Untitled - Centre for Comparative Literature - University of Toronto

Bonington has no national agenda and his authority over the expedition comes through
consensus, the diffi culty of ascending Annapurna eventually forces the 1971 expedition
to resort to the same tactics as Herzog. In Bonington’s account, this compromise inevitably
leads to reaching the summit, but also the adoption of the martial framework.
The same could be said of Blum’s 1978 expedition, which, though it repeated
the route of the 1950 expedition, attempted to change the sexist preconceptions
within the mountaineering subculture though an all-woman expedition team. Blum offers
another ideal for this expedition. Rather than focus on prestige or dominance,
Blum’s ideal focuses on women “climbing for the fun of it”, and argues that the experience
of mountaineering is fl eeting, yet worthwhile (188). However, in sharing the traditional
defi nitions of success, Blum’s expedition and account also becomes compromised.
By putting the goal of the summit, and the concerns of the subculture,
before her own ideals, Blum begins to rely on the martial framework for signifi cance.
As Bonington’s expedition is attempting a new line of ascent on a peak that
has already been climbed, his justifi cations must necessarily take into account Herzog’s
experience. Trevor Williams and Peter Donnelly argue that within the climbing subculture
an expedition’s applying a different style of ascent to a previously climbed peak indicates
a “dissatisfaction with a previously accomplished ascent” (13). In Bonington’s
second chapter, “Why Annapurna,” he recounts a brief history of Himalayan mountaineering.
Bonington begins with listing the order of the ‘eight-thousander’ peaks in order
of ascent, which starts with the original “conquering” of Annapurna (28). However,
this “conquering” of Annapurna’s north side by the French team is conditional: “[The
1950 approach march] was fairly easy-angled up a huge glacier leading to the upper
slopes, but the party must have been tired by their exertions and had very little time
before the arrival of the monsoon” (30). By discounting the French expedition’s efforts
Bonington can justify the need for a new ascent as well as a different framework.
The south face proved to be more formidable than Bonington had suspected,
and several weeks later the expedition did have to resort to siege tactics. When more
climbers were added to the team to justify safety and ensure success, the expedition
changed in his words “from a rapid blitzkrieg into a full-scale siege” (34). This martial
terminology compromised Bonington’s own personal ideal, and eventually the account will
describe the overall experience as a violent struggle. The military framework becomes
more prominent as the climbers grew weary with the effort and routine of climbing. A
transverse 27