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EU Competition Law and Policy - compal

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1061/1/1/06 Makers UK Ltd v Office of Fair Trading<br />

1114/1/1/09 Kier Group PLC <strong>and</strong> others v Office of Fair Trading<br />

Market Sharing <strong>and</strong> Non-compete Agreements<br />

©Ariel Ezrachi, December 2012<br />

P a g e | 8<br />

Article 101(1) TF<strong>EU</strong>, subsections (b) <strong>and</strong> (c) specifically refer to the limitation or control of<br />

markets <strong>and</strong> the sharing of markets. Market sharing allows competitors to shield themselves<br />

from the pressures of competition by dividing the market between them, thereby allowing them<br />

to exercise a large degree of market power within their exclusive territory. Note that whereas an<br />

agreement to fix price might still allow for residual competition between undertakings, for<br />

example on quality of service, market sharing, at its extreme, eliminates all forms of competition<br />

between undertakings.<br />

Horizontal Cooperation Agreements<br />

By contrast to the anticompetitive horizontal agreements discussed above, it is important to note<br />

that horizontal agreements can lead to efficiency gains, allowing medium <strong>and</strong> small sized<br />

companies to achieve greater efficiencies <strong>and</strong> cope with dynamic markets. The European<br />

Commission published Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TF<strong>EU</strong> to Horizontal<br />

Cooperation Agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1. The Guidelines provide an analytical framework for<br />

the most common types of horizontal cooperation, including agreements on research <strong>and</strong><br />

development, production, purchasing, information exchange, commercialisation <strong>and</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ardisation.<br />

Information Exchange Arrangements<br />

Information exchange, even between competitors, may serve legitimate goals when it concerns<br />

for example general information, st<strong>and</strong>ardisation or developments of new technologies. ‘The<br />

exchange of information may however have an adverse effect on competition where it serves to<br />

reduce or remove uncertainties inherent in the process of competition… Whether or not<br />

exchange of information has an appreciable effect on competition will depend on the<br />

circumstances of each individual case: the market characteristics, the type of information <strong>and</strong> the<br />

way in which it is exchanged…’ (see UK OFT Guidelines on Agreements <strong>and</strong> Concerted<br />

Practices, OFT 401, 3.17-3.23)<br />

T-34/92 Fiatagri v Commission (UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange)<br />

T-35/92 John Deere v Commission<br />

C-89/85 A Ahlström Osakeyhtiö <strong>and</strong> others v Commission (WoodPulp II)<br />

C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherl<strong>and</strong>s BV <strong>and</strong> others<br />

Vertical Agreements<br />

Vertical agreements are agreements entered into between companies operating at different levels<br />

of the production or distribution chain. These agreements differ in their potential<br />

anticompetitive effect from horizontal agreements. Whereas the latter may eliminate competition<br />

between competing undertakings, the former concerns the relationship between upstream<br />

operator <strong>and</strong> downstream distributor or retailer. As a result, vertical agreements often generate<br />

positive effects <strong>and</strong> would raise concerns predominantly when there is some degree of market<br />

power at the upstream <strong>and</strong>/or downstream levels. Of major significance to the application of<br />

Article 101 TF<strong>EU</strong> to vertical agreements are the Vertical Block Exemption <strong>and</strong> Vertical

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