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TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

FOREWORD Page<br />

Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan ……………………… 1<br />

Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

Alfred Kumi-Atiemo …………………………………………… 21<br />

Technological Protection Measures for Digital Works: A Legal<br />

Analysis<br />

Márcio Mello Chaves ………………………………………… 43<br />

Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property<br />

Protection in the Fashion Industry<br />

Layne Randolph………………………………………………… 65<br />

Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

Eno-obong Usen ……………………………………………… 81<br />

The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

Fanny Koleva ………………………………………………… 107<br />

- v -


Patent Ownership in view of Technology Transfer in Government-<br />

Sponsored Research<br />

Dragan Ćorić ……………………………… ………….……… 127<br />

Extraterritorial Technology in a Territorial Regime:<br />

Challenges after Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical<br />

Emily J. Zelenock …………………………………………………..… 141<br />

The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in Arab<br />

Public-Funded Universities<br />

Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam … 159<br />

The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu …………………………………..… 179<br />

The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration: Would it be<br />

Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

Pablo Kyllmann …………………………………………….……… 207<br />

A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection<br />

in Italy, Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

Saad Nusrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov … 221<br />

Color and Combination of Colors as Trademark<br />

Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaj …………………………..… 263<br />

- vi -


Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic<br />

Reproductions of Real Cars on which the Owner’s Mark appears?<br />

John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli …………………………… 287<br />

Analysis of the Geographical Indications (GIs) in the<br />

United States of America-Colombia FTA and Choice of Forum<br />

in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication’s Dispute<br />

Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno …………………………………….……. 319<br />

Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

Larisa Thommen …………………………………………………… 333<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

Feiyu Lei ……………………………………………………………. 351<br />

The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in the<br />

Pharmaceutical Market after Patent Expiration. An Analysis of the<br />

Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition Law<br />

Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato …………………….… 367<br />

Interplay between IPRs and Competition: Case of Information and<br />

Communication Technology Standards (ICT) Standards<br />

Larysa Kushner ……………………………………………………… 397<br />

Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated<br />

in Information andCommunication Technology Standards:<br />

Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

Simon Z. Qobo ……………………………………………………… 413<br />

- vii -


IPRs Infringement on Trade Exhibitions in China:<br />

In Search of a Practical Solution<br />

Hua Yu, Qing Yang ………………………………………………… 433<br />

Access and Benefit Sharing System under Thai Plant<br />

Variety Protection Act 1999<br />

Setthabut Ittithumwinit ……………………………………………. 451<br />

The Public Domain and Traditional Knowledge:<br />

Friends or Adversaries in the Quest for Development?<br />

Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson …………………………………… 463<br />

Creative Commons of Indigenous People: An Appraisal<br />

of the Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu …………………………………………. 475<br />

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ………………………………………………. 487<br />

- viii -


ABSTRACT<br />

FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS IN THE DIGITAL AGE<br />

by<br />

Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan<br />

Copyrights have been granted with the objective of providing more<br />

incentives for creative activities. However, as the ultimate goal of copyright<br />

legislation is not only protecting the right-holders but as well the interest of the<br />

public at large, certain exceptions and limitations (including fair use) to those<br />

exclusive rights have been introduced since the dawn of copyright. In the digital<br />

age, along with the modernization of the traditional copyright system, the<br />

copyright-holders also have sought for supplementary protection from<br />

technological measures and contract law. This has resulted in changes in<br />

international and national legislation as well as case law. These changes help to<br />

reassure the ―survival‖ of copyright system in the new context but also threaten to<br />

restrict the fair use doctrine. The scope of fair use as well as the interaction<br />

between ―fair use‖ and ―contracting around‖ in the digital era is not yet decided.<br />

Nevertheless, in order to protect the legitimate beneficiaries of fair use, copyright<br />

legislators in the U.S. and EU have codified certain exceptions for the protection of<br />

technological measures and some courts have given pro-―fair use‖ rulings. Based<br />

on this analysis, certain recommendations regarding anti-circumvention rules and<br />

the treatment of fair use doctrine v. contract doctrine for two developing countries,<br />

namely Armenia and Vietnam, is also one of the expected contributions of this<br />

paper to the broad topic.<br />

1. WHAT IS COPYRIGHT?<br />

Copyright is a bundle of exclusive moral and economic rights of the author to<br />

his works. The granting of copyright is considered as a constitutional policy of<br />

promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. 1 Works which qualify for<br />

copyright protection shall be the unique outcome of a creative activity in the<br />

domain of science, literature and art. Copyright protection provides two types of<br />

rights in the work: moral rights and economic rights. Moral non-economic rights of<br />

the author are his intellectual and personal ties to the work, granting the author the<br />

so called ―right of paternity‖ and ―right of integrity‖. Moral rights are not<br />

transferable and not subject to exhaustion. Along with moral rights the author has<br />

economic rights. Economic rights provide the economic interests of the author<br />

giving the author an exclusive right to authorize or to prohibit the use of his work<br />

or copies thereof. The right of receiving remuneration is an incentive for creation.<br />

In the contrary to moral rights, economic rights are transferable and are subject to<br />

exhaustion. It is with economic rights, that the concept of exceptions and<br />

limitations to copyrights arose.<br />

1 See, for example, Art I of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the power ―to<br />

promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and<br />

inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.‖


2 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. FAIR USE AND OTHER LIMITATIONS TO COPYRIGHT<br />

Protecting authors‘ rights had been the main reason of the existence of<br />

copyright law, which however is not the ultimate objective of copyright law; it is as<br />

well a method to achieve the purpose of ensuring the public‘s access to copyrighted<br />

material and promoting the public welfare. 2 Therefore, copyright owners‘ rights are<br />

not untrammeled; they are subject to important exceptions and limitations or, as it<br />

is called in the American system, the ―fair use‖ doctrine. Fair use is traditionally<br />

defined as ―a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the<br />

copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent.‖ 3 Nowadays, it<br />

means that the use of a work shall be allowed without the consent of the author and<br />

without remuneration, however with the obligatory mention of the author's name<br />

and the origin of the work, provided that it is not of prejudice to the normal<br />

exploitation of the work and legitimate interests of the author to his work.<br />

As the original source of the term, the Anglo-American approach highlights<br />

more the idea of free use and freedom of speech. Some infringements are regarded<br />

as worthy of protection because they promote the free discussion about the quality<br />

of the work (e.g. criticism, review), or they enhance the general public<br />

understanding of literature or the art (e.g. parodies, satire). 4<br />

The purposes of copyright exceptions are various. The author‘s consent to a<br />

reasonable use of his copyrighted works has always been implied by the courts as a<br />

necessity to reach the objective of promoting the progress of science and the useful<br />

arts, since a prohibition of such use would prevent subsequent authors from<br />

attempting to improve upon prior works. 5 The exceptions and limitations may be<br />

used to serve some public interests of more significance than the private benefit of<br />

the copyright owner. In this case, the realization of copyrights should not be<br />

dependent on the latter‘s consent. Some exceptions that reflect these wider interests<br />

include education, news reporting, efficient public services or the protection of the<br />

rights of the disabled. 6<br />

Another justification for the existence of ―fair uses‖ is that copyrights must<br />

come to an end somewhere. The rights should not extend into the regulation of<br />

wholly private or non-commercial activities, to over-protect the right holder‘s<br />

interest. Exceptions should cover common and socially beneficial uses of<br />

copyrighted works where formal permission requirements would impose<br />

excessively burdensome transaction costs on all parties. 7<br />

2 L. Luo, Legal Protection of Technological Measure in China, in EIPR Issue 2. 2006, 101.<br />

3 F.M. Abbott, T. Cottier and F. Gurry, The International Intellectual Property in an Integrated<br />

World Economy, Aspens Publisher, New York, 2007, 423.<br />

4 E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press, 2005, 255.<br />

5 F.M. Abbott el. al., supra note 3, at 423.<br />

6 L. Edwards, Law and the internet, Hart Publishing, Portland Or., 2009, 204.<br />

7 Ibid., at 204-205.


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 3<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

As mentioned above, traditionally the fair use doctrine can be justified in<br />

case when the transaction costs are too high and prevent copyright owners and<br />

users from entering a license. But modern technologies have enabled copyright<br />

owners and users to negotiate individual licenses for digital works at a low cost, 8<br />

therefore, criteria to define a fair use exception must be focused more on the social<br />

and cultural aspects of copyrights. Moreover, to meet the original purpose of<br />

copyright system, the right-holders must have exclusive rights to fully exploit the<br />

economic potential of the work. That is why the fair use doctrine has always<br />

precluded a use that ―supersedes‖ the use of the original. 9<br />

Fair Use in International Treaties:<br />

The Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement permit exceptions for fair use of<br />

copyrighted works. The availability and scope of the exceptions remain, for the most<br />

part, subject to national law.<br />

The Berne Convention, being the first international convention on the<br />

protection of literary and artistic works, provides that any type of use, but for the<br />

purposes of private use, educational and scientific research, etc. shall be subject to<br />

authorization and payment. Exceptions for fair use have been mentioned in various<br />

specific conditions, namely Art. 2bis (2) regarding press reporting of publicly given<br />

addresses; Art. 10 regarding quotation and use of work for teaching; Art. 10bis<br />

regarding reproduction of ―current affair‖ articles and use of work in reporting<br />

current events; Art. 11bis (3) regarding ephemeral recording by broadcasters.<br />

However, the ―three-step-test‖ set out in Art. 9 (2) of the Convention is the general<br />

guidance for member states to codify the fair use doctrine. Member States of the<br />

Convention can provide exceptions (1) in certain cases; (2) which do not conflict<br />

with a normal exploitation of the works; and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the<br />

legitimate interests of the author.<br />

Although the TRIPS Agreement requires all the WTO members to comply<br />

with Art.1 to 21 of the Berne Convention (which includes Art. 9 (2)), the Three-<br />

Step-Test has been reinforced in Art. 13 of this Agreement which does not confine<br />

exceptions only to the right of reproduction but to all internationally recognized<br />

exclusive rights.<br />

8 C.M. Correa, Fair Use in the Digital Era, in IIC 2002,<br />

.<br />

9 F.M. Abbott el. al., supra note 3, at 423


4 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Under the <strong>WIPO</strong> ―Internet‖ Copyright Treaty, ―the need to maintain a<br />

balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly<br />

education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne<br />

Convention‖ has been re-proclaimed. 10 The Three-Step-Test has been adopted<br />

again in Art. 10 of WCT.<br />

Fair Use in the US, UK and Continental European Countries<br />

As early as 1841, in Folsom v. Marsh case, the fair use doctrine has been<br />

recognized in the US. 11 With the power granted by Article I of the United States<br />

Constitution, 12 the Congress has adopted the Copyright Act (1976) to codify the<br />

common law doctrine. Section 107 of the Act requires a case-by-case determination<br />

of whether or not a particular use is fair. It allows limited use of copyrighted<br />

material without requiring permission from the right-holders, such as for<br />

commentary, criticism, news reporting, research, teaching or scholarship. It<br />

provides for the legal, non-licensed citation or incorporation of copyrighted<br />

material in another author's work under a four-factor balancing test. The factors to<br />

determine fairness includes: (1) Purpose and character of the use, including<br />

whether the use is for commercial or non-profit educational purpose,<br />

transformative and productive or duplicative; (2) the nature of work or adaptation,<br />

(3) the amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole<br />

work or adaptation; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or<br />

value of the work or adaptation. However, the distinction between fair use and<br />

infringement may be unclear and not easily defined. There is no specific number of<br />

words, lines, or notes that may safely be taken without permission. Acknowledging<br />

the source of the copyrighted works does not exempt the users from obtaining<br />

permission.<br />

As mentioned above, the term "fair use" originated in the United States, but<br />

has been added to several countries laws as well; a similar principle, fair dealing,<br />

exists in some other common law jurisdictions. Since the Copyright Act (1911),<br />

UK copyright law has provided for exceptions or limitations upon the exclusive<br />

rights of copyright owners, for the benefit of users of their works. In the Copyright<br />

and Patent Act (1988) (CDPA) they are described as ―permitted acts‖ and the<br />

relevant sections are nearly 60 in number. 13 Unlike the US where a general defense<br />

of fair use is available (omnibus and open ended), the Anglo-Australian law<br />

provides for fair dealing for specific purposes within certain statutory limits. It is<br />

not enough that the copying or other dealing was carried out for the purpose of<br />

research or study, the dealing must be fair. Principles involving fair dealing defense<br />

include the degree and impression of the dealing which should be judged by<br />

10<br />

The Preamble of the <strong>WIPO</strong> Copyright Treaty (1996).<br />

11<br />

F.M. Abbott el. al., supra note 3, at 423<br />

12<br />

See supra note 1.<br />

13<br />

L. Edwards, supra note 6, at 201


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 5<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

criterion of a fair minded and honest person. Fairness is to be judged objectively in<br />

relation to the relevant purpose and is an abstract concept.<br />

Civil law jurisdictions have other limitations and exceptions to copyright.<br />

Opposing to the Anglo-American approach, protection of the author‘s rights in the<br />

European copyright system is in the centre of the law as authors are the weakest<br />

part in civil interrelations. Notwithstanding this fact, the legislators also stress that<br />

the interests of the public as a whole should not be ignored. As knowledge is a<br />

public good and access to knowledge is a human right there should be some<br />

balancing regulation between these two layers of the society, thus the legislators‘<br />

conclusion on providing exceptions and limitation to the authors‘ rights but under<br />

certain conditions. 14 Along with the progress made in the harmonization of<br />

different aspects of intellectual property laws, the issue of exceptions to copyrights<br />

is contained in many directives. Given that copies of software can be identical to<br />

the original, the EC Computer Program Directive narrowly tailored exceptions to<br />

such rights. The EC Directive on Databases also limits reproduction for private<br />

purposes only to non-electronic databases (Art. 6.2.a). The most important<br />

directive as far as exceptions to copyright protection are concerned is the<br />

Information Society Directive (2002/29/EC-Infosoc Directive). Besides the<br />

reintroduction of the three-step-test, Article 5 of the Infosoc Directive provides a list<br />

of mandatory and possible exceptions to the three exclusive rights that member<br />

states are required to provide. The only mandatory area of this Article (5.1),<br />

requires Member States to take account of ―temporary acts of reproduction which<br />

are transient or incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological<br />

process whose sole purpose is to enable transmission in a network between third<br />

parties by an intermediary, or a lawful use of a work, which have no ―independent<br />

economic significance‖ (mostly involving caching 15 ). Subsections 2 and 3 of<br />

Article 5 detail possible exceptions to the reproduction and communication and<br />

―making available to the public‖ rights. Member states are permitted to exempt<br />

from the reproduction rights copies for non-commercial purposes including private<br />

use, special acts by libraries, museums and educational establishments; in respect<br />

of ephemeral fixations made by broadcasting organizations by means of their own<br />

facilities and for their own broadcasts, etc. (Art. 5 (2)). Possible exceptions to the<br />

rights of reproduction and communication to the public in the following cases:<br />

14 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides freedom of speech mentioning<br />

that the article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or<br />

cinema enterprises. Notwithstanding the principle of free use of copyrighted works, there are<br />

provisions on liabilities for misuse of any such work that may be of prejudice to the reputation or<br />

the rights of the author or likely to mislead the public, unauthorized disclosure, etc. Paragraph 2 of<br />

the same article expressly states: ―The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and<br />

responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are<br />

prescribed by law and are necessary... for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for<br />

preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and<br />

impartiality of the judiciary.‖<br />

15 Temporary copy of materials


6 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

illustration for teaching and scientific research, dissemination of news, political<br />

speeches as well as extracts of public lectures; criticism, etc (Art. 5 (3)).<br />

The primary objective of this Article of the Infosoc Directive is to settle<br />

liability that could be placed upon host service providers, transmitters and access<br />

providers on the internet. 16 With the limitation set forth in Art. 5(1), there is no<br />

general obligation to monitor for internet service providers (ISPs). In other words,<br />

ISPs are not liable for the data they transmitted even if it infringes copyright.<br />

However, the exemptions permitted under the Directive are prescriptive, with<br />

the permitted acts being listed within Article 5 (exemptions and limitations).<br />

Member states are therefore not able to deviate from or add to these exceptions.<br />

This is in order to ―ensure the proper functioning of the internal market‖ (Recital<br />

31). 17 This limitation constricts the ability of national states to respond to<br />

technological change and potential the new uses of information within society. The<br />

restriction could be seen as contrary to the <strong>WIPO</strong> Copyright Treaty of 1996 which<br />

the Directive is implementing. Under the terms of the <strong>WIPO</strong> Treaty, member<br />

states are permitted ―to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital<br />

environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have been<br />

considered acceptable under the Berne Convention‖. To ensure that there are no<br />

barriers to the internal marketplace, the Directive must not be more restrictive than<br />

international treaties. 18<br />

Though the case by case approach of the U.S. proved to be more flexible than<br />

the rigid prescribed list in the EU Directive, it has been recommendable for the<br />

U.S. law to follow in part the practice of European copyright systems. While case<br />

by case fair use determination is still applied, the U.S. copyright law should specify<br />

precisely the kinds of uses of creative work that should be regulated by copyright<br />

law and certain uses that were beyond the scope of copyright law to make the<br />

system clearer and simpler. 19 This ―hybrid‖ approach may be considered as an<br />

effective way to avoid the over-protection of copyrights (either by providing a very<br />

restrictive list of exemptions in the EU case or by the burden of proof or lawyer<br />

cost in the case of the U.S.).<br />

16 M. Li, Fair use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age, Collection of Research Papers, Master<br />

of Laws in Intellectual Property, Turin, Italy, 2007, 64.<br />

17 M. Wallace, The Information Society Directive (UK implementation): the end of educational and<br />

research use of digital works?,<br />

18 Ibid.<br />

19 L. Lessig, Remix. Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, The Penguin Press,<br />

2008 , 266-267.


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 7<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

Digitization and Challenges to Copyright<br />

With the coming of the digital era, there arises a conflict between the fact that<br />

new digital technologies provide incentive to the free flow of ideas, knowledge and<br />

information, and the fundamental design of copyright law which is to limit the<br />

unauthorized flow of copyrighted works. 20 From the copyright-holders‘<br />

perspective, the digital environment brings great dangers to copyright protection.<br />

Information in digital form is intangible and can be reproduced instantaneously.<br />

Digital copies are different from printed copies as there is no difference between<br />

the original and a copy. Digital technology also eases the retrieval and distribution<br />

of works via the internet. 21 After a certain period of bewilderment with the fear<br />

about ―the death of copyright‖, copyright and other forms of protection of<br />

intellectual property rights have been modernized so as to be appropriate for the<br />

digital age. 22 This movement has lead to the introduction of <strong>WIPO</strong> ―internet‖<br />

treaties (including the WCT mentioned above and WPPT 23 ). The ―Digital Agenda‖<br />

has been built up in the WCT in two agenda. In Agenda I, the right of reproduction<br />

has been expanded to temporary reproduction (Art. 1(4)) and the right of making<br />

available has been introduced under the ―umbrella solution‖ (Art. 8). In Agenda II,<br />

copyright protection has been enhanced with the revised limitation and exception<br />

(Art. 10), the introduction of technological measures (Art. 11) and Right<br />

Management Information (Art. 12).<br />

3. NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS<br />

IN THE DIGITAL AGE<br />

As mentioned above, along with technology development, there emerge new<br />

control mechanisms over access to copyrighted works. The previous broad<br />

reproduction rights and broad distribution rights are now exempted by technology.<br />

Access to content and copies has been restricted by the use of digital right<br />

management measures and licenses with restriction conditions, alternative business<br />

models. Those restriction measures pose new challenges for the traditional<br />

beneficiaries of ―fair use‖ doctrine.<br />

- The development of right management protection technologies and<br />

the application of technical protection measures (TPMs) and anticircumvention<br />

measures<br />

Supported by the famous phrase by Charles Clark: ―the answer to machine is<br />

machine‖ 24 , various technological measures have been developed to strengthen<br />

20<br />

P. Akester and F. Lima, The Economic Dimension of the Digital Challenge: A Copyright<br />

Perspective, IPQ, 2005, 80.<br />

21<br />

Ibid. at 71<br />

22<br />

L. Edwards, supra note 6, at 183.<br />

23<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> Performances and Phonograms Treaty<br />

24<br />

A. Abdalla, International protection of intellectual property rights in light of the expansion of<br />

electronic commerce, Trafford, Victoria, B.C. 2005, 190.


8 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

copyright protection in a digital environment which aim either to control access to<br />

content (access control) or to control the copying of content (copy control).<br />

Technological solutions such as digital watermarking 25 and encryption 26 have<br />

been used to develop copyright protection systems to limit use to a single user and<br />

to avoid redistribution or reuse of material. 27 Although those technological<br />

protection measures (TPMs) may be effective with ordinary users, they can be<br />

neutralized, ―hacked‖ or circumvented by high-tech users. Thus, a market for illicit<br />

devices facilitating decryption and other forms of TPM circumvention has<br />

emerged. 28 Therefore, anti-circumvention legislation has been introduced with the<br />

purpose of providing extra protection against piracy. At international level, Art. 11<br />

of the WCT provides an independent legal protection for TPMs used by copyright<br />

owners which requires Contracting Parties to provide “adequate legal protection<br />

and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological<br />

measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights<br />

under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and restrict acts, in respect of their<br />

works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law”.<br />

It can be interpreted from this provision that Contracting Parties are allowed<br />

to implement this obligation at their discretion provided that the implementation is<br />

adequate and effective to protect technological measures as required by the WCT.<br />

The U.S. adopted a minimalist approach when implementing the WCT, based<br />

on the understanding that any provision of the Treaty that had already been<br />

implemented in US law would not be addressed in new legislation. 29 The Digital<br />

Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has been enacted in 1998 with a new chapter<br />

(section 1201-1205) that regulates the protection of TPMs. Section 1201 covers<br />

both the protection of ―access control‖ and ―copy control‖ technologies. The<br />

protection of technological measures established under section 1201 is threefold<br />

which prohibit (1) the act of circumvention of TPMs that protect access control; (2)<br />

25<br />

Digital watermarks are bits embedded in digital content, usually invisible in the absence of the<br />

proper software to detect and decode it. The watermarks can contain information such as the author‘<br />

name and email address, ID number and a URL, information about who owns a work, how to<br />

contact the owner and whether a fee must be paid to use the work. A watermark can only be<br />

effective if the playback and record devices look for the watermark in that particular piece of<br />

content.<br />

26<br />

Encryption is a technological method used to obscure the meaning of a message. There are<br />

various types of encryption. Asymmetric encryption is the best suited for e-commerce, since it uses<br />

two different keys and only public keys need to be distributed. Each user generated two keys that<br />

are different: a private key and a public key. They keep their private key secret but send their public<br />

key to other users. The sender encrypts a message with the public key of the intended recipient and<br />

then sends it on to the recipient. Only the recipient‘s privat key can be used to decrypt the message.<br />

27<br />

P. Akester and F. Lima, supra note 20, at 71-72.<br />

28<br />

A. Abdalla, supra note 24, at 192.<br />

29<br />

N. Braun, The interface between the Protection of Technological Measures and Exercise of<br />

Exceptions to Copyright and Related Rights: Comparing the situation in the United State and the<br />

European Community, EIPR, Issue 11, 2003, 496.


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 9<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

trafficking in devices, services, etc. that circumvent ―access control‖ TPMs; (3)<br />

trafficking in devices, services that circumvent ―copy control‖ TPMs. 30<br />

All Contracting Parties implementing the WCT face the problem that, on the<br />

one hand, there is a need to protect the technological measures which right owners<br />

apply to the protected content, on the other hand, the beneficiaries of ―fair use‖ or<br />

other exceptions or works that fall into public domain need not be restricted in<br />

realizing the benefits. As another Contracting Party, the U.S. has tried to strike a<br />

balance between both positions by not prohibiting the act of circumvention itself of<br />

a ―copy control‖ technology. 31 The legislators were aware of the scenario where<br />

activities might be allowed under the ―fair use‖ doctrine but prevented by a ―copy<br />

control‖ technology. However, it is noteworthy that there is no obligation of the<br />

right owner to provide the beneficiary of ―fair use‖ defense with the means to<br />

enable the enjoyment of the content. In the contrary, the act of circumvention of an<br />

―access control‖ technology is prohibited as ―access‘ to a work has to be<br />

distinguished from ―use‖ of work and the legislators‘ concerns with respect to the<br />

―fair use‖ defense focused merely on the second act.<br />

The DMCA provides a closed list of limited exceptions permitting the<br />

circumvention of and/or trafficking in TMPs in respect of legitimate encryption<br />

research, computer security testing, reverse engineering for computer program,<br />

libraries (for the sole purpose of determining whether to acquire a particular work),<br />

and when it is necessary to achieve interoperability and used solely for that<br />

purpose. However, the DMCA does not mention the phrase ―fair use‖.<br />

In Europe, the Infosoc Directive deals with the protection of technology<br />

measures. Art. 6 (1) and (2) establish the scope and Art. 6 (3) sets forth the<br />

definition of the technological protection measures. The scope of protection is<br />

broad and obliges Member States to protect right holders against both the act of<br />

circumvention of any effective technological measure (Art. 6 (1)) as well as against<br />

the trafficking in circumvention devices and services (Art. 6 (2)). The content of<br />

Art. 6 (2) is similar to those set forth in section 1201 of the U.S. Copyright Act.<br />

The definition of technology measures in Art. 6 (3) refers to ―any effective<br />

technological measure… designed to prevent or restrict acts… which are not<br />

authorized by the right holder‖. Technological measures shall be deemed<br />

―effective‖ where the use of a protected work is controlled by the right-holders<br />

through application of an access control or protection process or a copy control<br />

mechanism, which achieves the protection objective. The Directive does not<br />

distinguish between ―access control‖ and ―copy control‖ technology as in the<br />

DMCA. Art. 6 (1) to (3) the Infosoc Directive introduce a three levels of protection<br />

for digital works: copyright, TPMs and legal protection of TPMs (ACP). The same<br />

problem here is copyright‘s balance (level 1) can be jeopardized by the legal<br />

30 Ibid.<br />

31 Ibid. at 497.


10 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

protection (level 3) of TPMs (level 2). Art. 6 (4) of the Directive is designed to<br />

solve the dilemma but does not introduce exceptions to the liability of the<br />

circumvention of TPMs but rather introduce a unique legislative mechanism which<br />

foresees responsibility on the right-holders to accommodate certain exceptions to<br />

copyrights. If Art. 6 (4) is implemented properly, it can help in the finding of<br />

solutions by right-holders and beneficiaries of exceptions without weakening the<br />

effective protection of technological measures. 32 Art. 6 (4) distinguishes between<br />

―public policy‖ exceptions (para. 1) and ―private copying‖ exceptions (para. 2).<br />

Member States are obliged to introduce mechanisms to accommodate the<br />

exceptions only with respects to ―public policy‖ exceptions in Art. 5 of the<br />

Directive. The scope of the intervention of Member States is limited in the online<br />

environment where the making available of content on agreed contractual terms is<br />

involved.<br />

If the digital protection measures and anti-circumvention rules are applied<br />

properly, with very limited exceptions provided by DMCA and EC Infosoc<br />

Directive, there are concerns that right-holders are in a position to prohibit any type<br />

of use or to seek for payment for any use of their works. Therefore, they can<br />

supersede any rules allowing fair use. 33 Besides, there are concerns that DRMs will<br />

be used for anti-competitive purposes, or to restrict the freedom of speech.<br />

There are cases in which the use of DRMs has proved to rendered<br />

competition and innovation. Lexmark v. SCC (6th Cir. 2004), regarding the control<br />

of the aftermarket for printer cartridges, held that it is not illegal to circumvent a<br />

technological measure that is blocking access to an unprotected idea. The Federal<br />

Circuit also held that authentication sequence does not effectively control access<br />

and does not effectively prevent all access to a work protected under copyright law<br />

and the Printer Engine Program is copyrightable, but not its functionality.<br />

32 Art 6 (4) ―Notwithstanding the legal protection provided for in paragraph 1, in the absence of<br />

voluntary measures taken by rightholders, including agreements between rightholders and other<br />

parties concerned, Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make<br />

available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided for in national law in accordance<br />

with Article 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a), (3)(b) or (3)(e) the means of benefiting from that<br />

exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation and<br />

where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or subject-matter concerned.<br />

A Member State may also take such measures in respect of a beneficiary of an exception or<br />

limitation provided for in accordance with Article 5(2)(b), unless reproduction for private use has<br />

already been made possible by rightholders to the extent necessary to benefit from the exception or<br />

limitation concerned and in accordance with the provisions of Article 5(2)(b) and (5), without<br />

preventing rightholders from adopting adequate measures regarding the number of reproductions in<br />

accordance with these provisions.<br />

The technological measures applied voluntarily by rightholders, including those applied in<br />

implementation of voluntary agreements, and technological measures applied in implementation of<br />

the measures taken by Member States, shall enjoy the legal protection provided for in paragraph 1.<br />

The provisions of the first and second subparagraphs shall not apply to works or other subjectmatter<br />

made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the<br />

public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.‖<br />

33 C. M. Corea, supra note 7.


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 11<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

In Chamberlain v. Skylink (Fed. Cir. 2004) case regarding the prevention of<br />

the use of universal remote controls; the court held that circumvention is illegal<br />

only if it enables infringing copying, consumers have a right to use a copy (so far<br />

as copyright law does not explicitly restrict it). DMCA should not allow any<br />

company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies, a practice<br />

that both antitrust laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse normally prohibit.<br />

However, there are also court findings in which the development of new<br />

programs/devices that promote competition was not considered as an exception for<br />

the protection of TPMs based on anti-trust ground. Cases include Universal v.<br />

Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000), Sony v. Gamemaster (2000), Reimerdes & Corley<br />

(2001), RealNetworks v. Streambox (2000), Blizzard v. Bnetd (2004).<br />

For other grounds of fair use, there also different court rulings. Freedom of<br />

speech could not help the defendant in Universal City Studios v. Corley (2nd Cir.<br />

2001). However, in Felten v. RIAA (2002), the case was only dropped by Felten<br />

when the courts implied that scientists studying digital copying technologies would<br />

not be subject to the DMCA.<br />

- The extended use of contract law to control access to and the use of<br />

digital copyright works<br />

Besides resorting to technological measures, the copyright-holders also seek<br />

for supplement protection under the law of contracts (which can be called<br />

―contracting around‖ the Copyright law 34 ). Since modern technologies permits<br />

right-holders to directly interact with users and to determine the conditions for<br />

access to and use of works, the cost of establishing and monitoring contracts have<br />

been reduced dramatically and contracts with ―a very fine-grained level of details‖<br />

and a variable pricing mechanism have been enabled. 35 Moreover, it is argued that<br />

copyright law was originally conceived as a mechanism for creating property rights<br />

in intangibles. The presumption is that voluntary exchange will be of benefit for<br />

both buyers and seller and voluntary exchange is facilitated by property rights.<br />

Therefore, individuals are free to make virtually any contract over copyrighted<br />

works they choose, whatever effects on ―fair use‖ or the ―first sale‖ doctrines. 36<br />

In fact, the massive use of contracts on terms and conditions dictated by<br />

suppliers to extend the copyrights beyond those granted by the copyright legislation<br />

is a real challenge to fair use doctrine. The enforcement of a particular type of<br />

contract: the "shrink wrap" license 37 for software and of pre-determined conditions<br />

34 V. R. Moffat, Rethinking Contractual Restrictions on Fair Use: Preemption and the Structure of<br />

Copyright Policymaking, (2007) < http://works.bepress.com/viva_moffat/1><br />

35 T. Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2<br />

(1995) <br />

36 Ibid.<br />

37 The shrink-wrap license agreement purports to create a binding legal agreement (so it says)<br />

between the software vendor and the user. A ―shrink-swap‖ license is simply a set of terms printed<br />

inside the heat-shrunk wrapping of the commercial software. These terms constitute an ―offer‖ that


12 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

attached to the commercialization of other digital works illustrate this threat. 38<br />

In Vault v. Quaid (5 th Cir. 1988), Vault, a software developer, introduced a<br />

computer program named ―Prolok‖ that rendered other commercial software<br />

impossible to copy. Vauld sold Prolik with ―shrink-wrap‖ licenses. A Louisiana<br />

state statute expressly validated those ―shrink-wrap‖ licenses. Quaid, Inc. made<br />

copies of the Prolok program to reverse engineer its anti-copy scheme and then<br />

sold its software which can disable the Prolok mechanism and permit copying. In<br />

this case, Vault sued Quaid for copyright infringement and lost. The court held that<br />

Quaid‘s actions to be permissible even though they violated the license restrictions.<br />

The Louisiana statute that effectively prevented the running of such programs by<br />

validating Vault‘s license restrictions therefore conflicted with the U.S. Copyright<br />

Act and was preempted. 39<br />

In Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson (D.Utah 1981), appeal dismissed, (10 th<br />

Cir. 1985), Warner Bros. involved ―blind bidding‖, a common practice in the<br />

motion picture industry. With blind bidding, motion picture distributors require that<br />

theatres agree to certain conditions before viewing the entire movie. The conditions<br />

may include guaranteeing certain minimum royalty fees. 40 This practice has been<br />

considered very unfair for the theatre owners and in many state in the U.S., statutes<br />

have been enacted to prohibit or curtail such practice. Motion picture owners and<br />

distributors then challenged the statutes but failed. The courts held that states may<br />

impose restraints on what would otherwise be valid contracts relating to copyrights.<br />

Though the enforcement of unconscionable contractual terms may be denied<br />

by courts based on copyright or unfair competition or antitrust law, 41 the<br />

asymmetry in the contractual relationship may still lead to overriding fair use and<br />

other statutory limitations to copyright. 42 The land-mark conclusion reached in<br />

Vault did not seem to be reaffirmed in other contract cases in the U.S. 43 The<br />

reasoning in these cases is that copyright should not preempt when the state law at<br />

issue requires elements of proof (offer and acceptance) of contracts which is not<br />

relevant to the U.S. Copyright Act. It can be concluded that the question of<br />

whether the ―fair use‖ doctrine (and copyright in general) preempt ―contract‖<br />

the buyers is said to accept by the act of tearing open the plastic wrapping. Such license agreement<br />

should be challenged as adhesion contracts or invalidated on the ground of unequal bargaining<br />

strength.<br />

38 C.M. Correa, supra note 7.<br />

39 T. Hardy, supra note 35<br />

40 Ibid.<br />

41 The U.S Uniform Computer Infornmation Transactions Act (1999) authorizes a court to refuse<br />

enforcement to contractual terms that violate a "fundamental public policy"<br />

42 R. Denicola, Mostly dead? Copyright law in the new millennium, Journal of the Copyright<br />

Society of the USA, vol.47, 2000, 198, quoted in C. M. Correa, supra note 7.<br />

43 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus. (10th Cir. 1993); Nat'l Car Rental Systems v. Computer<br />

Assocs. Int'l (8th Cir.), cert. denied (1993); Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney (9th Cir. 1989), cert.<br />

denied, (1990); Acorn Structures v. Swantz (4th Cir. 1988); Adobe v. Stargate (N.D. Cal. 2002),<br />

ProCD v. Zeidenberg (7th Cir. 1996).


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 13<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

doctrine has not yet settled and still left open for case-by-case judgments by the<br />

courts.<br />

It is also noteworthy that the use of contract not always restricts ―fair uses‖<br />

but can support them. In the case of A.V. v. iParagigms LLC (2009), Rurnitin.com<br />

operated by the defendant iParadigms LLC compares the newly submitted works<br />

by the students against its database of existing student works in order to deliver an<br />

assessment to the educational institution customers regarding plagiarism. Before<br />

submitting, each student is asked to accept an e-contract. The lower court held that<br />

Turnitin.com made a fair use of the student works and the e-contract is a valid one<br />

and the 4 th Federal Circuit reaffirmed this decision.<br />

4. INITIATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO BALANCE THE<br />

INTEREST BETWEEN FAIR USERS AND COPYRIGHT OWNERS IN<br />

THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT<br />

Before going to the recommendations on how to ―protect‖ fair users against<br />

these above changes in legislation and case law, it is necessary to answer again the<br />

question regarding the importance of ―fair use‖ in the digital environment.<br />

Copyright-holders argue that the justifications underlying the exceptions and<br />

limitations such as fair use has been eliminated online 44 . As transaction cost for<br />

licensing has been reduced, there is no market failure to provide end-users with<br />

their needs. Besides, the loss for author‘s earnings is no longer insignificant but<br />

accumulatively significant. This argument, however, concentrates more on the<br />

economic aspects of copyright but not on its social and cultural aspects as other<br />

―fair use‖ justifications do stand in whatever technological context. In the digital<br />

age, ―fair use‖ is more needed to promote User-Generated-Content (creative<br />

activity without a business structure); to promote remix, mash-up culture which can<br />

create a wider creative space; to ensure the freedom of speech (and freedom of<br />

expression in general); and to protect privacy 45 . Fully recognized the important<br />

balance between copyright-holders and fair users, some initiatives have been<br />

launched in the U.S., continental European Community to neutralize the threats of<br />

these above movements on the exercise of exceptions to copyrights.<br />

At corporate level, shared interest of platform and content owners (i.e.,<br />

YouTube, Google Settlement) has been created. Under those, ―fair use‖ has been<br />

implemented with automated enforcement. However, there are concerns that<br />

automated system should be applied for detection only and not for removal.<br />

Removal should be done upon notice and ―fair use‖ should be considered prior to<br />

issuing a notice. Some authors have also come up with the idea of voluntary<br />

contributions 46 to effectively exercise the rights conferred by copyright but not<br />

prejudice the benefit of fair users. However, there‘s not yet any ―real‖ experiment<br />

44<br />

A. Abdalla, supra note 24, at 194.<br />

45<br />

L. Lessig, supra note 19<br />

46<br />

P. Akester and F. Lima, supra note 20, at 79


14 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

with this.<br />

At national and regional level, under both the DMCA and the EC Infosoc<br />

Directive, a Committee is directed to examine the effects of the anti-circumvention<br />

rules and to adjust the list of exceptions in order to avoid the ―side effects‖ of those<br />

rules on issues related to copyright such as ―fair use‖. In Europe, besides adopting<br />

the human review to determine fair use, the Council of Europe has introduced<br />

human rights guidelines for ISPs (Council of Europe in cooperation with<br />

EuroISPA, 2008). The guidelines recognize that internet service is increasingly<br />

becoming a prerequisite for a comprehensive participatory democracy and that ISPs<br />

should not be put under a general obligation to actively monitor content and traffic<br />

data. This initiative has re-stated the rule set forth in the above-mentioned Art. 5 (1)<br />

of the Infosoc Directive. With the guidelines, the question of whether online<br />

service providers are obliged to screen/track all transmissions or not has been<br />

answered again. More certainty has been created for ISPs. This helps to balance<br />

between keeping them away from liability and engaging them in enforcement.<br />

Some Recommendations for Armenia and Vietnam:<br />

Regardless of the status of being Contracting Parties to <strong>WIPO</strong> ―internet‖<br />

treaties or not, both Armenia and Vietnam have codified anti-circumvention rules<br />

as set by WCT and WPPT.<br />

Articles 22-26 of the Law of the Republic of Armenia on Copyright and Related<br />

Rights provide for ―free use of works‖ stating that ―Free use of a work shall mean the<br />

use of a work without the consent of the author and without remuneration, however<br />

with the obligatory mention of the author's name and the origin of the work, which<br />

does not prejudice the normal exploitation of the work and legitimate interests of the<br />

author to his work.‖ The Articles expressly state ―works lawfully made public‖ as to<br />

secure the authors‘ right of making the work public. Article 22 (2)(f) states that<br />

among others, the use of a work, except computer programs, for the purposes of court<br />

and administrative proceedings, to the extent justified by the purpose , shall as well be<br />

free, and in such cases the mentioning of the author‘s name and the source of the<br />

work is not obligatory. Chapter V of the Law concerns enforcement of the law and<br />

technical protection measures; namely Art. 67 Protection of Technological Measures<br />

and Art. 68 Protection of Rights Management Information provide for liability for<br />

circumvention of technical protection measures, which are in total compliance with<br />

the WCT and WPPT (Armenia is a member of these treaties in March 6, 2005).<br />

Copyright law in Vietnam is governed by the ―Intellectual Property Law,‖<br />

effective July 1, 2006 and Decree 100/ND-CP/2006 implementing the Law. Like<br />

China, though Vietnam has not yet ratified WCT and WPPT, the law provides<br />

protection for temporary reproductions (Article 4(10)), and protection against<br />

circumvention of technological protection measures used by right holders to protect<br />

their works/subject matters in the digital environment (Articles 28(12) and 35(7)) and<br />

against trafficking in circumvention devices (Article 28(14)). Besides, right-holders


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 15<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

are allowed to ―apply technological measures to prevent acts of infringing upon<br />

intellectual property rights‖ as part of the right to self protection (Art. 198 (1) (a)).<br />

The IP Law also offers a broad range of exceptions to copyright and related rights.<br />

There are some exceptions that can be considered overly broad, e.g., Art. 25 (g) on<br />

―[d]irectly recording and reporting performances for public information and<br />

educational purposes,‖ and Art. 25(k) regarding personal use imports, and Article<br />

25(1)(e) on ―dramatic works and other forms of performing arts in cultural gatherings<br />

or in promotional campaigns, Art. 25(2) of the implementing Decree appears to allow<br />

the copying of a computer program ―for archives in libraries for the purposes of<br />

research.‖<br />

A common character of the two copyright systems in respect to anticircumvention<br />

rules is that they are general in nature and there is no provision<br />

which provides exceptions to the protections of TPMs. These rules also do not<br />

address the relationship between TPMs and exceptions and limitations. It is not<br />

clear whether fair uses can be considered as a justifiable defence for violations of<br />

anti-circumvention rules. The role of ISPs is also not clarified.<br />

Besides, in both systems, there is no provision regarding the treatment of fair<br />

use doctrine when it conflicts with contract doctrine.<br />

The following recommendations can be adopted in the process of revision of<br />

those regulations:<br />

Regarding Anti-Circumvention Rules<br />

The Armenian copyright law provides for a definition of technological<br />

measure in compliance with the WCT 47 but the Vietnamese law does not. It is<br />

necessary to give a legal definition of technological measures in the anticircumvention<br />

rules and set some limitations to the function of TPMs in Vietnam‘s IP<br />

Law and implementing decree. For both countries, it would be recommendable to<br />

introduce a general purpose clause for the exceptions to the protection of TPMs and to<br />

establish a committee to monitor and adjust this list of exceptions. The list should<br />

include exceptions to protect consumers‘ privacy, freedom of speech, etc. Besides,<br />

just like the approach taken in EC Database Directive, legal protection should be<br />

given to not only technological measures that related to copyrighted works but also<br />

those needed to protect investment in the creation/collection of material (under a sui<br />

generic regime). This will avoid the pro-investment tendency in the copyright<br />

enforcement and keep the copyright systems in the right track to the very ends they<br />

sought to attain. ISPs should not be imposed from monitoring obligation but<br />

encouraged to cooperate with the State for surveillance and enforcement of<br />

copyrights.<br />

47 Art. 67 (2) of the Armenian Copyright law states ―A technological measure for the protection of<br />

copyright and related rights shall mean any device or their components, that in the normal course of<br />

their operation, are designed to prevent or restrict acts in respect of works or subject matters of<br />

related rights which are not authorized by holder of copyright or related rights.‖


16 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Regarding the ―Contracting Around‖Iissue<br />

As mentioned above, preemption doctrine has not yet been recognized as a<br />

tool for addressing contractual restrictions on fair use. However, the doctrine<br />

should be applied since it is a way of acknowledging and emphasizing the<br />

policymaking role of the government. If the law has already defined in detail the<br />

proper uses of a copyrighted work, including its fair uses, it was based on a careful<br />

balance of interest and therefore, individuals should not be free to redefine that<br />

liability. 48<br />

Besides, along with promoting voluntary measures (agreements) to achieve the<br />

objective of certain specific exceptions/limitations, the law should ensure that rightholders<br />

provide beneficiaries of such with appropriate means of benefiting from them.<br />

CONCLUSIONS<br />

In the digital context, the copyright law has regulated more and seeks for<br />

technology and other branches of law to regulate more effectively. With the<br />

ratification of the control that technology can impose over every use of the<br />

copyrighted works (by TPMs and anti-circumvention rules) and the supplement of<br />

standardized contractual schemes, copyrights in the digital age are thus ―open to<br />

control in a way that was never possible in the analog age‖.49 However, more control<br />

of copyrighted works does not always help to promote innovation and creation. The<br />

protection of created works and their creators must always be balanced with the<br />

guarantee of public interest and fundamental freedoms. Fair use is designed to<br />

maintain such balance. The growing use of contracts and application of technological<br />

measures may threaten the fair use doctrine thus cause an unprecedented break in the<br />

balance inherent in all intellectual property system 50<br />

The relationship between anti-circumvention rules and fair use has been dealt<br />

with under the U.S. DMCA as well as EU Infosoc Directive with certain exceptions<br />

to the rules. There are also court rulings that were pro-―fair use‖. Nevertheless, fair<br />

use justifications were not strong enough in a variety of cases regarding anticircumvention<br />

rules under DMCA. The use of pre-described contracts has also<br />

been addressed by the U.S. courts with the principle of preventing contracts with<br />

unbalanced bargain power but preemption doctrine has not yet recognized.<br />

It is inevitable that maintaining the scope of fair use to promote access to<br />

valuable knowledge is even more important in developing countries like Armenia<br />

48 COHEN has noted that ―if society values the fair use limits on copyright protection, it would be<br />

entirely logical to forbid or limit the ability to contract around them -particularly where the terms<br />

are non-negotiated and bind large numbers of consumers" (J. Cohen, <strong>WIPO</strong> Copyright Treaty<br />

Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive?, EIPR, Issue 5, 1999, 240)<br />

49 L. Lessig, supra note 19, at 100.<br />

50 S. Dusollier, Y. Poullet and M. Buydens, Copyright and Access to Information in the Digital<br />

Environment, (2000) .


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 17<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

and Vietnam. Both countries have ratified anti-circumvention rules but exception<br />

clause should be introduced and monitored. To protect fair users in those two<br />

developing countries, it is also recommendable to apply the pre-emption doctrine in<br />

case of conflict between fair use doctrine and contract law.<br />

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F. M. ABBOTT, T. COTTIER and F. GURRY, The International Intellectual<br />

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light of the expansion of electronic commerce, Trafford, Victoria, B.C. 2005<br />

P. AKESTER, A Practical Guide to Digital Copyright, Thomson-Sweet &<br />

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P. AKESTER and F. LIMA, The Economic Dimension of the Digital<br />

Challenge: A Copyright Perspective, IPQ, 2005, 69-81<br />

E. BARENDT, Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press, 2005<br />

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C. GEIGER, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright<br />

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M. LI, Fair use of Copyrighted Works in the Digital Age, Collection of<br />

Research Papers, Master of Laws in Intellectual Property, Turin, Italy, 2007<br />

J. LITMAN, Digital Copyright, Prometheus Books, New York, 2006<br />

A. LUCAS, Applicable Law in Copyright Infringement Cases in the Digital<br />

Environment, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin, October - December 2005,<br />

http://portal.unesco.org<br />

L. LUO, Legal Protection of Technological Measure in China, in EIPR Issue<br />

2. 2006, 100-105<br />

G. MAZZIOTTI, EU digital copyright law and the end-user, Springer,<br />

Berlin, 2008<br />

R. MOFFAT, Rethinking Contractual Restrictions on Fair Use: Preemption<br />

and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, (2007), <<br />

http://works.bepress.com/viva_moffat/1><br />

R.T. NIMMER, Google Print Library Project” – Unfair Use of Copyright / J.<br />

BAND, M. SCHRUERS, Grokster in the International Arena, The Merits of<br />

Grokster (U.S.) and Sharman (Australia) compared.<br />

M. SCHOLOSSER, Fair Use in the Digital Environment, The Alert<br />

Collector, A Research Guide, volume 46, issue 1, 11-17<br />

P. SCHONNING, Internet and the Applicable Copyright Law: A<br />

Scandinavian Perspective, in EIPR, 1999, 45 ff.


Khanh Pham and Shushik Mkhitaryan 19<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

S. STOKES, Digital copyright: law and practice, Hart Publishing, Oxford,<br />

2009<br />

M. WALLACE, The Information Society Directive (UK implementation): the<br />

end of educational and research use of digital works?,<br />

(<br />

H. WIESE, The Justification of the Copyright System in the Digital Age, in<br />

24 EIPR 2002, 387 ff.<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong>, <strong>WIPO</strong> Intellectual Property on the Internet: A Survey of Issues,<br />

http://ecommerce.wipo.int, 2002


COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED<br />

RIGHTS IN MUSIC – A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND<br />

GHANAIAN SYSTEM<br />

by<br />

Alfred Kumi-Atiemo<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

1.1. Abstract<br />

1.2. Background : Why Writing the Topic<br />

1.3. Definition of Copyright and Related Rights<br />

1.4. Purpose of Copyright and Related Rights<br />

2. WHY THE NEED FOR COPYRIGHT COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT<br />

2.1. History of Collective Management Organisations<br />

2.2. Objectives/Functions of Collective Management Organisations<br />

2.3. Legal Statutes - UK<br />

2.4. Legal Statutes - Ghana<br />

2.5. Structures of Collective Management Organisations<br />

3. DOCUMENTATION - REPERTOIRE<br />

3.1. National Repertoire<br />

3.2. Foreign Repertoire<br />

3.3. The Works of Authors who do not belong to Collective<br />

Management<br />

Societies and the Works of Unknown Authors<br />

3.4. The Global Repertoire<br />

4. CLIENTS – RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS<br />

4.1. Contract with Clients<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY


22 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

1.1. Abstract<br />

Collective management of authors‘ rights has been seen as indispensable<br />

method of exploiting creative works. The system has worked over a century and<br />

half in developed countries in the creative industry especially in developing the<br />

music industry. However, in spite of the support and technical assistance for the<br />

developing world including African countries to set up and manage collective<br />

management organisations; it has been relatively difficult task for countries in Sub-<br />

Saharan Africa like Ghana to succeed. The essence of the paper is to do a<br />

comparative case study of collective management societies (CMS) in developed<br />

and developing countries with particular reference to the United Kingdom and<br />

Ghana and see if there are some best practices (lessons) that can be learnt from the<br />

developed world. It is the desire of the author as part of the recommendations at the<br />

end of the research paper that there will be an international treaty such as the<br />

TRIPS Agreement 1 or a special treaty of the Berne Convention 2 to govern the<br />

activities of collective management societies (CMS). 3 Since the World Intellectual<br />

Property Organisation (<strong>WIPO</strong>) guidelines for CMS has not been helpful particular<br />

to developing countries such as Ghana.<br />

1.2. Background: Why Writing the Topic. 4<br />

As stated in the abstract, collective management of authors‘ rights has been<br />

seen as indispensable method of exploiting creative works. The system has worked<br />

over a century and half in developed countries and has helped the development of<br />

the music industry. The World Intellectual Property Organisation (<strong>WIPO</strong>) 5 and its<br />

developing partners such as United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural<br />

Organisation (UNESCO), the International Confederation of Societies of Authors,<br />

Composers (CISAC) and collective management societies in developed countries<br />

have given support and technical assistance to African countries to set up collective<br />

management societies for effective management of copyright and related rights.<br />

However, in spite of the support and technical assistance to developing countries to<br />

collectively license, collect and distribute royalties on behalf of right owners, it<br />

has been relatively difficult task for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa like Ghana to<br />

1<br />

The TRIPS Agreement stands for the Agreement Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property<br />

Rights.<br />

2<br />

Article 20 of the Berne Convention (1971) provides ―… countries reserve the right to enter into<br />

special agreements…‖<br />

3<br />

Wherever collective management societies or (CMS) is used it also refers to Collective<br />

Management Organisations (CMOs) and are used interchangeable.<br />

4<br />

Interest of the author in the research.<br />

5<br />

Hereinafter, the World Intellectual Property shall be referred to as [<strong>WIPO</strong>].


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 23<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

succeed. 6 Such societies are often accused of lack of efficiency, transparency and<br />

abuse of incumbency due to the “de facto or de jury monopoly‖ they enjoy.<br />

This has generated various uprising and ‗factionalism‘ among rightholders<br />

especially in the music industry in Africa who are constantly agitating for reforms<br />

and formation of other competitive societies. In Ghana efforts, however, to set up<br />

rivalry societies 7 has not succeeded as a result of constitutional issues and the need<br />

to amend the Copyright law whilst Nigeria saw a number of court cases between<br />

the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) and various stakeholders who<br />

attempted to set up rivalry societies but could not secure approval from the NCC. 8<br />

Section 32B of the Nigerian Copyright Act (as amended in 1999) made it a<br />

prerequisite for approval by the Nigerian Copyright Commission for the operation<br />

of a collective management organisation in Nigeria. 9 It was also noted in two<br />

landmarks Nigerian case law that “no collective society could operate as such<br />

unless it was approved under the relevant legal provisions. 10<br />

The focus of the paper therefore is to do a comparative study of collective<br />

management societies in developed and developing countries systems with<br />

particular reference to the United Kingdom and Ghana and see the sort of lessons<br />

that can be learnt from the developed world. 11<br />

The choice of the author of the British system is as a result of the long<br />

standing relationship between the two countries since the 19 th century. Indeed the<br />

legal system in the United Kingdom has influenced the development of the<br />

Ghanaian legal system. 12 The paper will focus on CMS in the music industry<br />

because of the potential the industry holds for Ghana and the Sub-Saharan Africa<br />

6 CMS system has failed in Ghana and there is the need to rebuild the system. See Poku Adusei, The<br />

Evolution of Ghana‘s Copyright Regime Since Independence: A Critical Appraisal published in<br />

Ghana Law Since Independence, History, Development and Prospects, UGFL 2007 p11et seq.<br />

7 Ibid p25, Musicians such as Charles Amoah, Rex Omar and Carlos Sakyi et al. played leading role<br />

in the fight for rival societies.<br />

8 For further reading see, See John Asein, Nigeria Copyright Law and Practice, Abuja, 2004.<br />

9 The Musical Society Nigeria Ltd. was not approved to operate as a collective management<br />

organisation.<br />

10 See Musical Copyright Society Nigeria Ltd. v. Details Nigeria Ltd. (Suit No. FHC/L/ICS/434/95)<br />

and Musical Copyright Society Nigeria Ltd. v. Ade Okin Records (Suit No. FHC/L/CS/216/96)<br />

The law in Ghana now has been amended for rightholders desiring to form a society to seek<br />

approval from the sector minister. However, commentators are arguing that the power struggle<br />

problem which confronted other developing countries like Nigeria would soon be experienced in<br />

Ghana.<br />

11 The author is mindful of the fact that collective societies operating in the two countries operate in<br />

heterogeneous environments and can therefore not be compared. However, the choice of the two<br />

countries is as a result of the long standing socio-political, legal and economic relationship between<br />

them as stated in the subsequent paragraph.<br />

12 For in-depth study on the relation between the two legal systems see supra 6, p11-12. See also<br />

Marisella Ouma, Copyright and the Music Industry in Africa, in JWIP2004 p919. Poku Adusei,<br />

Kwame Anyimadu-Antwi and Naana Halm in Africa Copyright & Access to Knowledge Ghana<br />

Country Report 2008.


24 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

as a whole. 13 In Africa, music is seen as a way of life and like other cultural<br />

industries, it can be a source of wealth, music is seen as a kind of “cultural gold,”<br />

for developing countries if well managed. 14<br />

1.3. Definition of Copyright and Related Rights<br />

Copyright is a form of intellectual property (IP) which protect authors‘ and<br />

artists‘ creative expression. Legislatures and courts have consistently interpreted<br />

the term ―expression‖ to exclude the protection of ideas or methods of operation<br />

that might be embodied in an expressive work.15<br />

There exist related rights to, or ―neighbouring on,‖ copyright. Works of the<br />

mind ―copyright‖ are created in order to be disseminated among as many people as<br />

possible, however, this cannot be done generally by the author him/herself, it<br />

requires intermediaries whose professional capability gives the works those forms<br />

of presentation that are appropriate to make accessible to a wider public. All<br />

persons who make use of literary, artistic or scientific works in order to make them<br />

publicly accessible to others require their own protection against the illegal use of<br />

their contributions in the process of communicating the work to the public. 16 These<br />

include performers, producers of phonogram and broadcasting organisations,<br />

however, their contributions are not creative enough to meet the requirement of<br />

copyright, and hence, protection is attempted by means of related rights to<br />

copyright. These rights are generally referred to as related rights or neighbouring<br />

rights. 17<br />

1.4. Purpose of Copyright and Related Rights<br />

The objective of copyright is the protection not only of the creators of work<br />

but also promotion, enrichment and dissemination of the national cultural heritage.<br />

Copyright constitutes an essential element in the developmental process of a<br />

country and its development to a large extent depends on the creativity of its<br />

people. Encouragement of individual creativity and its dissemination is a sine qua<br />

non for progress. 18<br />

13<br />

The principles as discussed can be applied to other category of protected works as well.<br />

14<br />

Supra note 12 Ouma, p. 920.<br />

15<br />

For further reading on copyright, works protected and types of rights granted by copyright see<br />

Fredrick M. Abbott, Thomas H. Cottier and Francis Gurry, International Intellectual Property in an<br />

Integrated World Economy, Aspen Publishers, 2007 p413et seq., also see provisions of article 2 –<br />

18 of the Berne Convention.<br />

16<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, Geneva p.47.<br />

17<br />

Whenever the term copyright is used, it should be understood to refer to both copyright and<br />

related rights.<br />

18 Supra note 16 p41.


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 25<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. WHY THE NEED FOR COPYRIGHT COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT<br />

2.1. History<br />

Historically, collective management organisation (CMO) was introduced as<br />

early as the 19 th century for musical works whose authors were clearly powerless<br />

to control their use individually. 19 The foundation of the very first society was<br />

closely linked to the named of Beaumarchais. He led the legal battles against<br />

theaters which were reluctant to recognize and respect authors economic and moral<br />

rights. Those victorious battles, led, on his initiative, to the foundation of the<br />

Bureau de législation dramatique in 1777, which was later transformed into the<br />

Société des auteurs et compositteurs dramatiques (SACD), the first society dealing<br />

with the collective administration of authors‘ right.<br />

This encouraged Honoré de Balzac, Alexandra Dumas, Victor Hugo and<br />

other French writers to follow suit in the field of literary more than half a century<br />

later when they constituted the Société des gens de letters (SGDL) whose general<br />

assembly met, for the first time, at the end of 1837. 20<br />

However, the events leading to a fully developed collective administration<br />

started only in 1847 when two composers, Paul Henrion and Victor Parizot and a<br />

writer, Ernest Bourquet, supported by their publisher, brought a lawsuit against<br />

“Ambassadeurs”, a ―café-concert‖ in the Avenue des Champs-Elsyées in Paris.<br />

They saw a flagrant contradiction in the fact that they had to pay for their seats and<br />

meals in the “Ambassadeurs”, whereas nobody had the intention of paying for<br />

their works performed by the orchestra. They took the brave and logical decision<br />

that they would not pay as long as they were not paid as well. In the litigation, the<br />

authors won; the owner of the “Ambassadeur” was obliged to pay a substantial<br />

amount of fees.<br />

Enormous new possibilities were opened for the composers and text-writers<br />

of non-dramatic musical works by that court decision. It was clear, however, that<br />

they would not be able to control and enforce their newly identified rights<br />

individually. The realization led to the foundation of a collecting agency in 1850,<br />

which was soon replaced by the still functioning ―Société des auteurs,<br />

compositteurs et éditeur de musique” (SACEM). 21<br />

At the end of the 19 th century and during the first decades of the 20 th century,<br />

similar authors‘ organisations (so-called performing rights societies) were formed<br />

19 The first authors‘ societies that were more than mere professional associations of authors and also<br />

fought for the recognition of authors‘ rights in their works were established in France.<br />

20 According to Paul Florence in the Management of Authors‘ Rights and Neighbouring Rights in<br />

Europe, in RIDA 2003, SGDL now has the status of association.<br />

21 The historic account of Collective management is quoted as Dr. Mihály Ficsor gave in Collective<br />

Management of Copyright and Related Rights, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong>, Geneva 2002 p18-19.


26 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

in nearly all European countries and in some other countries as well. Cooperation<br />

developed rapidly among those organisations and they felt a need for an<br />

international body to coordinate their activities and contribute to a more efficient<br />

protection of authors‘ rights throughout the world. It was in June 1926 that the<br />

delegates from 18 societies set up the International Confederation of Societies of<br />

Authors and Composers (CISAC). The membership of CISAC has been constantly<br />

widening since then and now also includes, in addition to the more traditional ones,<br />

societies dealing with other types of works (such as works of fine art and<br />

audiovisual works. 22<br />

2.2. Objectives/Functions of Collective Management Organisations<br />

Authors and performers can choice from a whole range of methods of<br />

management adapted to the nature of work and performance, and the rights<br />

conferred by such works and performance; and the status of the author or<br />

performer. Some of them manage their interests themselves, although uncommon,<br />

some may also use the services of ―agents‖ 23 to act as intermediary between them<br />

and users. Even so, the laws protecting rightholders have not disregarded individual<br />

management: controls on contractual practices have been established in order to<br />

protect authors, who are considered to be the weak party in negotiations concerning<br />

their economic rights. Some laws have also provided a protective framework for<br />

exploitation contracts involving neighbouring rights where the ordinary law of<br />

contracts did not seem sufficient on its own.<br />

However, experience has shown that in certain cases, individual management<br />

is unable to meet the requirements of the exploitation of works and performances,<br />

especially where secondary use of works and performances are concerned, even<br />

within an organized contractual framework. This is particularly true in the case of<br />

musical works whose reproduction and performance cannot be controlled<br />

individually due to the number of frequency of such acts and the variety of<br />

communication channels. 24 When a work appears on the market, the public starts to<br />

take interest in it. The disks or cassettes sold commercially are sooner or later used<br />

22 For in-depth information on the activities and contributions of CISAC to the growth and<br />

development of collective management over the years, visit the CISAC<br />

http://www.cisac.org/CisacPortal/security.do;jsessionid=C44C52A97DC654ED6A6C418EF6C204<br />

66?method=before (date last accessed 18 th February, 2010).<br />

23 There are various types of agents that can be used in the making of a work or performance<br />

available to the public, notable amongst them in the music industry is the services of publishers or<br />

phonogram producers. Their activities and the important role they play, the author hopes to discuss<br />

in another forum.as it is beyong the scope of this paper.<br />

24 The advent of new technology such as the internet makes the situation much complicated. For an<br />

in-depth analysis of this challenges see, inter alia, Marco Ricolfi, Individual and Collective<br />

Management of Copyright in the Digital Environment, in Paul Torremans (edited by) Copyright<br />

Law: A Handbook Contemporary Research, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007, p283et seq.;<br />

published work 2008, M.M. Frabboni, Online Music Licensing, the calm after the storm,<br />

Entertainment Law Review, 2006, 17 (2), p65-69.


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 27<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

for the purposes of broadcasting and/or public performance in restaurants, hotels,<br />

shops and other public places. The author or composer is rarely consulted; the work<br />

follows, so to speak ―the law of the market‖. 25<br />

The authors or composers have realized they are completely unable to<br />

monitor what happened to their works that were published. They had the choice<br />

between resigning to their fate – considering the uses of their works as the<br />

appendage of the success of the sales of copies – or defending their rights. 26 On the<br />

other hand given the scope of usage of music outside the private sphere – for<br />

purposes of public performance, broadcasting programmes or production of<br />

phonograms, rightholder could look for publishers who would act as intermediaries<br />

between creators and the public.<br />

According to the legal provisions, user organisations are obliged to contact<br />

authors in advance so as to know whether, how many times and under what<br />

financial conditions the composers and/or authors would consent to their works<br />

being performed or broadcast. However, users found this a difficult task seeking<br />

clearance from rightholders who were scattered all over the world and where they<br />

were able to make such contacts, experience shows that most composers never<br />

responded to those contacts. 27 It should therefore be noted that such a method<br />

would quite simply be absurd. The use of music for the masses requires a special<br />

service where the copyrights are gathered together by one person or organisation,<br />

thereby allowing users to respect them more easily. This need for specialized<br />

organisation in the form of concentration of copyrights, one-stop-shop 28 , where<br />

such clearance can be obtained, facilitated the need for collective management<br />

organisations or societies. Collective management societies on behalf of members<br />

simply the procedure for “negotiations, calculation of fees and facilitate access to<br />

works and distribute royalties to its members,” consequently reduce administrative<br />

cost for both rightholders and users. 29 Collective management societies are<br />

therefore in a better position in establishing appropriate and efficient monitoring<br />

and fee calculation mechanisms which would work in favour of both their members<br />

and clients. Thus, in conclusion, tracing the owners and obtaining permission was<br />

not necessary when the client knows there exist such one stop-shop in its<br />

operational territory, as they ameliorate the cumbersome tracing problem.<br />

25<br />

The law of demand and supply in economics.<br />

26<br />

As narrated the history of collective management above, this struggle for defense led to Paul<br />

Henrion et al. with the support of their publisher, bringing a lawsuit against “Ambassadeurs”, a<br />

―café-concert‖ in the Avenue des Champs-Elsyées in Paris in 1847.<br />

27<br />

See Dr. Ulrich Uchteenhagen in Copyright Collective Management in Music, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong><br />

No. 789(E) p.12.<br />

28<br />

Supra 24, as stated, the advent of the information age has created serious challenges to<br />

rightholders. To overcome this, major corporations are using a centralised form of license for online<br />

music. A typical example is the Warner/Chappell Music Launches initiative for Pan-European<br />

Digital Licensing (P.E.D.L.) which is discussed later.<br />

29<br />

Major users of services of corporate firms are often referred to as clients so the article will refer to<br />

users of copyright works as clients of CMS. This will be explained in chapter 4 below.


28 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2.3. Legal Statutes: Nature & Status of Collective Management Organisation –<br />

UK<br />

Before we look at the legal statutes in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ghana<br />

governing collective societies, it will be appropriate to comment briefly on the<br />

nature and status of CMS in general as they differ from one jurisdiction to the<br />

other. The nature and status of CMS may differ in various respects depending on<br />

the choice of legal regime involved. They differ in respect of the form and the<br />

extent of governmental supervision, whether as private, public or semi-public<br />

societies. CMS also differ in respect of the scope and the types of rights they<br />

manage. Some mange exclusively performing rights, some manage a combination<br />

of performing rights and mechanical reprographic rights whilst in other countries<br />

especially developing countries CMS mange works in all categories, ―trilogy‖ of<br />

economic rights. 30 Finally, CMS differ in respect of whether they are the only CMS<br />

in the jurisdiction responsible for the management of the rights, ―de facto or de jury<br />

monopoly” or there are more than one such organisation in the field. 31<br />

Collective management began in the UK early in the twentieth century when<br />

it was also realized that in many circumstances it was virtually impossible for an<br />

individual owner of an intellectual property right to police all potentially infringing<br />

uses. This gave rise to the idea of collective licensing, whereby rights were<br />

assigned to a society or such a society was given the right to grant licenses on<br />

behalf of the right-owner and to enforce those rights against infringers. The UK<br />

Copyright Act 1911 gave impetus and even before the Act was adopted the<br />

Mechanical Copyright Licenses Copyright Ltd. (MECOLICO) was formed in order<br />

to collect and distribute mechanical royalties from the gramophone companies. 32<br />

Soon afterwards, in 1914, the Performing Rights Society Ltd. (PRS) saw the light<br />

of the day with the specific aim to collectively administer public performance<br />

rights in musical works. 33 A role, PRS has up-to-date successfully played on behalf<br />

of its members and went to court whenever the need arose to enforce the rights of<br />

its members and principals. 34 Collective management organisation in UK has<br />

always been private and there had been various societies which were incorporated<br />

after PRS to administer other category of works subject to the statutory regulatory<br />

30 Supra note 27, p.18.<br />

31 For some examples of each type see Dr. Mihály Ficsor supra note 26, p38 et seq.<br />

32 Gramophone Co. Ltd. v. Stephen Cawardine & Co. [1934] gave credence to development of<br />

collective licensing in UK. For chronological account of the development of CMS in the UK see<br />

Paul L.C. Torremans, Collective Management in the United Kingdom (and Ireland), in Daniel<br />

Gervais (edited by) Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, Kluwer Law<br />

International, 2006, p227et seq.<br />

33 For historic account of PRS incorporation see<br />

http://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/AboutMCPS-PRS/PRSMEMART.pdf (last<br />

visited 3 rd February, 2010)<br />

34 To cite a few case law to support the assertion: - Performing Rights Society v. Hammonds<br />

Bradford Brewery Co. Ltd. [1935] AII ER 270; Jennings v. Stephens [1936] AII ER 409 and<br />

Performing Rights Society v. Harlequin Record Shop Ltd. [1972] 2 AII ER 828.


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 29<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

authority. 35 It is worth mentioning that the Mechanical Copyright Society Ltd.<br />

(MCPS) and the Performing Right Society (PRS) entered into an alliance, known<br />

as the MCPS-PRS Alliance, which became operational in 1997. The MCPS-PRS<br />

Alliance was further rebranded as “PRS for Music” in January, 2009.<br />

For purposes of this paper, the focus will be on societies relating to the music<br />

industry, particularly PRS for Music, and currently operating as CMS.<br />

2.4. Legal Statutes: Nature & Status of Collective Management Organisation –<br />

Ghana<br />

Although Ghana, since early the twentieth century, has legal framework<br />

concerning the protection of intellectual property rights including copyright and<br />

related right; the concept of collective management of rights was introduced in<br />

1986 following the enactment of the Copyright Law, 1985 (PNDCL 110). Ghana<br />

like all other English speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were colonized by<br />

Britain, the UK therefore applied the Copyright Act of 1911 and subsequent Acts<br />

to all the colonies. Ghana for instance had the Copyright Ordinance, 1914 (CAP<br />

126) with its enabling Copyright Regulations 1918, the Ordinance sought to carry<br />

into effect within the colony the fore mention British Copyright Act. After<br />

independence in 1957, not much was done to enact Ghana‘s own laws, the common<br />

law system was carried over with a mere cosmetic changes. 36 The 19661Copyright<br />

Act (Act 85) and the Copyright (Fee) Regulation of 1969 (L.I. 174) respectively<br />

therefore borrowed the UK Copyright Act of 1956 which remained in force until<br />

1985. The Act 85 and its L.I. only added more materials as far as protectable<br />

subject matter of copyright was concerned.<br />

As a result of technological challenges which confronted copyright protection<br />

in the 70s and 80s, Ghana enacted its own copyright law P.N.D.C Law 110 of<br />

1985 37 to meet the demands of the challenges and also to take into cognizance<br />

international norms such as provisions of the Berne Convention and the Rome<br />

Convention. Section 42 of the PNDCL 110 made provision for “the establishment<br />

of a non-profit making society of body corporate which shall, among other things,<br />

be responsible for authors, the promotion and protection of the interest of authors<br />

and, in particular the collection and distribution of any royalties or other<br />

remuneration accruing to authors in respect of their rights as was provided under<br />

the law”. In pursuant to that mandate a semi-quasi society, the Copyright Society<br />

of Ghana (COSGA) was set up in 1986 and like other developing countries,<br />

35 Section 128A of the English Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 ("the Act") confer such<br />

statutory regulatory authority on the Secretary of State.<br />

36 Supra note 6, Adusei p13-24 and note 12, Ouma p921-923.<br />

37 P.N.D.C Law 110 of 1985 has since been repealed by the enactment of Copyright Act 690 of<br />

2005. The Act 690 took into consideration Ghana‘s obligation under the TRIPS Agreement and<br />

other international treaties such as the <strong>WIPO</strong> Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the <strong>WIPO</strong> Performances<br />

and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).


30 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

COSGA, managed works in all categories. 38 COSGA enjoyed both “de facto or de<br />

jury monopoly” as the law and regulation made provision for a single society to<br />

administer all categories of works. 39 There were two great setbacks to the<br />

substantive law and the regulation which are:- one, the lack of possibilities for the<br />

formation of several collective societies to the promotion and protection of<br />

different creators. 40 The interest of literary authors are entirely different from the<br />

interest of musical, artistic authors etc., therefore such unrelated interests been put<br />

together to be administered by a single society as stated above rather achieved a<br />

detrimental result for creators. COSGA has not been able to organize its general<br />

assembly after a failed General Assembly in 1992 elected a literary author as its<br />

president which music composers opposed. COSGA only ended up administering<br />

public performance of music right owners. Again, lack of a provision in the law for<br />

a supervisory authority to supervise the activities of COSGA, accounts for<br />

accusations and counter accusations against the operation of the society. This has<br />

affected public image of COSGA and its overall performance. Nonetheless, these<br />

anomalies have been corrected by the Copyright Act, 2005 (Act 690); the Act<br />

provides for formation of several collective societies to the promotion and<br />

protection of different creators. 41 It also gives the Minister of Justice the<br />

responsibility to make regulation and supervise the activities of CMS so formed. 42<br />

Again the Act provides for a Copyright Tribunal to settle disputes such as license<br />

schemes, tariff related disputes etc. 43 , 44 with the activities of the Tribunal subject to<br />

appeal. 45 The provision for an appeal by an aggrieved party is informed by abuse of<br />

power and biases which such tribunals in African are often accused of.<br />

2.5. Structures of Collective Management Organisations<br />

The structures of collective management organisations are relatively the<br />

same, the structure however, differ slightly depending on the choice of its<br />

38<br />

COSGA operated under the P.N.D.C Law 110 of 1985 between 1986 and 1992 until the<br />

regulation governing the activities of COSGA, the Copyright Society of Ghana Regulations 1992,<br />

L.I.1527 was promulgated in 1992.<br />

39<br />

There is no significant judicial pronouncement s in the development of collective management of<br />

authors‘ rights in Ghana. The only case law that can be cited is Copyright Society of Ghana v.<br />

Afreh [1999-2000] 1 GLR 135.<br />

40<br />

L.I.1527 Regulation 2 of the LI states the objects of the COSGA as:-<br />

(a) to represent and protect the professional, economic, moral and other interests of authors of<br />

literary, musical, artistic, dramatic and other works.<br />

(b) to serve as a collecting society for the collective administration of copyright of the members of<br />

the Society.<br />

41<br />

Section 49(a) of Act 690 (Act 205)<br />

42<br />

Section 49(c)<br />

43<br />

Sections 51-58<br />

44<br />

Supra note 35 Sections 145-151 also provides for Copyright Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The<br />

Tribunal has the right pursuant to 128(A) and (B) also to make decision on licensing schemes, it<br />

may either confirm or vary a license or licensing scheme section 128 B(3). The decisions of the<br />

Tribunal is also subject to an appeal to the High Court pursuant to s. 152 of the Act<br />

45<br />

Supra note 43Section 58


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 31<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

regulation, legal regime involved and the form and the extent of governmental<br />

supervision, whether as private, public or semi-public societies. A general structure<br />

of a CMS consist of a general assembly constituted by members and principals of<br />

the CMS which elect a board, president or chairpersons, committees appointed by<br />

the board; general administration/commission headed by a chief executive officer<br />

which run the day-to-day affairs of the CMS. It also determines the procedures<br />

through which authors become members and principals of the CMS and how works<br />

are assigned to a CMS concerned. Details of the structure of PRS for Music are part<br />

of the PRS Rules and Regulations 46 whilst that of COSGA can be found in the<br />

COSGA Regulation. 47<br />

3. DOCUMENTATION – REPERTOIRE<br />

3.1. National Repertoire<br />

The repertoire of a CMS means all the works for which the society is entitled<br />

to grant to third parties, administer or grant its clients authorization for use. For a<br />

society to operate successfully without any limitation to the content of its<br />

repertoire, it must hold the global repertoire where it is able to encompass not only<br />

works of its nationals but also works originating from all countries and the<br />

continents. This begins with the national repertoire, i.e. works created or published<br />

by the specific members and principals of the society. The society is obliged to<br />

prove which authors it represents, its status and capacity to represent authors,<br />

composers and publishers.<br />

A good CMS must from the onset concentrate all its efforts on keeping a<br />

repertoire which is as complete as possible. To achieve this, authors must be aware<br />

of the existence and functions of their national society and furthermore be<br />

convinced to enroll with the CMS as principals and subsequently become<br />

members. Trust in the CMS is a major factor and the level of management of its<br />

documentation. The PRS for Music over the years has been able to establish and<br />

built that level of trust and confidence required as a corporate body to operate, its<br />

membership now stands at about 65,000. 48 In Ghana, it has not only been difficult<br />

to tell the membership of and the repertoire COSGA holds at the moment, its<br />

membership is also dwindling each day in and day out. This can be attributed to<br />

lack of proper filing system and accountability which affect most organisations in<br />

developing countries. It is difficult to readily ascertain the total number of works<br />

46 Source see:-http://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/AboutMCPS-<br />

PRS/PRSRULES.pdf (date last accessed 19 th February, 2010).<br />

47 Supra note 40 Regulation 3-14.<br />

48 Source PRS for Music website for membership information<br />

www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Membership/MA2andannexes.pdf (date last<br />

accessed 10 th February, 2010).


32 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

which have been assigned to COSGA) by its members. 49 Members of COSGA<br />

have also lost trust in the society due to accusations of alleged lack of transparency<br />

and accountability and this has subsequently affected the quality of the relationship<br />

COSGA has as members and principals are no longer interested in assigning news<br />

works or updating their records with the society. These have also affected the<br />

relationship COSGA has with its major clients as most of its clients year after year<br />

feel no longer obliged to pay attention to renewing or signing new contracts with<br />

the society or pay royalties for the works they use. The above description has<br />

characterised the operations of CMS not only in Ghana but in some developing<br />

countries. COSGA and CMS in some developing countries can therefore learn<br />

from their counterparts in the developed world how to build and establish trust<br />

required to operate as corporate bodies with their principals, members, clients and<br />

the general public within their operational environment.<br />

3.2. Foreign Repertoire<br />

The rights relating to foreign repertoires are conferred as part of the<br />

―reciprocal representation contracts‖ which the national CMS signs with foreign<br />

sister societies. These contracts signed between societies which are based on the<br />

CISAC and BIEM models 50 have come under close scrutiny especially by antitrust<br />

bodies, in the EU in particular, as the terms and conditions of such agreement are<br />

seen as anti competitive. The scrutiny is beyond the scope of this paper. 51 The<br />

reciprocal representation contract itself does not give a society the mandate to<br />

represent other societies in its territory. It is other well developed international<br />

documentation such as the CISAC CAP/IPI documentation which contained<br />

detailed information on the foreign authors, composers and publishers a society<br />

represents. 52 This information system which is shared amongst CMS assists in<br />

administering foreign repertoire.<br />

49<br />

COSGA still uses paper filling system and the same declaration forms used since its inception<br />

1986.<br />

50<br />

Articles 1-3 of the CISAC model agreement define the rules of governing such reciprocal<br />

agreement.<br />

51<br />

For in-depth analysis of reciprocal agreements and the reaction of the EU Antitrust see inter alia,<br />

Enrico Bonadio, Copyright Collective Licensing and the EU initiatives in the on-line music field, in<br />

DANTe 2006, p387et seq. Also see M.M. Frabboni, The current discussion on collective<br />

management of rights in the EU, Economic Concerns, paper presented at the Workshop on the Law<br />

and Economics of Intellectual Property and Information Technology, July 22-23 2005, Universitá<br />

Carlo Cattaneo Castellanza LIUC 7 (available at<br />

http://www.liuc.it/ricerca/istitutoecomicsjuly2005/papers/frabboni_LIUCpaper.pdf), M.M.<br />

Frabboni, Cross Border Licensing and Collective Management: A Proposal for the On-Line<br />

Context, in Entertainment Law Review, 2005, 16 (8), 204.<br />

52<br />

CAP means ―composers, authors and publishers‖ whilst IPI stands for Interested Party<br />

Information. They contain relevant information relating to authors, composers and publishers who<br />

are affiliated to CMS as members and principals. For detailed discussions on what constitute such<br />

documentation system and how it works, see supra note 27 Uchtenhagen, p58-67.


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 33<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

CMOs in Europe including PRS for Music have over the years utilised such<br />

reciprocal agreements to widen its repertoire and licensing even into the online<br />

music field. This includes but not limited to the Simulcasting Agreement signed on<br />

16 th November, 2000 by CMS. The Simulcasting Agreement which included PRS<br />

for Music had 31 countries; this was followed by the Webcasting Agreement in<br />

2003. It is also worth mentioning the Santiago Agreement signed in October,<br />

2000 53 as some of the many of such reciprocal agreements. The PRS for Music has<br />

been involved in all these reciprocal agreements and many more and now is in a<br />

position to grant Pan-European licensing for European repertoire which cover the<br />

EU member states. Two of such initiatives of late which PRS for Music is involved<br />

are “the Pan-European Digital Licensing Initiative (PEDL”) and “the Centralised<br />

European Licensing and Administrative Service (CELAS). The PEDL initiative was<br />

launched in June 2006 by Warner Chappell Publishing, European CMS<br />

representing author and music publishers were invited to join. Some of the CMS<br />

which joined the initiative were PRS for Music (UK), STIM (Sweden), SACEM<br />

(France), SGAE (Spain), BUMA-STEMRA (the Netherlands). These CMS were<br />

designated as non-exclusive licensing agents of Warner/Chappell Music for the<br />

mechanical rights 54 of its Anglo-American repertoire. Licenses are granted on a<br />

short term basis (1-2 years) and tariffs are based on the country of destination. In<br />

principle, any European CMS may join the initiative, provided it complies with a<br />

set of specific criteria intended to ensure transparency, efficiency and<br />

accountability. 55<br />

The CELAS GmbH is also a new entity which was established in 2007, based<br />

in Munich, and is jointly owned by the German CMS, Gema and by the UK CMS<br />

PRS for Music. CELAS was set up to also provide cross-border licensing and<br />

administration services on a pan-European basis to right holders for on-line and<br />

mobile exploitations. The entity is theoretically “open for all types of right<br />

holders”; however, currently it only licenses the mechanical rights of EMI music<br />

Anglo-American repertoire. The licenses cover all interactive and some noninteractive<br />

forms of exploitation, including ring-tones, downloads, streaming and<br />

web-casting. In 2008 CELAS entered into agreements with several commercial<br />

users, including 7Digital, iTunes, Nokia, Real and Omnifone. By the end of<br />

January 2009, licenses have been granted to more than 20 of the largest digital<br />

providers in Europe 56 .<br />

53 For information about the pros and cons of each of these agreements and how they were received<br />

by antitrust bodies, clients and members of CMS involved see Bonadio, supra note 51 p395 -399.<br />

54 Mechanical rights means a piece of music reproduced as a physical product.<br />

55 For further reading on ―the Pan-European Digital Licensing Initiative (PEDL‖)<br />

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pwwi/is_200606/ai_n16451812/ (last visited 18 th February,<br />

2010).<br />

56 For further reading on the Centralised European Licensing and Administrative Service (CELAS)<br />

see http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=aabcf6cf-9152-4dd7-b8d5fb3faf9834fc


34 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

COSGA like most developing countries‘ societies began very well from its<br />

initial stages with a number of reciprocal representative agreements with foreign<br />

societies which were members of CISAC. But the competence to manage its owner<br />

repertoire has dwindled with time, COSGA has not been able to analyse or<br />

exchange any of the documentations mentioned above with sister societies.<br />

Although sister societies constantly send documentation on their repertoires to<br />

COSGA, the latter has not been able to analyse, administer, nor send its own to<br />

other societies. 57<br />

3.3. The works of Authors who do not belong to Collective Management<br />

Societies and The Works of Unknown Authors<br />

Clients such as broadcasting organisation 58 broadcast or use works created by<br />

authors and composers who may not be members and principals of CMS.<br />

Experience has shown that this practice is unavoidable as clients cannot determine,<br />

with the best will in the world, who is and who is not affiliated as members or<br />

principals of a CMS. Nor can clients easily determine which society to seek<br />

authorisation from for works of authors who do not belong to the society concerned<br />

in its territory of operation. Clients often conclude by arguing that the authorisation<br />

to broadcast the works granted by a CMS is general in scope and covers all sorts of<br />

musical works. 59<br />

The big question is: which should the attitude be of the CMS when it<br />

discovers, in the lists of broadcast works, works created by non-member or<br />

―unknown authors‖? 60 Should the CMS remove these works on the grounds they<br />

are not part of its documented repertoire or should it by contrast include them in its<br />

distribution work?<br />

The general practice is that CMS are seen as firms established in the interest<br />

of the public to provide services to everyone and not only those who wish to use it<br />

or who are members or principals of the society. CMS thus manage works of<br />

authors who do not belong to the CMS based on a solid legal foundation:<br />

“business management without a mandate.” 61 The non-member or the unknown<br />

author cannot know what happens to his/her works and he/she is unable to act<br />

57 A search at COSGA showed a number of documentation on foreign repertoire including the<br />

repertoire of BUREAU BURKINABE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR (BBDA) i.e. the collective society<br />

of Burkina Faso.<br />

58 Whenever broadcasting organisations are referred to, it includes webcasters and<br />

organisations/individuals that commercialised copyright protected works on the internet.<br />

59 Supra note 55 and 56.<br />

60 ―Works of unknown authors‖ often termed as ―orphan works‖ are works in respect of which the<br />

right owner cannot easily be ientified and/or located.<br />

61 This is a quasi-contract relationship between two persons, one of which relies on the other in case<br />

of incapacity. Also article 3 of the Berne Convention provides the principle of ―national treatment‖.


