain traps, must be treated with extra caution.
(j) Before deciding on whether or not to cross a potential avalanche slope, consider the
remoteness of the location, weather, time of day, strength of the party, and similar factors
that may influence how effective an avalanche rescue would be. Consider also whether
safer alternative routes are available, and whether the party should turn around, rather than
risk being avalanched.
(k) If a slope that may avalanche must be crossed, complete additional snow stability
assessments, check safety equipment, do up clothing, ensure that a minimum number of
people at a time are exposed to the hazard, take advantage of islands of relative safety,
move as quickly as it is safely possible to do so, and be prepared to carry out an avalanche
rescue.
(l) When touring up a valley, try and stay outside of the 25° avalanche shadow zone below a
potential avalanche slope.
(m) Complete regular transceiver practices, including ones with multiple burials. Ensure that a
touring group knows how to carry out an efficient avalanche rescue if a slide occurs.
U. Police statements on the accident
1. After the accident, on January 21, 2003, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Revelstoke
held a press conference at which they made the following statements:
(a) The avalanche had occurred at approximately 10 am (another press release stated that the
avalanche had occurred shortly before 11 am).
(b) The accident site was approximately 55 km northeast of Revelstoke.
Measurements with a global positioning system (GPS) indicate the accident site is
about 35 km north northeast of Revelstoke. The Coroner’s Inquiry report describes it
as being 25 km north of Revelstoke.
(c) The avalanche was 300 feet (91 m) long, and 75 to 100 feet (23 to 30 m) wide.
Information in Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner indicates that the avalanche was a
total of 360 metres long, 65 metres wide at the crown, and 185 metres wide in the
deposition area.
(d) That “there is nothing in the initial investigation at this time to lead investigators to believe
that this is nothing more than a tragic accident.”
This statement was made while investigators were still in the field gathering data, and
before any analysis of the accident had even been started.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 23
V. The Coroner’s Inquiry report
1. The Coroner’s Inquiry report on this accident, dated September 23 rd , 2003, included the
following statements:
(a) “Search and rescue efforts had been underway since 10:45 hours and Emergency Health
Services had personnel on site.”
In fact, the first rescue helicopter did not arrive until about 11:41; and no Emergency
Health Services personnel were on site until after that time. Of course, self-rescue
efforts would have started immediately after the accident.
(b) “Selkirk Mountain Experience is a world-renowned hut based wilderness ski touring
lodge….”.
It is not known on what basis this operation would be “world renowned”, or how this
statement relates to the reporting requirements in the Coroner’s act.
(c) “Both the lead guide and the assistant guide were operating within the guidelines set out by
the ACMG (Association of Canadian Mountain Guides) Terrain Guidelines.”
This statement in the Coroner’s Inquiry report is misleading in that it implies that the
terrain that the party was on was acceptable, according to the ACMG terrain
guidelines.
But the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides’ Terrain guidelines refer to the level
of supervision that an assistant guide must have when he or she is taking clients on a
given excursion. They have nothing whatsoever to do with the terrain that clients are
being led over, and whether a chosen route in that terrain is reasonably safe, given the
avalanche conditions, or other factors.
(d) Describes the accident site as being “approximately 25 kilometres north of Revelstoke,
British Columbia.”
In fact, the accident site is 35 km north northeast of Revelstoke, B.C.
(e) States that the “UTM coordinates are east 294 and north 823.”
This in fact is an incomplete and erroneous description of the UTM co-ordinates, and
suggests that the Coroner does not understand the workings of the Universal
Transverse Mercator (UTM) co-ordinate system. The actual location is at UTM Zone
11U, 0429244 east, 5682451 north, 2300 m elevation, NAD 83, EPE±10 m, DOP 1.5.
(f) Inconsistently describes the slope on which the avalanche started as being 37°, but then
later in the report as 33°.
(g) Reports the elevation of the starting point (crown) of the avalanche as being at 2510
metres. However, according to the best available contour map of the area, the crown was
at about 2465 metres elevation. A global positioning system (GPS) gave the elevation as
being about 2474 metres.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 24
2. The Coroner’s Inquiry report does not address the following key facts that pertain to travel
in avalanche terrain, and that are directly applicable and important in this specific case:
(a) There is no mention that any standard snow profiles, as described in the Canadian
Avalanche Association’s Observation Guidelines and Recording Standards for Weather,
Snowpack and Avalanches (2002) were prepared, or that standard stability tests or a
stability analysis of the snowpack at Durrand was carried out before the group set out on
the morning of January 20 th .
