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EARLY INTERSERVICE AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF PLANNING 41
at the same time had to be co-ordinated with
the plans of politically associated foreign
powers, especially those of Great Britain.
The Secretary of War and the Chief of
Staff were the primary agents for the Army
in the planning of national military policy.
Of the War Department staffs which served
them in one way or another and represented
them in dealing with other agencies and
with representatives of foreign powers, WPD
shared most fully in their knowledge of
strategic probabilities and best reflected
their growing preoccupation with the development
of Army units to meet the threat
of war.
WPD officers had long maintained a liaison
with most of the executive agencies,
particularly with the State and Navy Departments.
They sat on several interdepartmental
committees, prepared reports
and briefs for the use of the Chief of Staff
in discussions outside the War Department,
and when not sitting on these committees
studied the deliberations of those who were
working on such matters. The liaison was
most imperfect, viewed in relation to the
needs of World War II as they actually
developed, but the principle of liaison
existed. Moreover, the Army planners were
able to carry on their work, not in isolation
from conflicting or diverging ideas, but in
an intellectual environment shared with
planners in the State and Navy Departments.
This association sometimes simplified,
frequently complicated, and always
was a conditioning factor in the Army's
strategic planning.
Politico-Military Co-ordination
President Roosevelt, in order to determine
national policy with respect to World War
II, co-ordinated the ideas and work of the
three agencies principally concerned—the
State, War, and Navy Departments. He
conferred with the three Secretaries of these
departments in Cabinet meetings and at
special "War Council" meetings at the
White House attended by the Secretaries
and the senior military advisers. 1 The
President kept the main strands of national
policy in his own hands, and his Cabinet
assistants advised him as individuals rather
than as a body. In addition to attending
meetings at the White House, Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the
Navy Frank Knox, and Secretary of State
Cordell Hull began holding informal weekly
conferences in 1940, but this "Committee
of Three" was designed primarily to keep
the civilian heads of the three agencies
abreast of one another's and the President's
problems rather than to help solve them. 2
In April 1938 a Standing Liaison Committee
was formed by the State, War, and
Navy Departments. This committee was
suggested by Secretary Hull, and President
Roosevelt heartily approved the idea. In
accordance with the President's wishes, the
committee consisted of the Chief of Staff,
the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Under Secretary of State. 3 In view of the
Chief of Staff's role, WPD had to work on
some of the problems before they reached
1
S Doc 244, 79th Cong, 2d sess, Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 43-44.
2
(1) Ibid., p. 44. (2) Henry L. Stimson, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947),
p. 563. The "Committee of Three" reorganized its
conferences and put them on a slightly more formal
basis late in the war. Minutes were kept throughout
1945 and were frequently distributed to the OPD
chief. See copies of some of these minutes in ABC
334.8 Far East (9 Nov 44), 4.
3
(1) Memo, FDR for Secy State, 4 Apr 38. (2)
Ltr, Secy State to SW, 8 Apr 38. (3) Memo, ASGS
for TAG, copies of (1), (2), and (3) filed with
minutes of meetings of Standing Liaison Committee,
Vol. I, WDCSA rcds.