1 CHAPTER 1: AMERICAN INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND ...

CHAPTER 1:
AMERICAN INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
AND THE WAR ON POVERTY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
By the start of the twenty-first century, self-
determination had become one of the fundamental ideas in the
study of American Indian policy and affairs. The scholarly
literature almost routinely refers to the last three to four
decades or so of the twentieth century as a time of "self-
determination." 1 What exactly, though, does the term mean?
And what happened to make the term so applicable to
developments in Native American history and policy since
1960? This chapter explores both of these questions. First,
it examines the definition of self-determination contained
within the Declaration of Indian Purpose, arguably one of the
most important documents in American Indian history. In
1 See, for example, Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M.
Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1983), 21-24; Peter Iverson, "We
Are Still Here: American Indians in the Twentieth Century
(Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1998), ch. 4; Kenneth
R. Philp, ed., Indian Self-Rule: First-Hand Accounts of
Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Logan: Utah
State University Press, 1995), part 3; Francis Paul Prucha,
The Great Father: The United States Government and the
American Indian, vol. II (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1984), part 10; James J. Rawls, Chief Red Fox is Dead:
A History of Native Americans Since 1945 (Fort Worth:
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), ch. 3; Clifford E.
Trafzer, As Long as the Grass Shall Grow and Rivers Flow: A
History of Native Americans (Forth Worth: Harcourt College
Publishers, 2000), ch. 18.
1

particular, the Declaration saw the maintenance of a "trust
relationship" or "special relationship" between Native
Americans and the United States as the key to self-
determination. Second, the chapter offers a brief overview
of the historical context in which self-determination
emerged. In particular, the role of the War on Poverty in
the 1960s is found to be a key factor in the emergence and
eventual triumph of self-determination. More specifically,
the War on Poverty facilitated self-determination by
strengthening the trust relationship between the United
States and Native American nations.
The Declaration of Indian Purpose
and the Components of Self-Determination
"The year 1961 was a kind of watershed in Indian
affairs," observed author D'Arcy McNickle (Salish-Kootenai). 2
In June, after a series of regional meetings throughout the
country, about 460 Native Americans from ninety Indian
nations (along with observers from Canada and Mexico)
attended the American Indian Chicago Conference (AICC). 3
2 D'Arcy McNickle, Native American Tribalism: Indian
Survivals and Renewals (London: Oxford University Press,
1973), 115.
3 For primary source information on the AICC and the
regional meetings leading up to it, see Progress Report #2,
22 February 1961; Sol Tax to All American Indians, 31 March
1961; "Indians Meet Here to Discuss Problems," 23 June 1961;
"The American Indian Chicago Conference: A Unique Experiment
in Action Anthropology and Political Organization," n.d.; all
documents in fd. 11, box 216, Sol Tax Papers, Department of
Special Collections, University of Chicago Library, Chicago,
Illinois. See also Progress Reports #4 and #5, 26 April
2

Anthropologists Sol Tax and Nancy Lurie spearheaded the
organization of the conference. The AICC had the support of
the University of Chicago and the National Congress of
American Indians (NCAI)--the largest and (at that time) the
only nationwide, pan-tribal American Indian organization.
Those in attendance drafted a Declaration of Indian Purpose,
a statement of concerns and policy recommendations. 4
1961, "American Indian Chicago Conference (Charter
Convention), 1961)," series XI, box 148/5, National Congress
of American Indian Papers, National Anthropological Archives,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
For secondary accounts, see Thomas Clarkin, Federal
Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 17-20;
Thomas W. Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians:
The Founding Years (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1999), 133-140; Laurence M. Hauptman, Tribes and
Tribulations: Misconceptions About American Indians and
Their Histories (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1995), ch. 8; Alvin M. Josephy Jr., Now That the
Buffalo's Gone: A Study of Today's American Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 224; McNickle, Native
American Tribalism, 115-117; Dorothy R. Parker, Singing an
Indian Song: A Biography of D'Arcy McNickle (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 187-191, 283.
4 American Indian Chicago Conference (AICC), Declaration
of Indian Purpose, 13-20 July 1961. The Declaration is
reprinted in American Indian Policy Review Commission, Task
Force Three, Report on Federal Administration and Structure
of Indian Affairs (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1976), 184-218; a partial reprint can be found in Alvin M.
Josephy Jr., Joane Nagel, and Troy Johnson, Red Power: The
American Indians' Fight for Freedom, 2d ed. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 13-15.
For primary source information on the AICC and the
regional meetings leading up to it, see Progress Report #2,
22 February 1961; Sol Tax to All American Indians, 31 March
1961; "Indians Meet Here to Discuss Problems," 23 June 1961;
"The American Indian Chicago Conference: A Unique Experiment
in Action Anthropology and Political Organization," n.d.; all
3

According to historian Alvin M. Josephy Jr. and former NCAI
Executive Director Robert Burnette (Rosebud Sioux), the
Chicago Conference and the Declaration constituted a move
toward "self-determination." 5
To be sure, the creation of such a statement did not
mean that the AICC participants were wholly united in their
views. The proceedings of a series of regional meetings
leading up to Chicago and the discussions at the conference
itself revealed deep divisions. For example, Eastern and
Western Indians clashed on several issues. A few critics
felt that "elitist insiders" dominated the conference. 6
documents in fd. 11, box 216, Sol Tax Papers, Department of
Special Collections, University of Chicago Library, Chicago,
Illinois. See also Progress Reports #4 and #5, 26 April
1961, "American Indian Chicago Conference (Charter
Convention), 1961)," series XI, box 148/5, National Congress
of American Indian Papers, National Anthropological Archives,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
For secondary accounts, see Thomas Clarkin, Federal
Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 17-20;
Thomas W. Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians:
The Founding Years (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1999), 133-140; Laurence M. Hauptman, Tribes and
Tribulations: Misconceptions About American Indians and
Their Histories (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1995), chapter 8; Alvin M. Josephy Jr., Now That the
Buffalo's Gone: A Study of Today's American Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 224; McNickle, Native
American Tribalism, 115-117; Dorothy R. Parker, Singing an
Indian Song: A Biography of D'Arcy McNickle (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 187-191, 283.
5 Alvin M. Josephy Jr., Red Power: The American Indians'
Fight for Freedom, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971),
38; Philp, Indian Self-Rule, 211.
6 Hauptman, Tribes and Tribulations, 99, 102-106; John
4

Nevertheless, the Declaration identified several factors
critical to self-determination: (1) the concept of inherent
sovereignty and protection of Indian lands and resources, (2)
federal services to tribes and opportunities for self-
administration, and (3) preservation of distinctive Indian
cultures. These factors make up what has come to be known as
the "trust relationship" or "special relationship" between
Indian nations and the federal government (although the
Declaration did not use either of these specific phrases). 7
Fahey, Saving the Reservation: Joe Garry and the Battle to
be Indian (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001),
175; Progress Report No. 4, 26 April 1961.
7 On trust relationship, see American Indian Policy Review
Commission, Final Report, vol. I (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1977), 121-132; Robert L. Bennett, "Workshop
on Tribal Government: National Congress of American
Indians," 8 December 1959, fd. 12, box 16, series VI, William
Zimmerman Papers, Center for Southwestern Research; National
Tribal Chairmen's Association (NTCA), "The American Indian
World," 9 February 1974, no fd., box 65, National Tribal
Chairmen's Association Papers, National Anthropological
Archives, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.; D'Arcy
McNickle, Mary E. Young, and W. Roger Buffalohead, "Captives
Within a Free Society: Federal Policy and the American
Indian," chapter 2/part III, no fd., box 14, D'Arcy McNickle
Papers, Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois; Felix S. Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 ed. (Charlottesville,
Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), 220-228; Vine Deloria
Jr., "Trouble in High Places: Erosion of American Indian
Rights to Religious Freedom in the United States," in The
State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and
Resistance, ed. M. Annette Jaimes (Boston: South End Press,
1992), 271-273; Gilbert L. Hall, The Federal-Indian Trust
Relationship: A Duty of Protection (Washington, D.C., 1979),
2-3; National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), Historical
Tribal Policies and Priorities, 1944-1975 (1989), 3; Philp,
Indian Self-Rule, 302-310; David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina
Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and
5