(b) There is no mention of what instructions the guests had received with regard to dealing
with avalanches, or conducting an avalanche rescue, especially one with so many buried
victims.
(c) There is no description of the route taken by the group from the Durrand Chalet to Swiss
Meadows, and the fact that they had to cross the narrow upper valley of Cairns Creek, and
the very large, steep, and potentially dangerous south face of Tumbledown Mountain.
(d) There is no description of the route finding decisions made that day; specifically, how close
under the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain the group toured up. There is only a brief
mention that part of their uphill track was subsequently overrun by the avalanches that
occurred.
(e) There is no full description of the dimensions, configuration, and slope of the La Traviata
couloir, and no attempt to define what the many avalanche books on safe travel in
avalanche country have to say about going up such a couloir during a time of considerable
avalanche hazard.
(f) There is no detailed description of how wind loading affects this couloir, what the slope
configuration at the top of the gully is like (convex), how the snowpack thickness varied in
and above the couloir, and how all of these factors relate to the avalanche that
subsequently occurred.
(g) There is no mention of how far ahead of the group Ruedi Beglinger was, and whether his
location allowed him to attend to the well-being of his clients in an effective manner, and
efficiently respond to the avalanche emergency that presented itself.
(h) There is no mention of whether the group spacing used by the guide was appropriate
relative to commonly accepted standards described in various avalanche books on the
subject. Most books on the subject suggest exposing only one person at a time, or a
limited number of people, to avalanche hazard.
(i) There is no mention of how the guide’s actions compare with those described in the
Association of Canadian Mountain Guide’s training manuals, and other publications.
(j) There is only a rudimentary description of whether Ruedi Beglinger took notice of and
acted on the basic terrain, weather, snow stability, route finding, and other edicts given in
various avalanche books.
(k) There is no description of how effectively survivors used their transceivers to locate buried
victims, and whether the rescue equipment they had was appropriate for finding and
extricating the victims.
Copyright: no part of this report may be reproduced without the written permission of the author.

Durrand Avalanche Report page 25
W. Information in the ACMG mountain guide’s training manual
1. The Association of Canadian Mountain Guides and the American Mountain Guides
Association Technical Handbook for Professional Mountain Guides (1999) provides some
general guidelines for traveling safely in avalanche terrain. Specifically, this manual states
the following:
(a) “Safe travel protocols for traveling in avalanche terrain that are treated as “rules” in
recreational circles and taught as required learning on many avalanche courses are less
applicable in guiding. This is not to say safe travel procedures are not used or
inappropriate; only that they are tools which are used when required, not as a matter of
course.”
(b) “In some cases spreading out whenever in avalanche terrain can be more hazardous than
staying close together. A spread out party is harder to manage and control, potentially
leading to a situation where guides can’t provide adequate care in pacing, coaching, or
observing clients’ condition which could lead to overexertion, unsafe techniques, or
deterioration of health and well-being; all of which can be as great or greater a hazard than
exposure to avalanche.
Skiing one at a time can also cause a party to spread out and make it difficult for a guide to
respond should a client require assistance. One at a time, while perhaps reducing
exposure of skiers to avalanche terrain, can greatly increase exposure times of the party if
mis-applied.”
(c) “Skiing one at a time slows down progress and the extra time required must be factored
into the decision. It may be more efficient and safer to avoid an area where skiing one at a
time is required, even when avoidance involves a longer route, if the group can be kept
together and can move constantly.”
(d) “Guides must constantly evaluate and upgrade their evaluation of snow stability and
avalanche hazard as they ski. Each run and every pitch requires a conscious decision be
made: to ski it or not.”
(e) “While it is impossible to be 100% certain about snow stability (just as 100% certainty is
impossible in practically all hazard assessment, both in the mountains and out) guides must
realistically analyze and forecast snow stability and avalanche hazard. If the potential for
avalanche is low and the consequences are minimal, increased exposure may be
acceptable.”
(f) “Guides must accept that they will be in avalanche terrain and a small sluff in a glade can
be just as deadly as a large slab in an alpine bowl. In all cases, the key lies in determining
what and where the real hazard is, choosing an appropriate technique to manage risk, and
above all, maximizing use of safe points in the terrain.”