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 35<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

him/herself. During such situation the CMS can intervene by carrying out business<br />

without a mandate, according to the legal definitions, “in order to prevent damage<br />

with which the non-member or unknown author is threatened”. The CMS then<br />

collect royalties; pay the share of royalty collected on his/her behalf, after<br />

administrative expenses have been deducted.<br />

The payment of non members or unknown authors, however, should not be<br />

subject to the condition that the author must join the CMS beforehand. The<br />

percentage of fees to be deducted must correspond to the rate applied to the<br />

management of the rights of members and principals affiliated to the CMS in the<br />

normal manner. Where the CMS manages to identify the author, it is obliged to<br />

pay the royalty within the deadlines prescribed by the applicable law. This period<br />

varies between two and five years.<br />

Whilst CMS in developed countries including PRS for Music have been able<br />

to administer works of authors who do not belong to the CMS and works of<br />

unknown authors including works of foreign origin and have created accounts for<br />

such authors, it has been very difficult to manage such works in developing<br />

country. COSGA has not been able to administer such works, collect royalties and<br />

pay the authors concerned. This is attributed to the difficulties with which COSGA<br />

has to administer works of its members and principal as it is unable to identify<br />

works of its own members and principals. As being practiced by COSGA at the<br />

moment, the minimal money paid by clients are shared among its members<br />

subjectively without sound best practice. It is therefore the wish of the author that<br />

developing countries should be assisted to overcome the administrative challenges<br />

they face in order to broadened their scope of operation. Ghana would need such<br />

technical assistance as new CMS are envisaged for all categories of copyright<br />

works under the ACT 690.<br />

3.4. The Global Repertoire<br />

Global repertoire consists, in each county, of the national or a repertoire<br />

specific to the CMS, the foreign repertoire entrusted to the CMS under reciprocal<br />

representation contracts with sister societies of other countries as discussed above.<br />

And also the works of non-members or unknown authors may be included in the<br />

repertoire through the application of business management without a mandate also<br />

discussed above. It is worth mentioning that not all states have adopted a system of<br />

―extended collective licensing, however, every CMS must be able to play its role as<br />

an intermediary between production and consumption on the music market. To<br />

play this role effectively, the CMS must be able to authorise its clients to use the<br />

global repertoire on the conditions that every effort is made to be the owner or<br />

assignor of the repertoire. A role CMS in developed world have played very well<br />

using approved international documentation system such as the CISAC CAP/IPI<br />

documentation system.<br />

Although clients in Ghana and all developing countries presume CMS in<br />

their territories possess such mandate and on that assumption use the global


36 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

repertoire, COSGA has not been able to effective manage the global repertoire as<br />

mentioned above. This is an area that needs rethinking in collective administration<br />

of such rights vis-á-vis authorisation for public performance. There is at the<br />

moment a regime of “free commercial usage musical works” by TV and radio<br />

stations 62 for economic benefits without corresponding remuneration to authors<br />

who created such works. It is worth mentioning that this practice of ―free usage of<br />

musical works‖ for commercial activities at the detriment of authors cannot, in the<br />

imagination of any fair minded person, constitute permitted or fair use under the<br />

current copyright dispensation. 63 Efforts should therefore be made to correct such<br />

practices which are not only detrimental to the creative industries but also<br />

discourages foreign investment flow into Ghana and other developing countries.<br />

It is also worth adding that whilst management of such global repertoire must<br />

be encouraged, care must be taken to ensure that agreements that would be reached<br />

between sister CMS to promote global repertoire are without ―customer allocation<br />

clauses‖ or ―territorial restriction clause.‖ 64<br />

Management of such global repertoire must, however, be encouraged without<br />

―customer allocation clauses‖ or ―territorial restriction clause.‖ 65<br />

4. CLIENTS – RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS<br />

4.1. Contract with Clients<br />

The paper will be incomplete without a comment regarding clients of CMS.<br />

Indeed - like every corporate entity - CMS have their own clients. As a matter of<br />

fact, all those who use music for professional or commercial purposes should be<br />

treated as partners of the authors‘ society in the music market – or as ―clients‖ and<br />

not as ―users‖ 66 – the word ―user‖ which has been used in the development of CMS<br />

system conveys lack of respect for these major partners who play crucial role in<br />

making authors works available to the public. Broadcasting organisation and other<br />

users relied on the consent of CMS in order to be able to carry out their duties; the<br />

clients were often seen as subservient or inferior in relation to these authors‘<br />

societies. CMS thus were often seen as awkward; in their arbitrary billing system<br />

which often left clients with missed feeling after their first contact with CMS as is<br />

62 Ghana at the moment has 47 authorised TV stations and 217 F.M. stations with total of 177 radio<br />

stations in operation. Source Ghana‘s National Communication Authority website:-<br />

http://www.nca.org.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=199&Itemid=113<br />

(visited 17 th February 2010)<br />

63 See Adusei supra note 6, p25.<br />

64 See Bonadio, supra note 51, p396 -397.<br />

65 See Bonadio, supra note 51, p396 -397.<br />

66 See Uchteenhagen, supra note 27, p12


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 37<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

being witnessed in Ghana at the moment. CMS often solely took decisions whether<br />

or not to authorise a client the use of its repertoire and fixed the royalties as they<br />

deemed fit.<br />

For decades numerous CMS, particularly in developing world, have not<br />

signed contracts with clients. Clients were unilaterally ―authorised‖ and their<br />

obligations took the form of conditions for the grant of authorisation. And in<br />

extreme cases as is still the case in Ghana, the authorisation was combined with the<br />

invoice issued after the royalty had been paid. This created tensions and<br />

disagreements which much often than not worked against CMS not only from the<br />

point of view of clients but also from the point of view of antitrust authorities, as<br />

this unilateral method of authorisation was accompanied by legal failings. As stated<br />

above, clients relation building based on trust and confidence is a major area CMS<br />

in developing countries including COSGA would need support from their<br />

developed counterparts to build to enable CMS in developing countries to succeed.<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

In conclusion, the failure of CMS in Ghana and most developing countries<br />

does not mean the CMS system is not workable; the system has worked over a<br />

century and half in developed countries in the creative industry especially in the<br />

music industry. The failure of CMS in Ghana and for that matter for some<br />

developing countries are due to a number of factors, some of which have been<br />

summed up by Dr. Poku Adusei in his article 67 as follows:- first, the fight against<br />

capitalist interests, since time immemorial, has never been easy to surmount;<br />

secondly, the failure of the musicians to establish vibrant collective societies to<br />

pursue a common legal cause; thirdly, the failure of institutions such as the<br />

Musicians Union of Ghana (MUSIGA), the National Communications Authority<br />

(NCA), the National Commission On Culture (NCC), the Ministry of Justice and<br />

the courts to enforce the legislative framework to the core.‖ The net effect has been<br />

negative on the music industry as musicians are unable to get equitable<br />

remuneration for commercial use of their works.<br />

All hopes are not lost:- Ghana is currently working on a new regulation to<br />

govern the activities of CMS and, the legislators may help to strengthen the new<br />

CMS that will be formed to function well and avoid any ambiguity that have<br />

confronted management of rights in Ghana over the years. This can be done by<br />

detailing in the regulation of what can be managed and what cannot be managed by<br />

a CMS in Ghana. 68 As stated above management of global repertoire must also be<br />

encouraged in developing countries also ―customer allocation clauses‖ or<br />

―territorial restriction clause.‖ These CMS should be encouraged to make efforts to<br />

be the depository of the global repertoires as being done by the European<br />

67 See Adusei, supra note 6, p25<br />

68 Section 49(3) provides that ―the he Minister may by legislative instrument make Regulations for<br />

the formation, operation and administration of societies‖.


38 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Commission in the EU instead of allowing proliferation of CMS to manage each<br />

economic right. It however should be stressed that the trilogy of economic rights<br />

for each category of work can be exercised either by the author him/herself or by a<br />

national CMS, authorised for this purpose and placed rather under State<br />

surveillance. 69 Thus excluding any form of dissent and any two-track system which<br />

is being agitated for in Ghana today by stakeholders; authors are already aware of<br />

the alternative between the individual exercise of their rights and collective rules<br />

governing these rights.<br />

To conclude, CMS so formed should be encouraged to make efforts to be the<br />

depository of the global repertoires in the category of work set up to managed.<br />

However, such efforts should in no way affect authors of their right to become<br />

members of a CMS of their choice or limit clients in their choice to any<br />

monopolistic CMS established in their operational territory. A comprehensive<br />

system of reciprocal representation contracts based on the CISAC/BIEM 70 models<br />

between CMS would allow the author to become a member where he/she wishes<br />

and clients to obtain authorisation of CMS of their choice without weakening the<br />

system. Whatever the author‘s place of membership, his/her works will form part<br />

of the global repertoire and wherever a client chooses to seek authorisation from, it<br />

might still have access to the global repertoire and/or multi-territorial license. The<br />

freedom of membership and clients corresponds to the element of free competition<br />

between CMS which affects neither their monopoly position “de jure or de facto”,<br />

nor the content of the global repertoire.<br />

Again, in order to cut short any arbitrary attempt, a good number of<br />

legislators especially in Europe have stipulated a legal constraint obliging authors‘<br />

societies to consent any use of music in their repertoire, which would be requested<br />

by all clients willing to pay the fee charged irrespectively of their operational<br />

territory. This legal constraint is a clear indication that any arbitrary consideration<br />

must be eliminated from CMS. The new CMS in Ghana must learn from such best<br />

practices and domesticate it in their interest.<br />

Furthermore, CMS now negotiate contracts and tariffs 71 simultaneously with<br />

client and in most cases with associations on behalf of their members. The resultant<br />

negotiation is then submitted for approval or amendment by a competent authority.<br />

This practice has helped to reduce the tension, if not eliminated, as through the<br />

combination a situation is avoided in particular where contradictory opinions on<br />

certain tariff-related provisions again become inflamed during the discussion of the<br />

69<br />

COSGA‘s failure is due to lack of proper supervision by the then National Commission on<br />

Culture and the Copyright Office.<br />

70<br />

CISAC was defined at the beginning of the paper. BIEM however is defined as the International<br />

Bureau of Societies Managing Recording and Mechanical Reprographic Rights.<br />

71<br />

Tariff means the determination of the royalties applicable to a particular circle of clients for the<br />

use of music during a particular period. The good experience acquired from international best<br />

practices is that tariffs are often based on a percentage of the income of a client.


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 39<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

content of the contracts. There is an appreciable difference between a client who<br />

undertakes through its signature to pay a tariff-related royalty and a client who does<br />

not respect an authorisation condition. The author recommends that developing<br />

country CMS adopt such approach to avoid animosity which has characterised their<br />

operations. The publication of Dr. U. Uchtenhagen, ―the Setting-up of New<br />

Copyright Societies: Some Experiences and Reflexions,‖ can be of immense<br />

benefit in that direction. CISAC would also need to strengthen its technical<br />

cooperation towards capacity building of CMS in developing countries including<br />

Ghana to make the CMS much more effective and relevant in the 21 st Century.<br />

Finally, the author recommends the adoption of an international treaty under<br />

the auspices of <strong>WIPO</strong>, which could be called “<strong>WIPO</strong> Collective Management<br />

Organisation Treaty (WCMOT)”. To be spearheaded by <strong>WIPO</strong> and CISAC for<br />

CMS operations. Such a treaty could be seen as a special treaty of the Berne<br />

Convention 72 like the <strong>WIPO</strong> Copyright Treaty (WCT) to govern the activities of<br />

CMS. It will replace the <strong>WIPO</strong> guidelines 73 on CMS and technical assistance<br />

provided for such CMS, which have not been helpful particular to developing<br />

countries like Ghana.<br />

72 Article 20 of the Berne Convention (1971) provides ―… countries reserve the right to enter into<br />

special agreements…‖ Also article 1(1) of the WCT states, ―This Treaty is a special agreement<br />

within the meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention…..‖<br />

73 For up to date information on technical assistance see <strong>WIPO</strong> publication No. PCIPD/1/7 of the<br />

Permanent Committee on Cooperation for Development Related to Intellectual Property<br />

on ―Promotion and Development of Collective Management of Copyright and Related<br />

Rights.


40 Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Music:<br />

A Case Study of the United Kingdom and Ghanaian System<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

F.M. Abbott - T.H. Cottier – F. Gurry, International Intellectual Property in<br />

an Integrated World Economy, Aspen Publishers, 2007<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> Intellectual Property Hand Book, Administration of Copyright, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

<strong>Publication</strong> No. 489(E)<br />

M. Ficsor, Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties administered<br />

by <strong>WIPO</strong> & Glossary of Copyright and Related Rights Terms, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong><br />

No. 816<br />

U. Uchtenhagen, the Setting-up of New Copyright Societies: Some<br />

Experiences and Reflexions, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. CD 926<br />

M. Fiscor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

<strong>Publication</strong> No. 855(E)<br />

U. Uchtenhagen, Copyright Collective Management in Music, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

<strong>Publication</strong> No. 789(E)<br />

D. Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, Kluwer<br />

Law International 2006<br />

P. Adusei, The Evolution of Ghana‘s Copyright Regime Since Independence:<br />

A Critical Appraisal published in Ghana Law Since Independence, History,<br />

Development and Prospects, UGFL 2007<br />

M. Ricolfi, Individual and Collective Management of Copyright in the<br />

Digital Environment, polished work 2008<br />

M. OUMA, Copyright and the Music Industry in Africa, in JWIP 2004, 919 ff.<br />

J. Asein, Nigeria Copyright Law and Practice, Abuja, 2004<br />

H. Cohen Jehoram, The Future of Copyright Collecting Societies, EIPR,<br />

2001, 134ff.<br />

P. Florenson, Management of Authors‘ Rights and Neighbouring Rights in<br />

Europe, in RIDA 2003, 2 ff.<br />

E. Bonadio, Copyright Collective Licensing and the EU initiatives in the online<br />

music field, in DANTe 2006 ff<br />

P. Gillierson, Collecting Societies and the Digital Environment, in 37 IIC<br />

2006, 939-969


Alfred Kumi-Atiemo 41<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

P. Adusei, K. Anyimadu-Antwi, M. Halm, Ghana Country Report, African<br />

Copyright and Access to Knowledge (ACA2K), 2009<br />

The English Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988<br />

Copyright Law of Ghana, PNDC Law 110 of 1985<br />

Copyright Society Regulation L.I.1527<br />

Copyright Act 690, (2005)<br />

M.M. Frabboni, A Difficult Future for Reform on Collective Management of<br />

Rights, Entertainment Law Review, 2005, 144-148<br />

M.M. Frabboni, The current discussion on collective management of rights in<br />

the EU, Economic Concerns, paper presented at the Workshop on the Law and<br />

Economics of Intellectual Property and Information Technology, July 22-23 2005,<br />

Universitá Carlo Cattaneo Castellanza LIUC 7 (available at<br />

http://www.liuc.it/ricerca/istitutoecomicsjuly2005/papers/frabboni_LIUCpaper.pdf<br />

)<br />

M.M. Frabboni, Cross Border Licensing and Collective Management: A<br />

Proposal for the On-Line Context, in Entertainment Law Review, 2005, 16 (8), 204<br />

M.M. Frabboni, Online Music Licensing, the calm after the storm,<br />

Entertainment Law Review, 2006, 17 (2), 65-69.


TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES FOR DIGITAL WORKS:<br />

A LEGAL ANALYSIS<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Author: Márcio Mello Chaves<br />

Advisor: Giancarlo Frosio<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

2. BRIEF TECHNOLOGY CLARIFICATION<br />

a. Digitization of Works, Internet and the Access to Contents<br />

b. Technological Protection Measures<br />

i. Technological Protection Measures on Digital Works<br />

c. Digital Rights Management (DRM)<br />

d. The Analog Hole<br />

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND<br />

a. Anti-circumvention Provisions<br />

b. Users' Rights and Public Interest<br />

i. Introduction to Fair Use and Legal Exceptions to Copyright<br />

ii. Visually impaired Exceptions<br />

a. Recent Trends at the International Level<br />

4. KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION<br />

a. Content Protection of Digital Works<br />

b. Digital Libraries<br />

5. CONCLUSION: TPM vs Users' Rights and Public Interest: Who Should<br />

Prevail?<br />

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY


44 Technological Protection Measures for Digital Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

___________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

On a traditional point of view in the field of Intellectual Property Rights or<br />

IPRs, copyrights have as a main objective the incentive to authors and artists in<br />

general to create, granting a temporary, economical monopoly on their creations<br />

and is called the dynamic benefit. This traditional overview has been updated by<br />

new analysis concerning the static point of view. According to that doctrine, the<br />

static benefit allows IPR owners to overuse property rights based on the right to<br />

exclude others from using the protected works 1 .<br />

Such monopoly, granted by the country where the creation occurred, has to<br />

be enforced by the IPRs owners, which have the burden of actively policing<br />

infringement on every territory (principle of territoriality) on the limits on the<br />

jurisdictional reach of laws and regulatory actions of countries. 2 In addition, the<br />

digitalization of works such as music and movies had a tremendous impact on<br />

those industries when technology switched from analog to digital, with global<br />

reach of illegal distribution.<br />

As consequence of such burden, IPR owners take measures to control the use<br />

of their digital works in the online environment through technology, measures<br />

which could be grouped into two separate categories: (i) measures that are<br />

deployed to limit access to protected content to users who are authorized to such<br />

access, such as cryptography, passwords and digital signatures; and (ii) measures<br />

that are deployed to control the use of protected content once users have access to<br />

the work.<br />

In the digital world, however, the scenario becomes more complex due to the<br />

ease to copy. In that matter, an effective way to avoid piracy has been the usage of<br />

Technological Protection Measures (TPM), the object of the present study. Such<br />

active rather than passive enforcement has undeniable benefits for IPR owners as it<br />

reaches the problem's cause instead of its consequences.<br />

Aside from the effectiveness brought by the TPM to the works in the digital<br />

format, some of the tools used deserve a special attention due to the consequences<br />

of an abuse of the IPRs that could affect copyright exceptions. In this study, the<br />

user‘s rights and public interest will be the focus. In particular, I will review the<br />

conflict between two counterpoising interests: the right to enforce IPRs by means<br />

of TPM versus User‘s rights and Public Interest.<br />

Another important issue to be addressed is the legislation that concerns<br />

Information Technology and shares common problems from around the world. As<br />

1 W. M. LANDES & R. A. POSER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Harvard<br />

University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 12.<br />

2 Idem.


Márcio Mello Chaves 45<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

stated by MOORE 3 , technology develops at rampant speed, causing great<br />

difficulties for the legislation to keep up with and resulting in last minute changes<br />

of bills.<br />

The scope of the present study is to analyze, technically and legally, the TPM<br />

in the digital environment. The technical analysis will be toned down to allow<br />

better understanding of the legal analysis.<br />

The prevention of IP infringements by technological means is one of the most<br />

dynamic areas related to the enforcement of intellectual property rights, in both the<br />

legal and technological arenas. Faced with an ongoing period of dramatic<br />

commercial losses caused by counterfeiting and piracy as well as IP infringements<br />

in general, IP right owners have made over the past years, vast efforts to develop<br />

measures and technologies aiming to protect their products from being copied.<br />

New technologies usually bring challenges, but also opportunities: (i) the<br />

visually impaired and the organizations which provide to them access to<br />

information and knowledge have on technology a great ally; (ii) libraries have<br />

changed their traditional view of being a simple collection building for provision<br />

and preservation of printed material activities to become providers of material in<br />

alternative formats, such as audio books or digitized material.<br />

As I will propose, works under TPM, including those under Digital Rights<br />

Management – DRM – can invert the logistics of the authorizations required to<br />

have access to them through copyright exceptions for users rights (i.e. fair use) and<br />

public interest (i.e. the visually impaired, digital libraries). The exercise of<br />

copyright exceptions for their benefit allow under certain conditions the use of a<br />

work without any authorization, but works under TPM could require such<br />

authorization to avoid breaching anti-circumventing legislation. As an effect, ―the<br />

exercise of exceptions for the benefit of the visually impaired, including the<br />

operation of the libraries for the blind, has been affected by important shifts<br />

regarding the copyright protection of works in the global information<br />

infrastructure‖. 4<br />

At last, it is crucial to explain the interdisciplinary importance and context of<br />

this study. Computer technicalities can seem extremely complicated to the law<br />

student; the same way, legal technicalities have the same effect on computer<br />

engineering students. The challenge faced by the current study is to find a simple,<br />

yet complete on its terms, explanation, since technical terms do not facilitate law<br />

interpretation and vice versa.<br />

3 Moore's theory suggests that computer's processing capacity doubles every two years. G. Moore E.<br />

Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Electronics Magazine, 1965.<br />

4 G. LUNG, Copyright Exceptions for the Visually Impaired - International Perspective, lecture<br />

presented in the 70th IFLA General Conference and Council, Buenos Aires, 2004.


46 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. BRIEF TECHNOLOGY CLARIFICATION<br />

a. Digitization of Works and the Internet<br />

Technologies have major developments from time to time, drastically<br />

changing previous technologies. The digitalization phenomenon and the internet<br />

are two of those examples and to better understand the current situation faced by<br />

this study it is of great importance to first analyze their how they affected IPRs.<br />

Technology made possible to convert works such as music, movies or books<br />

beyond mere human capacity. Computer language converted images and sounds to<br />

zeros and ones (0, 1), making possible to obtain perfect copies of works in digital<br />

format.<br />

But the digitalization of works mentioned above alone did not cause the<br />

digital revolution that currently challenges IPR owners. Many of the current<br />

problems, especially in the uncontrollable levels faced nowadays, happened due to<br />

the widespread use of the Internet, beyond any prediction. 5 Over the last years, the<br />

growing access to personal computers caused the Internet to grow exponentially.<br />

The Internet is being used by approximately 1.73 billion people worldwide,<br />

representing 25.6% of the world population with a 380.3% growth since 2000,<br />

being of great importance to individuals and the global society as a whole, with<br />

economic, cultural and, inevitably, legal impacts. 6<br />

b. Technological Protection Measures<br />

TPM are technological methods, which certify the authenticity (physically) or<br />

control the access to or the use of a copyrighted work (digitally), and hence<br />

facilitate authorized use of copyrighted material. Although this study will focus on<br />

the second type of TPM, a brief explanation on the first type will be given for<br />

illustration and better understanding.<br />

As stated before, enforcement of IPRs are crucial to any IPR owner and, as a<br />

way to better identify legitimate copies of works, distinguishing them from<br />

counterfeited illegitimate ones, physical TPM were developed. Holograms,<br />

stickers, microscopic labels, or banderoles, placed on products prior to their<br />

distribution on the market are common examples largely used.<br />

5 J. KANG, History of the internet: internet basics and protocols.<br />

http://law.ucla.edu/faculty/kang/scholarship/scholarship.htm. defending an academic origin which<br />

followed the military network ARPANET in the sixties as an alternative to unique and centralized<br />

computer storage to military data. Based on the open structure and broad usage, scientists<br />

exchanged research data using the later called ARPA-INTERNET for academic purposes only. In<br />

order to make the data transmission, which was inconsistent due to the great variety of computers<br />

and Operational Systems (OS), uniform, the TCP-IP protocol was developed.)<br />

6 World Internet Stats – Use and Population Statistics, 2010, available at<br />

http://www.worldinternetstats.com.


Márcio Mello Chaves 47<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

Physical TPM therefore enable customers and authorities to be aware of the<br />

legitimacy of a product, reacting when facing infringing content on the market.<br />

Nonetheless, they can be forged in a way that confuses both users and authorities.<br />

Besides simple stickers, far more complex stamps with holograms are<br />

created, which can be relatively costly and hard to forge, but are also produced by<br />

counterfeiters, making it harder to both users and authorities to identify illegitimate<br />

products. 7<br />

Digital TPM, on one other hand, can be grouped into two separate<br />

categories 8 : (i) measures that are developed to limit access to protected content to<br />

users who are authorized to such access, such as cryptography, passwords and<br />

digital signatures; and (ii) measures that are deployed to control the use of<br />

protected content once users have access to the work.<br />

DRMs, on the other hand, are sophisticated systems 9 inserted into the<br />

lifecycle of the copyrighted work, usually including a set of technological tools for<br />

protecting the content as well as monitoring the users' behavior and controlling<br />

payment terms.<br />

i. Technological Protection Measures on Digital Works<br />

The TPM used in the digital works are highly developed as result of their<br />

easiness to make perfect copies of digital content. Digital systems such as the<br />

binary codes, are represented by zeros (0) and ones (1), hence making possible the<br />

reproduction of works perfectly despite the number copies or the media it was<br />

fixed. 10<br />

As IPRs owners have the burden of actively policing every territory in which<br />

infringement occurs, its enforcement simply treats the symptoms of the disease<br />

and, as most of the medical treatments, it can be really expensive to its rightful<br />

owners.<br />

That analogy was followed on January 1986, when two Pakistani<br />

programmers, released one of the first computer viruses in history, the ©Brain. 11<br />

7<br />

Good examples of complex holographic stamps are in the Microsoft`s products with the Certificate<br />

of Authenticity – COA, that vary from versions, sellers and products. Available at:<br />

http://www.microsoft.com/howtotell/content.aspx?pg=coa<br />

8<br />

See in general on TPM in R. ARIDOR-HERSHKOVITZ, Antitrust Law – A Stranger in the<br />

Wikinomics World? The John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law, 2010.<br />

9<br />

Idem.<br />

10<br />

See in general on digital TPM in R. TOCCI, Digital Systems: Principles and Applications.<br />

Prentice Hall, 2006.<br />

11<br />

The ©Brain (also know as Lahore, Pakistani, Pakistani Brain, Brain-A, UIUC and the Pakistan<br />

Flu), was created to stop and track pirate copies of the Farooq Alvi brothers‘ heart monitoring<br />

program for the Apple //e series. The ―virus‖ came with the users‘ address, phone numbers and a<br />

message telling the user that their machine was infected and, for inoculation, the user should call<br />

them. The company owned by Basit and Amjad, was sued for damages right after receiving phone


48 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

What could be seen as just a prank or a demonstration of computer knowledge was,<br />

in fact, not only the first MS-DOS computer virus but also, the first technological<br />

protection measure in the software industry. 12<br />

That first example of TPM was then followed by a series of TPM such as<br />

serials and encryption methods by the high-tech industry, with a far less negative<br />

impact on their users. The easiness to copy digital content demanded additional<br />

legal protection and its failure came with the Content Scrambling System<br />

technology, CSS 13 , to the Digital Versatile Disk, DVD. In 1999, shortly after the<br />

popularity of DVD players in the USA, this TPM tool, sponsored and developed by<br />

the main entertainment and high-tech companies and supposedly inviolable, was<br />

circumvented by a 15-year old programmer, Jon Lech Johansen, later known as<br />

DVD-John. 14<br />

Nowadays, digital TPM are very well developed. Ironically, the same internet<br />

that helps to disseminate illegitimate copies of digital works now helps IPR<br />

owners: through online software authentication, up-to-date technological protected<br />

content confronts legitimate licenses with the illegitimate copies, as an attempt to<br />

block unauthorized use of such digital works. This type of digital TPM has had<br />

good results once that it is usually used when installing or updating software, but is<br />

limited to this kind of content.<br />

c. Digital Rights Management (DRM)<br />

The term digital rights management or DRM is a general term, which means<br />

management of works to, digitally or not (e.g., use of access codes to limit use of<br />

photocopiers), include copy restrictions. DRM inserts on digital works digital<br />

licensing agreements, digitally setting legal permissions to establish what one can<br />

and cannot do. 15<br />

It is mostly important to mention that DRM itself is not the copy protection<br />

that TPM include on works 16 , but only relies on them to control and/or restrict the<br />

calls from several countries demanding that they disinfect their PCs and, shortly thereafter, the<br />

company was quickly dissolved. R. FORD & E. H. SPAFFORD, Happy Birthday, Dear Viruses,<br />

Science Magazine, 2007, p. 210.<br />

12<br />

Idem.<br />

13<br />

See in general on CSS technology in the DVD Copy Control Association website: http://<br />

http://www.dvdcca.org/css/.<br />

14<br />

Jon Lech Johansen, Jon Lech Johansen's blog. Available at http://nanocr.eu/. For more<br />

information on the CSS related U.S. cases, see Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes (S.D.N.Y. 2000)<br />

and Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley (2nd Cir. 2001).<br />

15<br />

See in general on Digital Rights Management in P. AKESTER. Technological accommodation of<br />

conflicts between freedom of expression and DRM: the first empirical assessment. Social Science<br />

Research Network, 2009.<br />

16<br />

R. ARIDOR-HERSHKOVITZ. Antitrust Law – A Stranger in the Wikinomics World? The John<br />

Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law, 2010, p. 02.


Márcio Mello Chaves 49<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

use and access to digital content on electronic devices with such technologies<br />

installed.<br />

DRM is applied to enforce limitations on the use and transfer of copyrighted<br />

digital content. MP3 and AAC songs, JPEG and GIF pictures, MPEG and DivX<br />

videos, Playstation, Wii and PC games, are some of the formats in which DRM that<br />

have in their lifecycle a set of technological tools for protecting the content. The<br />

technological tools set in the DRM works can be used to even monitor the user<br />

behavior and control payment terms. 17<br />

DRM technology can be classified as (i) first-generation or (ii) secondgeneration:<br />

the first is merely sought to control copying, while the second seeks to<br />

control viewing, copying, printing, altering or using in any other way that digital<br />

content 18 .<br />

A very well known example of a DRM that uses TPM is the Apple‘s<br />

FairPlay, which consists on encrypting Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) to control<br />

the access to copyrighted works. It imposes licensing schemes through several<br />

restrictions on the use of the AAC encrypted files such as the number of devices a<br />

song can be played.<br />

d. The Analog Hole<br />

The analog hole or analog loophole 19 or reproduction problem is considered a<br />

fundamental and inevitable vulnerability in copy protection schemes for<br />

noninteractive (software is excluded) works in digital formats which can be<br />

exploited to duplicate copy-protected works that are ultimately reproduced using<br />

analog means. 20 It is based on the fact that it is simply impossible to<br />

simultaneously display and conceal a signal. In particular, an audio signal must be<br />

converted to analog before it reaches the speaker/screen. 21<br />

Once digital information is converted to a human-perceptible (analog) form,<br />

it is a relatively simple matter to digitally recapture that analog reproduction in an<br />

unrestricted form, thereby removing any restrictions placed on copyrighted work. It<br />

17 P. AKESTER, supra, p. 15.<br />

18 P. AKESTER, supra, p. 15.<br />

19 See in general on analog hole in D. SICKER, P. OHM & S. GUNAJI, The Analog Hole and the<br />

Price of Music: An Empirical Study. Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law,<br />

2007.<br />

20 The term "analog hole" was first popularized by the Motion Picture Association of America and<br />

some of its members during speeches and legislative advocacy in 2002; this term later fell into<br />

disrepute within the industry after it was abbreviated to "a. hole" (which was misconstrued as an<br />

allusion to the word asshole), thus being replaced by analog reconversion problem, analog<br />

reconversion issue and similar terms.<br />

21 L. M. EZRA.The Failure of the Broadcast Flag: Copyright Protection to Make Hollywood<br />

Happy. Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, 2005, p. 384.


50 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

is usually followed by quality loss of the work copied, which many times result in a<br />

low percentage of use among copyright exceptions beneficiaries. 22<br />

Although the technology for creating digital recordings from analog sources<br />

has existed for some time, it was not necessarily viewed as a "hole" until the<br />

widespread deployment of TPM. For example, bootleg films may have poor audio,<br />

or highly washed-out video.<br />

At a minimum, copy protection can be circumvented for types of material<br />

whose value is aesthetic, and does not depend on its exact digital duplication. In<br />

general, performing a digital-to-analog conversion followed by an analog-to-digital<br />

conversion results in a worse quality copy, except if used high quality conversion<br />

equipment to reduce the loss of quality, to the point where such noise is essentially<br />

imperceptible to the human senses. For instance, playing a video in a DVD player<br />

and using a DVD recorder to record the output can create a high-quality copy of the<br />

video.<br />

Regardless of any digital or software copy control mechanisms, if sound can<br />

be heard it can also be recorded using a microphone. And if images such as pictures<br />

or movies can be seen by the eye, they can also be recorded by a camera. For texts,<br />

the image can be converted back to text using optical character recognition (OCR).<br />

The movie industry legally tried to eliminate the analog hole 23 .<br />

Technologically, IPR owners tried to block the analog hole by degrading analog<br />

signals to interfere with some recording devices. 24 Some vendors claim to have<br />

developed equivalent techniques for preventing recording by video capture cards in<br />

personal computers. Recording devices can be required to screen analog inputs for<br />

watermarks (or Macrovision or CGMS-A) and limit recording as a condition of<br />

private contracts. Set-top boxes can have its analog outputs entirely disabled, or to<br />

degrade the analog output quality, when particular programming is displayed. 25<br />

Despite the fact that the abovementioned technologies can be quite advanced<br />

and beyond the capacity of most people to circumvent them, in theory it is possible<br />

to bypass all these measures by constructing a player that creates a copy of every<br />

22 See D. SICKER et al., supra, p. 05.<br />

23 In 2002 and 2003, the U.S. motion picture industry publicly discussed the possibility of<br />

legislation to "close the analog hole" — most likely through regulation of digital recording devices,<br />

limiting their ability to record analog video signals that appear to be commercial audiovisual works.<br />

These proposals are discussed in the Content Protection Status Report, User Broadband and Digital<br />

Television Promotion Act, and Analog Reconversion Discussion Group.<br />

24 Macrovision attempt to defeat recording by VCRs by outputting a deliberately distorted signal,<br />

crippling the automatic gain control for video, causing the brightness to fluctuate wildly.<br />

25 P. ARKESTER, Technological accommodation of conflicts between freedom of expression and<br />

DRM: the first empirical assessment, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law,<br />

Cambridge, 2010.


Márcio Mello Chaves 51<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

frame and sound it plays. 26 Motion Picture Association of America has even<br />

recommended the use of a camcorder as an alternative to circumventing the<br />

Content Scrambling System on DVDs for educational purposes, indicating that this<br />

technique could have acceptance when dealing with copyright exceptions. 27<br />

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND<br />

The internet global reach also enhanced international integration, challenging<br />

jurists to the applicable law. Nonetheless, intellectual property law has the<br />

advantage of being rather recent, thus conceived with a different perspective and<br />

nowadays with legal standards imposed by International Treaties, subject to<br />

examination on this chapter.<br />

In this scenario, two conflicting interests received legislative treat: (i) the<br />

anti-circumvention legislation and (ii) the user‘s rights for fair use and the public<br />

interest of the visually impaired and the libraries exceptions to copyrights,<br />

appearing internationally in the <strong>WIPO</strong> Treaties, with proportional effects on<br />

national legislations.<br />

Since the goal of this study is to give an international overview on this<br />

matter, three main groups of legislation will be analyzed: (i) international treaties,<br />

(ii) the American legislation and (iii) the European Union legislation. The three<br />

legislation different levels are important to show the wide acceptance of the TPM<br />

and the necessary legislative changes that could be required to insert previsions to<br />

the copyright exceptions.<br />

Before reaching a conclusion on this topic, it is mandatory for the present<br />

study to describe some the most important legal background behind TPM.<br />

a. Anti-Circumvention Provisions<br />

i. <strong>WIPO</strong> Treaties – The WCT and the WPPT<br />

Starting with the international level legislation, two <strong>WIPO</strong> treaties dated from<br />

1996 need to be mentioned: the Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the Performance and<br />

Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), recently ratified by the European Union. 28<br />

Known as ―The <strong>WIPO</strong> Treaties‖ they entered into force in 2002 establishing<br />

an international legal framework for TPM. 29 The two treaties state in their<br />

26 Nonetheless, certain contents could not be benefitted by the analog hole. For obvious reasons,<br />

interactive works such as videogames cannot be circumvented through analog reconversion<br />

methods, which can copy signals only, not the rules used to generate those signals.<br />

27 J. CHENG. MPAA: teachers should videotape monitors, not rip DVDs. Ars Technica, 2009.<br />

28 The EU ratified the <strong>WIPO</strong> Internet Treaties on December 14 th , 2009.<br />

29 A status quo of the implementation as of April 01, 2003, can be found in a <strong>WIPO</strong> Survey on<br />

Implementation Provisions of the WCT and the WPPT.


52 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

―Obligations concerning Technological Measures‖ 30 chapter that counties shall<br />

provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the<br />

circumvention of effective technological measures in connection with the exercise<br />

of rights under these Treaties or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in<br />

respect of their works, which are unauthorized concerned or permitted by law. 31<br />

However, <strong>WIPO</strong> Internet treaties implementation in national legislation has<br />

provided sometimes rather different solutions to the treaties‘ obligations. Acts of<br />

circumvention or preparatory acts or making available of equipment aiming to<br />

circumvention, legal remedies that are provided for the interrelation between the<br />

use of technological protection measures and the limitations and exceptions of<br />

copyright, i.e. for educational purposes, are some of the differing known legislative<br />

solutions. These last may render more difficult when protection measures for<br />

copyrighted content are deployed and require well-balanced legislative solutions.<br />

ii. United States Legislation<br />

The American legislation concerning DRM is commonly analyzed due to its<br />

impact on technology. Approved in 2001, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act<br />

(DMCA) created an extra protection to copyrighted works in the digital era and<br />

complied with the <strong>WIPO</strong> Internet Treaties, amending Title 17 of the U.S. Code<br />

with the § 1201 ―Circumvention of copyright protection systems‖.<br />

According to the §1201, owners of a valid copyright on a work, effectively<br />

controlled by a technological measure are protected from having it circumvented to<br />

allow third parties to access without authorization. Therefore if a product is<br />

designed or produced primarily for circumvention, made available despite only<br />

limited commercial significance other than circumvention or marketed for use in<br />

circumvention of the controlling technological measure, it infringes the right<br />

protected by the DMCA.<br />

Despite the explicit provision that states the prohibition of anti-circumventing<br />

technologies, Article 17 of the U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) requires that the Librarian of<br />

Congress issue exemptions 32 from the prohibition against circumvention of accesscontrol<br />

technology. Such exemptions, 33 which have to be revised and renewed<br />

every three years, have to be granted when access-control technology has had a<br />

substantial adverse effect on the ability of people to make non-infringing uses of<br />

copyrighted works.<br />

30<br />

Article 11 of the WCT and Article 18 of the WPPT.<br />

31<br />

Idem.<br />

32<br />

See generally on Copyright Exemptions in W. HARTZOG. Falling on Deaf Ears: Is the "Fail-<br />

Safe" Triennial Exemption Provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Effective in<br />

Protecting Fair Use? Journal of Intellectual Property Law, 2005. Recommendations on Section<br />

1201(a)(1) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

33<br />

In 2000 there were only two exemptions, number that doubled in 2003 and tripled in 2006.<br />

Exemption history and full text can be accessed in http://www.copyright.gov/1201/.


Márcio Mello Chaves 53<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

The six current exemptions (2006) 34 are: (i) non-profit libraries, archives,<br />

educational institutions 35 , (ii) law enforcement, intelligence, and other government<br />

activities, 36 (iii) reverse engineering, 37 encryption research, 38 exceptions regarding<br />

minors 39 , protection of personally identifying information, 40 security testing 41 and<br />

certain analog devices and certain technological measures. 42<br />

iii. European Union Legislation<br />

The European Union Legislation concerning TPM is located in the<br />

2001/29/European Copyright Directive from May, 22 nd . Articles six makes<br />

reference to the protection of technological measures designed to prevent or restrict<br />

acts, in respect of works unauthorized by IPR owners.<br />

The directive defines Technological Measures as ―any technology, device or<br />

component that, in the normal course of its operation, is designed to prevent or<br />

restrict acts, in respect of works or other subject matter, which are not authorized<br />

by the right holder of any copyright or any right related to copyright as provided<br />

for by law or the sui generis right provided for in Chapter III of Directive<br />

96/9/EC‖. 43<br />

It also demands that the technological measures must be ―effective‖, through<br />

application of an access control or protection process, such as encryption,<br />

scrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject matter or a copy<br />

control mechanism, which achieves the protection objective. 44<br />

This directive states in article 6 of the ―Obligations as to technological<br />

measures‖ that Member States shall provide:<br />

(i) adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective<br />

technological measures, which the person concerned carries out in the<br />

34 See generally on Copyright Exemptions in W. HARTZOG. Falling on Deaf Ears: Is the "Fail-<br />

Safe" Triennial Exemption Provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Effective in<br />

Protecting Fair Use? Journal of Intellectual Property Law, 2005. Recommendations on Section<br />

1201(a)(1) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

35 Section 1201(d) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

36 Section 1201(e) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

37 Section 1201(f) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

38 Section 1201(g) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

39 Section 1201(h) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

40 Section 1201(i) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

41 Section 1201(j) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

42 Section 1201(k) title 17, of the United States Code.<br />

43 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the<br />

harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.<br />

44 Article 6 (1) of the Directive 2001/29/EC.


54 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing<br />

that objective; and<br />

(ii) adequate legal protection against the manufacture, import, distribution,<br />

sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental, or possession for commercial<br />

purposes of devices, products or components or the provision of services.<br />

In addition, these last must be promoted, advertised or marketed for the<br />

purpose of circumvention, have only a limited commercially significant purpose or<br />

use other than to circumvent and be primarily designed, produced, adapted or<br />

performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention of, any<br />

effective technological measures.<br />

At last, as a main provision to the present study, the directive determines that<br />

in the absence of voluntary measures taken by IPR owners, including agreements<br />

with other parties concerned, countries must take appropriate measures to ensure<br />

that they make available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided<br />

for in national law the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation, to the<br />

extent necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation and where that<br />

beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or subject matter concerned. 45<br />

Such prevision therefore assures the rights originated in the fair use doctrine<br />

and the visually impaired exceptions, further analyzed in the following topics.<br />

b. User's Rights and Public Interest<br />

i. Introduction to Fair Use and Legal Exceptions to Copyright<br />

Despite of not being the core of this study, it is mandatory to contemplate<br />

some concepts of the Fair Use exceptions to Copyright legislation 46 . In American<br />

copyright law, 47 the fair use doctrine establishes the conditions under which the<br />

IPRs owners do not need to be asked for permission, allowing third parties to use<br />

copyrighted works as long as four conditions are observed 48 :<br />

45 Idem at n. 44.<br />

46 See in general on fair use doctrine in T. K. ARMSTRONG, Digital Rights Management and the<br />

Process of Fair Use. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 2006.<br />

47 Although the doctrine only existed in the U.S. as common law until it was incorporated into the<br />

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107, the legal concept of "test copyright" was first ratified in the<br />

British 1709 Statute of Anne followed by the courts creation of the doctrine of "fair abridgment" in<br />

Gyles v Wilcox, evolved into the modern concept of fair use.<br />

48 The four fair use factors where firstly introduced by the classic opinion of Joseph Story in Folsom<br />

v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (1841), in which the defendant had copied 353 pages from the plaintiff's 12volume<br />

George Washington biography in order to produce a two-volume work.


Márcio Mello Chaves 55<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

(i) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a<br />

commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;<br />

(ii) the nature of the copyrighted work;<br />

(iii) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the<br />

copyrighted work as a whole; and<br />

(iv) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the<br />

copyrighted work.<br />

Amongst the most common cases of fair use are those used for commentary,<br />

criticism, news reporting, research, teaching or scholarship and parodies. Copyright<br />

exceptions happened as a way of ―counterbalance the minimum standards of<br />

protection, limiting the strict application of the rules regarding exclusive rights‖ 49 .<br />

Most copyright legislations worldwide hold in their texts such previsions 50<br />

but legal texts usually have a numerus clausus effect. Therefore, although<br />

exceptions must be limited to those hypotheses, interpretations to other fair uses<br />

arise such as user‘s rights and recent trends at international level, as occurred with<br />

the exceptions for the visually impaired.<br />

ii. Visually Impaired Exceptions<br />

a. Recent Trends at the International Level<br />

The meeting held in December 2009 51 in Geneva at the <strong>WIPO</strong>‘s headquarters<br />

turned eyes to an ever existing problem faced by the visually impaired 52 : getting<br />

access to reading content made available through copyrighted works. Nearly sixty<br />

countries 53 have statutory exceptions to allow access and conversion to Braille or<br />

other reading formats without previous consent of authors but a global consensus is<br />

still far from reality.<br />

49 F.M. ABBOT; TH. COTTIER; F; GURRY, International Intellectual Property in an Integrated<br />

World Economy, Aspen Publishers, 2007.<br />

50 Canada, Israel, South Korea, Brazil and many other countries have specific legislative prevision<br />

on the fair use as a direct consequence of two International Treaties: The Berne Convention (Article<br />

9 (2), 10, 10 bis, and 11 bis (3) and the TRIPS Agreement.<br />

51 World Intellectual Property Organization Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights<br />

(SCCR) Nineteenth Session, December 14-18, 2009.<br />

52 The term visually impaired persons refers to blind or partially sighted people. According to the<br />

World Health Organization, 161 million people worldwide are blind or visually impaired and<br />

another 153 million have an uncorrected visual impairment, of which 87 per cent live in developing<br />

countries.<br />

53 Treaty Proposal made by Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay before the Standing Committee on<br />

Copyrights and Related Rights <strong>WIPO</strong>. <strong>WIPO</strong> Treaty for Improved Access for Blind, Visually<br />

Impaired and other Reading Disabled Persons, Geneva, 2009. Available at:<br />

http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=122732.


56 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the United<br />

Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunity for Disabled People are<br />

the main international instruments to this matter. They allow such exception to<br />

secure the right to access information and knowledge to blind or partially sighted<br />

people. 54<br />

As stated in the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

Internet Treaty, any exception for the visually impaired must pass the three-step<br />

test, which are as follows:<br />

(i) the exception must apply to certain special cases limited to specified<br />

groups of users and covering certain kinds of works and uses;<br />

(ii) it must be satisfied in the sense that such uses may not have the<br />

potential to conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and;<br />

(iii) the use must be considered in order to determine if the exception<br />

should be subject to a requirement to pay equitable remuneration, or<br />

qualified as a free use.<br />

It is important to mention that many current national copyright laws include<br />

specific provisions addressed to this exception: the United States, in the Section<br />

121 of the Copyright Law (the Chafee Amendment of 1996); the European Union,<br />

on Article 5(3)(b) of the Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonization of Certain<br />

Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society of 2001;<br />

Brazil, in the Article 46 of the Copyright and Related Rights Law 9.610 of 1998,<br />

among others that fall out of this study‘s scope.<br />

The ways these exceptions are used also vary greatly from country to<br />

country, restricting or extending them, with different types of royalties collection.<br />

The restrictions can be to certain types of works or rights or to the inexistence of<br />

commercially available versions.<br />

The exceptions can be extended to governmental organizations, authorized<br />

entities or individuals acting on behalf of the visually impaired, or any noncommercial<br />

basis for the visually impaired. The Braille system, for instance,<br />

usually allowed free or under compulsory licenses, sometimes is extended to other<br />

formats such as audio, large print and electronic formats.<br />

Yet, no reference is made on those legislations to technologically protected<br />

works and the conflict with the anti-circumventing laws, which brings in the need<br />

to insert on international legislation specific provisions referring to that matter, as<br />

further suggested in the conclusion of this study.<br />

54 G. LUNG, supra n. 4.


Márcio Mello Chaves 57<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

4. KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION<br />

a. Content Protection of Digital Works<br />

History has taught us that the means of information preservation are as<br />

important as the means to access it. Cave men‘s paintings survived thousands of<br />

years; information stored on paper several centuries, but information stored<br />

digitally may not be recoverable due to the rampant technology development,<br />

which makes digital created works rapidly inaccessible.<br />

Around seven million pages of new information are added to the Internet<br />

every day. Scientific journals are choosing it as their primary publication venue.<br />

Nonetheless, storage and access systems are not always compatible with the goals<br />

of long-term preservation and access. 55<br />

As a pioneer system, the LOCKSS Program, initiated by Stanford University<br />

Libraries, was launched to aid librarians whose mission is to build collections and<br />

transmit today's intellectual, cultural, and historical content to the future<br />

generations.<br />

LOCKSS (Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe) is open source software that<br />

provides librarians a way to collect, store, preserve, and provide access to their<br />

own, local copy of authorized content. The system converts a personal computer<br />

into a digital preservation appliance, creating low-cost, persistent, accessible copies<br />

of web based content as it is published. Accuracy and completeness of LOCKSS<br />

appliances is assured through a peer-to-peer polling and reputation system.<br />

Despite the fact that Project LOCKSS only acts through express consent of<br />

authors, the idea behind it shows really shows the reality of what could happen to<br />

hundreds of thousands of information which could be lost due to works protected<br />

with TPM. Preservation of this huge amount of information created exclusively in<br />

the digital format is extremely important and could result in an important font of<br />

data for us in a near future and to the generations to come.<br />

b. Digital Libraries<br />

Technology is changing the way people deal with the once thought<br />

unchangeable instruments: books. The nowadays so present term e-book 56 is<br />

subject to several studies, which have as main objective the possibility of a<br />

55 See generally on Project LOCKSS at http://www.lockss.org/lockss/About_Us.<br />

56 See generally on e-books in T. C. FOLSOM, Can't Stop the Signal: The Library in Space and<br />

Transformational Copyright Law-Specifying Fair Use in the Public Interest, Social Science<br />

Research Network, 2009 and J. T. L. GRIMMELMANN, The Google Book Search Settlement:<br />

Ends, Means, and the Future of Books, NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper, 2009.


58 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

complete substitution of physical books, p-books, to new technological devices<br />

from Amazon‘s Kindle to the recent Apple iPad.<br />

Nonetheless, e-books alone do not have direct impact on copyright<br />

exceptions for information preservation and knowledge divulgation as libraries do.<br />

Google Books project to digitalize every book, indexing information for the<br />

purpose of searching and selling has drawn attention to what can become<br />

tomorrow‘s libraries. 57<br />

Libraries, which have always depended on physically preserving and storing<br />

books, due to national statutes, started making copies of materials for research and<br />

preservation. Now, the growing trend to content creation exclusively on electronic<br />

format has drawn the attention to the huge amount of information that has to be<br />

stored and organized. 58<br />

Although national legislations that have library exceptions to copyrighted<br />

works could apply directly to e-books or to digitalization of works, TPM could also<br />

get in the way of using such exception. Since they depend on voluntary actions<br />

from TPM users, the road from requesting the use based on the exception becomes<br />

tortuous and mostly uncertain, questioning the validity of the protection<br />

measures 59 .<br />

5. CONCLUSION: TPM VS USERS' RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST:<br />

WHO SHOULD PREVAIL?<br />

Technology has developed to give to the visually impaired and to contentprotecting<br />

libraries the opportunity to gain access to certain works which, in other<br />

times, would be virtually inaccessible. Despite the great advantage brought by such<br />

development, it also brought a set of technological restrictions that limit the use,<br />

not rarely in a complete disregard to unauthorized uses protected by copyright<br />

exceptions.<br />

As this brief study has the objective to give an overview focused on the legal<br />

aspects of the TPM in the digital environment, the uniqueness of this specific<br />

market demands a specific approach from studies concerning the enforcement and<br />

genuine use of IPRs by their owners. Excessive use of such rights through TPM<br />

emerges as the focus of discussions.<br />

As an attempt to follow technological development, copyright law is<br />

constantly changing. Those changes affect both IPR owners on one hand, users and<br />

57 The recent settlement in The Authors Guild, Inc., et al. v. Google Inc., Case in the New York<br />

District Court brought good success probability to the Google Books Project.<br />

58 See generally on digital libraries in T. HANNIBAL. Building Universal Digital Libraries: An<br />

Agenda for Copyright Reform. Pepperdine Law Review, 2006.<br />

59 P. AKESTER, supra n. 15, p. 15.


Márcio Mello Chaves 59<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

special communities, such as libraries and the visually impaired, on the other,<br />

bringing up the question: who`s interests should prevail?<br />

The EU Information Society Directive made the measures required to solve<br />

potential problems voluntary instead of compulsory. 60 IPR owners complain that<br />

one of the reasons they have not introduced voluntary measures is the absence of<br />

legal obligation, which leads them to help beneficiaries on a case-by-case basis.<br />

In order to achieve balance between protection of works, to allow proper<br />

compensation for their owners and stimulate creativity, and the reasonable<br />

exceptions for user‘s rights and public interest, legislation, nationally or<br />

internationally, fail to present a practical and convincing solution. Technology<br />

itself may not give the solution to this problem once that circumventing TPM have<br />

legislative prohibitions.<br />

In this scenario, three solutions could be given to the situation proposed: (i)<br />

the creation of an administrative system that assures that beneficiaries from<br />

copyright exceptions have access to the pledged digital works; (ii) the use of the<br />

analog hole and (iii) the solely insertion on international treaties of the obligation to<br />

embrace in the national legislations such exceptions, allowing the use of TPM<br />

circumventing tools when not properly respected.<br />

Although TPM has not impacted on many acts permitted by law, certain<br />

permitted acts are being affected by their use despite of the existence of<br />

technological solutions which enable partitioning and authentication of users to<br />

accommodate those permitted acts through privileged exceptions.<br />

Beneficiaries of privileged exceptions who have been prevented from<br />

carrying out those permitted acts due to TPM brought up a legal dilemma between<br />

the rights of IP owners to enforce their works, using the anti-circumventing legal<br />

shield, and the interests represented by the legally protected copyright exceptions.<br />

The current existing onus some legislations have on content owners to<br />

accommodate privileged exceptions, making available to the lawful beneficiaries,<br />

are simply voluntarily. The effect of a voluntary action is usually the absence of an<br />

active conduct, which can many times simply impede beneficiaries to have access<br />

to digital works.<br />

The use of the analog hole could be a solution to the issue, apparently<br />

dismissing the creation of an administrative system and/or the insertion on<br />

international and national legislation. Nevertheless, as it is usually followed by<br />

60 Article 5.3.(b) of the Directive EC/ 2001/29 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of<br />

Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment.


60 Technological Protection Measures for Digical Works: A Legal Analysis<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

quality loss 61 of the work copied and the limitations to certain types of digital<br />

works, it could result in a low percentage of use among copyright exceptions<br />

beneficiaries.<br />

On the other hand, the creation of an administrative system to which the<br />

alleged beneficiaries request access to TPM protected content expressing their<br />

needs is also an option. The request could either (i) be granted if the content has<br />

already been willingly by IPR owners, (ii) be forwarded to IPR owners to provide<br />

the TPM-free work or, (iii) in case of express or implicit denial, circumvented by<br />

the administrative system itself.<br />

Along with this previous solution is the solely insertion on international<br />

treaties the obligation to embrace in the national legislations the exceptions,<br />

allowing the use of TPM circumventing tools when such exceptions are not<br />

properly respected. The absence of an administrative body to link the beneficiaries<br />

request to IPR owners would simplify the process of implementation of such<br />

solution.<br />

The two above-mentioned solutions are surely complex and would require<br />

further development and analysis by governments and international bodies to<br />

inserted in the related legislation, but could put an end to this legal dilemma,<br />

making sure no right surpasses the other.<br />

Despite the complex situation faced as result of this conflict of interests,<br />

TPM are unlikely to disappear. The IPR owners such as the editors, movie and<br />

music industries maintain permanent lobby to avoid or at least mitigate any attempt<br />

to reduce the reach of copyrights, and copyright-exception beneficiaries and<br />

governmental bodies which defend their rights must stand up to this arm war,<br />

apparently still far from ending.<br />

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P. RONCAGLIA, Enforcement: Perfecting the System, Italy 3rd edition: IP<br />

Focus, 2008.<br />

D. SICKER, P. OHM & S. GUNAJI, The Analog Hole and the Price of<br />

Music: An Empirical Study. Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology<br />

Law. Bolder, 2007.<br />

J. SULLIVAN, <strong>WIPO</strong> Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the<br />

Visually Impaired, 2006.<br />

R. TOCCI, Digital Systems: Principles and Applications. Prentice Hall, 2006.<br />

WBU, Treaty Proposal made by Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay at <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

SCCR. <strong>WIPO</strong> Treaty for Improved Access for Blind, Visually Impaired and other<br />

Reading Disabled Persons, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, 2009.


FASHION FORWARD OR FASHION VICTIM:<br />

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN THE FASHION<br />

INDUSTRY<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Layne Randolph<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

2. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CONSIDERED COUNTERFEITING<br />

3. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN FASHION DESIGN NOT<br />

UNIVERSALLY TREATED AS DESIGN PIRACY<br />

4. EU TERRITORIES GRANT MULTI-TIERED IP PROTECTION S FOR<br />

FASHION DESIGN<br />

5. SPARSE IP PROTECTION FOR US FASHION DESIGN<br />

6. US DEBATES THE PROS AND CONS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR<br />

FASHION DESIGN<br />

7. PROPONENTS OF THE ACT: FASHION DESIGN IS A CREATIVE WORK<br />

AND DESERVES PROTECTION TO DETER PIRACY<br />

8. OPPONENTS OF THE ACT: THE ACT WOULD HAVE A CHILLING<br />

EFFECT ON THE US FASHION INDUSTRY BECAUSE LESS PROTECTION<br />

EQUALS MORE INNOVATION<br />

9. CONCLUSION: LEVEL OF IP PROTECTION GRANTED NOT<br />

DETERMINING FACTOR<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY


66 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: International Property Protection in<br />

the Fashion Industry<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

―Fashion is made to become unfashionable,‖ according to Coco Chanel. Ms.<br />

Chanel may have been an accidental intellectual property (IP) guru, decades ahead<br />

of her time. She unwittingly referred to an aspect of fashion that some modern IP<br />

scholars claim is the crux of the reason why they oppose stronger IP protection for<br />

fashion. 1 The nature of fashion is such that regardless of what is created, it has<br />

likely been borrowed or referenced from someone else‘s work. The standard<br />

thinking is that there are only so many ways to cover the body, and the<br />

determination of what is original is very subjective. And while much of the current<br />

focus of the IP world revolves around gaining and maintaining IP protection of<br />

creative works; in certain circles, IP specialists strongly assert that IP protection<br />

should be granted only in exceptional circumstances to reward innovation truly<br />

worthy of a limited monopoly in a free market. Not surprisingly, this debate is<br />

particularly intense in fashion where the boundaries between inspiration and<br />

imitation shift, are questioned, and by virtue of the subject matter will never be<br />

defined by any sort of bright line test.<br />

The top fashion capitals of the world are London, Milan, Paris and New York<br />

and so for the purposes of this paper we will focus on Europe and the United<br />

States. Of these, the European fashion design protection is better established. The<br />

most controversial battle over fashion design protection at the moment occurs in<br />

the United States, where fashion design has been left largely outside of the purview<br />

of IP protection and where many fashion designers argue for an amendment to the<br />

US Copyright Act to protect original fashion designs from copyists. The US battle<br />

wages among those who argue that fashion is better off in a low IP environment,<br />

and those who argue that fashion designs are no less creative than other protected<br />

industries and deserve similar protection.<br />

2. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CONSIDERED COUNTERFEITING<br />

No discussion of IP protection in fashion would be complete without a<br />

discussion of brands, i.e. trademarks. Trademark law has traditionally been the<br />

source of the strongest IP protection for the fashion industry, as the trademarks<br />

serve to identify the products and their source to consumers and function as<br />

advertising to create good will and awareness in the product. 2 Designers have the<br />

ability to successfully assert monopolistic rights in their brands and to litigate to<br />

stop the counterfeiting of them, often with the aid of law enforcement officials.<br />

The penalties are strict because many of the counterfeiters use the industry as a<br />

money laundering opportunity and as a vehicle to commit more dangerous crimes.<br />

1 See K. RAUSTALIA & C. SPRIGMAN, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual<br />

Property in Fashion Design, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, p. 1687, 1691 (2006).<br />

2 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.


Layne Randolph 67<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

Partly aided by the fact that the international counterfeiting in goods trade has been<br />

working in conjunction with organized crime, these counterfeiters can now face not<br />

only fines but also potential imprisonment if found to be infringing on trademark<br />

rights. 3<br />

Designers know that strong protections exist for their trademarks and many<br />

splash their brands and logos all over the products so as to attempt to protect their<br />

rights from infringement. From the double F‘s of Fendi to the LV‘s of Louis<br />

Vuitton, top designers know that a logo or brand name built into the product is the<br />

best and strongest offense in the world of counterfeiting. But, there is a major<br />

loophole in law enforcement and it‘s the banning of a fake label but not a fake<br />

design. And while in the US ―it is perfectly acceptable to sell merchandise that<br />

copies a fashion design and style, and these are called ―knock-offs‖, it is against the<br />

law to sell merchandise that copies a trademark.‖ 4<br />

Because of the strength of trademark protection in fashion and the virtually<br />

harmonious application of trademark law internationally, most conflict over IP<br />

protection in fashion relates not to the counterfeiting of trademarks, but instead, the<br />

counterfeiting of fashion designs 5 . It‘s the fashion design itself, the shape of the<br />

bag, the cut of a sleeve or the overall impression of a garment that causes the most<br />

discord among industry officials, lawyers, legislators, judges and designers<br />

themselves.<br />

3. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN FASHION DESIGN NOT<br />

UNIVERSALLY TREATED AS DESIGN PIRACY<br />

Fashion design counterfeiting (more commonly referred to as design piracy)<br />

is nothing new, and even in concept causes debate ranging from the Miuccia Prada<br />

argument that copying is the highest form of flattery (―We let others copy us, and<br />

when they do, we drop it‖) to the Council of Fashion Designers of America‘s<br />

argument that fashion designers are creators of independent expression no different<br />

from authors or painters, and therefore deserve a similar form of intellectual<br />

property protection. The debate ranges between giving a designer all of the rights<br />

of an artist in his designs, to the most open and free market perspective that more<br />

3 If infringement is willful, a court may treble the award of damages and profits and in some cases, a<br />

plaintiff may recover reasonable attorneys' fees. The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 (18<br />

U.S.C. 2320) made counterfeiting a federal crime and allows the destruction of the counterfeit<br />

labels, packages and the machines for making them. Additionally, the federal counterfeiting statute<br />

provides for fines of up to $2 million dollars and prison terms of up to 10 years, or both, for<br />

individuals, and fines of up to $5 million for business entities.<br />

4 J. BARNETT, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption,<br />

Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005).<br />

5 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright § 2.08[H][1], Bender, New York, 1997 at 2-<br />

143 to 2-144 (2009) (noting the difference between the terms ―fabric design‖ and ―dress design,‖<br />

and defines ―dress design‖ as ―the design that graphically sets forth the shape, style, cut, and<br />

dimensions for converting fabric into a finished dress or other clothing garment.‖).


68 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

copying is better for society but also for designers as well, since it speeds up the<br />

design cycle and keeps customers consuming and designers producing. 6<br />

However, ―while digital technology has made the fashion industry much<br />

more efficient and has facilitated creativity, the same technology has also<br />

facilitated counterfeiting and piracy‖ 7 which means that with the advent of digital<br />

technology and virtually instantaneous information sharing, the copyists can beat<br />

the originators at their own game, often knocking off fashion designs exactly,<br />

reproducing them in cheaper fabrics and with much less attention to detail, and<br />

mass producing and selling them to mega-stores worldwide before the creators<br />

have had the chance to produce one version for sale. Both European and American<br />

territories have attempted to deal with these issues and have taken decidedly<br />

different approaches to the situation. While Europe employs a vast array of IP<br />

protections to cover fashion designs, the American approach has been to apply as<br />

little protection as possible. An analysis of each is in order.<br />

4. EU TERRITORIES GRANT MULTI-TIERED IP PROTECTIONS FOR<br />

FASHION DESIGN<br />

In the European Community, fashion designers have the ability to avail<br />

themselves of design protection, both registered and unregistered. The community<br />

design system defines a design as "[t]he outward appearance of a product or part of<br />

it, resulting from the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture, materials, and/or its<br />

ornamentation." 8 All designs receive three years of protection whether or not they<br />

are registered. With registration, the initial period of protection is five years, but<br />

designers can increase the protection to up to 25 years with renewals. This<br />

registration provides a rebuttable presumption of validity and an exclusive right to<br />

use the registered design. 9 Also, a single distinguishing feature may produce a<br />

unique overall impression and justify protection. 10<br />

Designs must be new and have an individual character in order to be eligible<br />

for design protection. The originality will be viewed from the standard of the<br />

informed user, i.e. a fashion consumer, and it must be apparent to the public that it<br />

6 See K. RAUSTALIA & C. SPRIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1689.<br />

7 LECG, Economic Analysis of the Proposed CACP Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Initiative<br />

Prepared for the Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP), at 14 (Nov. 2007), available<br />

at http:www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20080610072737_large.pdf.<br />

8 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, The Community Design, Frequently Asked<br />

Questions on the Community Design, Question 1.1, http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/faq.htm (last<br />

visited February 2010).<br />

9 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 5, § 12.11[A], at 12-196 (stating<br />

that courts may "examine the underlying facts" of a registration to rebut the presumption of<br />

validity); see also Council Regulation No. 6/2002, art. 85, 2001 O.J. (L 3) 20 (EC) ("Validity [of a<br />

registration] may be challenged only with a counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity.").<br />

10 Mega Zipper (registered Community Design no. 000823414-0002. OHIM).


Layne Randolph 69<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

is different from products that already exist. 11 Unregistered European designs must<br />

meet the same criteria as registered designs in that they must be new and have an<br />

individual character. While unregistered designs are automatically protected for<br />

three years, they are only protected against deliberate copying and the design<br />

owner must prove that an infringer had knowledge of the design, in order to prevail<br />

in an infringement action. 12 France goes one step further and specifically provides<br />

copyright protection to the three-dimensional garment on the basis that fashion is<br />

art 13 and the French Design Act extends patent-like protection to designs, where<br />

infringement is based on use and not copying 14 and specifically provides for<br />

protection for fashion articles. 15 In contrast to the more liberal French system, the<br />

EC law protects all types of design without singling out fashion design for special<br />

protection.<br />

And yet, there is little use of this type of protection by fashion designers in<br />

Europe 16 and in fact, there are few lawsuits concerning fashion designs. 17 While<br />

increased IP protection would seem to produce a more enforceable right, these<br />

factors suggest that not to be the case. Certainly, litigation activity is not the only<br />

representation of enforcement actions taken but nonetheless provides some<br />

information of market activity. Perhaps most interestingly however, fast-fashion is<br />

the most rapidly growing segment of fashion in the world; a segment that regularly<br />

copies top designers looks and reproduces them for the mass market. Three of the<br />

top fast-fashion companies are in Europe: H&M (Sweden), Zara (Spain), and<br />

11<br />

Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community Designs, 2001 O.J. (L 3) 5 art. 11.<br />

12<br />

Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community Designs, 2001 O.J. (L 3) 4 art. 4., stating that the<br />

design owner must demonstrate that the item has individual character and prove the date that the<br />

article was made public).<br />

13<br />

J.H. REICHMAN, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne<br />

Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, Duke L.J. 1143, 1153 (1983), see also C.<br />

PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, art. I, L112-2 (14) (Act No. 94-361 of 10 May 1994 art. 2<br />

Official Journal of 11 May 1994), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.<br />

14<br />

V. MANLOW, Designing Clothes: Culture And Organization Of The Fashion Industry,<br />

Transaction Publishers, 2007.<br />

15<br />

C. PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, supra, note 13, specifically lists as protected works<br />

―creations of the seasonal industries of dress and articles of fashion. Industries which, by reason of<br />

the demands of fashion, frequently renew the form of their products, particularly the making of<br />

dresses, furs, underwear, embroidery, fashion, shoes, gloves, leather goods, the manufacture of<br />

fabrics of striking novelty or of special use in high fashion dressmaking, the products of<br />

manufacturers of articles of fashion and of footwear and the manufacture of fabrics for upholstery<br />

shall be deemed to be seasonal industries‖.<br />

16<br />

Although Europe is a breeding ground for haute couture design houses, surprisingly fashion<br />

designs accounted for only 8.98% of all design registrations. See Statistics for Community Designs<br />

2006, Breakdown by Class, at 10 (Dec. 31, 2006), available at<br />

http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/office/SSC007-Statistics_of_Community_Designs_2006.pdf (last visited<br />

February 2010), (listing registered Community designs by class). The class used is Locarno<br />

Classification 02, which applies to clothing, shoes, and accessories. See Locarno Classification.<br />

(However, under the community design system, registration is optional; many designers may opt not<br />

to register because they are given three years of protection for free).<br />

17<br />

Kal Raustalia & Christopher Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1722.


70 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

Topshop (U.K.) 18 These models of fashion design piracy not only exist but are<br />

allowed to thrive in the more fashion design IP protective environment of the EC. 19<br />

For these reasons, the thoughtful IP scholar must question whether the granting of<br />

more IP protection truly dissuades copyists thereby creating stronger IP in fashion<br />

design, or whether there may be other, more relevant issues at play.<br />

5. SPARSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR US<br />

FASHION DESIGN<br />

In terms of levels of protection for fashion worldwide, the US‘s level is quite<br />

low. Most intellectual property laws were not written with fashion protection in<br />

mind. Although certain elements of fashion can be protected by various forms of IP<br />

protection, the majority of fashion designer‘s rights slip through the cracks of the<br />

IP system. The basic premise at the heart of US fashion design protection is the<br />

notion that apparel is useful and therefore outside copyright protection. Current US<br />

copyright law covers ―original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium<br />

of expression‖ 20 and specifically includes: (1) literary works; (2) musical works,<br />

including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any<br />

accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,<br />

graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)<br />

sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. 21 Certain elements of fashion design<br />

are specifically protected under US IP law. Two-dimensional fashion design<br />

sketches are protected as pictorial works under copyright law, however, the threedimensional<br />

garment exists in a virtually copyright-free zone. While an aesthetic<br />

component of the fashion design can be protected if physically or conceptually<br />

separable, 22 the garment in its totality is considered to be primarily used for<br />

covering the body and therefore does not rise to the necessary standard for<br />

copyright protection because it is generally considered to have a ―utilitarian<br />

function‖ as a ―useful article‖. 23<br />

Design patents provide some protection for the non-useful, ornamental<br />

elements of a fashion design but the standards required to obtain a design patent are<br />

18<br />

DPPA Testimony of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of<br />

Law, infra note 35 (stating that stores like H&M, Zara, and Topshop are three of the largest retail<br />

culprits of copying high end designs and selling them at affordable prices). Professor Sprigman<br />

argues that the fact that there is widespread copying and minimal litigation in Europe means that the<br />

design protection system has done nothing to affect the way the industry operates.<br />

19<br />

See Kal Raustalia & Christopher Sprigman, Where IP Isn‟t, UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law &<br />

Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-05 (2007).<br />

20<br />

See U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).<br />

21<br />

Id.<br />

22<br />

United States District Court For The Central District Of California, 2006, Express, LLC v. Fetish<br />

Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1224–25, 1228–29 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that, although the<br />

utilitarian aspects of a camisole could not be protected, lace and embroidery elements were<br />

copyrightable because they were irrelevant to the utilitarian aspects of the camisole).<br />

23<br />

U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101.


Layne Randolph 71<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

extremely difficult to meet. A design patent is a type of patent that protects the<br />

inventor of ―any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture‖<br />

for fourteen years 24 . The design element seeking protection must be novel and nonobvious,<br />

25 which excludes inspiration because it requires that the new creation<br />

advance beyond prior art in a way that is not obvious. 26 Moreover, this patent<br />

protection is limited by the expense and time involved in obtaining patent<br />

protection, because although very few items or garments meet the standards of<br />

patentability, even if they did, a patent takes months or years to obtain, which is<br />

generally unworkable in the fast-paced fashion world.<br />

The limited protection afforded US designers by application of design patent<br />

or copyright protection gives way to an extended protection under trademark law. 27<br />

Typically, trademark law gives the strongest and most enforceable protection<br />

against infringement universally. Even the Burberry plaid has become a legitimate<br />

trademark 28 , namely because the pattern has acquired a secondary meaning that can<br />

be protected under trademark law. In the US trademarks are relatively easy to<br />

obtain and do not require registration for legal protection. 29 A subset of trademark<br />

law in the US is trade dress protection for iconic designs, which requires source<br />

identification and secondary meaning. This protection encompasses<br />

signature/iconic looks so recognizable that they have acquired secondary<br />

meaning. 30 Secondary meaning is difficult to achieve and usually arises only after a<br />

significant amount of time in the public eye, and therefore, trade dress protection is<br />

not readily available to most designers for their designs, and certainly rarely<br />

available to the new or small designer. Moreover, trade dress protection is rarely<br />

available to designers due to the fact that the primary significance of the feature<br />

must be to identify the source, which is a standard that will rarely be met with<br />

clothing due to its inherent usefulness. Some US fashion designers have chosen to<br />

confront this IP protection void by proposing an amendment to the US Copyright<br />

Act which would grant a limited copyright protection to fashion designs.<br />

24 U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).<br />

25 U.S. Patent Act, Conditions for Patentability, 35 U.S.C. §102 (2002).<br />

26 United States Supreme Court, Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871).<br />

27 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Diane von Furstenberg<br />

Studio, LP v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-2413 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007). Without any legal authority<br />

to support design infringement, von Furstenberg‘s lawsuit was primarily based on infringement of<br />

copyrighted fabric designs.<br />

28 US Trademark, Ser. No. 73, 170, 890, Reg. No. 1,241,222 (filed May 17, 1978).<br />

29 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademarks, Basic Facts, Should I Register My Mark?,<br />

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic/register.jsp, (last modified 12/30/2009, last visited<br />

February 2010), (stating that registration, while not required, provides many benefits to the<br />

registrant).<br />

30 T. MCCARTHY, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:91 (4th ed. 2008).


72 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

6. US DEBATES THE PROS AND CONS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION<br />

FOR FASHION DESIGN<br />

The Design Piracy Prohibition Act (―DPPA‖) 31 is a bill to prohibit design<br />

piracy in the US, and according to some proponents, to prevent the US from<br />

becoming a safe haven for design piracy and to promote international<br />

harmonization of IP protection. The DPPA bill pending in the US Senate would<br />

amend the Copyright Act to provide copyright protection to fashion designs after<br />

requisite registration of an original design. Under copyright, an owner can rarely<br />

bring an action for an article that is not registered. 32 "Original, as the term is used<br />

in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as<br />

opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal<br />

degree of creativity." 33 The standard of protection under DPPA is ―all expression<br />

not copied in its entirety from others that contains a modicum of creativity‖<br />

extended to the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its<br />

ornamentation. And apparel is defined as ―men's, women's, or children's clothing,<br />

including undergarments, outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear; handbags,<br />

purses, and tote bags; belts; and eyeglass frames.‖ 34 However, the DPPA would<br />

not protect any design that has been made public prior to the law‘s enactment.<br />

Those designs, lacking in originality, will belong to the public domain.<br />

The standard of infringement under the DPPA would be ―closely and<br />

substantially similar‖ 35 , and defenses to infringement would include merely<br />

reflecting a trend, and independent creation. One criticism of the bill is the test of<br />

"substantial similarity" that courts would be required to use to determine if articles<br />

31 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H. REP. NO. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006), Design Piracy Prohibition<br />

Act, H. REP. NO. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007), S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007), Design Piracy<br />

Prohibition Act, H. REP. NO. 2196, 111 th Congress (2009-2010). On March 30th, 2006, H.R. 5055<br />

was introduced to Congress. The bill proposed an amendment to Title 17, United States Code to<br />

provide protection to fashion design. Hearings were held to discuss the bill on July 27th, 2006, but a<br />

debate on the issue was never brought to the House floor and H.R. 5055 was thus never put to a<br />

vote. The 110th Congress saw an almost identical bill, H.R. 2033, introduced on April 25th, 2007.<br />

Although it was referred to a subcommittee on May 4th, 2007, the bill was once again abandoned<br />

and cleared at the end of the Congressional session. On Apr 30, 2009, the bill was referred to the<br />

House Committee on the Judiciary.<br />

32 U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 411 ("Except [for certain actions] no action for infringement of<br />

the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the<br />

copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.").<br />

33 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 9, at §§ 2.01[A], [B], 1990.<br />

34 DPPA Hearings, supra note 31, A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Designs: Hearing<br />

Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 109th Cong., 2nd<br />

sess. (2006) at § 2(a)(2).<br />

35 Written Statement on H.R. 5055, ―The Design Piracy Prohibition Act‖ presented to the<br />

Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, U.S. House of Representatives, by<br />

Susan Scafidi, Associate Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of History, SMU, Visiting<br />

Professor, Fordham Law School, at 812 available at 2006 WL 2127242 (F.D.C.H.).


Layne Randolph 73<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

are infringements of protected articles. 36 The substantial similarity liability<br />

standard ―presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that<br />

is least susceptible of helpful generalizations.‖ 37 The bill is aimed at deterring the<br />

counterfeiting of fashion design by changing the behavior of would-be infringers.<br />

By creating financial liability for direct copying (paying any profits to original<br />

design holder), the copyists would have strong incentive not to directly copy<br />

another designer‘s design exactly. With damages for infringements suggested at<br />

the greater of $250,000, or $5 per copy, this infringement standard could incite a<br />

plethora of litigation, and the ―fast-fashion‖ designers would presumably be most<br />

negatively affected by the DPPA.<br />

7. PROPONENTS OF THE ACT: FASHION DESIGN IS A CREATIVE<br />

WORK AND DESERVES PROTECTION TO DETER PIRACY<br />

The Council for Fashion Designers and Artists (―CFDA‖), a non-profit trade<br />

association for American fashion and accessory designers, represents a small<br />

number of elite and often very successful designers including Tom Ford, Calvin<br />

Klein, Ralph Lauren, and Diane von Furstenberg. 38 CFDA argues that American<br />

designers need protection for their designs in order to remain innovative and<br />

competitive in today‘s fashion industry. Essentially, the pro-DPPA arguments<br />

focus on the deterrent factor behind the bill, and that the rampant copying of<br />

fashion designs hurts the industry. The DPPA proponents also assert that copyright<br />

protection may strengthen the American fashion brands, pointing to the French<br />

protection of fashion as an art form which has helped maintain the pre-eminence of<br />

the French fashion industry.<br />

Susan Scafidi, a professor of Fashion Law at Fordham University School of<br />

Law, is a vocal supporter and one of the sponsors of the Bill 39 . She argues that it‘s<br />

the small designer who suffers the most without copyright protection-they have no<br />

trademark to brand per se, and their designs are knocked off without recourse.<br />

Small and start-up designers are at great risk if their designs are not protected by<br />

copyright because small designers cannot rely on their reputation or trademark to<br />

make up for lack of design protection and cannot afford litigation for<br />

enforcement. 40 She argues the law would change the behavior of the large fast-<br />

36 4 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 9, at § 13.03[A], at 13-34.1 to<br />

-34.3 (2007) (providing "substantial similarity" as the standard for copyright infringement); see also<br />

U.S. Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 1309(e) (using the same standard for infringement of vessel hulls).<br />

37 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 9, at § 13.03[A].<br />

38 For the membership roll, see Council of Fashion Designers of America,<br />

http://www.cfda.com/members (last visited February, 2010).<br />

39 Written Statement on H.R. 5055, supra note 35, Scafidi Testimony, at 814.<br />

40 S. SCAFIDI, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 Intellectual Property and<br />

Information Wealth, Peter K. Yu, 2006, at 117 (stating that even if a famous designer‘s new line is<br />

knocked off, consumers may still be willing to pay higher prices for the trademarked version.<br />

Emerging designers, by contrast, cannot depend exclusively on brand recognition for protection<br />

against design piracy. The author went on to quote a young designer who explained the problem as


74 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

fashion companies that knock off the small designer‘s ideas and that if these<br />

companies know that they cannot make an exact copy, they will be required to<br />

innovate-which she rightly states as the goal of IP. If they do copy, a cease and<br />

desist letter may be enough to stop them since they know the designer has a prior<br />

right. Other proponents of the DPPA further assert that the relatively short term of<br />

protection afforded—three years—is particularly suited to the fashion industry‘s<br />

shorter life cycles. 41<br />

8. OPPONENTS OF THE ACT: THE ACT WOULD HAVE A CHILLING<br />

EFFECT ON THE US FASHION INDUSTRY BECAUSE LESS<br />

PROTECTION EQUALS MORE INNOVATION<br />

The American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA) strongly oppose<br />

the DPPA, citing the chilling effect such a law would have on the US fashion<br />

industry. The AAFA and other opponents to the bill believe that a low IP<br />

environment is beneficial to the US fashion industry, and that copyright protection<br />

would curb creativity and innovation in fashion design. Opponents to the bill cite<br />

various reasons for their stance. Legal scholars argue that due to the referencing<br />

and borrowing inherent in the fashion industry cycles, originality is difficult to<br />

define and monitor and too low of a bar for copyright protection in fashion. 42 But<br />

by far the most convincing arguments relate to the principal at the core of the bill,<br />

that the copying of fashion design must be deterred in order to encourage<br />

innovation. Many DPPA opponents assert that in reality the contrary is true, that<br />

copying in the fashion industry does not stifle innovation, but rather that copying is<br />

beneficial to the fashion industry. This concept, developed by Kal Raustiala &<br />

Christopher Sprigman, is referred to as ―The Piracy Paradox‖. 43<br />

The Piracy Paradox arises from the premise that desirable designer fashions<br />

get copied by lower-end producers and are then picked up by the masses. By the<br />

time the masses have adopted the fashions, the consumers of designer fashions are<br />

looking for the next trend. Therefore, the copying of the fashion designs creates a<br />

faster trend cycle which benefits the fashion industry by inducing rapid turnover<br />

and additional sales. And Raustiala and Sprigman argue that the consumer is the<br />

one who wins in this scenario, because the consumer has access to affordable yet<br />

fashionable products. The conventional thinking is that unauthorized copying of<br />

fashion designs tarnishes a brand‘s image by confusing the public and<br />

commingling the designer‘s image with that of cheaper and less desirable products<br />

she sees it: ―[Famous designers] can just sell their trademarks. We [unknown designers] have to sell<br />

our designs.‖<br />

41 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H. REP. NO. 2196, 111 th Congress (2009-2010) at § 2(f).<br />

42 U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) ("A design is ‗original‘ if it is the result of the<br />

designer‘s creative endeavor that provides a distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining to<br />

similar articles which is more than merely trivial and has not been copied from another source.").<br />

43 K. RAUSTIALA & C. SPRIGMAN, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property<br />

in Fashion Design,, supra note 1, at 1692.


Layne Randolph 75<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

(or inversely, literally stealing a design to produce a design copy under a different<br />

brand and stealing the consumer as well). The piracy paradox theory essentially<br />

turns this theory on its head, and asserts that once a high-status customer senses<br />

that the fashion trend has become ordinary, the high status customer moves on to<br />

the next trend. But for the ordinary consumer the trend stays in place longer and<br />

even extends to the mass market, at which time the ordinary consumer moves on to<br />

the next trend. Because of the cyclical nature of the industry and the constant need<br />

for new products and trends to feed the cycle, the over-arching theory behind the<br />

piracy paradox is that fashion design works best in a low-IP environment where<br />

designs can be pirated/copied most effectively. In fact, ―the low-IP regime acts as<br />

an accelerant of innovation.‖ 44<br />

And then there is the nearly universally accepted notion that much of fashion<br />

design is an accepted derivative work i.e., a work that appropriates certain design<br />

elements of a specific design but is still distinguishable to the average consumer. 45<br />

This derivation is helpful to those consumers who wish to flock to the latest<br />

designs while still being distinguishable in some way. 46 And, the designers of the<br />

original fashions most often accept this type of derivative work as a part of the<br />

world of fashion, and simply move on to the next design and trend rather than<br />

spend time and money fighting every knock-off which may just as well be<br />

considered a derivative work. It should be stated that the piracy paradox, while<br />

certainly applicable for the major fashion conglomerates, leaves small designers<br />

outside of the analysis. It‘s as if the proponents of the piracy paradox believe that<br />

fashion innovation is solely a top-down affair, when industry experts know that this<br />

is often not the case. Street fashion and young/small designer fashion is often<br />

copied by the major conglomerates themselves, with little to no recourse when<br />

considering the time and expense needed for the creator to pursue litigation. In this<br />

arena, the more established designer would simply argue inspiration as a defense to<br />

a substantially similar design, without the added protection of the DPPA. The cost<br />

of arguing whether a second design is substantially similar to the original design is<br />

significant in terms of time and money. Additionally, by the time a court reaches a<br />

final decision, the fashion design will likely no longer be in vogue 47 . Therefore, it<br />

is this segment of the US fashion industry that will suffer without further<br />

protection, even though the industry as a whole may thrive.<br />

A direct copy, however, is certainly almost never looked upon with favor,<br />

especially if done by a direct competitor who is likely to steal the original<br />

44<br />

K. RAUSTIALA & C. SPRIGMAN, Where IP Isn‟t, supra note 19, at 1209.<br />

45<br />

U.S. Copyright Act, supra, note 23.<br />

46<br />

C. SCOTT HEMPHILL & J. SUK, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L.<br />

REV. 1147 (2009).<br />

47<br />

L. HEDRICK, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 WASH. & LEE L.<br />

REV. 215, 272 (2008).


76 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

designer‘s sale/customer. 48 However, the same designer who may be willing to<br />

litigate a direct competitor‘s knock-off, may not care quite as much if fast-fashion<br />

industry copies his designs 49 for some of the exact reasons stated in the piracy<br />

paradox theory. Frankly, there are many reasons why European designers may not<br />

choose registration or the courts as a way to protect their fashion designs.<br />

Therefore it is difficult to accept the notion that design protection is not fully<br />

enjoyed in the EU as a rationale for not providing additional IP protection in the<br />

US, although many opponents to the DPPA are quick to do so. But beyond<br />

whether the European or the American approach to provide legal protection for<br />

fashion design is better, the bigger question for the DPPA revolves around the<br />

concept of territories when looking to impose new protections and requirements.<br />

9. CONCLUSION: LEVEL OF IP PROTECTION GRANTED NOT<br />

DETERMINING FACTOR<br />

Opponents of the DPPA commonly refer to the Piracy Paradox as evidence<br />

that while there may be a dearth of IP protection for fashion design in the US, there<br />

is no correlating negative effect to the industry because the US has a thriving<br />

fashion industry. 50 The EU fashion industry and market are thriving too, 51 even in<br />

the face of blatant fashion design piracy 52 and an apparent under-utilization of<br />

protections. However, an identical system of protection in the US may not produce<br />

the same effect due to cultural differences in the territories. Taken one step farther,<br />

to introduce added IP protections could have a chilling effect on the marketplace,<br />

one that doesn‘t exist in European markets due to the differences in the civil law<br />

systems. "Unlike in Europe where there is a weak civil litigation system, here in<br />

the States we have a very powerful civil litigation system and we are a society<br />

teeming with lawyers, including obviously a class of litigation entrepreneurs that<br />

accesses the Federal courts." 53<br />

48 T. JACKSON & D. SHAW, The Fashion Handbook 177 (Routledge 2006), See also Yves Saint<br />

Laurent S.A. v. Societe Louis Dreyfus Retail Management S.A., Tribunal de Commerce, Paris (1994)<br />

E.C.C. 512<br />

49 J. BARNETT, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption,<br />

Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, supra at note 4 at 1385.<br />

50 U.S. Marketline Report 2007. Industry reports on the apparel industry indicate that the U.S.<br />

menswear market generated $106 billion in 2007, the US women‘s wear market generated revenues<br />

of $175.3 billion, and the US infants‘ wear market generated revenues of $9.9 billion. Thus,<br />

according to these figures, the total U.S. fashion industry generated $291.2 billion in 2007.<br />

51 Global Marketline Report 2007 stated that revenues of the global fashion industry range<br />

somewhere between $750 billion and $862 billion.<br />

52 Testimony on H.R. 5055, ―The Design Piracy Act‖, given July 27, 2006 before the Committee on<br />

the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual<br />

Property, given by Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of<br />

Law (stating that stores like H&M, Zara, and Topshop are three of the largest retail culprits of<br />

copying high end designs and selling them at affordable prices. Professor Sprigman argues that the<br />

fact that there is widespread copying and minimal litigation in Europe means that the design<br />

protection system has done nothing to affect the way the industry operates).<br />

53 Testimony on H.R. 5055, supra note 52 at 4 (stating that ―[W]e fear that H.R. 5055 might turn the<br />

industry‘s attention away from innovation and toward litigation.‖).


Layne Randolph 77<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

Although the two territories operate with very different levels of IP for<br />

fashion designs, it would appear that the level of IP protection available is not<br />

determinative of success in the fashion industry. With increased protections and<br />

incentives for litigation in the US, the market could change dramatically in ways<br />

that would not necessarily be expected in the EU, i.e. more legal protection in the<br />

US would probably equal more litigation and a potential stall to fashion innovation<br />

as designers act out of an abundance of caution for fear of crossing the<br />

inspiration/imitation line. Whether IP protections granted are many or are few, the<br />

best environment for a thriving fashion industry still appears to be one in which the<br />

utilization of the IP protection is low. And within each territory, it would be<br />

advisable to structure the level of protection taking into account that territory‘s<br />

cultural norms as regards utilization.<br />

Finally, we must address the issue of the technological advances that allow<br />

the fashion cycle to recycle itself at a pace inconceivable only a few years ago. To<br />

a certain extent, design copyists are able to take the punch out of the piracy paradox<br />

with their ability to copy designs before the original designer can produce one<br />

garment. No longer does the mass market not have to wait for fashion trends to<br />

trickle down, through fast-fashion and the like the mass market is often on the edge<br />

of fashion just as quickly as the top designer‘s customers. This may be the best<br />

argument for additional IP protections for the original designer, both the original<br />

top fashion house designer and the small emerging designer.<br />

The DPPA may not be the perfect solution, but a limited and specific<br />

protection could certainly provide a proactive response to industry changes as they<br />

occur. Certainly there is no easy answer to this conundrum, other than for fashion<br />

and IP legal experts to remain alert to potential risks inherent in their applicable<br />

territory, risks which may not be so great that a radical change is immediately<br />

necessary, but which may require future intercession. Because even if we find that<br />

current IP protections are well-suited to their territory and the industry today, there<br />

may very well come a point at which these protections are no longer adequate<br />

which would warrant adjustments. For the moment, however, the debate over<br />

whether now is the time for intercession rages on.


78 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Articles<br />

J. BARNETT, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status<br />

Consumption, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Thesis, in Virginia L. Rev.,<br />

2005.<br />

L. HEDRICK, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65<br />

WASH. & LEE L. REV., 2008.<br />

T. JACKSON & D. SHAW, The Fashion Handbook, Routledge, 2006.<br />

V. MANLOW, Designing Clothes: Culture And Organization Of The<br />

Fashion Industry, Transaction Publishers, 2007.<br />

T. MCCARTHY, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition,<br />

Thomson West, 2008.<br />

M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright, Bender (1990).<br />

M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Nimmer On Copyright, Bender (2007).<br />

K. RAUSTALIA & C. SPRIGMAN, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and<br />

Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, in Virginia L. Rev., 2006.<br />

K. RAUSTALIA & C. SPRIGMAN, Where IP Isn‟t, in UCLA Sch. of Law<br />

Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 2007.<br />

H. REICHMAN, Design Protection in domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:<br />

From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, Duke L.J. 1143<br />

(1983).<br />

S. SCAFIDI, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 Intellectual<br />

Property and Information Wealth, Peter K. Yu, 2006.<br />

Laws and Treaties<br />

Council Regulation No. 6/2002 on Community Designs, 2001 O.J. (L 3).<br />

C. Propriété Intellectuelle, art. I, L112-2 (Act No. 94-361 of 10 May 1994 art.<br />

2 Official Journal of 11 May 1994).<br />

Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H. REP. NO. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006),<br />

Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H. REP. NO. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007) and S.<br />

1957, 110th Cong. (2007). Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H. REP. NO. 2196, 111 th<br />

Congress (2009-2010).