Some observers might disagree over the relative importance of
any given aspect of the relationship. Nevertheless, taken as
a whole, the AICC's statement articulated a conception of
self-determination relevant to a broad range of American
Indian societies.
Inherent Sovereignty and Protection of Lands and Resources
Self-determination begins with the concept of inherent
sovereignty. As the Declaration put it, "The right of self-
government, a right the Indians possessed before the coming
of the white man, has never been extinguished." 8 What this
means is that American Indian nations' right to rule
themselves did not and does not stem from a grant of power
from the federal government. Rather, because tribes had
existed separate from and prior to the creation of the United
States, they had and have inherent sovereignty. While the
expansion of United States power over the tribes' territory
eroded some of their sovereignty, their right to self-rule
had endured. 9
Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001),
64-97; Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the
Law: Native Societies in a Modern Constitutional Democracy
(New Haven, Conn., 1987), 85-86.
8 AICC, Declaration, 16.
9 USDOI, Federal Indian Law, 395-396; AIPRC, Final Report,
vol. 1, 126; Deloria, Behind the Trail, ch. 6; Deloria and
Lytle, Nations Within, 158-161; Gerard, interview; O'Brien,
American Indian Tribal Governments, 196; Prucha, American
Indian Treaties, 2-9.
6

Such sovereignty was often recognized by the United
States through treaties and trust-protected lands.
Throughout the late eighteenth and much of the nineteenth
century, the United States entered into treaties with many
Native peoples. The treaties--which usually involved Indians
ceding land or agreeing to maintain peaceful relations with
the United States--recognized that American Indian peoples
had sovereignty. Certain court decisions, executive orders,
and laws have also recognized inherent sovereignty. The
classification of most reservation lands as "trust
protected"--that is, occupied and used by the tribes but held
"in trust" by the federal government--served to protect
Native sovereignty. On the trust lands of the reservations,
Indian nations and the federal government have jurisdiction;
generally, states have no authority over Indian reservations,
even those within a state's boundaries. (There have been and
are some exceptions.) The trust relationship between tribes
and the federal government also served to help preserve the
Indians' lands by restricting the ability to sell, lease, or
mortgage tribal territory. 10 The goal of the trust status
was and is to prevent tribal lands and their resources from
being taken or misused by non-Indian individuals or groups,
10 AIPRC, Final Report, vol. 1, 126; Bennett, "Workshop on
Tribal Government," 8 December 1959; Hall, Federal-Indian
Trust Relationship, 2-3; Donald L. Fixico, The Invasion of
Indian Country in the Twentieth Century: American Capitalism
and Tribal Natural Resources (Niwot: University of Colorado
Press, 1998), 177-178; Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 2-9.
7

state governments, and/or federal agencies. (Of course, this
goal has all-too-often not been met.) 11
The loss of trust-protected lands--according to NCAI co-
founder Archie Phinney (Nez Perce)--threatened Indians'
existence. 12 Scholar Vine Deloria Jr. agrees. He has argued
that "no people can continue" and "no government can
function" unless "bound to a land area of its own." 13 So,
the Indian land base allowed for the existence of Indian
peoples and Indian self-determination, and the trust status
helped preserve that land base. Admittedly, some Indian
communities, especially in Oklahoma, have maintained tribal
governments despite the loss of most if not all of their
trust lands. Nevertheless, according to the AICC, "It is a
universal desire among all Indians that their treaties and
trust-protected lands remain intact and beyond reach of
predatory men." 14 In addition, as will be discussed below,
the trust relationship involves more than just land.
Federal Services and Self-Administration
11 O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments, 262.
12 Archie Phinney, "Indian Thoughts about Indian Service,"
n.d., 1, "NCAI Organizational Materials 1945," Box 1503,
Portland Area Office, Record Group 75 (RG 75), Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), National Archives--Pacific Northwest
Region (NAPNWR), Seattle, Washington. The NCAI consistently
argued this point; see National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI), Historical Tribal Policies and Priorities, 1944-1975,
1989, 3.
13 Deloria, Custer, 178-179.
14 AICC, Declaration, 15.
8

While tribes possessed an inherent right to run their
own affairs, exercising self-determination proved far more
difficult. Federal policies have all-too-often decimated
Native American economies, and with it the ability to control
and develop the economic resources necessary to exercise
self-government. These federal policies have included
dividing up tribal lands into individually-owned plots,
allowing non-Indians to benefit from the use of Indian lands
and resources at the expense of the tribes, reducing
livestock herds, and flooding Native lands as part of water
development projects. 15 Hence, many Indian peoples lacked
the resources to effectively exercise their right to self-
determination. 16
Consequently, the AICC called on the federal government
to live up to its "responsibilities" and its "positive
national obligation" to assist tribes with developing their
15 For just a few of the works on the subject, see
Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to
Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984); Michael L. Lawson, Dammed Indians:
The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux, 1944-1980
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982); Janet A.
McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-
1934 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Melissa
L. Meyer, The White Earth Tragedy: Ethnicity and
Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinaabeg Reservation, 1889-
1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Richard
White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment,
and Social Change Among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
16 Gerard, interview.
9

economies and providing services like health care and
education. 17 Such assistance, and the identification of it
as a federal responsibility, was an important part of the
trust relationship and thus an important part of self-
determination. The trust relationship between tribes and the
United States involved not just land, but a moral and legal
responsibility on the part of the federal government to aid
Native Americans. 18 Such aid was and is owed to the tribes
17 AICC, Declaration, 5-12; quotation taken from page 5.
18 On trust relationship, see Robert L. Bennett, "Workshop
on Tribal Government: National Congress of American
Indians," Dec. 8, 1959, folder 12, box 16, series VI, William
Zimmerman Papers, Center for Southwestern Research; Felix S.
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 ed.
(Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982),
220-228; Gerard interview; Gilbert L. Hall, The Federal-
Indian Trust Relationship: A Duty of Protection (Washington,
D.C., 1979); National Congress of American Indians (NCAI),
Historical Tribal Policies and Priorities, 1944-1975 (1989),
3; NCAI, "Treaties and Trust Responsibilities," 21 October
1976, "National Congress of American Indians, 1976," box 5,
Bradley H. Patterson Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann
Arbor, Michigan; Donald L. Fixico, The Invasion of Indian
Country in the Twentieth Century: American Capitalism and
Tribal Natural Resources (Niwot, Colo., 1998), 177-178; David
E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground:
American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 64-97; David E. Wilkins,
American Indian Politics and the American Political System
(Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 44-45,
339-340; Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and
the Law: Native Societies in a Modern Constitutional
Democracy (New Haven, Conn., 1987), 85-86.
For a more critical view of the trust concept, see Frank
Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers: American Indian Law and
Contemporary Life (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1995), 41-46; Francis Paul Prucha, The Indians in American
Society: From the Revolutionary War to the Present
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 91-92.
10