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 26
X. The Association of Canadian Mountain Guide’s Code of Ethics
1. The first article in the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides Code of Ethics reads as
follows:
“The safety of our clients must be our prime concern at all times. All personal objectives
and the objectives of our clients must be subordinate to this concern.”
The third article of the ACMG Code of Ethics states:
“Our clients have the right to expect all guides to be up-to-date on methods and
techniques and to always use appropriate and well-functioning equipment.”
The eighth article of the Code of Ethics states:
“It is the duty of the executive committee of the ACMG to see that all members adhere to
the articles of the code and take the necessary disciplinary action should any breach
occur.”
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 27
Comments and Conclusions
1. For several weeks prior to the accident, warnings of the presence of a widespread
persistent weak layer of faceted crystals in the winter snow pack, and an overlying snow
slab that could produce large avalanches, were being widely reported in public avalanche
bulletins issued by the Canadian Avalanche Association, and the Avalanche Control
Section of Parks Canada at Rogers Pass. The Canadian Avalanche Association’s private
data exchange system (InfoEx) was also warning of the hazard; however, Selkirk Mountain
Experience did not subscribe to InfoEx and therefore was not able to obtain this detailed,
daily information on avalanche hazard.
2. After the accident, all nine snow profiles dug in the vicinity of the fatal avalanche by
investigators, and other tests, confirmed the widespread presence of the persistent weak
layer and overlying snow slab. This means that the dangerous (potentially life threatening)
avalanche conditions in the Durrand glacier area should have been detected in standard
snow profiles, and by doing stability tests, as described in the Canadian Avalanche
Association’s Observation Guidelines and Recording Standards for Weather, Snowpack
and Avalanches (2002).
3. The destination chosen for this fatal ski tour first required going down into the narrow valley
of Cairns Creek, and then up to a sub-alpine area called Swiss Meadows. This part of the
route required crossing potentially high risk and unavoidable avalanche terrain on the south
face of Tumbledown Mountain during a period of considerable avalanche hazard. The
overall slope angle of this face is about 38° to 40°, which, statistically, is the most common
range of slope angle where avalanches occur. An avalanche occurring on this face would
carry skiers down over bluffs or through gullies and into the terrain trap at the confined
bottom of the Cairns Creek valley.
4. From Swiss Meadows, the group originally intended to go up low angled and relatively safe
slopes to the summit of Fronalp Peak, as shown on Selkirk Mountain Experience’s guiding
map. Instead, they toured up below the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain on a route
that was so close to the base of the slope that it was subsequently overrun by the
avalanches that occurred later that day.
Safer route
avalanche
Tumbledown Mountain
Fig. 21: Safer route option (dashed green line; SME Route 19) to the top of the La Traviata
couloir on the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain. View approximately north.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 28
5. The La Traviata couloir, where the fatal accident occurred, is a steep, wind-loaded, 310
metre long shallow gully with a 37° upper slope where the avalanche started. All the
avalanche reference books and other sources consulted warn that couloirs such as this
have a high probability of being potential sites of avalanche activity. According to the
references, the specific features of this couloir that were indicators of high avalanche
hazard are:
(a) The slope steepness. Avalanche accidents most commonly occur on slopes of 31° to 35°;
this one is even steeper at 36° to 37°.
(b) Lee slope build-up and cross-slope loading. Most avalanches occur on slopes where
winds cause snow to accumulate and build-up to form dense and potentially dangerous
snow slabs. In this case, more than a metre of additional snow was present in the gully.
(c) A convex upper slope. At such places of convex curvature, a snow slab resting on a
persistent weak layer would be in tension due to the difference in the rate of snow creep
above and below the break in slope. A skier crossing over such a convex slope is more
likely to trigger a release compared to other slopes.
(d) Relatively smooth underlying terrain (scree in this case). This would not provide the
anchors that a more rocky slope would have, and means that the slope would have a
relatively small surface roughness depth. Compared to more rocky slopes, it would be
more prone to slide with lesser amounts of snow.
(e) Connectivity to an area of shallow snow. In such areas, the weight of a person skiing over
into the more shallow snowpack can set off a skier remote triggered avalanche. This is
more likely to happen if the snow slab rests on a persistent weak layer, such as a layer of
faceted crystals, as was the case at Durrand.
