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76 WASHINGTON COMMAND POST: THE OPERATIONS DIVISION
semination of intelligence about the enemy
and for specific warnings against the danger
of subversive activities. The more important
function of assisting the Chief of Staff
in preparing and dispatching to the field
orders that translated the current diplomatic
situation into instructions governing military
dispositions was WPD's responsibility,
insofar as the Pacific area was concerned.
WPD was therefore intimately connected
with the transmission of the war warnings
and operational directives that were sent to
the Pacific commanders in November 1941.
Of the several war warnings which went
out over the Chief of Staff's signature concerning
the possibility of a Japanese attack
in the Pacific, the most important was a
message dispatched on 27 November 1941
to several commanders, including the commanding
general of the Hawaiian Department.
Progress in the protracted negotiations
then being conducted between Japanese
diplomatic representatives and the
U. S. Department of State came to an end
as of 27 November. Although no one at the
time could be sure Japan would not resume
the conversations, Secretary of State Hull
informed Secretary of War Stimson on the
morning of 27 November that the memorandum
given the Japanese representatives
on the preceding day had "broken the whole
matter off." The President himself told Secretary
Stimson that the "talks had been
called off." 2
Under these circumstances, it became
necessary for the War Department to warn
Pacific commands of the latest turn of diplomatic
events. Secretary Stimson, in the
temporary absence of General Marshall, 3
2
(1) Report, p. 46. (2) For an account of the
negotiations with Japan and their termination, see
Report, pp. 13-41.
3 General Marshall was in North Carolina viewing
Army maneuvers. Report, p. 199, n. 214.
discussed the problem with General Gerow
and with the senior Deputy Chief of Staff,
Maj. Gen. William Bryden. General Gerow
reported the results of this early morning
meeting with Secretary Stimson: "The
Secretary . . . told me he had telephoned
both Mr. Hull and the President this morning.
Mr. Hull stated the conversations had
been terminated with barest possibility of
resumption. The President wanted a warning
message sent to the Philippines. I told
him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare
an appropriate cablegram." Such a
warning message for the Philippines, the
most exposed Pacific outpost, was formulated
and approved at a second meeting on
27 November at which the Secretary of
War, the Secretary of Navy, Admiral Stark,
and General Gerow were present. 4 This
draft "formed a basis for the preparation of
other messages to the other three commanders
in the Pacific area," that is, the Panama
Canal Department, the Western Defense
Command (which had responsibility for
Alaska), and the Hawaiian Department.
These three messages were drawn up in
WPD, cleared with the Deputy Chief of
Staff, and, together with the message for the
Philippines, dispatched the same day over
the name of General Marshall. 5
The message which WPD thus came to
prepare was carefully phrased to reflect the
current diplomatic-military situation, and
was intended to convey precise operational
instructions based on a clear warning. This
message (No. 472) read:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated
to all practical purposes with only the
barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue.
4
(1) Hearings, Part 3, p. 1020. (2) Memo, WPD
for CofS, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation,
WPD 4544-13.
5
Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1021-24.