in exchange for Indians ceding their lands to the United
States. 19 As legal scholar Charles F. Wilkinson has
observed, "the trust relationship extends to areas such as
education, housing and health. . . . Congress has a moral
obligation toward Indians." 20 Therefore, the AICC concluded
that the federal government should make social and economic
programs available to Native Americans at least until tribal
governments could take them over. 21 Economic development
activities in Indian Country would hasten that takeover by
helping tribes to become more self-sufficient. As former
Senator Benjamin Reifel (Rosebud Sioux) and authors Joe Sando
(Jemez Pueblo) and Vine Deloria have argued, self-
determination requires that tribes to have a solid economic
base. 22
Economic development and social programs were also
important because they helped insure that there would be
peoples in Indian Country to exercise their right to self-
determination. High rates of Indian unemployment and
poverty--combined with government relocation policies--played
19 AIPRC, Final Report, vol. 1, 126-128; O'Brien, American
Indian Tribal Governments, 261-262.
20 Philp, Indian Self-Rule, 303; Charles F. Wilkinson,
American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a
Modern Constitutional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1987), 85-86.
21 AICC, Declaration, 19-20; Gerard, interview.
22 Deloria and Lytle, Nations Within, 258; Philp, Indian
Self-Rule, 296; Sando, interview.
11

a role in encouraging Native Americans to leave their home
communities and move to urban areas. 23 Those most likely to
relocate were individuals with skills and leadership
abilities. To be sure, urban Indians often maintained ties
with their tribe, and historian Donald L. Fixico has
indicated that relocation's effect on tribal governments'
effectiveness was uncertain. 24 Nevertheless, an increase in
employment opportunities and services within Indian Country
would be likely to help insure that tribes would have the
leadership necessary to exercise self-determination.
While the participants at Chicago advocated federal
economic and social programs for Indians, the federal
government frequently used the "trust responsibility" to
justify administering existing programs in a paternalistic
23 For examples of the lack of economic opportunity among
several Southwestern tribal communities, see General
Superintendent to Phillips, 5 December 1962, "C&S Packing
Company-Isleta UPA," Box 2, 8NN-075-92-003, Albuquerque Area,
BIA, RG 75, NARMR; "Summary Statement of Withdrawal Status,
Alamo (Puertecito)," n.d., "053 Historical, Etc. Data Ute,"
Box 10, 8NS-075-95-022, Albuquerque Area, BIA, RG 75, NARMR;
"Overall Economic Development Program, Santo Domingo Indian
Reservation, Santo Domingo Pueblo, New Mexico," n.d., Box 16,
8NS-075-95-022, Albuquerque Area, BIA, RG 75, NARMR; Joseph
G. Jorgensen, "Sovereignty and the Structure of Dependency at
Northern Ute," American Indian Culture and Research Journal
10:2 (1986): 82-83. Kenneth R. Philp, "Stride Toward
Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Cities, 1952-1960,"
Western Historical Quarterly 16 (April 1985): 175-190.
24 Ned Blackhawk, "I Can Carry on from Here: The
Relocation of American Indians to Los Angeles," Wicazo Sa
Review 2 (Fall 1995): 16-30; Fixico, Termination and
Relocation, ch.7.
12

fashion. Instead of working with Indian peoples to determine
how to best address their needs, government officials imposed
programs that they thought would be best. 25 The
Declaration's authors opposed such paternalism. Non-Indians,
no matter how well-intentioned, should not have the sole
power to make decisions affecting Native peoples. Rather,
policymakers needed to recognize and respect
the desire on the part of Indians to participate in
developing their own programs with help and guidance as
needed and requested, from a local decentralized
technical and administrative staff, preferably located
conveniently to the people it serves. . . . The Indians
. . . want to participate, want to contribute to their
own personal and tribal improvements. 26
Self-administration was not simply a procedural matter
but constituted a vital component of self-determination. By
accepting self-administration, government officials would
recognize American Indian leaders' right to shape policies
and programs affecting them. Such acceptance was important
because Congress possessed plenary power over the tribes,
which meant it had the legal authority to unilaterally alter
the trust relationship and abrogate treaty provisions. 27
25 See, for example, Ortiz, "Half a Century," 17. AIPRC,
Final Report, 126-127.
26 AICC, Declaration, 6.
27 Deloria, Behind the Trail, ch. 7; Francis Paul Prucha,
American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 355-358;
David E. Wilkins, The Masking of Justice: American Indian
Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1997), 67-81.
13

Thus, self-administration would help Native Americans to
protect the trust relationship by insuring that the
government did not simply impose policies on American Indians
that would harm that relationship. 28
Cultural Preservation
A final component of the AICC's vision of self-
determination was cultural preservation. As the Declaration
explained,
We believe in the inherent right of all people to retain
spiritual and cultural values, and that the free
exercise of these values is necessary to the normal
development of any people. Indians exercised this
inherent right to live their own lives for thousands of
years before the white man came. 29
Vine Deloria Jr. sees the maintenance of Native cultures--
that is, cultural self-determination--as necessary for other
kinds of self-determination. Cultural identity gives people
a shared understanding of their world, their place in that
world, and a way to adjust to changes. Such a shared
understanding allows people to feel a common identity and to
feel that they are part of a nation. The lack of a common
cultural identity means that sovereignty cannot be exercised
effectively because the people of a nation will feel no
obligation to accept the decisions of the nation's leaders.
Governments which lack the political support of their people
cannot function well, if at all. Hence, preserving Native
28 O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments, 266-267.
29 AICC, Declaration, 5.
14

cultures was necessary for tribal governments to operate and
exercise meaningful self-determination and thus is part of
the United States' responsibilities as part of the trust
relationship. 30
As can be seen, the components of the AICC's vision of
self-determination are interconnected. The preservation of
tribal cultural values required preservation of Indian lands
and resources, which in turn required the maintenance of
trust protection for those lands and resources. The trust
relationship provided tribes with the right to federal
economic and social assistance. This assistance helped
insure that American Indians would remain in their homelands
to shape and administer programs in a way consistent with
tribal cultural values.
The Context and Evolution of Self-Determination, 1945-1975
Just as it is important to understand the interrelations
between the Declaration's components of self-determination,
it is also important to understand that the conference's
conception of self-determination did not emerge in a vacuum.
It stood out as the product of--and had an impact on--the
history of Native peoples in the three decades after the
Second World War. The period from 1945-1975 saw some of the
most significant shifts in federal Indian policy. These
30 Vine Deloria Jr., "Self-Determination and the Concept
of Sovereignty," in Economic Development in American Indian
Reservations, ed. Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Native American Studies, 1979), 27;
Deloria and Lytle, Nations Within, 250-254.
15

shifts ultimately moved policies away from attempts to break
down tribal governments and societies and assimilate Native
Americans into "mainstream" American society. The
assimilationist agenda of the 1940s and 1950s--known as
"termination"--would be replaced by one of "self-
determination."
From the Indian New Deal to Termination
At the end of World War II, Indian policy was officially
based on the "Indian New Deal." This policy had been
initiated by Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier
during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration of 1933-1945,
and it worked to reverse decades of efforts to assimilate
Native Americans through allotment (ending tribal landholding
in favor of individual ownership of land) and eradicating
Native cultures. 31 Collier opposed government interference
with tribal religious and cultural practices and won passage
of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. Among other
provisions, the IRA ended allotment, created a revolving loan
fund to underwrite Native American economic development
projects, provided for placing more land under tribal
control, and established a system through which Indian
nations could set up elected governments. Granted, these IRA
tribal governments suffered from significant problems. Among
other things, they were limited in power, and they often
supplanted existing traditional governments, which sometimes
31 On assimilationist policies, see Hoxie, Final Promise.
16