6. By taking his entire party up the La Traviata couloir at the same time, the guide was
unnecessarily exposing his group to a higher avalanche risk, and not following generally
accepted safety procedures described in the avalanche references consulted. Specifically,
the following features or actions increased the avalanche risk and the risk generally to the
group.
(a) The presence of the whole group in the couloir at the same time. This exposed the entire
party to avalanche hazard, and reduced the number of potential rescuers available. It also
meant that a rescue would likely involve the difficult task of tracking down several
transceivers buried in a small area. Finally, the large group size meant that a greater weight
of skiers (surcharge) was present on the unstable snow slab, especially at the convex top of
the couloir, and on the thinner snowpack above.
(b) The presence of a terrain trap at the base of the La Traviata couloir. The abrupt change in
slope caused rapid deceleration and deposition of snow, allowing an initial 310 metre long
moving snow slab in the gully to cascade over itself and form a deep, 65 to 85 metre long
debris deposit. This deeply buried many of the victims and greatly decreased their
chances of survival.
(c) The location of the guide some distance ahead of his group. This did not allow him to track
their progress and well-being, or immediately notice that a large avalanche had occurred.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 29
(d) The remote location of the accident site and poor weather conditions. This did not allow
outside rescuers to arrive at the accident scene until nearly an hour after the avalanche
happened, at which point all but one of the totally buried victims had been recovered, and
were dead.
(e) The lack of the most efficient equipment to find and dig out buried victims. Specifically, the
group did not all have dedicated avalanche probes and full-sized, robust shovels.
7. The September 23 rd , 2003 Coroner’s Inquiry report on the Durrand accident has numerous
errors and omissions and does not, in our opinion, fulfill the objectives of a coroner’s
inquiry report, as described in the British Columbia Coroner’s Act and related
documentation. Specifically, the Coroner’s Inquiry report does not establish the full body
of facts that led up to this accident, and therefore does not allow a thorough set of
recommendations, to prevent a reoccurrence, to be developed. Some of the errors and
omissions are as follows:
(a) The location of the accident site is erroneously reported as being 25 km north of
Revelstoke, when in fact it is 35 km north northeast of Revelstoke. The Universal
Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid location is also not correctly stated.
(b) The report inconsistently reports the steepness of the slope, and does not give the correct
elevation of the starting zone (crown).
(c) The report does not say anything about what was done by the guide to evaluate snow
stability in the weeks prior to, or on the day of, the accident.
(d) There is no mention of what instructions the guests received with regard to dealing with an
avalanche, or conducting an avalanche rescue, especially one with so many buried victims.
(e) There is no comment on the destination and route finding choices that were made by the
guide. Specifically, there is no mention that the group had to cross the high risk face of
Tumbledown Mountain before even getting to the La Traviata couloir, and that they toured
up so close under the west ridge of Tumbledown Mountain that their uphill track was
subsequently overrun by the avalanches that occurred later the same day.
(f) There is no description of how the guide’s route finding decisions, and other actions,
compare with commonly accepted principles for traveling safely in avalanche terrain, as
described in numerous textbooks and other literature on the subject, including the
Association of Canadian Mountain Guide’s training manual.
(g) There is only a brief mention of the rescue efforts, and no description of how the remote
location, poor weather conditions, deep burial, large number of buried transceivers, and
available probes and shovels affected the rescue efforts, and how efficient those rescue
efforts were.
8. A Coroner’s Inquiry report is limited in scope and cannot establish fault or censure anyone
who may bear responsibility for an accident. By relying on the Coroner’s Inquiry report, not
conducting its own thorough investigation of this accident, and not considering taking
disciplinary action against its member, the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides is not
following its own Code of Ethics, and standards common to many professional
organizations in Canada. This lack of action does not, in our opinion, encourage safe
operating standards, or serve the best interests of the winter recreation industry, society as
a whole, or the ACMG itself.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 30
9. The fatal slide was most likely a skier-remote triggered Size 3-4 slab avalanche involving at
least 19 000 tonnes of snow. It most likely occurred as a result of the following sequence
of events:
(a) Early winter snow and weather conditions which produced a deep seated layer of unstable
faceted snow resting on a rain crust.
(b) Deposition of an initial layer of new snow, without much wind, on the facet layer. This
protected the facet layer, and prevented it from being destroyed by wind. This was
followed by further deposition of wind-driven snow, which would have formed a cohesive,
dense snow slab. In areas of lee slope build-up in the La Traviata couloir, the snow resting
on the weak facet layer was up to 260 cm deep.