Layne Randolph 79<br />

____________________________________________________________________________<br />

Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.<br />

Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 18 U.S.C. 2320 (1984).<br />

U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. (2006).<br />

U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. (2006).<br />

Cases<br />

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Diane<br />

von Furstenberg Studio, LP v. Forever 21, Inc., Case No. 07-2413 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.<br />

29, 2007).<br />

United States District Court For The Central District Of California, Express,<br />

LLC V. Fetish Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2006).<br />

United States Supreme Court, Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871).<br />

Tribunal de Commerce Paris, 1994, Yves Saint Laurent S.A. v. Societe Louis<br />

Dreyfus Retail Management S.A., E.C.C. 512, case «Yves Saint Laurent».<br />

Additional Sources<br />

Global Marketline Report 2007.<br />

LECG, Economic Analysis of the Proposed CACP Anti-Counterfeiting and<br />

Piracy Initiative Prepared for the Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy<br />

(CACP), 2007.<br />

Mega Zipper (registered Community Design No. 000823414-0002. Office for<br />

Harmonization in the Internal Market).<br />

Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, The Community Design,<br />

Frequently Asked Questions on the Community Design, Question 1.1,<br />

http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/faq.htm (last visited February 2010).<br />

Testimony on H.R. 5055, ―The Design Piracy Act‖, given before the<br />

Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on<br />

Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, by Christopher Sprigman, Associate<br />

Professor, University of Virginia School of Law (2006).<br />

Written Statement on H.R. 5055, ―The Design Piracy Prohibition Act‖<br />

presented to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,<br />

U.S. House of Representatives, by Susan Scafidi, Associate Professor of Law and


80 Fashion Forward or Fashion Victim: Intellectual Property Protection<br />

in the Fashion Industry<br />

Adjunct Professor of History, SMU, Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School<br />

(2006).<br />

U.S. Marketline Report 2007.<br />

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademarks, Basic Facts, Should I Register<br />

My Mark?, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic/register.jsp, last<br />

modified 12/30/2009, last visited February 2010.<br />

US Trademark, Ser. No. 73, 170, 890, Reg. No. 1,241,222 (filed May 17,<br />

1978).


ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT CLAIM SCOPE.<br />

1. INTRODUCTION.<br />

2. CLAIMS<br />

Broad Patent Claim Scope<br />

Narrow Patent Claim Scope<br />

3. COMPARISON<br />

by<br />

Eno-obong Usen<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

Pros and Cons of Broad and Narrow Scope Infringement<br />

Direct Infringement<br />

Indirect Infringement<br />

- Induced Infringement<br />

- Contributory Infringement<br />

4. INFRINGEMENT<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY


82 Econimic Implications of Patent Scope<br />

1. INTRODUCTION:<br />

The baseline rationale for intellectual property right is to grant exclusivity to<br />

its owner as a means of discouraging free-riding and encouraging innovation 1 . The<br />

right so granted consist mainly of patrimonial and non-patrimonial (moral) right.<br />

The non-patrimonial aspect (moral right) consist of the right to paternity and<br />

integrity it pertains mostly to copyright and some neighbouring rights while the<br />

patrimonial right consist of the exclusive right to authorise or prevent others from<br />

making, using, selling or otherwise dealing in the invention without the prior<br />

consent of the right holder 2 . This pertains to other branches of intellectual property<br />

rights. Patents right are mainly patrimonial 3 .<br />

The scope of the patent right determines the extent of the exclusionary<br />

characteristic of the grant 4 . Patent has its strong area of influence secondarily<br />

concealed behind the words used to define its scope 5 . The scope of protection<br />

plays an important role in the decision by an inventor whether to patent or keep the<br />

invention a secret, this is partly due to the educative nature of the specification 6 . It<br />

is also a critical factor in determining the proximity of any new competitor 7 : that is<br />

how close a new invention maybe in order to be termed infringing. In addition it<br />

serves a commercial purpose in adjusting the relationship between the inventor and<br />

the second comer to the technological area, who neither bore the burden of creation<br />

1 J. HARRISON, Law and Economics, Thomson West, New York, 2007 at 683<br />

2 S. THORLEY-R. MILLER-G. BURKILL- C. BIRSS, TERRELL on the Law of Patents, 15 th ed., Sweet<br />

& Maxwell, London, 2006 at 1<br />

3 Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement present the rights conferred in a succinct manner and in doing<br />

so reflect common practise nationally. Accordingly 1(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a<br />

product, to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using,<br />

offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter<br />

of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the act of using<br />

the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at<br />

least the product obtained directly by that process. 2. Patent owners shall also have the right to<br />

assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts. See Agreement on<br />

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement<br />

Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay<br />

Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]<br />

4 Idem, 133 ―once the public misperception of patent changes from anticompetitive monopolies to<br />

useful stimulant for economic growth, the patent becomes revived to some extent‖, Kastriner, The<br />

Revivial of Confidence in the Patent System (1991) 73 JPTOS 5 at 8<br />

5 M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation and scope of protection Hart Publishing,<br />

Oxford – Oregon , 2007 at 113<br />

6 The patent documents have a legal obligation to teach the reader how to make the stated<br />

invention. Even where the innovators in developing countries may not be able to reproduce the<br />

latest cutting edge technology contained in patent documents, they may be still be able to use<br />

information contained in the specifications about the technology to adapt to local situations. This<br />

could be the very backbone for a technological revolution in developing countries.<br />

7 M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation and scope of protection, Supra note 5 at<br />

113.


Eno-obong Usen 83<br />

or the risk if failure 8 . The wordings of the patent claim play an important role in the<br />

determination of the scope of protection.<br />

2. CLAIMS<br />

The claim is a technical description of the process, machine method or matter<br />

to be patented. It defines what the inventor considers to be the scope of her<br />

invention, the technological territory she claims is hers to control and it<br />

distinguishes the inventor‘s intellectual property right from other terrains 9 . The<br />

claim is often required to be crafted in clear and certain words so as to provide a<br />

clear definition of the scope of patent right to be granted because lack of clarity can<br />

impede legitimate investment in technological-based products and services 10 . In<br />

the United States and the United Kingdom the claim determines the scope of the<br />

invention by placing a ‗fence post‘ around it, in other jurisdiction the claim are<br />

meant to provide ‗sign post‘ for the invention to make it easier to ascertain the<br />

inventive step and novelty of the invention 11 . The European Patent Convention<br />

reflects a compromise between the fence post and sign post claiming 12 .<br />

In the UK, the United States, Japan and Germany, the Patent Offices and the<br />

courts constant make decisions as to the exact coverage of the patent claim scope 13 .<br />

The former does this when it determines which claims to be allowed on a specific<br />

claim and the latter in litigation where questions of infringements are decided 14 .<br />

8 J. HARRISON, Law and Economics, supra at note1 at 688.<br />

9 R. MERGES and R. NELSON, On Complex economics of Patent Scope decisions, in the Colum. L.<br />

Rev . Vol 90, 1990 at 845<br />

10 C. NARD, Law of Patents, Aspen, New York, 2008 at 437<br />

11 G. SUTHERSANEN, Global Intellectual Property Law. Commentary and Materials, Edward Elgar,<br />

2008 at 123<br />

12 W. CORNISH and LLEWELYN, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademark and Allied<br />

Marks, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003, at 66 . It is instructive to note that the fence post claiming is<br />

otherwise called the peripheral claiming approach, it purports to set the outermost boundaries of<br />

patent rights. It serves as a notice function in setting out clear boundaries to warn the public of what<br />

is and is not claimed. Its ―notice function‖ has been terms by scholars as a dangerous illusion,<br />

because it means that courts define the scope of legal rights not by reference to the invention but by<br />

reference to semantic debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers. For this reason, it<br />

brings uncertainty into the patent system. In the sign post claiming otherwise known as central<br />

claiming approach, the patentee does not delineate the outer reach of what it claims. Rather, the<br />

patentee discloses the central features of the invention, what distinguishes it from the prior art, and<br />

the courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled to by looking at the prior art that<br />

cabins the invention, how important the patentee‘s invention was, and how different the accused<br />

device is. While the peripheral claiming establishes fence posts marking the boundary of the patent,<br />

the central claiming replaces the fence posts with sign posts identifying new inventions by<br />

describing the core or gist of the patentee‘s contribution to technology.<br />

See D. BURK & M. LEMLEY., Fence posts or sign posts? Rethinking Patent claim construction, U.<br />

Pal L. Rev. , Vol. 57 at 1745-6 available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/lawreview/<br />

articles/volume157/issue6/ BurkLemley157U.Pa.L.Rev.1743(2009).pdf<br />

13 R. MERGES and R. NELSON, On Complex Economics of Patent Scope decisions, supra note 9 at<br />

840<br />

14 C. NARD, Law of Patents, supra note 10 at 395


84 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

The determination of the optimal claim scope of protection of patent plays an<br />

important role in the stimulation of economic growth. The creation of rules for<br />

determining the optimal patent scope that maintain the protection a patent is meant<br />

to confer while still keeping the patent monopoly within reasonable bounds has<br />

posed a major challenge to court and legislature. The difficulty of this task has led<br />

to different results in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have chosen to<br />

determine the scope of patent protection under broad claim scope, while others<br />

have maintained the position that adequate scope can be obtained by a narrow<br />

claim interpretation. Article 5 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with issues bordering<br />

on Patent. It is silent on the issue of claim interpretation, thus leaving this issue at<br />

the discretion of member states. The Patent Act of United kingdom, United States,<br />

Japan and German represent divergence view of the interpretation of the patent<br />

claim scope. The objective of this research is to study the claim interpretation of<br />

four patent jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and<br />

Japan, their divergent approach to the interpretation of the patent claim scope of<br />

protection and the resultant effect in their economy, with a view of providing<br />

possible clues for developing countries. For a gainful insight it is pertinent to<br />

understand the concept of broad and narrow patent claim scope.<br />

Broad Patent Claim Scope<br />

There has been a lot of debate weighted heavily on the proposition that broad<br />

claim scopes of protection are conducive to economic development and growth 15 .<br />

Notable proponents of the Patent induced theory depicts patent as a necessity for<br />

inducing invention and suggest broad claim scope of protection for revolutionary<br />

inventions 16 , yet many scholars have argued along the line that broad patent claim<br />

scope were not always necessary to induce invention and entailed significant<br />

economic cost 17 . Scholars have suggested that the optimum patent claim scope is<br />

that which promote competition in research 18 . Kitch argues that since competition<br />

in research is inefficient broad claim scope of protection to the originator of<br />

revolutionary creations would provide optimum incentive for technological<br />

development and improve the larger social welfare 19 . Schumpeter elucidating on<br />

this point avers that market factors alone would not justify entities investing the<br />

amount of time, effort and money that the creation of a spectacular technical<br />

contribution would require more so revolutionary creations are an important<br />

15<br />

R. MAZZOLENI- R. NELSON, Economic theories about the benefits and costs of patents, in J. of<br />

Econ Issues 1998, 1031ff at 25.<br />

16<br />

The anticipation of obtaining a patent induces firms to invest money into the research that resulted<br />

in the invention or bring the invention into the market. Fisher supra at note 3 at p 114<br />

17<br />

R. MAZZOLENI- R. NELSON, Economic theories about the benefits and costs of patents, supra note<br />

15 at 26.<br />

18<br />

R. MERGER and R. NELSON, On limiting or encouraging rivalry in Technical Progress: The effect<br />

of Patent Scope decisions in the J. of Econ Behaviour Org Vol. 25, 1994<br />

19<br />

E. KITCH, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265(1977) cited in J.<br />

HARRISON, Law and Economics, supra note 1 at 689


Eno-obong Usen 85<br />

driving force behind economic growth 20 . Fisher also asserts that broad patent<br />

claim scope of protection induces disclosure. The narrower the scope of protection<br />

offered by the patent system is the less the potential returns, the less likely public<br />

disclosure and the decision to patent would be made by inventors 21 . On the other<br />

hand broad patent leads to potentially large social cost, such as the inefficiencies<br />

associated with monopoly profit (deadweight losses) 22.<br />

The broad claim scope of patent protection is justified by Kitch from a<br />

different perspective; he reasoned that the patent system is a necessity to encourage<br />

investment in technological prospect after the right has been granted. He<br />

emphasized that patents are granted after invention but before commercialisation:<br />

this enables the inventor to invest in development without fear of imitation and also<br />

enables him to coordinate future R&D efforts of potential imitators to reduce<br />

inefficient duplication of inventive effort 23 . Kitch demonstrates that unless there is<br />

a broad patent claim scope of protection on the prospect opening invention, greater<br />

competition in the race for the new product and development of the prospect may<br />

proceed in a socially wasteful way 24 . From this perspective, broad patents are<br />

probably better since they tend to reduce the inefficiencies associated with rivalry<br />

uncoordinated invention and reduce over fishing within the same product space.<br />

Broad patent claim scope of protection however, poses a danger of raising up<br />

industries who create such ‗inventions‘ and get such patent with the aim to make<br />

profit through licensing rather than development and commercialization in-house 25 .<br />

There is a danger of fostering the growth of a market based on patent licensing, this<br />

becomes worst where such rights are conferred on research tools and ideas that<br />

would have otherwise formed part of the public domain 26 yet it the fact that such<br />

inventions would have otherwise been kept secret cannot be ignored. The granting<br />

of broad claim scope results in a social cost to the society, it acts as a deterrence to<br />

other firms with capacity to invent in the neighbourhood to undertake any of the<br />

wide variety of follow on inventive work that improves, or variegate on an initial<br />

invention because of the likelihood that their inventions would be challenged 27 as<br />

infringing. The option to for the follow-on inventor lies on his ability to negotiate a<br />

20<br />

J. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 5th ed. London: George Allen and<br />

Unwin, 1976 cited in M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of<br />

protection, supra at note 5 at 140<br />

21<br />

Ibid. at156<br />

22<br />

Ibid at 143<br />

23<br />

This amount to granting a right over an unexplored pool with the right holder granted the right to<br />

charge an access fee for the exploitation of the various part of this pool. E. KITCH, Nature and<br />

Function of the Patent System supra at note 19 at 279 cited in R. MERGES and R. NELSON, On<br />

Complex economics of Patent Scope decisions, supra at note 9 at 871<br />

24<br />

The rationale here is that too many people would race to that same opportunity and the result<br />

would be ‗wasteful mining‘ of the prospect or ‗over fishing of the pool‘<br />

25<br />

R. MAZZOLENI- R. NELSON, Economic theories about the benefits and costs of patents, supra note<br />

15 at 278<br />

26 Ibid at 282<br />

27 Ibid at 275


86 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

license with the holder of the original prospect defining patent, and to do these<br />

broad claims patent offers less incentive 28 .<br />

Narrow Patent Claim Scope<br />

There are yet other scholars who proposed a narrower claim scope. Scherer<br />

identifies two categories of invention in addition to revolutionary invention;<br />

serendipitous or accidental inventions often termed market induced invention, and<br />

invention characterised by high development cost 29 . For the latter inventions<br />

Scherer suggests a narrow patent scope of protection in view of the fact that<br />

incentive should not extend further than is necessary to induce invention and broad<br />

claim scope will reduce the incentive for others to make improvements and would<br />

restrict the use that could be made of the invention thereby increasing the cost<br />

associated with the patent. 30 Scotchmer asserts that the interaction between the first<br />

and second generation inventions depends on the scope of claim protection of the<br />

primary patent, often referred to as the upstream right 31 . If the primary patent has a<br />

narrow scope of protection, it will allow many improvements to be patented and<br />

marketed without fear of infringing the primary right.<br />

Merger & Nelson justifies the award of narrow claim scope of patent<br />

protection on its importance role in preserving competition and place the inventor<br />

of significant improvements in a good bargaining position vis-a-vis the inventor of<br />

basic invention, more so every potential inventor is also a potential infringer 32 . For<br />

this reason patents ought to be confined and controlled, their scope restricted to<br />

curb possibility of abuse 33 .<br />

A narrower patent scope is useful in lowering the transaction cost 34 of<br />

cumulative innovators. This is essentially so because contemporary innovation is<br />

more of a network process and new ideas and inventions are a result of<br />

recombination of element from various industries, even with the benefit of the<br />

patent monopoly the production of an invention is often beyond the capacity of a<br />

lone inventor. Fisher however argues that narrow patent claim grant gives rise to<br />

consequential incremental technological advances which could potentially translate<br />

into patent clusters springing up to surround any given innovation, this could give<br />

rise to a situation where technological field becomes entangled with narrow<br />

28 The rationale behind this is that a controlling patent on the original invention is a means of<br />

preventing competitors from sharing in the returns through imitation.<br />

29 F. SCHERER, Patents. Economics, Policy and Measurement, Edward Elgar , Cheltenham, 2005 at<br />

447<br />

30 Ibid at 139<br />

31 S. SCOTCHMER, Standing on the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and the Patent Law, in<br />

J. Econ Persp 1991 at 30<br />

32 R. MERGER and R. NELSON, On limiting or encouraging rivalry in Technical Progress: The effect<br />

of Patent Scope decisions, supra note 18 at 916<br />

33 F. SCHERER, Patents. Economics, Policy and Measurement, Edward Elgar supra note 29 at p.153<br />

34 C. NARD, Law of Patents supra note 10 at 65


Eno-obong Usen 87<br />

competing interest. 35 and what we may have would be a number of small clusters<br />

of blocking patent preventing technological advancement. Thus narrow patent can<br />

be just as stifling in number as broad patent. However the Japanese system which<br />

is typified by narrow patent grant demonstrate that this problem could be avoided<br />

or at least lessen by anticompetitive regulation of the market, cross licenses or other<br />

technology transfer practices 36 .<br />

The determination of the proper patent claim scope of patent has been the<br />

subject of policy debate over the years 37 . Yet there has been no consensus on its<br />

optimal scope. Figures from the European patent office easily demonstrate that the<br />

use of patent system varies widely between different technologies 38 . This might<br />

reflect the notion that there is inherently less innovative activity occurring in<br />

certain industries or that there is something in the patent system that makes it less<br />

attractive to these industries. Another rationale for this might well be that technical<br />

advances varies significantly in different field of industries making any attempt to<br />

provide a general formulae of claim scope for all nature of invention fundamentally<br />

flawed.<br />

Countries at different stages of economic development show preference to<br />

broad or narrow patent claim scope of protection in response to the need for<br />

technological and economic advancement that might exist at that particular period<br />

in their history or as a reflection of their historical and cultural circumstances. This<br />

is mainly due to the variation in incentives that broad and narrow protection<br />

provides to the inventive pool 39 . At a low level of economic development,<br />

countries develop by bridging their technology gap through imitation. A narrow<br />

scope of patent protection serves to reduce the cost of imitation. But as their<br />

indigenous innovation capability develops and an indigenous innovation springs<br />

up, the welfare calculus changes such that countries find it in their own interest to<br />

broaden their scope of protection. To this end it is pertinent to compares the Patent<br />

claim scope regime of different countries.<br />

3. COMPARISON<br />

35<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5<br />

at155<br />

36<br />

Ibid at 256<br />

37<br />

R. J. GILBERT and C. SHIPORA, Optimum Patent Length and Breadth in RAND J. of Econs 21,<br />

no. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 106 at 112<br />

38<br />

The top performer in 2005 was, according to the Annual Report of the European Patent Office ,<br />

electronics and electrical communications technology, which accounted for 11.06% of filings.<br />

Agriculture accounted for 0.79% of applications , and mining for 0.32%. Health related inventions<br />

made up 6.92%, and 1.30% were in the field of inorganic chemistry. Nucleonic was at the bottom of<br />

the table, accounting for only 0.13% of applications. The Annual Report is available at<br />

http://annual-report.european –patent-office.org/2005_chapter4.pdf<br />

39<br />

As earlier noted broad protection is often said to encourage so-called pioneer inventions well<br />

adapted to countries at a high level of technological evolution while narrow protection encourages<br />

follow-on inventions preferable for countries at a lower level of technological evolution.


88 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

Broad and Narrow Patent Claim Scope of Protection<br />

The Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right<br />

(TRIPS) of 1994 40 was established as a response to the need to for an effective<br />

international protection measure for intellectual property right as necessitated by<br />

increased international trade and development. Section 5 borders on patent related<br />

issues, yet its provision is silent on the issue of claim interpretation, leaving the<br />

matter to the discretion of national legislation of contracting parties. The approach<br />

to this issue reflects disparity between nations; with some giving broad protection,<br />

others narrow protection and yet others trying to maintain a balance between broad<br />

and narrow protection. Such manifest disparity is unfavourable to the maintenance<br />

of the spectrum of innovative activity in the world system and goes against the<br />

tenet of the TRIPS agreement itself which is the transfer and dissemination of<br />

intellectual property 41 .<br />

The United States, Germany and Japan are the three systems that at one times<br />

was acclaimed to handle nearly 90 percent of the world‘s patent traffic 42 , United<br />

Kingdom also is a major player in the patent system. The approach to the<br />

appropriate scope of patent claim varies widely. Claim interpretation in these<br />

countries are diversified, from the traditionally narrow, sub-literal, Japanese<br />

approach, through the expansive effect of the US Doctrine of equivalents, to the<br />

German broad protection of the general inventive Idea 43 and the UK purposeful<br />

claim interpretation approach.<br />

In the United States and the United Kingdom, the principle upon which claim<br />

drafting is based is that of peripheral definition, with the claim marking the outer<br />

boundary of the protection 44 . However when it comes to interpretation, the two<br />

system part company, for the United States, patent claim scope is determined by<br />

application of a two stage test whereby the literal assessment of the wordings used<br />

in the claim is augmented by recourse to the doctrine of equivalents 45 . The<br />

doctrine of equivalent seeks to eliminate the problem resulting from literalism in<br />

the construction and application of the claim language judging from the fact that<br />

the literal infringement alone is sometimes inadequate to protect the patentee and<br />

the recognition that the literal claim language may not fully capture the patentee‘s<br />

40 TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade<br />

Organisation<br />

which was concluded on April 15, 1994. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_<br />

agm0_e.htm<br />

41 ibid Article 7<br />

42 T. Isayama, „Japan‟s view on a Desirable IP System for the Global Economy‟ in JWIP 1999,<br />

679ff at 687<br />

43 M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

174<br />

44 Ibid.<br />

45 Per Justice Jackson in Graver Tank v Linde Air Products, 339 US 605(1949, Supreme Ct) at 608<br />

and also Section 112 Patent Act of 1952, ch 950, 66 Stat 792 (19 July, 1952)


Eno-obong Usen 89<br />

contribution to the invention 46 . It further presupposes that limiting patent protection<br />

to the literal scope of the claim would encourage the concealment of invention<br />

thereby going against a tenet of the patent law 47 and the very foundation of the<br />

American Patent Law 48 . The doctrine of equivalent has been viewed as extending<br />

the patent claim scope beyond that contemplated by the inventor at the time of<br />

filing the patent application and thus negatively affecting after raising inventions.<br />

However there exist other methods of expanding protection beyond the literal<br />

wording that the patentee uses, such as a true purposive construction wherein the<br />

perceived desire of the patentee inform the lexicon.<br />

Conversely, in the United Kingdom the scope of protection is determined by<br />

a single- stage purposive construction of the claim 49 . A purposive interpretation<br />

demands that the claims be read through the eyes of a person skilled in the art, and<br />

that the purpose or function of the invention should be borne in mind when the<br />

patent is interpreted 50 . Thus how broad or narrow the patent claim scope should<br />

be, is left to the determination of the person skilled in the art. The European Patent<br />

Convention 51 entered into force in 1977, UK is a signatory and as part of its<br />

obligation under the convention the UK Patent Act 1977 was passed into law 52 .<br />

The provisions of Article EPC and the Patent Act of 1977 are similar. Section 69 of<br />

the European Patent Convention provides that ‗the extent of the protection<br />

conferred by the European patent or a European patent application shall be<br />

determined by the terms of the claim, Nevertheless, the description and drawings<br />

shall be used to interpret the claims‘. Contracting States have criticised this<br />

principle as often leading to an unduly narrow and literal interpretation and in<br />

certain cases it has also lead to an over generous interpretation 53 Lord Diplock in<br />

the leading case of Catnic Components Ltd v Hills & Smith Ltd (1982) RPC 183 54<br />

interpreted this principle to mean that which actually gave effect to what the person<br />

46 J. S. CIANFRANI, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Va. J. of L.& Tech ,<br />

Spring 1997, pp. 8 available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol1/issue/vol1_art1.html<br />

47 M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

187<br />

48 To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for a limited times to authors the<br />

exclusive right to their respective writings and discovery. Article 1 of the Constitution of the United<br />

States of America.<br />

49 Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Inc (2005) 1All ER 667<br />

50 Kastner v Rizla (1995) RPC 585, cited in L. BENTLEY and B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property<br />

Law, Oxford<br />

University Press, 2009 at pp. 536<br />

51 European Patent Convention(EPC) was signed in Munichi on 5 October, 1973 but entered into<br />

force 7 October 1977. It is available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legaltexts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html<br />

52 M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

291<br />

53 C. NARD, Law of Patents supra note 10 at 507<br />

54 ―A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one<br />

derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often<br />

tempted by their training to indulge‖. Ibid. At 538


90 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to be claiming. Thus article<br />

69 prevents equivalence from extending protection outside the claims<br />

Contracting States to the European Patent Convention criticised this<br />

principle as often leading to an unduly narrow and literal interpretation and in<br />

certain cases it has also lead to an over generous interpretation 55 . It is appreciated<br />

the fact that matters relating to claim construction by the contracting states admits<br />

widely differing interpretative styles. To this end the protocol on the interpretation<br />

of Article 69 was enacted. The protocol makes it clear that one cannot go beyond<br />

the claim to what, on the basis of the specification as a whole, it appears that the<br />

patentee has contemplated but however in determining the extent of protection<br />

according to the content of the claim but avoiding literalism, the court of the<br />

Contracting State should combine a fair protection for the patent with reasonable<br />

degree of certainty for third parties 56 . The drafters of the Convention by adopting a<br />

formula whereby the extent of protection conferred by a patent is determined by the<br />

terms of the claims rather than the words of the claim takes a position somewhat<br />

broader than that of a pure literal claim interpretation 57 . The protocol has been<br />

regarded as a compromise between the claim interpretation policies of United<br />

Kingdom and Germany which are the two most important patenting powerhouses<br />

in Europe 58 .<br />

Traditionally in Germany as opposed to UK where the claim formed the<br />

periphery of the monopoly, and interpretation a key to both the definition of the<br />

invention and the extent of protection. Traditionally, in Germany claim<br />

interpretation formed the core of the monopoly, but protection is determined by<br />

extrapolation from this central point based on what the patent actually teaches the<br />

skilled addressee 59 . Thus the claim served only to define the invention, the scope of<br />

the protection was determined by a generalisation of the inventive concept,<br />

unhindered by the exact words used in any claim limitation 60 . The German courts<br />

traditionally adopt a reward-based justification for the grant of patent, this<br />

establishes another key principle in German Claim interpretation namely the idea<br />

that a broad scope protection should be given to the so-called ‗pioneer inventions‘<br />

55<br />

C. NARD, Law of Patents supra note 10 at 507<br />

56<br />

Ibid at 508<br />

57<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

225<br />

58<br />

Germany accounts for nearly 45 % of patent applications originating in Europe and the United<br />

Kingdom accounts for nearly 10% of this figure. See : EPO Annual Report for 2005 available at<br />

http://annual-report.european-patent-office.org/facts_figures/_pdf/fact_figures_05.pdf<br />

59<br />

This is otherwise called the Central Definition theory.<br />

60<br />

T. TAKENAKA, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan, 17 IIC<br />

Studies, 1995 ed., Max Plant Institute of Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and<br />

Competition Law, Munich. At 30<br />

in M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

224


Eno-obong Usen 91<br />

than to minor advances 61 .Thus if the patent did not add appreciably to the prior<br />

teaching, then it was not deserving of a reward and would be given a narrow<br />

interpretation but for pioneer or revolutionary inventions a broad interpretation<br />

would be given 62 . The essence of this was to spare competitors the necessity of<br />

bringing a nullity suit.<br />

This expansive interpretation of patent scope admits a lot of uncertainty into<br />

the process of innovation and patenting. Theoretically beneficial to the patentee, as<br />

protection is provided that is commensurate to the inventive merit of their creation<br />

yet third parties are at disproportionate disadvantage as they can no longer rely on<br />

patent document to determine the scope of the invention. This tends to undermine<br />

the value of patent as an information tool 63 .<br />

The traditional German claim interpretation had been criticised, exalted,<br />

supported and denounced but one key fact is undeniable; German industry did not<br />

falter and grind to a halt under its influence, the inventive landscape was not<br />

chocked with unwieldy broad patent grants. It serves its purpose. Perhaps that was<br />

the support for the method of interpretation that no agreement could be found over<br />

narrowing the wording of the official German Version of Article 69 EPC(which<br />

refers to the ‗content‘s of claims) to match the official English and French versions<br />

( referring to ‗terms‘). The German Act of 1918 was promulgated in order to satisfy<br />

German obligation under the EPC. Article 69 of the EPC viewed as incompatible<br />

the Central definition theory thus forcing German Patent practice to be modified to<br />

a position where by claim occupied a position more central to the grant. In practice<br />

however the presumption underlying the protection of the general inventive idea-<br />

that the patentee is entitled to reward to the full extent of their contribution to the<br />

art is most significant and can be seen to have coloured many decisions under the<br />

1981 Act 64 . German claim scope nevertheless remains much broader than that of<br />

the United Kingdom yet as earlier noted the general inventive idea did not stifle<br />

German‘s economic and technological advancement to any appreciable extent.<br />

However there remains yet another claim interpretation style the Japanese subliteral<br />

interpretative style which may give more insight on this issue.<br />

61<br />

Decision of Reichsgericht of 2 Mar cited in T. TAKENAKA, Interpreting Patent Claims: The<br />

United States, Germany and Japan, supra note 60 at 24 Thus if the patent did not add appreciably<br />

to the prior teaching, then it was not deserving of a reward and would be given a narrow<br />

interpretation but for pioneer or revolutionary inventions a broad interpretation would be given.<br />

62<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

231<br />

63<br />

ibid at 232<br />

64<br />

In Formstein‘s case for instance the court while asserting that the new law marked a firmed<br />

departure from the principles of the old structures the new test and in particular the statement of<br />

invention paraphrased in the claims to reflect the legacy of expansive interpretation. It provided a<br />

potential scope of protection which does not seem to be different from the traditional German Claim<br />

Interpretation- Geissler, ‗Comments on Formstein‘ (1987) 18 IIC 795 at 802 See for instance<br />

Improver Corp v Remington Consumer Products Ltd, (1993) 24 IIC 838


92 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

Japan Patent Ordinance of 1959 represented a novel approach to claim<br />

interpretation. Article 70 provides that the court should determine the technical<br />

scope of a patented invention, and therefore the breadth of protection, by reference<br />

to the claim 65 . The Ordinance came into force as a response to government policy<br />

to aid Japan in its post-war recovery 66 . However the Ordinance did little to change<br />

the institutionalised perception of the Japanese Patent Claim scope which was<br />

fundamentally narrow 67 . Therefore despite the provisions of Article 70 of the 1959<br />

Patent Law Ordinance, the claim was still being utilised up till the late1990 as a<br />

guiding principle to be remoulded at will 68 . Takura summarised the three main<br />

position that may be adopted to in the determination of claim scope in Japan as<br />

follows: The literal interpretation which is important for legal certainty, second a<br />

supra-literal interpretation which expands the patent‘s scope beyond their precise<br />

wordings, thereby emphasising protection of the right holder and thirdly the subliteral<br />

interpretation which provides for a narrow understanding of the claim than<br />

the actual wording would suggest, and emphasis protection of the general public 69 .<br />

Thus the claim was considered to provide a succinct summary of the invention<br />

while the scope of protection had to be decided on the basis of the entire<br />

application including the specification and the drawings 70 . The third approach is<br />

peculiar only to Japan, though in decided cases Japanese courts tend to follow this<br />

seemingly unorthodox pathway 71 . The sub-literal protection reflects an essential<br />

element of Japanese patenting culture that is collectivism, over individual reward<br />

system 72 . The system of narrow grant allows patent to beget patent thus making it<br />

virtually impossible for one entity to control all technology surrounding an<br />

invention.<br />

Apparently, the Japanese system protects what the inventor actually realise<br />

he had invented and thus fully disclosed to the public in his specification. This is a<br />

somewhat limiting principle as it tends to suppress the breadth of patent. 73 .<br />

Takenaka rightly asserts that if protection does not extends to minor innovation<br />

then this is a tragedy especially to the inventor who is thereby not wholly rewarded<br />

for his contribution further more if infringement does not cover minor modification<br />

65<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

260<br />

66<br />

T. TAKENAKA, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan, supra note<br />

60 at 34<br />

67<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

260<br />

68<br />

ibid<br />

69<br />

O. TUKURA, „Japanese Claim interpretation‟ (1994) AIPPI Journal 215 at 215<br />

70<br />

Ibid at page 194<br />

71<br />

See for example Token Lender-Ace Denken KK v Yuai Shoji – p.113 Hanrei Jihou(Law Report)<br />

No. 1390 (July 1999)<br />

72<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

274<br />

73 The practice of limiting patent scope based on disclosure in the specification rather than the<br />

wording of the claim is also known as the inventors recognition theory.- T. TAKENAKA,<br />

Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan, supra note 60 at 66


Eno-obong Usen 93<br />

then patent law would encourage imitation instead of innovation 74 . Fisher<br />

reasoning along this line avers that as an ideology, it fits very well with an<br />

economic model that promotes importation and assimilation of technology, a sort<br />

of legalised piracy promoting patent clusters, rather than giving incentive to<br />

pioneer inventions 75 . While these views are well maintained, yet Japan based on<br />

her model of patent scope did reach a high level of economic and technological<br />

growth within a very short expanse of time. The narrow scope of protection in the<br />

long run became of immense benefit to all categories of people in Japan, from<br />

inventors to innovators down to the consumers. The technical teachings of the<br />

patent system provided a platform upon which future technology built on without<br />

fear of infringements.<br />

There are no uniform rules applicable to the interpretation of patent claim and<br />

their scope even at the international level. The ambivalence in claim interpretation<br />

across national territories produces a disincentive to inventors and investors to<br />

transfer technology or engage in inventive activities in states which offer an<br />

inadequate protection for their rights and economic interest 76 . It is therefore of<br />

much economic advantage for the claims to be construed in a manner clear enough<br />

to mark a definite boundary between what is actually protected and the extent to<br />

which a new inventors activity would constitute an infringement. To this end it is<br />

important to consider what actually institutes and infringement of a patent right.<br />

Infringement can be loosely defined as the commission of a prohibited act with<br />

respect to a patented invention without permission of the patent holder and this<br />

forms our next discussion.<br />

4. INFRINGEMENT<br />

Patent infringement is the commission of a prohibited act with respect to a<br />

patented invention without the permission or licence from the patent holder. Patent<br />

is territorial and infringement is only possible in a country where a patent is in<br />

force. The definition of patent infringement varies by jurisdiction but it typically<br />

includes using or selling the patented invention. In most countries, a use is required<br />

to be commercial or have a commercial purpose to amount to an infringement. In<br />

German Section 9 of the Patent Act defines the uses constituting patent<br />

74<br />

Ibid at 47<br />

75<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

261<br />

76<br />

In 1871, Bessmer, the German-born inventor of a revolutionary steel-making process that bears<br />

his name told the those gathered at the select committee that he brought his invention to Britain<br />

because he of the protection afforded by the patent system. Also Holden, in evidence before the<br />

same committee cited example of Switzerland, ‗where there was no protection afforded by the<br />

patent system at that time, industries made no progress and people were unemployed‘- See Report<br />

of the 1871 Select Committee on Letter Patent, House of Common Papers N 0 368 at 746-62 cited in<br />

76<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of protection, supra note 5 at<br />

76.


94 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

infringement as use of a patented method or process in Germany 77 . This is similar<br />

to direct patent infringement provision under the US laws, Article 35 U.S.C. 271<br />

provides that the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale or selling any<br />

patented invention by the infringer must be within the United States or United<br />

States Territories,. In Japan Article 101 of Patent Act provides for the use by the<br />

patent infringer to be ―...exclusively for the producing of the said patented product<br />

as a business‘ coupled with the ‗...knowing that the said invention is a patented<br />

invention and the said product is used for the working of the invention‘. Impliedly<br />

‗use‘ has to exclusively pertain to the patented product and for commercial<br />

purpose. In the UK by section 60 of the Patent Act 1977 the ‗use‘ constituting<br />

infringement is ‗.... the use, or offer for use where it is known that the use of the<br />

process would be an infringement‘. Thus the said use must be coupled with<br />

malicious. It is important however to note that such ‗use‘ of the patented product<br />

must be done during the lifetime of the patent.<br />

The laws of the United State, UK, Japan and Germany bellies two broad<br />

categories of patent infringement namely indirect infringement and direct<br />

infringement 78 . Nard elucidating on this categorises of infringement identifies<br />

indirect infringement as occurring where a party encourages or aids another<br />

directly to infringe the patent while direct infringement, occurs where a party is by<br />

himself committing acts (e.g., making a product or practicing a process) that<br />

infringe one or more patent claims 79 .<br />

Direct infringement: This comprises literal infringement and non-literal<br />

infringement, commonly referred to as the doctrine of equivalents (or ‗‗DOE‘‘) 80 .<br />

Literal infringement seems to assume a somewhat uniform interpretation in<br />

UK, USA, Japan and Germany. Nard rightly points out that it occurs when an<br />

accused device possesses each and every limitation recited in at least one patent<br />

claim 81 . Literal infringement is also found where the accused device in addition to<br />

possessing each and every limitation recited in at least one of the patent claims<br />

contains additional elements not found in the claim 82 . However it has been<br />

commonly recognized that literal infringement alone is sometimes inadequate to<br />

protect the patentee as the literal claim language may not fully capture the<br />

77<br />

A German patent and a European patent granted for Germany are not generally affected by acts<br />

committed exclusively in other countries.<br />

78<br />

R. WESTON JR. A comparative analysis of the Doctrine of equivalent: Can European Approach<br />

solve an American Dilemma. 39 IDEA 35 see generally on the provisions for infringement Article<br />

101 of the Japanese Patent Act (Act No. 121 of 1959), Section 60 of the UK Patent Act 1977,<br />

Section 35 U.S.C. § 154 in United States and German Patent Act Section 139-142.<br />

79<br />

C. NARD, Law of Patents, supra note 10 at 391.<br />

80<br />

ibid<br />

81<br />

Ibid 457.<br />

82<br />

For example, Inventor claims a sewing device, comprising A, B, and C; an accused device would<br />

still infringe if it possessed A, B, C, and D see for instance Dippin‘ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d<br />

1337


Eno-obong Usen 95<br />

patentees‘ contribution to the art 83 . This was also well noted by Justice Jackson‘s<br />

in Graver Tanks & Manu. v Lined Air Product Co when he stated that ‗‗to permit<br />

imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be<br />

to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing‘‘ and<br />

limiting the patentee to his literal claim scope ‗‗would leave room for—indeed<br />

encourage—the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial<br />

changes and substitutions in the patent.‘‘ 84 . In the case of Hoechest Celanese v BP<br />

Chem Ltd 85 , there was an intense dispute over the term ―stable‖. It clearly<br />

illustrated that the meaning of even the seemingly clear term in a patent claim can<br />

be hotly contested in an infringement suit and the entire case can turn on which<br />

definition the court would accept 86 . Thus the same word would mean different<br />

things to different people making language inherently incapable of capturing the<br />

essence of the invention and a patent susceptible to being easily circumvented 87 . In<br />

order to mitigate the hardship that may be occasioned by literal infringement courts<br />

have over time evolved infringement under the doctrine of equivalent otherwise<br />

known as non-literal infringement.<br />

The doctrine of equivalent is an equitable remedy, applied where the accused<br />

product or process does not literally infringe the claim, it allows liability to be<br />

found if the infringing device (or process) is an ‗‗equivalent‘‘ to the claimed<br />

invention 88 . The doctrine of equivalent gives the patent applicant all of the reward<br />

to which they are entitled to without the cost of obtaining additional protection thus<br />

giving him the protection that would otherwise not have been possible under the<br />

literal infringement.<br />

The doctrine of equivalent thought to have evolved in the US, have been<br />

given different interpretation by courts in different jurisdiction 89 . Ralston 90 mirrors<br />

this inconsistency as driven by national tradition. He noted that some countries,<br />

83<br />

S. HALPERN, C. NARD and K. PORT, Fundamentals of United States Intellectual Property Law:<br />

Copyright, Patent, and Trademark, Kluwer 1999 at 285<br />

84<br />

Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) cit. In S.<br />

HALPERN, C. NARD and K. PORT, Fundamentals of United States Intellectual Property Law:<br />

Copyright, Patent, and Trademark ibid.<br />

85<br />

Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals, Ltd., 846 F. Supp. 542, 31 USPQ2d 1825 (S.D. Tex.<br />

1994).<br />

86<br />

J. S. CIANFRANI, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents supra note 46 at 22<br />

87<br />

Miquel reasoned in her writing that patent law would have no purpose if third parties are allowed<br />

to use without permission(and without infringement) allege technical solutions, which, without<br />

falling into the scope of the literal wording of the claims of a previous patent , showed insubstantial<br />

variants in respect of the element claimed therein.<br />

88<br />

S. HALPERN, C. NARD and K. PORT, Fundamentals of United States Intellectual Property Law:<br />

Copyright, Patent, and Trademark supra note 83 at 266<br />

89<br />

See International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), Committee<br />

Q175, Summary Report, The role of equivalents and prosecution history in defining the scope of<br />

patent protection 1(2003), available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/q175/q175_summary_e.pdf.<br />

90<br />

W. T. RALSTON, Foreign Equivalents of the U.S. Doctrine of Equivalents: We‟re Playing in the<br />

Same Key but it‟s not Quite Harmony, Chicago-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 2007 p. 2 available at<br />

http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%206/6%20Chi-Kent%20J%20Intell%20Prop%20177.pdf


96 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

including Japan and the United Kingdom, traditionally interpreted claims very<br />

literally, and thus did not until recently have any doctrine analogous to the U.S.<br />

doctrine of equivalents 91 . Conversely, other countries, including Germany,<br />

interpreted claims very broadly and incorporated doctrines similar to the U.S.<br />

doctrine of equivalents into their approach to determining literal infringement 92 .<br />

In the United States for infringement to be found under the doctrine of<br />

equivalence the accused infringing device must have each element of the patented<br />

claim 93 . This all elements rule was affirmed in Pennwalt, and the Federal Circuit<br />

asserted that the element by element analysis must consider all of the limitations<br />

included in the claim 94 .<br />

The U.K. recognized a doctrine of equivalents, referred to as the doctrine of<br />

―pith and marrow.‖ 95 Under this doctrine, if an accused device contains all of the<br />

elements of the claim, but some ―inessential elements‖ are substituted with<br />

equivalent elements, then non-literal infringement of a patent is found 96 . Hence, for<br />

infringement to be found ―every element and limitation … is essential.‖ 97<br />

Germany‘s approach to infringement under the doctrine of equivalence<br />

mirrored that of the U.S. accordingly any accused device that embodied the same<br />

inventive concept as claimed in a patent infringed that patent 98 . But, after Germany<br />

signed the EPC, it made a number of changes to its laws, and requires that for an<br />

infringement to be said to have occurred the court must look at the technical<br />

function of each of the individual features of the claims. This analysis considers<br />

―every single feature and . . . the mutual connection of all features of the claim 99 .‖<br />

Takenaka recounting the Japanese experience noted that its Patent Laws were<br />

originally patterned according to Germany‘s approach, but the Law came under<br />

much influence by the U.S. law. Consequently Japan adopted a much narrower<br />

91<br />

See also W. C. REVELOS, Patent Enforcement Difficulties in Japan: Are There Any Satisfactory<br />

Solutions for the United States?, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT‘L L. & ECON. 503, 521 (1995)<br />

92<br />

A. M. SOOBERT, Analyzing Infringement by Equivalents: A Proposal to Focus the Scope of<br />

International Patent Protection, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 190 (1996) at 207<br />

93<br />

C. NARD , The Law of Patents supra note 10 at 418<br />

94<br />

833 F.2d at 949-954 (J. Nies, concurring); See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis<br />

Chemical Co., 520<br />

U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (setting forth same rule).<br />

95<br />

R. D. WESTON, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can European<br />

Approaches Solve an American Dilemma, 39 IDEA 35, 40 (1998), 49-50<br />

96<br />

Ibid. 50-51<br />

9797<br />

The following cases are instructive on this issue ; Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd.,<br />

[1982] R.P.C 183 (H.L.) and Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] F.S.R.<br />

181 (Pat. Ct. 1989)<br />

98<br />

W. T. RALSTON, Foreign Equivalents of the U.S. Doctrine of Equivalents: We‟re Playing in the<br />

Same Key but it‟s not Quite Harmony supra note 90 at 11<br />

99<br />

Ibid.


Eno-obong Usen 97<br />

interpretation of claims 100 . Thus, Japan also applies the ―all elements‖ rule 101 in<br />

order to determine an infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalence.<br />

However, in order to strike a balance between the interest of the patent<br />

applicant and the new comer to the technological area, by ensuring that the<br />

innovation process in not stifle the courts formulated four important limitations on<br />

the doctrine of equivalent they include: prosecution history estoppel- which<br />

prevents a patentee from capturing (or recapturing) claim scope which the patentee<br />

had surrender during prosecution to obtain allowance over cited prior art 102 . The<br />

public dedication rule- subject matter disclosed but not claimed in the patent<br />

application is dedicated to the public 103 ; the all-limitations rule demands that each<br />

limitation of a patent claim is material to defining the scope of the patented<br />

invention and must not be vitiated or rendered meaningless. Thus, for there to be<br />

infringement under the doctrine of equivalent an equivalent of each claim<br />

limitation must be found in the accused device 104 . Relatedly specific exclusion<br />

rule, which is a corollary to the all-limitations rule, holds that the doctrine of<br />

equivalent is unavailable to capture subject matter that the claim specifically<br />

excludes. The reasoning behind this rule is that by defining a claim in a way that<br />

specifically excludes certain subject matter, the patentee implicitly disclaimed the<br />

subject matter and is therefore prevented from invoking the doctrine of<br />

equivalent 105 . Prior Art The role of prior art as a limitation on the doctrine of<br />

equivalent is straightforward. Claim coverage under the Doctrine of Equivalent<br />

cannot extend to include subject matter that forms part of the prior art. The reason<br />

is claims that read on the prior art do not satisfy the patentability requirements, and<br />

therefore, the Patent office would never have issued the patent 106 .<br />

Indirect infringement: Nards identifies two possible types of indirect<br />

infringement known to patent law, there are induced infringement and contributory<br />

infringement 107 . In Germany and the Patent Laws did not expressly make mention<br />

of contributory and induced patent infringement, yet it is submitted that induced<br />

and contributory infringement as a common legal principle which the court would<br />

always give effect to, is reflected in its Patent provisions to.<br />

Induced infringement is alleged where there is some positive act of<br />

inducement by the person being sued to another to carry out a direct infringement<br />

of that which is claimed. Having case law roots, induced infringement was codified<br />

100<br />

T. TAKENAKA, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System with Its U.S. Counterpart Through<br />

Judge-Made Law: Interaction Between Japanese and U.S. Case Law Developments, 7 PAC. RIM.<br />

L. & POL‘Y 249, 252-253 (1998)<br />

101<br />

Ibid. 253<br />

102<br />

Sofamor Danek Corp., v DePuy-Motech Inc., 74 F.3d 1216,1222(Fed. Cir. 1996) cit. Ibid. at 267<br />

103<br />

Maxwell v J. Baker, Inc., 86 F. 3d 1098,1106 (Fed. Cir.1996) cit. Ibid. At 266<br />

104<br />

C. Nard, Law of Patents supra note 10 at 454<br />

105<br />

SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed.<br />

Cir. 2001). Cit , ibid.<br />

106<br />

C. Nard, Law of Patents supra note 8 at 454<br />

107 Ibid.


98 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

in 1952 by the Patent Act .under § 271(b) of Title 35 of the United State Code<br />

which succinctly provides that ―[w]hover actively induces infringement of a patent<br />

shall be liable as an infringer‖. Such a positive act may be in instructing, directing<br />

or advising the third party as to how to carry out a direct infringement 108 . To<br />

constitute infringement by inducement under the US Laws two element must be<br />

present: (1) direct infringement by another and (2) intent to cause the acts which<br />

constituted infringement 109 . Though the term ‗Inducement‘ is not expressly<br />

mentioned under Article 101 of Japanese Patent Law yet its provision mirrors<br />

same 110 . In Germany and UK, provisions for induced infringement is not clearly<br />

reflected in the Patent Laws, however European Patent Convention (EPC 1973)<br />

Article 64 (3) provides that any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt<br />

with by national law, this gives courts in Germany and UK the leverage of<br />

resorting to their national laws in order to find induced patent infringement,<br />

howbeit against the provisions of section 10 of the German Patent Act and UK<br />

Section 60(2)(3) Patent Act 1977 respectively. The German Civil Code §840 BGB<br />

bellies the provisions for induced infringement and has provided a basis upon<br />

which patent infringement has been found. Elements that constitute infringement<br />

under the German and UK laws can be summarized as: (1) the allegedly infringing<br />

part, which must not be a staple commercial product, has to relate to an essential<br />

element of the patented invention. (2) It has to be suitable and intended for<br />

exploiting the invention. (3) It has to be supplied within and for use in Germany or<br />

UK as the case may be and (4) must be delivered to a person that is not entitled to<br />

exploit the invention. (5) the supplier has to know that the means are suitable and<br />

intended for exploiting the invention or it has to be at least obvious to him.(5)<br />

Finally, the patentee must not have consented to this specific supply.<br />

Contributory infringement: The doctrine of contributory infringement, like<br />

the doctrine of equivalents, provides patentees with some additional protection<br />

against those who unfairly took advantage of their inventions 111 . A contributory<br />

infringement occurs where a person without the authority from the patentee sells or<br />

offers to sell within the patent granting States or imports in such States, a<br />

component of the patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, a<br />

material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, or machine<br />

constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially<br />

made or especially adapted for use in infringement such as patent, and not a staple<br />

108 Hewlett – Packard Co. V Baushch & lomb, Inc 909 F. 2d 1464(fed. Cir, 1990)<br />

109 S. HALPERN, C. NARD and K. PORT, Fundamentals of United States Intellectual Property Law:<br />

Copyright, Patent, and Trademark supra note 83 at 268<br />

110 Article 101 of the Japan Patent Law provides where a patent has been granted for an invention of<br />

a product, acts of producing, assigning, etc., importing or offering for assignment, etc. any product<br />

(excluding those widely distributed within Japan) to be used for the producing of the said product or<br />

process and indispensable for the resolution of the problem by the said invention as a business,<br />

knowing that the said invention is a patented<br />

invention and the said product is used for the working of the invention;<br />

111 LADAS and PARRY LLP. Indirect infringement available at / http://www.ladas.com/Patents/<br />

BiotechnologyUSPharmPatentLaw/USPhar31.html


Eno-obong Usen 99<br />

article of commerce, suitable for substantially non-infringing use 112 .<br />

The concept of contributory patent infringement varies from country to<br />

country. There exist substantial differences in the scope, premises and the laws<br />

bordering on contributory infringement although a look at the various applicable<br />

laws reveal a general consensus that the sale or offer for sale of an article will<br />

constitute contributory infringement only if the said article is not a staple article of<br />

commerce. In the US inducement is also a key element in contributory patent<br />

infringement. First recognized as a tort in the United States in 1871, developed in<br />

the case law until it was eventually codified by the patent statute. Section 271(b) of<br />

the Patent Act declares that a person who actively induces the infringement of<br />

another‘s patent is jointly responsible with the direct infringer. Prior to<br />

codification, however, the case law further extended the limits of contributory<br />

infringement and § 271(c) of the current federal patent statute likewise includes<br />

elements beyond active inducement 113 . Many other countries do not require active<br />

inducement but instead merely require proof of another‘s actual direct infringement<br />

or a substantial possibility of direct infringement 114 . Often, these countries strictly<br />

required the contributory infringer to know that the components sold were to be<br />

used for patent infringement. Recent statutes, however, only require awareness that<br />

the components were made for the exploitation of the patented invention. By<br />

contrast, some countries like Japan do not require any knowledge of the direct<br />

infringement. Contributory infringement is recognised from the mere production of<br />

components that could only be used to produce a patented article where the<br />

infringer must have knowledge that the article in question was patented and that his<br />

use of such an invention to make, use, sell or offer for sell will constitute an<br />

infringement 115 .<br />

The German Patent Law Section 10 bellies the essential elements of<br />

contributory infringement. It has been contended that contributory infringement in<br />

Germany requires the ―essential element‖ to be set out in the claims of the<br />

infringed patent 116 . The law of contributory infringement in the UK is codified in<br />

Sections 60(2) and 60(3) of The Patents Act 1977, The elements of contributory<br />

infringement under the Act in UK is similar to that of Germany and can be<br />

summarised thus; (1) the infringing product of process must have been supplied or<br />

offered to be supplied within the jurisdiction. (2)the means supplied must relate to<br />

an Essential element of the invention;(3) the person supplied must not be a<br />

licensee, or otherwise entitled to work the invention;(4) the patent must be in<br />

force;(5) the supply must be without the consent of the patentee; and (6) the<br />

112 B. LOHARY, K. BANERJEE and A. PANIKAR, Contributory Patent Infringement and the<br />

Pharmaceutical Industry, 8 JIPR July 2003 at 303<br />

113 S. JONG, Contributory Patent Infringement in Korea; Re-Engineering Patent Law, Wash. U. J.L.<br />

& Pol‘y Vol.2:287 2000 p. 295 available at http://law.wustl.edu/journal/2/p287jong.pdf<br />

114 Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476(1961)<br />

115 Stroco Prod. Inc v Mullenbach 67 USPQ 168, 171(S. D. Call 1944)<br />

116 J. TAORMINO, Contributory Patent Infringement in Germany, Hoffmann.Eitle, Munchen London<br />

2008 at p. 6


100 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

infringer must know, or it must be obvious to a reasonable person in the<br />

circumstances, that the means supplied are suitable for putting, and are intended to<br />

put, the invention into effect in the jurisdiction 117 .<br />

It is however observed that in UK where a staple product is supplied, it will<br />

only be a contributory infringement if the supply is accompanied by an inducement<br />

for the person supplied to commit a direct infringement. Such an inducement might<br />

come in the form of instructions which would lead the person supplied to commit<br />

an infringement. It has been maintained that the U.S. Patent Law theoretically<br />

provides a patent owner with stronger or broader protection under contributory<br />

infringement 118 .<br />

5. CONCLUSION:<br />

It is safe to conclude that the approach to the interpretation of claim scope<br />

plays a vital role in the promotion of research investment, foreign technology<br />

transfer and consequently higher economic growth in the nation. It has been<br />

proposed by some writers that the level of development in a country ought to be a<br />

strong determinant of the scope of patent protection offered in that country.<br />

Developed countries are most likely to benefit from a broader scope of patent<br />

construction because they engage in more international trade and in revolutionary<br />

research. In developing countries most industries lack technical capacity and<br />

inadequate infrastructure to engage in break through research and they majorly<br />

engage in improvements or follow-on inventions, to this end a narrow scope of<br />

claim interpretation is suggested.<br />

It is worth emphasising that the technological field also plays a major role in<br />

determing the scope of protection. With broad patent claim scope, revolutionary<br />

and breakthrough inventions is expected as any invention close to the patented<br />

claim would be in danger of infringement, for instance the quest for permanent cure<br />

to HIV (in form of vaccine and drug) might well benefit from broad patent claim<br />

scope of protection, as researcher would need the prospect of broad protection to be<br />

induced into such venture. Whilst a narrow patent claim scope for the most time<br />

births many improvement as mirrored in electronic industries. For this reason the<br />

computer industry witnesses many patented improvements which might take place<br />

as quick as the speed of light. This is a model of which Japan is noted for. Indeed<br />

countries could draw a lot of lessons from the Japanese experience when adopting<br />

the narrow patent claim scope which could positively translate to the birth of<br />

industries specializing in adaptation and improvement of invention developed in<br />

117<br />

See J. TAORMINO, Contributory Patent Infringement in Germany, Hoffmann.Eitle, Munchen<br />

London 2008 p.6<br />

118<br />

K. KURUSU, Recent Amendments to Indirect Infringement Provision of Japan Patent Law with<br />

Corresponding Ones in the U.S. and Germany, Oct. 2002 available at<br />

http://homepage2.nifty.com/kurusu-patent/information_draftclaim_e.htm


Eno-obong Usen 101<br />

other countries more so, the patentee could generate a lot of revenue from<br />

licensing.<br />

Stimulation of invention and their commercial activities is one of the<br />

rationale for the grant of patent right. However with its monopolistic nature and<br />

tendency, patent can negatively impact diffusion of new technology and<br />

information as the system itself is susceptible to abuse. It is a common place<br />

observation that inventors most at times seek to extend and expand patent<br />

protection to major advancements and myriads of minor developments thereby<br />

limiting competition in that sector of the economy. Countries can benefit from<br />

adapting into their legislation the pro-competitive measure allowed by TRIPS and<br />

the exceptions to patent right, as a safeguard in order to strike a meaningful balance<br />

between the need to ensure reward to the inventor and the preservation of the<br />

public welfare and economic advancement.<br />

TRIPS, which are administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO),<br />

sets minimum standards of availability, scope, use, and enforcement of IP rights.<br />

These standards are essentially based on those of the United States and the EU<br />

member states and seem to be virtually oblivious of the peculiarities in developing<br />

countries. Consequently, WTO members must, in accordance with Article 27 of<br />

TRIPS, make patents available "for any inventions, whether products or processes,<br />

in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step<br />

and are capable of industrial application." Furthermore, patents must be available<br />

and patent rights enjoyable "without discrimination as to the place of invention, the<br />

field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced." The<br />

divergent construction of the appropriate claim scope and how patent policy should<br />

promote national economic development and public policy priorities challenges the<br />

very foundation of such ―one size fit all‖ provision. This rightly reflects the<br />

divergent social and economic circumstances countries face. The better view<br />

however would be that countries should adopt the appropriate claim construction<br />

well suited for its own economic and technological level to ensure a balance<br />

between the need to reward the inventors for their creative efforts and the<br />

dissemination of information and technology transfer.


102 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

A. M. SOOBERT, Analyzing Infringement by Equivalents: A Proposal to<br />

Focus the Scope of International Patent Protection, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER &<br />

TECH. L.J. 189, 190 (1996)<br />

B. LOHARY, K. BANERJEE and A. PANIKAR, Contributory Patent<br />

Infringement and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 8 JIPR July 2003 at 303<br />

C. NARD, Law of Patents, Aspen, New York, 2008<br />

D. BURK & M. LEMLEY., Fence posts or sign posts? Rethinking Patent<br />

claim construction, U. Pa. L. Rev , Vol. 57 at 1745-6 available at<br />

http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/<br />

lawreview/articles/volume157/issue6/BurkLemley157U.Pa.L.Rev.1743(2009).pdf<br />

F. SCHERER, Patents. Economics, Policy and Measurement, Edward Elgar II,<br />

Cheltenham,<br />

G. SUTHERSANEN, Global Intellectual Property Law. Commentary and<br />

Materials, Edward Elgar, 2008 International Association for the Protection of<br />

Intellectual Property (AIPPI), Committee Q175, Summary Report, The role of equivalents<br />

and prosecution history in defining the scope of patent protection 1(2003), available at<br />

http://www.aippi.org/reports/q175/q175_summary_e.pdf<br />

J. HARRISON, Law and Economics, Thomson West, New York, 2007<br />

J. S. CIANFRANI, an Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Va.<br />

J. L & Tech, spring 1997, pp. 8 available at<br />

http://www.vjolt.net/vol1/issue/vol1_art1.html<br />

J. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 5th ed. London:<br />

George Allen and Unwind, 1976.<br />

J. TAORMINO, Contributory Patent Infringement in Germany,<br />

Hoffmann.Eitle, Munchen London 2008<br />

K. KURUSU, Recent Amendments to Indirect Infringement Provision of Japan<br />

Patent Law with Corresponding Ones in the U.S. and Germany, Oct. 2002<br />

available at http://homepage2.nifty.com/kurusupatent/information_draftclaim_e.htm<br />

K. KURUSU, Recent Amendments to Indirect Infringement Provision of Japan<br />

Patent Law with Corresponding Ones in the U.S. and Germany, Oct. 2002<br />

available at http://homepage2.nifty.com/kurusupatent/information_draftclaim_e.htm


5<br />

Eno-obong Usen 103<br />

Kastriner, The Revivial of Confidence in the Patent System (1991) 73 JPTOS<br />

L. BENTLEY and B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University<br />

Press, 2009<br />

LADAS and PARRY LLP. Indirect infringement available at<br />

http://www.ladas.com /Patents/Biotechnology/<br />

USPharmPatentLaw/USPhar31.html<br />

M. FISHER, Fundamentals of Patent Law: interpretation and scope of<br />

protection, Hart Publishing, Oxford – Oregon, 2007<br />

215<br />

O. TUKURA, „Japanese Claim interpretation‟ (1994) AIPPI Journal 215 at<br />

R. MERGER and R. NELSON, On limiting or encouraging rivalry in Technical<br />

Progress: The effect of Patent Scope decisions in J. of Econ Behaviour Org. Vol<br />

25, 1994<br />

R. WESTON JR. A comparative analysis of the Doctrine of equivalent: Can<br />

European Approach solve an American Dilemma. 39 IDEA 35 available at<br />

http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%206/6%20Chi-<br />

Kent%20J%20Intell%20Prop%20177.pdf<br />

R. MERGES and R. NELSON, On Complex economics of Patent Scope<br />

decisions, in the Column. L. Rev. Vol 90, 1990<br />

R. MAZZOLENI- R. NELSON, Economic theories about the benefits and costs<br />

of patents, in J. of Econ. Issues 1998, 1031ff at 25.<br />

R. J. GILBERT and C. SHIPORA, Optimum Patent Length and Breadth in<br />

RAND J. of Econs 21, no. 1, Spring 2001<br />

S. JONG, Contributory Patent Infringement in Korea; Re-Engineering Patent<br />

Law in the Wash. U. J.L. & Pol‘y Vol.2:287 2000 p. 287 available at<br />

http://law.wustl.edu/journal/2/p287jong.pdf<br />

S. THORLEY-R. MILLER-G. BURKILL-C. BIRSS, TERRELL on the Law of<br />

Patents, 15 th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London<br />

S. HALPERN, C. NARD and K. PORT, Fundamentals of United States<br />

Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patent, and Trademark, Kluwer 1999


104 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

S. SCOTCHMER, Standing on the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and<br />

the Patent Law, in J. Econ Persp. 1991<br />

T. TAKENAKA, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and<br />

Japan, 17 IIC Studies, 1995 ed., Max Plant Institute of Foreign and International<br />

Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich.<br />

T. TAKENAKA, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System with Its U.S.<br />

Counterpart Through Judge-Made Law: Interaction Between Japanese and U.S.<br />

Case Law Developments, 7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL‘Y 249, 252-253 (1998)<br />

T. Isayama, „Japan‟s view on a Desirable IP System for the Global Economy‟<br />

in JWIP 1999<br />

W. CORNISH and LEWELYN, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright,<br />

Trademark and Allied Marks, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003,<br />

W. C. REVELOS, Patent Enforcement Difficulties in Japan: Are There Any<br />

Satisfactory Solutions for the United States? 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT‘L L. &<br />

ECON. 503, 521 (1995)<br />

W. T. RALSTON, Foreign Equivalents of the U.S. Doctrine of Equivalents:<br />

We‟re Playing in the Same Key but it‟s not Quite Harmony, Chicago-Kent Journal<br />

of Intellectual Property 2007 p. 2 available at<br />

http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%206/6%20Chi-Kent%20J%20Intell %20Prop<br />

%20177.pdf<br />

Table of Cases<br />

Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.<br />

476(1961)<br />

Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C 183 (H.L.)<br />

Hewlett – Packard Co. V Baushch & lomb, Inc 909 F. 2d 1464(fed. Cir,<br />

1990)<br />

Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals, Ltd., 846 F. Supp. 542, 31<br />

USPQ2d 1825 (S.D. Tex. 1994).<br />

Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181<br />

(Pat. Ct. 1989)Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Inc (2005) 1All ER 667<br />

Kastner v Rizla (1995) RPC 585


266<br />

Eno-obong Usen 105<br />

Maxwell v J. Baker, Inc., 86 F. 3d 1098,1106 (Fed. Cir.1996) cit. Ibid. At<br />

Stroco Prod. Inc v Mullenbach 67 USPQ 168, 171(S. D. Call 1944)<br />

Sofamor Danek Corp., v DePuy-Motech Inc., 74 F.3d 1216,1222 (Fed. Cir.<br />

1996) cit. Ibid. at 267<br />

SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242<br />

F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Cit , ibid<br />

Stroco Prod. Inc v Mullenbach 67 USPQ 168, 171(S. D. Call 1944)<br />

Tank v Linde Air Products, 339 US 605(1949, Supreme Ct) at 608<br />

Token Lender-Ace Denken KK v Yuai Shoji – p.113 Hanrei Jihou(Law<br />

Report) No. 1390 (July 1999)<br />

Statutes<br />

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)<br />

European Patent Convention(EPC) 1977. Available at<br />

http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html<br />

Japanese Patent Act (Act No. 121 of 1959),<br />

The German Patent Act Section 139-142<br />

TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the<br />

World Trade Organisation Available at<br />

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_ agm0_e.htm<br />

UK Patent Act 1977,<br />

US, Section 35 U.S.C. § 154 of the United States<br />

Abbreviation of Journals<br />

Colum. L. Rev – Columbia Law Review.<br />

J. L. & Econ. – Journal of Law and Economics J.L. & Econ.<br />

J. of Econs – Journal of Economics.<br />

J. of Econ Behaviour Org. - Journal of Economic Behaviour and<br />

Organisation


106 Economic Implications of Patent Claim Scope<br />

J. of Econ Issues – Journal of Economic Issues<br />

J. of Econ – Journal of Economics<br />

J.L. & Pol'y – Journal of Law and Policy<br />

J. Econ persp. – Journal of Economic Perspectives<br />

JWIP – Journal of World Intellectual Property.<br />

J. Int‘l L. & Econ – Journal of International Law and Economics<br />

J. Intell. Prop. – Journal of Intellectual Property.<br />

JIPR – Journal of intellectual property right<br />

Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. - Rutgers Computer & Technology Law<br />

Journal<br />

U. Pa. L. Rev. – University of Pennsylvania Law Review<br />

Va. J. L & Tech – Virginia Journal of Law and Technology<br />

Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y – Washington University Journal of Law and<br />

Policy


THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY<br />

AND COMPETITION LAW: IS THE REFUSAL OF A PATENTEE<br />

TO LICENSE ANTI-COMPETITIVE?<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Fanny Koleva 1<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

2. IS THE PATENTEE ALWAYS IN A DOMINANT POSITION?<br />

3. DOES THE DOMINANT PATENTEE ALWAYS BEHAVE IN AN<br />

ANTICOMPETITIVE WAY IN CASE OF REFUSAL FOR<br />

LICENSING?<br />

4. CASE LAW<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Acknowledgements<br />

The author wishes to thank Professor Marco Ricolfi for his support<br />

throughout the program and Professor Paolisa Nebbia for her guidance in the<br />

research process. The support of Ms. Laura Milano, Ms. Simonetta Sabbadini and<br />

Ms. Ilaria Iannazzo is also appreciated. Special thanks to all lecturers and<br />

participants in the program, as well as to the teams of <strong>WIPO</strong>, University of Turin<br />

and ITC of ILO.<br />

“In any case, one may hope that future enforcement of antitrust law will<br />

succeed in combining the need to maintain competition with the quest for legal<br />

certainty, without any attempt to penalize firms because (and not despite) of their<br />

IP rights”. Rita Coco and Paolisa Nebbia. 2<br />

1 Assistant Professor, Intellectual Property Department, University of National and World<br />

Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria. E-mail: fanny_koleva@unwe.eu.<br />

2 Compulsory licensing and interim measures in Merck: a case for Italy or for antitrust law?, in<br />

JIPLP 2007, 452 ff., at 462.


108 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

The purpose of the patent system is to provide incentives for innovations, and<br />

therefore for competition, through the grant of property rights upon the created<br />

inventions. The aim of the antitrust law, on the other hand, is to guarantee the<br />

competition, and in this way the innovations, by monitoring the behaviour of the<br />

competitors and not allowing restrictive practices and abuse of market power.<br />

Therefore the two systems share basically the same purpose – to keep markets<br />

innovative and competitive, although they use different tools to achieve this 1 .<br />

At the same time, their differing approaches may cause tension in a short run<br />

perspective, as far as the grant of a property right on an invention in fact restricts<br />

the competition for the term of protection, creating incentives for competition in<br />

the long run. One of the controversial issues in this respect is if the patentee‘s<br />

refusal to license his invention is anticompetitive. The view points are highly<br />

differing, from the one that the opportunity to exclude is the very essence of the<br />

property right and therefore should be excluded from antitrust scrutiny, to the other<br />

that the patent right is a monopoly and therefore should be object to the same level<br />

of scrutiny as every other monopoly 2 . The purpose of the paper is to try to find the<br />

answer, as well as if there‘s a way to balance the two systems‘ approaches in this<br />

respect. As far as many considerations are at hand, we will explore theoretically<br />

and regarding the experience of EU and USA basically first the question if the<br />

patentee is a monopolist, afterwards if his behaviour is anticompetitive and how is<br />

this being assessed, including in patent cases, in order to conclude.<br />

1 Probably this is the reason for being said sometimes that they are controversial, while these<br />

differing approaches show that the two systems are complementary, see U. S. DEPARTMENT OF<br />

JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Antitrust enforcement and intellectual<br />

property rights: promoting innovation and competition, Bibliobazaar, Charleston, 2007, 2 ff., B.<br />

GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal to license indispensable intellectual property rights – US and EU<br />

approaches in J. Drexl (ed.), Research Handbook on Competition and Intellectual Property Law,<br />

Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008, 216 ff., G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law.<br />

The Innovation Nexus, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006, 99 ff., H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS<br />

and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal to license in the US, in F. Leveque - H. Shelanski (eds.),<br />

Antitrust, Patents and Copyright. EU and US Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005, 12 ff.,<br />

R. WHISH, Competition Law, Lexis Nexis, UK, 2003, 663 ff., V. KORAH, Antitrust<br />

considerations: refusal to license intellectual property in the U.S. and EC, in C. Heath – A. Sanders<br />

(eds.), Spares, repairs and intellectual property rights, Kluwer Law International BV, The<br />

Netherlands, 2009, 185 ff., R. GILBERT – C. SHAPIRO, An economic analysis of unilateral<br />

refusals to license intellectual property, in PNAS, USA, 1996, 12749 ff., P. NEBBIA, EU<br />

competition law (lectures for the LLM in intellectual property law, 2009/2010), 2 ff.<br />

2 On this controversy, see U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE<br />

COMMISSION, Antitrust ..., supra at note 3, at 21, V. KORAH, The interface between intellectual<br />

property and antitrust: the European experience, in ALJ 2001, 801 ff., at 803, R. GILBERT – C.<br />

SHAPIRO, An economic analysis ..., supra at note 3, at 12750.


Fanny Koleva 109<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. IS THE PATENTEE ALWAYS IN A DOMINANT POSITION?<br />

The refusals for licensing are viewed in competition terms as abuses of<br />

dominant positions or anticompetitive monopoly creations or maintenances. In<br />

order to apply the instruments of the competition policy to a company in this<br />

direction, two things must be at hand: that it is in a dominant position on the market<br />

and that this position is being abused or the monopoly is abusively created or<br />

maintained. Very often the patent right is called monopoly right and therefore it‘s<br />

automatically considered that the first prerequisite is fulfilled.<br />

The things, nevertheless, are usually not so straightforward, because the very<br />

existence of a patent right doesn‘t also mean that the products under it are present<br />

on the market 3 . On the other hand, the right, given by the patent, is to exclude, the<br />

same property right obviously as any other one in this respect. Interestingly, the<br />

property is usually not called a monopoly right, but only in the case of intellectual<br />

creations 4 .<br />

Even if we leave this aside and concentrate on the popular assumption that<br />

the patent creates legal monopoly, we must say that the legal monopoly doesn‘t<br />

necessarily coincide with a market monopoly 5 . There usually are other products on<br />

the market, not covered by the patent, which serve the same purpose and satisfy the<br />

same needs. Therefore, if the patentee is not in a dominant position on the specific<br />

market, his behaviour on it can not be considered abusive.<br />

The said doesn‘t necessarily mean that the patentee can not be a real<br />

monopolist on the market, but that this happens seldom and has to be established in<br />

3 Therefore, even if there is a patent, the very fact that the holder is not on the market with it means<br />

that he can not be in a dominant position and his conduct – anticompetitive. See J. LANG, The<br />

application of the essential facility doctrine to intellectual property rights under European<br />

competition law, in F. Leveque - H. Shelanski (eds.), Antitrust, Patents and Copyright. EU and US<br />

Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005, 63 ff.<br />

4 Probably this is mostly historically based, coming from the first law, regulating the issue in a<br />

contemporary manner, the English Statute of monopolies, 1623 (which covered other issues too, we<br />

must not forget), see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Monopolies_1623.<br />

5 Even if this is a legal monopoly, it‘s an abstract one, limited to the niche market of the very<br />

products under the patent and not the real market situation. Nowadays both the theory and practice,<br />

both in the field of IP and competition law usually recognize it. For example Torremans said<br />

―Intellectual property rights confer exclusive rights, but they hardly ever confer a real monopoly in<br />

the sense that the monopolist can act in an arbitrary way without being influenced by his<br />

competitors‖ in P.L.C. TORREMANS, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law (5 th<br />

edition), Oxford University Press, 2008, 15 ff. and a competition body stated ―…intellectual<br />

property rights do not necessarily (and indeed only rarely) create monopolies….Therefore, antitrust<br />

doctrine doesn‘t necessarily presume the existence of market power from the mere presence of an<br />

intellectual property right.‖ in U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE<br />

COMMISSION, Antitrust …, supra at note 3, at 2 and ECJ confirmed that ―the mere ownership of<br />

an intellectual property right cannot confer a dominant position‖ in V. KORAH, The interface<br />

between …, supra at note 4, at 810. See also M. RICOLFI, Is there an antitrust antidote against IP<br />

overprotection within TRIPS, in MIPLR 2006, 305 ff, at 351 on the issue.


110 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

every single case. This makes the determination of the relevant market and the<br />

share of the patentee on it crucial. As far as there‘s very seldom a lack of any<br />

substitutes, in which case the monopoly is usually at hand, in the rest of cases the<br />

dominance must be present on the market of all substitutes, being such because of<br />

the products‘ characteristics, their prices and their intended use 6 .<br />

Apart from this, if the products under the patent are also branded products, it<br />

can mean that the relevant market coincides with the niche market of the exclusive<br />

right in case that the brand creates barriers for entry at the market. Again, it‘s the<br />

case only seldom.<br />

Regarding the geographical scope, as far as the patent is territorially limited,<br />

the relevant market can usually not be bigger than this territory 7 . On the other hand,<br />

if the SSNIP test is applied, it can turn out that the neighbouring geographic<br />

markets (or parts of them) must be included in the scope of the relevant market,<br />

because there‘s a serious probability for consumer ―migration‖ to those markets<br />

(demand-side substitutability) 8 . In such a case, the relevant market would be bigger<br />

again, meaning a lower probability of dominance.<br />

Therefore, if dominance is really established, the next step is to check if the<br />

patentee‘s behaviour is abusive 9 . Obviously, the legislator had this probability in<br />

6 Another approach is to look for dominance of the patentee on the technology market, defined<br />

again by the very technology and its substitutes, determined by the same criteria. This approach is<br />

considered heavier for application and therefore recommended for use in combination with the<br />

product oriented approach in order to assess more accurately the market strength of the patentee, see<br />

the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC treaty to technology transfer<br />

agreements, April 2004, in the Official journal of the European Union, 5 ff. Moreover, some authors<br />

criticize the evaluation of the dominance of the technology markets as far as it makes it easier to<br />

find dominance on them because of the exclusive right of the patentee, see B. GALLEGO,<br />

Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 226. The relevant market must in fact also include the<br />

substitutes of the products/ technologies under the patent if the assumption of the SSNIP (The Small<br />

but Significant Non-transitory Increase) test can be presumed, i.e. if in case of small price increase,<br />

there‘s enough ―migration‖ of the customers to other goods, technologies or markets to make the<br />

price increase unprofitable for the dominant company.<br />

7 This doesn‘t mean that there‘s no demand for the goods under the patent on other markets, but<br />

only that in the lack of exclusive right for them, it‘s much less probable that the patent owner is in<br />

dominant position there.<br />

8 This would usually be connected with the lower prices there, due to the lack of patent protection<br />

for these territories and respectively the presence of competition.<br />

9 Regarding the dominance issue, the approach in the countries differs – in EU 50% market share at<br />

hand is enough, while in USA the threshold is 70%. Share between 40 and 50% and even less (but<br />

no less than 25%) is also possible in EU, if other circumstances, showing dominance, are at hand<br />

(e.g. low number of competitors, having low market shares, existing barriers for entering or<br />

expansion in the market, lack of opportunity for their replication, etc. or basically independence on<br />

the market). See DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of article 82 of the Treaty to<br />

exclusionary abuses, issued by the Commission December 2005, in<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, 9 ff., as well as V. KORAH,<br />

Antitrust ..., supra at note 3, at 184. This clearly shows that it‘s more probable to find an abuse in


Fanny Koleva 111<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

mind, while working on the patent law, because it recognized the opportunity for<br />

compulsory licensing for the cases of non-use of the patent and dependent<br />

patents 10 . At the same time, as far as the possible cases of abuse are much more and<br />

not so straightforward, the instruments of the competition law are at hand to<br />

balance the patentee‘s and the public‘s interest, if and when necessary 11 .<br />

3. DOES THE DOMINANT PATENTEE ALWAYS BEHAVE IN AN<br />

ANTICOMPETITIVE WAY IN CASE OF REFUSAL FOR LICENSING?<br />

The real issue here is how to differentiate the cases when the patentee just<br />

exercises his rights from the cases, in which his behavior is anticompetitive. And<br />

this is the area where the approaches differ substantially. However, as far as in the<br />

very beginning in the intellectual property (IP) cases the common attitude, already<br />

used for other types of assets for refusals to deal (supply), has been tested,<br />

requiring risk for the competition and lack of objective justification, it is<br />

recognized that there must be negative effect on the competition and therefore on<br />

the consumers 12 . EU considers that this effect is abuse of a dominant position,<br />

EU than in USA. Moreover, the fact that IP rights are considered both barriers and absolute cost<br />

advantages in EU confirms this further, although it‘s recognized that they do not confer dominance<br />

themselves.<br />

10 In fact the legislator in these cases protects the public interest against the patent abuse in a broader<br />

sense than the competition law by protecting the very purpose of the patent system to encourage the<br />

creation and utilization of inventions and therefore doesn‘t require a dominant market position. In<br />

this sense the law is stricter in these cases, considering the behaviour abusive even if there‘s no<br />

market dominance, if the specific prerequisites are at hand (non-use for 4 years after the application<br />

or 3 years after the patent issuance date, considering the later and refusal for licensing respectively,<br />

as well as lack of objective justification). Moreover the patent laws usually also include other<br />

grounds for compulsory licensing, which are not connected with the risk of abuse, but with the<br />

common public interest, which we don‘t take in consideration here (e.g. national security protection<br />

or emergency). For more information on the issue see also the Paris convention for the protection of<br />

the industrial property, March 20, 1883, which came into force on July, 7, 1884, 173 member<br />

countries, art. 5A, esp. (2) and (4) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,<br />

Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994), art.<br />

31, and M. RICOLFI, Is there an antitrust …, supra at note 7, at 305.<br />

11 This means in fact that even if the patentee has market dominance, the abuse must be at hand in<br />

order to have him liable. This point of view is also shared in the practice. The U.S. Supreme court<br />

for example said that ―the mere possession of monopoly power…is not unlawful unless it‘s<br />

accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.‖ in U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE<br />

AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Antitrust ..., supra at note 3, at 22.<br />

12 It must be underlined that the negative effect must be on competition and not on a specific<br />

competitor. See V. KORAH, The interface between …, supra at note 4, at 817, 820 and I.<br />

HARACOGLOU, Competition law and patents. A follow-on innovation perspective in the<br />

biopharmaceutical industry, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008, 123 – 126 ff., R. STERN, Refusals<br />

to license intellectual property rights and monopoly “leverage”, in EIPR 1998, 390 ff., at 393. This<br />

has also been recognized many times by EU in the DG Competition Discussion Paper ..., supra at<br />

note 11, although it has also stated that sometimes the fate of a competitor might influence the fate<br />

of the competition. Moreover, in EU the approach hasn‘t also been consistent. See A. STRATAKIS,<br />

Comparative analysis of the US and EU approach and enforcement of the essential facilities<br />

doctrine, in ECIR 2006, 434 ff. Here Australia has an approach different to some extent, as far as its


112 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

which can affect the trade between the member states 13 and USA – that the effect is<br />

the anticompetitive monopolization or maintenance of monopoly 14 . Together with<br />

this as far as the IP laws give the owner a legal monopoly and a right to exclude,<br />

the refusals per se have not been usually considered anticompetitive and therefore<br />

something additional has been felt necessary in order to recognize antitrust<br />

scrutiny. What is it is treated in various ways, as follows.<br />

The ―scope of the rights‖ approach presumes that if the right is exploited out<br />

of its borders, the exploitation is anticompetitive 15 . Recognized extensions are<br />

when the patented invention is input for the activity of another company on another<br />

market 16 and by the refusal the owner aims to create or maintain monopoly on one<br />

law said that ―eliminating or damaging a competitor‖ would be considered abuse. See M.<br />

O‘BRYAN, Refusal to license intellectual property under Australian Trade practices act, in PW<br />

1992, 10 ff. Nevertheless, it‘s usually considered necessary to have a competitive relationship<br />

between the parties at hand in order to have anticompetitive behavior recognized. See H.<br />

HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 15, G.<br />

MCCURDY, Intellectual property and competition: does the essential facilities doctrine shed any<br />

new light?, in EIPR 2003, 472 ff., at 476. It must also be said that in legislative, as well as in case<br />

law dimension in the field of antitrust, EU usually follows USA – in time and in doctrine<br />

application.<br />

13 It is regulated by art.82 of the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the<br />

Treaties establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, entered<br />

into force on May 1, 1999. The abuse can be exploitative or exclusionary conduct. According to DG<br />

Competition Discussion Paper ..., supra at note 11, the refusals to supply are part of the potential<br />

abuses.<br />

14 It is regulated by section 2 of the Sherman antitrust act, July 2, 1890. The case law (United States<br />

v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see also Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984),<br />

Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Antitrust_Act) develops the concept further,<br />

differentiating the anticompetitive cases from the ones, when the monopoly is a result of superior<br />

product, business acumen or historic accident. This can also be read in sense that the IP refusals to<br />

license are seldom anticompetitive, as far as IP is usually connected with superior product.<br />

15 The interpretation of this approach is usually that the patent gives the right to exclude the<br />

competitors for one market and when the owner refuses licensing for exploitation in other/s, it‘s<br />

extension of the rights out of their scope (or attempt for monopoly leverage) and therefore<br />

anticompetitive (the additional element is the very fact that the refusal is for another market).<br />

16 The term market is perceived as flexible sometimes, covering the situations when the invention is<br />

input for activity on downstream, neighbouring, complementary or even the same market, if it<br />

contains different levels. See R. GILBERT – C. SHAPIRO, An economic analysis ..., supra at note<br />

3, at 12751, R. PITOFSKY, The essential facilities doctrine under United States antitrust law,<br />

submitted to the European Commission in support National Data Corporation in the IMS case, at 20,<br />

V. KORAH, The interface between intellectual property rights and competition in developed<br />

countries, in SCRIPT-ED 2005, 429 ff., at 437, R. WHISH, Competition Law, supra at note 3, at<br />

664, B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal ..., supra at note 3, at 223-8, G. GHIDINI, Intellectual<br />

Property and Competition Law ..., supra at note 3, at 104, B. ONG, Anti-competitive refusals to<br />

grant copyright licenses: reflections on the IMS saga, in EIPR 2004, 505 ff., at 506, G.<br />

MCCURDY, Intellectual property and competition ..., supra at note 14. On the other hand, the issue<br />

is quite controversial, incl. the case law, see I. HARACOGLOU, Competition law and patents …,<br />

supra at note 14, A. STRATAKIS, Comparative analysis …, supra at note 14, at 441. The EU<br />

position is very interesting, while saying numerous times that two markets are necessary, it also says


Fanny Koleva 113<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

or the two markets. The doctrines, used to address the refusals to supply, are<br />

additionally developed and applied for the IP extensions as follows.<br />

Inherent for this approach is the leverage test (facilitation of<br />

monopolization). It has usually been applied with other doctrines and approaches.<br />

In USA the courts said that the refusal was legal, if it was in the scope of the<br />

right 17 , that it could be abusive if it extended this scope 18 , as well as that patents<br />

were not always limited to one market (Xerox), but missed to clarify when the<br />

refusal was out of the rights‘ scope (or how to differentiate when the right covered<br />

one or more markets). Together with this the courts differed in their opinions – in<br />

Data General it was considered that there was rebuttable presumption of legality of<br />

the refusal, in Xerox that the refusal in IP cases was per se legal, and that the<br />

presumption was irrebuttable regarding patents. Moreover, the courts rarely<br />

recognized anticompetitive behavior in refusals to license IP 19 . In EU among the<br />

examples for the application of the test are the Magill and Decca cases, in both of<br />

which the behaviour have been found abusive 20 .<br />

The approach has also been developed to include the essential facility<br />

doctrine, requiring except a risk for the competition and lack of objective<br />

justification, also indispensability or essentiality of the asset as an input for the<br />

competitors 21 .<br />

that even potential or hypothetical markets are enough, especially in IP cases, opening the concept<br />

in this way, see DG Competition Discussion …, supra at note 11, at 65.<br />

17 Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1 st Cir.1994).<br />

18 Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastmen Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9 th Cir. 1997); In re<br />

Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (CSU v. Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.<br />

2000).<br />

19 The appellate courts in the cases haven‘t also agreed under what circumstances the presumption<br />

has been rebuttable, having had different opinions on the issue. Of the discussed cases, only the<br />

behavior of Kodak has been found abusive; see the analysis for the reasons further. Moreover, the<br />

very property has sometimes been recognized as objective justification of the refusal, e.g. in Data<br />

General v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastmen Kodak<br />

Co., CSU v. Xerox. For more information, see H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A.<br />

LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3,<br />

G. MCCURDY, Intellectual property and competition ..., supra at note 14.<br />

20 Magill case (C-241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television <strong>Publication</strong>s v.<br />

Commission [1995] ECR I-743) and Decca (Commission Decision Decca Navigation System, OJ<br />

1989 L 43/27). We have also to add that the discussed approaches and doctrines are applied for<br />

refusals to license as a whole, and not necessarily to patents. Therefore in this part various examples<br />

are cited.<br />

21 The asset is considered indispensable if the competitor/s can not duplicate it (or invent around it)<br />

as input for their activity, being under the control of the monopolist. And it‘s considered essential if<br />

it‘s not possible or reasonable, or economically feasible for the competitor/s to duplicate the<br />

necessary input, controlled by the dominant company. Although the essentiality is derived on the<br />

base of indispensability, it is obviously further developed in direction of higher level of flexibility<br />

for application. See R. PITOFSKY, The essential facilities ..., supra at note 18, at 6.