produced intratribal conflict. Nevertheless, the importance
of Indian New Deal stemmed from its recognition that tribes
had inherent right to self-determination. 32
Not everyone saw Collier's policy as beneficial. The
IRA had long been controversial, and by the 1940s its support
among Indians and non-Indians alike had eroded. Many
American Indians felt frustrated because the IRA had failed
to bring the political and economic improvements promised by
Collier. Consequently, some Native Americans desired to
abolish federal oversight of Indian affairs and to enter more
fully into mainstream society. 33 At least some non-Indians
agreed. In 1943, Senate Report 310 condemned the IRA and
32 The Indian New Deal has been the subject of a number of
scholarly treatments, including Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford
M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books,
1984); Laurence M. Hauptman, The Iroquois and the New Deal
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981);
Lawrence C. Kelly, "The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream
and the Reality," Pacific Historical Review 45 (August 1975):
291-312; Donald L. Parman, The Navajos and the New Deal (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Kenneth R. Philp, John
Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920-1954 (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1977); Philp, Indian Self-Rule,
part 1; Paul C. Rosier, The Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation,
1912-1954 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001);
Elmer R. Rusco, A Fateful Time: The Background and
Legislative History of the Indian Reorganization Act (Reno:
University of Nevada Press, 2000); Graham D. Taylor, The New
Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of
the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934-1945 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1980).
33 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 14-15, 17-18;
Philp, Termination Revisited, 11.
17

urged its abandonment. 34 American Indian service in the
military convinced at least some Americans that Native
Americans should be "rewarded" through assimilation into
mainstream society. World War II and the subsequent Cold War
placed a premium on national unity and made the continuation
of distinctive American Indian communities seem subversive.
In addition, a rising tide of fiscal conservatism emphasized
cutting government spending and services. At the same time,
a growing emphasis on racial integration among liberals
discouraged support for preserving group identities. 35
These trends led policymakers to replace the Indian New
Deal with an assimilation-oriented policy known as
"termination." Advocates of termination wanted to abolish
(or "terminate") the trust status of Indian lands and special
government services for American Indians. 36 Indian
34 Philp, Indian Self-Rule, 115-116; John Collier, "The
Senate Committee Again 'Reports' on Indian Affairs," 24
October 1944, 1, Fd. 19, Box 82, Reel 18, Dennis Chavez
Papers, Center for Southwestern Research (CSWR), University
of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
35 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 14-15; Prucha,
Great Father, 1015; Clayton R. Koppes, "From New Deal to
Termination: Liberalism and Indian Policy, 1933-1953,"
Pacific Historical Review XLVI (November 1977): 543-566.
36 Works on termination include Larry W. Burt, Tribalism
in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953-1961 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1982); Donald L. Fixico,
Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986); Larry
J. Hasse, "Termination and Assimilation: Federal Indian
Policy, 1943-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Washington State University,
1974); R. Warren Metcalf, "Arthur V. Watkins and the Indians
of Utah: A Study of Federal Termination Policy" (Ph.D.
18

communities on trust lands were not subject to state
jurisdiction. If the government removed the trust status,
tribal laws in conflict with state laws would be null and
void. In addition, Indian lands would be subject to state
taxes. Once termination had been completed, its advocates
expected that the government agency primarily responsible for
Indian services--the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)--would be
liquidated. In other words, termination was a means of
assimilating or "de-tribalizing" Indians. To facilitate this
policy, the government also initiated a relocation program,
which encouraged Native Americans to leave their home
communities and move to urban areas. 37
To be sure, the termination era had its roots in the
years before and during World War II. It began in earnest,
however, in 1950--during the presidential administration of
Democrat Harry Truman--with the appointment of Dillon S. Myer
as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Myer, a government
bureaucrat who managed the Japanese American internment camps
during World War II, strongly favored assimilation and pushed
for termination. 38 Myer characterized federal trusteeship
diss., Arizona State University, 1995); R. Warren Metcalf,
"Lambs of Sacrifice: Termination, the Mixed-Blood Utes, and
the Problem of Indian Identity," Utah Historical Quarterly 64
(Fall 1996): 322-343; Philp, Termination Revisited.
37 Fixico, Termination, 183. Donald L. Fixico, The Urban
Indian Experience in America (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2000).
38 Cowger, "'Crossroads,'" 127; Drinnon, Keeper, chs. 8-
11; Clayton R. Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman: A Liberal at the
19

over Indian Country as paternalistic and as a cause of Indian
segregation and poverty. The Commissioner's solution
involved providing federal assistance to improve the Indians'
economic and social status and then abrogating the trust
relationship. 39 To this end, by January 1952, Myer's bureau
had drafted proposed legislation to terminate Indian groups
in Oregon and California. 40 While Myer emphasized that
bureau policy called for consultation with the tribes, he
nevertheless asserted that, in some cases, termination should
be imposed regardless of Native American desires. 41
The push for termination accelerated during the
administration of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower
from 1953-1961. Myer's successor was Glenn L. Emmons, a New
Mexico banker active in state Republican party politics. The
Interior Department, 1933-1953" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Kansas, 1974), 220.
39 Myer to Anderson, 20 April 1951, "Navajo-Hopi
Rehabilitation Watch Dog Committee--S. 1407," Reel 19,
Clinton P. Anderson Papers, CSWR; Dillon S. Myer, "The Needs
of the American Indian," 12 December 1951, 2-3, "Myer, Dillon
S.," Box 27, Helen Peterson Papers, National Anthropological
Archives (NAA), Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
40 "Statement by Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs," 21 January 1952, 12, "Myer,
Dillon S.," Box 27, Peterson Papers, NAA.
41 Myer to Watkins, n.d., "Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation
Watch Dog Committee--S. 1407," reel 19, Anderson Papers,
CSWR; Myer to All Bureau Officials, 5 August 1952, in United
States Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, House Report 2503, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 15 December
1952, 3.
20

new Commissioner favored the eventual abolition of federal
trusteeship and maintained that such abolition could occur
without tribal consent. 42 Congress concurred, and it passed
two key termination measures in August 1953. The first,
House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108), expressed the
legislative branch's view that Native Americans "should be
freed from Federal supervision" as soon as possible. 43
Public Law 280 (PL 280), the second measure, allowed
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin to
assume criminal jurisdiction over all or most of the
reservations within those states and allowed other states to
assume jurisdiction if they so desired. 44
With this legal structure in place, members of Congress-
-particularly Republican Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah--
began pushing legislation to terminate specific Indian
42 "Address to be Delivered by Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Glenn L. Emmons at Meetings with Indian Tribal
Groups," September 1953, 10, Fd. 12, Box 2, Reel 3, Glenn L.
Emmons Papers, CSWR.
43 House Concurrent Resolution 108, Statues at Large, vol.
67 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), B132.
44 Public Law 280, Statutes at Large, vol. 67 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1953), 588-590. Eventually,
Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Washington
became PL 280 states. Several states assumed jurisdiction
over reservations prior to PL 280's passage: North Dakota,
Iowa, Kansas, and New York. T.J. Reardon Jr. to Frank
Lorenz, 4 June 1962, "IN/S," box 380, WHCF, Subject Files,
JFKL; untitled document, n.d., "Jurisdiction over Indian
Lands (PL 280) - General," box 3, Bradley H. Patterson Files,
Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
21

eservations and communities. The Menominees of Wisconsin
and Klamaths of Oregon stood out as the two largest tribes to
be terminated during the 1950s. Congress subjected many
smaller groups to the same policy, including the Southern
Paiutes and mixed-blood Utes of Utah, the Alabama-Coushattas
of Texas, many of the ranchería Indians in California, and
the peoples of the Siletz and Grand Ronde reservations in
Oregon. 45
The Shift from Termination to Self-Determination
The withdrawal of trusteeship had disastrous
consequences, especially for the Menominees and the Klamaths.
Termination resulted in the loss of federal lumber contracts,
and the assessment of state taxes forced the Menominees to
sell off hunting and fishing lands. The Menominees'
hospital, lacking adequate funding, closed because it could
not meet state licensing standards. Consequently, health and
unemployment problems skyrocketed. Menominees also
experienced an erosion of their cultural distinctiveness. 46
The Klamath tribe disintegrated after termination, with many
members ending up in prison or mental institutions. 47
45 Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle. American
Indians, American Justice (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1983), 18; Fixico, Termination, 122.
46 Nicholas C. Peroff, Menominee Drums: Tribal
Termination and Restoration, 1954-1974 (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 169-173.
47 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Indian Education: A National Tragedy--A National
Challenge, Report 91-501, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 17;
22