(c) The widespread presence of the persistent weak facet layer, which allowed a slide, once it
started, to propagate over a very large area. It is important to recognize that there must be
a weak layer of snow to begin with, otherwise it would be physically impossible for an
avalanche to start and propagate out into more distant snow.
(d) In the La Traviata couloir itself, the wind-deposited snow may have been deep enough to
support the weight of the skiers ascending the slope, and did not initially trigger a release.
(e) As the lead skiers crossed over the convex roll at the top of the La Traviata couloir, they
crossed onto a much shallower snowpack, where the weight of the skiers relative to the
weight of snow was much greater, and the snowpack was not capable of supporting their
weight. This may then have caused the surface snow slab to collapse into the underlying
weak (faceted) snow, which would explain the “whumpf” that was heard, and adjustment of
the snowpack that was noticed.
snow slab
weak layer
old snow
' Frank W. Baumann
1. stress 2. Whumpf!
3. propagation
4. fracture
5. AVALANCHE!
frictional
force
Fig. 22: Probable triggering mechanism of the fatal La Traviata avalanche. The weight of
skiers above the crown caused a thin snow slab resting on an unstable facet layer to
collapse. This collapse created a flexural wave that propagated into the deeper, winddeposited
snow at the top of the couloir, where it set-off the fatal avalanche.
Copyright: no part of this report may be reproduced without the written permission of the author.
force of
gravity
shear
force
normal
force

Durrand Avalanche Report page 31
(f) As the snow collapsed, a flexural wave propagated through the slab, and the weak facet
layer was ruptured, ultimately precipitating a shear failure in the deeper snow at the top of
the La Traviata couloir. This in turn caused the snow slab in the couloir to catastrophically
fail over a wide area, and move rapidly down the slope.
(g) At the bottom of the couloir, the first portion of the moving snow rapidly decelerated as it
hit the flat ground in this area, and was deposited. This then allowed the remaining snow to
cascade in a series of waves over the initial deposits, compressing about 310 metres of the
initial 150 cm thick slab into a 65 to 85 metre long, 300 cm deep deposit of avalanche
debris. This would explain why many of the victims were so deeply buried.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 32
Recommendations
1. A Coroner’s Inquest should be convened as soon as possible to more thoroughly establish
the body of facts related to this accident, and develop meaningful recommendations to
avoid a similar tragedy.
2. The Association of Canadian Mountain Guides should work with an independent third party
to complete a thorough investigation of this accident, develop recommendations that will
improve the safety of guided trips, and determine whether action should be taken against
the guide.
3. The British Columbia Government should work with the professional mountain guides to
establish a guiding association, similar to other professional associations, that would set
minimum standards for guides, codes of conduct, establish an investigation and
disciplinary process, and have requirements for on-going professional development.
4. To warn all backcountry users of potentially hazardous conditions, the British Columbia
government should work with the Canadian Avalanche Association to develop a protocol
that would provide for an immediate preliminary analysis and public report when an
avalanche accident or near miss occurs. This should then be followed by a more thorough
analysis and report.
5. Commercial recreation companies and guides should be required to report all accidents
and near misses. This information should then be made available to prospective clients so
that they can make informed choices about what activities they participate in, and where
they go on backcountry excursions.
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Durrand Avalanche Report page 33
An Understanding:
The conclusions of this report are based on the currently available data and may need to be
modified if additional information becomes available. It must be stressed that terrain analysis,
hazard assessment, and the evaluation of avalanche risk are inexact sciences and that any
activity in mountainous terrain is subject to a certain degree of inherent risk. Despite this
uncertainty, it should be noted that many of these risks are predictable and can be managed. If
questions remain, additional specialist advice or a second opinion should be obtained.
Yours truly,
Frank W. Baumann, P.Eng.
Consulting Professional Engineer
Copyright: no part of this report may be reproduced without the written permission of the author.

Durrand Avalanche Report page 34
References:
Association of Canadian Mountain Guides and American Mountain Guides
Association. 1999. Technical Handbook for Professional Mountain Guides. Association
of Canadian Mountain Guides and the American Association of Mountain Guides.
Canadian Avalanche Association. 2004. Avalanche tutorial and information resource
on their Web site at http://www.avalanche.ca/accident/index.html.