114 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

In USA, where the doctrine has been created, its application to IP is<br />

considered problematic 22 , as far as the incentives for innovations of all the parties<br />

can decrease and those claims have never been supported by the courts. Moreover,<br />

with the time the scope of the doctrine has been narrowed. On the other hand, in<br />

Europe, where the doctrine has almost never been used explicitly, it has been more<br />

often and more readily applied incl. with negative outcome for the right holder 23 .<br />

Besides the usually assessed issues under claims of essentiality, EU sometimes also<br />

addresses additional questions, meaning that it started interpreting the doctrine<br />

narrowly, which is positively assessed by some authors 24 . It can also be said that<br />

the essentiality is to some extent irreconcilable with IP, as far as IP is something<br />

extraordinary, appearing on the market, technological, cultural and scientifical<br />

landscape and that‘s why exclusive rights are going with it. Or said in another way,<br />

there must usually be substitutes anyway. The approach is also criticized as far as<br />

the patent law doesn‘t specify ―scope market‖ and therefore this interpretation is<br />

quite fragile 25 . Moreover the problem how to define the scope and what is out of it<br />

is a serious one 26 .<br />

22<br />

See H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3,<br />

at 20, analyzing the case law too.<br />

23<br />

Among the EU IP examples for the application of the doctrine are the Magill, Ladbroke (T-<br />

504/93 Tierce Ladbroke [1997] ECR 927) and IMS (C-418/01 [2004] ECR I-05039) cases, where<br />

the behavior of the defendant has been respectively found abusive, non-abusive and for IMS –<br />

abusive at first and non-abusive at second instance. In F. LEVEQUE, Innovation, leveraging and<br />

essential facilities ..., supra at note 27, at 110 the doctrine is criticized as being risky regarding the<br />

incentives for innovations, as far as the patentees would potentially have their rights at antitrust<br />

scrutiny.<br />

24<br />

See e.g. V. KORAH, Antitrust …, supra at note 3, at 190. See also the analysis for the next<br />

approach on this issue.<br />

25<br />

The approach is also fragile, as far as no other concrete interpretation suggestion is at hand, which<br />

means that the level of legal uncertainty around it is very high. On the other hand the Chicago<br />

school says that it‘s out of sense for the monopoly to be extended to other markets as far as all the<br />

profits can be extracted on the first market. This compromises the approach even more, if accepted.<br />

But this is not the critic, best fitting to it, as far as some authors say that in high technology markets<br />

this is not the fact (e.g. G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law ..., supra at note 3,<br />

at 105). Together with this it is really possible to have an IP monopoly, which covers more than one<br />

market. More about the critics of the approach and its application to IP cases can be read in I.<br />

HARACOGLOU, Competition law and patents …, supra at note 14, at 131, H. HOVENKAMP,<br />

M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 18 – 26, F. LEVEQUE,<br />

Innovation, leveraging and essential facilities: interoperability licensing in the EU Microsoft case,<br />

in F. Leveque - H. Shelanski (eds.), Antitrust, Patents and Copyright. EU and US Perspectives,<br />

Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005, 103 ff, at 111, B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note<br />

3, at 217.<br />

26<br />

Possible reading of this approach is the broad one, that there is attempt for extension when the IP<br />

is used as a ―ground‖ for anticompetitive conduct, which is not connected with it in fact, but the<br />

truth is that such an interpretation is not justifiable, as far as case of the kind is not IP case, but one,<br />

disguised as such one, and therefore – subject to standard scrutiny. The test for differentiation of<br />

such cases from real IP refusals is if the competitors would infringe the exclusive right if they use<br />

the asset without license; see H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral<br />

refusal …, supra at note 3, at 37.


Fanny Koleva 115<br />

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The “plus” approach presumes that together with the refusal for licensing<br />

(being it on the same or another market), additional anticompetitive behavior is<br />

necessary. This approach is usually being applied together with the previous.<br />

Again, there‘s lack of consistency what‘s this behavior - first the more common<br />

test for other anticompetitive acts has been introduced and after that specifications<br />

on it followed, sometimes as examples and sometimes as prerequisites. In USA<br />

presumed examples for such additional acts are when: the IP is adopted illegally<br />

(Data General), there are concerted acts (Kodak) or tying, fraud on the Patent and<br />

trademark office or sham litigation (Xerox). Those are criticized, as far as they are<br />

not connected with the very act of the refusal and can be subject to separate<br />

scrutiny 27 . Probably the most popular of the additional acts, which in fact are<br />

connected with the refusals is the ―new product development prevention‖, followed<br />

later by the ―technological development prevention‖, developed as tests<br />

respectively by EU in the Magill and Microsoft cases and clarified in other cases<br />

too (e.g. IMS, Bronner) 28 . There are arguments if the test, developed in Magill,<br />

must be alternatively or cumulatively required with the other ones, specific for the<br />

more common doctrines and if the whole list is exhaustive or non-exhaustive 29 . The<br />

answer of the case law after it doesn‘t help a lot 30 . In the Discussion Paper of the<br />

Commission it is stated not only that the list is cumulative, but that the last test in it<br />

– the product development or technological development (follow-on innovation)<br />

prevention would be considered only after the previous circumstances are at hand 31 .<br />

This shows clearly that the concept is narrowing, but at the same time the approach<br />

of the Discussion Paper is also been criticized, because it doesn‘t cover every<br />

possible scenario 32 . In this way a separate doctrine on the refusals for licensing<br />

has been developed, although it‘s based on the already mentioned at great extent 33 .<br />

27 For more information see U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE<br />

COMMISSION, Antitrust ..., supra at note 3, B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3.<br />

28 These mean that the refusal is anticompetitive if it prevents the development of a new product on<br />

the market (and not me-too version) or the development of new technologies from the competitor/s<br />

respectively, as far as the refusal contradicts the purpose of the IP system (see B. GALLEGO,<br />

Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 228). The second test is obviously closely connected with<br />

the first. But here even the development of specific new product must not be at risk, but only of a<br />

potential new product, resulting from the technology development. Microsoft (COMP/C-3/37.792<br />

[2004]) and Bronner (C-7/97 [1998] ECR I-7791).<br />

29 See for example V. KORAH, The interface between …, supra at note 4, at 811, J. LANG, The<br />

application …, supra at note 5, at 64 on this issue.<br />

30 But after IMS it‘s usually considered that the list is cumulative. In Microsoft it was considered<br />

non-exhaustive and in IMS – exhaustive. For critics on these tests, see e.g. A. STRATAKIS,<br />

Comparative analysis …, supra at note 14, at 440, V. KORAH, Antitrust ..., supra at note 3, at<br />

195.<br />

31 See DG Competition Discussion Paper ..., supra at note 11.<br />

32 See B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 234.<br />

33 Or, said in other words the leverage and essential facility doctrines haven‘t been considered as<br />

sufficient criteria and therefore recently the concepts have been developed to include additional<br />

abusive conduct. At least in Europe there seem to have attempt for imperative doctrine in the field,<br />

although it‘s quite controversial if this is achieved already. Moreover in EU abusive behaviour in<br />

cases of refusals for licensing has quite often been found.


116 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

The “intent” approach presumes that the refusal is anticompetitive, if the<br />

owner‘s purpose is such. Although it‘s implicitly present in the other approaches<br />

too, sometimes it‘s explicitly recognized by the case law. Such is the case of Kodak<br />

in USA, when the IP argument was used long after the start of the proceedings and<br />

recognized as ―mere pretext‖. Moreover, only insignificant part of the refused<br />

assets has been protected by IP rights. In EU the approach hasn‘t been explicitly<br />

addressed. At the same time, it‘s again rarely used as the only approach. It‘s<br />

criticized because it‘s hard and subjective to prove this intent and also because the<br />

very intent can be considered insufficient, as far as the results of the behaviour are<br />

more important 34 . The already mentioned lack of objective justification also shows<br />

implicitly bad (anticompetitive) intent, being together with this more objective 35 .<br />

All these approaches and the imposition of compulsory licensing in case of<br />

anticompetitive behaviour of the patentee are very often criticized because of the<br />

probable negative effect on the incentives for innovation 36 , although the opinions<br />

on this also differ. The authorities in the USA usually don‘t impose such a remedy<br />

exactly because of this consideration. The opposite approach in EU has sometimes<br />

been criticized 37 for being short term oriented and not taking into consideration the<br />

long term dimensions of the problem, basically if the imposition of compulsory<br />

licensing would not deprive the patentee and ones competitors from their incentives<br />

to innovate, as far as the lack of certainty in the opportunity to assert ones patent<br />

makes the investment too risky. Therefore, probably because of the mentioned<br />

critics, in its recent decisions the EU institutions also applied 38 another approach<br />

together with the other ones.<br />

The “incentives balance” approach has the purpose to assess if the decrease<br />

in the incentives for the monopolist because of the potential compulsory licensing<br />

(incl. the ones for follow-on innovations) would be compensated by the increase of<br />

the incentives for follow-on innovations of his competitors, and therefore of the<br />

whole industry. Only if this is the case, compulsory licensing should be imposed 39 .<br />

Although this approach shows intention on part of EU to make the evaluation in<br />

34<br />

H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at<br />

31.<br />

35<br />

Moreover, it transfers the burden of evidence to the accused. Nevertheless, although this test is<br />

often mentioned, it‘s not developed in fact, which makes this burden quite heavy. Mentioned in this<br />

respect are the efficiency considerations and the lack of ability to serve the own clients. See for<br />

example in the case law in R. PITOFSKY, The essential facilities ..., supra at note 18, at 7.<br />

36<br />

See e.g. J. LANG, The application …, supra at note 5, at 66 – 67, V. KORAH, Antitrust …, supra<br />

at note 3, at 184, R. GILBERT – C. SHAPIRO, An economic analysis …, supra at note 3, at 12753.<br />

37<br />

See for example V. KORAH, The interface between …, supra at note 4.<br />

38<br />

The first case, in which the Commission explicitly considered this approach, was Microsoft, and<br />

later it was also confirmed in its Discussion Paper. See F. LEVEQUE, Innovation, leveraging and<br />

essential facilities ..., supra at note 27, at 106 – 110 and B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal …, supra<br />

at note 3, at 232 for more information.<br />

39<br />

Moreover, this assessment must be made only after refusal, dominance, indispensability, negative<br />

effect on competition are recognized.


Fanny Koleva 117<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

cases of refusals more economically oriented and more flexible regarding the long<br />

term dimensions of the problem, it‘s still criticized 40 . Among the critics are that as<br />

it is developed, it doesn‘t cover all the possible scenarios, as well as it doesn‘t fit to<br />

all the cases. We would also like to add that the approach is quite abstract, as far as<br />

it‘s not clear how in fact would the two types of effects on the innovations<br />

incentives be measured and therefore balanced 41 . Moreover, in case of compulsory<br />

licensing the incentives of the competitors can also be negatively influenced as<br />

concerns to their own basic innovations, which must be balanced with the other<br />

mentioned effects too. The same refers to the fact that in case of compulsory<br />

licensing the competitors would have incentives to duplicate and free ride and<br />

therefore they would be deprived substantially of their follow-on innovation<br />

incentives 42 . Therefore, this approach is also not the one, solving all the<br />

problems 43 .<br />

Additional Circumstances, which can Influence the Decision<br />

One of the specific issues is if in case that the information is an industry<br />

standard, this influences on the evaluation of the refusal as anticompetitive. Often<br />

it‘s considered that there‘s such a risk, because the standard in fact gives market<br />

power, if held by a company, and therefore it includes risk of anticompetitive<br />

conduct 44 . And that this is even more valid for the information technologies<br />

sector 45 . Some authors even consider the cases of standards as ones of the few,<br />

when the duty to supply may be justified 46 . So, as far as there is a standard and<br />

there are no substitutes (because often inventing around is impossible), the asset is<br />

40<br />

See for example B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, R. WHISH, Competition<br />

Law, supra at note 3.<br />

41<br />

See also on this issue A. STRATAKIS, Comparative analysis …, supra at note 14, at 441 and V.<br />

KORAH, Antitrust …, supra at note 3, at 190.<br />

42<br />

The Commission in its Discussion Paper also recognizes this risk and the necessity for its<br />

consideration, supra at note 11, at 62. But still it‘s not clear how to do it.<br />

43<br />

Some authors think that if the compulsory licensing is not royalty free, there should be no<br />

problem with the innovation incentives (e.g. G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition<br />

Law ..., supra at note 3, at 107 – 108). Nevertheless we would say that the incentives are not<br />

connected only with the opportunity for direct financial return from the asset, but also with the<br />

possibility to exclude because of strategic considerations. Moreover, the appropriateness of the<br />

compulsory licensing as a remedy is also quite often criticized for cases of anticompetitive refusals<br />

for licensing on many grounds, as well as the preparedness of the authorities to determine properly<br />

the conditions of the compulsory license (see H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A.<br />

LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 16 and 34, V. KORAH, Antitrust ..., supra at<br />

note 3, at 190 and 194, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE<br />

COMMISSION, Antitrust …, supra at note 3, at 22). Together with this, as far as all the existing<br />

approaches and doctrines are highly criticized, some authors propose alternative variants, e.g.<br />

impossibility for competition by substitution as criterion or consideration of the refusals for<br />

licensing as never being abusive, but imposing compulsory licensing as a remedy in case of other<br />

abuse by the dominant company (see B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal ..., supra at note 3, at 236<br />

and J. LANG, The application ..., supra at note 5, at 74 respectively).<br />

44<br />

See for example U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE<br />

COMMISSION, Antitrust …, supra at note 3, at 36.<br />

45<br />

See G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law ..., supra at note 3, at 104 – 106.<br />

46<br />

See V. KORAH, Antitrust …, supra at note 3, at 194, 204.


118 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

indispensable or essential and therefore access to it should not be denied.<br />

Otherwise it turns into an entry barrier. This logic was more readily followed in EU<br />

(e.g. in IMS, as well as in Microsoft case) 47 . If there‘s a refusal after consent to<br />

license for the purposes of the standard in case of standard-setting organizations,<br />

it‘s usually really anticompetitive 48 . A similar logic does exist as regards to pools,<br />

which because of the synergy between the partners‘ technologies, can give rise to<br />

de facto standards and therefore the refusals for licensing can be anticompetitive 49 .<br />

Another important issue is if the refusal is in fact termination of contractual<br />

relations, which would change the analysis regarding its anticompetitive character.<br />

The opinions on the issue also differ. In USA the courts sometimes tend to impose<br />

duty for licensing in such cases under circumstances, which would not be<br />

considered sufficient for new relationships. Still, as regards to IP cases, it‘s<br />

considered that although imposition of such obligation happened (Kodak), it has<br />

never been based on this circumstance. Moreover, such a termination may be based<br />

on efficiency grounds, and as far as the IP related markets are fast changing, this is<br />

even truer. Therefore the risk of compulsory licensing could decrease the licensing<br />

incentives, which are presumed to have pro-competitive effect, as a whole 50 . In EU<br />

on the other hand, there‘s rebuttable presumption that continuing such relationships<br />

is pro-competitive, as far as their very existence shows that they have been efficient<br />

at a certain point. Moreover, the customers may usually have made investments<br />

because of these relations. Therefore, the refusals are considered anticompetitive,<br />

unless objective justification is at hand 51 .<br />

47 Moreover, it must be mentioned that in these cases there was de facto standard and not even an<br />

official one. Together with this, in cases of standards the ―new product‖ test is considered out of<br />

sense (see B. GALLEGO, Unilateral refusal ..., supra at note 3, at 229), and therefore abuse is<br />

easier to be found. For more information on this, see I. HARACOGLOU, Competition law and<br />

patents …, supra at note 14, at 136, V. KORAH, The interface …, supra at note 18, at 437, 442, B.<br />

ONG, Anti-competitive refusals …, supra at note 18, at 507.<br />

48 See J. LANG, The application ..., supra at note 5, at 68. Still some authors think that in cases of<br />

standard setting organizations, the contract with the organization is what should compel the owner<br />

to license, and not the antitrust law (H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY,<br />

Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, at 24). Other authors (B. ONG, Anti-competitive refusals …,<br />

supra at note 18, at 511) consider the refusals for licensing for standards, covered by patents, easier<br />

for justification because of the novelty and inventive step, than for copyright cases, where the<br />

criteria for protection are lower (and for which the rights are considered invalid by the case law in<br />

USA, if they have turned into standards). Nevertheless, we think that the industry standards usually<br />

really change the factual environment of the case and, as far as they often include patent issues, this<br />

can also influence its outcome. Moreover, the standard setting organizations usually do not address<br />

the issue themselves in cases of refusals, and leave its solving to the parties.<br />

49 See G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law ..., supra at note 3, at 101 and also<br />

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Antitrust …,<br />

supra at note 3, at 66 – 67.<br />

50 For more information see H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral<br />

refusal …, supra at note 3, at 33 – 35 and U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE<br />

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Antitrust ..., supra at note 3, at 28.<br />

51 For more information see DG Competition Discussion Paper …, supra at note 11, at 62 – 64.


Fanny Koleva 119<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

4. CASE LAW<br />

It should be mentioned in the very beginning that it‘s very limited for IP and<br />

even more restricted for patents 52 . Therefore it‘s difficult to have representative<br />

analysis. In the same time, the two systems already showed certain attitudes in the<br />

refusals to license cases, which could support the analysis here 53 .<br />

The first EU case, which came to the attention of the Commission, was<br />

IGR 54 . The Commission tended to order compulsory licensing, but IGR agreed to<br />

license Salora and therefore formal decision hasn‘t followed. Shortly, collective<br />

dominance was recognized in the case together with prevention of competitor from<br />

entering the market, meaning that the common approach for refusals to supply has<br />

been applied (including also the essential facility implicitly). At the same time it<br />

can be argued if it has not been too broadly applied 55 . A patent pool was also at<br />

hand and the information could be considered a standard, as far as the authorities<br />

approved it. We believe that these considerations also influenced the decision.<br />

A more recent case, including patents among other assets, was Microsoft 56 .<br />

The Commission found that Microsoft was dominant on the market of PC<br />

52 Moreover, the patent cases without presence of other types of IP are even fewer. The cases<br />

regarding the so called aftermarkets (spare parts and service markets) will not be considered, as far<br />

as on one hand they are specific, and on the other hand they may include different forms of tying or<br />

refusals (not necessarily connected with IP).<br />

53 At Community level these issues are addressed either from the Commission, or from the court<br />

system (the European court of justices upon request of national courts or as a stage of appeal on<br />

Commission‘s decisions together with the Court of first instance). In USA a similar approach is<br />

followed by the Federal Trade Commission and the court system.<br />

54 In it German manufacturers of television transmission and receiving equipment, having patents<br />

for a system for stereo reception in Germany, grouped them into a pool, IGR. The system was<br />

approved by the authorities in the country and TV sets could not function in Germany without this<br />

type of receiver. The members of the pool exchanged licenses, but refused to license a Finnish<br />

company, Salora (in fact they planned to delay the licensing for non-members after a certain date<br />

and for a limited number of TV sets). Moreover, IGR used the patent rights in order to prevent<br />

Salora to distribute its own sets on the market of the country. The competitor complained. IGR<br />

Stereo Television EC, Comm XIth Competition Policy Report, 1982, 63 ff., para. 94. For more<br />

information, see J. LANG, The application ..., supra at note 5, at 56 and I. HARACOGLOU,<br />

Competition law and patents …, supra at note 14, at 150.<br />

55 On one hand, collective dominance has been recognized - concept, unknown in USA, except if<br />

concerted practices can be recognized (see A. STRATAKIS, Comparative analysis …, supra at note<br />

14, at 439). On the other hand, negative effect on competitor is recognized, although it can be said<br />

that effect on the competition itself can be implicitly recognized (on potential competitors, as far as<br />

the non-members have been treated equally). This case shows the trend (or al least in the past) in<br />

EU to find the behaviour abusive even in cases, for which the US approach could find no abusive<br />

character. Moreover, the inclination in EU to use flexible criteria as potential, hypothetical, etc. can<br />

also be recognized here – something, criticized by some authors in the sense that if it‘s intended to<br />

find abuse, some things can even be invented (see e.g. A. STRATAKIS, Comparative analysis …,<br />

supra at note 14, at 441 again).<br />

56 The company refused to share with its competitors its interoperability information (specifications<br />

of the interfaces of the PC operating system), protected by copyrights, patents and trade secrets,<br />

necessary for them in order to develop their own products (programs for work group server


120 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

operating systems with 90% market share, accompanied by entry barriers,<br />

presented by network effects 57 , learning or switching costs, etc. Regarding the<br />

abuse, it was found that: Microsoft‘s behavior limited the technical and market<br />

development, the company extended (leveraged) its dominance from PC operating<br />

systems to the market of server operating systems, which posed serious risks for<br />

elimination of competition from the server markets. Essentiality has been implicitly<br />

recognized. There was also license withdrawal and industry standard character of<br />

the information, which again influenced the decision. In the case the Commission<br />

also developed the incentives balance approach. In the end it ordered Microsoft to<br />

license the interface information to its competitors on reasonable and nondiscriminatory<br />

terms (and to unbundle the media player from Windows) 58 . Later<br />

the Court of first instance confirmed this decision on appeal 59 .<br />

If the EU approach regarding the patents has to be summarized, it can be said<br />

that not only exceptional circumstances must be at hand, but even extremely<br />

exceptional circumstances, as far as in the two cases one or more of the specific<br />

scenarios have been at hand (pool, standard, withdrawal) 60 . At the same time, it still<br />

seems that the bodies in EU tend to recognize anticompetitive behavior in refusals<br />

for license cases. Probably for this reason some authors considered this approach<br />

hostile 61 .<br />

A very popular and controversial patent case in USA was the one of Intel 62 .<br />

The district court recognized the essentiality argument of the plaintiff and also that<br />

operating systems), compatible with Windows. Moreover, Microsoft tied its media player with its<br />

operating system for PCs. In the past Microsoft supplied the designers with all the necessary<br />

information for the development of compatible operating systems, but this changed with time. As a<br />

result of this lack of interoperability, the servers started not to work so well with Windows, which<br />

could prevent the competitors from developing their own products. One of the competitors – Sun<br />

Microsystems complained, which gave start to the official case.<br />

57 The more consumers buy its products, the more potential customers want to buy them and also<br />

the more they want to buy products, compatible with the ones of this supplier. On this issue and the<br />

other entry barriers, see V. KORAH, The interface …, supra at note 18, at 439 – 442.<br />

58 It can be said that in this case the Commission applied all the possible approaches and doctrines in<br />

its reasoning. We hope that this really shows a trend for narrowing the treatment of the refusals for<br />

licensing as abusive, although flexible criteria have also been at hand here, e.g. risk for potential<br />

new product development as a result of the technological development prevention. Moreover in two<br />

similar cases with Microsoft in USA, the behavior of the company has been found nonanticompetitive<br />

(see H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A. LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …,<br />

supra at note 3, at 21 and G. MCCURDY, Intellectual property and competition …, supra at note<br />

14, at 476 for more information on those cases).<br />

59 Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, (2007) ECR 3601, (2007) 5 CMLR 846.<br />

60 Moreover, we must say that we consider these circumstances specific not themselves, but only in<br />

combination with other circumstances as essentiality, leveraging, etc.<br />

61 V. KORAH, The interface between …, supra at note 4.<br />

62 The company provided microprocessor chips (having 100% market share) for use by companies<br />

on products (basically computer systems) with different markets. One of these companies was<br />

Intergraph, who held patents on chips. Intel also had patents and trade secrets, some of which


Fanny Koleva 121<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

Intel tried to extend its monopoly on the graphic subsystem market (having 10% of<br />

it for the moment), where the plaintiff acted. Moreover it stated that as far as Intel<br />

had established relationship with Intergraph, and nothing changed, the use of IP as<br />

only objective justification was a mere pretext. On the appeal, the Federal Circuit<br />

reversed as far as the two companies were not competitors, and therefore although<br />

essential for Intergraph activity, the information foreclosure didn‘t lead to<br />

prevention, elimination or restriction of competition. The other consideration at<br />

hand was if Intel tried to create, maintain or facilitate a monopoly with its<br />

behaviour. Again, the court hasn‘t recognized abuse, because the Intergraph patent<br />

infringement suit was considered objective justification for Intel‘s refusal and also,<br />

because of the lack of competitive relationship between the two companies, the<br />

negative effect of Intel‘s conduct falls on Intergraph, but not on the competition<br />

itself. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) started suit against Intel on the same<br />

grounds and in the same time, but it also dealt with the previous behavior of the<br />

company 63 . This case was closed with settlement with Intel, under which it could<br />

not withhold the information unless there was (real) objective justification 64 .<br />

If this case is compared with the previous ones, it can clearly be recognized<br />

that the courts in USA tend to find the refusals for licensing non-anticompetitive<br />

than vice versa. In fact under quite similar and even heavier circumstances the<br />

court refused to impose compulsory licensing, which has already been commented<br />

covered the information, it used to supply to Intergraph (chips for workstations and Windows NT<br />

operating systems). Intergraph found out that Intel used the patented information, it owned, in its<br />

own chips and tried to sell licenses to some of the Intel‘s clients. Then Intel asked Intergraph for<br />

royalty-free cross-license, offering the company patented information, which the last never used in<br />

its activity. Therefore Intergraph refused to license under these conditions and started infringement<br />

suit. As a response Intel stopped supplying the company with the necessary information and<br />

products. It must also be mentioned that Intel had the same behaviour in the past (refused to supply<br />

other companies with the necessary technical information if they do not leave the infringement suits<br />

and give royalty-free licenses for their own patented information), but the companies always<br />

dropped the case, being the weaker parties in the argument. Moreover, in the very case Intel didn‘t<br />

tell to Intergraph about a bug in the already supplied equipment and also interfered when the<br />

company tried to buy equipment from another provider in order to fix it. Together with this a public<br />

campaign on its part against Intergraph followed, the purpose of which was to show that it was no<br />

more reliable supplier on its market. Intergraph claimed antitrust behaviour on part of Intel, raising<br />

the essentiality argument. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel copr., 195 F. 3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See R.<br />

STERN, Refusals to license …, supra at note 14, H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS and M.A.<br />

LEMLEY, Unilateral refusal …, supra at note 3, G. MCCURDY, Intellectual property and<br />

competition …, supra at note 14, at 476 for more information.<br />

63 Together with this, FTC had the authority to act in order to ―reach incipient antitrust violations‖,<br />

meaning that the standard for finding an abuse was lower. Unfairness was an argument, which it could<br />

also use, as well as the overall public interest, especially regarding the incentives for innovations and the<br />

functioning of the patent system.<br />

64 Moreover, later the infringement suit ended with settlement between the two companies in favour of<br />

Intergraph. See E. HAUSMAN, FTC approves Intel settlement, at http://www.crn.com/itchannel/18802020;jsessionid=EV3SXKC3VDZDJQE1GHPCKH4ATMY32JVN<br />

and L. FLYNN,<br />

TECHNOLOGY; Intergraph And Intel Settle Chip Dispute, in NYT 2004, at<br />

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/31/business/technology-intergraph-and-intel-settle-chipdispute.html<br />

for more information.


122 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

as a trend in IP cases. Only FTC found abuse, but its approach was more similar to<br />

the one of EU, as far as potential harms could be considered under it, as well as<br />

unfair behavior. This again confirms the already stated that EU imposes<br />

compulsory licenses readily, especially in comparison with USA (see the<br />

comparative table).<br />

Considerations, claims and<br />

additional circumstances<br />

IGR<br />

case<br />

Microsoft<br />

case<br />

Intel<br />

case<br />

Effect on competition X X X<br />

Essential facility X X X<br />

Leverage X X<br />

Incentives for innovation X<br />

Technical development prevention X<br />

Anticompetitive intent X<br />

License withdrawal X X<br />

Standard X X X<br />

Patent pool X<br />

Others 65 X<br />

Table. Comparative analysis of cases of patent refusals for licensing in EU (IGR<br />

and Microsoft) and USA (Intel)<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

If the patentee‘s refusal for licensing is anticompetitive is obviously a<br />

question with a hard answer and many considerations at hand. As far as the<br />

patentee is rarely in a dominant position on the market, incl. because there are<br />

substitutes usually, the refusal can not be anticompetitive in all the cases, when<br />

there‘s a lack of dominance. Moreover, even if there‘s dominance, consistent<br />

approach and criteria for assessment of the anticompetitive character of the<br />

behaviour are missing and therefore legal certainty too.<br />

The standard approaches for refusal for supply cases have been applied and<br />

adjusted for IP (and patent) cases, and even new ones have been developed, but all<br />

of them are controversial. There are differing opinions on the issue not only<br />

between the legal systems, but even within the very same legal systems. And this<br />

also refers to the case law.<br />

The patent cases analyzed show only that the outcome reflects the basic<br />

approach of the legal systems to the refusals. Together with this, although it is<br />

broadly recognized that the patents should probably be treated with more attention<br />

65 Similar behavior in the past, information hidden, regarding the already supplied product,<br />

anticompetitive (unfair) information campaign.


Fanny Koleva 123<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

because of the incentives for innovations issue, only the approach of USA in<br />

practice reflects this point of view. On the other hand, even there the authorities<br />

missed to clarify what should be the extremely exceptional circumstances, which<br />

could lead to duty for patent licensing. Regarding EU, it must be mentioned, that<br />

the attitude to the cases of refusals for licensing develops (narrows), which is<br />

positive and we hope that the often called ―hostile‖ approach to IP is more a growth<br />

mistake than real issue, because something similar happened in the past in the USA<br />

too.<br />

But still the lack of consistent approach for answering to the commented<br />

question comprises the risk to have patentees penalized because of their rights and<br />

not despite them. For this reason we would conclude with the opinion that at least<br />

for the moment it‘s necessary factual based case-by-case analysis to be realized for<br />

the refusals for patent licensing than mechanical application of tests and that in<br />

case of doubts it‘s better to miss an eventual short term solution than to put at risk<br />

the long term overall incentives for innovations of the industry.


124 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

C. HEATH – A. SANDERS (eds.), Spares, repairs and intellectual property<br />

rights, Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2009.<br />

F. LEVEQUE - H. SHELANSKI (eds.), Antitrust, Patents and Copyright. EU<br />

and US Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005.<br />

G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law. The Innovation<br />

Nexus, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006.<br />

I. HARACOGLOU, Competition law and patents. A follow-on innovation<br />

perspective in the biopharmaceutical industry, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008.<br />

J. DREXL (ed.), Research Handbook on Competition and Intellectual<br />

Property Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008.<br />

P.L.C. TORREMANS, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law<br />

(5 th edition), Oxford University Press, 2008.<br />

R. WHISH, Competition Law, Lexis Nexis, UK, 2003.<br />

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE<br />

COMMISSION, Antitrust enforcement and intellectual property rights: promoting<br />

innovation and competition, Bibliobazaar, Charleston, 2007.<br />

Articles<br />

A. STRATAKIS, Comparative analysis of the US and EU approach and<br />

enforcement of the essential facilities doctrine, in ECIR 2006, 434 ff.<br />

B. ONG, Anti-competitive refusals to grant copyright licenses: reflections on<br />

the IMS saga, in EIPR 2004, 505 ff.<br />

G. MCCURDY, Intellectual property and competition: does the essential<br />

facilities doctrine shed any new light?, in EIPR 2003, 472 ff.<br />

L. FLYNN, TECHNOLOGY; Intergraph And Intel Settle Chip Dispute, in<br />

NYT 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/31/business/technology-intergraphand-intel-settle-chip-dispute.html<br />

M. O‘BRYAN, Refusal to license intellectual property under the Australian<br />

trade practices act, in PW 1992, 10 ff.


Fanny Koleva 125<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

M. RICOLFI, Is there an antitrust antidote against IP overprotection within<br />

TRIPS? in MIPLR 2006, 305 ff.<br />

R. COCO – P. NEBBIA, Compulsory licensing and interim measures in<br />

Merck: a case for Italy or for antitrust law?, in JIPLP 2007, 452 ff.<br />

R. GILBERT – C. SHAPIRO, An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to<br />

license intellectual property, in PNAS, USA, 1996, 12749 ff.<br />

R. STERN, Refusals to license intellectual property rights and monopoly<br />

“leverage”, in EIPR 1998, 390 ff.<br />

V. KORAH, The interface between intellectual property and antitrust: the<br />

European experience, in ALJ 2001, 801 ff.<br />

V. KORAH, The interface between intellectual property rights and<br />

competition in developed countries, in SCRIPT-ED 2005, 429 ff.<br />

Legislation and Official Documents<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.<br />

15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,<br />

Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125,<br />

1197 (1994).<br />

DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of article 82 of the<br />

Treaty to exclusionary abuses, issued by the Commission December 2005, at<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf<br />

Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC treaty to technology<br />

transfer agreements, issued by the Commission April 2004, in the Official journal<br />

of the European Union.<br />

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883,<br />

which came into force on July, 7, 1884, 173 member countries.<br />

Sherman antitrust act, July 2, 1890.<br />

Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties<br />

establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997,<br />

entered into force on May 1, 1999.<br />

Case Law<br />

Bronner (C-7/97 [1998] ECR I-7791).<br />

Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1 st<br />

Cir.1994).


126 The Interface between Intellectual Property and Competition Law:<br />

Is the Refusal of a Patentee to License Anti-Competitive?<br />

Decca (Commission Decision Decca Navigation System, OJ 1989 L 43/27).<br />

IGR Stereo Television EC, Comm XIth Competition Policy Report, 1982, 63<br />

ff., para. 94.<br />

Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastmen Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9 th<br />

Cir. 1997).<br />

IMS (C-418/01 [2004] ECR I-05039).<br />

In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (CSU v. Xerox),<br />

203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).<br />

Intergraph Corp. v. Intel copr., 195 F. 3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).<br />

Ladbroke (T-504/93 Tierce Ladbroke [1997] ECR 927).<br />

Magill case (C-241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent<br />

Television <strong>Publication</strong>s v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743).<br />

Microsoft (COMP/C-3/37.792 [2004]).<br />

Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, (2007) ECR 3601, (2007) 5 CMLR 846.<br />

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).<br />

Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984).<br />

Others<br />

E. HAUSMAN, FTC approves Intel settlement, at http://www.crn.com/itchannel/18802020;jsessionid=EV3SXKC3VDZDJQE1GHPCKH4ATMY32JVN<br />

R. PITOFSKY, The essential facilities doctrine under United States antitrust<br />

law, submitted to the European Commission in support National Data Corporation<br />

in the IMS case.<br />

P. NEBBIA, EU competition law (lectures for the LLM in intellectual<br />

property law, 2009/2010).<br />

Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Monopolies_1623<br />

Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Antitrust_Act<br />

All websites cited were accessed on February 26, 2010.


PATENT OWNERSHIP IN VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY<br />

TRANSFER IN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH<br />

ABSTRACT<br />

by<br />

Dragan Ćorić 1<br />

This article analyzes the issue of patent ownership which arises from<br />

government sponsored research. In addition, it describes and compares two<br />

ownership systems: professor‘s privilege and institutional ownership.<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

The topic of technology transfer 2 and patents that arise from the publicly<br />

funded research organizations (PFRO) is the object of discussion and interest of<br />

various stakeholders: universities 3 (and other PFRO), researchers and students,<br />

industry, policy makers, and general public. In many cases these stakeholders have<br />

different position 4 on the main question: how the knowledge produced at<br />

universities can be effectively transferred and commercialized? This debate became<br />

especially active in the last 30 years. Before that period even the most prominent<br />

universities considered patenting contrary to their role as public servants, and it<br />

was considered ―not deemed within the sphere of the university‘s scholarly<br />

objectives‖ 5 . The changes came from the fact that two traditional roles of the<br />

university, education and research, are today accompanied by the third role,<br />

interaction with industry and commercialization. The creation of the invention is<br />

directly related to the intellectual property (IP), and whenever there is a property in<br />

1<br />

Author is researcher at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne Switzerland<br />

(dragan.coric@epfl.ch)<br />

2<br />

Technology transfer is the process of sharing of skills, knowledge, technologies, methods of<br />

manufacturing, samples of manufacturing and facilities among governments and other institutions to<br />

ensure that scientific and technological developments are accessible to a wider range of users who<br />

can then further develop and exploit the technology into new products, processes, applications,<br />

materials or services. Definition from www.wikipedia.org.<br />

3<br />

This work is focused on the universities as the main representative of publicly funded research<br />

organizations (PFRO). Some national legislation may treat universities differently from the rest of<br />

PFROs.<br />

4<br />

The extensive analysis of the subject can be found in a following works: A.L. MONOTTI, S.<br />

RICKETSON, Universities and Intellectual Property. Ownership and Exploitation, Oxford<br />

University Press, Oxford, UK, 2003; F. MONTOBBIO, Intellectual Property Rights and Knowledge<br />

Transfer from Public Research to Industry in US and Europe: which Lessons for Innovation<br />

Systems in Developing Countries? in The Economics of Intellectual Property <strong>WIPO</strong>, 2009; R.<br />

EISENBERG, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in<br />

Government Sponsored Research, in Virginia Law Review, 1996, 1663 ff.<br />

5<br />

S.STERCKX, Patenting and Licensing of University Research: Promoting Innovation or<br />

Undermining Academic Values?, in Science and Engineering Ethics 2009, 1ff., at 2


128 Patent Ownership in View of Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored<br />

Research<br />

the stake there is automatically the question of the ownership. The early discussion 6<br />

was focused on the question who should be the owner of the intellectual property<br />

(on the results of the PFROs research): funding agency (government) or PFROs<br />

and researchers. Many scholars argued that giving this right to PFROs will impose<br />

double taxation 7 on the public. However, currently accepted general opinion is that<br />

ownership should not be assigned to government, mostly in the name of efficiency,<br />

since the state bureaucracy had proven to be inefficient in managing technology<br />

transfer.<br />

From the legal point of view, the subject of university IP ownership is related<br />

to the broader issue of employees‘ inventions, which is regulated by national laws<br />

or acts. The main question that arises is whether employee or employer is the<br />

owner of the invention, and thus entitled to apply for the patent. This question,<br />

which can have significant social and economical impact, is regarded differently<br />

depending on the country, legal system, and type of the IP involved. Main<br />

regulations 8 discuss issues such as the notification (of the employer) and claiming<br />

process, and determination of a fair remuneration. It is clear that these regulations<br />

can have a dramatic impact on the employees‘ incentives and productivity. This<br />

complexity is further reflected in the fact that international conventions such as<br />

TRIPs 9 Agreement, the Paris Convention 10 and Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 11<br />

do not include any provisions on employees‘ inventions. Only European Patent<br />

Convention (EPC) in the Article 60(1) 12 gives provision regarding conflict in the<br />

case of the different national legislations. In the public sector, it is mostly accepted<br />

that inventions performed during the employment belong to the employer (with<br />

possible employee compensation). However, in academic sector the issue of<br />

6<br />

Elaborated discussion can be found for example in R. EISENBERG, Public Research and Private<br />

Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government Sponsored Research, in Virginia<br />

Law Review 1996, 1663 ff.<br />

7<br />

Double taxation refers to funding of the research by public money, and paying higher price<br />

because of the patent protection.<br />

8<br />

Examples from German Employees‘law (Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz or AEG) can be found in<br />

M. DECKER, J. MATTHES, Employee Inventions in Germany, in Intellectual Asset Management<br />

2005, 63 ff.<br />

9<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the<br />

Uruguaz Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994)<br />

10<br />

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as modified in 1967),<br />

mentioned in the WTO TRIPS Agreement Article 2.<br />

11<br />

Patent Cooperation Treaty, done at Washington on June19, 1970, amended on September 28,<br />

1979, modified on February 3, 1984, 2001, as in force from April 1,2002, adopted by 142 countries.<br />

12<br />

EPC Article 60(1) in the second sentence states‖ If the inventor is an employee the right to the<br />

European patent shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State in which the employee<br />

is mainly employed; if the State in which the employee is mainly employed cannot be determined,<br />

the law to be applied shall be that of the State in which the employer has his place of business to<br />

which the employee is attached‖.


Dragan Ćorić 129<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

invention property is treated differently 13 from the general principles of employee<br />

invention laws. Traditionally, Germany 14 and Nordic countries 15 preferred<br />

assigning rights to the inventors i.e. employees (regardless of funding source)<br />

based on academic freedom, and even human rights 16 (right to publish) arguments,<br />

while common law countries 17 such as US, UK, Canada and Australia gave<br />

preference to the university (employer) ownership.<br />

This paper aims to analyze and compare two different types of allocation of<br />

the ownership on the results of university research through patents 18 : Institutional<br />

(university) ownership, according to which the invention is attributed to the<br />

university where the research is performed, and professor‟s privilege, which<br />

confers the exclusive right on the invention to the professor 19 who performed the<br />

research.<br />

2. DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND PATENTING<br />

FROM UNIVERSITIES<br />

To better understand the issue of the technology transfer and patenting from<br />

PFRO it is necessary to look at its historical and geographical evolution. United<br />

States are considered as a pioneer in this aspect: the number of patents registered<br />

by US universities at USPTO has increased from 436 in 1981 to more than 3500<br />

patents in 2001 20 . Usually, the increase in the patenting in US is related to the<br />

Bayh-Dole Act 21 (BDA) which encouraged small businesses and non-profitable<br />

organization to patent the results of government sponsored research by allowing<br />

them to keep patent ownership. It is unquestionable that BDA had big impact on<br />

13<br />

The Norwegian Employee Invention Act before changes in 2005 stated that ―For the purpose of<br />

this Act teachers and scientific staff at universities and colleges shall not, in that capacity be deemed<br />

to be employees‖.<br />

14<br />

H.GODDAR, Compliance with the German Employees‟ Invention Law in the Handling of<br />

Inventions Developed by Universities, in Proceedings of the 1999 Summit Conference on<br />

Intellectual Property, University of Washington, Seattle, 1999<br />

15<br />

W.PRINZ, M.J. ADELMANN, R. BRAUNEIS, J.DREXL, R.NACK, Patents and Technological<br />

Progress in a Globalized World, Chapter 5., Springer-Verlag Berlin, 2009, 329 ff.<br />

16<br />

In Finland, Article 16 (3) of the constitution states that ―The freedom of science, the arts and<br />

higher education is guaranteed‖, while Article 13 in European Charter of Fundamental Right states:<br />

―The art and scientific research shall be free of constraints. Academic freedom shall be respected‖.<br />

17<br />

A.F. CHRISTIE, S.D‘ALOSIO, K.L. GAITA, M.J. HOWLETT, Analysis of the Legal<br />

Framework for Patent Ownership in Publicly Funded Research Institutions, Commonwealth<br />

Department of Education Science and Training, Canberra, Austarlia, 2003<br />

18<br />

The report focuses on the patents, considering they are the most significant type of IP to be<br />

transferred from universities. Other important IP assets include copyright (mostly software).<br />

19<br />

In broader sense, the privilege extends to collaborators and student. In some countris it is also<br />

known as teacher‘s privilege.<br />

20<br />

The data on US patenting and licensing from US universities can be found on the<br />

www.autm.net/surveys, official web page of the Association of University Technology Managers<br />

(AUTM).<br />

21<br />

Act of Dec.12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-3028 (codified as ammended at 35 U.S.C.<br />

§§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994)


130 Patent Ownership in View of Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored<br />

Research<br />

university patenting, but some scholars 22 argue that patenting increase in US is also<br />

related to the culture and traditional close relation between universities and<br />

industry in this country, and that such ―patent boom‖ would have occurred even<br />

without BDA. However, considering the role played by the specific characteristics<br />

of the US system, it is not possible to assume that in the other countries the simple<br />

introduction itself of similar legislation would produce the same increase in patent<br />

outputs. The BDA offered the universities the choice of using exclusive or nonexclusive<br />

licenses; it arises therefore the risk of impairing or delaying the<br />

knowledge transfer. The surveys 23 show that today most of the US university patent<br />

licenses are exclusive, but, while this policy could provide the universities with<br />

more revenues in the short time, in the longer run it could provoke negative<br />

consequences to them.<br />

European Union (EU) countries witnessed important increase in the number<br />

of university patents as well. It is interesting to note that, contrary to US<br />

experience, most of the patents on EU university research results are owned by the<br />

private companies. In the US commercial companies own only 24 per cent of US<br />

academic patents, while in Europe this percentage is from 60 per cent (France) up<br />

to 81 per cent (Sweden) 24 . It is still questionable whether high percentage of patents<br />

owned by private companies can be considered as the sign of an efficient<br />

technology transfer system. It is common understanding that Europe is less<br />

successful in converting its academic results into economic output. The European<br />

Commission (EC) expressed concern about the fact that European research<br />

institutions are good in producing academic output, but they are not able to transfer<br />

those outputs to the industry (this is known as ―European paradox‖). Such a<br />

problem could be related to the inefficiency of European Technology Transfer<br />

Offices (TTO) as well. Recent studies 25 show that this gap (between EU and US<br />

TTO generated revenues) is narrowing.<br />

4. OWNERSHIP AND ALLOCATION OF IP RIGHTS IN UNIVERSITY<br />

ENVIRONMENT<br />

The ownership (that is in some cases separated from the creator of invention)<br />

of the IP rights created in the university depends on the various factors such as: IP<br />

creators and their legal relationship among themselves and with funding source,<br />

and legal frameworks (national laws, university IP policies, and contractual<br />

22<br />

D.MOWERY, B.N. SAMPAT, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University Technology Transfer:<br />

A Model for Other OECD Governments?, in Journal of Technology Transfer 2005, 124 ff.<br />

23<br />

M. LAMLEY, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, in Stanford Public Law Working Paper No.<br />

980776. 2007<br />

24<br />

J. THURSBY, M. THURSBY, Knowledge Creation and Diffusion of Public Science with<br />

Intellectual Property Rights, in Intellectual Property Rights and Technical Changes, K. Maskus<br />

(Ed.), Elsevier Ltd. 2007<br />

25<br />

A. CONTI, P. GAULE, D. FORAY, Academic Licensing: a European Study, Working paper<br />

2007-001 CEMI, 2007


Dragan Ćorić 131<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

agreements). As a result, the ownership can be allocated to the inventors<br />

(researchers and students), the university, industrial partners, governmental or other<br />

funding agency. The first step in ownership allocation is the identification of the<br />

inventors and their legal status and relationship with university (employees and<br />

non-employees). For example, graduate students, who are deeply involved in the<br />

research, are not often university employees. Inventor identification is important,<br />

firstly, to help allocate the ownership, and secondly, to be aware of the person that<br />

can claim compensation once the patent is exploited. The most common situation<br />

in which university can claim rights on a work occurs when it has been created as<br />

the result of the performance of employment duties. Other typical circumstances<br />

which allow the university to claim the ownership of the exclusive rights are those<br />

in which the university. 26<br />

- provides the funding or obtains funding from other sources (sponsored<br />

research)<br />

- makes available equipment, facilities and other infrastructure<br />

- provides pre-existing university IP available.<br />

An important doctrine that strongly affects the allocation of IP rights in<br />

academic environment is the so called ―employed to invent‖. This doctrine is<br />

related to the controversial issue of distinguishing between invention and research.<br />

In the case of United States v Dubliner Condenser Corporation 27 the court<br />

distinguished between research and invention claiming that the two are not<br />

equivalent; as a consequence the person who was hired to perform research is not<br />

automatically employed to invent. Most of European legislations 28 distinguish<br />

between service inventions (invention made under the duties of employment<br />

contract), free inventions (made without connection with duties or resources<br />

provided by employer), and dependent inventions (made outside the contract but<br />

using the employer‘s resources). The fear from the many remaining legal<br />

uncertainties resulted in increase of the contractual agreements between<br />

universities and inventors, but also in the creation of detailed university IP<br />

policies 29 . Every university, unless restricted with strict legal limitations (such as<br />

Bayh-Dole Act), creates its own policies, which resulted in low level of the<br />

uniformity even among similar institutions. The interesting example is Stanford<br />

University policy 30 where, even though the university own IP from the research,<br />

inventors have right to decide to put inventions in the public domain. The<br />

interrelation of various legislation and policies resulted in many different<br />

26<br />

A.L. MONOTTI, S.RICKETSON, Universities and Intellectual Property. Ownership and<br />

Exploitation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003 at 302<br />

27<br />

United States v. Dubliner Condenser Corporation, 289 U.S. 178, amended, 289 U.S. 706 (1993)<br />

28<br />

L. MACDONALD, G. CAPART, Community Research. Management of Intellectual Property in<br />

Publicly-Funded Research Organizations: Towards European Guidelines, Commission of European<br />

Communities, Brussels, 2004. at 11<br />

29<br />

A.L. MONOTTI, S. RICKETSON, Universities and Intellectual Property. Ownership and<br />

Exploitation, supra at note 25, at 298<br />

30<br />

Stanford University IP policy available at http://rph.stanford.edu/5-1.html


132 Patent Ownership in View of Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored<br />

Research<br />

ownership systems which could be classified in two 31 dominant models of<br />

university IP ownership systems: professor‘s privilege and institutional ownership.<br />

5. PROFESSOR’S PRIVILEGE<br />

The concept of ―Professor‘s privilege‖ represents the idea that the results of<br />

the research performed at the university or other PFRO are retained by the person<br />

(generally a professor) who performed the research and not by the institution where<br />

such research was performed. It aims to motivate academics to get more actively<br />

involved in the commercialization of academic output. In Europe the general trend<br />

is toward abolishing the professor‘s privilege 32 : Denmark abolished it in 2000,<br />

followed by Germany in 2002, Norway in 2003, and Finland in 2007. The main<br />

reasons 33 for this ―abolitionist movement‖ can be found in the increased<br />

recognition that principle of academic freedom is not valid reason to grant<br />

privileges and to deprive universities from the IP rights. Another reason 34 for this<br />

property shift is the desire of policy makers to create similar conditions to US<br />

where university retains all IP rights.<br />

Italy was the only country that went in opposite direction adopting the<br />

privilege regime in 2001. It seems that Italy adopted professor‘s privilege for two<br />

main reasons 35 : because it could encourage the patenting of existing research, and<br />

because it could help to solve the problem of bureaucracy in university<br />

administrations, which often made impossible the exploitation of many academic<br />

inventions. However, these changes introduced concern 36 among Italian<br />

universities and companies since most of the university inventions could be then<br />

owned by private sector. For the same reason the adoption of professor‘s privilege<br />

system in developing countries might not be the best idea because public<br />

institutions could lose the control over strategic fields such as agriculture and<br />

health. Currently, in EU, only Italy and Sweden have professor‘s privilege<br />

31<br />

In EU the ownership systems are as follows:<br />

Professor‘s Privilege: Sweden, Italy<br />

Institutional Ownership: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,<br />

France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal,<br />

Slovak Republic, Spain, UK<br />

32<br />

Turning Science into Business: Patenting and Licensing at Public Research Organizations,<br />

OECD, Paris, 2003<br />

33<br />

W.PRINZ, M.J. ADELMANN, R. BRAUNEIS, J.DREXL, R.NACK, Parents and Technological<br />

Progress in a Globalized World, supra at note 14, at 339<br />

34<br />

F. LISSONI, P.LOTZ, J. SCHOVBSO, A. TRECCANI, Academic Patenting and the Professor‟s<br />

Privilege: Evidence on Denmark from the KEINS database, in Science and Public Policy 2009, 595<br />

ff. at 596<br />

35<br />

Monitoring and Analysis of Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Regimes and Their<br />

Use, Draft report to the commission, Mayson Hayes and Curran, 2008, at 17<br />

36<br />

F. MONTOBBIO, Intellectual Property Rights and Knowledge Transfer from Public Research to<br />

Industry in US and Europe: which Lessons for Innovation Systems in Developing Countries? in The<br />

Economics of Intellectual Property <strong>WIPO</strong> 2009, 180 ff., at 200


Dragan Ćorić 133<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

implemented. Outside Europe, the professor privilege existed in Japan until 2004.<br />

Traditionally, the academic research in Japan was strongly supported by private<br />

sector and professor‘s privilege system was, in a certain manner, necessary to<br />

ensure that all inventions with commercial potential could be attributed to sponsors<br />

(i.e. private companies). This kind of technology transfer process was tolerated by<br />

policy makers and university administrations. The system of professor privilege has<br />

never been introduced in US.<br />

Typical characteristics of professor‘s privilege (as implemented in Italy and<br />

Sweden) are 37 :<br />

- Scope to whom and to which IP privilege is applied: in Italy this scope is<br />

wider (compared to Sweden). For example, it applies not only to all<br />

employees of PFRO but also to all consultants and to third parties<br />

involved in research, while in Sweden it applies only to professors<br />

(teachers), graduate students and doctoral candidates. In Sweden<br />

professor‘s privilege applies to copyright as well, while in Italy it does<br />

not.<br />

- Compensation: In Italy PFRO is entitled to the part of the profits derived<br />

from the exploitation of the invention, while in Sweden PFRO can not<br />

profit from it.<br />

- Patent protection: In Italy, there is strict obligation on the researchers to<br />

patent their invention while in Sweden such a provision does not exist.<br />

- Derogations: Italian regulation states that if the researcher does not<br />

industrially exploit the invention within 5 years then PFRO is entitled to<br />

exercise a non exclusive right on the invention. Furthermore, if the<br />

invention came from the privately financed research, then PFRO owns the<br />

invention. There are not equivalent provisions under Swedish law.<br />

The introduction or abolition of professor‘s privilege can have important<br />

consequences on the university patenting and university-industry partnership, and<br />

disrupt the usual way of collaboration. The analysis of biotechnological research in<br />

Denmark 38 (which is good example because Denmark was first to abolish the<br />

privilege 10 years ago, and can provide earliest effects on the abolition), after the<br />

abolition of professor‘s privilege system in 2000, showed that it has been a decline<br />

in collaboration of Danish scientists and firms; the latter started to negotiate more<br />

with the scientists which benefit from the privilege (like those in Sweden). The<br />

same study showed that introduction of the intermediate (TT Office) can<br />

significantly delay decisions on university intellectual property. Another Danish<br />

37<br />

Monitoring and Analysis of Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property regimes and Their<br />

Use, supra at note 34, at 15.<br />

38<br />

F.VALENTIN, R.L. JENSEN, Effects on Academia-Industry Collaboration of Extending<br />

University Property Rights, in Journal of Technology Transfer 2007, 251 ff., at 271.


134 Patent Ownership in View of Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored<br />

Research<br />

study 39 showed that considerable amount of patenting activities moved from the<br />

professors to the universities.<br />

Ownership of invention is a strong financial incentive for the researchers,<br />

since salary structures are rigid and bonuses are very rare in the academic<br />

environment. Another function is to reward the individual effort and to motivate<br />

the researcher to take an active role in the commercialization of their inventions.<br />

On the other side, the professor‘s privilege system has been criticized for the<br />

following reasons 40 :<br />

- Lack of resources to commercialize: the academic researchers usually do<br />

not have skills, expertise, and financial resources, or even interest to<br />

commercialize their research output.<br />

- No benefit for the universities: attribution of all IP rights to the<br />

researchers does not bring any benefit to the department where research<br />

was performed. The benefits and knowledge are shared by a small<br />

number of people instead of wider scientific community and public.<br />

- Researcher Retention: PFRO are not likely to encourage any link<br />

between researchers and industry out of fear that researchers might move<br />

to industry rewards.<br />

6. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP<br />

Institutional ownership of university related research means that the IP rights<br />

on the results of academic research belong to the institution where the research is<br />

performed. There is a global trend 41 to move to this type of system. In general,<br />

institutional ownership system can be divided into two classes. First regime is<br />

automatic ownership 42 , where the first owner of the IP rights is the employer<br />

(university). In this regime usually there are no reversion rights to the employee.<br />

The right for compensation depends on the national legislation 43 and university IP<br />

policy. Second type of the institutional ownership is pre-emption rights 44 , where<br />

the first owner is employee (researcher), but employer (university) is entitled to<br />

claim the invention (usually within a certain term). In the case the university does<br />

39 F. LISSONI, P.LOTZ, J. SCHOVBSO, A. TRECCANI, Academic patenting and the professor‘s<br />

privilege: evidence on Denmark from the KEINS database, supra at note 33.<br />

40 Monitoring and Analysis of Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property regimes and Their<br />

Use, supra at note 34, at 41.<br />

41 Italy is rare example of opposite trend of moving from institutional ownership to professor‘s<br />

privilege<br />

42 The examples of countries with automatic ownership are : Latvia, France, U.K. Estonia and<br />

Ireland<br />

43 The comparison of employees‘ remuneration in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, UK, France. Japan,<br />

Switzerland and US can be found in D. HARHOFF, K. HOISL, Institutionalized Incentives for<br />

Ingenuity-Patent Value and the German Employees' Inventions Act, in Research Policy 2007, 1143<br />

ff., at 1146<br />

44 The examples of countries with pre-emption rights are: Austria, Finland, Germany, Lithuania


Dragan Ćorić 135<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

not claim the invention; the rights are reverting to the inventor. The reversion of the<br />

rights (in the case that PFRO does not claim rights or has no intention to<br />

commercialize the invention) to employee depends highly on national legislature,<br />

and the time usually ranges from 3 to 6 months. In addition, the university is<br />

usually obliged to pay certain remuneration to the inventor as a compensation for<br />

transferring the rights. There are several ways of compensation, depending on the<br />

national law 45 :<br />

- countries where no right of remuneration is provided with by the law 46 ;<br />

- countries where right to remuneration exists and is clearly defined 47 ;<br />

- countries where a right to remuneration exists and is not clearly defined 48 ;<br />

- countries where additional right to remuneration exists when the<br />

employer owns IPR 49<br />

Institutional ownership reduces freedom and rights of the researcher, but at<br />

the same time the advocates of Institutional ownership system claim several<br />

positive aspects:<br />

- Facilitation of technology transfer and competition: The institutional<br />

ownership incentivizes PFROs to develop technology transfer skills and<br />

capabilities. The US is a good example of a country where this approach<br />

has created a competitive environment.<br />

- Lack of incentives to develop infrastructure: without automatic ownership<br />

system PFROs would have no motivation to develop even basic<br />

infrastructure for commercialization and patenting.<br />

- Technology transfer simplification: the adoption of the institutional<br />

ownership allows creation of technology transfer offices, which can<br />

centralize and simplify the procedures. In this way the researchers can<br />

focus on what they do best – make inventions and breakthrough research.<br />

- Technology transfer awareness: the presence of the TT office in the<br />

university environment will likely increase understanding of IP rights and<br />

motivate the researches to commercialize.<br />

It is important to emphasize that pre-emption rights regime, contrary to<br />

automatic ownership, can negatively affect the university IP portfolio since in<br />

many cases when the invention is not claimed by the university it is reclaimed by<br />

the inventor, and eventually can not be reutilized by the academic or the industrial<br />

users.<br />

45<br />

Monitoring and Analysis of Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property regimes and Their<br />

Use, supra at note 34, at 23<br />

46<br />

EU examples : Ireland, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Cyprus<br />

47<br />

EU example : Slovenia<br />

48<br />

EU examples: Netherlands, Czech Republic and Malta<br />

49 EU example : France


136 Patent Ownership in View of Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored<br />

Research<br />

7. CONCLUSIONS<br />

Even though in theory there are only few distinctive university ownership<br />

systems, in the reality there are many layers of hard law (such as employees‘<br />

invention law), soft law (recommendations and directives), and university IP<br />

policies. These differences indicate that there is not general agreement yet on what<br />

should be considered the best system, and this circumstance negatively affects the<br />

harmonization and cross-border research.<br />

There is a general trend toward to institutional ownership since this system of<br />

allocation of IP rights seems to be the most suitable way to transfer technology for<br />

the interests of the majority of stakeholders. Research institution seems to be the<br />

best initial owner of the rights. Even though professor‘s privilege can be a good<br />

incentive for researchers, there is no evidence that it is an efficient technology<br />

transfer system. The effect of recent abolishing of the professor‘s privilege in some<br />

European countries is still to be fully understood in the following years.<br />

Regardless of the type of the ownership, the fruitful commercialization is<br />

only possible when the creators of the inventions are actively involved and<br />

motivated. For this reason the policy makers have to try to create legal framework<br />

that will encourage effective collaboration between researches, universities, and<br />

industry, and not create the tension among them.


Dragan Ćorić 137<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY:<br />

P. AZOULAY, W.W. DING, T.E. STUART, The Impact of Academic<br />

Patenting on Public Research Output, NBER Working paper N.11917, 2006<br />

P. AZOULAY, W.W. DING, T.E. STUART, The Determinants of Faculty<br />

Patenting Behavior: Demographics or Opportunities? in Journal of Economic<br />

Behavior and Organization 2007, 599 ff.<br />

E. BACCHIOCCHI, F. MONTOBBIO, Knowledge Diffusion from University<br />

and Public Research. A Comparison between US, Japan and Europe using Patent<br />

Citations, in Journal of Technology Transfer 2009, 169 ff.<br />

M.CALDERINI, C. FRANZONI, A.VEZZULLI, If Star Scientists Do Not<br />

Patent: The Effect of Productivity, Basicness and Impact on the Decision to patent<br />

in the Academic World, in Research Policy 2007, 303 ff.<br />

A. CAMPOS, P. D‘ESTE, A.GEUNA, Critical Appraisal of the Current<br />

Understanding of the Linkages between University and Industry, SPRU, University<br />

of Sussex, 2007<br />

A. F. CHRISTIE, S.D‘ALOSIO, K.L. GAITA, M.J. HOWLETT, Analysis of<br />

the legal framework for patent ownership in publicly funded research institutions,<br />

Commonwealth Department of Education Science and Training, Canberra,<br />

Australia, 2003<br />

W. COHEN, Patents and Appropriation: Concerns and Evidence, in Journal<br />

of Technology Transfer 2005, 57 ff.<br />

J. COLYVAS, M. CROW, A. GELIJNS, R. MAZZOLENI, R. NELSON, N.<br />

ROSENBERG, B. SAMPAT, How Do University Inventions Get Into practice?, in<br />

Management Science 2002, 61 ff.<br />

A. CONTI, P. GAULE, D. FORAY, Academic Licensing: a European Study,<br />

Working paper 2007-001 CEMI, 2007<br />

W. R. CORNISH, Rights in University Innovation, The Herchel Smith<br />

Lecture for 1991, in EIPR, 1992, 13 ff.<br />

S. CRESPI, Intellectual Property and the Academic Community, in EIPR,<br />

1997, 6ff.<br />

G. CRESPI, A. GEUNA, B. VERSPAGEN, University IPRs and Knowledge<br />

Transfer. Is the IPR Ownership Model More Efficient? SPRU, University of<br />

Sussex, 2006


138 Patent Ownership in View of Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored<br />

Research<br />

M. DECKER, J. MATTHES, Employee Inventions in Germany, in<br />

Intellectual Asset Management 2005, 63 ff.<br />

R. EISENBERG, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and<br />

Technology Transfer in Government Sponsored Research, in Virginia Law Review,<br />

1996, 1663 ff.<br />

D. ELFENBEIN, <strong>Publication</strong>s, Patents, and the Market for University<br />

Inventions, in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2007, 688 ff.<br />

H.GODDAR, Compliance with the German Employees‟ Invention Law in the<br />

Handling of Inventions Developed by Universities, in Proceedings of the 1999<br />

Summit Conference on Intellectual Property, University of Washington, Seattle,<br />

1999<br />

K.R. FABRIZIO, University Patenting and the Pace of Industrial Innovation,<br />

in Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 16, 2007, 505 ff.<br />

D. HARHOFF, K. HOISL, Institutionalized Incentives for Ingenuity-Patent<br />

Value and the German Employees' Inventions Act, in Research Policy 2007, 1143<br />

ff.<br />

K. HARVEY, Capturing Intellectual Property Rights for the UK: A Critique<br />

of University Policies, in A. WEBSTER-K. PACKER, Innovation and the<br />

Intellectual Property System, Kluwer, Deventer, 1996, 79 ff.<br />

R. KNELLER, University-Industry Cooperation and Technology Transfer in<br />

Japan Compared with the US: Another Reason for Japan‟s Economic Malaise? in<br />

24 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Int. Ec. Law, 2003, 329 ff.<br />

S. LACH, M. SCHANKERMAN, Incentives and Innovation in Universities,<br />

Rand Journal of Economics 2008, 403 ff.<br />

M. LAMLEY, Are Universities Patent Trolls? Stanford Public Law Working<br />

Paper No. 980776. 2007<br />

F. LISSONI, P.LOTZ, J. SCHOVSBO, A. TRECCANI, Academic patenting<br />

and the professor's privilege: evidence on Denmark from the KEINS database, in<br />

Science and Public Policy, 2009, 595 ff.<br />

L. MACDONALD, G. CAPART, European Commission. Community<br />

research, Management of intellectual property in publicly-funded research<br />

organizations: Towards European Guidelines, Commission of European<br />

Communities, Brussels, 2004


Dragan Ćorić 139<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

Monitoring and Analysis of Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property<br />

regimes and Their Use, Draft Report to the Commission, Mayson Hayes and<br />

Curran, 2008<br />

F. MONTOBBIO, Intellectual Property Rights and Knowledge Transfer from<br />

Public Research to Industry in US and Europe: which Lessons for Innovation<br />

Systems in Developing Countries? in The Economics of Intellectual Property<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong>, 2009<br />

A.L. MONOTTI, S. RICKETSON, Universities and Intellectual Property.<br />

Ownership and Exploitation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2003<br />

D.MOWERY, B.N. SAMPAT, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University<br />

Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments? in Journal of<br />

Technology Transfer, 2005, 115 ff.<br />

F. MURRAY, S. STERN, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the<br />

Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An empirical Test of the Anti-Commons<br />

Hypothesis, in Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 2007, 648 ff.<br />

R.R. NELSON, Observation on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise in Patenting at<br />

American Universities, in Journal of Technology Transfer 2001, 13 ff.<br />

W.PRINZ, M.J. ADELMANN, R. BRAUNEIS, J.DREXL, R.NACK,<br />

Parents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World, Chapter 5, Springer-<br />

Verlag Berlin, 2009, 329 ff.<br />

OECD, Turning Science into Business: Patenting and Licensing at Public<br />

Research Organizations, OECD, Paris, 2003<br />

S.STERCKX, Patenting and Licensing of University Research: Promoting<br />

Innovation or Undermining Academic Values? In Science and Engineering Ethics<br />

2009<br />

J. THURSBY, M. THURSBY, Knowledge Creation and Diffusion of Public<br />

Science with Intellectual Property Rights, in Intellectual Property Rights and<br />

Technical Changes, K. Maskus (Ed.), Elsevier Ltd. 2007<br />

F.VALENTIN, R.L. JENSEN, Effects on Academia-Industry Collaboration<br />

of Extending University Property Rights, in Journal of Technology Transfer 2007,<br />

251 ff


EXTRATERRITORIAL TECHNOLOGY IN A TERRITORIAL<br />

REGIME:<br />

CHALLENGES AFTER CARDIAC PACEMAKERS V. ST. JUDE<br />

MEDICAL<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Emily J. Zelenock<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

1. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT UNDER 35 U.S.C.§ 271(A)<br />

a. The Deepsouth Loophole: Exported Components of a Patented<br />

Product<br />

b. Expanding the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law by Closing<br />

the Deepsouth Loophole: Enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)<br />

2. TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF § 271(F) CASE LAW FROM DEEPSOUTH<br />

TO CARDIAC PACEMAKERS<br />

a. The Clear-Cut Cases: Patents for Machines with Mechanical Parts<br />

b. Where § 271(a) and § 271(f) Collide: Making Sense of the<br />

Blackberry Case<br />

c. The Supreme Court Weighs In<br />

A. The Conflict: Cases Involving ―Components‖ of Methods<br />

i. Union Carbide: Extension of § 271(f) to Methods<br />

ii. Cardiac Pacemakers: Reversing Union Carbide, Narrowing<br />

the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law, and Creating a<br />

New<br />

Loophole<br />

3. CLOSING THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS LOOPHOLE<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

B. Inadequacy of Domestic Solutions<br />

C. Proposed International Treaty Addressing Transnational Method<br />

Patents


142 Extraterritorial Technology in a Territorial Regime: Challenges after<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Appendix (i-iii)


Emily J. Zelenock 143<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

The territoriality of intellectual property rights (―IPRs‖) has long posed<br />

significant obstacles for IPR holders, but never more so than now. 1 The Internet<br />

has made the global dissemination of information instantaneous, digitization has<br />

made it possible to cheaply reproduce and distribute perfect copies of copyrighted<br />

and patented material, and many of the most cutting-edge innovations are practiced<br />

without regard to geographical borders. 2 The increasingly interdependent and<br />

―borderless‖ world is reflected not only by the nature of technology, but also by its<br />

ownership. Whereas the territorial system of IPR was predicated on a world where<br />

inventors sought IPR protection in their own country and then exploited their rights<br />

there, the demographics of technology ownership are far different today. Indeed,<br />

last year, a full 50% of U.S. patents granted were of foreign origin, as compared to<br />

18% in 1963 (when the United States Patent & Trademark Office began tracking<br />

the data). 3 It is no longer the case that one may presume that a ―U.S. patent‖ has<br />

U.S. ownership. Therefore, developments in U.S. law regarding the territoriality of<br />

IPR have international significance, impacting not only anyone who owns U.S.<br />

IPR, but also anyone who seeks to avoid infringement of such. 4 Similarly,<br />

developments in other countries with robust IP systems can have a far-reaching,<br />

transnational impact.<br />

In the patent context, the territoriality requirement generally means that a<br />

U.S. patent can only be infringed by conduct taking place ―within‖ the United<br />

States. 5 Thus, as a general rule, an infringing party can escape liability for<br />

1 While the territoriality of IPR is generally accepted and often cited principle, its basis in<br />

international law is not as easy to define. As Professors Cottier, Abbott and Gurry point out, the<br />

principle of independence embodied in the Paris and Berne Conventions appear to provide some<br />

basis, but yet territoriality is not discussed in either convention. Between those conventions and<br />

general jurisdictional principles that have evolved in the area of public international law, there<br />

remain ―a substantial number of questions regarding the territorial scope of intellectual property<br />

protection.‖ See F. ABBOTT, T. COTTIER AND F. GURRY, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY<br />

IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2007, at p. 75-76. See also M.<br />

LEMLEY ET AL., Divided Infringement Claims, in 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255-56 (2005).<br />

2 Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer<br />

Networks, in 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1993, p. 38-39. (―The dissolution of geographic, political, and<br />

temporal barriers made possible by global computer networks may pose a new challenge to the<br />

operation of U.S. patent law – a challenge not yet fully realized and likely impossible for the<br />

framers of the present patent code to anticipate, but a challenge whose parameters can already be<br />

seen.‖). See also T.R. HOLBROOK, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. AND MARY L.<br />

REV. 6 (2008).<br />

3 See United States Patent & Trademark Office Patent Statistics Report, available at:<br />

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#pat_trends.<br />

4 For an overview of the evolution of the territoriality principle in U.S. patent law, see C.A. NARD,<br />

THE LAW OF PATENTS, Wolters Kluwer, New York, 2008, at 538-71.<br />

5 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see, e.g., Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir.<br />

July 8, 2004) (―[T]he U.S. patent laws ‗do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits<br />

of the United States….‖) (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1857)); Rotec Indus., Inc. v.<br />

Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2000) (―extraterritorial activities are<br />

irrelevant to the case before us, because ‗the right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to


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infringement of a U.S. patent by shifting the infringing conduct outside of the<br />

United States. Yet every ―general rule‖ gives rise to exceptions, which are often<br />

more important than the rule in delineating the rights at issue. Carved out through<br />

statute and case law, the exceptions to the territoriality rule are far from clear and<br />

present particular difficulty for practitioners advising American and non-American<br />

owners of U.S. patents on the scope of their patent rights and accused infringers on<br />

the legality of their conduct. This article discusses recent developments in the law<br />

governing the territorial reach of U.S. patents and suggests that international<br />

collaboration may be necessary to achieve protection of inherently transnational<br />

technology.<br />

Part I of this article addresses direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a),<br />

the ―loophole‖ created by the U.S. Supreme Court‘s ruling in Deepsouth Packing<br />

Co. v. Laitram Corp. 6 , and closure of that loophole via Congressional enactment of<br />

35 U.S.C. § 271(f). Part II traces the evolution of case law interpreting § 271(f),<br />

including the Federal Circuit‘s 7 recent ruling in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St.<br />

Jude Medical Center, Inc. 8 , which held that § 271(f) does not apply to<br />

transnational method patents and thus created a new loophole in the law. Part III<br />

considers various domestic options for closing the Cardiac Pacemakers loophole,<br />

but ultimately concludes that an international approach will be the most effective<br />

long-term solution.<br />

1. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT UNDER 35 U.S.C.§ 271(A)<br />

The primary statutory provision addressing direct infringement of a U.S.<br />

patent is found in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which provides: ―whoever without authority<br />

makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States,<br />

or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the<br />

patent therefore, infringes the patent.‖ 9 While ―within the United States ―is on its<br />

face simple and clear language, the case law reveals that determining the metes and<br />

bounds of the territoriality requirement can be a very challenging task indeed.<br />

the United States and its territories….‖); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S.<br />

641, 650 (1915) (same).<br />

6 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (May 30, 1972).<br />

7 The Federal Circuit refers to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is the U.S.<br />

federal appellate court that handles all patent-related appeals from U.S. federal district courts.<br />

8 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2009).<br />

9 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (emphasis added).


Emily J. Zelenock 145<br />

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a. The Deepsouth Loophole: Exported Components of a Patented Product<br />

Section 271(a) hit the proverbial bump in the road in 1972, with the United<br />

States Supreme Court‘s landmark case Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.<br />

Laitram sued Deepsouth for infringing two patents directed to machines used to<br />

―devein‖ shrimp. Through extensive litigation, Laitram established that<br />

Deepsouth‘s shrimp deveining machines that were made, used and sold in the<br />

American market constituted infringement of Laitram‘s patents under § 271(a); the<br />

issue before the Supreme Court was whether Deepsouth could also be liable for<br />

direct infringement if it sold the disassembled components of the infringing<br />

machines and exported them to foreign countries, where they were then assembled<br />

and sold. The Court noted that Deepsouth was ―entirely straightforward‖ in<br />

admitting that it had devised this scheme for the express purpose of escaping<br />

liability under § 271(a). 10 Laitram argued that ―Deepsouth in all respects save final<br />

assembly ‗makes‘ the [patented] invention‖ within the meaning of § 271(a). 11<br />

However, the Court was persuaded by Deepsouth‘s argument that the express<br />

statutory language required that, to be liable for direct infringement, an infringer<br />

make, use or sell the ―patented invention‖ ―within the United States.‖ 12<br />

Accordingly, Deepsouth‘s sales and export of the disassembled components of the<br />

patented invention did not fall within the scope of § 271(a).<br />

b. Expanding the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law by Closing<br />

the Deepsouth Loophole: Enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)<br />

In reaching its decision in Deepsouth, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that<br />

―clear congressional indication of intent‖ would be required in order to extend the<br />

patent monopoly in the manner suggested by Laitram. 13 Clear indication of intent<br />

came -- albeit ten years later -- with 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which was enacted in<br />

direct response ―to the…decision in Deepsouth…concerning the need for a<br />

legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law.‖ 14<br />

Section 271(f)(1) provides:<br />

Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the<br />

United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented<br />

invention…in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such<br />

10 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523.<br />

11 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 525.<br />

12 The Court characterized the issue as follows: ―did Deepsouth ‗make‘ (and then sell) something<br />

cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it ‗make‘ (and then sell) something<br />

that fell short of infringement?‖ Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 527.<br />

13 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532.<br />

14 130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984); see also Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1360 (―In response to<br />

Deepsouth, Congress enacted Section 271(f).‖) (citing Patent Law Amendments of 1984, S. Rep.<br />

No. 98-663, pp. 2-3 (1984) (explaining that 271(f) was a response to Deepsouth) and Microsoft<br />

Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444 (Apr. 30, 2007) (―AT&T II‖)).


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components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the<br />

patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable<br />

as an infringer. 15<br />

2. TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF § 271(F) CASE LAW FROM DEEPSOUTH<br />

TO CARDIAC PACEMAKERS<br />

a. The Clear-Cut Cases: Patents for Machines with Mechanical Parts<br />

Not surprisingly, cases involving similar fact patterns to Deepsouth -- that is,<br />

patents for machines with mechanical components -- are the ―easy‖ cases involving<br />

a relatively cut-and-dried application of § 271(f). When the fact pattern of a case<br />

falls squarely within the Deepsouth loophole that § 271(f) was designed to close,<br />

the dispute is not whether § 271(f) applies 16 (it clearly does), but rather whether the<br />

accused infringer‘s disassembled component parts would infringe the patent if<br />

combination thereof took place within the United States. 17<br />

b. Where § 271(a) and § 271(f) Collide: Making Sense of the Blackberry<br />

Case<br />

In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. 18 (well-known as the ―Blackberry<br />

case‖), NTP alleged that Research in Motion‘s (―RIM‖) Blackberry devices (and<br />

systems and processes for using wireless e-mail via those devices) infringed its<br />

15 Section 271(f)(2) includes a similar, related provision: ―Whoever without authority supplies or<br />

causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is<br />

especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity<br />

of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in<br />

whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such<br />

component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent<br />

if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.‖ 35 U.S.C. §<br />

271(f)(2).<br />

16 Challenges regarding the scope of § 271(f) have arisen in cases involving product claims that are<br />

not directed to machines having mechanical parts - namely, claims directed to a chemical<br />

formulations in which the ―components‖ are individual chemical compounds and claims directed to<br />

software in which the ―components‖ are code. The chemical cases were resolved with relative ease<br />

by the Federal Circuit, however, and there is no longer any dispute that chemical compounds are<br />

―compounds‖ within the meaning of § 271(f). See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc.,<br />

60 F. Supp.2d 316 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 1999) (holding that that chemical compounds are ―components‖<br />

within the meaning of § 271(f)); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d<br />

1226 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 15, 2003) (same). The cases involving software are more complex and are<br />

discussed in Section II.C., infra.<br />

17 For examples of cases involving the application of 271(f) in scenarios directly analogous to<br />

Deepsouth, see, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F.Supp. 587, 590 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 21,<br />

1989); Windsurfing Int‟l v. Fred Ostermann, 668 F. Supp. 812, 813 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1987);<br />

Smith Int‟l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28247 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 12, 1986)<br />

(vacated for reasons unrelated to resolution of § 271(f) issue).<br />

18 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2, 2005), reh‟g denied, 2005<br />

U.S. App. LEXIS 23112 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2006).


Emily J. Zelenock 147<br />

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patents. One of the key bases upon which RIM argued that it did not infringe was<br />

that a component of its system/process (known as a ―relay station‖) was based in<br />

Canada and, as such, was not ―within the United States‖ as required by 35 U.S.C. §<br />

271(a). The Federal Circuit drew a distinction between NTP‘s patent claims that<br />

were directed to systems and processes, holding that the ―use‖ of a patented process<br />

(as proscribed by § 271(a) required completion of each and every process step<br />

within the United States. This compelled the Court‘s conclusion that RIM did not<br />

infringe NTP‘s process claims, as one step was performed in Canada. However, as<br />

to NTP‘s system claims, the Court stated that ―the ‗use‘ of the claimed system<br />

under § 271(a) is the place at which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e.<br />

the place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system<br />

obtained.‖ 19 Accordingly, RIM was liable under § 271(a) for infringing NTP‘s<br />

system claims, but not its process claims. 20<br />

NTP also argued that RIM infringed its method claims under § 271(f). RIM<br />

supplied Blackberry devices to its U.S. customers and those devices, concert with<br />

the Canadian relay station, employed NTP‘s patented method. In essence, NTP<br />

argued that each device was a ―component‖ of the patented method sufficient to<br />

trigger liability under § 271(f). The Court disagreed, noting that a component of a<br />

process claim is not a physical product, but rather a step of the process: ―By merely<br />

supplying products to its customers in the United States, RIM is not supplying or<br />

causing to be supplied in this country any steps of a patented process invention for<br />

combination outside the United States and cannot infringe NTP‘s asserted method<br />

claims under section 271(f) as a matter of law.‖ 21 The Court did not reach the<br />

question of whether § 271(f) could apply to process claims, but noted that ―it is<br />

difficult to conceive of how one might supply or cause to be supplied all or a<br />

substantial portion of a patented method in the sense contemplated by the phrase<br />

‗components of a patented invention‘ in section 271(f) 22 .<br />

19<br />

NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317 (citing Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. July 19,<br />

1976).<br />

20<br />

A similar approach has been taken in the United Kingdom. See Menashe Business Mercantile<br />

Ltd. & Anor v William Hill Organization Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 1702 (28 November 2002) (Court<br />

of Appeal decision); see also Menashe Business Mercantile Ltd. & Anor v William Hill<br />

Organization Ltd. [2002] EWHC 397 (Patents) (15 March, 2002) (Court of First Instance decision).<br />

In the Menashe case, the patent holder alleged that the defendant‘s operation of an online gaming<br />

system infringed the patent-at-issue. The defendant argued that there could be no infringement of<br />

the patented system because the server (which was an essential part of the system) was located<br />

outside of the U.K. Noting that to allow such a defense would undercut the spirit of the patent laws,<br />

the Court of First Instance found infringement. The Court of Appeal likewise found infringement,<br />

but did so based on a rationale similar to the NTP Court, i.e. that the ―use‖ of the invention was in<br />

the U.K., irrespective of where the server was located.<br />

21<br />

NTP, 418 F.3d at 1322-23.<br />

22 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1322.


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c. The Supreme Court Weighs In<br />

Software has presented particular challenges in the § 271(f) context. In Eolas<br />

Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 23 , Eolas Technologies, Inc. (―Eolas‖) sued<br />

Microsoft Corp. (―Microsoft‖) alleging, inter alia, that Microsoft‘s Internet<br />

Explorer infringed two of Eolas‘ patent claims for a web browser having an<br />

interactive environment. 24 At the trial stage, Microsoft was found to infringe and<br />

the district court ruled that Microsoft was liable for its domestic and foreign sales<br />

of Internet Explorer. 25 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, one of the key issues was<br />

whether Microsoft‘s software code on its exported ―golden master disks‖ 26 could<br />

be considered a ―component‖ within the meaning of § 271(f). 27 Microsoft argued<br />

that code was not a component and, therefore, should not be liable for infringement<br />

damages for its foreign sales. 28 The Federal Circuit ruled against Microsoft, noting<br />

§271(f)‘s use of the ―broad and inclusive term ‗patented invention‘…[which]<br />

includes ‗any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of<br />

matter‖ and further noting that ―[w]ithout question, software code alone qualifies as<br />

an invention eligible for patenting[.]‖ 29 The Court expressly rejected Microsoft‘s<br />

argument that ―component‖ should be limited to machines with physical<br />

components, explaining that this did not square with the plain language of § 271(f),<br />

in which ―every form of invention eligible for patenting falls within…§ 271(f).‖ 30<br />

Notably, the Court cited the TRIPS Agreement‘s non-discrimination provision for<br />

additional support of its view that ―all forms of invention‖ should be covered under<br />

§ 271(f), noting that ―this court cannot construct a principled reason for treating<br />

process inventions different than structural products.‖ 31<br />

23 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft, Inc., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005), reh‟g denied, 2005<br />

U.S. App. LEXIS 10067 (Fed. Cir. May 3, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005).<br />

24 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1328.<br />

25 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331.<br />

26 The golden master disks were either physical disks that were sent to foreign manufactus l yorers<br />

via conventional mailing methods or encrypted electronic versions that were transmitted to foreign<br />

manufacturers electronically.<br />

27 The golden master disks contained the ―software code for [Microsoft‘s] Windows operation<br />

system to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) abroad who use that disk to replicate the code<br />

onto computer hard drives for sale outside the United States. The golden master disk itself does not<br />

end up as a physical part of an infringing product.‖ Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331.<br />

28 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331.<br />

29 Cf. European Patent Convention, Article 52(2) (stating that ―programs for computers‖ are not<br />

patentable inventions).<br />

30 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339.<br />

31 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339. The non-discrimination provision of the TRIPS Agreement provides<br />

that ―Patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of<br />

invention [] [and] the field of technology[.]‖ See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of<br />

Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade<br />

Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197<br />

(1994) (hereinafter ―TRIPS Agreement‖).


Emily J. Zelenock 149<br />

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Shortly after the Eolas case, a similar case came before the Federal Circuit<br />

which involved Microsoft‘s exportation of ―golden master‖ disks containing<br />

Microsoft‘s Windows software (which was then copied and sold to customers<br />

abroad), though this time the patent holder was AT&T. 32 Relying on the reasoning<br />

in Eolas, the Court held that the software was a ―component‖ of a patented<br />

invention and, accordingly, Microsoft could not escape liability under § 271(f).<br />

However, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take this case on appeal and ultimately<br />

reversed the Federal Circuit, ruling in favor of Microsoft. 33 Critical to the Supreme<br />

Court‘s reasoning was the fact that the master disk itself was never installed on any<br />

foreign-made computers; rather, the software contained on the master disk was<br />

copied and those foreign-made copies were installed. Therefore, these<br />

―components‖ were not supplied from the United States, as required by § 271(f). 34<br />

Moreover, the Supreme Court was of the view that the software was not a<br />

―component‖ until it was expressed as computer-readable copy (which occurred<br />

when the foreign-made copies were generated). The Supreme Court expressly<br />

rejected the Federal Circuit‘s view that the software on the master disk was a<br />

―component‖ because copies could be readily and cheaply made from it: ―While<br />

copying software abroad is indeed easy and inexpensive….Section 271(f) contains<br />

no instruction to gauge when duplication is easy and cheap enough to deem a copy<br />

in fact made abroad nevertheless ‗supplie[d]…from the United States.‖ 35 Finally,<br />

the Supreme Court explained:<br />

The presumption [against extraterritoriality] tugs strongly against<br />

construing § 271(f) to encompass as a ‗component‘ not only a physical<br />

copy of software, but also software‘s intangible code, and to render<br />

‗supplie[d]…from the United States‖ not only exported copies of software,<br />

but also duplicates made abroad…. If AT&T desires to prevent copying<br />

abroad, its remedy lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign patents. 36<br />

32 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2005) (“AT&T I”).<br />

33 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2007) (“AT &T II”).<br />

34 As the Supreme Court pointed out, neither party ―argues that software can never rank as a<br />

‗component‘ under § 271(f).‖ Rather, the parties disagreed ―over the stage at which software<br />

becomes a component.‖ AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 447. AT&T maintained that ―software in the<br />

abstract, not simply a particular copy of the software, qualifies as a ‗component‘‖ and Microsoft<br />

argued (supported by an amicus brief of the United States) that only a copy of software in its usable<br />

form (i.e., functional object code rather than source code) and not software in the abstract, can be a<br />

component.‖ AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 447. Microsoft and the United States maintained that The<br />

Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Microsoft and the United States‘ position: ―Abstract software<br />

code is an idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does not match 271(f)‘s categorization:<br />

‗components‘ amenable to ‗combination.‘‖ AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 449.<br />

35 AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 440.<br />

36 AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 440. See also C.A. BRADLEY, Territorial Property Rights in an Age of<br />

Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT‘L L. 505, 513–16 (1997) (discussing five separate bases underlying the<br />

presumption against extraterritoriality).


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A. The Conflict: Cases Involving “Components” of Methods<br />

i. Union Carbide: Extension of § 271(f) to Methods<br />

In 2006, a Federal Circuit panel explicitly held that § 271(f) applies to<br />

patented methods. 37 In Union Carbide, Union Carbide had patent protection for a<br />

method of producing ethylene oxide and alleged that Shell‘s chemical catalyst,<br />

which was necessary for performing the patented method and was exported outside<br />

of the U.S. for the purpose of performing the method outside of the U.S., was a<br />

―component‖ within the meaning of § 271(f). The Court distinguished the facts<br />

from NTP on relatively shaky grounds: ―NTP is different from this case because<br />

Shell supplies catalysts from the United States directly to foreign customers[,]‖<br />

whereas in NTP, ―RIM itself did not supply any component to a foreign affiliate.‖ 38<br />

Rather than NTP, the Union Carbide Court relied upon the reasoning of Eolas,<br />

which is of course now the Supreme Court has reversed in pertinent part.<br />

ii. Cardiac Pacemakers: Reversing Union Carbide, Narrowing<br />

the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law, and Creating a<br />

New Loophole<br />

In August 2009, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled Union<br />

Carbide and held that § 271(f) does not apply to patented methods. 39 Cardiac<br />

Pacemakers alleged that St. Jude infringed its patented method of heart stimulation<br />

in which an implantable heart stimulator (known as an implantable cardioverter<br />

defibrillator or ―ICD‖) is used to determine an abnormal heart condition (e.g., an<br />

irregular heart rhythm known as an arrhythmia) and then selects and executes a<br />

single or multimode operation to treat that condition. 40 After a long and<br />

complicated procedural history, St. Jude‘s ICDs were found to infringe Cardiac‘s<br />

patented method -- at least insofar as the ICDs were used (and thus the method<br />

practiced) within the United States. 41 However, the parties vigorously disputed<br />

whether St. Jude should also have to pay royalties on those ICDs that were<br />

exported from the United States to other countries. Cardiac argued that § 271(f)<br />

applied, meaning that St. Jude should be liable for having supplied a ―component‖<br />

(the ICD) of the ―patented invention‖ (the method). St. Jude argued that § 271(f)<br />

does not apply to method claims, so it should be relieved from any duty to pay<br />

royalties when the ICDs had been exported and thus the patented method had been<br />

37<br />

Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed.<br />

Cir. Oct. 3, 2005).<br />

38<br />

Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1380.<br />

39<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.<br />

40<br />

U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 (―the ‗288 patent), claim 4 (claim 4 reproduced at Cardiac<br />

Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1352).<br />

41<br />

For a summary of the procedural history, see Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1352-55.


