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CASE HISTORY: PLANNING THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 341 bardment of Japan would create a situation favorable to an assault on Kyushu; second, the Kyushu operation would further reduce Japanese capabilities and further intensify blockade and air bombardment, thus establishing a tactical condition favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain. At the last ARGONAUT meeting Prime Minister Churchill suggested that after the defeat of Germany an ultimatum should be issued to Japan directing them to surrender unconditionally. He suggested that some mitigation in the Allied attitude toward Japan "would be worth while if it led to the saving of a year and a half of a war in which so much blood and treasure would be poured out." However, he hastened to add, "Great Britain would not press for any mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United States." President Roosevelt agreed that an ultimatum should be considered, but declared that he "doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on the Japanese, who did not seem to realize what was going on in the world outside, and still seemed to think that they might get a satisfactory compromise." 26 Despite the President's skepticism about the results of an ultimatum and the clear implication of the statements of both the Prime Minister and the President that mitigation did not mean a compromise peace satisfactory to the Japanese, the whole problem of the possibility of Japanese surrender received a great deal of attention in the following months. The Army planning staff continued to emphasize the need for being prepared at any time to reorient American plans without delay toward the Pacific, even though 1 July 26 Min 2d plenary meeting, ARGONAUT, 9 Feb 45, Official ARGONAUT Conference Book. 1945 had been adopted by the CCS as a date to be used in making logistic preparations. The Army planner, General Lincoln, left special instructions on this point, before departing on the round-the-world planning survey in February 1945, for Col. Thomas D. Roberts, who was to represent him on the Joint Staff Planners during his absence: At the JCS meeting today Admiral King made a comment on the CCS decision to accept 1 July as a planning date which is the earliest the war is likely to end. His remark indicated that in his mind we would now consider that the Pacific War would be planned on the basis of the European War lasting until 1 July or thereafter. The fallacy is, of course, evident to you. These planning dates for the end of the war were selected at the request of the British for use of their civilian and logistical people and administrative purposes. You may find it necessary in the Planners before I get back to edit papers rigidly with a view to maintaining our stand that we must be prepared to switch at once to the Pacific any day from today forward since there is a possibility, increasing with every week, that this war in Europe may fold up ahead of 1 July. 27 Nevertheless, the planners, while recognizing the need for flexibility, began to readjust their scheduling of operations to take account of the unexpected duration of the war against Germany. The Kyushu and Honshu operations clearly had to be postponed. Notes prepared in S&P pointed out that the "continuation of the war in Europe made the planning dates for Kyushu and Honshu unrealistic." These notes warned: "We may thus be forced from our 'invasion' strategy into a 'blockade' strategy, at least temporarily, by our inability to assemble 27 Memo, Brig Gen Lincoln for Col Roberts, 7 Feb 45, no sub, with JWPC Memo for Info 35 in ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43), 7.
342 WASHINGTON COMMAND POST: THE OPERATIONS DIVISION forces required." 28 In March OPD drafted a message for General MacArthur succinctly summarizing the new planning schedule then being worked out as a result of the necessity of decelerating in the Pacific: "CORONET [Tokyo Plain] will be the decisive operation against Japan and will be concurrently supported and assisted by continuation of OLYMPIC [Kyushu]. . . . Based on assumption the European war ends by 1 July 1945, planning is aimed at making possible target dates for OLYMPIC and CORONET of 1 December 1945 and 1 March 1946 respectively." 29 In mid-March 1945 OPD's senior representative on the JWPC noted: "It seems at last to be acknowledged that the ultimate defeat of Japan will require the invasion of Japan proper and the defeat of her ground forces there." 30 Nevertheless, some of the American planners were still inclined to prolong the period of time before the decisive invasion in order to give the Japanese a chance to feel the effect of the sea-air blockade. 31 At this time the inference was less that the Japanese would surrender under the influence of the air-sea blockade than that the ground forces should not be sent ashore before the full weight of the naval and aerial campaign had been brought to bear. No one clearly went on record in formal discussions as believing that any method of attack would end the 28 OPD notes for 190th meeting JPS, 21 Feb 45, filed with JCS 924/11 in ABC 381 Japan (8-27- 42), 7. 29 Msg, Gen Marshall for Gen MacArthur, 23 Mar 45, CM-OUT 57902. OPD drafted the message. 30 Memo, Brig Gen Bessell and Brig Gen F. F. Everest for Army and Air planners, 16 Mar 45, sub: Reorgn and Future Opns in Pacific Theater, OPD 384 TS, 1/9. 