HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Outlines of Scepticism

Outlines of Scepticism
These are the ContentS of the First Book of the Outlines ofScepticism:
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The most fundamental difference among philosophies
The accounts constitutive of Scepticism
Its nomenclature
What is the concept of Scepticism?
The Sceptic
Its principles
Do Sceptics hold beliefs?
Do they belong to a school?
Do they study natural science?
Do they reject what is apparent?
The standard of Scepticism
Its m
The general modes of Scepticism
The Ten Modes
The Five Modes
The Two Modes
What are the modes which overthrow those who offer causal
explanations?
The Sceptical phrases
The phrase ‘No more’
Non-assertion
‘Perhaps’, ‘Maybe’ and ‘Possibly’
‘I suspend judgement’
‘I determine nothing’
‘Everything is undetermined’
‘Everything is inapprehensible’
‘I have no apprehension’ and ‘I do not apprehend’
‘Opposed to every account there is an equal account’
Rules for the Sceptical Phrases
Is Scepticism a path to the philosophy of Heraditus?
Does the school of Democritus differ from Scepticism?
Does Cyrenaicism differ from Scepticism?
Does Protagoreanism differ from Scepticism?
Does Scepticism differ from the Academies?
Is Medical Empiricism the same as Scepticism?
Book I
i The most fundamental difference among philosophies
[i] When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is
either a discovery, or a denial of discovery and a confession of
inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. [2]
This, no doubt, is why in the case ofphilosophical investigations, too,
some have said that they have discovered the truth, some have
asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investi
gating.
[31 Those who are called Dogmatists in the proper sense of the
word think that they have discovered the truth — for example, the
schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others.
The schools of Clitomachus and Carneades, and other Academics,
have asserted that things cannot be apprehended.’ And the Sceptics
are still investigating. [] Hence the most fundamental kinds of
philosophy are reasonably thought to be three: the Dogmatic, the
Academic, and the Sceptical. The former two it will be appropriate
for others to describe: in the present work we shall discuss in outline 2
the Sceptical persuasion. By way of preface let us say that on none of
the matters to be discussed do we affirm that things certainly are just
as we say they are: rather, we report 3 descriptively on each item
according to how it appears to us at the time. 4
ii The accounts constitutive of Scepticism
[sJ The Sceptical philosophy contains both a general and a specific
account. 5 In the general account we set out the distinctive character of
Scepticism, saying what the concept ofit is, what are its principles and
The same is said ofthe Cyrenaics at i 215. For the New Academy see I 220—31; and
note that other sources expressly say that the Academics did not ‘assert that
things cannot be apprehended’.
2 utot1ntwtLKGç: the work is an outline or cotitwaç, and Sextus frequently
reminds us of the fact: i 206, 222, 239; III, 79, i8s, 194-; III I, 114, 167, 279. Note
also his assurances that he is only offering ‘few out ofmany’ examples (158, note)
and that he is concerned to be brief(i 163, note); and see i 94.; 1184,212; III 56, 71,
135, 168.
For this use of the term ‘report’ see I 15, 197, 203.
Cf. e.g. 1 191; H i8.
Cf.Mviii.