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Disciplinary Board Disciplinary Actions - Virginia State Bar

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The Panel confirms the accuracy of this finding, and it is<br />

not contested by the Respondent.<br />

4. Respondent drafted the order and presented it for entry<br />

with a direction to the Clerk of the Court to mail the order<br />

to Coleman at 218 Third Avenue West, Danville, VA 24540,<br />

an address where Coleman had not lived for a number of<br />

years. During the course of several years of prior proceedings<br />

with Coleman, Respondent had served process upon<br />

Coleman at his current two addresses of 816 Shephard<br />

Avenue, Danville, VA or 4611 Raven Drive, Climax, N.C.<br />

Moreover, Respondent’s first question at the hearing of<br />

May 6, 1999, asked and confirmed Coleman’s physical<br />

address at the Climax, North Carolina, address.<br />

The Panel again finds the allegation to be accurate, and it<br />

is not disputed by the Respondent. However, the Respondent<br />

claims that she made an error in reviewing the Division’s computerized<br />

records and used an “old” address, which was no<br />

longer valid, notwithstanding both that the computer records<br />

indicated that Mr. Coleman had moved from that address and<br />

that the Respondent acknowledged having served process<br />

upon Mr. Coleman at his correct address both prior and subsequent<br />

to the service in question. Respondent claims that she<br />

had no ulterior motive in using the invalid address for Mr.<br />

Coleman, and the Panel finds that the <strong>Bar</strong> has failed to sustain<br />

its position that suggested that the Respondent intentionally<br />

inserted the wrong address so that Mr. Coleman would not<br />

receive appropriate notice of the contents of the erroneous<br />

order specifying the arrearage.<br />

5. As a result of Respondent’s use of an old address,<br />

Coleman did not receive the erroneous order directly.<br />

The Panel finds that this is an accurate representation. The<br />

Respondent did not offer any evidence to suggest otherwise,<br />

but maintains that her error was unintentional and based on<br />

her failure to obtain Mr. Coleman’s accurate address from the<br />

computer records.<br />

6. Upon learning of the arrearage order, Coleman moved the<br />

Court to vacate the order and was heard on July 27, 1999.<br />

Despite the lack of any evidence being presented to the<br />

Court at the May 6, 1999, hearing, Respondent represented<br />

to the Court that arrearage had been at issue at the May 6,<br />

1999 hearing.<br />

The Panel finds that this allegation has been established,<br />

by clear and convincing evidence, and is a basis for a finding<br />

of misconduct, which will be referred to below. The <strong>Bar</strong><br />

proved, by clear and convincing evidence, a violation of DR 7-<br />

105(C)(1).<br />

7. Coleman filed his appeal to the <strong>Virginia</strong> Court of Appeals<br />

and served Respondent with his Appellant’s brief on or<br />

about September 25, 1999. Coleman’s brief presented only<br />

two (2) issues in his Question Presented, with the first<br />

being the lack of evidence for finding an arrearage.<br />

The Panel finds that this is an accurate statement, and the<br />

Respondent does not contest. However, Respondent states that<br />

she may have only “skimmed” the Appellant’s (Coleman’s)<br />

brief, and it did not become evident to her that Mr. Coleman’s<br />

major complaint was that the May 24, 1999, Circuit Court order<br />

contained the arrearage adjudication without any evidence hav-<br />

disciplinary actions<br />

ing been presented to the Court. The Respondent’s statement<br />

strains credulity but the <strong>Board</strong> could not conclude, based on<br />

the evidence before it, that the respondent was deceptive with<br />

this <strong>Board</strong>.<br />

8. Notwithstanding Coleman’s briefing of the arrearage issue,<br />

Respondent failed to report the issue in her memorandum<br />

dated October 7, 1999, to her superiors and supervisors at<br />

the Office of Attorney General.<br />

The Panel finds this allegation to be accurate. The<br />

Respondent does not contest its accuracy, although she continues<br />

to claim that she omitted discussion of the “arrearage<br />

issue” because she was essentially unaware of its significance<br />

notwithstanding Mr. Coleman’s previously filed Motion to<br />

Vacate the May 24, 1999, Circuit Court order and his<br />

Appellant’s brief filed on or about September 25, 1999, with<br />

the <strong>Virginia</strong> Court of Appeals. Both filings by Mr. Coleman<br />

clearly articulated his concern that the Respondent improperly<br />

inserted an erroneous finding in the May 24, 1999, order.<br />

9. On October 21, 1999, Respondent filed her Appellee’s<br />

brief with the Court of Appeals. Therein, Respondent<br />

failed to address, acknowledge, or attempt to explain the<br />

unsupported provision in the decree for the child support<br />

arrearage.<br />

The Panel finds this allegation to be established. The<br />

Respondent’s position is that the inclusion of the arrearage<br />

finding in the May 24, 1999, Circuit Court order was “harmless<br />

error” or, in the alternative, the Appellant (Coleman) was<br />

barred from presenting his argument to the Court of Appeals<br />

because he did not adequately preserve the issue in the Court<br />

below for appropriate appeal to the Court of Appeals. By<br />

maintaining that position up to and until confronted by the<br />

Judges of the Court of Appeals, this Panel believes that the<br />

Respondent participated in further misconduct, which will be<br />

addressed below. The <strong>Bar</strong> proved, by clear and convincing evidence,<br />

a violation of Rule 3.1.<br />

10. Only when expressly confronted by a three judge panel of<br />

the Court of Appeals did Respondent acknowledge that<br />

she had no defense to the arrearage provision. As a result<br />

of Coleman’s pro se appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed<br />

the trial court’s award of the child support arrearage.<br />

The Panel finds that this allegation is accurate. The<br />

Respondent claims that she brought her error to the attention<br />

of the Court of Appeals as soon as practicable. The Panel<br />

believes otherwise, and the Respondent’s failure to disclose her<br />

error in including the arrearage in the May 24, 1999, order until<br />

confronted by the Judges of the Court of Appeals was continuing<br />

misconduct by the Respondent and a violation of Rule 3.1.<br />

The Ninth District Subcommittee certified the following<br />

alleged violations of the <strong>Disciplinary</strong> Rules of the <strong>Virginia</strong> Code<br />

of Professional Responsibility and <strong>Virginia</strong> Rules of Professional<br />

Conduct:<br />

DR 1-102. Misconduct.<br />

(A) (4) * * *<br />

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT<br />

The Panel finds that the <strong>Virginia</strong> <strong>State</strong> <strong>Bar</strong> did not prove,<br />

by clear and convincing evidence, a violation of DR 1-102, and<br />

the charge is therefore dismissed.<br />

V i r g i n i a L a w y e r R e g i s t e r 2 3

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