31 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Lincoln for Maj Gen Hull, 26 Mar 45, no sub. (2) Msg, Gen Marshall for Gen MacArthur, 4 Apr 45, OPD 384 TS, 1/12, CM-OUT 63196. war very quickly, although the Army Air Forces and Navy air planners almost certainly retained more optimistic private views about the effects of bombardment than the ground force officers held. Thus the detailed operational planning that later brought about the concentrated and coordinated bombardment of the Japanese home islands by Army Air Forces B-29's and naval fast carrier task groups began in March, but the language used indicated merely that the bombardment should be conceived as undertaken "in order to create the most favorable situation in the shortest possible time for an amphibious assault against Japan proper." 32 Similarly, American planners who were busy evaluating the degree of possibility of Japanese surrender before a "decisive invasion" of the home islands showed no conviction that there was any probability requiring immediate preparations. 33 In February 1945 Col. Robert J. Wood of OPD had raised the possibility that the Japanese might conceivably collapse or surrender about V-E Day and that no advance planning to take care of such an eventuality had been done. 34 However, his own group in OPD, in considering some "proposals respecting surrender documents for Japan" drawn up by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee about that time, declared that urgency was not apparent. 35 32 JWPC 325/M, 8 Mar 45, title: Jt Bmr Offensive Against Japan. 33 (1) JIS 141/M, 6 Apr 45, title: Defeat of Japan by Blockade and Bomb. (2) JIS 143/M, 7 Apr 45, title: Unconditional Surr of Japan. 34 Memo, Col Wood for Chief S&P, 11 Feb 45, sub: Collapse of Japanese Govt on or About V-E Day, filed with JWPC 264/D in ABC 384.1 Japan (22 Aug 44). 35 OPD Memo for Asst Secy WDGS, 4 Mar 45, sub: Unconditional Surr of Japan (JCS 1275/1), filed with JCS 1275/1 in ABC 387 Japan (15 Feb 45), 1-A.
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Foreword This is the eighth of some
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For the preparation of this work my
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valuable comments out of their pers
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Chapter Page VIII. INSIDE OPD. . .
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Charts No. Page 1. War Plans Divisi
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CHAPTER I The Army High Command Bef
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THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND BEFORE PEARL
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CHAPTER II The War Plans Division B
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THE WAR PLANS DIVISION 31 ommendati
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THE WAR PLANS DIVISION 33 sonnel pr
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THE WAR PLANS DIVISION 35 and the t
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THE WAR PLANS DIVISION 37 third cas
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THE WAR PLANS DIVISION 39 Staff wil
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EARLY INTERSERVICE AND INTERNATIONA
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52 WASHINGTON COMMAND POST: THE OPE
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TRANSITION INTO WAR 87 supervision
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TRANSITION INTO WAR 89 introduction
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ORGANIZING THE HIGH COMMAND FOR WOR
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CHAPTER VII The New Army Command Po
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THE NEW ARMY COMMAND POST 109 refer
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THE NEW ARMY COMMAND POST 111 exist
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THE NEW ARMY COMMAND POST 113 paper
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THE NEW ARMY COMMAND POST or to the
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THE NEW ARMY COMMAND POST 117 ing a
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THE NEW ARMY COMMAND POST 119 of Ar
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INSIDE OPD 121 setting up the staff
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INSIDE OPD 123 and North Africa. 8
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INSIDE OPD The tasks of monitoring
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128 WASHINGTON COMMAND POST: THE OP
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CHAPTER X The TORCH Period The Army
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CHAPTER XI Transition to the Later
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TRANSITION TO THE LATER WAR YEARS 1
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CHAPTER XII Midwar International Mi
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MIDWAR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CONFE
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OPD AND JOINT PLANNING (1943-45) 23
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CHAPTER XIV Controlling Troops and
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CONTROLLING TROOPS AND MATÉRIEL 27
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Page 312 and 313: LINKS WITH THE OVERSEAS THEATERS 29
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GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES 391 ROUNDHAM
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