By the late 1950s and during the 1960s, such failures
helped erode government officials' support for termination,
but other reasons explain the declining support as well. 48
Historian Thomas W. Cowger has argued persuasively that
lobbying by the pan-tribal National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI) played a key role in weakening policymakers'
support for termination. 49 In 1954, for example, the NCAI
held an "Emergency Conference of American Indians on
Legislation" in Washington, D.C. to fight against
termination. Native Americans from twenty-one states and the
Alaska territory came to Washington, where they testified
before Congressional committees and met with members of
Congress, the Interior Department, and other government
agencies. 50 In this context, the NCAI helped put on the
American Indian Chicago Conference to express its opposition
to termination. Undoubtedly hoping to shape policy, a
delegation of American Indians presented a copy of the
Declaration of Indian Purpose to President John F. Kennedy in
1962, but he apparently paid little attention to the
Drinnon, Keeper, xxvi.
48 Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal, 220.
49 Thomas W. Cowger, "'The Crossroads of Destiny': The
NCAI's Landmark Struggle to Thwart Coercive Termination,"
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 20:4 (1996):
127; Cowger, National Congress, ch. 5.
50 "Emergency Conference of American Indians on
Legislation," 25-28 February 1954, "Emergency Conference,"
Box 32, Peterson Papers, NAA.
23

document's content. 51 Nevertheless, the Declaration helped
clarify the meaning of what would come to be known as self-
determination. 52
Sociologist Joane Nagel agrees with Cowger regarding the
importance of lobbying in eroding support for termination and
helping to open the way for self-determination, but she has
identified additional causes of the shift. Native American
51 Philleo Nash to Fred Dutton and attachment, 13 November
1961, "IN 11-21-61 - 11-20-62," box 379, WHCF, Subject File,
JFKL; "Statement by the President," n.d., "IN 11-21-61 - 11-
30-62," box 379, WHCF, Subject File, JFKL. Clarkin, Federal
Indian Policy, 79-80; Josephy, Now that the Buffalo's Gone,
224.
52 Some studies that deal with self-determination include
George Pierre Castile, To Show Heart: Native American Self-
Determination and Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1975 (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1998); Thomas Clarkin, Federal
Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,
1961-1969 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2001); Daniel M. Cobb, "Philosophy of an Indian War:
Community Action in the Johnson Administration's War on
Indian Poverty, 1964-1968," American Indian Culture and
Research Journal 22:2 (1998): 71-102; Vine Deloria Jr., ed.,
American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1985); Deloria, Behind the
Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of
Independence (New York: Delacorte Press, 1974); Deloria and
Lytle, Nations Within; William T. Hagan, "Tribalism
Rejuvenated," Western Historical Quarterly 12 (January
1981): 5-16; Josephy, Now That the Buffalo's Gone; Josephy,
Nagel, and Johnson, Red Power; Joane Nagel, American Indian
Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and
Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Kenneth
R. Philp, ed., Indian Self-Rule: First-Hand Accounts of
Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Logan, UT:
Utah State University Press, 1995); Rebecca L. Robbins, "The
Forgotten American: A Foundation for Contemporary American
Indian Self-Determination," Wicazo Sa Review VI (Spring
1990): 27-33.
24

activist protests in the 1960s and 1970s--such as those
carried out by the pan-Indian American Indian Movement (AIM)-
-highlighted the failures of termination and the need for an
alternative. The Civil Rights and Black Power Movements
challenged existing assumptions about federal policies and
racial/ethnic relations; changes in the assumptions in these
areas opened up the possibility for change in other areas,
including Indian policies. 53
As a result, by the late 1960s (if not earlier), another
shift had occurred. This time, termination was replaced with
self-determination. In 1968, Democratic President Lyndon B.
Johnson and and Republican presidential candidate Richard M.
Nixon (who would be elected in November of that year) both
issued statements rejecting termination and endorsing self-
determination. 54 In a March 1968 Special Message to Congress
on American Indians, Johnson said that "the special
relationship between the Indian and his government must grow
and flourish." In other words, the trust relationship would
not be ended. In addition, the speech demanded more Native
American input into the policymaking process, greater respect
for Indian cultures, and increased aid to help Indians deal
with such issues as poverty, poor health, and education. 55
53 Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal, 219-226.
54 Castile, To Show Heart, 68-69, 73-74, 91.
55 Public Papers of the President of the United States,
1968, (Washington, D.C., 1969), 335-344.
25

In a September 1968 campaign address, Nixon echoed many
of these themes. He pledged that termination would "not be a
policy objective" if he won the White House. Instead, his
administration would recognize the fact that society could
allow "many different cultures to flourish in harmony." He
would continue, therefore, the "special relationship" between
Native nations and the federal government. His presidency
would respect the tribes' "right of self-determination" while
working to assist Native nations with their social and
economic difficulties. 56
About two years after his election, in July 1970,
President Nixon issued an even stronger statement of support
for self-determination. 57 He declared termination to have
been "wrong" and the maintenance of the trust relationship
between tribes and the federal government to be a moral and
legal obligation. Thus, tribes could not be terminated
without their consent. 58 Along with a rejection of
termination, Nixon's self-determination policy included
respecting cultural pluralism, increasing federal assistance
to American Indians on reservations and in cities, and--
perhaps most importantly--developing legislation to permit
56 "A Bright Future for the American Indian," 27 September
1968, "Indian Affairs 91st, National Council on Indian
Opportunity," Series VII, Box 30, Allott Collection, AUCL.
57 Castile, To Show Heart, 91-95; Public Papers of the
Presidents, 1970, 564-576.
58 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1970, 565-566.
26

Indian nations to administer programs currently run by the
federal government. The president stressed that the transfer
of control to tribes was voluntary and could only occur if a
tribe desired it. 59
This statement had special significance because it
served as the basis for a series of bills--passed by
Democratic Congresses and signed by Nixon--that wrote the
ideas of self-determination into the lawbooks. The
legislation included laws to recognize certain land rights of
the Taos Pueblo and Alaska Natives, to provide greater
federal aid to Indian education, to allow Native Americans
greater say over education policy, and to reverse the
termination of the Menominee people of Wisconsin. Perhaps
most significant was the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Act of 1975. Signed by Nixon's successor,
Republican President Gerald R. Ford, the act provided for
tribes to take over the administration of federal programs--
as Nixon had called for in his 1970 message. Granted, some
critics argued that federal authorities still exercised
significant power over Indians and that the act contained so
many regulations that tribes had a difficult time utilizing
the act. It nevertheless seemed clear that self-
determination had triumphed over termination. 60
59 Public Papers, 1970, 567-569.
60 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,
S. 1017, 93d Cong., 4 January 1975, "Indian Rights," box 10,
Richard D. Parsons Files, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor,
Michigan; Statement by the President, 4 January 1975, "Self-
27