Emily J. Zelenock 151<br />

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practiced outside of the United States. The Federal Circuit agreed to resolve this<br />

issue en banc. 42<br />

The Court acknowledged that Cardiac was correct that the term ―patented<br />

invention‖ encompasses both product and method claims. 43 However, the Court<br />

noted that ―it is critical‖ to bear in mind that ―components‖ of patented methods are<br />

the ―intangible‖ steps of the method, thus flatly rejecting Cardiac‘s argument that a<br />

―component‖ of a method also includes ―the apparatus that performed the<br />

process.‖ 44 Based on this definition of ―component,‖ the Court then concluded that<br />

§ 271(f)‘s requirement that the components be ―‗supplied‘…eliminates method<br />

patents from Section 271(f)‘s reach.‖ 45 The Court reasoned that the word ―supply‖<br />

connotes ―the transfer of a physical object. Supplying an intangible step is a<br />

physical impossibility.‖ 46 The Court explained that its conclusion was ―fully<br />

consistent‖ with Congress‘ intent underlying its enactment of § 271(f), which was<br />

to close the Deepsouth loophole and nothing more. 47 Moreover, ―[a]ny ambiguity<br />

as to Congress‘s intent in enacting Section 271(f) is further resolved by the<br />

presumption against extraterritoriality.‖ 48 Therefore, St. Jude was not liable for its<br />

shipment overseas of ICDs capable of performing Cardiac‘s patented method. 49<br />

Judge Pauline Newman issued a strong dissent in response to the Court‘s<br />

interpretation of § 271(f). Judge Newman is particularly bothered that the Court‘s<br />

exclusion of methods from the scope of § 271(f) ―place[es] a different definition on<br />

‗patented invention‘ in § 271(f) than in any other provision of‖ the United States<br />

patent statute. 50 Moreover, she points out that the policy underlying the enactment<br />

of § 271(f) was to prevent purposeful ―evasion of United States patents,‖ and the<br />

42<br />

See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Center, Inc., 315 Fed. Appx. 273 (order<br />

granting rehearing en banc) (Fed. Cir. 2009).<br />

43<br />

Cardiac pointed to 35 U.S.C. 101, which broadly defines ―invention‖ as ―any new and useful<br />

process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.‖ The Court could not disagree that this<br />

definition ―is broad enough to include method patents.‖ Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362.<br />

44<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362-63.<br />

45<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364; see also James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives<br />

Under the Patent Laws: Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 88<br />

JPTOS 761, 771-72 (2006) ("The wording and legislative history of Section 271(f) discourage<br />

application of that provision to method claims").<br />

46<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364.<br />

47<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364.<br />

48<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365. The Federal Circuit was particularly swayed by the<br />

Supreme Court‘s reversal of its decision in AT&T I. In that case, the Supreme Court held that<br />

Microsoft‘s export of master disks (for overseas copying) did not constitute the ―supply‖ of<br />

combinable ―components.‖ AT&T II, 550 U.S. 437 (2007); see also Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d<br />

at 1362 (discussing AT&T II). From this case, the Federal Circuit received a ―clear message that the<br />

territorial limits of patents should not be lightly breached.‖ Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362<br />

(citing AT&T II, 550 U.S. 454-56).<br />

49<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365-66.<br />

50<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 et<br />

seq.


152 Extraterritorial Technology in a Territorial Regime: Challenges after<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Court‘s ruling creates yet another loophole for infringers. 51 While she ―share[s]…<br />

[the] concern about legislatively impinging upon sovereign foreign rights[,]‖ she<br />

rejects the notion that allowing methods to fall underneath the umbrella of § 271(f)<br />

would constitute an overreaching of U.S. patent laws:<br />

[T]he statutory purpose is to reach the evasion of United States rights by<br />

actions that are taken within the United States by entities subject to United<br />

States law. The practice in foreign countries of United States-origin<br />

technology without any contribution of components from the United States<br />

is untouched by § 271(f), whether of process or product. Liability under §<br />

271(f) is based on domestic conduct and intent. 52<br />

In addition, Judge Newman dismissed the idea that foreign patents could<br />

adequately protect inventors, noting that this alternative is not only expensive, but<br />

not always available. 53 Judge Newman cautioned:<br />

When a patented process is practiced so that some steps are performed in<br />

the United States and other steps are performed offshore, the purloiner of<br />

the patented process may escape liability everywhere, for United States<br />

infringement is avoided if all of the patented process steps are not practiced<br />

in the United States, and infringement of foreign patents is avoided for the<br />

same reason. 54<br />

Judge Newman concluded that Congress could not have intended to ―enable<br />

avoidance of process patents by this ploy, while correcting it for machine patents‖<br />

and, thus, the en banc‘s interpretation of § 271(f) to exclude method patents leads<br />

to an ―absurd result,‖ as it ―seriously devalue[s]‖ all method patents. 55<br />

3. CLOSING THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS LOOPHOLE<br />

There can be no doubt, as Professor Holbrook has pointed out, that the word<br />

―loophole‖ itself suggests a ―normative bias‖ against the strict application of the<br />

territoriality principle. 56 Indeed, it is entirely possible that one ―could view these<br />

‗loopholes‘ as the proper functioning of a territorially based patent system.‖ 57<br />

However, it is clear that the preference for a strictly territorial regime is slowly but<br />

51<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1366-71 (Newman, J., dissenting) (finding puzzling the<br />

Court‘s ruling that ―the legislators intended to preserve a large loophole for patented processes, and<br />

never intended to cover more than the narrow Deepsouth loophole for machinery.‖).<br />

52<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).<br />

53<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting).<br />

54<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting).<br />

55<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502<br />

U.S. 410, 427 (1992) (the interpretation of a statute should ―avoid absurd results‖).<br />

56<br />

T.R. HOLBROOK, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 2119, 2127<br />

(2008).<br />

57<br />

HOLBROOK, 49 WM. AND MARY L. REV. at 2127.


Emily J. Zelenock 153<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

steadily eroding, even in countries that have long favored such an approach. 58<br />

What is far from clear, however, is where --- and how -- to draw the line. 59<br />

B. Inadequacy of Domestic Solutions<br />

On January 10, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Cardiac‘s petition for<br />

writ of certiorari, meaning that the Federal Circuit‘s holding in Cardiac<br />

Pacemakers will have a significant impact on U.S. patent law. 60 For patent<br />

attorneys advising U.S. and non-U.S. clients who own U.S. patents or patent<br />

applications, the challenge is how to secure the best protection for innovative<br />

processes in light of this decision.<br />

First, to the extent possible, patent attorneys should be sure to always include<br />

claims directed to the products as well as the methods. 61 This was in fact the case<br />

in Cardiac Pacemakers, as there were product claims directed to the ICDs as well<br />

as claims directed to the method of using the ICDs (but only a method claim was at<br />

issue on appeal). If a product claim had been at issue in Cardiac Pacemakers, St.<br />

Jude‘s would have been liable for infringement under § 271(f) if it had exported<br />

―all or a substantial portion‖ of the disassembled components of the ICD ―in such a<br />

manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the<br />

United States.‖ 62 Moreover, patent applicants should strategically target markets in<br />

which their invention is likely to be made, used or sold and apply for foreign<br />

58<br />

G.A. BENDER, Clash of the Titans: The Territorality of Patent Law vs. The European Union, 40<br />

IDEA 49 (2000)<br />

(noting several signs that ―the territorial limit of patents in European countries is rapidly<br />

dissolving.‖).<br />

59<br />

Academics and practitioners have advanced various possible theories and solutions. See, e.g.,<br />

T.R. HOLBROOK, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 2119, 2122<br />

(2008); D. DEFRANCO & A. SMITH, Technology and the Global Economy: Progress Challenges the<br />

Federal Circuit To Define the Extraterritorial Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 373<br />

(2006); JAMES R. FARRAND, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws: Overreaching<br />

Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 88 JPTOS 761 (2006); J. OSBORNE, A Rational<br />

Analytical Boundary for Determination of Infringement by Extraterritorially-Distributed<br />

Systems, 46 IDEA 587 (2006); Y. CHAIKOVSKY & A. PERCER, Globalization, Technology Without<br />

Boundaries & the Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 9 U.S.F. INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95 (2005); R.<br />

DREYFUSS, The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why Invite<br />

Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819 (2005); C.A. BRADLEY, Territorial Property Rights in an Age<br />

of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT‘L L. 505, 513–16 (1997); D. CHISUM, Normative and Empirical<br />

Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603 (1997); J.R.<br />

THOMAS, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational<br />

Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 277 (1996)<br />

60<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Center, Inc., 78 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Jan. 11,<br />

2010).<br />

61<br />

Professor Lemley is among the prominent academics who advocates for careful claim drafting to<br />

reduce (though admittedly not eliminate) the ―divided infringement‖ problem, i.e., the problem of<br />

an otherwise infringing act becoming non-infringing by virtue of the infringing steps taking place in<br />

different countries. See M. LEMLEY ET AL., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 256<br />

(2005).<br />

62<br />

35 U.S.C. § 271(f).


154 Extraterritorial Technology in a Territorial Regime: Challenges after<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

patents in those countries. This was a point made by both the Supreme Court in<br />

AT&T II and the Federal Circuit in Cardiac Pacemakers.<br />

While it is best practice to have a diversity of claims directed to both<br />

products and processes, not all method claims can be rewritten as product claims.<br />

Indeed, while technology like Cardiac‘s is a physical device (ICD) used in a<br />

process, often it is the process itself that is the heart of the innovation. In such<br />

cases, the process is only infringed if each and every step takes place ―within the<br />

United States‖ under § 271(a); after Cardiac Pacemakers, there can be no doubt<br />

that § 271(f) is not an option for direct infringement of a method claim. For<br />

industries where transnational processes are inherent (such as telecommunications,<br />

distributed computer systems and Internet-based services), this can be seen as a<br />

blessing or a curse -- depending to some extent on whether the party is a patent<br />

holder or an accused infringer.<br />

Likewise, while it is best practice to obtain patents from multiple countries,<br />

doing so will not necessarily provide protection, as Judge Newman pointed out in<br />

dissent. Indeed, in a scenario involving an innovative process that can be practiced<br />

so that some steps are performed in the U.S. and another step (or steps) can be<br />

performed outside of the U.S., infringers ―may escape liability everywhere, for<br />

United States infringement is avoided if all of the patented process steps are not<br />

practiced in the United States, and infringement of foreign patents is avoided for<br />

the same reason.‖ 63<br />

To the extent that this loophole is sought to be closed, it is unlikely that it can<br />

be done so through a purely domestic solution. The Supreme Court made it crystal<br />

clear in AT&T II that any further ―reaching‖ of the U.S. patent laws beyond the<br />

strict territorial boundaries of the U.S. will need to be determined by Congress, not<br />

the courts. However, it took Congress over ten years to close the Deepsouth<br />

loophole with § 271(f) and that involved a far less controversial measure. Indeed,<br />

the U.S. software industry and the Solicitor General of the United States (in an<br />

amicus brief) supported Microsoft‘s position in AT&T II; with such powerful<br />

lobbying, it is difficult to imagine that Congress could or would even want to<br />

respond to this loophole, much less in a timely manner.<br />

C. Proposed International Treaty Addressing Transnational<br />

Method Patents<br />

Any proposed international solution dealing with transnational method<br />

patents should be narrowly tailored to specifically resolve the problem identified in<br />

Judge Newman‘s dissent in Cardiac Pacemakers -- i.e., to respond to the situation<br />

where someone has a U.S. patent for a patented method and foreign equivalent(s)<br />

but nevertheless is deprived of enforcing any of those patents because potential<br />

63 Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting).


Emily J. Zelenock 155<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

infringers could simply avoid liability by strategically placing the method steps in<br />

different countries. The international community should give serious consideration<br />

to this scenario, realizing of course that without international collaboration on this<br />

point, the effective result is to eliminate transnational methods from the scope of<br />

patent coverage.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

A survey of the recent U.S. case law regarding the territoriality principle in<br />

the patent area calls to mind the old adage: the only thing that is certain is that<br />

nothing is certain. This uncertainty is compounded when we consider that every<br />

country will ultimately devise its own solution for dealing with these issues. Still,<br />

perhaps now we have one more point to hold onto as practitioners: U.S. patent<br />

claims directed to transnational methods are in peril after the holding in Cardiac<br />

Pacemakers, allowing potential infringers to escape liability for patent<br />

infringement by strategically placing in different countries the different steps of a<br />

protected method. Whether this is a loophole that should be closed is one that<br />

requires careful examination by - and potentially collaboration with - the<br />

international community.


156 Extraterritorial Technology in a Territorial Regime: Challenges after<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Cases<br />

AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2005)<br />

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed.<br />

Cir. Apr. 15, 2003)<br />

Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (U.S. 1857)<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Center, Inc., 315 Fed. Appx.<br />

273 (Fed. Cir. 2009)<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Center, Inc., 576 F.3d 1348<br />

(Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2009)<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Center, Inc., 78 U.S.L.W. 3392<br />

(U.S. Jan. 11, 2010)<br />

Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. July 19, 1976)<br />

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (May 30, 1972)<br />

Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (U.S. Jan. 11,<br />

1915)<br />

Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft, Inc., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005),<br />

reh‟g denied, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10067 (Fed. Cir. May 3, 2005), cert. denied,<br />

126 S. Ct. 568 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005).<br />

Menashe Business Mercantile Ltd. & Anor v William Hill Organization<br />

Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 1702 (28 November 2002)<br />

Menashe Business Mercantile Ltd. & Anor v William Hill Organization<br />

Ltd. [2002] EWHC 397 (Patents) (15 March, 2002)<br />

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (Apr. 30, 2007)<br />

NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2,<br />

2005)<br />

NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23112 (Fed.<br />

Cir. Oct. 7, 2005)<br />

NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 546 U.S. 1157 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2006).


Emily J. Zelenock 157<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2004)<br />

Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. June<br />

13, 2000)<br />

Smith Int‟l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28247 (C.D.Cal.<br />

Mar. 12, 1986)<br />

T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F.Supp. 587 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 21,<br />

1989)<br />

Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425<br />

F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2005)<br />

W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp.2d 316 (D. Del. Aug. 9,<br />

1999)<br />

Windsurfing Int‟l v. Fred Ostermann, 668 F.Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,<br />

1987)<br />

Statutes and Legislative History<br />

35 U.S.C. § 101<br />

35 U.S.C. § 271(a)<br />

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)<br />

130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)<br />

European Patent Convention, Article 52(2)<br />

Patent Law Amendments of 1984, S. Rep. No. 98-663 (1984)<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.<br />

15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,<br />

Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125,<br />

1197 (1994)<br />

Other Sources<br />

F. ABBOTT, T. COTTIER AND F. GURRY, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL<br />

PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY, Aspen Publishers, New York<br />

(2007)<br />

G.A. BENDER, Clash of the Titans: The Territorality of Patent Law vs. The<br />

European Union, 40 IDEA 49 (2000)


158 Extraterritorial Technology in a Territorial Regime: Challenges after<br />

Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

DAN L. BURK, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on<br />

Global Computer Networks, in 68 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1993)<br />

C.A. BRADLEY, Territorial Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA.<br />

J. INT‘L L. 505, 513–16 (1997)<br />

Y. CHAIKOVSKY & A. PERCER, Globalization, Technology Without<br />

Boundaries & the Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 9 U.S.F. INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95<br />

(2005)<br />

D. CHISUM, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:<br />

Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603 (1997)<br />

D. DEFRANCO & A. SMITH, Technology and the Global Economy: Progress<br />

Challenges the Federal Circuit To Define the Extraterritorial Scope of U.S. Patent<br />

Law, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 373 (2006)<br />

R. DREYFUSS, The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property<br />

Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819 (2005)<br />

JAMES R. FARRAND, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws:<br />

Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 88 JPTOS 761<br />

(2006)<br />

T.R. HOLBROOK, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. AND MARY<br />

L. REV. 2119 (2008).<br />

M. LEMLEY ET AL., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005)<br />

C.A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS, Wolters Kluwer, New York (2008)<br />

J. OSBORNE, A Rational Analytical Boundary for Determination<br />

ofInfringement by Extraterritorially-Distributed Systems, 46 IDEA 587 (2006)<br />

J.R. THOMAS, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative<br />

Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 277<br />

(1996)<br />

United States Patent & Trademark Office Patent Statistics Report, available<br />

at: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#pat_trends.


THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF<br />

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES IN ARAB PUBLIC-FUNDED<br />

UNIVERSITIES<br />

Cairo University (Egypt) and Sultan Qaboos University (Oman)<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

2. LITERATURE REVIEW<br />

by:<br />

Ahmed Elsisi and Sheikha Al-Akhzami<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

3. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TTOS IN UNIVERSITIES<br />

4. SOCIAL & ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TTOS IN THE COMMUNITY<br />

5. ESTABLISHED IP POLICIES<br />

5.1. Stanford University IP Policy, Usa<br />

5.2. Glasgow University IP & Commercialization Policy, Uk<br />

5.3. Osaka University IP Policy, Japan<br />

6. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ARAB UNIVERSITIES<br />

6.1. Sultan Qaboos University IP Policy, Oman<br />

6.2. Cairo University, Egypt<br />

7. RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

8. CONCLUSION<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY


160 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

As from the eleventh century and during the Islamic Renaissance, the Arab<br />

world was the unrivaled intellectual centre for science, philosophy, medicine and<br />

art. Scholars were attracted from all over the world to cities like Cairo, Damascus<br />

and Baghdad, acquiring the knowledge and innovation.<br />

Nowadays, Arab countries‘ contribution to science and art is far beyond the<br />

contribution of developed countries. This situation is in part due to the brain drain<br />

problem and the inadequate implementation of rules, that makes their universities<br />

miss essential tools in research and education which are commonly used by their<br />

counterparts in the developed countries; and one of these tools is the necessary<br />

interaction between the university-industry-government (triple helix model) as a<br />

key for innovation through developing technology transfer offices.<br />

The two selected Arab universities are examples from the two categories of<br />

the Arab countries. While Egypt is representing the countries with historical<br />

universities and a strong industry, Oman represents the Arabian Gulf countries with<br />

young universities and a growing economy due to the oil evolution in the 1970s.<br />

Our research will excavate different intellectual property (IP) policies in the<br />

developed countries, giving examples of three universities representing three<br />

different continents (Stanford University in the US as private university, Glasgow<br />

University in the UK and Osaka University in Japan as public funded universities).<br />

Then, it will analyze the current situation in the two selected Arab public funded<br />

universities (Cairo University in Egypt and Sultan Qaboos University in Oman)<br />

highlighting the IP systems in both universities. Based on that, the research will<br />

recommend the improvements in the IP system for the Arab universities.<br />

2. LITERATURE REVIEW<br />

Technology Transfer Office (TTO) is a new organizational entity has<br />

emerged in the administrative structure of universities. Its main function is to<br />

facilitate commercial knowledge transfers from universities to practitioners in the<br />

industry. 1<br />

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)<br />

report on patenting and licensing at public research organizations shows that many<br />

of the TTOs are in their infancy. Most TTOs are less than 10 years old and have<br />

1 D. Siegel, D. Waldman, L. Atwater, A. Link, Toward a model of the effective transfer of scientific<br />

knowledge from academicians topractitioners: qualitative evidence from the commercialization of<br />

university technologies, Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, Volume 21, Issues 1-<br />

2, 2004, p. 115-142.


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 161<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

less than five full-time staff. However, the number of new TTOs is growing, to the<br />

order of 1 per year per institution. 2<br />

A common problem identified in the literature is the difficulty these<br />

universities face in getting the researchers to first disclose their inventions to the<br />

TTO and second to cooperate with the university in further development of their<br />

patent after licensing 3 . Some studies support the importance of encouraging<br />

inventors to disclose, protect and exploit their inventions through the incentives<br />

which can be legal or administrative. Royalty sharing agreements or equity<br />

participation in academic start-ups could be key factor to encourage researchers to<br />

evaluate and patent their inventions and eventually will increase the university<br />

number of patents and revenue obtained from licensing. Therefore, incentive<br />

element in the license seems to encourage higher levels of research effort and<br />

attract more productive researchers. 4<br />

According to Nelson 5 , The sharp increase in university patenting and<br />

licensing are clearly associated with the development and maturation of certain<br />

new fields of university research, in particular the rise of biotechnology, where<br />

research results seem to promise significant commercial value of great interest to<br />

the industry 6 .<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> publication shows that technology transfer in universities calls for a<br />

high level of different expertise, a firm knowledge of technology and the way<br />

universities function, and familiarity with the legal aspects of IPRs. One problem<br />

researcher face is their lack of expertise in filing patent application and negotiating<br />

agreement with the industry. This raises a fundamental issue for universities to<br />

have strong and effective TTO staffed with legal and technical experts. 7<br />

The literature lacks published work regarding technology transfer in the Arab<br />

universities, and no studies were found on IP policies in the Arab world.<br />

According to Zahlan 8 , what‘s needed for the Arab development is to combine<br />

2<br />

M. Cervantes, Academic Patenting: How universities and public research organizations are using<br />

their intellectual property to boost research and spur innovative start-ups,<strong>WIPO</strong> website:http://<br />

www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/academic_patenting.htm<br />

3<br />

I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo, R.Veugelers, Licensing of university inventions: The role of a<br />

technology transfer office, International Journal of Industrial Organization., 2007, p. 483-510<br />

4<br />

Supra note 2 M. Cervantes, Academic Patenting…<br />

5<br />

R. Nelson, Observations on the post-bayh-dole rise of patenting at American universities, Journal<br />

of technology transfer, 26, 2001, pp13-19<br />

6<br />

D. Mowery, R. Nelson, B. Sampat, A. Ziedonis, The growth of patenting and licensing by U.S.<br />

universities: an assessment of the effects of the Bayh–Dole act of 1980, Research Policy,Volume 30,<br />

Issue 1, January 2001, Pages 99-119<br />

7<br />

Technology transfer, intellectual property and effective university-industry partnerships: the<br />

experience of China, India, Japan, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand,<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> website: http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/928/wipo_pub_928.pdf<br />

8<br />

A. B. Zahlan is an independent science policy consultant. Formerly a professor of physics at the<br />

American University of Beirut, he has published extensively in the fields of chemical physics,<br />

science and technology policy, and the history of technology in the Arab World.


162 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

human resources and support services with effective government policies. But he<br />

shows a negative view when he mention the immigration of professionals including<br />

scientists and engineers and the massive brain drain. 9 Also Saleh 10 emphasize that<br />

many universities in the Arab countries ought to change from being classical<br />

establishments to become more pro-active in their research management.<br />

3. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TTOS IN UNIVERSITIES<br />

The concept of technology transfer found its way through the American<br />

industrial environment and education system in the last century. Before 1940, a<br />

little thought was given to the importance of technology, but during World War II,<br />

the value of technological advances to a strong military defense was recognized.<br />

The emerging needs of the U.S. military resulted in a large increase in governmentsponsored<br />

research. The government began contracting with qualified companies,<br />

universities, but with no overall plan for handling the intellectual property that<br />

would be developed.<br />

In 1945, US president Franklin D. Roosevelt's Science Advisor, Vannevar<br />

Bush, drafted a report (published on Science: ―The Endless Frontier‖ magazine)<br />

emphasizing the importance of basic research to a strong economy. At that time,<br />

each funding agency developed its own intellectual property policies. There were<br />

more than 25 different policies for dealing with intellectual property. In general,<br />

research institutions were unable to obtain title to their inventions developed under<br />

federal funding and were unable to license their own technologies, because at that<br />

time the government had the right to own the outcome of federal funding. In<br />

addition, the government adopted a non exclusive licensing policy. The result was<br />

that few inventions were licensed and even fewer were commercialized.<br />

In 1960‘s, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and then the<br />

National Science Foundation entered into inter-institutional patent agreements with<br />

a few universities. These agreements were the foundation for modern technology<br />

transfer. For the first time, universities were permitted to own the inventions they<br />

made under government-funded research. The terms and provisions of these<br />

agreements led to the passage of two very important statutes concerning technology<br />

transfer in the United States.<br />

As Lee mentioned in his book (Technology transfer and public policy) 11 , the<br />

first statute is the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act in 1980 (Public<br />

Law 96-480). This Act established the foundation for technology transfer at the<br />

national laboratories. It made technology transfer an integral part of the research<br />

9 A.Zahlan, Arab societies as knowledge societies, Minerva, 2006, 44:103-112<br />

10 N. Saleh, Research management issues in the Arab countries, Higher Education Policy, Volume<br />

15, Issue 3, September 2002, Pages 225-247<br />

11 Y. Lee, Technology Transfer and Public Policy, Quorum Books, 1997, p. 28


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 163<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

and development responsibilities of federal laboratories and their employees. A<br />

main target was to disseminate the information from the Federal government to<br />

private industry, and to establish an Office of Research and Technology<br />

Application (i.e., technology transfer office).<br />

After only two months of Stevenson-Wydler Act, US Congress passed the<br />

Bayh-Dole Act, the key piece of legislation enabling technology transfer in the<br />

whole nation. In this law, Congress determined that private (not government)<br />

ownership of inventions, motivated by the prospect of financial gain, would lead to<br />

commercialization of federally funded inventions. Consequently, small businesses<br />

and nonprofit organizations were given a statutory right to choose to retain title to<br />

inventions made during federally-assisted research and development (R&D), as<br />

long as they were interested in patenting and attempting to commercialize those<br />

inventions.<br />

After the Bayh-Dole Act, some minor laws were also issued serving the same<br />

purpose. One of them was the Federal Technology Transfer Act, which was issued<br />

in 1986 empowering government-owned government-operated labs (GOGOs)<br />

directly to enter into cooperative R&D agreements (CRADA) with firms and<br />

established the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) for Technology Transfer.<br />

The great success of these former laws has strengthened the U.S. economy<br />

and helped make the United States a world technology leader. 12 According to<br />

Nelson 13 , the number of universities with technology transfer offices increased in<br />

the US from 25 in 1980, to 200 in 1990.<br />

4. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TTOS IN THE COMMUNITY<br />

Over the last twenty years or so, the contribution of university research<br />

output of technological advance in industry has become even more important than<br />

it used to be. In particular, industries employing biotechnology draw greatly on<br />

university research. The contribution of university research to industrial<br />

development has been strong in several areas of electronics, and in certain kinds of<br />

software developments. 14<br />

Having a successful TTO in a university as a central body to handle all issues<br />

relating to the transfer of technology makes possible to professionalize technology<br />

transfer activities and enhance the bargaining power of the universities. 15 Also, it<br />

generates high social returns to the society at large by both creating new products<br />

or enhancing product quality/variety and boosting new industries.<br />

12<br />

Technology transfer: The history, Industrial partnership office, 2005,<br />

website: https://ipo.llnl.gov/data/assets/docs/TechTransfer.pdf<br />

13<br />

Supra note 5, R. Nelson, Observations on the post-bayh-dole…<br />

14<br />

ibid<br />

15<br />

Supra note 7, Technology transfer, intellectual property…


164 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

As widely known, innovation is very much dependent on R&D which had to<br />

be accompanied by the acquisition of knowledge 16 especially through basic<br />

sciences research which is done mostly at public funded universities. Moreover,<br />

quantitative studies tend to show that patenting has effect on the direction of<br />

research which led universities to conduct more applied research. This means that<br />

IP and technology transfer activities is making university research more responsive<br />

to the economy, leading to a danger impact on basic research. 17 In a free market<br />

economy, firms are not willing to invest in basic science research due to a high<br />

degree of technical and commercial uncertainty associated with it. Therefore,<br />

government direct financial support to public funded universities prevents underinvestment<br />

in basic science research and eventually will prevent market failure. 18<br />

In general, public funded universities have obligations toward promoting<br />

local and regional development through IP spillovers. This leads to a preference<br />

for local licensing agreements in favor of smaller firms with a consequent income<br />

loss. 19<br />

The technology transfer policy in a university gives firms incentives to<br />

develop commercial products resulted from university patents and on the other<br />

hand it gives incentives for researchers to cooperate in the commercial exploitation<br />

of their inventions by allowing them to own patents and to share<br />

profits. 20 Therefore, in order for universities to balance the benefits, there are three<br />

types of licenses between the university and industry: exclusive, non-exclusive and<br />

sole licenses.<br />

5. ESTABLISHED IP POLICIES<br />

In this section we will go through examples of developed systems in<br />

technology transfer in three universities from different developed countries (USA,<br />

UK and Japan). We will discuss the provisions of ownership, income sharing,<br />

confidentiality and clauses in case the university is unable to commercialize the<br />

patent. In the following IP policies.<br />

5.1. Stanford University IP Policy, United States<br />

16 D. Siegel, M. Weight, IP: the assessment, Oxford review of economic policy, v.23 no4, 2007,<br />

pp.529-540.<br />

17 Supra note 2 M. Cervantes, Academic Patenting…..<br />

18 Report of the multi-year expert meeting on enterprise development policies and capacity-building<br />

in science, technology and innovation (STI) on its first session, United Nations conference on trade<br />

and development, 2009, p.12, website: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ciimem1d4_en.pdf<br />

19 Supra note 16, D. Siegel, M. Weight, IP: the assessment…<br />

20 R. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and TT in governmentsponsored<br />

research, Virginia law review, v.82, 1996, p.1709


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 165<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

For nearly three decades, Stanford University has been a leader in technology<br />

transfer, fostering the growth of northern California's Silicon Valley and the<br />

biotechnology industry and providing a model for other research and educational<br />

institutions across the United States and the world.<br />

Stanford Office of Technology Licensing (OTL) is the first office to be set up<br />

for university technology transfer in the US. It was established in 1970 by its first<br />

director Mr. Niels Reimers who left Stanford in 1991 to consult to other<br />

universities.<br />

According to statistics, patent licenses income in Stanford from 1954 to 1967<br />

(before the Bayh-Dole Act) was roughly $45,000. Now, Stanford‘s start-ups in one<br />

year are more than what were raised by University of Cambridge -the leading<br />

university in the UK- in the whole period of the Nineteenth. A huge success that<br />

led universities like; Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to<br />

model their own technology transfer programs on Stanford's practices. 21<br />

5.1.1. Ownership of IPRs:<br />

Regardless of the source of funding, all potentially patentable inventions<br />

conceived or first reduced to practice in whole or in part by university employees<br />

and students in the course of their university responsibilities or with more than<br />

incidental use of the university resources shall be assigned to the university.<br />

Waivers of the provisions of this policy may be granted only by the president<br />

or the president's designate on a case-by-case basis, giving consideration among<br />

other things to university obligations to sponsors, whether the waiver would be in<br />

the best interest of the university and whether the waiver would result in a conflict<br />

of interest.<br />

5.1.2. Income Sharing from IP:<br />

Before distributing the revenues, a deduction of 15% to cover the<br />

administrative overhead of OTL is taken from gross royalty income, followed by a<br />

deduction for any directly assignable expenses, typically patent filing fees. After<br />

deductions, royalty income is divided one third to the inventor, one third to the<br />

inventor's department, and one third to the inventor's school. In the case of<br />

Independent Laboratories and Independent Research Centers or Institutes, which<br />

report directly to the vice provost and dean of research, the inventor may assign to<br />

his/her independent laboratory, center or institute the department's third of the<br />

royalty income or a part thereof, based on support of the work. In these cases, the<br />

school's portion goes to the dean of research. Similarly, when more than one<br />

department is involved, the inventor shall designate the distribution of the<br />

department and school thirds based on support of the work.<br />

21 L. Fisher, The Innovation Incubator, Strategy+Business Magazine, Issue13, 1998.


166 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

5.1.3. Confidentiality Clauses:<br />

Inventors in Stanford must prepare and submit on a timely basis an invention<br />

disclosure to the TLO for each potentially patentable invention conceived or first<br />

actually reduced to practice in whole or in part in the course of their university<br />

responsibilities or with more than incidental use of university resources.<br />

5.1.4. Where the University is unable to commercialize the IP<br />

If the University cannot, or decides not to, proceed in a timely manner to<br />

patent and/or license an invention, it may reassign ownership to the inventors upon<br />

request to the extent possible under the terms of any agreements that supported or<br />

related to the work.<br />

5.2. Glasgow University IP & Commercialization Policy, United Kingdom:<br />

In the UK during the period 1997-2000, an average of 95 spin-offs per year<br />

were created from universities. As a result of changes in government policy, 2006<br />

witnessed an increase in spin-offs having the potential to create new markets. 22<br />

The Glasgow university IP issues are managed through the Research and<br />

Enterprise Department which deals with the ownership, protection and<br />

commercialization of IP and know-how created by employees of the university.<br />

The policy aims to encourage and reward inventors and protects the university<br />

against any unnecessary risks as will be seen from the different clauses below.<br />

5.2.1. Ownership of IPRs:<br />

It indicates that all rights in IP devised or created by a University employee<br />

including students employed by the university in the course of his or her normal<br />

duties of employment will generally belong automatically to the university. But in<br />

the case of a sponsored research or other type of agreement with an external body,<br />

the IP will initially belong to the university and then ownership will be determined<br />

according to the terms of such agreement.<br />

In the case of any IP created by a university employee, the ownership belong<br />

to the university if the employee‘s normal duties are such that it would be<br />

reasonable to expect the creation of IP and if the employee of the university creates<br />

IP outside the course of his/her employment or normal duties with more than<br />

incidental use of university resources.<br />

22 Supra note 16, Siegel, M. Weight, IP: the assessment…


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 167<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

In the case of university employees working at other institutions, any IP<br />

created during that appointment should lie with the employer who pays the salary.<br />

On the other hand, in the case of academic or researchers who have an honorary<br />

association with the university but are not employed by the university, they are<br />

generally required to transfer any IP they create in the course of their honorary<br />

activities to the university. This includes visiting academics and individuals with<br />

honorary appointment in the university.<br />

Students who are not employed by the university own any IP they create and<br />

shall be given the option to assign any IP to the university; then they will be<br />

granted the same rights as any employee inventor.<br />

5.2.2. Income Sharing from IP:<br />

The policy stated that all license income from new technologies is distributed<br />

net of any legal, patent or other costs. The distribution is according to the income<br />

generated as following:<br />

- Up to £50,000 income: 50% inventor, 50% faculty.<br />

- Over £50,000 income: 33% inventor, 67% faculty.<br />

For equity sharing from spin-out development the distribution is as<br />

following: founding scientist 50%, faculty 25%, and university 25%. But if there is<br />

a partnership from an IP Group 23 , the following equity sharing applies: Founding<br />

scientist 50%, faculty 19%, university 19% and IP Group 12%. In general, the<br />

share distributed for the inventor remains the same (50% of the net income) in<br />

different scenarios.<br />

5.2.3. Confidentiality Clauses:<br />

The policy indicated that all university information must be treated<br />

sensitively and each employee (or student) of the university must ensure that any<br />

valuable or potentially valuable information is protected by a suitable agreement<br />

before disclosure to others who are not university employees or students. While the<br />

policy emphasizes strictly the importance of non disclosure clauses of information<br />

covered under any agreement/understanding with external body. But the<br />

disclosures may be permitted to other employees of the university.<br />

5.2.4. Where the University is unable to commercialize the IP<br />

After the decision by the faculty to commercialize the IP, the university<br />

agrees to a commercialization plan with the individual within 3 months of the<br />

decision by the faculty. Appropriate steps will be taken to protect the IP generated<br />

23 University support individuals in the creation of spin-out ventures via its partnership with the IP<br />

Group (www.ip2ipo.co.uk), IP and commercialization policy, Glasgow University, P. 8


168 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

by employees and students generally at the university‘s expense and within the<br />

timetable of the commercialization plan.<br />

If the university is unable to commercialize the IP then, upon the request<br />

from the individual, the university will assign all its rights, titles and interest of<br />

such IP to the individual in return for a perpetual non-exclusive royalty-free license<br />

with the right to sub-license.<br />

Where the individual successfully commercialize any IP created by them,<br />

following an assignment of such IP to them, then the individual will reimburse any<br />

expenses previously incurred by the university in connection with the protection of<br />

such IP, including patent agents‘ and other legal costs, out of any income generated<br />

by or on behalf of the individual from the commercialization of such IP.<br />

5.3. Osaka University IP Policy, Japan<br />

The <strong>WIPO</strong> report in the Japan experience mention that during 1977, it was<br />

agreed to transfer the IPRs resulted from national universities research to the<br />

individual researchers. But it was too burdensome for individual researchers to file<br />

patent applications or undergo the other processes necessary to claim and use IPRs.<br />

It was only as late as the 1990s that Japanese society became serious about<br />

establishing mutually supportive relation with industry due to the heavy loss of<br />

competitiveness by Japanese firms to the US in such key sectors as information<br />

technology and biotechnology. Under the pressure of global competition,<br />

companies began to show increasing interest in utilizing the most advanced<br />

knowledge developed by universities. On the part of universities, there have been<br />

increasing indications that Japanese universities are falling behind foreign<br />

universities in their levels of academic research because they have not interacted<br />

with industries. Therefore, as the result of a set of laws that were introduced in the<br />

late 1990s, Japanese universities are now capable of owning IPRs for inventions<br />

developed at their universities and are obliged to go through radical transformation<br />

in managing IPRs at universities. 24<br />

Osaka University IP policy issued in April 2004 and managed through the IP<br />

office and the Technology Licensing Organization (TLO). The IP policy objective<br />

is to provide fundamental rules with regard to the handling of IP in order to<br />

advance the university‘s social contribution and to serve the promotion of academic<br />

study.<br />

5.3.1. Ownership of IPRs:<br />

24 Supra note 7, Technology transfer, intellectual property…


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 169<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

IPR created by the employees of the university during their duties at the<br />

university shall belong to the university.<br />

If an IP is created through study conducted by students of the university<br />

using funds or equipment of the university or the public, the IPR may be assigned<br />

to the university by conducting agreements with students. However, students<br />

employed by the university and signed agreements concerning their rights to the IP<br />

they create shall be treated as employees of the university.<br />

Rights regarding the IP created by the employees shall belong to the<br />

university in principle. If the invention is made jointly by the employees and<br />

research partners, the IPRs shall be jointly owned by the university and the partner.<br />

But when the IP from the results of joint research are considered to be best used<br />

only by the partner, the IPR may be assigned to the partner for an appropriate<br />

compensation to the university.<br />

Income Sharing from IP<br />

The income gains from an invention for which application is made by the<br />

TLO will be distributed after deducting actual expenses related to the application as<br />

the following: the inventor, the TLO, the university each receive one third (1/3) of<br />

the net income. In that case, the university distribute one half (1/2) of its share to<br />

the inventor‘s research laboratory.<br />

If the income generated by the transfer or assignment of a tangible research<br />

results, the university pays 50 per cent of the net income to the inventor and his/her<br />

research laboratory as compensation.<br />

If the income generated related to IP assigned by students to the university,<br />

the university pays compensation to the student in the same manner as employees<br />

of the university.<br />

Confidentiality Clauses<br />

The policy stated that university employees shall have responsibility to<br />

faithfully observe any secrecy obligations related to IP. In the case of conducting<br />

cooperative activities with external organizations, both external organizations and<br />

the university shall conclude and observe secrecy agreements.<br />

5.3.1. Where the University is unable to commercialize the IP<br />

The policy mentioned briefly that the IPR that the university decides not to<br />

succeed shall belong to the employee who created the IP.


170 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

5. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ARAB UNIVERSITIES<br />

From the WTO data, the below figures where generated to summarize the<br />

economic situation in the two selected Arab countries. The figures 25 show that the<br />

GDP for Egypt is more compared to Oman, this indicate a stronger industry base in<br />

Egypt (Figure1) which is reflected in the number of industrial property of 300<br />

patents compared to non in Oman (Figure2). But this is far below the number of<br />

industrial property for the three developed countries: US, UK and Japan.<br />

180,000<br />

160,000<br />

140,000<br />

120,000<br />

100,000<br />

80,000<br />

60,000<br />

40,000<br />

20,000<br />

0<br />

Egypt Oman<br />

350,000<br />

300,000<br />

250,000<br />

200,000<br />

150,000<br />

100,000<br />

50,000<br />

0<br />

United States<br />

United<br />

Kingdom<br />

GDP(US$)<br />

Figure (1) GDP in million US$, 2008 25<br />

Figure (2) number of industrial property, 2007 25<br />

Japan Egypt Oman<br />

Trademark registrations by office 172,427 31,966 95,034 3,029 118<br />

Patent grants by patent office 157,283 5,930 164,954 300<br />

Some data shows that 69% of research is carried out in governmental<br />

institutions and 30% in universities in the Arab countries, and only 30–35% of all<br />

universities in region are research universities 26 . But this data is outdated because<br />

many Arab universities have made the transition from being classical academic<br />

establishments to becoming more pro-active toward research<br />

25 The two figures were generated in addition to several bar graphs showing the GDP in comparison<br />

with the population. This is based on the statistical data from the trade profile of each country (US,<br />

UK, Japan, Egypt and Oman) in the World Trade Organization report “Trade profiles 2009”.<br />

26 Supra note 10, N. Saleh, Research management issues…


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 171<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

.<br />

6.1. Sultan Qaboos University IP Policy, Oman<br />

The IP policy in SQU was issued in January 2006 managed by the Research<br />

& Innovation Affairs Department (RIAD) to protect the intellectual creation and<br />

innovation in the university resulted from the investment in laboratories and<br />

experimental fields. In addition, it will lead to commercialize the IP either through<br />

establishing spin-offs or licensing.<br />

But the IP policy is putting all the responsibility for the management of IPRs,<br />

including disclosure, ownership protection and commercialization on one single<br />

researcher with coordination with RIAD. This would discourage the researcher and<br />

reduce the likelihood of filing patents. On the other hand, the high royalty share of<br />

70% for the inventor is given as encouragement to disclose and patent his/her<br />

invention.<br />

6.1.1. Ownership of IPRs:<br />

Any IP created by the university employees (this includes the present<br />

employees and employees who left the university after creating the IP), students<br />

and visiting researchers with incidental use of university facilities belongs to the<br />

university. This is applied unless specified in an agreement of sponsored research<br />

with external organizations.<br />

6.1.2. Income Sharing from IP:<br />

The income generated from the IP is distributed after deducting the related<br />

expenses of filing and legal expenses. The remaining income is distributed as<br />

following: inventor/s 70% and the university 30% will be divided between the<br />

research department, college and the department/research center.<br />

6.1.3. Confidentiality Clauses:<br />

The policy emphasize that, from the idea is perceived, the inventor must not<br />

disclose the information related to his invention and keep it confidential. If it‘s<br />

necessary to disclose it to a third party, then a confidentiality and non-disclosure<br />

agreement should be signed.<br />

The inventor must keep a confidential notebook of the invention technical<br />

details of the experiments or research achievements in a time frame signed by one<br />

of the researchers as a witness. This notebook will include the invention stages and<br />

the university will rely on it as evidence in distributing the future royalties among<br />

the research team. In addition, the technical details will help in drafting the<br />

application for patent filing.<br />

6.1.4. Where the University is unable to commercialize the IP


172 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The IP commercialization shall be initiated and managed by the inventor on<br />

behalf of the university by identifying the interested companies. The university is<br />

responsible for the administrative and financial procedures related to IP protection,<br />

commercialization and licensing unless the university expresses unwillingness to<br />

proceed with it or renew the IP. In that case, the university will transfer back the<br />

IPR to the inventor unless the IP is a result of a sponsored research with a condition<br />

to prevent transferring the IPRs stated in the agreement.<br />

In the case of successful commercialization of the IP after transferring the<br />

IPR back to the inventor, the latter will benefit from any licensing or commercial<br />

contracts that may occur. In addition, he could establish a spin-off firm from the IP<br />

and the university may hold a share as a return of participating in the cost of<br />

protecting the IP.<br />

6.2. Cairo University, Egypt<br />

In Egypt, one of the first national systems for planning and funding R&D<br />

activities was set up in 1972 with the establishment of the Egyptian Academy of<br />

Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT). ASRT serves as a national<br />

organization responsible for the planning and funding of R&D activities in Egypt<br />

as well as patents and intellectual properties. Planning is carried out through 15<br />

specialized research councils. 27<br />

In the Middle East, Egypt was one of the leading countries in issuing IP law.<br />

The first Egyptian IP law was issued in 1949. Then, after Egypt joined TRIPS<br />

agreement, the new law was drafted to comply with the agreement and it has been<br />

put into force since 2002. The regulation included in that law is similar to the one<br />

in the TRIPS agreement which finally gives a quite strong protection to the IPRs.<br />

According to Article 7 of the said law, the employer shall have all the rights<br />

derived from the inventions discovered by the worker or the employee during the<br />

period of work relationship or employment, insofar as the invention falls within the<br />

scope of the work contract, relationship or employment. Also, the name of the<br />

inventor shall be mentioned in the patent, and he shall be remunerated in all cases.<br />

If such remuneration was not agreed on, he shall be entitled to a fair compensation<br />

from the employer who requested the invention. 28<br />

Cairo University like all Egyptian universities, has not yet issued an IP<br />

policy. The technology transfer issue is based on a contractual agreement between<br />

the researcher and the institution in order to regulate the revenues generated from<br />

the research within the scope of the law. In addition, the university-industry<br />

27 Supra note 10, N. Saleh, Research management issues…<br />

28 The Egyptian Law of Protecting the Intellectual Property Rights number 82/2002


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 173<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

relation is under the role of the research liaison and marketing office in Cairo<br />

University but most Egyptian Universities do not have an IP or technology transfer<br />

office. This has a profound negative influence on the research environment in<br />

Egypt especially the public funded research institutions which are almost 90<br />

percent of the research institutions in Egypt as it reflected negatively on the<br />

researchers‘ incentives to innovate. However, still we can find some inventions that<br />

are patented by the Egyptian Patent Office, but most of them are driven by<br />

individuals not research institutions.<br />

7. RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

The factors that affect the success of technology transfer are both individual<br />

researcher‘s motivation and institutional forces from inside and outside academia<br />

such as public policy. 29 Since both Arab countries are signatories of the TRIPS<br />

Agreement, the following recommendations shall be adopted inside academia:<br />

1. Oblige universities to issue IP policies and establish TTOs responsible of<br />

evaluating the inventions, patenting procedures and commercialization.<br />

2. Include provisions in the IP policy to monitor the patenting and the<br />

commercialization process. If the office did not start the patent<br />

procedures for an invention after a certain period of time, the inventor<br />

shall have the right to go for patenting it individually and acquire the title<br />

and the ownership for him/her automatically. On the other hand, if the<br />

inventor failed to meet the commitments in the commercialization plan,<br />

then the TTO have the right to terminate the commercialization process.<br />

3. To compete globally, Arab public funded universities must push<br />

themselves to understand exactly what the markets want from them and<br />

learn to commercialize research outputs.<br />

4. Like education and research, technology transfer should be part of the<br />

mission of Public funded universities in the Arab countries through its<br />

role in the community service.<br />

5. Arab public funded universities should contribute to generate knowledge<br />

in basic science in all levels of its growth in addition to support research<br />

in applied science.<br />

6. In the Arab countries where the industry is not strong and the surrounding<br />

IP environment is not yet well established in reality, Arab public funded<br />

universities should focus on funding research in the engineering and life<br />

science research which include biotechnology and medical research<br />

which are the most attractive for the industry. Moreover, from those<br />

fields the fruits can be harvested quicker and its affect will make a<br />

difference in the community.<br />

29 Y. Dai, D. Popp, S. Bretschneider, Institutions and intellectual property: the influence of<br />

institutional forces on university patenting, Journal of policy analysis and management, V.24 No.3,<br />

2005, p.p. 579-598.


174 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

7. Arab public funded universities should adopt awareness programs among<br />

it‘s‘ staff and students about the IP policy and to what extent is the<br />

important effect of the IPRs. This could be in forms of seminars,<br />

workshops, etc.<br />

8. Arab public funded universities should give higher royalty shares to the<br />

inventor in the first stage after establishing the TTOs. Meanwhile, this<br />

incentive encourages researchers to become inventors by encouraging<br />

them to disclose, protect and exploit their inventions before publishing it.<br />

Gradually, the quality, rather than the quantity, of inventions will<br />

increase. In addition, such incentive will help in preventing the brain<br />

drain problem because inventors in that case are getting compensation for<br />

their intellectual creation in their country.<br />

9. Arab public funded universities should realize the pro-active role of the<br />

TTOs to help the university to generate funding having three primary<br />

functions: legal, technical and managerial. Therefore, keeping technology<br />

transfer professionals is a difficult task and common worldwide. But this<br />

should be done by adjusting employment and pay-scales rules to provide<br />

competitive salaries to such professionals.<br />

10. Due to the current situation in the Arab world with under-developed<br />

industry facing lack of adopting new technologies in the market, Arab<br />

public funding universities have to realize its objectives relating to the<br />

promotion of local development through IP spillovers and a preference<br />

for local licensing agreements to smaller firms.<br />

11. Arab public funded universities should focus on two effective tools of<br />

transferring technologies from academia to industry: First, establishing<br />

Science Parks and incubators to accommodate the new technologies and<br />

commercialize the patents in order to strengthen the industry in the longrun.<br />

Second, involving the existing firms from the research proposal<br />

stages and employs the research expertise to improve the local firm‘s<br />

product/service.<br />

12. Arab public funded universities should adopt a balanced mix of exclusive<br />

and non-exclusive licenses and should decide depending on the type of<br />

technology. On one side, transferring the new technology and develop it<br />

as a new product in the market is a risky situation for a local business<br />

firm. So, in order to attract them, an exclusive license has to be granted<br />

to prevent competitors from exploiting the patent. On the other side, non<br />

exclusive license shall be granted to maintain disseminating the<br />

knowledge among the science community for further research.


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 175<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

8. CONCLUSION<br />

This research paper is the first to explore the current situation of IP policies<br />

and TTOs in Arab public funded Universities presented by Sultan Qaboos<br />

University in Oman and Cairo University in Egypt. Major points were observed to<br />

emphasize the necessities of adopting IP policies in the Arab Universities to cope<br />

with the rapid changes in the education field as well as in the technology field. In<br />

addition, the recommendations were based on combining both analysis; the legal<br />

through the existing IP policies and the economical through WTO statistical report<br />

due to the interrelation of the IP issues with the economic and welfare of the<br />

countries.<br />

Technology transfer is a very important factor for developing research and<br />

economy in the Arab countries. To reach and maintain a competitive edge globally<br />

in education and research, Arab universities should recognize the paramount social<br />

and economic importance of the academia-industry linkage.


176 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

Monotti, S. Ricketson, Universities and intellectual property, Oxford, 2003.<br />

Y. Lee, Technology transfer and public policy, Library of congress, 1997.<br />

Booklets and Reports<br />

Trade Profiles, WTO, 2009, website:<br />

http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/trade_profiles09_e.pdf<br />

Technology transfer, intellectual property and effective university-industry<br />

partnerships: the experience of China, India, Japan, Philippines, the Republic of<br />

Korea, Singapore and Thailand, <strong>WIPO</strong>, website:<br />

http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/928/wipo_pub_928.pdf<br />

Guidelines on developing intellectual property policy for universities and<br />

R&D institutions in African countries, <strong>WIPO</strong>.<br />

Report of the multi-year expert meeting on enterprise development policies<br />

and capacity-building in science, technology and innovation (STI) on its first<br />

session, United Nations conference on trade and development, 2009.<br />

Developing university-industry technology transfer: joint workshop<br />

sponsored by organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD), the<br />

U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), and Tomsk State<br />

University in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Science and Education and<br />

the Tomsk regional government, OECD, 2006, website:<br />

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/9/38423734.pdf<br />

Networking research, development and innovation in Arab countries, United<br />

Nation, 2005, website:<br />

http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/sdpd-05-2-e.pdf<br />

Technology transfer: The history, Industrial partnership office, 2005,<br />

website: https://ipo.llnl.gov/data/assets/docs/TechTransfer.pdf<br />

Regional seminar on the benefits of the intellectual property system for<br />

universities, university researchers and research and development organizations,<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong>, 2000.<br />

Guidelines on developing intellectual property policy for Universities and<br />

R&D organizations, <strong>WIPO</strong>, 1999, website:<br />

http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/uipc/en/guidelines/pdf/ip_policy.pdf


Ahmed Abd Eltawab Elsisi and Shaikha Nasser Ali Al-Akzam 177<br />

_______________________________________________________________________________<br />

Learning the R&D system: University research in Japan and United States,<br />

National academy press Washington DC, 1989.<br />

Published Papers<br />

M. Cervantes, Academic Patenting: How universities and public research<br />

organizations are using their intellectual property to boost research and spur<br />

innovative start-ups, <strong>WIPO</strong>, website:<br />

http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/academic_patenting.htm#P7_280<br />

G. Evans, University patent licensing for the research and development of<br />

pharmaceuticals in developing countries, Thomson Reuters, 2009.<br />

D. Siegel, R. Veugelers, M. Wright, Technology transfer offices and<br />

commercialization of university intellectual property: performance and policy<br />

implications, Oxford review of economic policy, v.23 no4, 2007, pp.640-660.<br />

D. Siegel, M. Weight, IP: the assessment, Oxford review of economic policy,<br />

v.23 no4, 2007, pp.529-540.<br />

A.Zahlan, Arab societies as knowledge societies, Minerva, 2006, 44:103-112<br />

B. Verspagen, University research, intellectual property rights and European<br />

innovation systems, Oxford, 2006<br />

I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo, R.Veugelers, Licensing of university<br />

inventions: The role of a technology transfer office, Elsevier B.V., 2006.<br />

Y. Dai, D. Popp, S. Bretschneider, Institutions and intellectual property: the<br />

influence of institutional forces on university patenting, Journal of policy analysis<br />

and management, V.24 No.3, 2005, p.p. 579-598.<br />

S. Lach, M. Schankerman, Incentives and invention in universities, Center for<br />

Economic Policy Research, 2003.<br />

N. Saleh, Research management issues in the Arab countries, International<br />

Association of Universities, 2002.<br />

R. Nelson, Observations on the post-bayh-dole rise of patenting at American<br />

universities, Journal of technology transfer, 26, 2001, pp13-19<br />

D. Mowery, R. Nelson, B. Sampat, A. Ziedonis, The growth of patenting and<br />

licensing by U.S. universities: an assessment of the effects of the Bayh–Dole act of<br />

1980, Research Policy,Volume 30, Issue 1, January 2001, Pages 99-119


178 The Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer Offices in<br />

Arab Public-Funded Universities<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

L. Fisher, The Innovation Incubator, Strategy+Business Magazine, Issue13,<br />

1998.<br />

T. Massaro, Innovation, technology transfer, and patent policy: the university<br />

contribution, Virginia Law Review,V. 82, 1996, p.p 1729-1735.<br />

R. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and TT in<br />

government-sponsored research, 1996. v.82, Virginia Law Review, 1996, p.p<br />

1663-1727.<br />

Laws and Policies<br />

Stanford University IP policy.<br />

Glasgow University IP & commercialization policy.<br />

Osaka University IP policy.<br />

Sultan Qaboos University IP policy.<br />

The Egyptian Law of Protecting the Intellectual Property Rights number<br />

82/2002<br />

Bayh-Dole Act 1980.


THE OPTIMAL SCOPE OF PATENT PROTECTION IN COMMON LAW<br />

AND CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

2. SUBJECT MATTER<br />

by<br />

Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu<br />

2.1. In Common Law<br />

2.1.1.Nowadays in the US<br />

2.1.2. History of Subject Matter<br />

2.1.3. Technology Development History in the US<br />

2.1.4. Economic Changes in the US<br />

2.1.5. Political Changes in the US<br />

2.1.6. Analysis<br />

2.1.7. Conclusion<br />

2.2. In Civil Law<br />

2.2.1. In the EU<br />

2.2.2. In China<br />

2.3. Discussion<br />

3. NOVELTY, UTILITY, NON-OBVIOUSNESS<br />

3.1. Novelty<br />

3.1.1. In Common Law<br />

3.1.2. In Civil Law<br />

3.2. Utility<br />

3.3. Non-obviousness<br />

3.3.1. In Common Law<br />

3.3.2. In Civil Law<br />

3.4. Discussion


180 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

4. THE SCOPE OF CLAIMS<br />

4.1. Disclosure<br />

4.1.1. In Common Law<br />

4.1.2. In Civil Law<br />

4.2. The Scope of Claims<br />

4.2.1. Literal Infringement<br />

4.2.2. the Doctrine of Equivalents<br />

5. TERMS OF THE PATENT<br />

5.1. In Common Law<br />

5.2. In Civil Law<br />

5.2.1. In the EU<br />

5.2.2. In China<br />

6. CONCLUSIONS


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 181<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

In the last decades, patent laws have been changed more rapidly. 1 The subject<br />

matters of patent law have been developed, such as software, business methods,<br />

generic methods, etc. No surprisingly, therefore, patent laws have been at the centre<br />

of the policy and economic agenda over the last 30 years. 2<br />

Look back to the history, we would find the changes of the scope of patent<br />

protection, and we would have interest to find what will be, and how it could be.<br />

For us, we want to do some researches to find what would be the optimal scope of<br />

Patent Laws.<br />

On 1884, Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property was built.<br />

It cost more than one century to develop members‘ number from first 11 to 173 till<br />

2008, 3 which gives influence to the whole word, but could not provide a<br />

harmonized dispute solution. On 1994, GATTs gives more attention on IP, and<br />

TRIPs came to the international stage 4 , which made big effects on worldwide<br />

patent law‘s development, now it has 153 members 5 , and built a new legal system<br />

of DSB 6 . After that, many countries make their efforts to try to harmonize patent<br />

laws. 7<br />

On these basis, we will list some acts in Common laws and Civil Laws, try to<br />

compare Patent laws under Common Law system and Civil Law system, find<br />

difference between them, abstract the common regulations in them, put forward<br />

analysis including legal parts, political parts, economic parts and so on, give<br />

suggestion of what will be the optimal choice for them.<br />

1<br />

EC patent laws give 13 editions during last 30 years (1977-2007), nearly every 2 years a new<br />

version, under legal system, it is amazing for changing so often. See EPC official website.<br />

2<br />

On 2007, Falk Martin wrote an article about ―What Determines Patents per Capita in OECD<br />

Countries?‖, introduced elements affecting patent application through 22 members of OECD,<br />

including policy and economy. Article, See,<br />

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5417/is_200704/ai_n21288317/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1.<br />

And, to the Common Law, we could find topics of ―on the political economy of patent reform in the<br />

US‖, see Landes and Posner (2004) and Scherer (2007) .<br />

3<br />

See Statistics of Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, provided by <strong>WIPO</strong>.<br />

4<br />

In the Uruguay Round Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on<br />

15 April 1994. See WTO official website.<br />

5<br />

See WTO website, 153 members on 23 July 2008 (with dates of membership).<br />

6<br />

See Dispute Settlement Body Of WTO<br />

7<br />

The most important example is what happened in USA. On April 18, 2007, U.S. Congress<br />

proposed the bill of Patent Reform Act ( S1145), which made many harmonizations between<br />

Common Law system and Civil Law system. Act, See 110th CONGRESS Calendar No. 563,1st<br />

110th CONGRESS,2d Session, S. 1145[Report No. 110-259]


182 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. SUBJECT MATTER<br />

In order to be eligible for patent protection, an invention must fall within the<br />

scope of patentable subject matter. Patentable subject matter is always established<br />

by statute, and is usually defined in terms of the exceptions to patentability. 8 The<br />

statutory subject matter requirement pertains to the kinds of inventions that are<br />

eligible for patent protection. 9 Generally, patents shall be available for any<br />

invention, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology. 10 But actually,<br />

it differed widely from country to country as what can be patentable subject matter<br />

or not.<br />

Subject matter is the most important element of patent protection. If one<br />

invention was excluded out of subject matter, it never could be protected by patent<br />

laws. We will try to tell the difference between Common legal system and Civil<br />

legal system, and discuss the optimal scope in Common law and Civil law.<br />

2.1. In Common Law<br />

2.1.1. Nowadays in the US<br />

According to United State patent law, ―Whoever invents or discovers any<br />

new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any<br />

new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the<br />

conditions and requirements of this title.‖ 11<br />

The courts have taken an expansive view of statutory subject matter; in case<br />

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which happened on 1980, the Supreme Court made the<br />

following points:<br />

―this Court has read the term ‗manufacture‘ in § 101 in accordance with its<br />

dictionary definition to mean ‗the production of articles for use from raw<br />

materials prepared by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,<br />

properties, or combinations whether by hand labor or by machinery.‘‖―The<br />

Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 act inform us that Congress<br />

intended statutory subject matter to ‗include any thing under the sun that is<br />

made by man.‘ S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952).‖ ―This is not<br />

to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The<br />

laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not<br />

patentable.‖ 12<br />

8<br />

See <strong>WIPO</strong> Intellectual Property Handbook, 2006, 18 ff.<br />

9<br />

Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publisher, 2008, 109 ff<br />

10<br />

See Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.<br />

11<br />

See 35 U.S.C 101<br />

12<br />

See case Diamond v. Chakrabarty


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 183<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

Indeed, Chief Justice Burger famously wrote that ‗‗Congress intended<br />

statutory subject matter to ‗include anything under the sun that is made by man.‖ 13<br />

In fact, it was not easy to say after that anything under the sun that is made by<br />

man always could be granted patent. There were lots of changes in the US patent<br />

laws, and we can trace the development of the scope of subject matter.<br />

2.1.2. History of Subject Matter<br />

The first United States Patent Act that of 1790 was a short act of seven<br />

sections only entitled ―An act to promote the Progress of Useful Arts‖. 14 Under its<br />

terms any two of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney<br />

General were empowered to grant patents for terms of up to fourteen years for<br />

inventions that were "sufficiently useful and important" provided that the grantee<br />

submitted a specification describing the invention (and where appropriate a model<br />

thereof) to the Secretary of State at the time of the grant. 15 There was no direct<br />

definition of scope of subject matter.<br />

In 1793, patent law was amended. Under it, first time a definition was given:<br />

any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter and any<br />

new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of<br />

matter. 16<br />

In 1842 a statute was passed to provide for the grant of patents for "any new<br />

and original design for a manufacture or for printing on a fabric. 17<br />

In 1930, the Plant Patent Act provided for the possibility of patent protection<br />

for asexually reproduced plants.<br />

In 1952, patentable subject matter was changed by replacing the eighteenth<br />

century word "art" by "process".<br />

In 1954, Provisions relating to plant patents were amended to make it clear<br />

that cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids and newly found seedlings were patentable.<br />

13 Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publisher, 2008, 110 ff.<br />

14 A similar title was used for all acts relating to patents before the consolidation of 1870.<br />

15 See ―A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States,‖ there is no author for this article.<br />

http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html<br />

16 See "Patent Act 1793" section 1; the term "art" was replaced by "process" in 1952 but this term is<br />

itself defined as a "process, art or method" 35 USC 101<br />

17 See ―A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States,‖ there is no author for this article.<br />

http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html


184 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In 1980, Supreme Court upholds the patentability of a genetically modified<br />

bacterium quoting the Congressional report leading up to the 1952 Act that<br />

"anything made by man under the sun" should be patentable. 18<br />

But even after this decision, in 1989, United States Court of Appeals for the<br />

Federal Circuit made a decision that denied software to be a patent by holding a<br />

pre-solution step of gathering data incapable of imparting patent-eligibility under §<br />

101. 19<br />

In 1992, under courts‘ decision, software was able to be eligible subject<br />

matter. 20<br />

On March 29, 1996, Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related<br />

Inventions applied. 21<br />

In 1998, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank v.<br />

Signature Financial 22 holds that there is no prohibition in U.S. law on patents for<br />

business methods as long as they are new, useful and non-obvious.<br />

Therefore, after the brief review of US patent law‘s history, we could find<br />

eligible subject matter was always changed with time goes on.<br />

2.1.3. Technology Development History in the USA<br />

At the same time, technology has changed fast.<br />

The First Industrial Revolution happened in the late 18th and early 19th<br />

centuries when major changes in agriculture, manufacturing, production, and<br />

transportation had a profound effect on the socioeconomic and cultural conditions<br />

in Britain. 23 The changes subsequently spread throughout Europe, North America,<br />

and eventually the world. The signal was the application of power-driven<br />

machinery to manufacturing, such as stationary steam engine. 24 The Industrial<br />

Revolution began an era of per-capita economic growth in capitalist economies. 25<br />

18 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty 206 USPQ 193.<br />

19 See In re Grams, 888 F.2d. 835, 838-39 (Fed. Cir. 1989).<br />

20 See Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc vs. Corozonix Corp (Feb.Cir.1992), and In re Alappat<br />

(Feb.Cir.1992)<br />

21 See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions,61 federal Register 7478(Feb.28<br />

1996)<br />

22<br />

See 149 F.3d. 1368 47 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed Cir 1998).<br />

23<br />

There were many different opinion of when the Industrial Revolution began, but the common<br />

opinion is late 18 th century.<br />

24<br />

There are many innovation on that time, which are big steps to development, including textiles,<br />

steam power, and iron founding.<br />

25<br />

Lucas, Robert consider "annual growth rates of 2.4 percent for the first 60 years of the 20th<br />

century, of 1 percent for the entire 19th century, of one-third of 1 percent for the 18th century. See


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 185<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

In the USA, it first happened in Lowell, Massachusetts 26 . During this period,<br />

the most common inventions were about machine manufacture.<br />

After the 1850s, there came further progress in the application of electricity<br />

and cheap steel technology. 27 In succession, telegraph, plane, radio, TV and so on<br />

came one by one. In 1940s, computer appeared first time. In 1980s, software grew<br />

up, went into not only enterprise use but private use. In 1990s, business methods<br />

became popular in money market, especially in investment banks. 28<br />

If we reflected the technology development to patent eligible subject matter,<br />

we could find they have direct ratio relationship. Technology development changes<br />

the range of subject matter, takes wider scope of subject matter.<br />

2.1.4. Economic Changes in the USA<br />

In 1790, USA had established for short time, things were bad that time. The<br />

economy was struggled during the happening war. 29 USA had no much stronger<br />

economic power that time. Technology developing makes economy better. But<br />

conflict between the North and the South of American grew, and since 1849, Civil<br />

War happened. Economy rushed down. 30<br />

"The Industrial Revolution Past and Future".2003 annual report essay. Whole article could be<br />

found on the website:<br />

http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3333<br />

26 Lowell, Massachusetts is considered the Cradle of the American Industrial Revolution, as it was<br />

the first large-scale factory town in America. See history of Lowell, Massachusetts<br />

27 It was not until 1873 that a dynamo capable of prolonged operation was developed, but as early as<br />

1831 Michael Faraday demonstrated how electricity could be mechanically produced. Through the<br />

nineteenth century the use of electric power was limited by small productive capacity, short<br />

transmission lines, and high cost. Up to 1900 the only cheap electricity was that produced by<br />

generators making use of falling water in the mountains of southeastern France and northern Italy.<br />

Italy, without coal resources, soon had electricity in every village north of Rome. Electric current<br />

ran Italian textile looms and, eventually, automobile factories. As early as 1890 Florence boasted<br />

the world's first electric streetcar.<br />

28 There were more and more technology invention to be mentioned, such as satellite, space shuttle.<br />

29 We can find the first several decades of USA was war time. American colonists fought off the<br />

British army in the American Revolutionary War of the 1770s and issued a Declaration of<br />

Independence in 1776. Seven years later, the signing of the Treaty of Paris officially recognized<br />

independence from Britain. See History of the United States,<br />

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States#Westward_expansion_.281789.E2.80.9<br />

31849.29<br />

30 Civil war era happened in the middle of the 19th century, white Americans of the North and<br />

South were unable to reconcile fundamental differences in their approach to government,<br />

economics, society and African American slavery, Which led to the Civil War. In 1965, the North<br />

of American won. See History of the United States,<br />

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States#Westward_expansion_.281789.E2.80.9<br />

31849.29


186 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

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In 1865, Civil war was over. There came the era for rreconstruction and the<br />

rise of industrialization, which made the consequence of progressivism. USA<br />

became the most important rich country before World War Ι.<br />

Because of the special geographical location, World War Ι took little harm<br />

to USA, on the contrary, USA made more health economic steps, and became the<br />

largest economic entity.<br />

In the 1920s and 1930s the Great depression came.<br />

In the later 1930s, World War Two took place. Before USA joined, The War<br />

provided immediate benefits to the U.S. economy because it led to a substantial<br />

increase in exports. 31 When joined, The War stimulated martial relevant<br />

industries, such as steel manufacture.<br />

After world War Two, US got bigger and bigger progress in economy. After<br />

1980s, economy gets more benefits from High-technology product, and takes more<br />

and more welfare to whole US.<br />

2.1.5. Political Changes in the USA<br />

Policy is one of important factors to patent protection, when policy trending<br />

to protect more rights, patent protection went into broad range, and with tough<br />

policy, patent would be confined into a narrow space tightly.<br />

During late 18 th century and early 19 th century, USA was only consisted of<br />

north states. The most important policy was how to defend USA, and establishing a<br />

whole legal system and a whole government system. Reflecting to patent law,<br />

patent law was simple in 1790, and amended with a whole definition on subject<br />

matter in 1793.<br />

In 1890, Sherman Act passed, which is forming the basis for antitrust law 32 ,<br />

which showed policy to keep balance between public welfare and private interest.<br />

Competition policy always influences the patent authorization. 33<br />

During 1930s and 1940s, policy turned to give more and more severe<br />

restriction to patent protection. For example, during the depression and World War<br />

II, the courts were generally not sympathetic to patents. Indeed in 1941, in Cuno<br />

Engineering v. Automatic Devices Corp, 34 the Supreme Court suggested that to be<br />

31 Dr. Carole E. Scott, ―American Economic History‖, See<br />

http://freepages.history.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~cescott/economics.html<br />

32 Sherman Act have no direct effect to patent law, but after that, antitrust law gives principle how to<br />

defend unfair competition arose by patent exclusive rights.<br />

33 Nowadays, some competition policy trends to circumscribe patent pool application.<br />

34 See 314 U.S. 84, 51 USPQ 272


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 187<br />

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patentable an invention must "reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the<br />

skill of the calling".<br />

After World War Two, policy comes into positive time, pays more attention<br />

to economic affairs, and technology development, and makes more projects to<br />

promote welfare of the whole society.<br />

In US, policy for innovation always changes with the whole environment,<br />

sometimes stimulates, sometimes balances, totally, which is trending to protect<br />

each invention in special regulation.<br />

2.1.6. Analysis<br />

What is the factor to influence patent law? Every body could give the answer,<br />

but there are some obvious factors including economy, policy and technology.<br />

What will be the most important factor? Maybe the most important factor in<br />

different time is different, sometimes economic factors would take the important<br />

position, e.g. during the depression through 1920s and 1930s, patent was tough<br />

restricted, and hard to achieve. Back to late 19 th century, one clear affair was<br />

antitrust policy. In early 20 th century, political power took on in every area,<br />

especially in patent system; there were fewer patents to be granted. After world war<br />

two, USA got a big chance to develop itself, began to incent innovation, and in<br />

1952, patent law was a whole amendment which is the foundation of today‘s patent<br />

law. Since 1950s, USA has more innovations on computer-related area and<br />

business industries. With technology, economic and political changes, patentable<br />

subject matter changes lot. We try to analysis how software got to be subject matter<br />

to tell how the influence works. 35<br />

35 Sometimes, people may confuse softwares with programs, programs have longer history than<br />

software. Here, softwares only mean computer software, and we will focus on those not programs.


188 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

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1. Background<br />

Software came with computers. Since computer into market, software went<br />

into market. 36 First several decades, only several independent companies got orders<br />

from US government and big companies, which took software industries into rapid<br />

development. 37 Software grew strong and strong, till 1980s, which was one of big<br />

industry in US. But the great achievement was in 1990s; Microsoft, Oracle, Sun<br />

companies and so on became independent from hardware, and got more attractive.<br />

Especially, in 1993, National Information Infrastructure came into<br />

implementation. 38<br />

2. Case law<br />

First period (1946-1978), is a period without patent protection. Software was<br />

not the eligible subject matter. The Supreme Court refused to authorize patent<br />

rights to computer software. In Gottschalk vs. Benson, 409U.S.63(1972) case, The<br />

Supreme Court held that a patent cannot cover all possible uses of a mathematical<br />

procedure or equation within a computer. That would be tantamount to granting the<br />

inventor a patent on the mathematical procedure itself, and this was no more<br />

acceptable than granting Samuel Morse a patent covering all possible uses of<br />

magnetism to communicate, rather than a narrower patent covering only the<br />

specific way in which Morse actually used magnetism to communicate in his<br />

telegraph. The court then said that "[i]f these programs are to be patentable,<br />

considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage<br />

...." This decision was accepted as a final determination that computer programs<br />

were not patentable, and the Patent Office immediately ceased examining all<br />

36 In 1949, the language Short Code appeared . It was the first computer language for electronic<br />

devices and it required the programmer to change its statements into 0's and 1's by hand. Still, it was<br />

the first step towards the complex languages of today. In 1951, Grace Hopper wrote the first<br />

compiler, A-0. A compiler is a program that turns the language's statements into 0's and 1's for the<br />

computer to understand. This lead to faster programming, as the programmer no longer had to do<br />

the work by hand. And after those, software was easy to produce. See www.byte.com.<br />

37 Big orders were all from US government, for example, the SAGE project for continental air<br />

defense (1949-1962) costed nearly 8 billion dollars, which is the first huge software project in the<br />

history. See Dag Spicer,” Dr. Strangelove Meets IBM: The SAGE System‖,<br />

http://www.ddj.com/architect/184403974<br />

38 The National Information Infrastructure (NII) was the product of the High Performance<br />

Computing and Communication Act of 1991. It was a telecommunications policy buzzword, which<br />

was popularized during the Clinton Administration under the leadership of Vice-President Al Gore.<br />

It was a proposed, advanced, seamless web of public and private communications networks,<br />

interactive services, interoperable hardware and software, computers, databases, and consumer<br />

electronics to put vast amounts of information at users' fingertips. A side-effect of the Clinton<br />

Administration programs to build the NII was a push by cultural industries to expand the scope of<br />

copyright. This led to the creation of the <strong>WIPO</strong> Copyright Treaty and the passage of the Digital<br />

Millennium Copyright Act. It was also used by the patent industry in order to widen the scope of<br />

patentability.


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 189<br />

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computer program inventions. 39 In the case Dann vs. Johnston, 425 U.S.219(1976)<br />

and Parker vs.Flook,437 U.S.584(1978), The Supreme Court still refused to grant<br />

patent rights. 40<br />

Second period was a limited patent protection period (1978-1992). During<br />

this period, The Supreme Court didn‘t deny each case. In 1981, in Diamond v.<br />

Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) case, The Supreme Court ordered the P.T.O. to grant a<br />

patent on an invention even though computer software was utilized. 41 As such, this<br />

case is important in the history of software patents. The invention in this case<br />

relates to a method for determining how rubber should be heated in order to be best<br />

"cured." The invention utilizes a computer to calculate and control the heating<br />

times for the rubber. However, the invention (as defined by the claims) included<br />

not only the computer program, but also included steps relating to heating rubber,<br />

and removing the rubber from the heat. The Supreme Court stated that in this case,<br />

the invention was not merely a mathematical algorithm, but was a process for<br />

molding rubber, and hence was patentable. This was true even though the only<br />

"novel" feature of this invention was the timing process controlled by the<br />

computer. 42<br />

But only eight years later, in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989) case,<br />

the Federal Circuit stated that these remaining steps were ―a procedure for solving<br />

a given kind of mathematical problem." The court cited the rule of In re Abele,<br />

which stated that: ―if a claim would be otherwise statutory, albeit inoperative or<br />

less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory subject<br />

matter when the algorithm is included.‖ 43 The Federal Circuit would not interpret<br />

this language as declaring any claim that was statutory without the algorithm as<br />

patentable. It also pointed to the ―provided that" qualification in Abele as denying<br />

effect to field of use limitations or nonessential post-solution activity. The court<br />

decided that the claimed process was nonstatutory subject matter because the step<br />

of performing lab tests ―merely provides the data for the algorithm,‖ and that<br />

whether or not the claims required that the method be performed by a programmed<br />

computer was irrelevant to the determination of whether the claim defined a<br />

Section 101 process. 44<br />

Last period (1992- ) is the width protection period. In 1992, in Arrhythmia<br />

Research Technology, Inc vs. Corozonix Corp (Feb.Cir.1992) case 45 , the<br />

39<br />

See Gottschalk vs.Benson,409U.S.63(1972), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-<br />

1979/1972/1972_71_485/<br />

40<br />

See Dannvs.Johnston,425 U.S.219(1976), Parker vs.Flook,437 U.S.584(1978), in those case, the<br />

Supreme Court thought software could not be patentable, and no mere mathematical algorithm<br />

could be patentable.<br />

41<br />

See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), http://supreme.justia.com/us/450/175/case.html<br />

42<br />

See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)<br />

43<br />

See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).<br />

44<br />

See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989)<br />

45<br />

See Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc vs. Corozonix Corp (Feb.Cir.1992)


190 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

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transformation of electrocardiograph signals from a patient's heartbeat by a<br />

machine through a series of mathematical calculations constituted a practical<br />

application of an abstract idea (a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation),<br />

because it corresponded to a useful, concrete or tangible thing--the condition of a<br />

patient's heart, and the Court of Appeals Federal Circuit reasoned that the method<br />

claims qualified as statutory subject matter by noting that the steps transformed<br />

physical, electrical signals from one form into another form - a number<br />

representing a signal related to the patient's heart activity, a non-abstract output. In<br />

1994, further, In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, at 1544, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (Fed. Cir.<br />

1994) case, the Court of Appeals Federal Circuit confirmed that software could be<br />

patentable subject matter. 46 In 1996, USPTO applied ―Examination Guidelines for<br />

Computer-Related Inventions‖.<br />

3. Analysis<br />

When software could not be popular goods, and could not make more<br />

economic benefits, no regulation would give the patent protection to software. But<br />

when technology developed, software came into more popular in the market, and<br />

made more and more money. The first condition is technology development, if no<br />

quick progress happened, there were not enough numbers of companies to pursue<br />

the absolute monopoly rights. Now software industry could not be replaced, which<br />

spreads every where. If no personal computer makes, software industry could<br />

develop so quickly, now each computer has to have many softwares, or could not<br />

work.<br />

When we reviewed the economic rate, we could find in the last few decades,<br />

software industry got larger and larger rate in US GDP. 47 More and more huge<br />

software companies appeared. Never mind made in US or other nations because of<br />

outsourcing, software industry has much more influence to whole economy.<br />

For the political reasons, U.S government supported software development<br />

from the first period, and with software industry growing, adapted their policy to<br />

support. For instance, in 1991, NII was proposed, in 1993, NII came in to<br />

implementation.<br />

The corresponding relationship of patent law and economic, technology,<br />

political factors could be easy found. What will be considered is how to find the<br />

future influence, which will decide the optimal scope of subject matter.<br />

46 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, at 1544, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)<br />

47 See Bureau of Economic Analysis of U.S.


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2.1.7. Conclusion<br />

Summarizing U.S. Patent legal, economic, political and technical history,<br />

from 1790-2007, could find three important factors during the development of<br />

Patent law: economic, political, technical factors. Educational and other factors will<br />

not be focused. In the historical view, we should connect those with the<br />

development of globalization, we could find patents become more and more<br />

important for US Goods in the world, such as Qualcomm Company, which has got<br />

lots of profits from his patents‘ pool, not only in USA, but all over the world. Let<br />

us imagine that if no export, what would be? Maybe we could read some materials<br />

of North Korea, 48 we could find no argue on the scope of patent protection.<br />

Patent could be barriers for other countries‘ competitors, especially in hightechnology<br />

fields. In order to keep advantage, US will continue strength the patent<br />

power and give more and more broad scope of the subject matters.<br />

2.2. In Civil Law<br />

2.2.1. In the EU<br />

According to EPC, European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in<br />

all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and<br />

are susceptible of industrial application. 49 The subject matter will be any<br />

inventions, in all fields of technology. EPC give a list to exclude some kinds of<br />

inventions out of the subject matter, if not on the exception list, it could follow<br />

Article 52(1), and be patentable.<br />

The following in particular shall not be subject matter: ―(a) discoveries,<br />

scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations;(c) schemes,<br />

rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business,<br />

and programs for computers;(d) presentations of information.‖ 50<br />

And in Article 53, there are exceptions to be subject matter: ―(b) plant or<br />

animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or<br />

animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products<br />

thereof; (c) methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or<br />

therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body; this<br />

provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or compositions, for<br />

use in any of these methods.‖ 51<br />

48 Law on invention of North Korea,<br />

http://www.kcckp.net/ko/notice/rainbow/index.php?en+Laws+3<br />

49 See EPC Article 52 (1)<br />

50 See EPC Article 52 (2)<br />

51 See EPC Article 53


192 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

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So, under EU patent law, subject matter is strictly defined, only the invention<br />

not in the excluding list could be subject matter. It is very clear for the inventors,<br />

they could easy to find whether or not their invention‘s patentability.<br />

But look back to the history, there are many things out of the meaning<br />

literatim. In 1998, European Union (EU) based on the consideration of the needs<br />

both of economy and respects, finally legislated Directive 98/44/EC 52 to provide a<br />

clear and determinative legal protection for biotechnological inventions, which<br />

enlarges the scope of subject matters.<br />

Another thing in EU is about software. In theory, the systems should be<br />

consistent: all should follow the Convention, which says that computer programs<br />

"as such" are not eligible for patenting. But different interpretations of that rule<br />

have evolved, with the European Patent Office in particular becoming rather liberal<br />

about its granting of software-related patents. In 2002, the Commission published a<br />

draft Directive 53 that intended to harmonize the approaches of the various patent<br />

offices and only permit so-called computer-implemented inventions, not pure<br />

software. Its proposal provided that, in order to be patentable, an invention that is<br />

implemented through the execution of software on a computer or similar apparatus<br />

has to make a contribution in a technical field that is not obvious to a person of<br />

normal skill in that field. The Commission considered this consistent with the 1973<br />

Convention. But, as a result, on 6th July 2005, the proposal was killed by the<br />

European Parliament. The Commission had no plans to put forward a new draft in<br />

the near future.<br />

Also the bill delayed, but the argument never goes down. Some fear that<br />

Europe would get a much more liberal regime, like that of the US. Some fear that<br />

they would lose the patent protection they already enjoyed. And some think no<br />

patent protection would reduce competition facing companies from USA or other<br />

nations which give patent protection to software, others think it will depress<br />

innovation on software. On November, 2007, on Official Journal EPO, EPO<br />

pressed the article ―Examination of computer-implemented inventions at the<br />

European Patent Office with particular attention to computer-implemented business<br />

methods‖ 54 , which gave some standards for computer software. In Oct. 8, 2008, the<br />

Court of Appeal in London confirmed that software can be patented if it provides a<br />

technical contribution to the state of the art, in Symbian‘s case. 55 So EU has to<br />

move to patent protection for software.<br />

52<br />

See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal<br />

protection of biotechnological inventions<br />

53<br />

See Directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions(2002/0047/COD)<br />

54<br />

See http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/oj007/11_07/11_5947.pdf<br />

55<br />

See http://www.managingip.com/Article/2025189/Court-of-Appeal-confirms-software-can-be-<br />

patented.html


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Nowadays, globalization makes earth like a small village, some have no<br />

protection, but some give, which will lead to confliction. How to face it? As the<br />

argument to software, EU will face more and more challenges, what will be?<br />

If analyzing factors, such as economy, policy, and technology, maybe when<br />

the benefits are so attractive that no one could resist it, the optimal scope of subject<br />

matters will be the same as USA, EU would choose broader scope.<br />

2.2.2. In China<br />

In Chinese patent law system, any invention or utility model for which patent<br />

right may be granted must possess novelty, inventiveness and practical<br />

applicability. 56 Just like EPC, it gives clear exclusion of subject matter by a list. If<br />

not on the list, the invention would be eligible.<br />

For any of the following, no patent right shall be granted: (1) scientific<br />

discoveries; (2) rules and methods for mental activities; (3) methods for the<br />

diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases; (4) animal and plant varieties; (5)<br />

substances obtained by means of nuclear transformation. For processes used in<br />

producing products referred to in items (4) of the preceding paragraph, patent right<br />

may be granted in accordance with the Provisions of this Law. 57<br />

2.3. Discussion<br />

Under the globalization economic environment, any nation would choose<br />

better regime to develop quickly. Patent protection would be the same, and the<br />

scope of subject matter would be the same too.<br />

There are many different regulations in different countries. USA has one, EU<br />

has one, and others are the same. So there will be conflict. Now, EU companies<br />

could feel it when they could not apply for patent protection on software. To some<br />

extent, they loose the competition.<br />

How to solve? Maybe the first choice is adopting the same standard. I think<br />

some day, EU will choose patent to protect software, and it will be the optimal<br />

scope for EU.<br />

Another choice is rebuilding the convention, for example, PCT could<br />

substitute domestic Law. It will depend on the negotiation. Maybe <strong>WIPO</strong> could<br />

lead it.<br />

56 See Patent law of the People's Republic of China, Article 22.<br />

57 See Patent law of the People's Republic of China, Article 25


194 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

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3. NOVELTY, UTILITY, NON-OBVIOUSNESS<br />

3.1 Novelty<br />

The novelty is related with prior art. The novelty requirement asks whether<br />

the applicant‘s invention is new. In another meaning, the novelty requires that no<br />

other person previously knew, disclosed or invented the applicant is seeking to<br />

patent. If an invention isn‘t new, it is said to be anticipated by the prior art.<br />

3.1.1. In Common Law<br />

Under U.S. patent law, a person shall be entitled to a patent if no conflict to<br />

novelty.<br />

In the regulation, there are many actives to destroy the novelty, including:<br />

(a)the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or<br />

described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention<br />

thereof by the applicant for patent, or<br />

(b)the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a<br />

foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior<br />

to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or<br />

(c)he has abandoned the invention, or<br />

(d)the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the<br />

subject of an inventor‘s certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or<br />

assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this<br />

country on an application for patent or inventor‘s certificate filed more than twelve<br />

months before the filing of the application in the United States, or<br />

(e)the invention was described in — (1) an application for patent, published<br />

under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by<br />

the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by<br />

another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent,<br />

except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section<br />

351(a) shall have the effects for the purposes of this subsection of an application<br />

filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United<br />

States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English<br />

language; or<br />

(f)he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or


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(g)(1)during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or<br />

section 291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted<br />

in section 104, that before such person‘s invention thereof the invention was made<br />

by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before<br />

such person‘s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another<br />

inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining<br />

priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the<br />

respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also<br />

the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to<br />

practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.‖ 58<br />

There are still two aspects related, one is first-to-invent, the other is one-year<br />

grace period.<br />

First-to-invent asks the person applies for patent should be the first inventor.<br />

Invention ownership is determined by who can establish she was "first to invent".<br />

All other developed economies grant patent rights to she who is "first to file" a<br />

successful patent application. Clause 101 of US Code 35 states:‖ Whoever invents<br />

or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of<br />

matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, .<br />

. ."This has further been defined by the following case law: "He who first perfected<br />

a thing is the inventor although others might have experimented with the idea." 59<br />

and "Crude and imperfect experiments are not sufficient to confer right to patent;<br />

until invention is perfected and adapted to use it is not patentable and he who first<br />

perfects it and adapts it to use is first inventor in sense of patent law and entitled to<br />

patent." 60<br />

Grace period: The patent laws therefore seek both to protect the public‘s right<br />

to retain knowledge already in the public domain and the inventor‘s right to control<br />

whether and when he may patent his invention. In 1839, Congress ameliorated that<br />

requirement by enacting a 2-year grace period in which the inventor could file an<br />

application. In 1939, Congress reduced the grace period from two years to one<br />

year. 61<br />

3.1.2. In Civil Law<br />

1. In EU Law<br />

The novelty requirement is:― (1) An invention shall be considered to be new<br />

if it does not form part of the state of the art. (2) The state of the art shall be held to<br />

comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral<br />

description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European<br />

patent application. (3) Additionally, the content of European patent applications as<br />