Brugger H, Durrer B, Adler-Kastner L, Falk M, Tschirky F. Field management of
avalanche victims. Resuscitation 2001; 51: 7-15
Canadian Avalanche Association. 2002. Observation guidelines and recording
standards for weather, snowpack and avalanches. Peter Weir, Editor. Canadian
Avalanche Association.
Daffern, Tony. 2002. Avalanche safety for skiers, climbers and snowboarders. Rocky
Mountain Books.
Ferguson, Sue and LaChapelle, Edward. 2003. The ABC’s of Avalanche Safety, 3 rd
edition. The Mountaineers Books.
Jamieson, Bruce. 2000. Backcountry Avalanche Awareness, 7 th Edition. Canadian
Avalanche Association.
Johnson III, Benjamin Crane. 2000. Remotely Triggered Slab Avalanches. A thesis
submitted to the faculty of graduate studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Science. University of Calgary.
McClung, David and Schaerer, Peter. 1998. The Avalanche Handbook. The
Mountaineers.
Purse, Charles. September 23, 2003. Judgment of Inquiry into the Death of Kathleen
Kessler. B.C. Coroner’s Service case 2003:528:0008. PSS No. 03-556
Stanier, Larry. March, 2003. Coroners Report from the Avalanche Accident on La
Traviata, Durrand Glacier Avalanche Area, Northern Selkirks, January 20 th , 2003.
Prepared for the B.C. Coroner’s Service. Note: this was a report prepared for the
Coroner by Larry Stanier. Despite the title, it is not the Coroner’s report itself.
Tremper, Bruce. 2001. Staying Alive in Avalanche Terrain. Mountaineer Books.
Weir, Peter. 2002. Snow Avalanche Management in Forested Terrain. British
Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Copyright: no part of this report may be reproduced without the written permission of the author.

#2-1160 Hunter Place, Box 1846
Squamish, B.C., V0N 3G0, Canada
Phone: (604) 892-2303
E-mail: baumann.eng@telus.net
Biographical Sketch, Frank W. Baumann, P.Eng.
AUMANN
NGINEERING
Geological Engineers
and Geoscientists
Frank Baumann is a professional engineer residing in Squamish, B.C. who specializes in the
evaluation and management of terrain and geotechnical issues and slope hazards, including
avalanche hazard, for the resource industry, land developers, and, most recently, the run of river
hydroelectric power generating industry.
Frank graduated from the University of British Columbia and became a professional engineer in
1973. For many years, he worked in the mineral exploration industry, where he first learned to
deal with terrain issues and slope hazards, including avalanche hazard, while working in
mountainous terrain in British Columbia, Washington State, Colorado, Utah, and Alaska. After a
period of time that included both managing mineral exploration programs and teaching, Frank
started his own consulting firm in 1991, but still teaches some courses at the British Columbia
Institute of Technology.
During all these years, Frank has been an active mountaineer; most notably, completing the first
ascent in 1977 of Warbler Ridge on 5956 metre high Mt. Logan, Canada's highest mountain,
and, in 2003, climbing 4807 metre high Mont Blanc, Europe's highest mountain. In 1971, he
was the training officer for the Mountain Rescue Group in British Columbia, and received his first
formal avalanche training through a program offered by the National Research Council of
Canada. In 1974, he successfully completed additional avalanche course work and earned his
Ski Guide's certification through the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides. For many years,
he led numerous trips for the British Columbia Mountaineering Club, was the co-owner of Coast
Range Guiding and heli-ski guided part time, was on the First Aid Ski Patrol at Whistler
Mountain, and taught avalanche courses to ski patrollers, mountain rescuers, B.C. corrections
staff, and to climbing clubs, as well as giving public lectures through Mountain Equipment Coop
and other organizations. In 1979, he developed, and then taught for many years, the
Federation of Mountain Clubs of B.C.'s first Recreational Avalanche Course (now provided by
Canada West Mountain School). During this time, he also produced articles dealing with
avalanches that were published in the Alpine Club of Canada’s Canadian Alpine Journal, and coauthored
an avalanche safety pamphlet.
Currently, he still provides avalanche safety training, but spends more time dealing with the
management of avalanche risk in the greater context of dealing with slope hazards in rugged
mountainous terrain. His latest contribution to avalanche knowledge was at the 2003
Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientist’s Annual General Meeting where he
presented a paper on managing avalanche hazard in forestry settings.
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