Self-Determination and the War on Poverty
While the above discussion helps to explain why
termination was abandoned, it does not fully explain why
policymakers chose to accept self-determination, as opposed
to some other policy. To be sure, the drafting of the
Declaration of Indian Purpose and other actions demonstrated
a Native American desire for self-determination. The wishes
of a particular group, however, do not automatically become
government policy.
Certainly, many factors help explain policymakers'
embrace of Indian self-determination. As several scholars
have pointed out, though, a critical factor was the Johnson
administration's War on Poverty. 61 The War on Poverty
Determination Act," box 5, Bradley H. Patterson Files, GRFL;
Memorandum for the President, 31 December 1974, "1/4/75 S.
1017," box 21, White House Records Office: Legislative Case
Files, GRFL. Castile, To Show Heart, 100-108, 148-152, 168-
169; Prucha, Great Father, 1160-1161. American Indian Law
Center, "NCAI/NTCA Team for the Review and Analysis of
Regulations for the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act," n.d.; Charles Trimble to William Youpee, 12
July 1975; both documents in fd. 12, box 12:12, series VII,
NCAI Papers, NAA.
On Nixon's Indian policies, see, in addition to Castile
and Prucha, Jack D. Forbes, Native Americans and Nixon:
Presidential Politics and Minority Self-Determination, 1969-
1972 (Los Angeles: University of California American Indian
Studies Center, 1981); Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New
York: Basic Books, 1994), 27-44; Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon's
Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), chapter 7.
61 Castile, To Show Heart, ch. 3; Clarkin, "New Trail,"
ch. 4; Cobb, "Philosophy," 71; Nagel, American Indian Ethnic
Renewal, ch. 5; Philp, Indian Self-Rule, pt. 3; Riggs,
"Indians."
28

constituted an important part of President Johnson's
expansive vision for America, the "Great Society." Johnson
saw the Great Society as a place where the nation's wealth
would serve "to enrich and elevate . . . national life, and
to advance the quality of . . . American civilization. . . .
The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all." 62
To assure "abundance for all," Johnson advocated a series of
federal initiatives designed to eradicate or at least
significantly reduce poverty. 63
62 U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1965), Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, pt. I, 704.
63 Numerous books examine the Great Society and the War on
Poverty. Just a few of these include John A. Andrew III,
Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1998); Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: The Presidency of
Lyndon Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996);
Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times,
1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Gareth
Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation
of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University PRess of
Kansas, 1996); Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From
the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989); Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A
History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper and
Row, 1984); James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against
Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2000); Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson
and American Liberalism: A Brief Biography with Documents
(Boston: Bedford, 1995); Irwin Unger, The Best of
Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society
Under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (New York: Doubleday,
1996). Lyndon Johnson offers his perspective in his memoirs,
The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971). None of these
books pays any significant attention to Native American
issues.
29

The origins of the War on Poverty were multifaceted. By
the early 1960s, a growing number of Americans had become
aware of and concerned that, despite significant economic
growth since World War II, millions of Americans continued to
live in poverty. In particular, author Michael Harrington's
1962 book, The Other America, publicized the fact that many
in the United States did not enjoy the fruits of prosperity.
Growing public anxiety that welfare costs would rise and
experts' concern that economic growth had slowed all helped
prompt the John F. Kennedy administration to develop programs
to assist the poor and the Johnson administration to expand
upon those initial Kennedy efforts. In addition, to at least
some observers, the prosperity of the post-World War II era
made a fight against poverty seem affordable and the
existence of poverty itself un-American. 64
President Johnson's background inclined him to favor
governmental programs to aid the poor. Johnson had been born
and raised in a poor community in Texas, and during his year
teaching school at Cotulla, Texas in 1928-1929, many of his
Mexican-American students came to school hungry and
illiterate. According to biographer Robert Dallek, the
experience at Cotulla sensitized him to the plight of the
impoverished and convinced him that people with power had a
64 Matusow, Unraveling of America, chapter 4; Patterson,
America's Struggle Against Poverty, 97-111. O'Connor,
Poverty Knowledge, chapter 6; Michael Harrington, The Other
America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmillan,
1962; reprint, Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1968).
30

esponsibility to open up opportunities for the less-
fortunate. As a Congressional aide, New Deal administrator,
and Congressman during the 1930s, Johnson became deeply
enamored of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his "New
Deal." Johnson believed that the New Deal showed that
government policies could make life better for the poor and
downtrodden. 65
In other words, the emergence of a War on Poverty
reflected modern liberalism's belief in the benefits of a
strong, activist federal government. 66 However, the Johnson
administration rejected redistributing income to the less-
fortunate (commonly called "welfare") or having the
government employ the poor. Instead, the War on Poverty
would provide the poor with greater opportunity to improve
their own economic condition. Economic development,
education, and other government services would give the poor
the chance to help themselves. Antipoverty policy sought to
change the poor, not the American economy. (The economy
itself would be managed to insure the long-term growth
necessary to pay for antipoverty and other new programs
without having to raise taxes or redistribute income.) 67
65 Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and
His Times, 1908-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 77-80, 107.
82.
66 Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism, 1,
67 Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement, 30-34;
Bernstein,
31

This philosophy could be seen clearly in the Economic
Opportunity Act, which the administration drafted in the
first few months of 1964 and which Congress passed in August
1964. The act created the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) to coordinate and oversee the assault on poverty. 68
The new agency's mission was "enabling low-income families
and low-income individuals . . . to attain the skills,
knowledge, and motivations and secure the opportunities
needed for them to become fully self-sufficient." 69 R.
Sargent Shriver, the Director of OEO from 1964-1968, said
that his programs constituted a "hand up, not a handout."
The goal was to give "millions of poor people . . . a new
Guns or Butter, 102; Patterson, America's Struggle Against
Poverty, 130-133. Ira Katznelson, "Was the Great Society a
Lost Opportunity?" in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal
Order, 1930-1980, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989),
198. On economic growth, see Robert M. Collins, "Growth
Liberalism in the Sixties: Great Societies at Home and Grand
Designs Abroad," in The Sixties: From Memory to History, ed.
David Farber (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1994), 11-44.
68 Dallek, Flawed Giant, 107-111.
69 Congress, Senate, S. 2642, 88th Cong., 2d sess.,
Congressional Record (23 July 1964), vol. 110, pt. 13, 16787-
16795; "Quick Facts About the War on Poverty," n.d., fd. 12,
box 70, J. Edgar Chenoweth Papers, Archives, University of
Colorado Libraries, Boulder, Colorado (AUCL); Committee on
Education and Labor, "Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, As
Passed by the House and Senate," n.d., fd. 12, box 70,
Chenoweth Papers, AUCL.
32

chance to participate in the economic growth of our
country." 70
How would the Economic Opportunity Act open the doors of
opportunity to the poor? It provided the OEO and other
federal agencies with a number of mechanisms. The Job Corps
provided young people with remedial education and vocational
training; Adult Basic Education programs offered adult
literacy instruction; the Neighborhood Youth Corps provided
young adults with vocational training or employment designed
to encourage them to stay in or return to school; other
programs provided loans, grants, and technical assistance to
farm families, migrants, and small business persons; the
VISTA program served as a antipoverty, domestic version of
the Peace Corps.
Finally, Community Action Programs (CAPs) made available
federal funds and technical assistance to local community-run
efforts to battle poverty. 71 The government officials and
social scientists who developed the idea for CAPs argued that
the existing federal, state, and local welfare bureaucracies
and officials had failed to effectively address the problem
of poverty. Therefore, community action would bypass the
70 Shriver's "hand up" quote taken from Isserman and
Kazin, America Divided, 110; Shriver to James Patton, 11
August 1964, fd. 5: "Sargent Shriver 1961-1966," box 7,
James G. Patton Papers, AUCL.
71 Congress, Senate, S. 2642, 88th Cong., 2d sess.,
Congressional Record (23 July 1964), vol. 110, pt. 13, 16787-
16795. Andrew, Lyndon Johnson, 70.
33