58 See 35 U.S.C. 102<br />

59 See Agawam Co. v Jordan (1869) 74 US583, 19 L Ed 177<br />

60 See Seymour v Osborne (1871) 78 US516, 20 L Ed 33<br />

61 Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publisher, 2008, 264 ff


196 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

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filed, the dates of filing of which are prior to the date referred to in paragraph 2 and<br />

which were published on or after that date, shall be considered as comprised in the<br />

state of the art. (4) Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not exclude the patentability of any<br />

substance or composition, comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method<br />

referred to in Article 53(c), provided that its use for any such method is not<br />

comprised in the state of the art. (5) Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall also not exclude the<br />

patentability of any substance or composition referred to in paragraph 4 for any<br />

specific use in a method referred to in Article 53(c), provided that such use is not<br />

comprised in the state of the art. ‖ 62<br />

2. In China<br />

Novelty means that, before the date of filing, no identical invention or utility<br />

model has been publicly disclosed in publications in the country or abroad or has<br />

been publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country,<br />

nor has any other person filed previously with the patent administrative organ<br />

under the State Council an application which described the identical invention or<br />

utility model and was published after the said date of filing. 63<br />

3. First-to-File and Grace Period<br />

Most Civil Law countries adopt first-to-file and six-month grace period.<br />

Grace period always is strict. In China, only three conditions could apply for grace<br />

period: (1) where it was first exhibited at an international exhibition sponsored or<br />

recognized by the Chinese Government; (2) where it was first made public at a<br />

prescribed academic or technological meeting; (3) where it was disclosed by any<br />

person without the consent of the applicant. 64<br />

Currently, the European Patent Convention (EPC) and Member States' patent<br />

laws do not offer a general grace period, except in specific situations in which a<br />

grace period is provided. Disclosure of an invention is not taken into account if it<br />

occurred less than six months before the filing of a patent application and if: (1) a<br />

third person has disclosed the invention in an abusive way that obviously harms the<br />

applicants' interests; (2) the applicant has displayed the invention at an official<br />

international exhibition falling within the terms of the Convention on international<br />

exhibitions . 65<br />

Some countries, such as Spain and Portugal, which are Member States of the<br />

EPC, have a special regulation on grace period . The Spanish patent law offers a<br />

grace period for tests carried out by the applicant or by his legal predecessor<br />

62 See EPC Article 54<br />

63 See Patent law of the People's Republic of China, Article 22<br />

64 See Patent law of the People's Republic of China, Article 24<br />

65 See EPC, Article 55


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 197<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

provided that they do not imply using the invention or offering it for sale, and that<br />

they were carried out during the six months preceding the filing of the application.<br />

Under Portuguese patent law, the novelty of an invention shall not be eliminated by<br />

communications made before scientific societies or professional technical<br />

associations or for the purpose of Portuguese or international competitions or<br />

exhibitions if the patent application is filed in Portugal within 12 months.<br />

Furthermore, the grace period for abusive disclosures does not have any time<br />

limit. 66<br />

3.2. Utility<br />

The utility requirement demands the invention should be operable, in another<br />

words, the invention should be made or used and can produce effective results.<br />

While there are examples of inoperable inventions (e.g., perpetual motion<br />

machines), the operability requirement is easily satisfied. Therefore, it is more<br />

similar in Common Law countries and Civil Law countries.<br />

3.3. Non-Obviousness<br />

The inventive step and non-obviousness reflect a same general patentability<br />

requirement present in most patent laws, according to which an invention should be<br />

sufficiently inventive — i.e., non-obvious — in order to be patented.<br />

The expression "inventive step" is predominantly used for instance in<br />

Germany, in the United Kingdom and under the European Patent Convention<br />

(EPC), while the expression "non-obviousness" is predominantly used in United<br />

States patent law. Although the basic principle is roughly the same, the assessment<br />

of the inventive step and non-obviousness varies from one country to another. For<br />

instance, the practice of the European Patent Office (EPO) differs from the practice<br />

in the United States.<br />

3.3.1. In Common Law<br />

"Non-obviousness" is the term used in US patent law to describe one of the<br />

requirements that an invention must meet to qualify for patentability, codified in 35<br />

U.S.C. §103. One of the main requirements of patentability is that the invention<br />

being patented is not obvious, meaning that a "person having ordinary skill in the<br />

art" would not know how to solve the problem at which the invention is directed by<br />

using exactly the same mechanism. The Graham Factors, shown below, are used by<br />

courts to determine if the claimed invention is nonobvious.<br />

Further, the combination of previously known elements can be considered<br />

obvious. As stated by Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d. 1340, 1348<br />

66 See Grace Period in the Industrial Property Law, http://www.iprhelpdesk.org/documents/ES_GracePeriod_0000006559_00.xml.html


198 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

(Fed. Cir., 2000), there must be a suggestion or teaching in the prior art to combine<br />

elements shown in the prior art in order to find a patent obvious. Thus, in general<br />

the critical inquiry is whether there is something in the prior art to suggest the<br />

desirability, and thus the obvious nature, of the combination of previously known<br />

elements.<br />

This requirement is generally referred to as the "teaching-suggestionmotivation"<br />

(TSM) test and serves to prevent against hindsight bias (In re Kahn,<br />

Fed. Cir. 2006). As almost all inventions are some combination of known elements,<br />

the TSM test requires a patent examiner (or accused infringer) to show that some<br />

suggestion or motivation exists to combine known elements to form a claimed<br />

invention. Some critics of the TSM test have claimed that the test requires evidence<br />

of an explicit teaching or suggestion to make a particular modification to the prior<br />

art, but the Federal circuit has made clear that the motivation may be implicit, and<br />

may be provided for example by an advantage resulting from the modification. In<br />

other words, an explicit prior art teaching or suggestion to make a particular<br />

modification is sufficient, but not required for a finding of obviousness. The TSM<br />

test has been the subject of much criticism. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the<br />

issue in KSR v. Teleflex (2006). The unanimous decision, rendered on April 30,<br />

2007, overturned a decision of the Federal Circuit and held that it "analyzed the<br />

issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with §103 and our precedents,"<br />

referring to the Federal Circuit's application of the TSM test. 67 The court held that,<br />

while the ideas behind the TSM test and the Graham analysis were not necessarily<br />

inconsistent, the true test of nonobviousness is the Graham analysis. However,<br />

according to Chief Judge Michel, the TSM test remains a part of the Federal<br />

Circuit's analysis, though it is applied mindful of the decision in KSR. 68<br />

Graham Factors<br />

The factors a court will look at when determining obviousness and nonobviousness<br />

in the United States were outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham et<br />

al. v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City et al., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) and are commonly<br />

referred to as the "Graham factors" 69 . The court held that obviousness should be<br />

determined by looking at:<br />

(1)the scope and content of the prior art;<br />

(2)the level of ordinary skill in the art;<br />

(3)the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and<br />

(4)objective evidence of nonebviousness.<br />

67 See Syllabus and Opinion of the Court in KSR v. Teleflex<br />

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/04-1350.pdf<br />

68 See Lawrence Ebert,More on the impact of KSR, 2007-05-01,<br />

http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/more-on-the-impact-of-KSR/<br />

69 See Tag, Gramham factors,<br />

http://www.fedcirc.us/index.php?option=com_tag&tag=Graham%20factors


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 199<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

In addition, the court outlined examples of factors that show "objective<br />

evidence of nonebviousness". They are: (1)commercial success; (2) long-felt but<br />

unsolved needs; and (3)failure of others.<br />

3.3.2. In Civil Law<br />

1. In the EU<br />

Pursuant to the Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 56, first sentence,<br />

EPC, European patents shall be granted for inventions which inter alia involve an<br />

inventive step, that is, the invention, having regard to the state of the art, must not<br />

be obvious to a person skilled in the art. 70<br />

In the practice, The Examining Divisions, the Opposition Divisions, and the<br />

Boards of Appeal of the EPO almost always apply the "problem-solution approach"<br />

in order to decide whether an invention involves an inventive step. The approach<br />

consists in: (1)identifying the closest prior art, i.e., the most relevant prior art;<br />

(2)determining the objective technical problem, i.e., determining, in the view of the<br />

closest prior art, the technical problem which the claimed invention addresses and<br />

successfully solves; and (3)examining whether or not the claimed solution to the<br />

objective technical problem is obvious for the skilled person in view of the state of<br />

the art in general. 71<br />

This last step is conducted according to the "could-would approach".<br />

Pursuant to this approach, the question to address in order to assess whether the<br />

invention involves an inventive step is the following (the question is the climax of<br />

the problem-solution approach):Is there any teaching in the prior art, as a whole,<br />

that would, not simply could, have prompted the skilled person, faced with the<br />

objective technical problem formulated when considering the technical features not<br />

disclosed by the closest prior art, to modify or adapt said closest prior art while<br />

taking account of that teaching [the teaching of the prior art, not just the teaching of<br />

the closest prior art], thereby arriving at something falling within the terms of the<br />

claims, and thus achieving what the invention achieves? 72<br />

If the skilled person would have been prompted to modify the closest prior<br />

art in such a way as to arrive at something falling within the terms of the claims,<br />

then the invention does not involve an inventive step.<br />

The point is not whether the skilled person could have arrived at the<br />

invention by adapting or modifying the closest prior art, but whether he would have<br />

done so because the prior art incited him to do so in the hope of solving the<br />

objective technical problem or in expectation of some improvement or advantage.<br />

70 See EPC Article 56,―An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having<br />

regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.‖<br />

71 See The Problem-Solution Approach, http://www.spiraldomain.com/6h_Problem_Solution.htm<br />

72 See Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, 11.7.3 Could-would approach


200 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

This must have been the case for the skilled person before the filing or priority date<br />

valid for the claim under examination.<br />

2. In China<br />

Inventiveness means that, as compared with the technology existing before<br />

the date of filing the invention has prominent substantive features and represents a<br />

notable progress. 73<br />

3.4. Discussion<br />

In fact, it was more similar in common law and civil law. The difference<br />

focuses on two points, one is the first-to-file and first-to-invent, the other is grace<br />

period. Only in the court, or in the examination, judges or examiners would have<br />

different comprehension, in fact, there would be no substantial different between<br />

them.<br />

4. THE SCOPE OF CLAIMS<br />

Patent claims are usually in the form of series of specified elements and<br />

corresponding limitations, or more precisely noun phrases, following the<br />

description portion of the invention in a patent or patent application. The claims<br />

define, in technical terms, the extent of the protection conferred by a patent, or the<br />

protection sought in a patent application.<br />

Patent claims are the touchstone of patent protection, and it is the claims that<br />

make two functions. Patent claims serve as a way for the Patent Office to determine<br />

whether an invention is patentable, and as a way for a court to determine whether a<br />

patent has been infringed. In concept, a patent claim marks the boundaries of the<br />

patent in the same way as the legal description in a deed specifies the boundaries of<br />

the property.<br />

4.1. Disclosure<br />

The claims (typically found at the end of a patent document) provide a<br />

definition of what the patent protects. Terms used in a claim may be defined by the<br />

whole document, but ultimately only what is described in the claims is protected.<br />

The claims are always used when judging the validity of a patent (or application).<br />

When prior art is found, it must be compared against the claims to determine<br />

if the patent is new and nonobvious. Even if the "spirit of the invention" or the<br />

"general idea" is the same as in the prior art, if the claims contain one feature that is<br />

73 See Patent law of the People's Republic of China, Article 22


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 201<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

not mentioned in the prior art, the invention is new. If the one new feature is not<br />

obvious, then the claim is patentable. 74 So disclosure is very important.<br />

4.1.1. In Common Law<br />

The disclosure requirements of § 112 are perhaps the most important of any<br />

of the patentability requirements, and are at the heart of patent law‘s goal of<br />

promoting the progress of the useful arts. By requiring the patent applicant to claim<br />

the invention with clarity and to sufficiently disclose his invention to persons<br />

having ordinary skill in the art, patent law seeks to facilitate the dissemination of<br />

technical information and follow-on innovation. Moreover, the disclosure<br />

requirements oblige the patentee to provide notice to the public of what the<br />

patentee regards as the boundaries of his property right. 75<br />

There are four disclosure requirements under US patent law: (1) Enablement;<br />

(2) Written Description; (3) Best Mode; and (4) Definiteness. 76<br />

1. Enablement<br />

United States patent law requires that the patent specification "contain a<br />

written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and<br />

using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled<br />

in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make<br />

and use the same." 77 The requirement "to enable" a person of ordinary skill in the<br />

art to make and use the invention is colloquially referred to as the "enablement"<br />

requirement. A patent that does not meet the enablement requirement may be<br />

declared invalid by a court.<br />

The enablement requirement can be viewed as serving two functions: (1)<br />

information dissemination; and (2) constraining claim scope. Technical information<br />

disclosed in the patent has potential immediate value to follow-on researchers<br />

interested in improving the patented invention or to the public by contributing to<br />

the general storehouse of technical knowledge. 78<br />

2. Written Description<br />

As mentioned above, the patent specification "contain a written description of<br />

the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,<br />

clear, concise, and exact terms ".<br />

74<br />

See Determining the scope of a patent, http://www.iusmentis.com/patents/claims/<br />

75<br />

Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publisher, 2008, 49 ff<br />

76<br />

See 35 U.S.C. 112<br />

77<br />

See 35 U.S.C. 112<br />

78<br />

Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publisher, 2008, 51 ff


202 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

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The ‗‗purpose of the ‗written description‘ requirement is broader than to<br />

merely explain how to ‗make and use‘; the applicant must also convey with<br />

reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or<br />

she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the<br />

‗written description‘ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.‘‘ 79<br />

3. Best Mode<br />

The specification shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor<br />

of carrying out his invention. 80<br />

Determining compliance with the best mode requirement requires a twoprong<br />

inquiry. First, it must be determined whether, at the time the application was<br />

filed, the inventor possessed a best mode for practicing the invention. This is a<br />

subjective inquiry which focuses on the inventor's state of mind at the time of<br />

filing. Second, if the inventor did possess a best mode, it must be determined<br />

whether the written description disclosed the best mode such that a person skilled<br />

in the art could practice it. This is an objective inquiry, focusing on the scope of the<br />

claimed invention and the level of skill in the art. 81<br />

4. Definiteness<br />

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly<br />

pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards<br />

as his invention. 82<br />

Because claims delineate the patentee‘s right to exclude, the patent statute<br />

requires that the scope of the claims be sufficiently definite to inform the public of<br />

the bounds of the protected invention, i.e., what subject matter is covered by the<br />

exclusive rights of the patent. Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid infringement,<br />

defeating the public notice function of patent claims. 83 In the case ―Athletic<br />

Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ,‖court<br />

stated that ―the primary purpose of the requirement is ‗to guard against<br />

unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from<br />

uncertainty as to their respective rights.‘‖. The Supreme Court has stated that ―the<br />

statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in claims is met only when<br />

the claims clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art and<br />

clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.‖ 84 .<br />

79<br />

See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64<br />

80<br />

See 35 U.S.C. 112<br />

81<br />

See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963, 58 USPQ2d 1865, 1874 (Fed.<br />

Cir. 2001).<br />

82<br />

See 35 U.S.C. 112<br />

83<br />

See The Patent Prospector, http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2008/01/indefinite_drilling.html<br />

84<br />

See United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 203<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

4.1.2. In Civil Law<br />

1. In the EU<br />

Article 84 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) defines the function of<br />

the claims under the European Patent Convention, the function being to define the<br />

matter for which patent protection is sought. This article also imposes that the<br />

claims must be clear, concise as well as supported by the description of the<br />

European patent application or patent. The form and content of the claims are<br />

supported by Article 84, and supplemented by the Rule 43 EPC. 85<br />

2. In China<br />

The request shall state the title of the invention, the name of the inventor or<br />

creator, the name and the address of the applicant and other related matters. The<br />

description shall set forth the invention or utility model in a manner sufficiently<br />

clear and complete so as to enable a person skilled in the relevant field of<br />

technology to carry it out; where necessary, drawings are required. 86<br />

4.2. The Principle of Protection<br />

Similar to the language in a deed for real property (i.e., land), the claims are<br />

to set out the "metes and bounds" of the intellectual property protected by the<br />

patent. They are of the utmost importance both during prosecution and litigation.<br />

4.2.1. Literal Infringement<br />

Literal infringement demands that the accused product possess each and<br />

every limitation of at least one of the patent claims in suit. The Larami case<br />

highlights this rule as well as the importance of claim drafting, particularly drafting<br />

with an eye towards litigation and competitor conduct. Literal infringement cannot<br />

be avoided if the accused device contains additional elements not found in the<br />

claim. Literal infringement has considerable practical significance. 87<br />

While there are relatively few published opinions, literal infringement is a<br />

common occurrence in practice, largely because of the uncertainties relating to<br />

claim interpretation, namely, ‗‗the pre-litigation ambiguity of the literal scope of<br />

the claims.‘‘ 88<br />

85 See EPC Article 84, ―The claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought. They shall<br />

be clear and concise and be supported by the description‖<br />

86 See Patent law of the People's Republic of China, Article 26<br />

87 Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publisher, 2008, 434 ff<br />

88 Jannice M.Mueller, An Introduction to Patent Law, Aspen Publishing 2nd ed.,2006,287 ff .


204 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

4.2.2. The Doctrine of Equivalents<br />

The doctrine of equivalents is a legal rule in most of the world's patent<br />

systems that allows a court to hold a party liable for patent infringement even<br />

though the infringing device or process does not fall within the literal scope of a<br />

patent claim, but nevertheless is equivalent to the claimed invention. U.S. judge<br />

Learned Hand has described its purpose as being "to temper unsparing logic and<br />

prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention". 89<br />

The goal of the doctrine of equivalents is to provide patent owners with fair<br />

protection for their patents. Historically, courts took a literal approach to patent<br />

interpretation, based on established principles of legal interpretation. However, by<br />

the 18th and 19th centuries, this had come to be seen as unduly limiting on the<br />

scope of protection afforded a patent-holder, especially as patent applicants are<br />

often required to describe new technology for which an adequate vocabulary has<br />

not yet been developed. In response to this, the English courts developed a socalled<br />

'pith and marrow' approach, which tried to distinguish between the essential<br />

and non-essential features of a patent claim when deciding infringement cases. At<br />

the same time, courts in other countries, notably the United States, developed<br />

slightly different approaches to claim interpretation, of which the 'doctrine of<br />

equivalents' is perhaps the most famous. The equivalents doctrine takes a more<br />

holistic approach when comparing the patented invention with an alleged<br />

infringing device than did the 'pith and marrow' approach.<br />

4.3. Discussion<br />

To some extent, the claims are the most important part of a patent. Not the<br />

title, not the text, not the examples, and not the figures. It is the claims that define<br />

the boundaries of the patent owner's rights. Importantly, the patent owner's<br />

rights are exclusionary: he may exclude others from making, using, selling,<br />

offering to sell, and importing the patented invention (e.g., a product or a<br />

process) and importing a product made by a process patented in the importing<br />

country. To determine if someone is infringing a patent (that is, making or using the<br />

invention) without the patent owner's permission, the allegedly infringing product<br />

or process is compared only to the claims of the patent. Sometimes, claims defend<br />

on the demand of disclosure, and disclosure defends on the regulation.<br />

Actually, nowadays, many nations take the same steps to determine the scope<br />

of the claims. PCT is a good example for civil patent system, we could find the<br />

demands of claims, and we can easily find how broad the claims would be. The<br />

optimal scope of claims in Common Law and Civil Law countries are almost the<br />

same, sometimes they have to choose the same steps as PCT, so today claims get to<br />

be harmonized.<br />

89 See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948).


Zhao Wenhua and Zhang Zhu 205<br />

______________________________________________________________________________


206 The Optimal Scope of Patent Protection in Common Law and<br />

Civil Law Countries<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

5. CONCLUSIONS<br />

Firstly, subject matter should be restricted in some scope, and maybe civil<br />

law could give some more width scope; as mentioned in the article, there are three<br />

important factors to determine how broad the subject matter could be. Nowadays,<br />

globalization changes behavior of countries, though patent law is always a national<br />

law issue. More and more countries make efforts to harmonize patent law system in<br />

the worldwide range. Since USA adopted software to be subject matter, many<br />

countries amended their law to adapt the change, but it was not a good thing, which<br />

means more and more countries want to divide the market in their territories.<br />

Therefore, I think the optimal scope of subject matter is the criterion of EPC, which<br />

could be more effective and sufficient to protect patent, and provide the ability for<br />

every country to protect patent. But EPC would not have sufficient reasons to<br />

refuse broader protection, and reject the profits during the EU nations. Maybe in<br />

few years, we would find more and more countries, never mind in Common Law<br />

countries, or in Civil Law countries, including EU and China, would have to<br />

choose the broader scope of subject matters. And someday, we could find no one<br />

would think invention is necessary for a patent, many other things could be<br />

eligible.<br />

Secondly, grace period should be harmonized. And first-to-file will substitute<br />

first-to-invent. How long grace period will be is related with the choice of first-tofile<br />

and first-to-invent. Three years ago, USA made a try to change first-to-invent<br />

system into first-to-file system. So we could expect the same regulation on first-tofile<br />

system and the same length and width of grace period.<br />

Thirdly, the scope of claims will be more similar in Common Law countries<br />

and Civil Law countries. Case Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.<br />

was quoted as a common reorganization on enablement, never mind in Common<br />

Law countries or Civil Law countries.<br />

Fourthly, nowadays, most countries choose same term of patent protection.<br />

The duration will achieve more protection under same regulations, on the other<br />

hand, some countries would refuse giving longer term protection, so it is an<br />

opportunity to harmonize the term worldwide.<br />

Finally, international treaties will be more effective, and will push the<br />

progress to whole patent system. When we look back to the history, we could find<br />

after WTO established, there were how many changes happened. It will be<br />

beneficial to each country. PCT could play an important role in the harmonization<br />

all the world, which could provide a standard for each country.


THE MADRID PROTOCOL FOR TRADEMARK REGISTRATION:<br />

WOULD IT BE CONVENIENT FOR BOLIVIA?<br />

by<br />

Pablo Kyllmann 1<br />

DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH<br />

1. WHAT IS THE MADRID PROTOCOL?<br />

1.1. Traditional System<br />

1.2. Madrid Protocol<br />

2. WHY THE MADRID PROTOCOL?<br />

2.1 The International Conference of The Union For The Protection of<br />

Industrial Property held in Madrid, April 2 to 14, 1890<br />

2.2. Development<br />

3. MEMBERS OF THE PROTOCOL<br />

3.1. Madrid Union<br />

3.2. Does the Protocol work for the Members?<br />

4. NOT MEMBERS OF THE PROTOCOL<br />

4.1. Who are not Members and Why?<br />

4.2. The Case of Bolivia<br />

5. FINAL REMARK<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

The Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of Marks<br />

(―the Madrid Agreement‖ that was concluded in 1891 and entered into force in<br />

1892), and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement (―the Madrid Protocol‖<br />

or ―the Protocol‖ that was adopted in 1989, entered into force on December 1,<br />

1995, and came into operation on April 1, 1996) are treaties which were adopted at<br />

1 Pablo Kyllmann is an attorney in private practice in Bolivia, IP LL.M. 2010 (University of<br />

Turin and <strong>WIPO</strong>), Domain Name Panellist for the .bo, and co-founder of DAK Intellectual Property<br />

(www.dak.com.bo).


208 The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration:<br />

Would it be Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Diplomatic Conference held in Madrid, Spain, and are conveniently referred to<br />

jointly as ―the Madrid system‖. 2<br />

The application of these two treaties is governed by two texts, namely the<br />

Common Regulations under the Madrid Agreement and Protocol (―the Common<br />

Regulations‖ or ―the Regulations‖) and the Administrative Instructions for the<br />

Application of the Madrid Agreement and Protocol (―the Administrative<br />

Instructions‖). 3<br />

The Madrid system of international registration of marks is administered by<br />

the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (<strong>WIPO</strong>) in<br />

Geneva, Switzerland. 4<br />

This international procedural mechanism offers a trademark owner the<br />

possibility to have his trademark protected in several countries by filing one<br />

application directly with his own national or regional trademark office. An<br />

international mark so registered is equivalent to an application or a registration of<br />

the same mark effected directly in each of the countries designated by the<br />

applicant. If the trademark office of a designated country does not refuse protection<br />

within a specified period, the protection of the mark is the same as if it had been<br />

registered by that Office.<br />

The Madrid system also deals with the subsequent management of the mark,<br />

like recording subsequent changes or to renew the registration through a procedural<br />

step at the International Bureau of <strong>WIPO</strong>. Also further countries may be designated<br />

subsequently. I will mention later which countries are members of the Madrid<br />

Union, but I can anticipate that the Madrid Union has 84 members today February<br />

22, 2010).<br />

It is important to study this system and the possible implications that the<br />

eventual ratification and application of it would have in a specific country or region<br />

and arrive to conclusions and recommendations.<br />

I have chosen to conduct my research paper about the Protocol (not the<br />

Agreement) because the Protocol has more chances to meet the expectations of<br />

holders, representatives and contracting parties to attract more undeveloped<br />

countries also to the system. For example, the official language for the Agreement<br />

is only French, but for the Protocol the official languages are French, English, and<br />

2World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the International Registration of Marks under<br />

the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva, 2008, p. A. 1.<br />

3World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the International Registration of Marks under<br />

the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva, 2008, p. A. 1.<br />

4World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the International Registration of Marks under<br />

the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva, 2008, p. A. 2.


Pablo Kyllmann 209<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Spanish. On the other hand, just States can be members of the Agreement, but<br />

States and Organizations can be members of the Protocol. The other difference is<br />

that the basic mark for the Agreement has to be a basic registration, but for the<br />

Protocol it can be a basic registration or application. Also has to be mentioned that<br />

the Protocol permits ―individual fees‖ to be decided by each Contracting Party for<br />

each designation, but with the condition of not charging higher than national fees.<br />

With respect to periods of denial, the Protocol provides for the possibility that the<br />

Contracting Parties replace the general term for the 12 months notice or the refusal<br />

of protection for a period of 18 months, or if denial is based in an opposition, an<br />

even longer period.<br />

The system has to be attractive, flexible, and user friendly, but there are<br />

concerns in countries like South American countries about the implications that the<br />

eventual ratification and application of the Protocol would have in a specific<br />

country or region. No South American country (with the exception of Cuba,<br />

Antigua and Barbuda) is a member of the system. Bolivia is not a member, so I<br />

analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the Protocol specifically for Bolivia,<br />

considering the stakeholders: IP Agents, National IP Office, National Applicants,<br />

Foreign Applicants, Bolivia itself.<br />

1. WHAT IS THE MADRID PROTOCOL?<br />

1.1. Traditional System<br />

A mark can get protection through different routes: a. National route (country<br />

by country), b. Regional route (Example: European Union), and c. International<br />

route (Example: Madrid system, specifically in my research paper, the Madrid<br />

Protocol).<br />

The traditional system would be the national route or national system.<br />

Anybody can use the national system filing applications in the countries of interest.<br />

The argument against this system is that there are several languages involved<br />

because each country has its own language, different national procedural rules, and<br />

lawyers in each country that make the cost are higher. But the traditional system is<br />

very important and depending the country and region has to be analyzed and used<br />

to satisfy the different interests analyzed in my research paper.


210 The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration:<br />

Would it be Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

1.2. Madrid Protocol<br />

Any State which is party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of<br />

Industrial Property may become a party to the Agreement or the Protocol or both.<br />

In addition, an intergovernmental organization may become a party to the Protocol<br />

(but not the Agreement).<br />

It has to be mentioned that an international mark does not exist. The system<br />

is a procedural system, an international application must be presented to the<br />

International Bureau through the IP office which is the Office of Origin of the<br />

applicant: The IP Office of the contracting party where the applicant has: a.<br />

required company, b. domicile, or c. nationality.<br />

The system is only for family members meaning this that the system can not<br />

be used by a person or legal entity which does not have the necessary connection,<br />

through establishment, domicile or nationality, with a member of the Madrid<br />

Union. Nor can it be used to protect a mark outside the Madrid Union.<br />

The filing formalities indicate that there is one form (MM2), one language<br />

(English, French or Spanish), and payment of the following fees: a. basic fee, b. a<br />

complementary fee in respect of each designated Contracting Party for which no<br />

individual fee is payable, and c. a supplementary fee in respect of each class of<br />

goods and services beyond the third.<br />

The international registration is for ten years, renewable per periods of ten<br />

years. There is a centralized management, for example regarding also assignments,<br />

changes in name and address of holder and representative, recording of limitation,<br />

renunciation and cancellation, recording of licenses. All this at the International<br />

Bureau, not with local law firms neither with National Offices. The International<br />

Bureau does the formality examination, publication at the <strong>WIPO</strong> Gazette,<br />

inscription in the International Register, issues one certificate, and notifies it to all<br />

the designated contracting parties. An International trademark registration (ITM)<br />

means, in other words, that there is one registration with many designations.<br />

The countries that are the major users of the Madrid Protocol are Germany,<br />

France, and the United States. The average fee per registration is CHF 3.734 (Three<br />

thousand seven hundred thirty four 00/100 Swiss Francs) that are about US$ 3.638<br />

(Three thousand six hundred thirty eight 00/100 American dollars).<br />

The ten top holders of ITM registrations in 2008 are Henkel (DE), Janssen<br />

Pharmaceutica (BE), Novartis (CH), L'Oreal (FR), Nestlé (CH), Unilever (NL),<br />

Sanofi-Aventis (FR), Siemens Building Technologies Fire & Security Products<br />

(DE), ITM Enterprises (FR), Lidle (Germany).


Pablo Kyllmann 211<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> states that the system of international registration of marks has several<br />

advantages for trademark owners. Instead of filing many national applications in all<br />

countries of interest, in several different languages, in accordance with different<br />

national procedural rules and regulations and paying several different (and often<br />

higher) fees, an international registration may be obtained by filing one application<br />

with the International Bureau (through the Office of the home country), in one<br />

language (either English, French, or Spanish) and paying one set of fees.<br />

According to <strong>WIPO</strong> similar advantages exist when the registration has to be<br />

renewed, this involves the payment of the necessary fees, every 10 years, to the<br />

International Bureau. Likewise, if the international registration is assigned to a<br />

third party or any other change, such as a change in name and/or address, has<br />

occurred, this may be recorded with effect for all the designated Contracting Parties<br />

by means of a single procedural step. Later I will analyse the implications of this.<br />

2. WHY THE MADRID PROTOCOL?<br />

2.1. The International Conference of The Union For The Protection of<br />

Industrial Property held in Madrid, April 2-14, 1890<br />

The system (first as the Madrid Agreement) was created as a system to<br />

expand a national mark.<br />

At the fourth session on April 09, 1890 at the international conference of the<br />

Union for the protection of industrial property held in Madrid (April 2 to 14, 1890),<br />

the subject of the Agreement concerning the international registration of<br />

trademarks was finally addressed. The text serving as a basis for discussion was<br />

that which had been submitted by the Swiss administration in the preceding<br />

Conference in Rome, with amendments made by Italy. The Swiss project accorded<br />

with the spirit of the International Convention of March 20, 1883, but it was<br />

criticized for depriving the signatory states of the fees they had been receiving, and<br />

for failing to take into account relevant national legislations. 5<br />

At all events, from the beginning of the Conference, national registration was<br />

regarded as the basis of international protection.<br />

But this system would be disadvantageous to signatory countries which were<br />

less developed industrially. Such countries which consumed more than they<br />

produced, and which therefore received more files from abroad than from their own<br />

nationals, would have to set very high fees for international registration,<br />

compensating with the few trademarks they filed internationally for the lack of<br />

income resulting from the shortage of direct registration of foreign trademarks in<br />

5REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL, MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA Y ENERGIA,<br />

A brief history of the Madrid Agreement concerning the international registration of marks signed<br />

1891, Impresión Epes, Industrias Gráficas, S.L., Spain, 1989.


212 The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration:<br />

Would it be Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

their national offices. Mr. Snyder, a delegate from the Netherlands, pointed out the<br />

inequities which would result from the adoption of this clause of the draft. In his<br />

opinion, an international surcharge of 200 francs should be added to the fees freely<br />

established by each state. This suggestion sparked a lively argument, since it would<br />

mean sacrificing one of the main purposes of the Agreement: to offer international<br />

protection of trademarks at a moderate cost. 6<br />

2.2. Development<br />

The Madrid Protocol introduced elements into the system originally created<br />

under the base of the Madrid Agreement in order to favor the accession of new<br />

States and Intergovernmental Organizations like the European Community.<br />

As mentioned, the Protocol permits ―individual fees‖ to be decided by each<br />

Contracting Party for each designation, but with the condition of not charging<br />

higher than national fees. With respect to periods of denial, the Protocol provides<br />

for the possibility that the Contracting Parties replace the general term for the 12<br />

months notice or the refusal of protection for a period of 18 months, or if denial is<br />

based in an opposition, an even longer period. Under the Protocol it is possible to<br />

file an international applications based on a pending trade mark application, so that<br />

a trade mark owner can file an international application concurrently with or<br />

immediately after filing an application in a member jurisdiction. By comparison,<br />

the Agreement requires that the trade mark owner already holds an existing<br />

registration in a member jurisdiction.<br />

Also one significant development is the mentioned that the official language<br />

for the Agreement is only French, but for the Protocol the official languages are<br />

French, English, and Spanish.<br />

The system has been revised through the years, but it did not adjust to the<br />

necessities of all countries, so that at the beginning of 1989 only 23 countries were<br />

members. Today the Protocol has 80 members.<br />

It has to be mentioned the accession of the United States on November 02,<br />

2003 and the accession of the European Union on October 01, 2004 as mayor<br />

accessions to the Protocol.<br />

6 REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL, MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA Y ENERGIA,<br />

A brief history of the Madrid Agreement concerning the international registration of marks signed<br />

1891, Impresión Epes, Industrias Gráficas, S.L., Spain, 1989.


Pablo Kyllmann 213<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

3. MEMBERS OF THE PROTOCOL<br />

3.1. Madrid Union<br />

Together, the Contracting Parties to the Agreement and the Protocol<br />

constitute the Madrid Union, which is a Special Union under Article 19 of the Paris<br />

Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The mentioned article<br />

indicates the following: It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve the<br />

right to make separately between themselves special agreements for the protection<br />

of industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the<br />

provisions of this Convention.<br />

The Madrid Union has 84 current members: Albania (A&P), Germany<br />

(A&P), Antigua and Barbuda (P), Algeria (A), Armenia (A&P), Australia (P),<br />

Austria (A&P), Azerbaijan (A&P), Bahrain (P), Belarus (A&P), Belgium (A&P),<br />

Bhutan (A&P), Bosnia and Herzegovina (A&P), Botswana (P), Bulgaria (A&P),<br />

China (A&P), European Community (P), Croatia (A&P), Cuba (A& P), Denmark<br />

(P), Egypt (A&P), Slovakia (A & P), Slovenia (A&P), Spain (A&P), USA (P),<br />

Estonia (P), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (A&P), Russian Federation<br />

(A&P), Finland (P), France (A&P), Georgia (P), Ghana (P), Greece (P), Hungary<br />

(A&P), Iran - Islamic Republic of (A&P), Ireland (P), Iceland (P), Italy (A & P),<br />

Japan (P), Kazakhstan (A), Kenya (A & P), Kyrgyzstan (A& P), Lesotho (A&P),<br />

Latvia (A&P), Liberia (A& P) , Liechtenstein (A& P), Lithuania (P), Luxembourg<br />

(A&P), Madagascar (P), Morocco (A& P), Monaco (A&P), Mongolia (A& P),<br />

Montenegro (A& P), Mozambique (A&P), Namibia (A&P), Norway (P), Oman<br />

(P), the Netherlands: - Territory in Europe (A& P) and Netherlands Antilles (P),<br />

Poland (A& P), Portugal (A&P), UK (P), Czech Republic (A&P), Syrian Arab<br />

Republic (A&P), Republic of Korea (P), Republic of Moldova (A& P), Democratic<br />

People's Republic of Korea (A&P), Romania (A&P), San Marino (A& P), Sao<br />

Tome and Principe (P), Serbia (A&P), Sierra Leone (A&P), Singapore (P), Sudan<br />

(A), Sweden (P), Switzerland (A&P), Swaziland (A&P), Tajikistan (A),<br />

Turkmenistan (P), Turkey (P), Ukraine (A&P), Uzbekistan (P), Vietnam (A & P),<br />

Zambia (P).<br />

So (A) means part of the Agreement (56), and (P) means part of the Protocol<br />

(80). No protection may apply separately for Belgium, Luxembourg and the<br />

Netherlands, but only for all these three countries (Benelux) subject to payment of<br />

a fee complement or a unique individual rate. The territory of the Netherlands<br />

Antilles is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. However, the Benelux<br />

Trademark Act does not apply in the territory of the Netherlands Antilles. These<br />

have their own trademark law and their own Office in charge of registering<br />

trademarks. Protection from the Netherlands Antilles must be submitted through a<br />

specific designation of the Netherlands Antilles, other than the designation of the<br />

Benelux.


214 The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration:<br />

Would it be Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

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3.2. Does the Protocol Work for the Members?<br />

The Madrid Protocol has its advantages and disadvantages. Japan is a<br />

member of the Protocol, but 80% of the Japanese companies opt to file their<br />

trademarks through the national route. Maybe Japanese companies fear the<br />

disadvantages of the Madrid Protocol.<br />

Regarding the regional exchange of commerce, the treaty can be useful for<br />

certain regions and not for other regions; it works for some members, and not for<br />

others.<br />

4. NOT MEMBERS OF THE PROTOCOL<br />

4.1. Who are not Members and why?<br />

Many countries are not members of the Protocol yet because as mentioned<br />

the Protocol has its advantages and disadvantages that each country has to consider<br />

according to his own reality.<br />

The world has different regions and different countries with diverse<br />

economies and laws, and systems of Intellectual Property protection. For each<br />

country there are stakeholders that have to be taken into consideration the moment<br />

of studying this system and the possible implications that the eventual ratification<br />

and application of it would have in a specific country or region and arrive to<br />

conclusions and recommendations.<br />

4.2. The Case of Bolivia<br />

My analysis considers the stakeholders (IP Agents, National IP Office,<br />

National Applicants, Foreign Applicants, Bolivia itself):<br />

IP Agents<br />

The registration is done for 10 years and renewals and changes are done<br />

directly at the International Bureau of <strong>WIPO</strong>, not with local agents. This situation<br />

is against the income of the IP agents. Law firms reduce staff, so less people<br />

specializes in IP. Agents can prepare themselves for the eventual ratification of the<br />

Protocol because it is mentioned that litigation will increase, licenses too, but<br />

actually it is uncertain and in a country like Bolivia where judges and authorities do<br />

not now work properly regarding litigation, less will litigation work if the<br />

registration of the trademark is in the International Bureau. Unfortunately IP is seen<br />

many times as a strange distant discipline, and could be seen further away with the<br />

Protocol. It is not good to centralize the applications in Geneva, it is like State<br />

control, and it is difficult to conduct searches.


Pablo Kyllmann 215<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

National IP Office<br />

The National Office has to work well for receiving a system like the Protocol.<br />

In Bolivia, the National IP Office is not ready for the Protocol. It needs capacity<br />

building and automation first, support staff. The registration is done for 10 years<br />

and renewals and changes are done directly at the International Bureau of <strong>WIPO</strong>,<br />

not with local agents, and not with the National Office, so it is replacing those<br />

important works for the National Office and income. The National Office loses<br />

competence with the Protocol, does not only lose the competence to do the<br />

formality examination, but also loses the competence to renew the trademark or to<br />

record the following changes regarding the trademarks (changes of name, address,<br />

etc.), so there is a limitation in the work for the National IP Office, also taxes are<br />

not paid locally.<br />

The publication is insufficient because the international applications are<br />

published in the <strong>WIPO</strong> Gazette. The applications could be republished in the<br />

country again, but the cost would be too high. The law in Bolivia obligates to<br />

publish the applications in Bolivia, so the Protocol is against Bolivian law. I see<br />

constitutional problems and sovereignty problems because also when a country<br />

ratifies the Protocol the Assembly takes legislative decisions and can modify the<br />

system. The territoriality justification for sovereignty and jurisdiction is an<br />

argument that is important. Now it is not possible to file an international<br />

application directly in Geneva at the International Bureau, but maybe in the near<br />

future the Assembly will decide to change the rules, so that also any other change<br />

can happen through the Assembly and not the Legislative Power of a certain<br />

country.<br />

National Applicants<br />

If the country does not use the right to deny the application, an administrative<br />

positive silence is applied, so that the trademark is considered registered. This can<br />

bring problems because the National Office should mention if accepts or not the<br />

application. From year 2010 all countries will have to communicate their decision.<br />

Till 2009 if there was no opposition the international application was considered<br />

registered and problems can arise if that application is very similar or identical to<br />

an existent trademark and the National Office did not deny it properly on time for<br />

examination difficulties, and the public itself can suffer confusion.<br />

The National Office receives income from the designations and the country<br />

can establish individual fees with the condition that those individual fees are not<br />

higher than national fees, so if we increase the individual fees for Bolivia, national<br />

fees will also have to be increased in detriment of national applicants (national<br />

users).<br />

There is also the problem of the central attack, there is no security. I mean,<br />

there is the possibility to transform and re-file the application locally, but maybe it


216 The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration:<br />

Would it be Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

is better to file directly in the market of interest. For example, regarding Japan,<br />

80% of the Japanese companies opt to file their trademarks through the national<br />

route. Maybe Japanese companies fear the ―central attack‖.<br />

The Protocol is a mechanism that facilitates the access to transnational<br />

companies, is not good for local companies because Bolivia does not export<br />

trademarks as much as receiving them. Local companies have to defend and file<br />

oppositions against new international applications, so it is not good for local<br />

companies. The searches cost increases and is more complicated with the Protocol.<br />

Foreign Applicants<br />

The Protocol reduces costs for companies that export much IP and simplifies<br />

the monitoring of the trademarks.<br />

A Contracting Party, indicating the motives, can deny the protection of the<br />

international application in his territory after 12 to 18 months after the publication<br />

of the application. In Bolivia it takes about 10 months from application to<br />

registration. With the Protocol the country can communicate the acceptance or<br />

denial before, but I believe our National Office would take the 12 to 18 months to<br />

do so if Bolivia ratifies the Protocol, so it would not be good for the foreign<br />

applicants.<br />

Also a problem is the one regarding to the ―central attack‖. There is the<br />

possibility to transform and file an application locally, but it is better to file directly<br />

in the market of interest.<br />

With the Protocol the search cost increases and is more complicated.<br />

The Case of Bolivia<br />

Bolivia is a developing country, not an emerging economy. The world has a<br />

widely variant economic reality, and attitudes toward IP tend to differ greatly<br />

between countries that import IP and countries that export it.<br />

5. FINAL REMARK<br />

The regional exchange in South America tells us to wait and see. There is no<br />

value addition for Bolivia for ratifying the Protocol.


Pablo Kyllmann 217<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

David Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, Longman, 7 th Ed, 2009.<br />

E.P. WINNER. A.W. DENBER, International Trademark Treaties with<br />

Commentary, Oceana <strong>Publication</strong>s, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York, USA, 2004.<br />

F.M. ABBOTT-TH. COTTIER-F. GURRY, International Intellectual<br />

Property in an Integrated World Economy, Aspen Publishers, New York, USA,<br />

2007.<br />

L.E. BERTONE-G. CABANELLAS, Derecho de marcas, Marca, Designaciones<br />

Y Nombres Comerciales, Tomo I and II; Editorial Heliasta, Buenos Aires, 2003.<br />

Lionel Bently-Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University<br />

Press, 2009.<br />

M. LOBATO, Comentario a la Ley 17/2001, de marcas, Ed. Thomson -<br />

Civitas, 2 a ed., 2007.<br />

REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL, MINISTERIO DE<br />

INDUSTRIA Y ENERGIA, A brief history of the Madrid Agreement concerning<br />

the international registration of marks signed 1891, Impresión Epes, Industrias<br />

Gráficas, S.L., Spain, 1989.<br />

S. ALIKHAN, World Intellectual Property Organization, Socio-Economic<br />

Benefits of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

publication, Geneva, 2000.<br />

Willliam Cornish-David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright,<br />

Trade Marks and Allied Rights, Thomson-Sweet & Maxwell, 2007.<br />

World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the International<br />

Registration of Marks under the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol,<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva, 2008.<br />

World Intellectual Property Organization, Intellectual Property A Power tool<br />

for Economic Growth, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva, 2003.<br />

World Intellectual Property Organization, Summaries of Conventions,<br />

Treaties and Agreements Administered by <strong>WIPO</strong>, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva,<br />

2006.<br />

World Intellectual Property Organization, The Madrid Agreement<br />

Concerning the International Registration of Marks and the Protocol Relating to


218 The Madrid Protocol for Trademark Registration:<br />

Would it be Convenient for Bolivia?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

that Agreement: Objectives, Main Features, Advantages, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication,<br />

Geneva, 2008.<br />

World Intellectual Property Organization, <strong>WIPO</strong> Intellectual Property<br />

Handbook, Second Edition, <strong>WIPO</strong> publication, Geneva, 2004, Reprinted 2008.<br />

Articles<br />

DENIS S. PRAHL, The Madrid Protocol: International Trademark<br />

Protection for United States Trademark Owners, USA, 2003 (www.marcasur.com).<br />

F. TRIANA-SOTO, Aspectos polémicos del Protocolo de Madrid, Colombia,<br />

2006 (www.dinero.com).<br />

J. BARREDA, The Madrid Protocol: Does it require a revision? In<br />

Trademark World No. 118, 1998/1999, 29-33.<br />

W.D. UBEDA, No al Protocolo de Madrid en el CAFTA, Nicaragua, 2004<br />

(www.marcasur.com).<br />

Laws and Treaties<br />

Arreglo de Madrid relativo al Registro Internacional de Marcas, del 14 de<br />

abril de 1891, revisado en Bruselas el 14 de diciembre de 1900, en Washington el 2<br />

de junio de 1911, en la Haya el 6 de noviembre de 1925, en Londres el 2 de junio<br />

de 1934, en Niza el 15 de junio de 1957, en Estocolmo el 14 de julio de 1967 y<br />

modificado el 28 de septiembre de 1979-Protocolo concerniente al Arreglo de<br />

Madrid relativo al Registro Internacional de Marcas, adoptado en Madrid el 27 de<br />

junio de 1989, modificado el 3 de octubre de 2006 y el 12 de noviembre de 2007-<br />

Reglamento, texto en vigor el 1 de septiembre de 2008-Instrucciones<br />

Administrativas, texto en vigor el 1 de enero de 2008.<br />

Constitución Política del Estado, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.<br />

Decisión 486, Régimen Común sobre Propiedad Industrial (Bolivia,<br />

Colombia, Ecuador, and Perú).<br />

Websites:<br />

www.asipi.org.<br />

www.comunidadandina.org.<br />

www.dinero.com.<br />

www.inta.org.<br />

www.marcasur.com.


Pablo Kyllmann 219<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

www.oepm.es.<br />

www.turin-ip.com.<br />

www.wipo.int.<br />

www.wto.org.<br />

Others<br />

Gaceta del Congreso, Ponencia para primer debate al proyecto de Ley No.<br />

277 de 2009, República de Colombia.<br />

Gaceta del Senado, Punto de acuerdo sobre el Protocolo de Madrid, por el<br />

Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Verde Ecologista de México, 2008, México.<br />

Proyecto de Ley No. 277 de 2009, Senado, 2009, República de Colombia.


OMPARATIVE STUDY OF WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS<br />

PROTECTION IN ITALY, PAKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Saad Nasrullah<br />

Luigi Mastroianni<br />

Djakhagir Aripov<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

1. INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION OF WELL KNOWN<br />

TRADEMARKS:<br />

1.1. Protection of Well Known Trade Marks under the Paris Convention<br />

1.2. Protection of Well Known Trademarks under TRIPS<br />

1.3. <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendation for Well Known Trademarks<br />

2. PROTECTION OF WELL KNOWN TRADEMARKS IN ITALY:<br />

3. PROTECTION OF WELL KNOWN TRADEMARKS IN PAKISTAN:<br />

4. PROTECTION OF WELL KNOWN TRADEMARKS IN UZBEKISTAN:<br />

5 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS<br />

CONCLUSIONS


222 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

Well-known international trademarks such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, IBM<br />

and Google surpass the boundary of marks known only in single countries. It is<br />

now generally accepted that these well-known marks should be given protection<br />

against later registration by third parties — although laws to offer this protection<br />

are still being developed. The definition and protection of well-known trademarks<br />

is still a grey area internationally. Despite general recognition that protection<br />

should be given to well-known marks, the national laws implementing the Paris<br />

Convention Art 6 Bis at present give variable protection depending upon<br />

jurisdiction. 1<br />

Well-known trademarks have been a legal concept that requires interpretation<br />

by the authorities of the country in which protection is sought. Its protective scope<br />

depends on the authorities‘ objective of protection of well-known trademarks. Mass<br />

media, telecommunications, travels and advertising promotion make people<br />

become familiar with the trademarks in other countries. Especially the extensive,<br />

skillful and modern advertising promotion can bring the high reputation to the<br />

owners. The effects of well-known trademarks extend to unrelated field in<br />

comparison with the original goods or services the trademarks are used. However,<br />

the trademark piracy and unfair use affect the owner of well-known trademark to<br />

expand their business activities under those marks in other jurisdiction. For the<br />

sake of the protection of consumers‘ interests and trademark owner‘s reputation,<br />

the enhanced protection of well-known trademarks has become the international<br />

trend. 2<br />

Some trade marks are so well known that their fame transcends the bounds of<br />

normal trademark law. 3 A ―strong‖ and famous brand may give unrelated firms<br />

incentives to choose a free riding strategy to exploit the full potential of the brand:<br />

a small producer of skis might, for example, be interested in using the FERRARI<br />

brand for the launch of a new product line. Free riding may, in turn, generate<br />

negative spillover effects that may derive from a free riding strategy on a famous<br />

trademark. In reality, the defense of the extended protection of ―strong‖ trademarks<br />

may be to a great extent based on the likelihood that free riding practices dilute the<br />

promotional value of a trademark. The rationale behind the extension of protection<br />

to include principles of antidilution and prohibitions against free riding has been<br />

clear to both courts and commentators from the very beginning. When a trademark<br />

may be perceived as ―strong‖ because it possesses a distinctive character or is<br />

―famous,‖ then its value is endangered by unauthorized uses by a non-related third<br />

party; this is true even though consumers may not be misled. Rather than aim<br />

1<br />

Protecting and managing well-known trademarks by Vasheharan Kanesarajah, Thomson<br />

Scientific, November 2007<br />

2<br />

Protection of well-known trademarks the comparision of trademark examination standards and<br />

trademark law systems between Japan and China, Xia Qing<br />

3<br />

Well-known Marks, Famous Marks and Dilution, Chapter 12 page 398.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 223<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

merely to protect against confusion as to the origin of goods, these extended<br />

protections are intended to avoid dilution of the promotional value of trademarks<br />

and the misappropriation of the capital of publicity invested in trademarks. As a<br />

result, protections are now afforded to trademarks where they formerly might not<br />

have been. The trademark ROLLS-ROYCE can now be protected, for example, in<br />

most jurisdictions against its use as sign for a pub even if no consumer would be<br />

misled into believing that the trademark owner had branched off into pub<br />

franchises or that there is an association with or sponsorship of the pub by the<br />

luxury car manufacturer. For a finding of infringement, confusion as to the origin<br />

of goods is no longer required. It is sufficient that consumers establish some sort of<br />

link between the junior sign and the senior one, and such a link may be established<br />

even if the goods are comparatively remote. 4<br />

However, even though a trademark has acquired the position of a globally<br />

well known trademark it cannot be said that their goods or services are actually<br />

supplied to the market in every country and in addition, this also does not mean<br />

that these trademarks are registered in every country throughout the world.<br />

Therefore, in the case such a trademark happens to be imitated or pirated in a<br />

country in which it is not registered or used yet, namely when a trademark identical<br />

or similar to such a well-known or famous trademark is applied for registration or<br />

begun to be used by an unrelated third party, the Trademark Office or Court of that<br />

country is confronted with complex legal issues in order to deal with this situation.<br />

Moreover in the case a third party applies for registration of this type of<br />

bothersome trademark under his own name or commences to use that trademark in<br />

respect of the goods or services that are quite remote from the goods or services on<br />

which the well-known or famous trademark is used, the Trademark Office or Court<br />

of that country encounters even more complex legal issues 5 .<br />

4<br />

N. BOTTERO-A. MANGÀNI-M. RICOLFI, The Extended Protection of “Strong” Trademarks, in 11 Marquette<br />

Intellectual Property Law Review, 2007, 265 ss<br />

5<br />

Japan Patent Office Asia-Pacific Industrial Property Center, JIII-Protection of Well-Known<br />

and Famous Trademarks


224 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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1. INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION OF WELL-<br />

KNOWN TRADEMARKS<br />

1.1. Protection of Well-known Trademarks under the Paris Convention<br />

The universal body of law on well-known marks finds its roots in the 1925<br />

addition of Article 6bis to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial<br />

Property (hereinafter ―Paris Convention‖). Article 6bis states that participating<br />

countries agree to prohibit use of with the mark of someone else and used on<br />

identical or similar goods.<br />

This Article was introduced into the Convention by the Revision Conference<br />

of The Hague in 1925. It was somewhat modified at two subsequent Revision<br />

Conferences, held in London in 1934 and in Lisbon in 1958, but it still retains its<br />

original number. At the latter Conference, the Article was very thoroughly<br />

discussed and its application, which formerly concerned only the refusal or<br />

cancellation of the registration of a mark conflicting with a mark which is well<br />

known in the country concerned, was then extended to a prohibition of the use of<br />

the mark first mentioned.<br />

For many years international trade mark law (as opposed to national law)<br />

concentrated on the protection that was granted to trade marks through registration.<br />

A frequent theme in the discussion of international trade mark law in the first part<br />

of the twentieth century was the extent to which rights should be granted, first, to<br />

unregistered marks and, secondly, to marks used on dissimilar goods or services.<br />

Hence, Article 6bis was originally designed to address the concept that owners of<br />

marks which were widely known in the marketplace but not registered needed<br />

some measures of protection against later registrations of the same mark by others.<br />

This was deemed to be particularly important in jurisdictions where the rights to a<br />

trade mark flow principally from registration rather than from mere use. However,<br />

the concentration on registration is no longer paramount ad in some legislations the<br />

distinction between the rights which derive from registration and those from mere<br />

use is blurred, most notably in the Regulation on the European Community Trade<br />

Mark, in which registration and user rights are both recognised.<br />

As conceived in 1925, Article 6bis protected well-known marks only against<br />

the registration of identical or similar marks for identical or similar goods by an<br />

unauthorised third party. In 1958, at the Lisbon Revision Conference, when the<br />

subject of well-known marks was again very thoroughly discussed, it was agreed<br />

that the Article should be extended to protect well-known marks also against the<br />

unauthorised use of identical or similar marks. But, unfortunately, there was no<br />

agreement on two other proposals that were put forward, namely that the Article<br />

should be extended to include a provision for the well-known mark not to have<br />

actually been used in the country where the identical or similar mark had been


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 225<br />

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applied for; and that the Article should be extended both to services as well as to<br />

dissimilar goods.<br />

As will be seen from the text above, the Article permits the owner of a mark,<br />

either in person or through the relevant authority to resist, for a period of five years,<br />

the deposit, the registration, or the use, by a third party, for the same or similar<br />

goods, of a mark which reproduces, translates, or is an imitation liable to create<br />

confusion with his mark if it is well known but not registered.<br />

At the 1958 Lisbon Conference, an attempt at clarification was made by<br />

including in Article 6bis the statement in sub-paragraph (1) that responsibility for<br />

deciding the well-known status of a mark lay with the competent authorities in any<br />

country applying its effects. Perhaps our predecessors thought that the meaning of<br />

―well-known‖ was beyond argument, but I cannot think there would be all this<br />

discussion, and all that litigation, if the matter was not open to question. But with<br />

so many countries now having a provision relating to Article 6bis in their laws,<br />

understandably there has been a tendency for the Article to be given different<br />

interpretations by the national offices and the courts in different countries 6 .<br />

Since 1925 many of the over 150 countries that are members of the Paris<br />

Union have sought to introduce Article 6bis into their trade mark laws, but without<br />

explaining precisely what is meant by the phrase ―well-known‖. A typical approach<br />

towards Article 6bis is that of the European Community Trade Mark Regulation<br />

which provides, in Article 8(2)(c), that one of the earlier rights which may prevent<br />

the registration of a Community trademark is any mark which is well-known in one<br />

of the Member States of the E.U. ―in the sense in which the words well known are<br />

used in Article 6bis‖. Interestingly, the Regulation creates another sort of mark, one<br />

which has a reputation, and this can be utilised by its owner to prevent the<br />

registration of a later mark also for dissimilar goods or services. Most<br />

commentators are agreed that this mark referred to Article 8, and this has now been<br />

confirmed by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg in a case involving the<br />

trade mark CHEVY (Case C-375/97 General Motors Corporation v. Yplon S.A.).<br />

Article 6bis of the Paris Convention reads as follows:<br />

(1) The countries of the Union undertake (a), ex officio if their legislation so<br />

permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the<br />

registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark (b) which constitutes a<br />

reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion (c), of<br />

a mark (d) considered by the competent authority of the country of<br />

registration or use to be well known (e) in that country as being already the<br />

mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention (f) and used for<br />

identical or similar goods (g). These provisions shall also apply when the<br />

6 DAVID H. TATHAM, <strong>WIPO</strong> Resolution on Well-known Marks: A Small Step or a Giant Leap?,<br />

Sweet & Maxwell Ltd and Contributors, 2000, 130.


226 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known<br />

mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.<br />

(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be<br />

allowed for requesting the cancellation of such a mark (h). The countries of<br />

the Union may provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must<br />

be requested (i).<br />

(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the<br />

prohibition of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith (j).<br />

(a) One of the questions which arises with respect to this Article is whether it<br />

may be considered ―self-executing‖ – in countries which admit such possibility –<br />

with the result that interested parties may directly claim its application by the<br />

administrative or judicial authorities of the country concerned. This question gives<br />

rise to the following observations.<br />

On the one hand, in stipulating that ―the countries of the Union undertake...‖,<br />

the Article is drafted differently from many other Articles of the Convention, which<br />

directly refer to rights or obligations of interested parties (for example, Articles 2,<br />

3, 4, 4ter, 5bis, 5ter, 5quater, 6, 6septies, 8), or directly regulate a situation at issue<br />

(for example, Articles 4bis, 5 A(1), (3) to (5), B, C, D, 6quater, 6quinquies, 7).<br />

Nor, on the other hand, does Article 6bis refer only to an undertaking by the<br />

countries of the Union to legislate on a particular matter, as in the case, for<br />

example, with Article 10ter and 11. Therefore, and although the Article leaves<br />

certain liberties to national legislations (paragraph (1): ―if their legislation so<br />

permits‖; paragraph (2): ―a period of at least five years... shall be allowed...‖; ―The<br />

countries of the Union may provide for a period...‖), it cannot be deemed only to<br />

oblige the Member States to legislate on the subject concerned, but may be<br />

considered to contain an undertaking also on behalf of the administrative and<br />

judicial authorities of these States, which – if compatible with their constitutional<br />

systems – must then give effect to the provisions of the Article at the request of<br />

interested parties.<br />

(b) The provision under consideration refers only to trademarks and not to<br />

service marks. The Member States are therefore not obliged to apply it to service<br />

marks, but are free to do so in analogous situations.<br />

(c) The purpose of the provision under consideration is to avoid the<br />

registration and use of a trademark, liable to create confusion with another mark<br />

already well known in the country of such registration or use, although the latter<br />

well-known mark is not, or not yet, protected in that country by a registration<br />

which would normally prevent the registration or use of the conflicting mark 7 . This<br />

7 Cf. STEPHEN P. LADAS, International Protection of Well-Known Trade-Marks, The Trade-<br />

Mark Reporter, 1951, p. 661; TROLLER, La marque de hatue renommée, P.I., 1953, p. 73; BLUM,<br />

La marque de hatue renommée, P.I., 1954, p. 110.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 227<br />

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exceptional protection of a well-known mark has been deemed to be justified<br />

because the registration or use of a confusingly similar mark will in most cases<br />

amount to an act of unfair competition 8 , and may also be considered prejudicial to<br />

the interests of those who will be misled 9 . Whether a trademark will be liable to<br />

create confusion with a well-known mark will be determined by the competent<br />

authority of the country concerned, and in so doing the said authority will have to<br />

consider the question from the viewpoint of the consumers of the goods to which<br />

the marks are applied 10 . The provision specifies that such confusion may occur in<br />

cases of reproduction, imitation or translation of the well-known mark, or even if<br />

only an essential part of a mark constitutes a reproduction or confusing imitation of<br />

the well-known mark.<br />

(d) The word ―mark‖ in itself would not exclude the extension of the<br />

envisaged protection also to well-known service marks, but the words ―used for<br />

identical or similar goods‖ make it clear that only well-known trademarks are<br />

covered by the provision. The Member States are; however, free to apply the same<br />

rules also to service marks in analogous circumstances.<br />

(e) A trademark may be well known in a country before its registration there<br />

and, in view of the possible repercussions of publicity in other countries 11 , even<br />

before it is used in such country. Whether a trademark is well known in a country<br />

will be determined by its competent administrative or judicial authorities. The<br />

Revision Conference of Lisbon in 1958 rejected a proposal according to which use<br />

of a well-known mark in the country in which its protection is claimed would not<br />

be necessary for such protection 12 . This means that a Member State is not obliged<br />

to protect well-known trademarks which have not been used on its territory, but it<br />

will be free to do so 13 . In view of the vote taken at the Lisbon Conference 14 , the<br />

great majority of the Member States will probably adopt this attitude.<br />

(f) A well-known trademark will, naturally, only be protected by the Article<br />

under consideration if it belongs to a person entitled to the benefits of the<br />

Convention, that is, to a natural or legal person who may claim the application of<br />

the Convention according to Articles 2 or 3 15 . The provision under examination,<br />

however, goes further than that when it states that, in order to be protected, the<br />

mark must be considered well known in the country concerned ―as being already<br />

the mark of‖ such person. The history of the provision 16 shows, however, that it<br />

8<br />

Actes de La Haye, p. 455.<br />

9<br />

Actes de La Haye, pp. 453-454.<br />

10<br />

Actes de La Haye, pp. 453-454.<br />

11<br />

Actes de Lisbonne, pp. 659, 667. See in Brazil: Supremo Tribunal Federal, 26/04/1963, G.R.U.R.<br />

Int., 1964, p. 318.<br />

12<br />

Actes de Lisbonne, pp. 659, 666-667.<br />

13<br />

Actes de Lisbonne, p. 668.<br />

14<br />

The above proposal was rejected at the Lisbon Conference by 2 countries only, while 25 approved<br />

it: Actes de Lisbonne, pp. 666-667.<br />

15<br />

Actes de La Haye, pp. 456, 543; Actes de Lisbonne, p. 637.<br />

16<br />

Actes de La Haye, p. 543.


228 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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will be sufficient if the mark concerned is well known in commerce in the country<br />

concerned as a mark belonging to a certain enterprise, without its being necessary<br />

that it also be known that such enterprise is entitled to the benefits of the<br />

Convention. Nor is it necessary – and it is therefore not necessary to prove – that<br />

the person who has applied for or obtained a conflicting registration or who uses a<br />

conflicting marks possessed such knowledge.<br />

(g) The protection of well-known marks, according to the provisions under<br />

examination, applies only with respect to other marks filed, registered or used for<br />

identical or similar goods. Whether this condition is fulfilled will be determined by<br />

the administrative or judicial authorities of the country in which protection is<br />

claimed 17 .<br />

(h) In order to give the owner of a well-known trademark sufficient time to<br />

react to the registration of a conflicting mark; this provision specifies that he must<br />

have a period of at least five years during which he may request the cancellation of<br />

such registration. This minimum period was three years until the Revision<br />

Conference of Lisbon in 1958. The words ―at least‖ indicate that the fixation of the<br />

period is left, on condition that it may not be shorter than five years, to the national<br />

legislation or to decisions of the administrative or judicial authorities of the<br />

Member States 18 .<br />

(i) The Member States are free also to provide for a period within which the<br />

prohibition of use of the conflicting mark must be requested, but no minimum is<br />

indicated for this period.<br />

(j) The administrative or judicial authorities of the country in which the<br />

protection of a well-known mark is requested will determine whether the<br />

conflicting mark is registered or used in bad faith, in which case no time limit for<br />

action will prevail. Bad faith will normally exist when the person who registers or<br />

uses the conflicting mark knew of the well-known mark and presumably intended<br />

to profit from the possible confusion between that mark and the one he has<br />

registered or used.<br />

Thus, many features of the protection provided for and many situations not<br />

expressly contemplated in Article 6bis may be noted:<br />

17 Cf. in France: Cour de Riom, 01/04/1957, Ann., 1959, p. 32; Cour de Paris, 08/12/1962, Ann.,<br />

1963, p. 147, with note by DUSOLIER. The question whether, at least for a certain category of<br />

marks of high renown, protection should not be extended to non-similar goods was discussed at the<br />

Revision Conference of Lisbon, but without giving positive results: Actes de Lisbonne, pp. 660-664,<br />

705-724; see also MIOSGA, Internationaler Markenund Herkunftsschutz, pp. 49-50, referring to<br />

further literature.<br />

18 Actes de Lisbonne, pp. 665, 758.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 229<br />

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1. Nothing is said in the Convention regarding the protection of service<br />

marks, nor about the possibility of relying upon Article 6bis to take action against<br />

an unauthorized third party that adopts the well-known trademark in relation to<br />

different goods.<br />

The protection in Article 6bis extends only to trademarks (marks in respect of<br />

goods), and does not extend to service marks (used in respect of services). By<br />

virtue of Article 16 of Trademark Law Treaty (TLT, 1994, 25 States), however, the<br />

provisions of the Paris Convention relating to trademarks were extended to service<br />

marks.<br />

2. The protection extends to registration or use in respect of identical or<br />

similar goods (in accordance with the principle, known as the ―principle of<br />

speciality‖, under which protection for a trademark extends only to the same or<br />

similar goods as are covered by the registration or use of the trademark);<br />

It may be said that the provision in Article 6bis addressing the protection of<br />

well-known trademarks is a provision of exception to the general rule that<br />

conditions trademarks protection for use or registration 19 . The owner of a<br />

trademark which is not used or registered in the country where protection is sought<br />

by a third party may still obtain protection for the mark, provided the requirements<br />

of Article 6bis (1) are met, namely that the mark is well-known in the country<br />

where protection is sought.<br />

Practice shows that trademark owners who have failed to register a trademark<br />

in a country where protection is granted only by local registration – as is the case in<br />

most countries of the world – often try to rely on Article 6bis in an attempt to<br />

remedy their failure to register. Clearly this was not the intention of the drafters of<br />

the Article. Whether as a provision of exception or as a different source of rights,<br />

the fact is that only those well-known but unregistered trademarks in the country<br />

where protection is sought have access to the privileged protection afforded by<br />

Article 6bis.<br />

Again, whether as a provision of exception or a different source of rights, the<br />

party that may benefit from the privileged protection afforded to well-known<br />

trademarks by Article 6bis may not benefit from all the rights given to registrants<br />

under national laws, but only those specifically contemplated in the Convention,<br />

namely:<br />

the right to have local authorities refuse registration to an unauthorized<br />

third party;<br />

the right to move for the cancellation of then mark registered by an<br />

unauthorized third party;<br />

19 HORACIO RANGEL-ORTIZ, Well-Known Trademarks Under International Treaties,<br />

Trademark World, February 1997, 15.


230 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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the right to move for the prohibition of use of the mark by an unauthorized<br />

third party.<br />

This is provided, in all cases, that the legal proceedings instituted by the<br />

owner of the well-known trademark attack the unauthorized use or registration by a<br />

third party in relation to identical or similar goods.<br />

The term ―well-known trademark‖ as used in Article 6bis extends to<br />

situations involving:<br />

a reproduction of the mark liable to create confusion;<br />

an imitation of the mark liable to create confusion;<br />

a translation of the mark liable to create confusion.<br />

The text of Article 6bis makes it clear that the protection afforded by its first<br />

paragraph extends to:<br />

situations where the essential part of the mark constitutes an unauthorized<br />

reproduction ―of any such well-known mark‖ liable to create confusion;<br />

situations where the essential part of the mark constitutes an unauthorized<br />

imitation ―of any such well-known mark‖ liable to create confusion.<br />

Acknowledging that there are reasons favouring the notion that Article 6bis is<br />

a provision of exception that should be interpreted in a restrictive way, practise,<br />

cases, law and the contributions of legal commentators have consistently shown<br />

that there is substantial room for argument, discussion, interpretation and<br />

speculation in the text of this provision.<br />

3. Article 6bis is silent on what constitutes a well-known mark. The<br />

appreciation of whether a mark is well-known is left to the ―competent authority of<br />

the country where the illegitimate registration or use occurs‖.<br />

Article 6bis does not define a well-known mark; it only enjoins the Member<br />

States of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property not to grant<br />

protection to any mark which the relevant authorities consider to be in conflict with<br />

a well-known mark belonging to someone else. Unfortunately, the Article fails to<br />

define what exactly one should understand by the term ―well-known‖; it does not<br />

extend this protection to services or to goods that are not similar, and it is silent on<br />

the question of whether the well-known marks should have been used in the<br />

country where protection is being sought.<br />

Although the first recognition of the concept of a well-known mark is<br />

embodied in Article 6bis, the Paris Convention does not provide any definitions or<br />

criteria for establishing which trademarks qualify as well-known marks.


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The better view seems to be one that focuses on the universal term provided<br />

in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention of a well-known mark: ―mark notoirement<br />

connue‖, ―notorisch bekannte Marke‖, ―marchio notoriamente conosciuto‖ o<br />

―marca notoriamente conocida‖.<br />

4. Article 6bis is of major importance for cases where a trademark in a given<br />

country does not – or does not yet – enjoy protection on the basis of a registration<br />

in that country or on the basis of an international or regional registration having<br />

effect in that country.<br />

This does not mean that the application of Article 6bis is excluded if the<br />

trademark is registered in the country where the protection is sought. However,<br />

protection according to Article 6bis does not go beyond what normally is conferred<br />

by registration of a trademark, namely, protection against the registration or use of<br />

the same or a similar sign for the same or similar goods. Thus, if the trademark is<br />

normally registered in the country, there is no need to invoke Article 6bis 20 .<br />

5. As to the activities that may be attacked by the owner of a well-known<br />

trademark, the Conventon is not explicit with respect to situations where an<br />

unauthorized third party adopts the well-known mark as a part of a corporate name.<br />

In all these situations, case law shows different ways to construe Article 6bis.<br />

In some cases, local authorities have interpreted it in strict terms, whilst others have<br />

been more flexible, affording protection to owners in circumstances not expressly<br />

contemplated in Article 6bis. Case law also provides examples of owners obtaining<br />

protection under a combination of Article 6bis and Article 10bis, governing unfair<br />

competition, or under the provisions of Article 10bis alone. Finally, Article 6bis<br />

does not address the issue of the criteria that should be used in the determination of<br />

whether or not a trademark is well-known.<br />

It appears that in drafting provisions of new international treaties, legislators<br />

did not merely reproduce Article 6bis but have indeed incorporated these situations.<br />

It is arguable, therefore, that the text of Article 6bis is due for an update.<br />

6. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides protection for marks which<br />

are well-known in the country in which protection is sought. Article 6bis is<br />

therefore of particular importance in cases where a well-known mark is not<br />

registered in a given country, so that protection must be predicated on the fact that<br />

the mark is well-known.<br />

According to the weight of authority, a mark must be well-known in the<br />

country in which protection is sought in order for it to enjoy the benefit of Article<br />

6bis of the Paris Convention. It is not sufficient that the mark be well-known only<br />

20 DENIS CROZE, Protection of Well-Known Marks, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.<br />

5, May 2000, 139.


232 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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in the country of origin or elsewhere; it must in fact also be well-known in the<br />

country where the protection is sought.<br />

Once a mark has been recognised as being well-known by applying the<br />

relevant criteria and parameters, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides for<br />

protection as follows. The owner of a well-known mark is entitled to request that<br />

with respect to a mark which is ―liable to create confusion‖ with the well-known<br />

mark, an application be refused or a registration be cancelled (at the registry) or the<br />

use be prohibited (by injunctive relief in court). Protection is granted against the<br />

―reproduction‖ or ―imitation‖ of the well-known mark with respect to ―identical or<br />

similar goods‖.<br />

Many countries have incorporated these protection standards into national<br />

law. Accordingly, where applicable, the likelihood-of-confusion-standard will be<br />

applicable within the framework of local law in order to determine whether an<br />

infringement of a well-known mark is present.<br />

7. Although ―famous‖ is not a word employed in the Paris Convention, it is a<br />

term which recurs in discussions relating to the extent of protection which the law<br />

should accord to trade marks which are merely known, well known or truly<br />

famous.<br />

The terminology of ―famous‖ and ―well-known‖ marks is unhelpfully<br />

imprecise.<br />

Article 6bis of the Paris Convention sought to protect ―well-known‖ marks<br />

against the use by others of those marks on identical or similar goods. In contrast,<br />

the original dilution doctrine propounded by Frank Schechter sought to protect<br />

trade marks against the use by others of those marks on non-related goods.<br />

How do the two major pieces of European trade mark law implement Article<br />

6bis of the Paris Convention? Although the final recital to the Preamble of<br />

Directive 89/104 confirms that the Directive‘s provisions are ―entirely consistent‖<br />

with the Paris Convention, its English text contains scarcely a mention of the words<br />

―well known‖ in relation to trade marks 21 . The registration of another‘s ―wellknown‖<br />

mark is a ground, upon which a trade mark application can be refused, or<br />

registration invalidated 22 , but the rights conferred against infringers are egalitarian<br />

in their nature and treat all used trade marks in a similar manner, protecting them<br />

by virtue of their reputation 23 even if they are not well known.<br />

21 Paris Convention, art. 6 bis(1).<br />

22 Council Regulation 89/104, art. 4(2)(d).<br />

23 Council Regulation 89/104, art. 5(2). The Trade Marks Act 1994, s56, gives foreign ―wellknown‖<br />

marks only the level of protection required by the Paris Convention, that is to say,<br />

protection against use on identical or similar goods which is likely to cause confusion.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 233<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The approach taken by the CTM Regulation corresponds to that adopted by<br />

Directive 89/104. The registration of another‘s ―well-known‖ mark is a ground of<br />

refusal of a trade mark application 24 , or registration invalidated 25 . Once again, the<br />

rights conferred against infringers treat all used trade marks in a similar manner,<br />

regardless of whether they are well known 26 .<br />

This relatively straightforward analysis has been thrown into small<br />

uncertainty by the ECJ in Davidoff v. Gofkid 27 when it chose, in the English version<br />

of its decision, to refer to the protection granted under Directive 89/104 28 to trade<br />

marks which have ―a reputation in the Member State‖ as being the protection of<br />

―well-known marks‖. Does this mean that ―marks with a reputation‖ and ―wellknown<br />

marks‖ are now synonymous? The ECJ itself in General Motors v. Yplon 29<br />

noted that the marks ―having a reputation‖ in the English were ―well-known‖<br />

marks in the French, German, Italian and Spanish versions of Directive 89/104 and<br />

considered this no more than a ―nuance which does not entail any great<br />

contradiction‖. Regardless of the terminology employed, a trade mark must be<br />

known to a particular extent before it is entitled to receive the protection accorded<br />

to such a mark. This extent is reached where the mark is known by a significant<br />

part of the public concerned with the goods sold under that trade mark.<br />

One final point should be mentioned. Directive 89/104 states that, for the<br />

purpose of refusing a national trade mark application or invalidating a subsequent<br />

grant, the words ―well known‖ mean well known in a Member State, in the sense in<br />

which the words ―well-known‖ are used in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention 30 .<br />

In theory, this qualification, which is not found in those provisions in<br />

Directive 89/104 that refer to marks being (in English) marks with a reputation and<br />

(in French, German, Italian and Spanish) well-known marks, suggest that it is<br />

somehow for the Paris Union rather than the ECJ to determine what ―well known‖<br />

means for Article 6bis purposes. In practice, the Paris Union countries have so far<br />

failed to come up with a consensus or understanding as to what ―well known‖<br />

means, though they may one day do so, and not all European jurisdictions however<br />

take their lead from the Directive.<br />

1.2. Well-Known Trademarks under TRIPS<br />

The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right<br />

(TRIPS Agreement), entered into force on January 1, 1995, an annex to the<br />

24 Council Regulation 40/94, art. 8(2)(c).<br />

25 Council Regulation 40/94, art. 52.<br />

26 Council Regulation 40/94, art. 9(1)(c).<br />

27 Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v. Gofkid Ltd, Case C-292/00 (2002) ETMR 1219, (2003)<br />

FSR 50 (Advocate General‘s Opinion); (2003) ETMR 534 (ECJ).<br />

28 Council Directive 89/104, arts 4(4)(a) and 5(2).<br />

29 General Motors Corp. v. Yplon SA, Case C-375/97 (1999) ETMR 950.<br />

30 Council Directive 89/104, arts 4(2)(d).


234 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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Marrakesh Agreement that established the World Trade Organization, perhaps is<br />

the most important international agreement promoting the harmonization of<br />

Intellectual Property Rights in member countries. TRIPS Agreement establishes the<br />

basic principles and minimum standards concerning the availability, scope, and use<br />

of trade-related international property rights; civil and criminal enforcement<br />

obligations including border measures; procedural requirements regarding<br />

governing the administrative acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property<br />

rights; dispute settlement for the resolution of any disputes between WTO member<br />

countries over the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. 31<br />

The TRIPS Agreement requires its member countries to provide protection to<br />

well-Known trademarks. Article 2(1) of the TRIPS Agreement 32 , which enunciates<br />

as follows,<br />

―In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply<br />

with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967)‖<br />

requires member countries to provide protection to well-known trademarks as per<br />

Article 6bis of the Paris Convention under which member countries are required,<br />

ex officio or on the request of an interested party, to refuse/cancel registration and<br />

prohibit use of a trademark which is a reproduction/imitation/translation of a<br />

trademark considered well- known by competent authorities of the country if used<br />

for identical/similar goods and is liable to cause confusion.<br />

The TRIPS Agreement not only incorporates Article 6bis of the Paris<br />

Convention but also has extended the scope of protection of well-known<br />

trademarks in the member countries. Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement<br />

enunciates as follows:<br />

“2. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis,<br />

to services. In determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members<br />

shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of<br />

the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been<br />

obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.<br />

3. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis,<br />

to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a<br />

trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to<br />

those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or<br />

services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the<br />

31 Protection of well known trademarks the comparison of trademark examination standards and<br />

trademark law systems between Japan and China by XIA Qing.<br />

32 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994,<br />

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments—<br />

Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 235<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged<br />

by such use”.<br />

Article 16(2) of the TRIPS Agreement requires member countries that Article<br />

6bis of the Paris Convention-related to well-known trademarks should apply to<br />

services as well in addition to the goods.<br />

The TRIPS Agreement does not provide any definition of well-known<br />

trademark. Also, only a competent authority of a member country can determine<br />

whether a trademark is well known or not in the country. However, Article 16(2) of<br />

the TRIPS Agreement requires member countries to take knowledge of the<br />

trademark in the relevant sector of the public, even if the knowledge is obtained as<br />

a result of the promotion of the trademark, as an important factor in determining<br />

whether a trademark is well known or not in the country.<br />

Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement extends protection of the well-known<br />

trademark for dissimilar goods/services in certain conditions which are as follows:<br />

1. well-known trademark is registered in the member country;<br />

2. use of the trademark may cause likelihood of association with the wellknown<br />

trademark;<br />

3. interest of the owner of the registered well known trademark is likely to<br />

be damaged by such use.<br />

Article 16 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), to some extent, generalized anti-dilution<br />

prohibitions. 33 The concept of trademark dilution is inherently complex. Because<br />

[dilution] is largely a theoretical and almost ephemeral concept, the legal theory of<br />

―dilution‖ is exceedingly difficult to explain and understand. Misunderstanding is<br />

rampant. 34<br />

As one of the most controversial and perhaps most elusive topics in<br />

intellectual property law, trademark dilution law has undergone a significant<br />

transformation over the past decade. For nearly all of the 20 th century, to the extent<br />

that trademark dilution was even recognized as a cause of action, it was only<br />

recognized as such under state statutory law, and dilution law was seen as<br />

protecting the commercial value or ―selling power‖ of a mark by prohibiting uses<br />

of a mark that were deemed to dilute the distinctiveness of the mark or to tarnish<br />

the associations it evoked. 35 A cause of action for dilution was first recognized<br />

33<br />

BOTTERO-A. MANGÀNI-M. RICOLFI, The Extended Protection of “Strong” Trademarks, in 11<br />

Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, 2007, 265 ss.<br />

34<br />

J.Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 24:67, at 24-166-24-<br />

167(4 th ed. 2008)<br />

35<br />

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition s 25(1995), cmt. A, at 265.


236 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

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under US statutory law in the FTDA 36 which was later fine tuned with the<br />

adoption of the TDRA. 37<br />

For dilution to occur, the relevant public must make some connection or<br />

association between the mark and both parties. But that connection or association is<br />

not the kind of mental link between the parties that triggers the classic likelihood of<br />

confusion test. Rather, the assumption is that the relevant public sees the junior<br />

user‘s use, and intuitively knows, because of the context of the junior user‘s use,<br />

that there is no connection between the owners of the respective marks. 38<br />

According to the doctrine of trademark dilution, famous trademarks should be<br />

granted protection even in the absence of direct competition between the senior and<br />

the junior users and in the absence of a risk of confusion as to the origin of the<br />

marked goods. 39 A mark may be diluted either by "tarnishment" or "blurring."<br />

Tarnishment occurs when someone uses a mark on inferior or unwholesome goods<br />

or services . Tarnishment involves a newcomer‘s use of a mark in acontext that<br />

risks consumer aversion to the famous brand. 40 A classic example of tarnishment<br />

under FDTA case law involved the use of CANDYLAND.COM for a sexually<br />

explicit website, which understandably evoked negative associations with the<br />

famous CNDYLAND brand of children‘s board games. 41 ―Blurring‖ involves a risk<br />

of ―clutter‖ in the minds of consumer on account of the newcomer‘s use of a mark<br />

that is similar to a famous brand. 42 Dilution by blurring consists of a single mark<br />

identified by consumers with two different sources. One mark: two sources. 43 One<br />

example of blurring under the FTDA case law involved the use of HERBROZAC<br />

as a mark for a natural alternative to the PROZAC brand pharmaceutical. 44<br />

Though the TRIPS Agreement provides minimum standards for the<br />

protection of well-known trademarks which each member country is required to<br />

provide in its relevant national legislation, however, member countries are free to<br />

provide higher standards of protection in their legislation if they wish. TRIPS<br />

Agreement neither provides any definition of a well-known trademark nor any<br />

criteria for determining whether a trademark is well-known or not in a member<br />

country and it has been left for the member states to determine.<br />

36 Federal Trademark Dilution Act, P.L. 104-98 (H.R. 1295, S. 1513), 109 Stat. 505 (1995) enacted<br />

January 16, 1996.<br />

37 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006), enacted<br />

October 6, 2006<br />

38 McCarthy, 24:72 at 24-176.<br />

39 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 825-30<br />

(1927).<br />

40 Scot A. Duvall, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Balanced protection for famous<br />

Brands, 97 TMR 1253.<br />

41 Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm‘t Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Z. 2d 1479(W.D. Wash. 1996).<br />

42 Scot A. Duvall, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Balanced protection for famous<br />

Brands, 97 TMR 1252, 1254.<br />

43 McCarthy, 24:67 at 24-169.<br />

44 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 233 F.3d 456(7 th Cir. 2000).


