Inclusion and Resilience

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Figure 29 Support for Conditionality of SSN Programs in the Middle East and North
Africa, Selected Countries, 2012
Respondents, %
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Egypt, Arab Rep. Lebanon Jordan Tunisia
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MENA SPEAKS survey.
Note: SSN = social safety net.
No requirements Some requirements
(complemented, in the case of Lebanon, with increased investment in education
and health services). When asked how the savings from subsidy reform could
be spent, most people in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia preferred targeted cash transfers
only to the poor rather than increased spending on public goods, loosely targeted
transfers, or universal compensation (see figure 32). In Lebanon, however, the majority
of respondents preferred to complement cash transfers to the poor with increased
investment in education and health.
However, support for cash transfers narrowly targeted to the poor decreases
with income. Respondents identifying themselves as lower-middle income,
Figure 30 Opposition to Subsidy Reform of Any Product, by Self-Reported Income
Group, in the Middle East and North Africa, Selected Countries, 2012
Respondents opposed, %
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MENA SPEAKS survey.
Poor Lower middle Upper middle and rich
Egypt, Arab Rep. Lebanon Jordan Tunisia
The Way Forward for Social Safety Nets in the Middle East and North Africa