established bureaucrats and politicians and allow the poor
themselves meaningful input into the development and
implementation of anti-poverty initiatives. Promoting
"maximum feasible participation" of the poor was consistent
with the opportunity model because it would (presumably)
change the poor by discouraging dependency and fostering
empowerment. 72
The Community Action model and the War on Poverty have
been and remain controversial. Nevertheless, antipoverty
policies dramatically impacted Native Americans. The War on
Poverty's emphasis on opportunity and self-help, and the
CAPs' emphasis on local involvement, meant that the poor
would be expected to act on their own behalf. Hence, the War
on Poverty gave American Indian nations the opportunity to
develop and administer their own policies and programs.
At least, that was the possibility in early-to-mid 1964
if the Economic Opportunity Act and the OEO took Indians and
their situation into account. Native American inclusion in
the War on Poverty did seem likely for three reasons. First,
72 Katz, Undeserving Poor, 97-101, 112-123; Alice
O'Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy,
and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 124-136, 168-
173; James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against Poverty
in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2000), 133-136, 144-149. For an excellent
case study of a Native American-oriented CAP, see Daniel M.
Cobb, "'Us Indians Understand the Basics': Oklahoma Indians
and the Politics of Community Action, 1964-1970," Western
Historical Quarterly 33:1 (Spring 2002): 41-66.
34

the economic and social conditions in Indian Country made
Indians a natural target for an antipoverty campaign. 73
Native American communities commonly experienced double-digit
unemployment rates: 14 percent for the Eastern Cherokees of
North Carolina and 43 percent for the Rosebud Sioux in South
Dakota in 1963, for example. 74 Disease and ill-health were
ubiquitous as well. In 1963, the average age of death was
forty-two for Indians and thirty for Alaska Natives, as
compared to sixty-two for the general population. These
figures were a consequence of an Indian infant mortality rate
that was about twice as great as that of non-Indians. In
fact, 21 percent of all Indian deaths in a given year were
infant deaths; for the general population, the figure was 6
percent. 75 Such figures were disturbing but not entirely
surprising given that 75 percent of all Indians lived in sub-
73 William T. Hagan, "Tribalism Rejuvenated: The Native
American Since the Era of Termination," Western Historical
Quarterly XII (January 1981): 5-16.
74 Unemployment figures are for Indians aged eighteen to
fifty-five. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Indian Unemployment Survey, pt. 1,
Questionnaire Returns, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 3, 34,
567.
75 "Report of Field Visit, Follow Up of White House
Conference on Children and Youth," 17-20 May 1961, 6-7,
"071.33-White House Conference," Albuquerque Area, 8NN-075-
88-077, Box 1/1, BIA, RG 75, NARMR. Congress, House,
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs, A Review of the Indian Health Program:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 88th
Cong., 1st sess., 23 May 1963, 6, 24-25.
35

standard houses. 76 Native Americans age twenty-five and
above only had about half as much education as non-Indians. 77
Second, Native Americans served on the Johnson
administration's poverty task force--which met in late 1963
and early 1964 to develop antipoverty legislation--included
Native Americans like federal official Forrest Gerard
(Blackfeet) and Pueblo leader James Hena (Tesuque Pueblo).
Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, who had developed
a reputation as being sympathetic to Indian interests while
serving as a Congressman from Arizona, also regularly showed
up for the poverty task force meetings. 78
Third, to help insure that members of Congress and
federal bureaucrats understood Native Americans' desire to be
included in the poverty program, the Council on Indian
Affairs conducted an "American Indian Capital Conference on
Poverty" on 9-12 May 1964 in Washington, D.C. The group was
a "coordinating council" made up of several organizations
interested in Indian affairs, including the NCAI and several
church groups. 79 The conference opened with an evening
76 Stan Steiner, "The American Indian Ghettos in the
Desert," The Nation, 22 June 1964, 625.
77 "Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task
Force on Indian Affairs," 10 July 1961, 22-23.
78 Nakai to Lester, 29 December 1964, "060 Tesuque-Gen.
Supt. File," box 13, 8NS-075-95-022, Albuquerque Area, BIA,
RG 75, NARMR; Gerard, interview. Bernstein, Guns or Butter,
101, refers to Udall's regular attendance.
79 "Hubert Humphrey to be Keynote Speaker at American
Indian Conference on Poverty," 9-12 May 1964, "IN Indian
36

address by Hubert H. Humphrey, a Democratic Senator (later
Vice President) from Minnesota. Humphrey assured his
audience of Natives and non-Natives that Indians would be
"prime targets" in the administration's program because
poverty disproportionately affected Native Americans and
because of the federal trust responsibility. Robert Burnette
(Rosebud Sioux), Executive Director of the NCAI from 1961-
1964, spoke that same night on Indian poverty. 80
The next day, Sunday, May 10, delegates attended a
church service dedicated to American Indians at Washington
Cathedral and led by Archdeacon Vine V. Deloria Sr. (Standing
Rock Sioux). That afternoon, during another service at the
Cathedral, a pan-tribal processional of Native Americans
dressed in traditional fashion and carrying symbols of their
respective nations took place. Interior Secretary Udall, in
his statement to those in attendance, gave assurances that
the administration would address Native Americans' economic
problems.
Affairs 11/23/64-2/29/64," box 1, WHCF, SF, IN, LBJL;
"American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty: Findings,"
9-12 May 1964, "American Indian Capital Conference on
Poverty," box 32, Peterson Papers; "NCAI Eminent Objectives:
Target--A New Dimension in Indian Affairs," The National
Congress of American Indians (pamphlet), n.d., "NCAI
Portland, Oregon, 10/2-6/67," box 1522, RG 75, BIA, NAPNWR;
Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy, 113-117.
80 Humphrey's speech is reprinted in Sheldon E. Engelmayer
and Robert J. Wagman, Hubert Humphrey: The Man and His Dream
(New York: Methuen, 1978), 272-277; Burnette, Tortured
Americans, 88.
37

On May 11, the Council on Indian Affairs put on a
reception at the Capitol building. This allowed delegates to
meet one-on-one with lawmakers and their staffers and to
acquaint them with the deleterious social and economic
conditions that were all-too-common in Indian Country. 81
At least some of the recommendations made to the
politicians and their aides at the reception came from the
findings and recommendations of a series of Council on Indian
Affairs working groups. The working groups met during the
conference to discuss a variety of areas, including health,
housing, education, and employment. Like the Declaration of
Indian Purpose, the groups advocated increased federal
assistance in all of those areas. The participants also
echoed the Declaration's call for self-determination in their
recommendations for self-administration, a rejection of
paternalism, and preserving distinctive Native societies and
cultures. The education work group, for example, urged that
"all education programs be planned by the Indian group
involved" and that they incorporate "traditional tribal
values." The health group wanted health care personnel "who
understand the American Indian." The housing group called on
the federal government to defer to the wishes of tribal
housing authorities in terms of project sites. Both the
housing and employment groups opposed tribes having to go
81 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy, 114; "Hubert Humphrey
to be Keynote Speaker," 9-12 May 1964.
38

through states to access funds and programs; instead, tribes
should be able to work directly with the federal
government. 82
The emphasis on self-determination and connection with
the Declaration also could be seen in a statement made by
delegate Melvin Thom (Northern Paiute), the President of the
National Indian Youth Council (NIYC). He explained that
[w]e do want to live under better conditions but we want to
remember that we are Indians. . . . We want this
country to know that our Indian lands and homes are
precious to us. . . . [W]e do not want to be freed
from our special relationship with the Federal
Government. We only want our relationship between
Indian Tribes and the Government to be one of [a] good
working relationship. . . . For any program or policy
to work we must be involved at the grassroots level.
The responsibility to make decisions for ourselves must
be placed in Indian hands. 83
Burnette observed that the Conference made an impact in
terms of highlighting Native American issues and concerns.
Not only did the New York Times and the Washington Post cover
the event, but key policymakers like Humphrey and Udall took
82 "American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty:
Findings," 9-12 May 1964, 2, 7, 9-10. Members of the working
groups included Honorary Conference Chairman and NCAI
President Walter Wetzel (Blackfeet), Navajo Tribal Chairman
Raymond Nakai (Navajo), Paschal Sherman (Colville), Francis
McKinley (Uintah and Ouray Ute), Ruth Bronson (Cherokee),
Marvin Mull (San Carlos Apache), Irving Santiago (Laguna
Pueblo), and Pauline Tyndall (Omaha). "Senator Humphrey to
be Keynote Speaker," 9-12 May 1964.
83 Thom's speech is reprinted in "American Indian Capital
Conference on Poverty: Findings," 9-12 May 1964, 14-17.
39