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 237<br />

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1.3. <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of<br />

Well-Known Marks<br />

Despite the fact that the TRIPS agreement has introduced some new elements<br />

as well as clarity into the notion and regime of protection of well-known<br />

trademarks 45 , there still have been a lot of unanswered questions left as to the<br />

criteria of recognition and scope of protection of well-known marks 46 . As a reply to<br />

this demand in 1995 World Intellectual Property Organization (<strong>WIPO</strong>) started<br />

working on what is now known as Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions<br />

on the Protection of Well-Known Marks 47 .<br />

The Preface to this document clearly states that the ―Recommendation is the<br />

first implementation of <strong>WIPO</strong>‘s policy to adapt to the pace of change in the field of<br />

industrial property by considering new options for accelerating the development of<br />

international harmonized common principles‖. Joint Recommendation is not<br />

legally binding, and therefore is a flexible instrument of international<br />

harmonization in the field of trademark law. It has a profound significance for<br />

countries, which seek to comply with their international obligations and are on the<br />

stage of development of their national legislation concerning protection of wellknown<br />

marks. But for the countries that already have an elaborated legislation and<br />

judicial practice in this field, the Joint Recommendation may at times be seen as<br />

controversial 48 .<br />

The Joint Recommendation addresses the issues that have stayed unclear<br />

since the introduction of the Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention, namely i) the<br />

determination of a well-known mark in a Member State 49 , by offering guidelines<br />

for assessment of a mark for being well-known; ii) the scope of protection of wellknown<br />

marks, by defining marks, business identifiers and domain names 50<br />

conflicting with a mark deemed well-known.<br />

Article 2(1)(b) of the Joint Recommendation proposes the following nonexhaustive<br />

list of types of information that must be taken into account by<br />

45<br />

For a brief analysis see David H.Tatham, <strong>WIPO</strong> Resolution on Well-Known Marks: A Small Step<br />

or a giant Leap?, I.P.Q. No.2, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd and Contributors, 2000, at 131-132<br />

46<br />

See David H.Tatham, supra note 1, at 132-133<br />

47<br />

Adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the<br />

General Assembly of the <strong>WIPO</strong> at the Thirty-Fourth Series of Meetings of the Assemblies of the<br />

Member States of <strong>WIPO</strong>, September 20 to 29, 1999; available at http://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf<br />

[hereinafter Joint Recommendation].<br />

48<br />

See e.g. Maxim Grinberg, The <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendation Protecting Well-Known Marks And<br />

The Forgotten Goodwill, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property, 2005<br />

49<br />

a State member of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and/or of the <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

[see Art.1 of Joint Recommendation]<br />

6<br />

the extension of protection of well-known marks to conflicting business identifiers and domain<br />

names is a distinctive feature of the Joint Recommendation, as these matters have never been<br />

included in an international document before; see David H.Tatham, supra note 1, at 133-134


238 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

competent authority when determining whether a mark is well-known in a Member<br />

State:<br />

(1) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in a relevant sector of<br />

the public;<br />

(2) the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the mark;<br />

(3) the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the mark,<br />

including advertising or publicity and the presentation, at fairs or<br />

exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which the mark applies;<br />

(4) the duration and the geographical area of any registrations, and/ or any<br />

applications of the mark, to the extent that they reflect use or recognition of<br />

the mark;<br />

(5) the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in particular,<br />

the extent to which the mark was recognized as well known by competent<br />

authorities;<br />

(6) the value associated with the mark.<br />

The approach of true flexibility in application of Joint Recommendation is<br />

reflected in Art. 2(1)(c), which states that<br />

―the determination in each case will depend upon the particular<br />

circumstances of that case. In some cases all of the factors may be relevant.<br />

In other cases some of the factors may be relevant. In still other cases none of<br />

the factors may be relevant, and the decision may be based on additional<br />

factors that are not listed in subparagraph (b), above. Such additional<br />

factors may be relevant, alone, or in combination with one or more of the<br />

factors listed in subparagraph (b)‖.<br />

Art. 2(3) also provides for the list of ―non-requirements‖ for well-known<br />

marks. It is not required:<br />

(i) that the mark has been used in, or that the mark has been registered or<br />

that an application for registration of the mark has been filed in or in respect<br />

of, the Member State;<br />

(ii) that the mark is well known in, or that the mark has been registered or<br />

that an application for registration of the mark has been filed in or in respect<br />

of, any jurisdiction other than the Member State; or<br />

(iii) that the mark is well known by the public at large in the Member State.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 239<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Thus, according to this article, the mark only needs to have a reputation in<br />

―the relevant sector of the public” 51 and not the public at large. Also, use and/or<br />

registration cannot be a requirement for protection.<br />

As to the question of the scope of protection for a well-known mark against<br />

conflicting marks, business identifiers and domain names, the Joint<br />

Recommendation establishes that it shall be at least from the time when the mark<br />

becomes well known in the Member State 52 , and that bad faith should be<br />

considered in balancing the interests of the parties involved when assessing<br />

possible infringement of well-known marks 53 .<br />

It also stipulates the conditions under which a mark is deemed to be in<br />

conflict with a well-known mark in respect of identical or similar goods and/or<br />

services. The provisions also cover conflicts with regard to dissimilar goods and<br />

services. However, in these cases, knowledge of the public at large can be required.<br />

In conclusion, it must be said that although the Joint Recommendation is a<br />

―soft‖ law document, and has some controversial provisions, it is a document<br />

reflecting a very high level of international consensus on harmonization of the<br />

national substantive law on protection of well-known marks, and is widely<br />

recognized and supported as one of the basic documents in this field 54 .<br />

2. PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS IN ITALY<br />

Article 12(1)(b) and (g) of the Italian Industrial Property Code (D.Lgs.<br />

February 10, 2005, n. 30) incorporate Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, as<br />

interpreted and expanded in its scope of application by Articles 16(2) and (3) of the<br />

TRIPS Agreement.<br />

Under Article 12(1)(b) and (f), a mark is not new and, therefore, inelegible<br />

for registration, if it is identical with or similar to a mark that is ―well-known<br />

within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention‖ (in accordance with<br />

Article 16(2) of the TRIPS Agreement), in the following cases:<br />

(i) when the later mark is registered for identical or similar goods or services,<br />

if ―by virtue of the identity or similarity of the signs and the identity or<br />

similarity of the goods or services, a risk of confusion may arise on the part<br />

51<br />

as defined in Art. 2(2)(a) of the Joint Recommendation. It must be said that this notion clearly<br />

takes its roots from the TRIPS Agreement‘s Art. 16.2, and is an attempt to clarify the definition in<br />

question.<br />

52<br />

Art 3(1) of the Joint Recommendation<br />

53<br />

Art 3(2) of the Joint Recommendation<br />

54<br />

See e.g. position of the International Trademark Association on this issue at<br />

http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=133&Itemid=143&getcontent<br />

=3


240 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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of the public, which may also consist of a risk of association of the two<br />

signs‖; and<br />

(ii) when the later mark is registered for dissimilar goods or services,<br />

irrespective of whether a risk of confusion or association may arise on the<br />

part of the public, on condition that use of the later mark ―without due cause‖<br />

is likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive<br />

character or the repute of the well-known mark.<br />

To qualify as ―well-known wihthin the meaning of Article 6bis‖ a mark<br />

needs to be well-known in Italy where its reputation will come as a result of its use<br />

or promotion in international trade 55 .<br />

Similarly, under Article 17(1)(f), a registered mark that ―enjoys a reputation‖<br />

in Italy constitutes a bar to the valid registration of identical or similar marks when<br />

use of the mark ―without due case‖ is likely to take unfair advantage of, or be<br />

detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the mark.<br />

The only provision of the Italian Industrial Property Code that deals with the<br />

protection of marks enjoying a reputation is Article 20(1)(c), under which the<br />

owner of a registered mark that enjoys a reputation is entitled to prevent<br />

unauthorized third parties from using identical or similar signs with respect to<br />

dissimilar goods or services, provided that use of the mark ―without due case‖ is<br />

likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distintive character or<br />

the repute of the mark.<br />

It is noteworthy that the Italian Industrial Property Code affords to both<br />

marks that are well-known within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris<br />

Convention and registered marks that enjoy a reputation the power to cancel the<br />

registration of identical or similar marks for dissimilar goods or services, while it<br />

affords only the latter protection against the unauthorized use of identical or similar<br />

marks with respect to dissimilar goods or services. In other words, the Italian<br />

Industrial Property Code does not contain any provision that expressly affords<br />

protection to unregistered well-known marks within the meaning of Article 6bis of<br />

the Paris Convention against the unauthorized use of conflicting signs by third<br />

parties as provided by Articles 16(2) and 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement.<br />

This is simply because, when dealing with the issue of protection, the Italian<br />

Industrial Property Code applies only to registered marks. In practical terms, to<br />

prevent the unauthorized use of the conflicting mark, the owner of a well-known<br />

mark within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention will have only the<br />

very light burden of filing an application in Italy before taking action.<br />

55 See ADRIANO VANZETTI – VINCENZO DI CATALDO, Manuale di diritto industriale, 6^<br />

edizione, Giuffré Editore, 2009, 181.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 241<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Hypothetically speaking, if the owner of a well-known mark within the<br />

meaning of Article 6bis does not intend to file an application, protection against the<br />

unauthorized use of a conflicting mark could be alternatively sought under Article<br />

21(3) of the Italian Industrial Property Code. Under this provision, no one may use<br />

a registered trademark after its registration has been declared invalid, when the<br />

reason for invalidity involves the unlawfulness of the use of the trademark.<br />

According to the most convincing scholarly interpretation of this provision 56 , the<br />

above prohibition not only applies with respect to absolute grounds of invalidity,<br />

but also when there is a violation of Article 14(1)(c) of the Italian Industrial<br />

Property Code (in relation with Article 21(2) of the Italian Industrial Property<br />

Code), which prohibits the registration as trademarks of signs when their use would<br />

infringe someone else‘s copyright, industrial property right, or any other exclusive<br />

right.<br />

In any event, it should be remembered that Article 6bis of the Paris<br />

Convention and, consequently, Articles 16(2) and 16(3) of he TRIPS Agreement,<br />

are automatically applicable in countries that are signatories to these agreements<br />

absent a specific, more favourable national provision 57 .<br />

Two additional provisions of interest for the protection of famous trademarks<br />

are Articles 8(3) and 19(2) of the Italian Industrial Property Code.<br />

Article 8(3) prescribes that, if well-known, personal names, signs used in<br />

artistic, literary, scientific, political or sports fields, denominations and acronyms<br />

of exhibitions and events, and non-profit bodies and associations, as well as the<br />

characteristic emblems thereof, may be registered as trademarks only by those<br />

entitled to them, or with their consent. This provision aims at preserving the<br />

possibility of exploiting the evocative power of famous names or signs that have<br />

not yet been used or registered as trademarks to those who have established their<br />

fame 58 .<br />

As in the case of marks that are well known within the meaning of Article<br />

6bis of the Paris Convention, Article 8(3) grants only the possibility of invalidating<br />

marks illegitimately registered. To prevent also the unauthorized use of a<br />

conflicting sign, those who have built the fame of these signs will have the burden<br />

of registering them as trademarks 59 .<br />

56<br />

See ADRIANO VANZETTI – VINCENZO DI CATALDO, Manuale di diritto industriale, 6^<br />

edizione, Giuffré Editore, 2009, 278-279.<br />

57<br />

See, among others, PEROT-MOREL, Les difficultés d‟application de l‟Article 6bis de la<br />

Convention d‟Union de Paris relatif à la protection internationale des marques notoires, Riv. dir.<br />

ind., 1981, I, 34, 49: ―On s‘accorde... à admettre qu‘en absence d‘une disposition spécifique de la<br />

loi nationale (de pays unionistes), l‘Article 6bis doit pouvoir etre invoqué directement, en tout état<br />

de cause, par les intéressés‖.<br />

58<br />

See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Giammar S.n.c., Court of Rome, January 9,<br />

2001, unpublished.<br />

59<br />

However, in FIFA v. Panini S.r.l., June 26, 1994, Giur, ann. dir. ind., 1994, No. 3133, the Court<br />

of Modena stated that ―even though Article 21(3) of the Italian Trademark Act – now Article 21(3)


242 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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Article 19(2) prohibits the registration of a mark filed in bad faith. An<br />

important area in which this provision can be invoked is that of marks that are<br />

famous abroad but not yet known to Italian consumers. Under these circumstances,<br />

in which it is not possible to resort to the protection afforded to marks that are wellknown<br />

within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, the fact that the<br />

mark was well-known in other jurisdictions could play an important role in<br />

determining whether the adoption of an identical or similar mark in Italy by a third<br />

party was in bad faith and, specifically, was done with the intent of taking unfair<br />

advantage of the reputation that would eventually reach our country 60 . Often, the<br />

element of bad faith can be inferred by the conduct of the registrant following<br />

registration.<br />

Finally, it has been noted by commentators that European trade mark law<br />

makes very little specific provision for the protection of famous trade marks as a<br />

separate category of subject matter of legal protection 61 .<br />

With the implementation of the European Trademark Harmonization<br />

Directive 62 a ―new‖ trademark was born in Italy: a trademark is no longer merely<br />

an indicator of source; it is also a means of communication, a message bearer, a<br />

carrier of goodwill, functions that better reflect the role of trademarks in today‘s<br />

market reality. Well-known trademarks – or better yet, trademarks enjoying a<br />

reputation in the words of the Directive – are now recognized as having an intrinsic<br />

value, stretching beyond the information they provide to the public with respect to<br />

the entrepreneurial origin of the goods and services they distinguish. Although the<br />

indication of origin remains the fundamental and primary function of all<br />

trademarks, the existence of this additional function has become legally relevant.<br />

Thus, trademarks are protected also with respect to this intrinsic value and for<br />

which the concept of likelihood of confusion cannot provide appropriate<br />

protection 63 .<br />

Under the former Italian Trademark Act, which, as mentioned previously, did<br />

not expressly provide for any special protection of famous marks, courts, especially<br />

of the Italian Industrial Property Code – recognizes to those who have contributed to the notority of<br />

a sign the right to register it as a trademark, a parallel prohibition is to be recognized as to the<br />

unathorized use of the sign, being otherwise defeated the scope of the provision, which is that of<br />

avoiding parasitism by protecting the evocative value of the sign‖.<br />

60 See ADRIANO VANZETTI, La nuova legge marchi, Milano, 1993, 106; MARCO RICOLFI, I<br />

segni distintivi dello sport, AIDA, 1993, 123 ss..<br />

61 See PIER LUIGI RONCAGLIA, Should We Use Guns and Missiles to Protect Famous<br />

Trademarks, in Europea (1998) 88 TMR 551.<br />

62 First Council Directive of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member States<br />

relating to Trade Marks (Directive 89/104/EEC).<br />

63 See PIER LUIGI RONCAGLIA, Italy, in FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, Famous and Well-<br />

Known Marks. An International Analysis, 2 nd Edition, International Trademark Association, 2004,<br />

4-221.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 243<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

from the late 1970s, tended to hold that the achievement by a mark of a general<br />

reputation enabled the broadening of its scope of protection so as to extend also to<br />

goods and services not strictly related. ―Famous‖ or ―well-known‖ were only those<br />

marks known to the public at large, generally identified as those that:<br />

(i) enjoyed a high degree of recognition: survey evidence, if accurate<br />

and trustworthy, was often admissible to prove such recognition 64 ;<br />

(ii) were associated with products that were widely distributed and<br />

enjoyed great consumer recognition: documentation attesting a significant<br />

volume of sales in Italy was generally of great assistance in proving fame;<br />

(iii) had been on the market for a long time;<br />

(iv) were the subject of intense and effective advertising: evidence of<br />

extensive advertising, especially on television and/or in national or foreign<br />

pubblications circulating in Italy 65 , was always of paramount importance.<br />

In determining whether a mark was famous or well-known, Italian courts<br />

generally adopted a case-by-case approach, considering the overall commercial<br />

impression emerging from the totally of the evidence produced.<br />

The Italian Industrial Property Code currently in force does provide special<br />

protection for marks enjoying a reputation. However, it still does not contain any<br />

definitions or guidelines to determine when a mark is well known within the<br />

Article 6bis of the Paris Convention or enjoys a reputation. In particular, debate<br />

arose among Italian scholars as to whether the concept of marks ―which enjoy a<br />

reputation‖ set out in Article 1(1)(c) of the last Trademark Act – now Article<br />

20(1)(c) of the Italian Industrial Property Code – is equivalent to that of wellknown<br />

marks. Some authors assumed that the two categories were coincident 66 .<br />

Others maintained that the definition ―mark which enjoys a reputation‖<br />

encompasses not only famous marks, i.e., marks that are known by a very high<br />

percentage of the public at large, but also marks that are simply known in the<br />

interested circles of trade or industry 67 . This latter interpretation is now the<br />

prevailing one 68 as a result of the European Court of Justice‘s decision in the<br />

64 In Jean Patou Parfumer SA v. Priority Srl, 23 May 1991, in Giur. ann. dir. ind., 1991, No. 2671,<br />

the Court of Milan considered hardly relevant a survey conducted among 500 consumers ―picked in<br />

only one commercial area, that ―of highest level‖, of only one Italian city, Turin‖.<br />

65 In Standard Oil Co. of California v. Ditta Santa Rita Mercantile Co. and Chevron Oil Italiana<br />

SpA Intervenor, Court of Catania, 25 January 1977, in Riv. dir. ind., 1977, II, 396, 426-428, it was<br />

held that the advertising of the plaintiff‘s mark in foreign magazines circulating in Italy amounted to<br />

legally relevant use of the mark.<br />

66 See FLORIDIA, La nuova legge marchi. Il commento, in Corr. Giur., 1993, 268 et seq.;<br />

FAZZINI, Prime impressioni sulla riforma della disciplina dei marchi, in Riv. dir. ind. 1993, I, 159<br />

et seq.<br />

67 See ADRIANO VANZETTI – VINCENZO DI CATALDO, Manuale di diritto industriale, 6^<br />

edizione, Giuffré Editore, 2009, 207 et seq.; SENA, Il nuovo diritto dei marchi, 3^ edizione,<br />

Milano, 2001, 87-88.<br />

68 In Altavista Company v. Alta Vista Srl, 9 November 2000, in Giur. ann. dir. ind., 2001, No. 4249,<br />

the Court of Vicenza stated that ―a famous trademark is a mark known within a considerable sector<br />

of the public interested in the products or services covered by the mark‖ (applying such principle,


244 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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General Motors Corporation v. Yplon case 69 . According to the Court‘s ruling, a<br />

trademark is famous pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Directive and, therefore, is<br />

entitled to the broader protection set forth in such provision, when it ―enjoys a<br />

reputation within the relevant sector of the public for which the particular goods or<br />

services it distinguishes are destined‖. In its decision, the Court of Justice also<br />

stated that ―the higher the distinctiveness and reputation of the trademark, the<br />

easier the ability to demonstrate the existence of an injury to the interest of the<br />

owner‖.<br />

The above decision is particularly important because it clearly indicates that<br />

the function of carriers of goodwill or message bearers is not performed only by<br />

exceptionally famous trademarks. Every trademark, as long as it has acquired some<br />

consumer recognition in the relevant field of trade or industry, is entitled to be<br />

protected against the unathorized use of an identical or similar mark, pursuant to<br />

Article 20(1)(c), even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion, when use of the<br />

later mark is likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive<br />

character or the repute of the prior mark.<br />

3. PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS IN PAKISTAN<br />

Pakistan became a member of WTO, hence signatory to the Agreement on<br />

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS Agreement), in<br />

1995 70 . TRIPS Agreement created an obligation on Pakistan to amend its<br />

intellectual property laws and to provide in its national legislation minimum<br />

standards of intellectual property rights protection provided in the TRIPS<br />

Agreement. Therefore, in order to comply with the TRIPS Pakistan promulgated its<br />

new Trademark Law in the year 2001 71 (hereinafter referred to as Ordinance).<br />

Article 16(2) and 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement which deal with the protection of<br />

well known trademarks were duly incorporated into the Ordinance, 2001.<br />

Section 86(1) of the Ordinance provides that a Trade Mark which is entitled<br />

to protection as a well known trademark shall be a mark which is so entitled under<br />

the Paris Convention and which is well known in Pakistan as being the mark of a<br />

person who:<br />

1. is a national of a Convention Country- a country, other than Pakistan,<br />

which is a party to the Paris Convention; or<br />

the trademark ―Alta Vista‖ has been considered famous with regard to the specific service offered<br />

by the plaintiff on the Internet).<br />

69<br />

Case C-375/97 General Motors Corporation v. Yplon SA, decision of 14 September 1999, in Giur.<br />

ann. dir. ind., 1999, No. 4047.<br />

70<br />

http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm<br />

71<br />

Pakistan Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001http://ipo.gov.pk/Trademark/Downloads/TradeMark_Ordinance.pdf


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 245<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. is domiciled in, or has a real and effective industrial or commercial<br />

establishment in, a Convention Country.<br />

It is not necessary that person carries on business, or has a good will, in<br />

Pakistan.<br />

1. The Criteria: When is a Mark Well Known?<br />

The Ordinance also set forth criteria for tribunal- ―the Registrar or, as the<br />

case may be, the High Court or a District Court before which the proceedings<br />

concerned are pending‖ 72 to distinguish well known trademarks from other marks.<br />

Subsection 2 of Section 86 provides that the tribunal shall take into account<br />

the following factors as relevant criteria in deciding whether or not a Trade Mark is<br />

well known:<br />

1. the amount of Pakistan or worldwide recognition of the Trade Mark;<br />

2. the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the Trade Mark;<br />

2. the Pakistan or worldwide duration of the use and advertising of the Trade<br />

Mark;<br />

4. the Pakistan or worldwide commercial value attributed to the Trade Mark;<br />

5. the Pakistan or worldwide geographical scope of the use and advertising<br />

of the Trade Mark;<br />

6. the Pakistan or worldwide quality and image that the Trade Mark has<br />

acquired; and<br />

7. the Pakistan or worldwide exclusivity of use and registration attained by<br />

the Trade Mark and the presence or absence of identical or deceptively<br />

similar third party Trade Marks validly registered or used in relation to<br />

identical or similar goods and services.<br />

What is more significant is that the section 86(2) of the Ordinance provides<br />

that the following should not be required by the tribunal while determining a<br />

trademark is well known:<br />

1. registration of the trademark is in Pakistan;<br />

2. actual use in the form of sales of goods/services under the trademark in<br />

Pakistan.<br />

However, in addition to the list of factors mentioned above the tribunal may<br />

consider any other factor as relevant while determining a trademark is well known<br />

or not among relevant public in Pakistan.<br />

Section 86(3) of the Ordinance provides that the owner of a well known<br />

trademark is entitled to restrain, by injunction, the use in Pakistan of a trademark<br />

which or essential part of which is identical/deceptively similar to the well known<br />

trademark:<br />

72 Section 2 (li) of the Pakistan Trademarks Ordinance, 2001


246 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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1. in relation to identical/similar goods or services where such use is likely to<br />

cause confusion; or<br />

2. where such use causes dilution 73 of the distinctive quality of the well<br />

known trademark.<br />

2. Well-Known Trademarks and Non-Competing Goods<br />

The most important aspect of well known trademarks is that the protection<br />

extends beyond the class of goods/services. The Ordinance provides for this as a<br />

special right for well known marks in Section 17 which deals with the ―relative<br />

grounds of refusal‖ of a trademark 74 . Section 17(3) of the Ordinance reads:<br />

―A trade mark which- (a) is identical with or similar to an earlier trade<br />

mark; and (b) is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar<br />

to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered. shall not be registered<br />

if, or to the extent that, the earlier trade mark has a reputation in Pakistan<br />

and the use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage<br />

of, or be detrimental to , the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier<br />

trade mark‖.<br />

Section 18(1)( c) of the Ordinance provides that an earlier trademark means a<br />

trademark which was entitled to protection under the Paris Convention as a well<br />

known trademark.<br />

Section 40 (4) of the Ordinance provides that a person shall infringe a<br />

registered trade mark if the person uses in the course of trade mark which- (a) is<br />

identical with or deceptively similar to the trade mark; and (b) is used in relation to<br />

goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is<br />

registered. Where the trade mark is a well known trade mark, or has a reputation in<br />

Pakistan, and the use of the mark being without due cause, takes unfair advantage<br />

of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.<br />

73 Section 2(xiii) of the Ordinance provides that "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a<br />

well known trade mark to identify and distinguish the goods or services, regardless of the presence<br />

or absence of competition between owner of the well know trade mark or other parties. or likelihood<br />

of confusion or deception<br />

74 The Trademarks Ordinance, 2001 provides for two types of grounds of refusal to register a<br />

trademark. The first one is an ―absolute‖ ground of refusal to register based on the inherent<br />

characteristics of the impugned mark only and the second one is the ―relative‖ grounds of refusal<br />

that are contingent on the existence of another mark.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 247<br />

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3. Protection of Unregistered Well-Known Trademarks under the Law of<br />

Passing Off<br />

Passing off is a common law tort which can be used to enforce unregistered<br />

trademark rights. The tort of passing off protects the goodwill of a trader from a<br />

misrepresentation that causes damage to goodwill. In passing off, the plaintiff is<br />

required to meet certain well entrenched qualifications in order to succeed. These<br />

test evolved as a result of successive court dicta, takes various forms ranging from<br />

the most basic ones calling for meeting of only the bare essential to more elaborate<br />

mandating the proof of supplementary conditions. The three essential constituents,<br />

viz., goodwill, misrepresentation and the damage are the primary elements, a<br />

successful claimant must prove, and are collectively referred to as the ‗classical<br />

trinity‘ of passing off 75 .<br />

Pakistani courts have been applying the common law action of passing off for<br />

the protection of well known trademarks in Pakistan for years. Keeping in mind the<br />

development in the protection of unregistered well known trademarks through<br />

passing off actions, the Ordinance under Section 17(4)(a) provides:<br />

―A trade mark shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, its use in<br />

Pakistan<br />

is liable to be prevented-<br />

(a) by virtue of any law, in particular, the law of passing off, protecting an<br />

unregistered trade mark or other mark used in the course of trade”.<br />

Section 46 (3) of the Ordinance provides that nothing in the Ordinance shall<br />

be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for passing off goods as the<br />

goods of another person or services as services provided by another person, or the<br />

remedies in respect thereof.<br />

Also, Subsection 3 of Section 39 states that without prejudice to the right of<br />

the proprietor of a registered Trade Mark to obtain any relief under any other law<br />

for the time being in force, the proprietor shall also have the right to obtain relief<br />

under this Ordinance if the Trade Mark is infringed.<br />

75 Narayanan P, supra note 11, at 685


248 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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4. Protection of Well Known Trademarks under Unfair Competition<br />

The Trademarks Ordinance, 2001 also provide protection to the well known<br />

trademarks under the law of unfair competition. Section 67 of the Ordinance<br />

provides that any act of competition contrary to honest business practices in<br />

industrial or commercial matters such as fraudulently registering or applying for<br />

registration of a trade mark is an act of unfair competition. And an action against<br />

unfair competition may be brought before a District Court of competent<br />

jurisdiction.<br />

Section 14(4) of the Ordinance, which deals with the absolute grounds for<br />

refusal of registration, provides that a trade mark shall not be registered if or to the<br />

extent that the application is made in bad faith.<br />

However, subsection 4 of Section 86 of the Ordinance provides that the<br />

continuation of any bona fide use of a trademark begun before the commencement<br />

of the Ordinance shall not be effected by the provisions of this Ordinance.<br />

5. Opposition to Registration of a Trademark by Proprietor of a Well-Known<br />

Trademark<br />

Pakistan Trademark Ordinance, 2001 provides an opportunity to the<br />

proprietor of a well known trademark to oppose an application for registration of<br />

trademark which is identical/deceptively similar to the well known trademark in<br />

Pakistan and the use of which is likely to cause dilution/confusion. Section 29 of<br />

the Ordinance provides grounds on the basis of which registration of a trademark<br />

may be opposed. Section 29(4) reads as follows:<br />

―The registration of trade mark in respect of particular goods or services<br />

may be opposed on the grounds that- (a) it is substantially identical with, or<br />

deceptively similar to, a well known trade mark to a trade mark that, before<br />

the priority date for the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in<br />

respect of those goods or services, had acquired a reputation in Pakistan;<br />

and (b) because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the firstmentioned<br />

trade mark would cause dilution or would be likely to deceive or<br />

cause confusion‖.<br />

6. Approach of the National Courts<br />

The Pakistani courts have long acknowledged the importance of protecting<br />

the rights of IP owners and have extended protection to well-known foreign


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 249<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

trademarks far beyond the traditional scope of such protection. Their approach<br />

when dealing with issues relating to IP rights has been forward looking 76 .<br />

The first key judgment in this area was given in 1979 by the Sindh High<br />

Court in Societé De Fabrication v Deputy Registrar of Trademarks 77 . In protecting<br />

an international trademark the court observed: ―The conduct of the respondent in<br />

appropriating trademarks of foreign owners is not proper… It is common<br />

knowledge that trade in French perfumery is of international character. With the<br />

revival of international trade and international publicity, the rights of owners of<br />

foreign trademarks ought to receive some safeguard unless it is clear from the<br />

evidence that the foreign owners have abandoned their intention of marketing their<br />

products under the mark in this country.‖ This trend was confirmed in Alpha<br />

Sewing Machine v Registrar of Trademarks 78 , in which the Supreme Court of<br />

Pakistan approved the following observations of the Lahore High Court: ―With the<br />

proliferation of the means of communication media the names and products of<br />

major world-renowned companies are getting the attention of the public at large in<br />

all civilized countries of the world and Pakistan is no exception. Extensive<br />

travelling abroad in the recent past has made it possible for the people of Pakistan<br />

to have knowledge of internationally renowned companies and their products.‖<br />

This judicial trend was explained by the Sindh High Court in Morphy Richards Ltd<br />

v Registrar of Trademarks 79 as follows: ―An enactment on trademarks is essentially<br />

an international statute, catering to national and international sensibilities… We are<br />

living in an information age where the world has become a veritable global<br />

village.‖ Globalisation thrives on the honesty of business practices. The judgments<br />

delivered by the Pakistani courts on IP rights (particularly in relation to the<br />

adoption and use of marks, the marketing of novel products and the use of<br />

copyrighted matter) show that the consideration of honest intentions has been<br />

pivotal to such judgments. Thus, in Cooper‟s Incorporated v Pakistan General<br />

Stores 80 the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that: ―although the appellant has not<br />

been selling its products in Pakistan because of import restrictions, this does not<br />

entitle the respondent to copy the appellant‘s trademark because by doing so it is<br />

deceiving the public into thinking that its products are the products of the<br />

appellant.‖ In the same case the Supreme Court also approved the following<br />

findings by the High Court: ―Clearly, if the adoption of a trademark by an appellant<br />

is proved to be dishonest, no amount of use of the trademark by it can justify<br />

registration.‖ In Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v Ch Muhammad Altaf 81 the Supreme<br />

Court, while refusing a Pakistani applicant‘s registration of the trademark<br />

TOSHIBA, held that: ―The respondent has shown no reason tenable at law to pick<br />

up an invented word of a foreign firm enjoying both inside and outside the country<br />

76 Pakistan Globalization and protection of foreign trademarks- Building and enforcing intellectual<br />

property value 2007 p 285-287.<br />

77 (PLD 1979 Kar83)<br />

78 (PLD 1990 SC 1074)<br />

79 (1992 MLD 2506)<br />

80 (1981 SCMR 1039)<br />

81 (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 27)


250 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

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a reputation for electrical goods of various descriptions. It is registered in this<br />

country as such. Against this background, the adoption of the same trademark<br />

phonetically in respect of electric fans is bound to create a likelihood of confusion<br />

and deception to the consumers of such goods. Hence, it is against the public<br />

interest to register such a trademark.‖ In another landmark judgment of the Sindh<br />

High Court in National Detergents Ltd v Nirma Chemicals Works 82 , in which the<br />

foreign company‘s trademark NIRMA was not being used in Pakistan, it was held<br />

that: ―The appellants have not alleged that the first respondents had abandoned any<br />

intention to use their foreign trademark in Pakistan for the goods and such<br />

inference cannot also be drawn in this case as the respondents have themselves<br />

filed an application for registration of their mark and have expressed their intention<br />

to use it in Pakistan. The use of the word ‗Nirma‘ is clearly not bona fide. No<br />

appreciable reason has been shown by the appellants or their counsel except with<br />

the intention to cause confusion. The conduct of the appellants in appropriating the<br />

trademark of foreign owners is not proper.‖ In Mars Incorporated v Pakistan<br />

Mineral Water Bottling Plant (Private) Limited 83 the defendants launched their<br />

beverages under the trademark MARS, which is famous worldwide for<br />

confectionery. The Sindh High Court at Karachi granted an interim injunction in<br />

favor of Mars even though the plaintiff‘s goods (confectionery products) were<br />

different from the defendant‘s goods, and recognized MARS as a well known<br />

international mark.<br />

4. PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS IN UZBEKISTAN<br />

Since 1991, when Uzbekistan had to jump from socialist to market economy,<br />

there has been a great amount of work done in the field of legislative reforms in all<br />

of the branches of law, including intellectual property. As a member of the Paris<br />

Union and <strong>WIPO</strong>, and a country willing to become a member of World Trade<br />

Organization (WTO), Uzbekistan nowadays needs to build a mechanism for<br />

efficient protection of intellectual property, including the protection of well-known<br />

marks.<br />

The national legislation concerning protection of well-known marks in<br />

Uzbekistan at the moment consists only of three documents. They are:<br />

1. Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan ―On Trademarks, Service Marks and<br />

Appellations of Origin‖, 2001 (hereinafter ―The Law‖);<br />

2. Rules of filing and examination of appeals and applications in the Board of<br />

Appeal of the State Patent Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan, reg.# 1889<br />

of 24.01.2009 (hereinafter ―The Rules‖);<br />

3. Recommendations on the conduction of surveys among consumers on the<br />

issue of recognition of a trademark to be well-known in Uzbekistan<br />

(hereinafter ―The Recommendations‖).<br />

82 (1992 MLD 2357)<br />

83 (2001 MLD 39)


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 251<br />

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The Law<br />

The current edition of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan ―On<br />

Trademarks, Service Marks and Appellations of Origin‖ was adopted in 2001 and<br />

was amended twice since that time: in 2002 and 2007. The last time it was<br />

amended there were added two articles, the significance of which for the purpose of<br />

this chapter is enormous. Those two articles, namely 32 1 (―A Well-Known Trade<br />

Mark‖) and 32 2 (―Legal Protection of a Well-Known Trade Mark‖), in strive of<br />

implementing of the Art. 6bis of the Paris Convention, directly deal with the issues<br />

of recognition of well-known marks in Uzbekistan.<br />

Article 32 1 of the Law stipulates the following:<br />

―A trademark 84 protected in the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the<br />

basis of its registration, a trademark, protected in the territory of the<br />

Republic of Uzbekistan without registration in accordance with the<br />

international treaty of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as a sign used as a<br />

trademark, but having no legal protection in the Republic of Uzbekistan, may<br />

be recognized as well-known in the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of the<br />

application of a legal or a natural person, if such trademarks or signs have<br />

on the date specified in the application become widely known among relevant<br />

consumers in respect of the goods of that person, as a result of their<br />

[trademarks and signs] intensive use.<br />

Well-known trademark is granted the same legal protection as provided by<br />

this Act for a trademark‖.<br />

As we can see, the article provides us with basic concept of a Well-Known<br />

Mark in Uzbekistan, namely it establishes the following requirements:<br />

1) The mark claimed to be well-known must be one of the following 3<br />

types of marks are eligible for protection:<br />

a) registered trademarks;<br />

unregistered trademarks protected under international treaties 85 ;<br />

b) unregistered signs used as trademarks.<br />

2) The mark is widely known among relevant consumers in respect of the<br />

goods of the claimant.<br />

3) There must be intensive use of the mark 86 .<br />

84 Under the Art. 3 of the Law, the term ―trademark‖ also applies to service marks, therefore<br />

protection for a well-known service mark may also be sought under the same conditions. This is of<br />

specific importance in the context of compliance with Art. 16.2 of the TRIPS Agreement<br />

85 at the moment the only treaty under which protection is granted to trademarks without registration<br />

in Uzbekistan is a Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International<br />

Registration of Marks (1989) (Madrid Protocol), in force for Uzbekistan since December, 2007


252 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The procedure of recognition can be started only upon the request<br />

(application) of an interested person, and not ex officio.<br />

Article 32 2 of the Law deals with the bases of procedure for granting<br />

protection to well-known marks: designation of a ―Competent Authority‖ 87 ,<br />

inclusion of recognized well-known mark into the special List, publication and<br />

issuance of a certificate. According to this article, legal protection of a well-known<br />

trademark once granted is valid indefinitely.<br />

As to the issue of protection from dilution the following must be stated.<br />

According to the Art. 10 of the, Law existence of a well-known trademark is an<br />

absolute ground for refusal of registration of another identical of confusingly<br />

similar trademark in respect of any types of goods [or services]. This looks like an<br />

attempt to comply with the requirements of the Art. 16.3 of the TRIPS Agreement,<br />

although rather awkward and vague, because it does not say that the well-known<br />

mark must be registered first, as well as that the requirements i) of a threat of<br />

―connection‖ or association with the well-known mark owner, and ii) possible<br />

damage to the interests of the latter, must be met. Therefore, this provision may,<br />

and certainly will 88 , give birth to a lot of complications in practice.<br />

The Rules<br />

The document is compulsory to be followed by all legal and physical persons<br />

in Uzbekistan. The part relating to the procedure of recognition of a mark as wellknown<br />

in Uzbekistan mainly deals with the following issues:<br />

1) requirements to application on recognition of a well-known mark, and<br />

materials complementary to it;<br />

2) procedural issues: registration of applications, duration of proceedings,<br />

rules of proceedings, and issuance of a decision by the BoA.<br />

The core part of the Rules (for the purpose of this paper) is the requirements<br />

to application on recognition of a well-known mark, as it describes what type of<br />

information and supporting documents to be presented to the BoA for<br />

consideration. Article 7 of the Rules reads:<br />

86 as we can see form the analysis of <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendations in Chapter 1.3 above, the<br />

criterion of intensive use of the trademark is contradicting to the Art.2(3) of the Joint<br />

Recommendation.<br />

87 According to the Law, the Board of Appeal of the State Patent Office of Uzbekistan (hereinafter<br />

―BoA‖) is the only competent governmental body to decide on the issue if recognition of wellknown<br />

marks. Courts have absolutely no authority over this issue.<br />

88 up to the moment there has been issued not a single decision on the recognition of well-known<br />

marks in Uzbekistan


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 253<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

―Application […], and the accompanying materials must contain the actual<br />

data confirming that the trademark is well-known. These materials may be<br />

documents containing:<br />

information about intensive use of the trademark on the territory of the<br />

Republic of Uzbekistan;<br />

list of geographic locations where the goods (in respect of which the<br />

trademark is used) have been sold;<br />

information about the amount of sales of these goods;<br />

information about the way of use of the trademark, including advertising and<br />

presentation at fairs or exhibitions of products and/or services for which the<br />

mark is applied;<br />

information about annual average number of consumers of the goods;<br />

information about the countries in which the trademark has become wellknown;<br />

the surveys of consumers of goods, provided by specialized independent<br />

organization, in accordance with the recommendations set out by the Patent<br />

Office.<br />

The duration, continuity, intensity and volume of use of a trademark may be<br />

demonstrated by presenting of: conclusions of product quality control bodies,<br />

trade organizations, and societies for the protection of consumer rights;<br />

declarations, quality certificates, and other documents.<br />

The application must indicate the date from which the use of the trademark<br />

has begun, and the date from which the claimant considers his trademark as<br />

well-known in the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan‖.<br />

This is an obvious attempt to implement <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendation<br />

Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks 89 , but with its<br />

specific features. Although optional (as well as the Joint Recommendation itself),<br />

the list above focuses more on the criterion of intensive use of the trademark in<br />

Uzbekistan, as implying that use is a decisive factor (and it actually is according to<br />

the Article 32 1 of the Law) in recognition of a well-known mark, which is<br />

inconsistent with the Art.2(3) of the Joint Recommendation. In fact the Rules (as<br />

well as the Law) do not contain any ―non-criteria‖, i.e. criteria which cannot be<br />

demanded by the BoA to be met by the claimant, which leaves a room for abuse by<br />

the BoA of its powers to grant protection to a well-known mark.<br />

The Recommendations<br />

The Recommendations are not obligatory provisions to be taken into account<br />

when conducting a survey on whether the mark is well-known or not in<br />

Uzbekistan. According to the Rules mentioned above, surveys or polls are not<br />

compulsory to be presented to the Board of Appeal for the latter to decide on the<br />

issue of recognition of a mark to be well-known in Uzbekistan. But it is encouraged<br />

to present them anyway (although they can turn out to be very costly) because they<br />

89 See Chapter 1 above


254 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

give a clear picture of the issue, i.e. the actual numbers and figures on how wellknown<br />

a mark is in a certain relevant sector of the public, or in other words, by an<br />

―average consumer‖ of goods and/or services in Uzbekistan.<br />

Mainly the Recommendations contain guidelines for conducting a survey<br />

specifically designed to help specialized organizations present information<br />

necessary to identify if a trademark has or has not become well-know in<br />

Uzbekistan.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 255<br />

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________<br />

5. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS<br />

No. Name of legal element of well-known<br />

marks protection regime<br />

Italy Pakistan Uzbekistan Notes<br />

1 Legal system Civil law Common law Civil law<br />

2 International obligations TRIPS, Paris Convention TRIPS, Paris<br />

Convention<br />

Paris Convention<br />

3 Who can claim protection and how An interested legal or a Owner of a well known An interested legal or a<br />

it can be claimed?<br />

natural person can file an TM can file an natural person can file an<br />

application with the application with the application with the<br />

Competent Authority, not ex competent authority. competent authority, not<br />

officio<br />

ex officio<br />

4 Grounds (criteria) for protection The Italian Industrial Any ground competent 1. The mark is widely Uzbekistan: the criterion of<br />

Property Code affords to authority consider known among relevant intensive use of the trademark is<br />

both marks that are well- relevant especially consumers in respect of contradicting to the Art.2(3) of<br />

known within the meaning mentioned in Sec. 86(2) the goods of the claimant the <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendation<br />

of Article 6bis of the Paris of the TM Ordinance, 2. There must be intensive<br />

Convention and registered<br />

marks that enjoy a<br />

reputation the power to<br />

cancel the registration of<br />

identical or similar marks<br />

for dissimilar goods or<br />

services, while it affords<br />

only the latter protection<br />

against the unauthorized use<br />

of identical or similar marks<br />

with respect to dissimilar<br />

goods or services.<br />

2001.<br />

use of the mark<br />

5 Competent authorities Tribunal IP Specialized Trademark Tribunal, Board of Appeal of the<br />

Sections<br />

Court of law<br />

State Patent Office of<br />

Uzbekistan<br />

6 Exception from the principle of Present Present Present Uzbekistan: protection may be<br />

territoriality<br />

granted to unregistered signs used<br />

as trademarks and service marks


256 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________<br />

7 Exception from the principle of<br />

specificity<br />

Present Present Present Uzbekistan: too broad –<br />

existence of a WKTM is an<br />

absolute ground for cancellation<br />

of any identical or confusingly<br />

similar existing mark or refusal to<br />

future identical or confusingly<br />

similar mark for any types of<br />

goods or services<br />

8 Protection from dilution by blurring Yes Yes See notes to point 7 above<br />

9 Protection from dilution by<br />

tarnishment<br />

Yes Yes See notes to point 7 above<br />

10 Scope of protection if mark is Registration does not For protection of well- Registration does not Uzbekistan: See notes to point 5<br />

registered<br />

influence the scope of known mark<br />

influence the scope of<br />

protection<br />

registration is not<br />

mandatory<br />

protection<br />

11 Scope of protection if mark is Registration does not Protection is provided Registration does not Uzbekistan: See notes to point 5<br />

unregistered<br />

influence the scope of for unregistered well influence the scope of<br />

protection<br />

known marks<br />

protection<br />

12 Bad faith consideration Article 19(2) prohibits the Usually considered Not present Uzbekistan: This must be<br />

registration of a mark filed especially for passing<br />

definitely included into<br />

in bad faith.<br />

off actions<br />

legislation of Uzbekistan along<br />

with the basics of doctrine of<br />

passing off from common Law<br />

tradition<br />

13 Retroactive protection of well- See point 4 above Yes, Depending upon See notes to point 7 above<br />

known mark or possibility of<br />

coexistence of two similar or<br />

identical marks (for similar or<br />

identical products in case of<br />

unregistered WKTMs)<br />

the merits of a case.


257 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

CONCLUSIONS<br />

Trademarks/service marks are used by persons or companies to identify their<br />

goods/services. Marks exist to protect consumers from confusion as to the source<br />

of a product/service. Principle of territoriality and specificity are very important<br />

part of any trademark law. However, an exception to these principles is the well<br />

known marks doctrine. Statutory evolution and recent cases show that the<br />

protection afforded to ―Well Known‖ trademarks is increasing. Even in the absence<br />

of any likelihood of confusion as to the origin of products, the protection of a<br />

trademark aimed at providing its owner with a return for promotional and<br />

advertising investment is clear.<br />

In this paper we have reviewed the concepts of the well known and famous<br />

marks. We have examined Trademark Laws of Italy, Pakistan and Uzbekistan for<br />

approaches to well known trademarks and have found that, in general, well known<br />

and famous trademarks are well protected by trademark law in Italy, Pakistan and<br />

Uzbekistan even though the means of achieving protection is sometimes is unclear<br />

in its path or uncertain in its objectives.


258 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

International Disciplines and Relevant Literature<br />

FREDERICK M. ABBOTT – THOMAS COTTIER – FRANCIS GURRY,<br />

International intellectual property in an integrated world economy, Aspen<br />

Publishers, 2007<br />

BARTON BEEBE, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution<br />

Law, in 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 2006, 1142 ff.<br />

W. CORNISH- D. LLWELYN, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights,<br />

Trademarks and Allied Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007<br />

TASHIA A. BUNCH, Well-known Marks Doctrine: Where do we go from<br />

here?, Journal of the Patent Trademark Office Society, March 2008, Thomson<br />

Reuters, 2009<br />

S. P. CHEETHAM, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in luxury<br />

goods, M.A. Cohen-A.E. Ban-S.J. Mitchell (eds.), Chinese Intellectual Property<br />

law and practice, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000.<br />

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, Dilution of a trade mark: European and United<br />

States law compared, in Vaver D., Bently L. (edited by), Intellectual property in<br />

the new millennium, Essays in honour of William R. Cornish, Cambridge<br />

University Press, Cambridge, 2004,<br />

F. MOSTERT, The protection of famous trademark on non competing goods,<br />

in Vol. I Intellectual Property Studies, 1996.<br />

B. W. PATTISHALL–D. C. HILLIARD–J. N. WELCH II, Trademarks and<br />

competition desk book, Matthew Bender, New York, 2001.<br />

The protection of well known marks in Asia-pacific, Latin America and<br />

Africa, issued by the International Trademark Assoication, Oct. 2004.<br />

MCCARTHY, On Trademarks and Unfair Competition, West Group, 2002.<br />

T.J. MCCARTHY & F. MOSTER, Famous and Well-Known Marks - An<br />

International Analysis, 2nd Edition, International Trademark Association, New<br />

York, 2004.<br />

A.KUR, TRIPS and TRADEMARK LAW, in ―From GATTS to TRIPS‖,<br />

WEINHEIM, 1996.


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 259<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

M. GRINBERG, The <strong>WIPO</strong> Joint Recommendation Protecting Well Known<br />

Marks and the Forgotten Good Will, Chicago- KENT Intellectual Property Law<br />

Society Journal of Intellectual Property, 2005.<br />

MICHAEL BLAKENEY, The Protection of Well-Known Trademarks, Lecture<br />

prepared for <strong>WIPO</strong> National Seminar On Intellectual Property organized by the<br />

World Intellectual Property Organization (<strong>WIPO</strong>) in cooperation with the Cairo<br />

University, Arab Republic of Egypt (Cairo, February 17 to 19, 2003)<br />

STEPHEN P. LADAS, International Protection of Well-Known Trade-<br />

Marks, The Trade-Mark Reporter, 1951<br />

FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is harmony<br />

possible in the global village?, The Trademark Reporter, 1996<br />

HORACIO RANGEL-ORTIZ, Well-Known Trademarks Under International<br />

Treaties, Trademark World, February 1997<br />

DAVID H. TATHAM, <strong>WIPO</strong> Resolution on Well-known Marks: A Small<br />

Step or a Giant Leap?, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd and Contributors, 2000<br />

Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),<br />

signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 Apr 1994.<br />

Joint Recommendations Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-<br />

Known Marks, adopted in 1999 by the World Intellectual Property Organization.<br />

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as amended in<br />

1979.<br />

National (or Domestic) Disciplines of Italy, Uzbekistan and Pakistan and<br />

Relevant Literature<br />

ADRIANO VANZETTI – VINCENZO DI CATALDO, Manuale di diritto<br />

industriale, 6^ edizione, Giuffré Editore, 2009<br />

JASMINE KARIMI, Avoiding Dilution of Well-known Marks in the US, EU<br />

and Asia, http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1971062/Avoiding-Dilution-ofWellknown-Marks-in-the-US-EU-and-Asia.html,<br />

April 2007<br />

C. HEATH & K. LIU, The protection of well-known marks in Asia, Kluwer,<br />

The Hague, 2000<br />

K. FAULKNER, Branding in South East Asia, in Brands and Branding, The<br />

Economist Series, Bloomberg press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2004.


260 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

S. YOOK, Trademark Dilution in European Union, North Western School of<br />

Law, LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE, 2001.<br />

Commentaries<br />

PIERGAETANO MARCHETTI – LUIGI CARLO UBERTAZZI,<br />

Commentario breve alle leggi su proprietà intellettuale e concorrenza, 4 edizione,<br />

Cedam, 2007<br />

Cases (Chronological Order)<br />

Corte di Giustizia 6 ottobre 2009, causa C-301/07, Pago International GmbH<br />

c. Tirolmilch Genossenschaft mbH, caso «Pago»<br />

Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 22 September 2009, in<br />

Cases C-236-238/08, Google France e Google Inc. c. Lousi Vuitton Mallettier,<br />

Google France c. Viaticum Luteciel e Google France Bruno Raboin, Tiger SARL c.<br />

CNRHH, Pierre Alexis Thonet, case ―Google-Ad-Words‖<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 15 settembre 2009, causa T-308/08, Parfums Christian<br />

Dior c. UAMI e Consolidated Artists BV, caso «MANGO adorably»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 18 giugno 2009, causa C-487/07, L‘Oréal SA, Lancôme<br />

parfums et beauté & Cie, Laboratoires Garnier & Ci. c. Bellure NV, Malaika<br />

Investments Ltd. e Starion International Ltd., caso «L‘Oréal»<br />

Conclusioni dell‘Avvocato generale Paolo Mengozzi del 10 febbraio 2009,<br />

causa C-487/07, L‘Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie, Laboratoires<br />

Garnier & Ci. c. Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd. e Starion International Ltd.,<br />

caso «L‘Oréal»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 18 dicembre 2008, causa C-16/06 P, Les Editions Albert<br />

René c. UAMI, caso «Mobilix»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 11 dicembre 2008, causa C-57/08 P., Gateway, Inc. c.<br />

UAMI e Fujitsu Siemens Computers, caso «Activy Media Gateway»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 27 novembre 2008, causa C-252/07, Intel Corporation c.<br />

CPM UK Ltd., caso «Intel»<br />

Conclusioni dell‘Avvocato generale Sharpston del 26 giugno 2008, causa<br />

252/07, Intel c. CPM UK Ltd., caso «Intel»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 19 giugno 2008, causa T-93/06, Mühlens GmbH & Ko.<br />

KG c. UAMI e Spa Monopole, compagnie fermière de Spa SA/NV, caso «Mineral<br />

spa»


Saad Nursrullah, Luigi Mastroianni and Djakhagir Aripov 261<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Corte di Giustizia 12 giugno 2008, causa C-533/06, O2 Holding Ltd., 02<br />

(UK) Ltd. c. Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd., in Racc. 2008, I, 4231 ss., caso «O2»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 16 aprile 2008, causa T-181/05, Citigroup Inc. e<br />

Citibank NA c. UAMI e Citi SL, in Racc. 2008, II, 669, caso «Citi/Citibank»<br />

Conclusioni dell‘Avvocato generale Paolo Mengozzi del 31 gennaio 2008,<br />

causa C-533/06, O2 Holding Ltd., 02 (UK) Ltd. c. Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd., caso<br />

«O2»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 30 gennaio 2008, causa T-128/06, Japan Tobacco, Inc.<br />

c. UAMI e Torrefação Camelo L da , caso «Camelo»<br />

Conclusioni dell‘Avvocato Generale Trstenjak del 29 novembre 2007, causa<br />

C-16/06 P, Les Editions Albert René c. UAMI, caso «Mobilix»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 27 novembre 2007, causa T-434/05, Gateway Inc. c.<br />

UAMI e Fujitsu Siemens Computers GmbH, caso «Activy Media Gateway»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 22 novembre 2007, causa C-328/06, Alfredo Nieto Nuño c.<br />

Leonci Monlleó Franquet, caso «Fincas Tarragona»<br />

Conclusioni dell‘Avvocato generale Paolo Mengozzi del 13 settembre 2007,<br />

causa C-328/06, Alfredo Nieto Nuño c. Leonci Monlleò Franquet, caso «Fincas<br />

Tarragona»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 11 luglio 2007, causa T-150/04, Mühlens GmbH & Co.<br />

KG c. UAMI e Minoronzoni s.r.l., in Racc. 2007, II, 2353 ss., caso «Tosca Blu»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 11 luglio 2007, causa T-263/03, Mühlens GmbH & Co.<br />

KG c. UAMI e Conceria Toska s.r.l., caso «Toska»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 16 maggio 2007, causa T-137/05, Gruppo La Perla c.<br />

UAMI e Worldgem Brands – Gestão e Investimentos L da , caso «La Perla»<br />

Court of First Instance 10 May 2007, in case T-47/06, Antartica s.r.l. c.<br />

UAMI e Nasdaq, case «Nasdaq»<br />

CFI 22 March 2007, in Case T-215/03, Sigla SA v. OHIM and Elleni<br />

Holding BV, case «VIPS»<br />

CFI 6 February 2007, case T-477/04, Aktieselkabet af 21.november 2001 v.<br />

OHIM and TDK Kabuiki Kaisha (TDK Corp.), case «TDK»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 25 gennaio 2007, causa C-48/05, Adam Opel c. Autec, in<br />

Racc. 2007, I, 1017 ss.; in Foro It. 2007, 137 ss. con nota di CASABURI e in Il dir.<br />

ind. 2007, 423 ss. con nota di M. BOGNI, Il marchio automobilistico dei modellini,


262 A Comparative Study of Well-Known Trademarks Protection in Italy,<br />

Pakistan and Uzbekistan<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

caso «modellini in miniatura»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 27 ottobre 2005, causa T-336/03, Les Editions Albert<br />

René c. UAMI e nei confronti di Orange A/S, in Racc. 2005, II, 4667 ss., caso<br />

«Mobilix»<br />

Trib. primo grado CE 25 maggio 2005, causa T-67/04, Spa Monopole,<br />

compagnie fermière de SPA SA/NV c. UAMI e Spa-Finders Travel Arrangements,<br />

in Racc. 2005, II, 1825 ss., caso «Spa-Finders»<br />

Trib. di primo grado 13 dicembre 2004, in causa T-8/03, El Corte Inglés SA<br />

c. UAMI e Emilio Pucci, in Racc. 2004, II, 4297 ss., caso ―Emilio Pucci‖<br />

Corte di Giustizia 23 ottobre 2003, causa C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG e<br />

Adidas Benelux BV c. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., in Racc. I, 389 ss., Giur. ann.<br />

dir. ind. 4608; in Il dir. ind., 2004, 31 ss. con Commento di R. S. DE MARCO e in<br />

Giur. comm. 2004, II, 363 ss. con nota di N. BOTTERO, Marchi notori, beni affini e<br />

usi atipici nella giurisprudenza comunitaria, caso «Adidas-Fitnessworld»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 9 gennaio 2003, causa C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie SA e<br />

Zino Davidoff SA c. Gofkid SA, in Racc. 2003 I, 389 ss., in Giur. it. 2003, 283 s.<br />

con mia nota La tutela dei marchi che godono di rinomanza nei confronti della<br />

registrazione ed utilizzazione per beni affini nella giurisprudenza della Corte di<br />

Giustizia e in Giur. comm. 2003, II, 574-584 con mia nota Marchi che godono di<br />

rinomanza e beni affini nella giurisprudenza comunitaria,, caso «Davidoff»<br />

Corte di Giustizia 14 settembre 1999, causa C-375/97, General Motors Corp.<br />

c. Yplon, in Racc. 1999, I, 5421 ss., caso «General Motors/Yplon»<br />

Boards of Appeal, Yearly overview of decisions 2007,<br />

http://oami.europa.eu/search/LegalDocs/la/en_BoA_index.cfm<br />

National Laws and Regulations<br />

Pakistan Trademark Ordinance, 2001.<br />

Pakistan Trademark Rules, 2003.<br />

Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Trademarks & Appellations of Origin<br />

of Goods, 2001<br />

Rules of filing and examination of appeals and applications in the Board of<br />

Appeal of the State Patent Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan, reg.# 1889 of<br />

24.01.2009.


COLOR AND COMBINATION OF COLORS AS TRADEMARK<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

1.1. Non-Traditional Trademarks<br />

1.2. Where is the Distinctiveness?<br />

by<br />

Chiara Gaido<br />

Giselda Metaliaj<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

2. REGISTRABILITY OF COLORS AND COMBINATION OF COLORS AS<br />

TRADEMARK<br />

2.1. The European Situation<br />

2.2. The Registrability of Color per se<br />

2.3. Is there a Different Approach for what concerns the Combination of Colors?<br />

3. THE CASES<br />

3.1. The Libertel Case<br />

3.2. The Heidelberger Case and the Subsequent Decisions<br />

4. THE US SITUATION<br />

5. A CASE STUDY: THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY<br />

6. IS THERE ANY FUTURE FOR THESE TRADEMARKS?<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY


264 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

The scope and functions of the modern trademark have expanded, as<br />

civilization continues to evolve into a modern technological era. For many years, it<br />

has been impossible to protect colors as trademarks and also even if still there is a<br />

large amount of uncertainty 1 about the protection of colors as a trademark, it‘s now<br />

undeniable that, in the most recent jurisprudence of European Court of Justice<br />

(ECJ), something new is now appearing on the scene bringing the European<br />

statements closer to the US approach.<br />

In this paper we will deal with colors per se and with combinations of colors<br />

as one of the most important category of non-conventional trademarks. In the light<br />

of the leading cases from US Supreme Court and from ECJ, considering the<br />

evolved applicable law in these countries, we will try to draw a picture of the<br />

present situation and to consider what are the possible future scenarios for this<br />

category of marks. While the combination of colors is quite more unified area, the<br />

destiny of colors per se is related to the national legislations, where different<br />

countries have chosen to specifically permit or exclude the registrability of color<br />

per se as trademark.<br />

We have chosen to inscribe a case study focused on the pharmaceutical<br />

industry, as it is a very interesting field where colors trademark are getting used<br />

more and more by companies to identify their products. The aim of this paragraph<br />

is to analyze the existing relationship between consumers and pharmaceutical<br />

trademarks, especially from the point of view of their perception of the signs and<br />

the relevant public that has to be taken into account in the case of likelihood of<br />

confusion.<br />

1.1. Non-Traditional Trademarks<br />

Among the world of trademarks the so called non-conventional or nontraditional<br />

trademarks have recently created a new group that is getting more and<br />

more attention from the market, lawyers, and by consequence, from the Courts 2 .<br />

Due to the lack of clearness, exhaustive explanations and strictness of the<br />

Legislator in the approach to the non-traditional trademarks, then the last word<br />

belongs to the Courts.<br />

Before analyzing the different features and issues of non-traditional<br />

trademarks, it is compulsory to explain what can constitute a trademark in the light<br />

of the main international treaties.<br />

1<br />

P. A. Dubois, Color trademark-the US and European approaches converge, IAM magazine, 2005,<br />

at 30<br />

2<br />

P. Torremans, Intellectual Property Law, Fifth edition, Oxford University Press, 2008 ; M.<br />

Schwarz, Registration of colours as trademarks, case comment, EIPR; L. Bently, B Sherman,<br />

Intellectual Property Law, Third Edition Oxford University Press, November 2008


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

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Article 6ter of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,<br />

signed on the 20 th march 1883 (and following amendments) has only defined what<br />

can not be used as a mark, not giving any further explanation on which signs can be<br />

validly used. In particular, this article expressly excludes from the registration<br />

―...State Emblems, Official Hallmarks, and Emblems of Intergovernmental<br />

Organizations” 3 . Can the famous statement ―what is not prohibited is allowed‖<br />

take place in this case? TRIPs agreement tried to fill this gap by dealing with the<br />

protectable subject matter for trademarks.<br />

The TRIPS Agreement was adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994 as annex<br />

C of the final act embodying the results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade<br />

Negotiations from 1986 to 1994. The Agreement came into force on January 1995<br />

and introduced global minimum standards for protecting and enforcing all forms of<br />

intellectual property rights. For what concerns trademarks, articles 15-21 lay down<br />

the rules for their protection.<br />

Article 15 (1) gives a broad definition of a trademark as it includes “any sign,<br />

or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one<br />

undertaking from those of other undertakings”. The second sentence continues by<br />

listing some of the signs that can be a valid trademark, such as “...in particular<br />

words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and<br />

combinations of colors as well as combinations of such signs...”.<br />

The words “such as” lead us to the conclusion that this is an indicative list,<br />

not an exhaustive one. Therefore, other signs can be eligible for trademark. Nontraditional<br />

trademarks belongs to this group, even if they are not specifically<br />

mentioned by article 15 and they comprise shapes, sounds, colors, smells or tastes.<br />

If the purpose of a trademark is to distinguish the goods or services of one<br />

undertaking and non-traditional trademarks are able to do that, why than their<br />

registration is so perplex and controversial from State to State? A lot of factors play<br />

an important role, like the difficulty of these marks to be presented graphically, to<br />

be visually perceptible 4 and the lack of inherent distinctiveness. The most frequent<br />

reason for refusal to register non-traditional trademarks, such as color and shape<br />

marks, is lack of distinctiveness. In order to harmonize this area and to reach some<br />

unified standards AIPPI 5 in 2004 has came up with a resolution for the Conditions<br />

3 Paris convention for the Protection of Industrial Property signed on the 20 th march 1883<br />

[hereinafter Paris Convention], revised Iin the following years and amended in 1979, it counts today<br />

173 contracting countries.<br />

4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of<br />

the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], art. 15(1)<br />

5 AIPPI resolution, Q.181. Conditions for registration and scope of protection of non conventional<br />

trademarks, in www.aippi.org


266 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

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for registration and scope of protection of non-conventional trademarks 6 aiming to<br />

influence the international regulation of this field.<br />

In any case, a mark not having a prima facie distinctive character, can<br />

nonetheless be protected if, following intense use over certain time period by a<br />

company, it assumes, in the eyes of the public, an individualizing capacity it lacked<br />

originally towards the goods and services of that company (the so called secondary<br />

meaning).<br />

In relation to this aspect, article 15 (1) of the TRIPs agreement states that<br />

“...Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or<br />

services, Members may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired<br />

through use. Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be<br />

visually perceptible”.<br />

In other words, the secondary meaning is acquired when, in the mind of the<br />

public, the primary meaning of sign serves to identify the origin of a product and<br />

not the product itself.<br />

As we will see further, the registration of colors trademarks have been<br />

accepted, in many cases, only on the basis of their proved secondary meaning. In<br />

fact the inherent disctinctiviness of these signs still remains a ground of refusal<br />

difficult to overcome.<br />

1.2. Where is the Distinctiveness?<br />

According to the statistics of 2008 of OAMI 7 color is the second mark, after<br />

shape, most registered in EU belonging to the group of non-traditional trademarks.<br />

The color‘s power in the identification of the brand has been understood from<br />

the marketers and effectively used by them because color is first perceived by the<br />

sense of sight 8 , the first element that attract our attention. Considering the power of<br />

advertisement in this consuming society, companies are willing to be more<br />

attractive and to present their products or services in such a manner that would be<br />

appealing to the consumer‘s aesthetic sense 9 . Furthermore, color can be the<br />

identifier of the company‘s image 10 , despite the different types of products it may<br />

offer. Today, in a world market, colors are most likely to overcome the linguistic<br />

and cultural barriers, being perceived in the same way throughout the world. But,<br />

maybe because of these facts there is the need to let colors free and not give<br />

monopolist rights over their use.<br />

6 R. Sieckmann, Welcome to the non-traditional trademark archive, in www.copat.de<br />

7 OHIM Report, Statistics of Community Trade Marks 2008, in www.oami.europa.eu<br />

8 S. Sandri- S. Rizzo, Non-conventional trademarks and community law , Marques, 2003, at 70<br />

9 N. Mishra, Registration of Non-traditional trademarks, JIPR, January 2008, 43 ff<br />

10 S. Sandri- S. Rizzo, Non-conventional trademarks and community law , supra note 6, at 70


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

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The color mark is either composed of a color per se or of a combination of<br />

colors. A color combination is a collection of more than a single color on products<br />

and services for the purpose of distinctiveness and of indicating their commercial<br />

or service origin.<br />

One of the first and most important conditions for a mark to be eligible for<br />

registration is the requirement of distinctiveness. A mark has to be distinctive in<br />

order to get registered. When it comes to colors this requirement is probably the<br />

most difficult barrier to overcome.<br />

In fact it is still controversial if a color can be considered inherently<br />

distinctive from the beginning. It seems that ―the distinctiveness‖ requirement in<br />

the case of colors is more rigid and strict comparing with signs or words because of<br />

the competitors‘ interest to keep the colors free to use 11 . In the Light Green case 12 ,<br />

Board of Appeal of OHIM (BOA) affirmed that a color per se in many cases lacks<br />

the distinctiveness. Exception to this rule may be only found if a very peculiar<br />

color shade is used and it regards very specific goods (for instance, black color use<br />

for detergents). The Board also affirmed that if a monopoly right on the use of light<br />

green for chewing gum were allowed, it would prohibit competitors from using<br />

similar shades for similar products with regard to which confusion could arise,<br />

bringing as consequence, problems on the competition.<br />

Another position has been held by the ECJ in the case KWS Saat AG 13 . With<br />

this decision, the Court has established that a decisive factor to decide whether the<br />

color is distinctive or not, it is the public itself to whom the goods/services are<br />

targeted. The relevant public of a particular sector is knowledgeable and attentive;<br />

therefore it can distinguish if the color used really acts as badge of the commercial<br />

origin of the product without misunderstanding any substantive value of the<br />

product itself.<br />

On the other hand, we have to consider that, for a lot of colors there is a<br />

conventional meaning as e.g green means natural products, white has a connection<br />

with cleanliness and purity, as well as blue with freshness. These associations are<br />

regularly used in marketing and advertising to promote a product through the use of<br />

positive associations 14 . In the mind of consumers there is a strong link between<br />

these colors and characteristics of the products. From this point of view, the use of<br />

the color per se can be considered non distinctive and can put at in a disadvantage<br />

position the competitors.<br />

11 C. Schulze, Registering Color trade mark in European Union, in EIPR, 2003 at 55<br />

12 Board of Appeal of OHIM December 3, 1998, Light Green R-122/2998-3<br />

13 European Court of Justice October 21, 2004, case C-447/02 , KWS Saat AG v. OHIM<br />

14 M. Green, Color in Trademark and Trade Dress disputes, in www.visualexpert.com, 2007


268 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

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2. REGISTRABILITY OF COLORS AND COMBINATION OF COLORS<br />

AS TRADEMARK<br />

A trademark to be validly registered has to consist in a ―sign‖; no statutory<br />

definitions of this term are expressed neither in the European legislation, neither in<br />

the American one, furthermore, the ECJ has held that the concept of sign is not<br />

limited to visually perceptible matter 15 and for this reason, sounds, smells and<br />

colors have been held to fall within the notion of sign.<br />

The essential function of a trademark is to guarantee the identity of the origin<br />

of the marked goods or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him,<br />

without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from<br />

others which have another origin. In other words, the primary purpose of a<br />

trademark is to act as a badge of origin.<br />

When a color can be considered as a sign identifying a specific good or<br />

service? In the light of the Qualitex and Libertel decisions, we have to consider that<br />

trademark rights are monopolistic and have no limitation on the duration of their<br />

subsistence; and for this reason once a sign has been accepted for registration, the<br />

rights of the proprietor are very strong, subject to a few minor exceptions and<br />

limitations 16 .<br />

The main problems concerning the registration of colors as trademarks are<br />

two: the first issue regards the greater monopoly that could be granted to the<br />

proprietor of a single color mark with a reputation. In this case, in fact, the<br />

protection could be extended to different shades of that color and to non similar<br />

goods, bringing by consequence, dangerous effects on competition.<br />

The second problem instead is connected to the balance that has to be found<br />

between the interest of companies, which want to achieve more and more<br />

competitiveness on the market, and the public interest of their competitors, to not<br />

be restricted on the availability of signs to distinguish their products or services<br />

(the so called requirement of availability) 17 .<br />

2.1. The European Situation<br />

The European Community enacted the First Council Directive on trademark<br />

law of 21 December 1988 (Regulation n. 104/89), which was aimed in<br />

15<br />

European Court of Justice December 12, 2002, case C-273/00, Ralf Sieckmann v. Deutsches<br />

Patent-und Markenant , parag. 43-44<br />

16<br />

D. I. Bainbridge, Smelll, Sound, Colour and Shape trade marks: an unhappy flirtation?, in JBL,<br />

2004, at 223<br />

17 European Court of Justice February 12, 2002, case C-363/99 Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV<br />

and Benelux Merkenbureau, parag. 32 Conclusion; S. Sandri, La giursprudenza comunitaria in<br />

tema di marchi non convenzionali, in Dir. Ind. 2004, at 216


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

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approximating the trademark laws of the Member States, in order to promote the<br />

internal market and remove disparities that may impede competition.<br />

In order to open up unrestricted economic activity, in 1993 the European<br />

Council promulgated the Community Trademark Regulation n. 40/94. The<br />

Regulation uniformed the identification of products and services throughout the EU<br />

and settled out the provisions governing the filing of an application for a<br />

community trademark, the conditions associated with the entitlement of the<br />

proprietor and the possibility for third parties to make written observations to<br />

OHIM and to oppose the registration of a trademark 18 .<br />

In particular, the Regulation established the ―searching‖ system designed to<br />

identify any conflict with other earlier rights.<br />

The Regulation was later amended into the European Council Regulation No.<br />

3288/94 in order to implement the TRIPs agreement.<br />

In 2004, the European Regulation No. 422/04 made a number of significant<br />

amendments to the community trademark system, with a view to increase its<br />

efficiency and to improve its operation. In particular, it simplifies the application of<br />

the ―searching system‖ in relation of existing rights.<br />

Because of many amendments introduced by the European Legislator to the<br />

Community Trademark System, in 2009 the European Council decided to codify it<br />

in the Regulation n. 207/2009 19 , without making any substantive changes.<br />

The Community trademark regime is an autonomous system with its own set<br />

of objective sand rules peculiar to it; it is self-sufficient and applies independently<br />

of any national system. Consequently the registrability of a sign as a Community<br />

mark must be assessed by reference only to relevant Community rules.<br />

Accordingly, the Examination Office and, if appropriate, the Community judicature<br />

are not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or indeed a third country, that<br />

the sign is registrable as a national mark.<br />

According to article 2 of Council Directive n. 104/89 and to article 4 of<br />

Council Regulation No. 40/94 (now article 4 of the Council Regulation No.<br />

207/2009): “A community trade mark may consist of any signs capable of being<br />

represented graphically, particularly words, including personal names, designs,<br />

letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging provided such signs are<br />

capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of<br />

other undertakings.”. This article sets out the main features that a sign has to<br />

possess to be validly registered as trademark.<br />

18 G. Rusen, ―Registrability of colors and smells as trademark”, in IJPM 2008, at 76<br />

19 European Council Regulation No. 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark


270 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

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In particular, the sign must be capable of being graphically represented and it<br />

must be able to distinguish the related goods or services from those of the other<br />

companies 18 . Failure to comply with these requirements determines the denial of<br />

the registration as they are included in the absolute grounds for refusal provided by<br />

article 7 (1) (a) and (b), of the Council Regulation No. 207/2009.<br />

For what regards the graphical representation, in the case C-273/00 Ralf<br />

Sieckmann v. Deustches Patentund Markenant, the ECJ stated that the requirement<br />

of a graphical representation must ―enable the sign to be represented visually,<br />

particularly by means of images, lines or characters, so it can be properly<br />

identified... It must be clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible,<br />

durable and objective‖ 20 .<br />

It is clear that this requirement is fundamental to grant legal certainty. In fact<br />

the trademark and the nature and scope of the rights associated with it can only be<br />

determined if the representation is precise and complete on its face. A graphical<br />

representation bearing the characteristics and qualities, settled out in the ECJ<br />

decision above mentioned, and the description of the goods or services for which<br />

the trademark is to be used, fully defines the true extent of the monopoly granted to<br />

the proprietor.<br />

In this way, on one side, other companies will be in the position to determine<br />

with a high degree of predictability what they can and cannot do. On the other side<br />

the proprietor of an earlier trademark will be able to see the precise nature of a<br />

trademark application so that he can assess whether or not it impinges upon his<br />

rights such that opposition proceeding should be initiated 21 .<br />

Instead, for what concerns the requirement of the distinctiveness, the focus is<br />

therefore on how the trademark would be perceived by the relevant public, which<br />

consists of average consumers of the goods or services in question.<br />

The Tribunal of First Instance of the European Court of Justice (TFI) has<br />

established that a sign, to be validly registered, it has to be capable to put the<br />

average consumer in the condition of repeating his choices in purchasing a specific<br />

good or service any time he will meet that particular sign 22 .<br />

Although the consumer is assumed to be reasonably observant, his level of<br />

attentiveness varies from sector to sector: the general consumer‘s level is lower in<br />

relation to everyday goods and it is higher for expensive goods 23 . For instance, for<br />

20<br />

European Court of Justice December 12, 2002, case C-273/00, Ralf Sieckmann v. Deutsches<br />

Patent-und Markenant, parag.46 and 55<br />

21<br />

D. I. Bainbridge, Smelll, Sound, Colour and Shape trade marks: an unhappy flirtation?, in JBL,<br />

2004, at 223<br />

22<br />

European Court of First Instance February 7, 2002, case T-88/00, Mag Instrument Inc v. OHIM;<br />

S. Sandri, La Giurisprudenza comunitaria in tema di marchi non convenzionali, supra at note 14, at<br />

218<br />

23<br />

L. Bently-B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 3d ed., Oxford Press, at 819


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

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what concerns the pharmaceuticals, the jurisprudence of the ECJ has stated in many<br />

cases (recently in the case T-95/07, Aventis Pharma SA v. OHIM, parag. 25), that<br />

the level of attentiveness of consumers is particularly hight when it comes to<br />

medicines.<br />

2.2. The Registrability of a Color per se<br />

The European trademark legislation does not contain any provisions limiting<br />

or barring the registration of colors or combination of colors as a trademark,<br />

provided they conform to the legal requirements of registration. The most<br />

important benchmark is whether the color performs the basic function of a<br />

trademark, which is to be distinctive of the proprietor‘s goods or services. Also the<br />

OHIM Examination Guidelines 24 explicitly contemplate the possibility of<br />

registering a color mark.<br />

Before analyzing the problems connected to the registrability of colors per se,<br />

it is necessary to focus our attention on the terms of signs and marks.<br />

A. Although the concept of sign is broad, it is not without limits. The terms<br />

of ―sign‖ and ―trademark‖ are not interchangeable, and there is a distinction<br />

between them.<br />

A sign can be a symbol, a device or an indicator (for example, an indication<br />

of quality or character). Trademarks are included within the meaning of signs but<br />

are sub species of them: they are graphical representations indicating origin 25 of the<br />

related goods or services.<br />

In the leading case Libertel, the ECJ stated that “…that a color per se cannot<br />

be presumed to constitute a sign. Normally a color is a simple property of things.<br />

Yet it may constitute a sign. That depends on the context in which the color is used.<br />

None the less, a color per se is capable, in relation to a product or service, of<br />

constituting a sign” 26 .<br />

B. Furthermore, the Court has held that a graphical representation it is<br />

necessary to enable the sign to be represented visually so that it can be<br />

precisely identified.<br />

In order to fulfill its function, the graphical representation must be “…clear,<br />

precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective.” 27<br />

24<br />

OHIM Examination Guidelines, parag. 3.7 in www.oami.europa.eu<br />

25<br />

D. I. Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, 7th Edition, Pearson Longman, at 639<br />

26<br />

European Court of Justice May 6, 2003, case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux<br />

Merkenbureau, parag. 28-29<br />

27<br />

European Court of Justice December 12, 2002, case C-273/00, Ralf Sieckmann v. Deutsches<br />

Patent-und Markenant, ut supra note 11 and 16, parag. 55


272 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

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In the Libertel case, the Court also specified that to fulfill this requirement, it<br />

is not sufficient the deposition of a single sample of color while a verbal<br />

description could suffice under certain circumstances.<br />

The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the sign to be represented<br />

visually, granting in this way legal certainty. The importance of the graphical<br />

representation it is clear, in fact: 1) the precise subject of the protection afforded by<br />

registration can be determined; 2) competent authorities will be able to identify the<br />

sign with clarity and precision, so that they can fulfill their obligations (e.g.<br />

examinations, publications, maintaining the register, etc...) and 3) economic<br />

operators will be able, by consulting the register, to find out registrations and<br />

applications made by current or potential competitors and to receive informations<br />

about the rights of third parties.<br />

C. One of the aims of the trademark is to preserve consumers from<br />

confusion. To achieve this, a trademark has to be distinctive, it has to elude<br />

distraction or depletion and it has to make trademarks different from each<br />

others.<br />

When it comes to color marks, to prove their distinctiveness becomes more<br />

complicated and arduous as colors can also refer and belong to public domain. A<br />

mark's distinctiveness must be assessed, firstly, by reference to the related goods<br />

and services and, secondly, by reference to the way in which the mark is perceived<br />

by a targeted public, which is constituted by the consumers of the products.<br />

The mark must enable the public targeted to distinguish the goods or services<br />

from those of other undertakings, and to believe that all the goods or services<br />

identified by it are manufactured or provided under the control of the trademark<br />

owner, who can be held responsible for their quality. Only in this way will a<br />

consumer, who purchases the goods or services identified by the mark, be in a<br />

position on a subsequent purchase to make the same choice, if his experience is a<br />

positive one, or to choose differently if it is not. 28<br />

The ECJ in the Libertel case stated that “a color per se is not normally<br />

inherently capable of distinguishing the goods of a particular undertaking” 27 . The<br />

Court also recognized that there is a strong public interest in favor of keeping<br />

colors free because the number of colors actually available is limited and for this<br />

reason, a small number of trademark registrations could exhaust the entire range of<br />

colors available. It is clear that, in the case of a color per se, “distinctiveness<br />

without any prior use is unconceivable save in exceptional circumstances, and<br />

particularly where the number of goods or services for which the mark is claimed<br />

is very restricted and the relevant market is very specific‖ 29 .<br />

28<br />

European Court of First Instance February 7, 2002, case T-88/00 Mag Instrument Inc. v OHIM,<br />

ut supra note 20, parag. 31<br />

29<br />

European Court of Justice Justice May 6, 2003, case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux<br />

Merkenbureau, parag. 66


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

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Simple colors are likely to be treated as devoid of distinctive character<br />

because in many cases the color it has been considered part of ―the look of the<br />

goods‖ and consumers were not in the habit of assuming the origin of goods merely<br />

from the color of packaging 30 .<br />

In order to decide whether or not a sign is perceived as a trademark, it is<br />

compulsory to consider the average consumers‘ perspective of it. The relevant<br />

consumer has been construed as a reasonably well-informed and reasonably<br />

observant and circumspect.<br />

For what regards colors trademark, the consumer‘s perception is different<br />

from the perception related to traditional trademarks 29 , because it varies remarkably<br />

due to external conditions, to different culture, language, etc.<br />

In any case, if the sign can not be considered inherently distinctive, the<br />

distinctiveness can be acquired through use. If a sign is recognizable for the<br />

consumers and capable of distinguishing the related goods or services from the<br />

others products, this means that it acquired the so called secondary meaning. In<br />

relation to this aspect, article 7(3) of the Council Regulation No. 207/2009 states<br />

that “Paragraph 1 (b), (c) and (d) shall not apply if the trade mark has become<br />

distinctive in relation to the goods or services for which registration is requested in<br />

consequence of the use which has been made of it‖.<br />

On the basis of its established use in trade, OHIM has accepted the<br />

registration of lilac/purple color as a community trademark for Milka chocolate 31 .<br />

In the case Audi AG 32 , the CFI held that, to satisfy the requirement of<br />

acquired distinctiveness to overcome the absolute grounds for refusal under art.<br />

7(1) (b)-(d) of the Regulation No. 207/09, the trademark must be seen by a<br />

significant proportion of relevant public as identifying the origin of goods or<br />

services in respect of which the trademark is used and that distinctive character<br />

must be shown to exist in the substantial part of the Community where it was<br />

devoid of any distinctive character. Factors to be taken into account include market<br />

share, intensity, geographical scope, duration of use and the amount of promotion<br />

of the mark 33 .<br />

30 L. Bently – B. Sherman, Intellectual property law, ut supra note 19 , 823 ff<br />

31 OHIM registration n. 31336; UKPTO registration n. 2042556A<br />

32 European Court of First Instance December 3, 2003, case T-16/02, Audi AG v. OHIM<br />

33 European Court of Justice 30 June, 2005, case C-286/04P, Eurocermex SA v.OHIM


274 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

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2.3. Is there a Different Approach for what concerns the Combination of<br />

Colors?<br />

In respect of a single color trademark, combinations of colors should present<br />

fewer problems because they can be considered as expression per se of a minimum<br />

effort of creativity.<br />

The requirements needed for the registrability of these kinds of signs as<br />

trademarks are exactly the same than those required for the registration of a color<br />

per se. This means that a combination of colors, to be considered a valid trademark,<br />

it has to fulfill, first of all, the distinctiveness requirement and then the graphical<br />

representation. This principle has been confirmed by the CFI in the case Viking-<br />

Umwelttechnik GmbH 34 . With this decision the CFI stated that colors or color<br />

combinations per se are capable of constituting Community trademarks in so far as<br />

they are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from<br />

those of another.<br />

The Court also focused its attention on the fact that the perception of the<br />

relevant section of the public is not necessarily the same in the case of a sign<br />

composed of a color or color combination per se as it is in the case of a word or<br />

figurative mark composed of a sign that bears no relation to the appearance of the<br />

goods that it identifies. While the public is accustomed to perceive words or<br />

figurative marks as instantly identifying the commercial origin of the goods, the<br />

same is not necessarily true where the sign forms part of the look of the goods in<br />

respect of which registration is sought.<br />

In the Viking case, the application was denied because of the imprecise and<br />

abstract graphical representation and because the combination of colors was not<br />

arranged in a particular format. In this case, the Court considered the juxtaposition<br />

of the colors just as characteristics of the goods themselves.<br />

Displaying colors on the products in a non-ordered way means that there will<br />

be a variety of possible different formats, which will not enable consumers to<br />

remember a particular colors combination and they could not repeat the purchase<br />

directly and with certainty.<br />

In conclusion, for what concerns the registrability of these non-traditional<br />

trademarks, we should underline that, it is not relevant the distinction between a<br />

color per se and a colors combination. The only important factor to be considered<br />

is weather the color in question, because of the arbitrariness of the choice or, for<br />

example for the constant use in time of it, can concretely function with a distinctive<br />

capacity for the products it characterizes.<br />

34 European Court of First Instance 25 September, 2002, case T-316/00, Viking-Umwelttechnik<br />

GmbH v. OHIM, parag. 23-27


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

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________________________________________________________________________________<br />

3. THE CASES<br />

3.1. The Libertel Case<br />

Qualitex case has influenced the European approach. Although sympathy has<br />

been emanating towards the registration of color trademarks, the preponderance of<br />

cases rejected the distinctive character of color per se, and it has been accepted<br />

only if the color has gained the secondary meaning.<br />

OHIM remarked that, to be registered as a community trademark on the basis<br />

of the acquired distinctiveness, at first the trademark has to be used in the<br />

community as a whole or, at least, in a substantial part of it and, secondly,<br />

substantial part of the consumers have to recognize the sign as a distinctive<br />

trademark at the time the application is submitted.<br />

Before the leading case Libertel, BOA has dealt with various cases of color<br />

marks. The first case the Board dealt with, Orange I 35 , was concerned with formal<br />

requirements for the registration of a color mark rather than the issue of<br />

registrability as such.<br />

The applicant, in this case, had neither submitted a reproduction of the<br />

specific color shade claimed, nor referred to a widely known color reference<br />

system. The application was denied and also its subsequent appeal was dismissed<br />

because of lack of a clear graphical representation of the mark.<br />

The Libertel case 36 is the leading case for what concerns the registrability of<br />

a color per se in the European Union. In this case an application was made to<br />

register the single color orange in the telecommunications‘ field and the<br />

representation was submitted in the form of a rectangle of color with no other<br />

indication such as references to a color coding system.<br />

In this case, the ECJ stated that “a color per se may be found to possess<br />

distinctive character within the meaning of Article 3(1) (b) and Article 3 (3) of<br />

Directive 89/104, provided that, as regards the perception of the relevant public,<br />

the mark is capable of identifying the product or service for which registration is<br />

sought as originating from a particular undertaking and distinguishing the product<br />

or service from those of others undertakings”. This means that a color must have<br />

acquired distinctive character before it can be registered.<br />

The Court also confirmed that the condition required for the acceptance of<br />

the application for registration of a color mark is that this application must include<br />

35<br />

Board of Appeal of OHIM February 12, 1998, case R-7/1997-3, Orange, in.<br />

www.oami.europa.eu<br />

36<br />

European Court of Justice May 6, 2003, case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux<br />

Merkenbureau, supra note 22 and 25


276 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

a written, clear, precise, self contained, easily accessible, intelligible and objective<br />

description.<br />

Merely reproducing the color in question on paper does not satisfy these<br />

requirements, whereas using an internationally recognized color code does. The<br />

deposition of a single sample of color it is not sufficient to grant the required<br />

protection. The Court also recognized the existence of an international color<br />

identification code (e.g. the Pantome Code), which is a commercial system that<br />

designates specific shades numerically and categorizes over thousands of shades by<br />

unique code 37 . This putted to an end the arguments that colors or combination of<br />

colors cannot be graphically represented.<br />

3.2. The Heidelberger Case and the Following Decisions<br />

Libertel has been further confirmed by the Heidelberger case 38 where the<br />

ECJ established, once again, its reticence regarding the registration of signs<br />

consisting of combination of colors.<br />

In this case the issue was focused on the requirement of the graphical<br />

representation, in particular the Court was asked to consider if a sample made of<br />

two stripes (one blue, the other one, yellow) could fulfill the requirement of a<br />

precise graphical representation. The trademark applied for were the applicant‘s<br />

corporate colors which were used in every conceivable form, in particular on<br />

packaging and labels.<br />

The ECJ ruled the abstract registrability of colors or combination of colors.<br />

Furthermore the Court stated that the protection could be granted only if: 1) the<br />

color or combination of colors used do not appear as characteristics of the marked<br />

goods or services; 2) the color can be represented graphically with lines, images,<br />

etc…and through an internationally recognized color coding system such as the<br />

Pantome Code to identify with certainty the scope of the protection sought and 3)<br />

the color have to be able to act as badge of origin of the marked goods or services.<br />

In conclusion, under current ECJ case law, color per se registrations, which<br />

might have been granted without a showing of acquired distinctiveness, are<br />

strongly suspect and most likely invalid.<br />

The KWS case 39 : this case regards the registration sought by KWS Saat AG<br />

as a community trademark of the single color orange for seeds treatment<br />

installations and for other agricultural products. KWS Saat submitted that the<br />

37<br />

INTA, Non-Traditional Trademarks in Europe-Shape Colour Trademarks-Commons Isuses with<br />

obtaining, Exploiting and Enforcinfg Rights ,2005<br />

38<br />

European Court of Justice June 24, 2004, case C-49/02 Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH v.<br />

OHIM<br />

39<br />

European Court of Justice October 21, 2004, case C-447/02 , KWS Saat AG v. OHIM, supra note<br />

11


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

277<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

distinctive character of trademarks consisting of one color must be assessed<br />

according to the same standards as the distinctive character of other marks,<br />

particularly word and figurative marks. The company argued that the CFI had<br />

applied more stringent criteria for color marks than for other types of marks.<br />

This case confirms a long line of ECJ decisions that have established that<br />

colors will be registrable as trademarks only once distinctiveness through use has<br />

been proved. It endorses the possibility of registering colors as trademarks but<br />

restrains that protection with a high distinctiveness requirement. Such decision<br />

sends out a clear message: companies can acquire the trademark protection only if,<br />

over time through public familiarity generated by extensive promotions and<br />

advertising, they can give evidence to the fact that their used color on the product<br />

can be immediately associated to their brand.<br />

4. THE US SITUATION<br />

In the United States the trademark field is covered by the Lanham Act,<br />

passed in 1946 but it was updated several times, the last of it was in 2005.<br />

According to this act the definition 40 of what is a trademark is quite broad, stating<br />

that ―The term trademark includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any<br />

combination thereof--to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a<br />

unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the<br />

source of the goods, even if that source is unknown”. The standard used to define<br />

the trademark is in persistence with the article of TRIPS and it is not too different<br />

with the EU directive on trademark. Colors or combination of colors are not<br />

mention specifically in this Act. What can be considered different from the EU<br />

approach is the fact that the ―graphical presentation‖ is not a prerequisite for the<br />

registration as a trademark. The final word in the US system belongs to the Court,<br />

especially to the Supreme Court. The American jurisprudence on trademark when it<br />

comes to the ―color issue‖ has without doubt created the basic for the acceptance of<br />

the registration of colors as trademarks. The issue of protecting color as a<br />

trademark was raised in the U.S.A. over twenty years ago when the U.S. judiciary,<br />

in the Owens-Corning Fiberglass corp., 774 Fed. 1116, 1120 (Fed. cir. 1985),<br />

granted protection to the purple color used by Owens-Corning to distinguish its<br />

products.<br />

This decision, however, did not put an end to the discussion, on whether a<br />

color per se may serve as a trademark, due to the several difficulties that were<br />

pointed out and developed by some legal authors supported by a number of U.S.<br />

Court decisions.<br />

It is the US jurisprudence that has created and developed several important<br />

theories applying in order to determine if a color is eligible for registration, like the<br />

theory of depletion of colors, theory of shade confusion and theory of functionality.<br />

40 Lanham Act, 15 USC 1127


278 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

All these theories together try to justify the opposition to the registration of the<br />

color per se as trademark.<br />

The theory of depletion was developed early in 1949, in the case Campell<br />

Soup co 41 and according to the Court the registering a single color as a trademark<br />

will limit the choice of the manufactures. By giving monopolistic rights over<br />

specific colors the list of available colors will be narrowed, especially when it<br />

comes to the most usual and appealing colors.<br />

In the same line with the theory of depletion was developed the theory of<br />

shade confusion according to which by giving the rights over one color in practice<br />

all the relative shades of that color will not be valid for use anymore by other<br />

companies, because the consumers are not so attentive to the exact shade of one<br />

particular color. Often it may be confusing and not easy to immediately notice the<br />

differences.<br />

According to the theory of functionality if a feature of the product is<br />

functional, meaning that it is essential to the use or purpose or it affects the cost or<br />

quality of the product it cannot be registered as a trademark because in that way it<br />

would harm the competition.<br />

The three above mentioned theories have been mentioned again in the case<br />

Qualitex, in 1995 by the Supreme Court. We can say that Qualitex is the leading<br />

case for the color registration, not only in US but it clearly had a very strong<br />

influence on the European approach to this issue. Qualitex Company has for years<br />

colored the dry cleaning press pads it manufactured with a special shade of greengold.<br />

After respondent Jacobson Products (a Qualitex rival) began to use a similar<br />

shade on its own press pads, Qualitex registered its color as a trademark and added<br />

a trademark infringement count to the suit it had previously filed challenging<br />

Jacobson's use of the green-gold color. The Supreme Court held that color alone<br />

can meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark, and this is<br />

demonstrated both by the language of the Act and by the underlying principles of<br />

trademark law, including the requirements that the mark "identify and distinguish<br />

(the seller's) goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate<br />

(their) source.<br />

In Qualitex it was clearly stated that a color can be registered as a trademark<br />

with the condition that it has to have acquired a secondary meaning. This secondary<br />

meaning constitutes the necessary distinctiveness that can be acquired through the<br />

use of the color prior to the application. The Court raised a very interesting<br />

question, by saying that if trademark law permits a descriptive word with a<br />

secondary meaning to act as a mark, why would it not permit a color, under similar<br />

circumstances to do the same?<br />

41 S. Sandri, S. Rizzo, Non-conventional trademarks and community law, supra note 6 and 8, at 70


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

279<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The Court tried to criticize the theory of depletion and the shade confusion,<br />

and the theory of functionality. The color sometime plays an important role in<br />

making product more desirable and sometimes it does not effect neither, cost nor<br />

quality of the product. Considering so, the Court stated that the doctrine of<br />

functionality does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a<br />

trademark.<br />

In a recent case in US, Smack Apparel 2008 42 , the Court of Appeal seems to<br />

reaffirm strongly the registration of a single color as a trademark. The Fifth Circuit<br />

upheld the district Court‘s finding that Smack Apparel, a company that makes tshirt<br />

who used school color schemes in combination with specific facts and indicia<br />

about the school infringed on the schools‘ trademark rights in those color schemes,<br />

even if neither the school logo nor other marks appeared on the t-shirt. The Court<br />

determined that the color schemes had developed a secondary meaning and for the<br />

first time a Court has analyzed the trademark rights of a color scheme separate and<br />

apart from an accompanying word mark or logo. But what if the color scheme<br />

would have been used without the specific facts and indicia about the school?<br />

Would Court go so far to give protection to specifically the color scheme? It might<br />

have been an audacious decision. If courts will go that far in the future, this is<br />

something to be seen in the future decisions.<br />

5. A CASE STUDY: THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY<br />

Trademarks, as a vital aspect of building and expanding an IP monopoly in<br />

many fields, are largely used in pharmaceuticals. The use of non traditional<br />

trademarks it is starting to be frequent also for what concerns pharmaceutical<br />

goods. Companies in fact understood that these non-conventional signs can become<br />

important and powerful tools to create brand identification. For example for what<br />

concerns the U.S. system, on 14 June 2006 the USPTO Trademark and Appeal<br />

Board handed down its decision in In re N.V. Organon concerning trademark<br />

application for ―an orange flavor‖ for antidepressants tablets and pills (the product<br />

concerned was Mirtazapine marketed as RemeronSoltab) 43 .<br />

In order to gain a competitive advantage in this market, pharmaceutical<br />

companies strive to increase consumers‘ recognition through name of the brand,<br />

color, shape, taste or aroma. All these features of pills can be registered and gain<br />

protection as a trademark if they comply with the legal requirements, mostly if they<br />

are distinctive and non-functional. But, differently from other colors trademarks<br />

when it comes to the drug industry there are a lot of factors who play an important<br />

role.<br />

Sometime a colored pill becomes so well-known and finishes by serving to<br />

identify the kind of medication in addition to its source. In this situation the Courts‘<br />

42<br />

5th Circ.Federal Court November 25, 2008, Board of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel No. 07-<br />

30580<br />

43<br />

RemeronSoltab Application n. 76467774, in www.uspto.gov


280 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

decisions in US has written that competitors might be free to copy the color of a<br />

medical pill where that color serves to identify the kind of medication in addition to<br />

its source 44 . The main obstacles a color has to deal with in order to gain protection<br />

through trademark are distinctiveness and functionality. In the case Wal-Mart<br />

Stores v Samara Bros. 45 the Supreme Court of US pronounced that because product<br />

design serves purposes other than source identification, there is no consumer<br />

predisposition to equate the feature with the source, and it can therefore never be<br />

inherently distinctive. But even if a color trademark is registered in the<br />

pharmaceutical industry it is weak and there are decisions that affirm that the<br />

applicant has the burden of proof in order to register the color and shape of its<br />

wares as a trademark 46 . Future Applicants, especially in the pharmaceutical<br />

industry, should be weary of the fact that, although the color and shape of their<br />

wares may be different from those of others, color and shape should not<br />

automatically be construed as distinctive, thus warranting trademark registration. 42<br />

As for other color marks, even in pharmaceutical industry it is necessary that color<br />

has gained a secondary meaning.<br />

As we mentioned above, some patients rely on the color of the pill to<br />

differentiate one from another or a particular feature of a product is deemed by a<br />

Court to have a psychological impact on patients, this may be considered<br />

functional. Drug color cases “has more to do with public health policy” regarding<br />

generic drug substitution “than with trademark law” 47 and the possibility of<br />

confusion of the consumers are the reasons why competition is left in a second<br />

place. Nevertheless, it should be considered, case by case, the possibility of<br />

confusions of the relevant public or consumer before taking that decision. It is<br />

necessary to establish what constitutes ―the relevant public‖, and to see if the risk<br />

of confusion is a real option. As it is wide known, when it comes to the<br />

pharmaceutical industry the consumers tend to be highly attentive. This fact leads<br />

to the conclusion that the higher level of attention, the lower the risk of confusion.<br />

In the recent Prazol case 48 the CFI reaffirmed this principle also for what concerns<br />

the over-the-counter products (products which are accessible to consumers without<br />

the need of a prescription by the doctor), leaving definitely the previous opinion<br />

which was focused on a case by case analysis of the type of product sold to<br />

determine the level of consumers‘ attention . The relevant public mostly is<br />

composed not only of end users, but also of professionals, that are, doctors who<br />

prescribe the medicines and pharmacists who sell that prescribed product<br />

(confirmed by the European jurisprudence: case T-146/06 ATURION/URION<br />

parag. 23; case C-412/05 TRAVATAN/TRIVASTAN parag. 49; case T-483/04<br />

44<br />

Supreme Court of US March 28, 1995, Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Products Co. 514 US, 149<br />

45<br />

Supreme Court of US, Case No.99-150 March 22, 2000 Wal Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Brothers<br />

Inc.<br />

46<br />

A. Steele, The colour and shape of a pharmaceutical tablet deemed not distinctive enough to<br />

warrant trade-mark registration, federal court rules, WIPR, Leger Robic Richard, 2002<br />

47<br />

Supreme Court of US March 28, 1995, Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Products Co. 514 US, 149<br />

48<br />

European Court of First Instance October 21, 2008, case T-95/07, Aventis Pharma SA v. OHIM<br />

and Nycomed GmbH


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GALZIN parag. 66 and in the case T-154/03 ALREX, parag.46 49 ). For what<br />

concerns the so called over-the-counter drugs, the possibility of confusion is higher<br />

in this case. Because colors are attractive and can be easily stick in your mind,<br />

consumers may identify the drug through the color. It is left to the Courts that in<br />

the basis of a case by case analysis, will define the relevant public, and the<br />

possibility of confusion.<br />

The situation of pharmaceutical colors trademarks is not that different from<br />

trademarks in other fields, the two basic requirements needs to be fulfill: the color<br />

should not be functional and it should be distinctive, meaning it should have<br />

acquired a secondary meaning.<br />

6. IS THERE ANY FUTURE FOR THESE TRADEMARKS?<br />

Although the Courts‘ decision in US and in EU made it clear that there is no<br />

absolute bar against color per se serving as a trademark, it is not clear whether a<br />

color per se can be registered as a trademark without having first acquired a<br />

secondary meaning. There exists the possibility to register a color as a trademark if<br />

the color chosen is unusual in relation to the products.<br />

But even if a color can be registered we think that the trademark will be weak<br />

if it has not acquired a secondary meaning. In order to build up a strong trademark<br />

it is necessary to select an unusual shade of color and then to prove the secondary<br />

meaning for that color.<br />

The secondary meaning can be acquired through use, but not only. There is a<br />

list of fact and factors that serve to establish if there is a secondary meaning for the<br />

mark. The type and amount of evidence necessary to establish secondary meaning<br />

varies by case, but rarely is it created by happenstance. Rather, appropriate<br />

evidence typically results from an artfully executed marketing effort, meaning<br />

strong advertisements are needed. Surveys, market research and consumers‘<br />

reaction studies, as well as intentional, direct copying by a competitor can support<br />

the finding of acquired distinctiveness, as it is said "one only copies something of<br />

value‖.<br />

In the pharmaceutical field the Courts tends to become increasingly open to<br />

allow protection and ‗value-added‘ through the use of distinguishing elements<br />

other than traditional words and designs as color, shape or flavor. But, the risks in<br />

this field are greater than in the others because of the consumers‘ wealth. It would<br />

be maybe too dangerous to rely on the pharmaceuticals brands identification only<br />

on the color used, especially for what concerns the over-the-counter products.<br />

49 European Court of First Instance October 17, 2006, case T-483/04, Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v.<br />

OHIM andTeva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd; European Court of First Instance November 17,<br />

2005, case T-154/03, Biofarma SA v. OHIM and Bausch & Lomb Pharmaceuticals Inc.