part. 84 But did this mean that Native Americans would be
included in the War on Poverty? The text of the Economic
Opportunity Act (that Congress passed over two months after
the American Indian Capital Conference) did not refer
explicitly to Native American poverty or specifically state
that tribes were eligible to sponsor antipoverty programs.
However, according to Senator George McGovern, a Democrat
from South Dakota, the legislative history of the act made it
clear that federal antipoverty policy would take Native
American concerns seriously. Poverty program planner Richard
Boone and OEO Director Shriver both expressed their
commitment to extensive Native American participation in the
War on Poverty. They also pledged that tribes would deal
directly with the OEO and not through state, county, or
municipal agencies. 85 Admittedly, Shriver had made
statements to that effect even before the Capital Conference.
However, the Conference and the attention it garnered helped
to insure that Native American concerns would not fall by the
wayside, and it continued the tradition of sophisticated and
effective lobbying that Native Americans had developed in the
84 Burnette, Tortured Americans, 88; Clarkin, Federal
Indian Policy, 117.
85 Richard W. Boone to Jacob I. Rodriquez, 9 June 1964,
"IN 8/21/64-4/22/65," box 2, WHCF/SF/IN, LBJL; Shriver to
Ryan, 12 June 1964, "IN, 5/1/64-8/20-64," WHCF/SF/IN, Box 1,
LBJL; Congress, Senate, "The Poverty Bill and the American
Indian," S. 2642, 88th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record
(23 July 1964), vol. 110, pt. 13, 16707-16708.
40

fight against termination in the 1950s. 86 Peter MacDonald
(Navajo), who directed the Navajos' antipoverty program and
who later became Tribal Chairman, argued that the quality of
early tribal proposals to the OEO further cemented Shriver's
commitment to granting funds directly to Indian nations. 87
The decision that tribes could receive funding directly
from OEO to administer their own poverty programs
constituted, in the words of Vine Deloria Jr., a "big
breakthrough," one that would inspire similar moves by other
federal agencies. 88 Another breakthrough was the creation of
an "Indian Desk" in OEO to coordinate the use of the agency's
resources to benefit Native Americans. The OEO's Indian Desk
was headed by James J. Wilson (Pine Ridge Sioux), and Native
Americans held 85 percent of all positions within the OEO's
86 Vine Deloria Jr., interview by author, 15 August 2000,
Golden, Colorado.
87 Peter MacDonald, recorded by Tom Ration, February 1969,
2-3, Navajo Transcripts, tape 377 (side 1), reel 2, AIOHC-
UNM. For a slightly different interpretation, see Human
Sciences Research, A Comprehensive Evaluation of OEO
Community Action Programs on Six Selected American Indian
Reservations, September 1966, 369-370.
88 Deloria interview, 15 August 2000. Castile, To Show
Heart, 30-33; Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy, 122-123; Cobb,
"Philosophy of an Indian War," 82-93; Deloria, "The Era of
Indian Self-Determination," 196-197; Jennie R. Joe, ed.,
American Indian Policy and Cultural Values: Conflict and
Accommodation (Los Angeles: American Indian Studies Center,
1986), 4, 16-20.
41

Indian Desk division. 89 By 1974, over twenty federal
agencies had "Indian Desks." 90
The opportunity to administer programs had many other
effects which bolstered self-determination as well. Several
American Indian authors and activists--including Vine Deloria
Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux), John Echohawk (Pawnee), LaDonna
Harris (Comanche), and Alfonso Ortiz (San Juan Pueblo)--have
pointed out that Native Americans gained valuable technical
and leadership experiences running these programs. These new
leaders understood the federal bureaucracy and often used
their work in the poverty programs as a springboard to tribal
councils and chairpersonships. As Harris put it, "Indian
leadership developed out of that program." 91
As part of administering programs, Indian nations
received and spent an increasing amount of federal money from
OEO and other federal agencies, such as the Public Health
Service (PHS) and the Economic Development Administration
(EDA). In fact, sociologist Joane Nagel estimates that, each
year between 1960-1980, Indian leaders saw the federal funds
they administered increase by an average of $78 million.
89 Tyler, History of Indian Policy, 211; Cobb, "Philosophy
of an Indian War," 75.
90 NTCA, "Panel/Workshop IV: Panel/Workshop Papers of the
Fourth Annual Convention," 1974, no fd., box 65, NTCA Papers.
91 For Harris and Ortiz, see Philp, Indian Self-Rule, 220-
224; Harris quote on page 223; Ortiz, "Half a Century," 16-
18. Deloria, interview; Echohawk, interview.
42

Access to and control over such funds were critical. For
one, the situation meant the BIA's virtual monopoly over
Indian policy and programs had been broken. The new money
facilitated the creation of tribal bureaucracies. Such
Indian-run bureaucracies enhanced self-determination by
making it easier to tribes to use their inherent sovereign
powers--powers which, because of a lack of resources, most
tribes had been unable to exercise. 92
The War on Poverty also transformed the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA). The BIA (usually called the Indian Department
or Indian Office until a 1947 government reorganization) had
been created in 1824 to handle the administration of Indian
policies dictated by Congress and the President. Reflecting
the War on Poverty's emphasis, the Bureau sponsored a number
of programs during the 1960s to increase economic
opportunities for reservation residents. 93 According to
attorney John Echohawk (Pawnee), the OEO's example and
antipoverty efforts helped transform the BIA. Previously,
the agency had been virtually synonymous with paternalism,
92 Echohawk, interview; Gerard, interview; Nagel, American
Indian Ethnic Renewal, 124. Harris made this observation in
Philp, Indian Self-Rule, 223.
93 Information on the BIA's formation and implementation
of policies can be found in Prucha, Great Father, vols. I and
II. See also Philleo Nash, "Twentieth-Century United States
Government Agencies," in Handbook of North American Indians,
vol. 4, History of Indian-White Relations, ed. Wilcomb E.
Washburn (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1988), 264-
275; Theodore W. Taylor, American Indian Policy (Mt. Airy,
Maryland: Lomond Publications, 1983).
43

administering programs with little to no Indian input. Over
time, Native peoples, utilizing the skills they developed
through working with OEO, successfully gained greater control
over BIA programs and transformed the agency into primarily a
grant-making and advising agency--much like the OEO. 94
Most if not all of these points have been made by
scholars and others who write Indian policy studies and
tribal histories. This study attempts to build on these
works by combining their insights with archival sources and
oral histories to provide a series of case studies of
American Indian participation in War on Poverty programs.
Each chapter focuses on a particular type of antipoverty
program--economic development, community and social services,
health care, and education--and how selected tribes'
involvement with that type of program advanced one or more of
the Declaration's components of self-determination. This is
not meant to deny that there were many problems and
challenges associated with Native American participation in
the antipoverty campaign. For example, the influx of funding
often encouraged corruption with tribal governments and
exacerbated political divisions within certain communities
while failing to fundamentally alter Native American
economies. 95 Nevertheless, the War on Poverty of the 1960s,
94 Echohawk, interview; Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, 184.
95 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy, 128; Robert Burnette,
The Tortured Americans (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1971). For a case study of intra-tribal divisions, see
44

y moving the government in the direction of more fully
meeting its trusteeship responsibilities, planted the seeds
of self-determination that would grow and blossom in the
1970s in the form of the legislation designed to enhance
Indians' rights and opportunities to determine their own
destiny.
Robert L. Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado: The Impact
of Government Policy on the Quechan Indians (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1981), chapter 5.
45