282 Color and Combination of Colors as Trademarks<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In conclusion, color is powerful tool and over time, customers may come to<br />

treat a particular color on a product or its packaging as signifying a brand; but these<br />

marks have been generally recognised by Courts as weak marks if they do not<br />

show an acquired secondary meaning. The inherent disctinctive character of these<br />

signs is still difficult to prove.


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

283<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

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M. S. SOMMERS, Owning your own colour, Trademark World 1995, No. 77<br />

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Board of Appeal of OHIM, February 12, 1998, case R-7/1997-3, Orange<br />

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Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent-und Markenant


Chiara Gaido and Giselda Metaliaji<br />

285<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

European Court of Justice May 6, 2003, case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV<br />

and Benelux-Merkenbureau<br />

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v. OHIM<br />

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GmbH<br />

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European Court of Justice June 30, 2005, case C-286/04P, Eurocermex SA<br />

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European Court of First Instance November 17, 2005, case T-154/03,<br />

Biofarma SA v. OHIM and Bausch & Lomb Pharmaceuticals Inc.<br />

European Court of Justice April 26, 2007, case C-412/05, Alcon Inc. v.<br />

OHIM<br />

European Court of First Instance October 21, 2008, case T-95/07, Aventis<br />

Pharma SA v. OHIM and Nycomed GmbH<br />

5th Circ.Federal Court of US, November 25, 2008, Board of Supervisors v.<br />

Smack Apparel, No. 07-30580<br />

Kraft Foods Schweiz Holding GmbH registration n. 31336 on<br />

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2042556A on www.ipo.gov.uk<br />

RemeronSoltab Application n. 76467774, in www.uspto.gov<br />

Supreme Court of US March 28, 1995, Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Products Co.<br />

514 US, 149<br />

Supreme Court of US, Case No.99-150 March 22, 2000 Wal Mart Stores Inc.<br />

v. Samara Brothers Inc.


CAN THE OWNER OF A MARK REGISTERED FOR TOY CARS<br />

PROHIBIT THE MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF TOY CARS WHICH<br />

CONSTITUTE NATURALISTIC REPRODUCTIONS OF REAL CARS ON<br />

WHICH THE OWNER’S MARK APPEARS?<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

University Network Research Session<br />

Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market<br />

Alicante, Spain<br />

May 3 – 5, 2010<br />

2. TRADEMARK BACKGROUND<br />

by<br />

John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

a. Overview<br />

b. The Essential Function: ―Use as a Trademark‖<br />

c. Descriptive Use and Embellishment<br />

i. Descriptive / Referential Use<br />

ii.Embellishment<br />

3. INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS<br />

a. Trademark Use Requirement<br />

b. Likelihood of Confusion<br />

4. ANALYSIS<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

6. FINAL THOUGHTS<br />

BIBILIOGRAPHY


288 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

Can the owner of a trademark registered for toy cars (hereinafter ―model<br />

cars‖) prohibit the manufacture and sale of model cars which constitute naturalistic<br />

reproductions of real cars (hereinafter ―automobiles‖) on which the owner‘s mark<br />

appears? We conclude that the manufacturers of model cars should be free to make<br />

and sell naturalistic reproductions of automobiles and to which they have affixed<br />

relevant automobile trademarks even though the mark may be owned by another<br />

entity seeking to prevent such use. This is true where the trademark is affixed to<br />

the model‘s visible exterior as a descriptive element of the automobile‘s design<br />

(hereinafter the ―Detail Trademark‖) as opposed to the underside of the model car<br />

to guarantee source of origin (hereinafter the ―Origin Trademark‖). Moreover,<br />

finding that the descriptive use of the Detail Trademark is non-infringing is on such<br />

solid theoretical ground that European Community Law should provide the<br />

certainty, consistency, and predictability necessary to prevent automobile<br />

manufacturers, who generally own the rights to their automobile trademarks in the<br />

―Scale Models of Motor Cars‖ class from dominating the model car industry<br />

through an unjustified expansion of the their rights. 1<br />

European Community law, however, currently provides that the owner of a<br />

trademark registered for model cars could potentially prohibit the manufacture and<br />

sale of model cars displaying the owner‘s mark as a Detail Trademark depending<br />

on the jurisdiction and the perceptions of consumers in local markets. 2 The body<br />

of law comprising the European Court of Justice‘s jurisprudence on this issue is<br />

therefore far from clear and decisive. Indeed, although the ECJ could have<br />

provided a more definitive solution to this conundrum in deciding the 2007 case<br />

Opel v. Autec by finding that decorative applications of trademarks are beyond the<br />

scope of Article 5(1), ultimately the Court declined to employ a trademark use<br />

requirement in favor of protracted, costly, and unpredictable factual assessments of<br />

local markets by national courts. In so doing, the Court left the matter essentially<br />

unresolved and invited inconsistent results concerning what types of uses are<br />

infringing. 3<br />

Answering the question posed requires an analysis of legal issues at the very<br />

heart of trademark theory such as what constitutes trademark use and whether<br />

descriptive, decorative, or referential use may also be considered infringing. Of<br />

fundamental concern is the appropriate balance between the trademark owner‘s<br />

interests and those of competitors, third-party businesses, and the marketplace. A<br />

heated debate has been entertaining trademark law practitioners and academics for<br />

1<br />

Nice Classification System, Class No. 28.<br />

2<br />

Or the automobiles on which they are based, although this is beyond the scope of the question<br />

posed.<br />

3<br />

European Court of Justice January 25, 2007, Case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec (2007) ECR I-<br />

1017 ff., case ―Autec‖.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

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the last few years and the tension between the two sides is manifest in both<br />

European and American discourse and jurisprudence. 4 While some scholars submit<br />

that trademarks should be protected from a broad array of unauthorized uses by<br />

third parties, and that the optimal way to accomplish this is for the courts to<br />

conduct comprehensive analyses of the impact each use has on consumer<br />

confusion, others assert that trademarks are registered for certain limited purposes –<br />

to distinguish goods and services – and should therefore remain generally available<br />

to third parties for other uses as a matter of law. 5<br />

For purposes of infringement analysis, certain courts, such as those<br />

influenced by the Chicago School, support the application of a ―trademark use<br />

requirement.‖ 6 Generally, this approach requires plaintiffs in trademark<br />

infringement cases to demonstrate that a defendant made a ―trademark use‖ of its<br />

validly registered mark as a threshold requirement prior to factual discovery<br />

concerning markets and consumer perceptions. Advocates submit that this<br />

approach provides a straightforward, objective, and, most importantly, efficient,<br />

means of determining whether consumers are likely to look to the defendant‘s use<br />

of a symbol for information about the source of origin – whether consumers are<br />

likely to be confused or deceived. As we shall see, applying a trademark use<br />

requirement raises corresponding concerns about the value of registering an<br />

automobile trademark in the model car class for what is, in practice, use primarily<br />

as a Detail Trademark.<br />

Applied more frequently by courts in trademark infringement litigation is a<br />

test focused squarely on the likelihood of consumer confusion caused by a<br />

particular use. This approach moves the analysis beyond the purely legal question<br />

of whether a trademark use has been made by a defendant to the assumption that<br />

any use can be infringing so long as the trademark owner can demonstrate that it<br />

raised the level of confusion in the marketplace, thereby diminishing the ability of<br />

the trademark to perform its essential function.<br />

4 See generally M. BARRET, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use, 39<br />

U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 371 (2006); S. L. DOGAN & M. LEMLEY, Trademark and Consumer Search<br />

Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777 (2004); U. WIDMAIER, Use, Liability, and the<br />

Structure of Trademark Law, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 603 (2004); see also Mark P. MCKENNA, The<br />

Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev., 1839, 1892 (noting the<br />

―traditional requirement that, in order to infringe, the defendant [must] use a term as a sourcedesignator<br />

(as a ―trademark‖)).<br />

5 W. M. LANDES, R. POSNER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, The<br />

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003; see also M. RICOLFI,<br />

Strategic Branding (Opel/Autec, Eventmarke), Max Planck Institute paper, 2009 (citing A. KUR,<br />

Strategic Branding: Does Trade Mark Law Provide for Sufficient Self Help and Self Healing<br />

Forces? in I. Govaere, H. Ullrich (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public<br />

Interest, College of Europe Series, Bruxelles, P. I. E. Lang, 2008, 191-217; M. S. SPOLIDORO, La<br />

capacità distintiva dei marchi c.d. «deboli», in Il dir. ind. 2007, 39 ff.; J. DAVIS, European Trade<br />

Marks Law and the Enclosure of the Commons, in I.P.Q. 2002, 343 ff.); G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D.<br />

JANIS, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, in Iowa L. Rev. 2007, 1597 ff.<br />

6 W. M. LANDES, R. POSNER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra at<br />

note 5.


290 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

Although the interests of a well-functioning trademark system, and society as<br />

a whole, would be better served by consistent application of one or the other<br />

approach in infringement litigation across jurisdictions, choosing a winner is<br />

unnecessary here and, indeed, beyond the scope of our analysis. For our purposes,<br />

the answer to the question posed is the same under either approach. Nevertheless,<br />

as we shall see, had the ECJ resolved the legal questions raised in Opel v. Autec by<br />

focusing on the actual use of the mark, or by applying a strict trademark use test,<br />

the result would have been increased efficiency in the marketplace, albeit at the<br />

expense of a marginally higher degree of confusion in the minds of consumers until<br />

market forces had an opportunity to react.<br />

2. TRADEMARK BACKGROUND<br />

a. Overview<br />

Trademarks are signs or symbols used to distinguish the goods or services of<br />

one enterprise from those of other enterprises in commerce. 7 Other related or<br />

corresponding functions generally attributed to trademarks including the tendency<br />

they have to reinforce consistent levels of product quality, to represent businesses<br />

goodwill, and to function as tools for advertising products by fostering thoughts or<br />

emotions in the minds of consumers.<br />

From the Chicago School, however, we understand that the fundamental<br />

value of trademarks is their ability to reduce consumer search costs which, in turn,<br />

promotes efficiency in the marketplace. 8 Trademarks facilitate consistent and<br />

lasting associations in the minds of consumers between brands and quality,<br />

providing consumers with valuable information concerning goods and services.<br />

Trusting a reliable trademark is, of course, less costly and time consuming for the<br />

consumer than conducting research and assuming associated risks while relying<br />

primarily on asymmetric information at the point of each purchase decision.<br />

Informed consumers will generally make better decisions as a result and this will,<br />

in turn, increase the overall utility of the products purchased while simultaneously<br />

pushing producers to develop higher quality goods and services – or at least to<br />

maintain appropriate price-quality relationships. 9 The public therefore benefits<br />

7<br />

F. ABBOTT, T. COTTIER, F. GURRY, International intellectual property in an Integrated<br />

World Economy, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2008, 259; M. BARRETT, Internet Trademark Suits<br />

and the Demise of ―Trademark Use,‖ 39 in U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2006, 388.<br />

8<br />

W. M. LANDES, R. POSNER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra at<br />

note 5, 169.<br />

9<br />

In the words of United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter: ―The protection of trade-marks is<br />

the law‘s recognition of the psychological function of symbols.... A trade-mark is a merchandising<br />

short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he<br />

wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate<br />

the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

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from the trademark system insofar as the establishment and maintenance of a mark<br />

facilitates the flow of reliable of information, encourages higher and more<br />

consistent product quality, and reduces social waste and consumer deception.<br />

The trademark system‘s effectiveness in performing these functions makes it<br />

extremely valuable to the marketplace. While, for obvious reasons, trademark<br />

owners view the objective of the trademark system to be the protection of the<br />

investment in their company‘s goodwill, in fact the guiding principle the trademark<br />

system must be continued reduction of consumer search costs. Trademark doctrine<br />

must therefore always consider first the costs and benefits that accrue to the<br />

marketplace as a whole and not only the interests of trademark holders. The scope<br />

of the rights protected by trademark law must therefore be narrower and more<br />

context-specific than in the case of patents, trade secrets, and copyrights. Indeed,<br />

other intellectual property rights are generally understood to bestow far-broader,<br />

although time-limited, protection from unauthorized use than trademarks in order<br />

to achieve their policy objectives. Illustrative of the theoretical difference between<br />

trademarks and other IPRs is the fact that trademark owners are not granted<br />

property rights in their trademarks. 10 As a result, owners are not permitted to sell<br />

or otherwise transfer their trademarks in gross, or separate them from their business<br />

goodwill. 11<br />

To fully realize the benefits of trademarks, it is imperative that the legal<br />

system provide clear rules and strong protection since the cost of misappropriating<br />

a trademark is undoubtedly less than the potential profit to a concern from<br />

confusion with another firm‘s superior reputation. Clarity in enforcement increases<br />

the entire system‘s effectiveness by strengthening the message trademarks carry<br />

and reinforcing their trustworthiness. Whether by protecting established<br />

trademarks from potentially confusing appropriation by third parties or by<br />

streamlining the litigation process through application of a trademark use<br />

requirement, the law must facilitate an honest, open, inexpensive, and consistent<br />

dialogue between producers and consumers. From a clear and reliable system both<br />

sellers and buyers benefit: producers can invest in their brand‘s goodwill with the<br />

confidence that trademark infringement will be prevented while consumers can be<br />

confident that they are receiving what they expect in the marketplace. In the<br />

absence of clear and reliable enforcement, excessive free-riding would inevitably<br />

corrupt the information capital embodied in a trademark; even more destructive, the<br />

employed, the aim is the same – to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers,<br />

the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark<br />

owner has something of value.‖ Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 US<br />

203 (1942).<br />

10<br />

M. BARRETT, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, supra at note 7,<br />

377.<br />

11<br />

L. J. OSWALD, Tarnishment and Blurring under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, in<br />

American Business Law Journal, 1999, 255 ff.


292 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

threat of an intolerable amount of free-riding could reduce the incentive for<br />

companies to invest in their goodwill in first place. 12<br />

Chief among the concerns when answering the question posed is sound<br />

competition policy. For example, stretching the right to prevent third-party use of a<br />

word or symbol in additional contexts – even those not signalling origin – would<br />

inadvertently bestow unjustified legal power to trademark proprietors over<br />

―downstream‖ markets thereby conferring unwarranted competitive advantages<br />

over neighboring markets for goods and services. 13 While the tension between<br />

trademarks and free competition is less alarming than in other fields of intellectual<br />

property law where the rights granted could be, if too broad or impenetrable,<br />

severely antagonistic to healthy competition, trademarks can also have a negative<br />

impact on competition if not properly understood or respected. Rather than<br />

accruing to their owner a monopoly over a certain product, creation, invention,<br />

good, or service, trademarks protect information about goods and services and<br />

should therefore facilitate consumer access to the goods or services with which<br />

they are associated. A properly functioning trademark system therefore assists,<br />

rather than inhibits, competition and trademark law represents an affirmation of,<br />

rather than a departure from, the competitive model. The danger, however, is clear:<br />

unenlightened and poorly calibrated trademark law, as in other fields of intellectual<br />

property, would have an anticompetitive influence on the public‘s access to goods,<br />

services, and markets. 14<br />

It is axiomatic that, absent extraordinary circumstances, competition is<br />

beneficial to the marketplace and deserves careful consideration when resolving<br />

disputes between rights owners and third parties. 15 While it is has been argued that<br />

the ECJ does not sufficiently consider preserving, let alone fostering, competition<br />

in its interpretation of Community Law (except with respect to the<br />

anticompetitiveness inherent in granting protection to overly-descriptive marks),<br />

failure to do so could lead to unintended results that contradict the very purpose of<br />

granting control over the use of signs and marks in the first place and actually<br />

12<br />

W. M. LANDES, R. POSNER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra at<br />

note 5, 169.<br />

13<br />

M. RICOLFI, Strategic Branding (Opel/Autec, Eventmarke), supra at note 5; see also A. KUR,<br />

Strategic Branding: Does Trade mark law Provide for Sufficient Self Help and Self Healing<br />

Forces?, supra at note 5, 191-217; see A. SRAFFA, Monopoli di segni distintivi o monopoli di<br />

fabbricazione, in Riv. dir. comm. 1930, II, 1 ff. (arguing that trademark protection should always<br />

ensure that exclusivity over signs does not translate into monopolies over markets for goods and<br />

services); T. ASCARELLI, Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali. Lezioni di diritto<br />

industriale, Giuffrè, Milano, 1960 (arguing that trademark exclusivity should never enable control<br />

of linguistic or semantic entities).<br />

14<br />

A. KUR, Strategic Branding: Does Trade Mark Law Provide for Sufficient Self Help and Self<br />

Healing Forces?, supra at note 5, 191-217, 216.<br />

15<br />

Ibid, at 195.


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enable their use as swords rather than signals in the battle to dominate additional<br />

markets and goods. 16<br />

b. The Essential Function: “Use as a Trademark”<br />

The point has been correctly made that if trademark law were properly<br />

calibrated, it would enable rights owners to prevent use by third parties in more<br />

limited contexts than other IPRs and with respect to specific types of uses only. 17<br />

This approach is supported by the argument that, in principle, trademark protection<br />

aims to confer exclusivity over symbols rather than over goods, services, or<br />

markets and that the cost of overly broad protection is an anticompetitive restriction<br />

on the flow of information through the marketplace, even preventing would-be<br />

participants from accessing markets entirely. As we will see, however, courts<br />

occasionally venture beyond the core principles of trademark law to bestow what<br />

may be regarded as anticompetitive or even monopolistic power unjustified by<br />

trademark theory. 18 In order to ensure trademark law stays true to its mission, it is<br />

therefore necessary to consider the essential function for which the right to exclude<br />

is granted – the so-called ―use as a trademark.‖ 19<br />

16 M. RICOLFI, Strategic Branding (Opel/Autec, Eventmarke), supra at note 5 (Contrast the<br />

Opinion of the Advocate General, Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of June 13, 2002, Case C-206/01, Arsenal<br />

Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, (2002) ECR I-3422 ff., case ―Arsenal‖, para 43, acknowledging<br />

the importance of competition policy in European trademark law but failing to draw from the<br />

statement a corollary either way with the Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro,<br />

September 22, 2009, in Cases C-236-238/08, Google France and Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton<br />

Mallettier, Google France v. Viaticum Luteciel and Google France Bruno Raboin, Tiger SARL v.<br />

CNRHH, Pierre Alexis Thonet, case “Google-Ad-Words”, paras 102-103 and 105-106 where the<br />

balancing between the ―protection afforded to innovation and investment‖ (para 102) by means of<br />

trademarks and the requirements ―of competition and open access to ideas, words and signs‖ (para<br />

103) is determinative of the outcome reached (or, rather, in this case, suggested)).<br />

17 A. KUR, Strategic Branding: Does Trade Mark Law Provide for Sufficient Self Help and Self<br />

Healing Forces?, supra at note 5, 191-217, 216; M. RICOLFI, Strategic Branding (Opel/Autec,<br />

Eventmarke), supra at note 5.<br />

18 A. KUR, Fundamental Concerns in Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law, in G. B.<br />

DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade Mark Law and Theory, a Handbook of Contemporary<br />

Research, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, Northampton MA USA, 2008, 151-176, 165.<br />

19 M. BARRETT, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, supra at note 7,<br />

392. The author clarifies that the rationale of trademark use ―is consistent with the limited purpose<br />

of trademark protection. We protect trademarks to ensure that they will effectively communicate the<br />

source of goods or services to consumers, thus lowering consumer search costs and promoting a<br />

more efficient marketplace. If the defendant does not refer to the plaintiff‘s mark or if consumers<br />

are not exposed to the defendant‘s reference, then finding infringement would not serve trademark‘s<br />

purpose: consumers would not likely rely on the mark to identify the source of the defendant‘s<br />

goods or services, there would be no interference with the source indicating function of the<br />

plaintiff‘s mark, and, thus, there would be none of the harm that trademark and dilution laws are<br />

meant to prevent. Trademark laws were never meant to prevent all forms of free riding on a<br />

plaintiff‘s business goodwill. Indeed, we have long recognized that, in many instances, free riding<br />

may be pro-competitive.‖; see G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Lessons from the Trademark Use<br />

Debate, in Iowa L. Rev. 2007, 1713; M. BARRETT, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical<br />

Foundation for Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses „In the Manner of a Mar‟, in Wake Forest<br />

Law Review, 2008, 895.


294 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

Strangely, the Trademark Directive fails to define ―trademark use.‖ Scholars<br />

have observed that it is ironic that ―such an essential criterion in the hierarchy of<br />

criteria necessary to establish an infringement was paid such little attention during<br />

the drafting process.‖ 20 Indeed, if this one criterion is not satisfied, a dispute<br />

should not – although sometimes does – fall within the web of European trademark<br />

law. 21 Although the term ―trademark use‖ is not explicit in the Directive, the<br />

concept flows from Article 5 where infringement is defined as the use of marks ―in<br />

the course of trade‖ in a manner that conflicts with the essential functions of the<br />

trademark. 22 The legal protection of marks must be connected to a mark‘s ability<br />

to distinguish a good or service; the importance of this criterion is justifiably<br />

recognized as the conceptual foundation of trademark theory. The determination of<br />

whether a sign was used as a mark at all is therefore an obvious and indispensable<br />

step in assessing whether a use was infringing. 23<br />

The ECJ first addressed the question of trademark use in the case of BMW v.<br />

Deenik where it considered whether the use of the BMW trademark by a third-party<br />

automotive service center to identify a characteristic of its own service infringed<br />

the registered mark. In defining trademark use as a ―use for the purpose of<br />

distinguishing and identifying goods or services as originating from a particular<br />

undertaking,‖ the Court found that it did. 24 The Court defined trademark use under<br />

the Directive as use which caused consumers to infer the existence of a material<br />

link in the course of trade between a concern and its goods or services. 25 Indeed, in<br />

deciding BMW, the ECJ properly required a trademark use to find infringement, but<br />

did so in the broadest sense: the Court found that the mark must be used to indicate<br />

the origin of either of the parties‘ goods or services – not necessarily those of the<br />

alleged infringer. Thus, in BMW, the Court concluded that conduct now generally<br />

described as ―referential use‖ was trademark use in violation of Article 5 even<br />

though we may safely conclude that consumers were not confused about the origin<br />

of the goods or services and that the flow of useful information to the consumer<br />

was likely facilitated, not corrupted, by the defendant‘s use. 26 The BMW Court<br />

found, however, that the actual confusion engendered by use of a registered<br />

20<br />

A. KUR, Small cars, Big Problems? An Analysis of the ECJ‟s Opel/Autec Decision and its<br />

Consequences, in Engelbrekt-Bakaedjieva et al. (eds.), Writings in Honor of Marianne Levin,<br />

Norsteds, 2008, 335.<br />

21<br />

Ibid, at 335.<br />

22<br />

Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to<br />

approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks.<br />

23<br />

A. KUR, Fundamental Concerns in Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law, in G. B.<br />

DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade Mark Law and Theory, a Handbook of Contemporary<br />

Research, supra at note 19, 151-176, 166.<br />

24<br />

European Court of Justice February 23, 1999, case C-63/97, BMW v. DEENIK, (1999) ECR I-<br />

905 ff., case ―BMW‖, para 38.<br />

25<br />

Ibid, para. 53.<br />

26<br />

European Court of Justice February 23, 1999, case C-63/97, BMW v. DEENIK, (1999) ECR I-<br />

905 ff., case ―BMW‖.


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trademark by a third party is secondary and that the only questions to be answered<br />

are whether there was a use to describe an essential characteristic of the goods or<br />

services offered and, if so, whether the use was authorized. 27<br />

c. Descriptive Use and Embellishment<br />

Straightforward trademark infringement cases typically involve the<br />

unauthorized use of a trademark by a third party seeking to confuse consumers as<br />

to the origin of goods or services offered for sale – to blur in the minds of<br />

consumers the third-party‘s products with those of the trademark proprietor,<br />

presumably to exploit the owner‘s superior reputation. In such cases, infringement<br />

must be found to prevent third-party users from deceiving the public and diluting<br />

the power of the trademark to convey essential information about the relevant good<br />

or service.<br />

There are many trademarks uses other than those identifying and<br />

distinguishing goods and services, however, and each presents challenges for<br />

courts, trademark owners, and third parties seeking to use trademarks not to<br />

confuse or deceive, but rather to convey information in good faith. 28 Two common<br />

uses relevant to our analysis are frequently referred to as descriptive, or referential,<br />

use and embellishment.<br />

i. Descriptive / Referential Use<br />

In an effort to strike the appropriate balance between the power granted to<br />

trademark owners and the public‘s interest in a healthy public domain, courts must<br />

establish the appropriate scope of the right to prevent use by third parties for<br />

purposes other than identifying or distinguishing goods. One category of such uses<br />

are so-called descriptive, or referential, uses which include, for example, affixing a<br />

trademark to an article of clothing not to indicate origin, but rather to enable the<br />

27 Ibid, para 65.<br />

28 The comparative advertising conundrum is frequently debated in the context of the so called<br />

―trade mark use debate‖ (citing R. KNAAK, Markenmäßiger Gebrauch als Grenzlinie des<br />

harmonisierten Markenschutzes, in GRUR Int. 2008, 91 ff.; A. KUR, Confusion over Use? – Die<br />

Benutzung “als Marke” im Lichte der EuGH Rechtsprechung, in GRUR Int. 2008, 1 ff.; B.<br />

TRIMMER, An Increasingly Uneasy Relationship: The European Courts and the European Court<br />

of Justice in Trade Mark Disputes, in E.I.P.R. 2008, 87 ff.; CH. RUTZ, After Arsenal and<br />

Electrocoin: Can the Opinions on Trade Mark Use be Reconciled?, in 36 IIC 2005, 682 ff. but also,<br />

in connection with the increasingly crucial issue of the lawfulness of the use of trademarks as sold<br />

―ad-words‖, N. SHEMTOV, Searching for the Right Balance: Google, Keywords Advertising and<br />

Trade Mark Use, in EIPR 2008, 470 ff. For the U.S. see among the many U.S. cases Government<br />

Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D. Va. Aug. 25, 2004) and Google<br />

Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 2005) and<br />

in the literature G. DINWOODIE - M. D. JANIS, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, in 92 Iowa<br />

L.R. 2007, 1703 ff. and S. L. DOGAN, M. A. LEMLEY, Grouding Trademark Law Through<br />

Trademark Use, 92 Iowa L.R. 2007, 1669 ff., in both of which the link with the ad-words issue is<br />

palpable.


296 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

wearer to display appreciation or loyalty for the brand associated with the mark. 29<br />

Frequently, trademark owners seek to prevent such uses by third parties, whether to<br />

protect their brand‘s image or to capture the economic benefits represented by the<br />

use. Defendants typically respond by arguing that descriptive use is not infringing.<br />

The ECJ has been asked to consider these questions but has responded with a<br />

somewhat inconsistent body of jurisprudence.<br />

After BMW, the ECJ revisited the question of trademark use in Arsenal v.<br />

Reed, in which the Court opined on whether the unlicensed use of the famous<br />

English football club‘s trademark by a third party on sports merchandise<br />

constituted infringement. 30 The English Court referred to the ECJ the question of<br />

whether a valid defense to allegations of infringement existed where the use does<br />

not indicate trade origin but rather satisfies some other purpose. 31 While plaintiff<br />

alleged that defendant infringed its rights by appropriating its trademark for use on<br />

goods identical to those it produced, defendant argued that its use of the mark was<br />

not a ―trademark use‖ and that consumers would not interpret the mark as<br />

signifying the origin of the goods but rather recognize it as a ―badge of support,<br />

loyalty or affiliation.‖ 32 Defendant argued that such descriptive uses are beyond<br />

the scope of Article 5 and should be permitted.<br />

In rejecting defendant‘s argument, the ECJ concluded simply that ―where a<br />

third party uses in the course of trade a sign which is identical to a validly<br />

registered trade mark on goods which are identical to those for which it is<br />

registered, the trade mark proprietor of the mark is entitled . . . to rely on [Article<br />

(5)(1)(a) of the TMD] to prevent that use.‖ 33 The Court found that ―[i]t is<br />

immaterial that, in the context of that use, the sign is perceived as a badge of<br />

support for or loyalty or affiliation to the trade mark proprietor.‖ 34 The ECJ thus<br />

found that it was of little significance whether there was another use implied by the<br />

defendant‘s appropriation of the mark, in this case a descriptive use; it was<br />

sufficient only that an identical mark was affixed to identical goods. 35<br />

Although the question referred by the English court was whether use as a<br />

trademark was necessary to find infringement, the ECJ did not answer this question<br />

directly but instead focused its attention on the likelihood of confusion in the<br />

marketplace, finding that the use was infringing because ―[t]he use of a sign which<br />

29<br />

European Court of Justice June 13, 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew<br />

Reed, (2002) ECR I-10273 ff., case ―Arsenal‖.<br />

30<br />

European Court of Justice February 23, 1999, case C-63/97, BMW v. DEENIK, (1999) ECR I-<br />

905 ff., case ―BMW‖.<br />

31<br />

European Court of Justice June 13, 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew<br />

Reed, (2002) ECR I-10273 ff., case ―Arsenal‖, para. 27.<br />

32<br />

Ibid, para 63.<br />

33 Ibid, para 34.<br />

34 Ibid, para 63.<br />

35 Ibid.


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297<br />

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is identical to the trade mark at issue in the main proceedings is liable to jeopardise<br />

the guarantee of origin which constitutes the essential function of the mark.... It is<br />

consequently a use which the trade mark proprietor may prevent in accordance with<br />

Article 5(1) of the Directive.‖ 36 Importantly, although such questions are clearly<br />

matters of fact that should be referred to national courts, the ECJ also found that the<br />

average consumer in the relevant local market perceived that goods bearing the<br />

football club‘s marks had an economic link of some sort with the trademark<br />

owner. 37<br />

In so holding, the ECJ rejected the non-trademark use defence in support of a<br />

test based more broadly on the likelihood of, or potential for, consumer confusion.<br />

In elevating the potential for consumer confusion over liberal competition in the<br />

marketplace on the list of priorities, the Court rejected a strict trademark use test in<br />

cases arising under Article 5(1). Indeed the ECJ found that the analysis of whether<br />

the defendant was making a descriptive, or non-trademark, use of the mark wasn‘t<br />

definitive. Rather, the appropriate test is whether a particular third-party use of a<br />

mark has a damaging effect on the mark‘s ability to function as a trademark for its<br />

owners‘ goods or services. The ECJ cared less about whether the actual use itself<br />

implicated the ―essential function‖ of the trademark (i.e., distinguishing the origin<br />

of the goods) than about whether, as a result of the defendant‘s use, the owner‘s<br />

mark was subsequently less able to distinguish the goods and services due to<br />

increased confusion in the minds of consumers. In sum, the ECJ didn‘t look at the<br />

character of the use by the third party but rather at the impact of the use on the<br />

trademark itself.<br />

According to the Court‘s decision, the Directive does not require use as a<br />

trademark to find infringement but rather only that the third-party use ―creates the<br />

impression that there is a material link in trade between the third party‘s goods and<br />

the undertaking from which those goods originate.‖ 38 Arsenal thus provides that<br />

uses other than distinctive trademark uses can cause confusion impairing a<br />

trademark‘s ability to guarantee source of origin, and that such impairment is more<br />

harmful to the marketplace than other implied costs such as protracted litigation by<br />

trademark owners and the chilling effect the threat of litigation can have. 39 As a<br />

practical matter, however, if consumers do not perceive the defendant‘s mark as<br />

distinguishing goods or services, there should be no basis on which to find the<br />

existence of increased confusion.<br />

In questioning the concept of descriptive use, some critics have asked<br />

whether a fundamental difference truly exists between descriptive use and<br />

trademark use that distinguishes descriptive use from unauthorized copying and<br />

infringement. For example, critics have pondered the difference between real and<br />

counterfeit handbags and why the trademark located on the fake bag can‘t also be<br />

36 Ibid, para 55.<br />

37 Ibid, para 63.<br />

38 Ibid, para 56.<br />

39 Ibid, para 54.


298 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

also considered ―descriptive use.‖ 40 The answer is likely found in the relationship<br />

between the goods themselves. Counterfeit handbags are substitutes for the<br />

authentic bags on which they are based and, while consumers are not typically<br />

confused between the two given the often dramatically different price points and<br />

markets in which they are sold, nevertheless the class is the same and the<br />

―descriptive‖ use of the trademark is clearly motivated by the desire to deceive.<br />

Indeed, there is no benign or good faith justification for making and selling<br />

counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags other than a desire exploit the reputation of<br />

Louis Vuitton. For our purposes, model cars certainly perform a function<br />

independent from automobiles so a fundamental distinction exists. 41<br />

ii. Embellishment<br />

The use of a mark as an embellishment is another type of trademark use<br />

relevant to our analysis. The question of whether embellishing uses of trademarks<br />

violate Article 5 was addressed by the ECJ in Adidas Salomon v. Fitnessworld<br />

Trading LTD, in which the Court considered the proper scope of European dilution<br />

protections. Specifically, the Court considered the impact on infringement analysis<br />

when ―consumers see a sign purely as an embellishment.‖ 42 In interpreting the<br />

Directive, the Court opined that, where a later use of a mark is viewed purely as an<br />

embellishment, it cannot have any link with a registered mark with the result that<br />

one of the conditions of protection conferred by Article 5(2) of the Directive would<br />

not be satisfied. 43 In evaluating the practical impact of the case, it has been argued<br />

that the ECJ effectively introduced a trademark use requirement. 44<br />

The ECJ did not define the term embellishment in Adidas, although the<br />

Advocate General appears to use the term synonymously with decorative use. 45<br />

The AG opined that Article 5(5) was intended to redress provisions of national law<br />

in areas other than trademark regulation, such as unfair competition and<br />

comparative advertising. 46 It follows from that provision, he concluded, ―that the<br />

regulation of non-trade mark use of a sign which without due cause takes unfair<br />

advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of a trade<br />

40 A. KUR, Small Cars, Big Broblems? An Analysis of the ECJ‟s Opel/Autec Decision and its<br />

Consequences, supra at note 22, 344.<br />

41 A. KUR, Small Cars, Big Problems? An Analysis of the ECJ‟s Opel/Autec Decision and its<br />

Consequences, supra at note 22, 344.<br />

42 European Court of Justice October 23, 2003, C-408/01, Adidas Salomon v. Fitnessworld Trading<br />

LTD, (2003), ECR I-4881 ff., case ―Adidas‖.<br />

43 European Court of Justice October 23, 2003, C-408/01, Adidas Salomon v. Fitnessworld Trading<br />

LTD, (2003) ECR I-4881 ff., case ―Adidas‖, para 40.<br />

44 I. SIMON, Embellishment: Trade Mark Use Triumph or Decorative Disaster?, in E.I.P.R 2006,<br />

321 ff.<br />

45 Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs July 10, 2003, C-408/01, Adidas Salomon v.<br />

Fitnessworld Trading LTD, (2003), ECR I-3711 ff., case ―Adidas‖.<br />

46 Ibid, para 57.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

299<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

mark is not governed by the Directive. Such use cannot therefore fall within<br />

Article 5(2).‖ 47 The Advocate General further opined that:<br />

The question therefore is whether a sign may be correctly<br />

regarded as ―used for the purpose of distinguishing goods or<br />

services‖ where it is viewed purely as a decoration by the<br />

relevant section of the public. It seems to me that that question<br />

must be answered in the negative. If the relevant section of the<br />

public perceives a given sign as doing no more than embellishing<br />

goods, and in no way as identifying their origin, that sign cannot<br />

be regarded as used for the purpose of distinguishing those<br />

goods. 48<br />

Purely decorative use would therefore not be viewed as a trademark since the<br />

fact that consumers only viewed the mark as decorative meant that they did not see<br />

it as as an indication of source. 49<br />

The ECJ, however, elaborated on the issue, stating that<br />

the fact that a sign is viewed as an embellishment by the relevant<br />

section of the public is not, in itself, an obstacle to the protection<br />

conferred by Article 5(2) of the Directive where the degree of<br />

similarity is none the less such that the relevant section of the<br />

public establishes a link between the sign and the mark. 50<br />

Under what circumstances consumers would or would not make this<br />

connection is left unanswered by the Court.<br />

The embellishing use of a trademark has also been addressed in United States<br />

case law. In Interactive Products Corp. v. A2 Z Mobile Office Solutions, for<br />

example, the 6 th Circuit found that use of a registered trademark on a book cover is<br />

a non-trademark use if the mark is merely descriptive of the book‘s subject matter<br />

and the actual source of the book is clearly indicated. 51 Thus, under U.S. law, if a<br />

defendant uses a trademark in a ―non-trademark way,‖ the laws of infringement<br />

and false designation are also not implicated.<br />

Other examples of descriptive or referential use or embellishment with<br />

potentially infringing characteristics can be found in contemporary art. Indeed,<br />

with its focus on the topic of consumerism, American Pop Art after 1945 is rife<br />

with potential trademark infringement. Andy Warhol‘s 1962 Campbell Soup Cans,<br />

47 Ibid.<br />

48 Ibid, para 60.<br />

49 Ibid, paras 52-61.<br />

50 European Court of Justice October 23, 2003, C-408/01, Adidas Salomon v. Fitnessworld Trading<br />

LTD, (2003), ECR I-4881 ff., case ―Adidas‖, para 41.<br />

51 Interactive Products Corporation v. A2 Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc, 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th<br />

Cir. 2003).


300 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

for example, provide little information to the viewer other than reproducing images<br />

of the food company‘s products and trademarks. Moreover, Warhol‘s purpose was<br />

undoubtedly commercial, at least in part. Nevertheless, Warhol was neither<br />

competing with Campbell nor was he confusing consumers as to the origin of his or<br />

Campbell‘s products. It is likely that such uses, if challenged, would be considered<br />

non-trademark and non-infringing use, if not fair use. 52<br />

3. INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS<br />

a. Trademark Use Requirement<br />

Realizing the trademark system‘s full potential is not an easy task and the<br />

evolution of trademark law reflects a perpetual recalibration in an effort to<br />

maximize the informational value of marks while avoiding their propensity to<br />

facilitate anticompetitive conduct. 53 To effectively perform a trademark‘s primary<br />

function of lowering search costs for consumers, trademark use by third parties<br />

should be prevented only when the use causes significant confusion over origin. 54<br />

One way to ensure this is for courts to apply a strict ―trademark use‖ test, providing<br />

that a plaintiff must demonstrate as a preliminary matter that an alleged infringing<br />

use involved the misappropriation of their mark for use as a trademark and not in<br />

another, non-origin signaling way. Supporters of the so-called trademark use<br />

requirement believe that limiting the court‘s analysis at the outset to a preliminary<br />

assessment of trademark use, so that any use aside from a trademark use shall be<br />

presumptively permissible, provides crucial legal certainty.<br />

A requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate use as a trademark by a third party<br />

would thus serve as a preliminary threshold, limiting litigation of trademark rights<br />

to those cases in which potential consumer confusion is likely to be material and<br />

substantially detrimental. Proponents argue that the trademark use requirement<br />

tailors infringement causes of action to ensure that enforcement serves its purpose<br />

without interfering unnecessarily with the flow of otherwise useful market<br />

information. The requirement also shelters certain unauthorized but beneficial uses<br />

of marks without necessitating a factual inquiry into the issue of consumer<br />

confusion. 55 In practice the theory subjugates broad protection for trademark<br />

52<br />

Indeed Campbell appears to have been savvy enough to appreciate the free advertising. In 1965<br />

the company provided Warhol with actual soup can labels to be used as invitations for an exhibit<br />

and, in 1985, commissioned the artist to paint a series of their dry soup mixes. They recognized the<br />

brand enhancement his paintings provided.<br />

53<br />

S. L. DOGAN, M. A. LEMLEY, A Search-cost Theory of Imitating Doctrines in Trademark Law,<br />

in G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade Mark Law and Theory, a Handbook of Contemporary<br />

Research, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, Northampton MA USA, 2008, 65-94.<br />

54<br />

W. M. LANDES, R. POSNER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra at<br />

note 5, 169.<br />

55<br />

M. BARRETT, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, supra at note 7,<br />

379; Cf., G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, in Iowa L.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

301<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

owners and the value to them in reducing confusion in favor of more information,<br />

greater legal certainty, reduced enforcement costs ex ante, and less anticompetitive<br />

conduct by trademark owners seeking to expand their control over their goods and<br />

services or neighboring industries.<br />

Trademark doctrine must, of course, always justify an owner‘s right to<br />

exclude other entities from using a particular sign. The system must therefore be<br />

guided by an effort to increase its value to the marketplace and to the public rather<br />

than on merely bestowing rewards or benefits to complaining firms. Proponents<br />

argue that trademark use theory accomplishes numerous related objectives. First,<br />

pursuant to trademark use theory, courts are charged with the responsibility of<br />

establishing the existence of trademark use as a matter of law, rather than of<br />

consumer perception as a matter of fact, in order to identify and dispose of cases in<br />

which the degree of consumer confusion at issue fails to justify the potential for<br />

anticompetitive conduct, the increased unpredictability of enforcement, and the<br />

chilling effects of protracted litigation. Although the market may be forced to<br />

adjust to some greater degree of confusion, it would simultaneously benefit from<br />

additional activity by market participants seeking to make socially beneficial uses<br />

of marks in good faith.<br />

Jurisdictions vary concerning their willingness to apply a trademark use<br />

requirement to infringement litigation. English courts are more amenable to the<br />

theory than other European courts, often determining early in infringement<br />

litigation whether conduct has been infringing as a matter of law in order to avoid<br />

factual analysis of consumer confusion in a relevant market. 56 As we shall see, had<br />

the ECJ opted to avail itself of the efficiencies of the trademark use requirement<br />

system, model car manufacturers in need of access to Detail Trademarks would not<br />

be liable for infringement, nor would they be intimidated ex ante by the devastating<br />

impact of trademark enforcement litigation. Without it, however, they could<br />

eventually lose the market entirely to large concerns willing to battle over<br />

infringement alleged on the basis of descriptive uses of their trademarks. Indeed,<br />

according to trademark use theorists, without the ―use as a trademark‖ requirement<br />

for finding infringement, trademark owners could accrue through aggressive<br />

litigation an unjustified monopoly over their marks and, in turn, over goods and<br />

markets. 57<br />

b. Likelihood of Confusion<br />

Rev. 2007, 1714 (opining that ―[t]he trademark use doctrine is simply not an effective surgical tool<br />

for defining the normative boundaries within which the likelihood of confusion doctrine can<br />

operate, but is instead a clumsy stratagem for rendering a priori judgments without the benefit of a<br />

contextual inquiry‖).<br />

56 See, for example, Court of Appeal (Civil division) on Appeal from Chancery division, Mr.<br />

Justice Laddie, May 21, 2003, WCA Civ. 96 Case No: A2/2003/007, Arsenal Football Club v.<br />

Matthew Reed, case ―Arsenal‖.<br />

57 I. SIMON, Embellishment: Trade Mark Use Triumph or Decorative Disaster?, supra at note 46,<br />

321-328.


302 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

As we have discussed, trademarks are not property rights but limited<br />

entitlements to protect owners against uses that diminish the informative value of<br />

their marks. 58 Trademark law historically limited itself to preventing uses of marks<br />

that ―defraud[ed] the public‖ by confusing people into believing that an infringer‘s<br />

goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark holder. 59 Likelihood of<br />

confusion does not necessarily ensue from every instance of third-party<br />

appropriation of a registered trademark; rather, it turns on a long and complicated<br />

analysis of many factors such as competitive proximity, relevant consumer<br />

sophistication, and other factors that explore to what degree, if any, a use will<br />

create a false association in the minds of consumers thereby distorting the<br />

information in the marketplace. Certainly, when the average relevant consumer is<br />

confused, the ability of a trademark to function has been impaired. Many courts<br />

and scholars maintain that such impairment must be prevented notwithstanding the<br />

increased costs so disliked by trademark use theory.<br />

The ECJ‘s 2007 decision in Opel v. Autec appears to move ECJ further away<br />

from trademark use theory. 60 In Opel, plaintiff automobile manufacturer sued<br />

remote-control model car manufacturer Autec in German District Court for<br />

trademark infringement alleging that it had wrongfully manufactured and sold a<br />

1:24 scale model based on an Opel to which it had affixed the Opel ―Blitz‖<br />

figurative trademark in the same place where it is found on the automobiles, i.e., as<br />

a Detail Trademark. In its defence, Autec argued that the use of the Blitz logo on<br />

its remote-controlled cars was not ―use as a mark‖ and that it therefore could not be<br />

held to have infringed Opel‘s trademark under the German trademark statute. The<br />

defendant‘s own trademark, together with its trade name and addresses, were<br />

58 S. L. DOGAN, M. A. LEMLEY, A Search-Cost Theory of Imitating Doctrines in Trademark<br />

Law, in G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade Mark Law and Theory, a Handbook of<br />

Contemporary Research, supra at note 53, 65-94, 70; See Beanstalk Group, Inc v AM Gen. Corp.,<br />

283 F.3d 856, 861 (7 th Cir. 2002) (stating that ― a trademark is an identifier, not a free standing piece<br />

of intellectual property; hence the rule that a trademark cannot be sold in gross, that is, without the<br />

assets that create the product that it identifies‖); Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.1984)<br />

(invoking the rule against assignments of trademarks in gross, which states that ― (a) trade name or<br />

mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent significance apart from the goodwill it<br />

symbolizes‖); see generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‟g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6 th Cir. 2003)<br />

(differentiating between trademarks and patents because the latter confer a property right in gross<br />

rather than a limited interest). Professor Landes and Judge Posner explain the rule against the<br />

transfer of trademarks in gross is important to prevent consumer deception during a ―last-period‖<br />

game in which the company is going out of business and wishes to spend its goodwill; the longterm<br />

effect of permitting confusion of consumers in this way would be to increase aggregate search<br />

costs, W. M. LANDES, R.A. POSNER, The economic structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra<br />

at note 5, 185-186.<br />

59 S. L. DOGAN, M. A. LEMLEY, A Search-Cost Theory of Imitating Doctrines in Trademark<br />

Law, in G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade Mark Law and Theory, a Handbook of<br />

Contemporary Research, supra at note 53, 65-94, 71; see Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 Fed. Cas. 742,<br />

744 (CCD Mass. 1844).<br />

60 European Court of Justice January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007), ECR I-<br />

1017 ff., case ―Autec‖.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

303<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

displayed on the remote control device for the cars as well as on the packaging and<br />

user instructions. Indeed, Autec was correct that such descriptive use was not, in<br />

fact, use as a trademark and, in a system incorporating trademark use theory, the<br />

litigation would likely have ended in the preliminary stages as a matter of law.<br />

Seeking guidance from the ECJ, the German district court referred the<br />

question of whether the use of the Opel sign constituted ―use as a mark‖ and, if not,<br />

whether such use was preventable. 61 In his opinion, Advocate General Ruiz Jarabo<br />

Colomer found that ―use for toys of a registered sign does not constitute use as a<br />

trade mark within the meaning of Article 5 of [the Trademark Directive], where the<br />

manufacturer of a toy car copies a real car in a reduced scale, including the<br />

proprietor‘s trade mark and markets it since the activity of creating models consists<br />

basically in making an accurate and detailed copy of reality.‖ 62 ―According to the<br />

case-law,‖ the AG explained, ―references made to trade marks for purely<br />

descriptive purposes do not constitute use as a trade mark since, in such situations,<br />

there is no infringement of any of the interests which Article 5(1) is intended to<br />

protect.‖ 63 The Advocate General referring to, inter alia, the decision in Hölterhoff<br />

v. Ulrich Freiesleben, in which the ECJ adopted Advocate General Jacob‘s<br />

conclusions that<br />

[w]here a sign identical or similar to a registered trade mark is<br />

used by a competitor for a purpose other than [the] essential<br />

function [of identifying goods and services] it is much more<br />

difficult to see why the proprietor should be entitled to prevent<br />

such use. And, as has been pointed out in the observations to the<br />

Court, both the wording of Article 5(5) of the Trade Marks<br />

Directive and the judgment in BMW support the view that the use<br />

which may be prevented under Article 5(1) or (2) is confined to<br />

use for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services. Perhaps<br />

even more cogently, the Commission drew attention at the<br />

hearing to the existence of situations in which it would clearly be<br />

inequitable to allow the trade mark proprietor to prevent use by<br />

third parties yet where the Trade Marks Directive contains no<br />

provision precluding him from doing so if his right is taken to<br />

61 In full, the referring court asked: ―When a trade mark is registered both for motor vehicles and for<br />

toys, does the affixing by a third party, without authorisation from the trade mark proprietor, of a<br />

sign identical to that trade mark on scale models of that make of car, in order to reproduce it<br />

faithfully, and the marketing of those scale models, constitute, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of<br />

the Directive, a use which the trade mark proprietor is entitled to prevent?‖ in European Court of<br />

Justice January 25, 2007, in case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007), ECR I-1017 ff., case<br />

―Autec‖, para 14.<br />

62 Opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, March 7, 2006, C-48/05, Adam Opel v.<br />

Autec, (2007), ECR I-905 ff., case ―Autec‖, para 46.<br />

63 Ibid, para 32.


304 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

extend to all forms of use, including use which cannot and does<br />

not purport to indicate the origin of supplies. 64<br />

The Advocate General Colomer also found that, should the ECJ disagree with<br />

his conclusion concerning the inapplicability of Article 5(1) to prevent descriptive<br />

use, the Directive nevertheless permitted the use of trademarks by model car<br />

manufactures insofar as such marks are ―an inherent part of the original which, in<br />

order for the consumer to be better informed and for all operators in the sector to<br />

compete on the same terms, can be considered as falling under Article 6(1)(b) . . .<br />

as one of the other characteristics to which the provision refers.‖ 65<br />

The ECJ did not reverse the opinion of the Advocate General, but did dismiss<br />

his conclusion that defendant‘s conduct should be permissible as a matter of law<br />

pursuant to Article 6(1)(b), finding that affixing a trademark to a model car is, in<br />

fact, a descriptive use and not an indication of its one of its essential characteristics<br />

such as kind, quality, or intended purpose. The Court‘s decision not to apply<br />

Article 6(1)(b) has been questioned¸ with some scholars arguing that the exception<br />

would have been an expeditious way to protect against what appears to be the<br />

inevitable monopolization of the model car market by a few large players. 66 The<br />

Court further opined that Art. 6(1)(c) was also unavailing to the defendant model<br />

car manufacturer, finding that the affixing of the trademark on Autec‘s scale<br />

models was not designated to indicate the ―intended purpose‖ of the goods. 67 In<br />

other words, the trademark does not constitute an essential descriptive term<br />

necessary for consumers to understand the model cars, similar to information<br />

relevant to fair use exceptions. 68 Instead, it is merely ―an element in the faithful<br />

reproduction of the original vehicles.‖ 69<br />

64<br />

European Court of Justice, September 20, 2001, Case C‑ 2/00, Hölterhoff v. Ulrich Freiesleben,<br />

(2002), ECR I‑ 4187, case ―Hölterhoff‖, para 16.<br />

65<br />

Ibid, para 51.<br />

66 A. KUR, Small Cars, Big Problems? An Analysis of the ECJ‟s Opel/Autec Decision and its<br />

Consequences, supra at note 20, 329-352.<br />

67<br />

European Court of Justice January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007), ECR I-<br />

1017 ff., case ―Autec‖, para 29.<br />

68<br />

The fair use doctrine in the United States acknowledges that trademark protection is an exception<br />

to the rule of free competition. Fair use provides a safe haven for uses of trademarked terms that<br />

belong beyond the boundaries of trademark enforcement. A strong fair use defence alleviates<br />

concerns of free riding because there is little justification for eliminating free riding for its own sake<br />

since the purpose of trademark law has never been to maximize profits for trademark owners at the<br />

expense of competitors and consumers. The fair use defence is meant to accommodate the special<br />

concerns that arise when businesses claim exclusive rights in surnames and descriptive words and<br />

symbols. Thus fair use defence focuses on a defendant‘s purpose in applying a surname or<br />

descriptive word or symbol, determined through examination of circumstantial evidence, not on the<br />

impact of the use on consumers. The fair use defence provides defendants who are acting in good<br />

faith leeway to make descriptive use of words and symbols in their primary meaning even if<br />

consumers may perceive the use as source-indicating. Thus, even though a plaintiff demonstrates<br />

that the defendant made a trademark use of it symbol, and even though plaintiff demonstrates that


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

305<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In addressing the question of whether the owner of a trademark registered for<br />

model cars could prevent third parties from using its mark pursuant to Article 5(1),<br />

the ECJ observed, as a preliminary matter, that Article 5(1) does bestow an<br />

exclusive right to the owner of a registered trademark entitling it to prevent third<br />

parties from using it in the course of trade. The ECJ then observed, in contrast to<br />

the the Attorney General‘s decisive opinion, that ―the exclusive right under Article<br />

5(1) was conferred in order to enable the trademark proprietor to protect his<br />

specific interests as proprietor‖ and, therefore, ―the exercise of that right must be<br />

reserved to cases in which . . . use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the<br />

functions of the trademark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to<br />

consumers the origin of the goods.‖ 70 The Court‘s test of whether a particular use<br />

is infringing under Article 5(1) appears similar to Arsenal: the use itself – in this<br />

case descriptive – is not determinative. Rather, the impact of the use on the<br />

trademark itself must be analyzed. If the use is considered liable to impair the<br />

trademark‘s ability to perform its essential function, then the infringement analysis<br />

would continue. Finding that this was a possibility, the Court therefore held that<br />

the German national court should conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether<br />

the trademark‘s ability function had been impaired by the defendant‘s use.<br />

The Court thus held that potential liability depended on whether the relevant<br />

consumer ―perceived the sign identical to the [plaintiff‘s] logo appearing on the<br />

scale models . . . as an indication that those products come from [plaintiff] or an<br />

undertaking economically linked to it.‖ 71 The test is, in essence, an analysis of the<br />

likelihood of confusion or, more strictly, of antecedent consumer association that<br />

might in turn lead to confusion. 72 So, if the relevant public were to interpret the<br />

Opel logo on Autec‘s remote control cars as an indication that the toys were<br />

somehow linked to Opel, the essential guarantee of origin function of the trademark<br />

this trademark use is likely to confuse consumers, the defendant can avoid liability by<br />

demonstrating that it applied the word or symbol in good faith merely for the purpose of describing<br />

its own goods or services. Occasionally the fair use defence is denied because of its propensity to<br />

cause consumer confusion. In KP Permanent Make-up v. Lasting Impressions, 543 U.S. 111, 122<br />

(2004), the Supreme Court continues its tendency to restrain protection in favour of preserving<br />

competition and recognizing distinctiveness as the essential ingredients of trademark protection<br />

when it recognized that fair use and some confusion may coexist. It rejected the approach of the<br />

Ninth Circuit which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove a lack of consumer<br />

confusion. See Margreth Barett, Reconciling Fair Use and Trademark Use, unpublished, pp. 8-12.<br />

69<br />

European Court of Justice, January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007), ECR I-<br />

1017 ff., case ―Autec‖, para 44.<br />

70<br />

European Court of Justice January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007), ECR I-<br />

1017 ff., case ―Autec‖, para 31 (emphasis supplied).<br />

71<br />

European Court of Justice, June 13, 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew<br />

Reed, (2002), ECR I-10273 ff., case ―Arsenal‖, para 24. The German Supreme Court recently held<br />

that there has been no trademark infringement according to Article 5(1)(a) and 5(2) (decision<br />

forthcoming); but see Decision of the Spanish Supreme Court (Sala 1a), 8 March 2004, case<br />

168/2004, Harley Davidson Inc. v. Juguetes Faber S.A., Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi Nr.<br />

2004/813.<br />

72<br />

G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS ―Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law‖,<br />

Iowa L. Rev. 2007, 1597-1667.


306 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

could be impaired and infringement under Article 5(1)(a) could be found.<br />

Conversely, if the relevant public did not perceive the sign as an indication that the<br />

models originated from Opel or an undertaking economically linked to it, the<br />

German court should conclude that Autec‘s use did not affect the essential<br />

functions of Opel trademark and that there had been no infringing pursuant to<br />

Article 5. 73<br />

73 European Court of Justice, January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007), ECR I-<br />

1017 ff., case ―Autec‖, para 24.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

307<br />

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4. ANALYSIS<br />

If, as in Arsenal, Autec‘s use of an identical mark on identical goods were<br />

found to implicate Article 5(1) despite the descriptive use of the mark, how could<br />

model car makers avoid liability when they affix identical marks on identical goods<br />

in their production of model cars? According to the Arsenal and Opel Courts, the<br />

answer is found in the minds of the consumers and, at least in the case of Opel,<br />

that‘s where the national courts must look to find it. While the English High Court<br />

found that the use of Arsenal‘s trademark by defendant was not a ―trademark use,‖<br />

it nevertheless found that such use was harmful to its ability to function as a<br />

trademark. To explain why, one must look to the market in which it was<br />

demonstrated that relevant consumers believed the manufacturer of the goods was<br />

economically linked to the football club. 74<br />

According to the Advocate General Colomer, while some uses should not be<br />

considered use as a trademark and are therefore outside of the scope of Article 5(1),<br />

these must nevertheless be determined through an analysis of the relevant market,<br />

noting that ―when I stated [in Arsenal that] it was for the national court to specify<br />

the moment at which a trade mark is used [for decorative and not trademark<br />

purposes], I pointed out the need to consider other factors, particularly the nature of<br />

the goods in question, the structure of the market and the position in the market of<br />

the proprietor of the trade mark….‖ 75 Thus, because the owner of the mark in<br />

Arsenal had a validly registered trademark for sports merchandise, and because the<br />

trademark in that market could potentially function as a symbol of origination to<br />

the relevant consumer market, permitting a descriptive but nevertheless confusing<br />

use by a third party could harm the Arsenal trademark. Accordingly, the use made<br />

by the defendant could therefore be precluded pursuant to Article 5(1).<br />

Providing in Opel an assessment of the presently booming model car market<br />

to frame the context, the Advocate General observed – importantly – that that<br />

particular market had been served by independent model car manufacturers for<br />

more than a century and that automobile manufacturers had only recently begun to<br />

push for control of their marks in that industry. As a result, because of the nature<br />

and history of this specific market, present-day consumers and collectors of model<br />

cars expect that their models are constructed by myriad manufacturers who may<br />

have no connection with the automobile manufacturers whatsoever; that, for<br />

example, the Ferrari Scudetto on a die-cast model 250 GTO does not reliably<br />

signify that the good was made by, or even in conjunction with, the company in<br />

Maranello. He further concluded that consumers of model cars associate the<br />

model‘s Detail Trademark with the trademark on the automobile on which the<br />

model is based and not with the trademarks on the models manufactured for Opel<br />

by its licensees. 76<br />

74 Ibid, case ―Arsenal‖.<br />

75 Opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, March 7, 2006, C-48/05, Adam Opel v.<br />

Autec, (2007), ECR I-905 ff., case ―Autec‖, para 33.<br />

76 Ibid, paras 37, 40.


308 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

Because trademarks registered in the model car class fail to reliably signal to<br />

the market the characteristic of origin, national courts deciding such cases today<br />

pursuant to the ECJ‘s interpretation of Community Law should generally find that<br />

the descriptive use of a mark by model car manufacturers does not impair the<br />

ability of a trademark to function because the Detail trademark does not – and has<br />

never – functioned effectively as an Origin Trademark. Thus, Detail Trademarks<br />

affixed to model cars should not implicate Article 5. At least for the time being.<br />

Indeed, to hold that automobile trademarks registered in the model car class could<br />

exclude other makers from using the marks in a descriptive manner would be<br />

tantamount to stretching the power of the automobile companies (who, in practice,<br />

have registered most of the automobile trademarks in the model car class) over the<br />

model car industry. To grant them control – significant legal power – over another<br />

industry would contravene the pro-competitive principles of trademark theory.<br />

The ECJ thus concluded that the Detail Trademark may not indicate an<br />

essential characteristic of the good since the identical reproduction of the<br />

automobile logo may not be interpreted by relevant consumers as a mark<br />

guaranteeing origin. 77 Nevertheless, while the ECJ could have simultaneously<br />

concluded that the descriptive use implicit in a Detail Trademark excluded it from<br />

application as an Origin Trademark, it deferred this crucial question to the German<br />

national court. 78 The result is clear: while national courts may presently decide that<br />

Detail Trademarks do not impair the functionality of Origin Trademarks, trademark<br />

proprietors are free to campaign for the minds of consumers with the hope of<br />

changing their perception concerning the trademarks in order to capture the market<br />

in the future.<br />

5. CONCLUSION<br />

Similar to many European industries, the model car industry is comprised of<br />

a vast array of producers ranging from large toy companies producing inexpensive<br />

toys for children in large quantities to artisans and craftsmen making limited<br />

numbers of exquisite models for serious collectors. However, in ruling on the<br />

various questions referred by national courts and, specifically, in Opel v. Autec, the<br />

ECJ may have made it more difficult for this diverse and growing industry to<br />

continue its robust expansion. Indeed, it is likely that the ECJ‘s decision in Opel<br />

will have a negative impact on the market, limiting the ability of many producers to<br />

continue making and selling their models and of many collectors to enjoy the array<br />

of collectibles previously available to them. Automobile makers, economically<br />

powerful concerns compared to model car makers, typically register their famous<br />

77<br />

Or takes an ―unfair advantage‖ of the reputation of the motor car trademark if the plaintiff is an<br />

automobile producer.<br />

78<br />

T. C. JEHORAM, M. SANTMAN, Opel /Autec: Does the ECJ Realize What it Has Done?, supra<br />

at note 75, 507-510.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

309<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

trademarks in the toy car class and do so with the intention of controlling an<br />

industry related to its own in only the most aesthetic of ways. Should a national<br />

court find that a trademark owner registered for model cars could prevent other<br />

model car makers from using trademarks necessary for naturalistic reproductions,<br />

as the Spanish national court did in Harley Davidson v. Juguetes Faber Sa, the<br />

ability to make naturalistic models using purely descriptive trademarks would be<br />

limited to an extent unprecedented in the model car industry. 79 It is, of course,<br />

apparent how so many European industries could be affected by opening the door<br />

to such an unjustified restriction on descriptive use.<br />

Had the ECJ recognized that Article 5(1) required a demonstration of use as a<br />

trademark by alleged infringers, however, it would likely concluded that the<br />

decorative use of Detail Trademarks by model car manufacturers in the creation of<br />

their models is not infringing. Moreover, had the ECJ arrived at this conclusion as<br />

a matter of law, it would have increased legal certainty and consistency across<br />

jurisdictions while reducing costs for manufacturers and consumers. Requiring a<br />

trademark use for infringement, or finding that descriptive use either does not<br />

impair the functionality of Origin Trademarks or is properly beyond the scope of<br />

Art. 5(1), would have provided appropriate protection for the descriptive use of<br />

trademarks generally. This, in turn, would have provided the certainty necessary to<br />

permit smaller manufacturers to commit to production and for financiers to invest<br />

with more confidence. By electing, instead, for a localized consumer confusion<br />

test that ignores the descriptive characteristic inherent in Detail Trademarks, the<br />

ECJ reduced certainty, raised costs for producers, and cast a pall over prospects for<br />

growth and diversity in the model car industry as well as other industries dependent<br />

on access to trademarks for descriptive purposes.<br />

The likelihood of confusion analysis delegated to national courts by the ECJ<br />

also increases temporal uncertainty in the market by permitting large manufacturers<br />

who own the trademarks to important automobile brands (and who likely own the<br />

corresponding marks in the model car class) to allocate their considerable resources<br />

to change consumer perception about the origin of models in an effort to capture<br />

the increasingly lucrative market. Thus, while the trademark use requirement<br />

would have provided legal certainty by basing infringement analysis on a<br />

consistent type of use, the likelihood of confusion analysis also raises costs for<br />

market participants by enabling courts to regularly revisit the question of consumer<br />

confusion, perhaps arriving at different conclusions based on changing perceptions<br />

or as a result of judicial subjectivity. When national courts inevitably arrive at their<br />

irreconcilable factual conclusions, model car makers will face additional challenges<br />

created by territorial restrictions on the marketplace; their markets will be reduced<br />

as will the diversity of models available to collectors.<br />

The evolution of trademark law reflects a continuous rebalancing that seeks<br />

to maximize the informational value of marks while avoiding their use to suppress<br />

79 Spanish Supreme Court (Sala 1a), 8 March 2004, case 168/2004, Harley Davidson Inc. v.<br />

Juguetes Faber S.A., Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi Nr. 2004/813.


310 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

access to goods, services, and markets. 80 However, it would seem unjustified and<br />

inadvisable to satisfy the anticompetitive potential of trademarks by enabling a few<br />

trademark owners to control entire markets by granting them control not just over<br />

Origin Trademarks but Detail Trademarks as well. Particularly in cases where<br />

trademark owners have substantial economic power, to grant them outsized control<br />

over all uses of their marks would create market friction in the form of, at a<br />

minimum, additional barriers to entry for competitors. 81 This would, of course,<br />

result in fewer options, reduced quality, and higher costs for consumers.<br />

As we have seen, if the use of a trademark is descriptive, as in the case of<br />

affixing a Detail Trademark to a model car, then it is generally understood that the<br />

mark no longer functions reliably as an indication of origin – it is no longer<br />

trustworthy for that purpose and it is no longer properly within the scope of Art.<br />

5(1). As a result, in deciding Opel, the ECJ should have resolved the problem of<br />

distinguishing between trademark and descriptive uses of marks as a matter of law<br />

by recognizing that trademark theory doesn‘t support the expansion of the right to<br />

preclude the use of marks in all contexts. The benefits of carefully defining the<br />

differences are clear. The costs of monopolization of marks and protracted<br />

infringement litigation are also clear. 82 While it‘s true that consumer perception of<br />

the Detail Trademark may vary by jurisdiction, the increased efficiency in a<br />

marketplace operating under clear rules would certainly work to ameliorate initial<br />

confusion.<br />

In conclusion, the owner of a trademark registered for model cars should not<br />

be able to prohibit the manufacture and sale of model cars which constitute<br />

naturalistic reproductions of real cars on which the owner‘s mark appears because<br />

such use is descriptive, does not conflict with the purpose of trademarks, and is<br />

outside the scope of protection pursuant to Art. 5(1). The ECJ‘s decision in Opel<br />

paves the way for this outcome but, unfortunately, does not guarantee this result for<br />

the many diverse jurisdictions of Europe. Thus, while the ECJ suggested that a<br />

case for infringement under Article 5(1) may be defeated on the basis of nontrademark<br />

use, it nevertheless found there could be (under the same circumstances)<br />

an infringement depending on a national court‘s assessment of local consumer<br />

perception. This, of course, provides an opportunity for trademark owners to<br />

campaign for changes in consumer perception in the years to come.<br />

80 S. L. DOGAN, M. A. LEMLEY, A Search-Cost Theory of Imitating Doctrines in Trademark<br />

Law, in G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade Mark Law and Theory, A Handbook of<br />

Contemporary Research, supra at note 53, 65-94, 66<br />

81 Ibid, 65-94, 70; the danger of monopolization of trademarks is explored by G. S. LUNNEY Jr.,<br />

Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L. J. 1999, 367, 370.<br />

82 American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Pro-Line Protoform and T. Mattson Enterprise, Inc., 2004<br />

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13949.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

311<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

6. FINAL THOUGHTS<br />

When deciding whether to register automobile trademarks for application on<br />

model cars, companies and authorities must ask for what purpose these marks have<br />

been registered in the model car class. Are they registered to function as Origin<br />

Trademarks on the models as they are on the automobiles after which they are<br />

modelled? Or are registrants seeking to restrict third-party access to their<br />

trademarks – even though use as a Detail Trademark is purely descriptive – in an<br />

effort to corner the market? If the answer is the latter, what is the basis for<br />

inferring the right to preclude such descriptive use in light of the true scope of<br />

protection provided for by Article 5(1)?<br />

As we know, tension between trademark owners and third-party users may<br />

arise in three primary contexts in the life of a trademark: registration, infringement<br />

litigation, and the assertion of fair-use defence. 83 In asking whether there has been<br />

an infringement by a third-party model car maker, the question posed assumes the<br />

existence of a validly registered trademark in the model car class. However, in<br />

light of our conclusion that the purely descriptive use of Detail Trademarks should<br />

never be considered infringing, we submit that a system based on sound trademark<br />

theory must question whether there is any theoretical or legal justification for<br />

granting registration of these marks in the first place. Since all infringement<br />

litigation should fail in cases of descriptive use, the market would certainly benefit<br />

from clearer signals not only in the early stages of infringement litigation through<br />

application of trademark use theory, but at an even earlier stage – the point of<br />

registration – where the strength of such marks and the potential outcome of<br />

litigation is first assessed by existing and potential market participants.<br />

83 M. RICOLFI, Strategic Branding (Opel/Autec, Eventmarke), Max Planck Institute paper, 2009,<br />

supra note 5.


312 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

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of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

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Justice, Case C-17/06 2006, available at:<br />

http://www.inta.org/downloads/brief_celine.pdf.<br />

T. C. JEHORAM, M. SANTMAN, Opel/Autec: Does the ECJ realize What it<br />

has done?, 8 Journal of Intellectual law & Practice 2008, 507 ff.<br />

A. KUR, Fundamental Concerns in Harmonization of (European) Trademark<br />

Law, in G. B. DINWOODIE, M. D. JANIS, Trade mark law and theory, a<br />

handbook of contemporary research, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, Northampton<br />

MA USA 2008, 151 ff.<br />

A. KUR, Small Cars, Big Problems? An Analysis of The ECJ‟s Opel/Autec<br />

Decision and its Consequences, in Engelbrekt-Bakaedjieva et al. (eds.), Writings in<br />

honor of Marianne Levin, Norsteds 2008, 329 ff.<br />

A. KUR, Strategic Branding: Does Trade Mark Law Provide for Sufficient<br />

Self Help and Self Healing Forces?, in Govaere, H. Ullrich (eds.), Intellectual<br />

Property, Market power and the Public interest , College of Europe Series,<br />

Bruxelles, P. I. E. Lang 2008, 191 ff.


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

315<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

M. LEISTNER, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Law in Europe: The<br />

European Court of Justice‟s trade mark case law, 1 Common Market Law Review<br />

2008, 65 ff.<br />

S. M. MANIATIS, Trademark Rights – A Justification Based on Property, in<br />

IPQ 2002, 123 ff.<br />

J. MASONS, Using a Trade mark in a “Trade Mark Sense,” 2007, article<br />

available at:<br />

http://www.pinsentmasons.com/PDF/UsingaTradeMarkinaTradeMarkSense.pdf.<br />

L. J. OSWALD, Tarnishment and Blurring under the Federal Trademark<br />

Dilution Act of 1995, 36 American Business Law Journal 1999, 255 ff.<br />

T. PINTO, Is Consent Required to Use Registered Trade Marks on Model<br />

Replica Cars?, 2 Journal of Intellectual law & Practice 2007, 359 ff.<br />

M. RICOLFI, Strategic Branding (Opel/Autec, Eventmarke), Max Planck<br />

Institute paper 2009.<br />

J. M. SAMUELS, L. B. SAMUELS , A review of recent decisions of the<br />

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: article: the trademark<br />

jurisprudence of Judge Rich, 25 The American University Law Review 2007, 5059<br />

ff.<br />

N. SHEMTOV, Trade mark use in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of<br />

Opel and Picasso, 8 Journal of intellectual Law & Practice 2007, 557 ff.<br />

I. SIMON, Embellishment: Trade mark use triumph or decorative disaster ?,<br />

in E.I.P.R. 2006, 321 ff.<br />

C. WADLOW ―One more outing for Arsenal: a case of dilution or one for<br />

restitution?‖, 2 Journal of Intellectual Law & Practice 2005, 143 ff.


316 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

Case Law<br />

a. ECJ<br />

European Court of Justice February 23, 1999, case C- 63/97, BMW v. Deenik,<br />

(1999) ECR I-905 ff., case ―BMW‖.<br />

European Court of Justice, September 20, 2001, Case C‑ 2/00, Hölterhoff v.<br />

Ulrich Freiesleben, (2002), ECR I‑ 4187 ff., case ―Hölterhoff”.<br />

Opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer June 13, 2002, C-<br />

206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, (2002) ECR I-3422 ff., case<br />

―Arsenal‖.<br />

European Court of Justice June 13, 2002, case C- 206/01, Arsenal Football<br />

Club plc v. Matthew Reed, (2002) ECR I-10273 ff., case ―Arsenal‖.<br />

Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs July 10, 2003, C-408/01, Adidas<br />

Salomon Ag v. Fitnessworld Trading LTD, (2003) ECR I-3711 ff., case ―Adidas‖.<br />

European Court of Justice October 23, 2003, C-408/01, Adidas Salomon Ag<br />

v. Fitnessworld Trading LTD, (2003) ECR I-4881 ff., case ―Adidas‖.<br />

European Court of Justice November 16, 2004, C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch<br />

v. Bud jovickð Budvar, (2004) ECR I-2013 ff., case ―Budweiser‖.<br />

European Court of Justice March 17, 2005, case C-228/03, The Gillette<br />

Company, Gillette Group Finland Oy v. LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy, (2005) ECR I-<br />

2337 ff., case ―Gillette‖.<br />

Opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer March 7, 2006, C-<br />

48/05 Adam Opel v. Autec, (2007) ECR I-905 ff., case ―Autec‖.<br />

European Court of Justice January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel v.<br />

Autec, (2007) ECR I-1017 ff., case ―Autec‖.<br />

European Court of Justice September 11, 2007, case C-17/06, Céline Sarl v.<br />

Céline SA, (2006) ECR I-7041 ff., case ―Celine‖.<br />

European court of Justice October 10, 2007, C-487/07, L‟Oréal S.A. (and<br />

others) v. Bellure N.V. (and others), (2007) ECR I-7079 ff., case ―l‟Orèal‖.<br />

b. European Member National Cases<br />

England


John Graziadei and Angela Saltarelli<br />

317<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Court of Appeal ( Civil division) on Appeal from Chancery division, Mr<br />

Justice Laddie, May 21,2003, WCA Civ 96 Case No: A2/2003/007, Arsenal<br />

Football Club v. Matthew Reed, case ―Arsenal‖.<br />

Germany<br />

Bundesgerichtshof, 14 January 2010, I ZR, 88/08.<br />

Italy<br />

Cassazione civile, I° sezione, September 1, 1998, n° 10739, available on<br />

www.cortedicassazione.it<br />

Cassazione civile, I° sezione, September 20,1998 n° 10416, available on<br />

www.cortedicassazione.it<br />

Tribunale di Roma, ordinanza 28 aprile 2004, in Foro It, 2005, 586 ff.<br />

Spain<br />

Spanish Supreme Court (Sala 1a), 8 March 2004, case 168/2004, Harley<br />

Davidson Inc. v. Juguetes Faber S.A., Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi Nr.<br />

2004/813.<br />

c. United States<br />

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 US 203, 205,<br />

53 USPQ 323, 324-25, 1942.<br />

Warner Bros Inc v. Gay Toys Inc, 553 F. Supp 1018, 1983 Us Dist.<br />

American Honda Motor Co Inc v. Pro Line Protoform and T Mattson<br />

Enterprise Inc, F. Supp 2D 1081, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS<br />

13949.<br />

Dr Ing H.C.F. Porsche AG ans Porsche Cars North America Inc v Universal<br />

Brass Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist Lexis 7079.<br />

Interactive Products Corporation v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions Inc, 326 F<br />

3d 687, 695, April 10, 2003, (6th Cir 2003 ).<br />

KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc v. Lasting Impression I Inc, 328 F. 3d 1061,<br />

1072 (9 th Cir 2003).<br />

Volkswagen Ag v. Dorling Kindersley Publishing Inc, 614 F. Supp. 2d 793,<br />

2009 US dist Lexis 288851.<br />

Legislation<br />

Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22<br />

October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade<br />

marks.


318 Can the Owner of a Mark Registered for Toy Cars Prohibit the<br />

Manufacture and Sale of Toy Cars which constitute Naturalistic Reproductions<br />

of Real Cars on which the Owner‟s Mark appears?<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

Council Regulation 09/207/EC of February 26, 2009 on the Community trade<br />

mark, 2009.<br />

Internet<br />

http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de<br />

http.//en. wikipedia.org


ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN THE US-<br />

COLOMBIA FTA AND CHOICE OF FORUM IN ADJUDICATING A<br />

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION’S DISPUTE<br />

by<br />

Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno<br />

A Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and the United States (herein<br />

thereafter referred to as the ―FTA‖) was concluded in 2006. 1 The goal of the<br />

agreement is to eliminate tariffs and other barriers to goods and services, and to<br />

expand trade between the United States and Colombia. The agreement is pending<br />

before US Congress and its approval it is expected to happen in 2010. The<br />

intellectual property provisions as well as the dispute settlement provisions are<br />

among the most important parts of the agreement. Given the social and economical<br />

advantages resulting from the protection of Geographical Indications (GIs) for a<br />

developing country like Colombia, it is important to analyze which changes are<br />

introduced in this regard in the FTA. Furthermore, this work will observe some<br />

factors to be taken into account in order to choose between the FTA or the World<br />

Trade Organization (WTO) system of settlement disputes in order to solve a<br />

controversy regarding GIs that may arise between Colombia and the US.<br />

1. SCOPE OF THE APPLICATION<br />

The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Article XXIV<br />

authorizes members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to establish free trade<br />

areas. 2 Consistent with this agreement the governments of Colombia and the<br />

United States decided to engage in an agreement that will eliminate tariffs and<br />

other barriers in order to trade in good and services. The scope of the agreement<br />

includes important areas relating to customs administration and trade facilitation,<br />

technical barriers to trade, government procurement, investment,<br />

telecommunications, electronic commerce, intellectual property rights and labor<br />

and environmental protection.<br />

In the following part the work will focus on the intellectual property rights<br />

provisions, and specifically on the geographical indications rules in order to<br />

determine what changes are introduced by the FTA and whether or not they go<br />

beyond the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of<br />

Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 3<br />

1 The text of the agreement can be accessed at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/colombia-fta/final-text<br />

(last visited Feb. 21, 2010).<br />

2 Article 24 of the GATT 1994.<br />

3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the<br />

Uruguay Round, Vol. 31, 33 IM 81 (1994).


320 Analysis of the Geographical Indications in the US-Colombia FTA and<br />

Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

2. THE GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION STANDARD: WHAT GOES<br />

BEYOND TRIPS?<br />

2.1. Geographical Indications under the Current Standard of Protection<br />

According to Article 22.1 TRIPS geographical indications are ―indications<br />

which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member (country) or a<br />

region o locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other<br />

characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin‖. Such<br />

definition has been incorporated in Decision 486/2000 which is the Common<br />

Regime on Intellectual Property for the countries of the Andean Community<br />

(Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia). The Decision makes a distinction between<br />

designations of origin (DOs) and indications of origin (IOs). In fact, DOs indentify<br />

a good as originating in a particular territory, the qualities, reputation, or<br />

characteristics of which are exclusively or essentially attributable to the<br />

geographical environment in which such good is produced, including both natural<br />

and human factors. On the other hand, IOs are understood to be a name, expression,<br />

image, or sign that indicates or evokes a particular country, region, locality, or<br />

place. However, the qualities of the good identified with an IO are not exclusively<br />

attributable to the geographical origin. 4<br />

As it can be observed, Colombia as part of the Andean Community, has<br />

given GIs independent protection from trademarks. Such separate protection is due<br />

to the fact that some benefits are said to be obtained by protecting GIs, among them<br />

the promotion of manufacture of local products, the regional marketing of protected<br />

products, the promotion of tourism and touristic routes, the establishment of high<br />

levels of quality control. 5 Indeed, through GIs, in the words of J. Bullbrook ―it is<br />

ensured that consumers in international markets will accept and favor the<br />

product‖. 6 Evidence of that could be the most famous Colombian GI ―Café de<br />

Colombia‖.<br />

4 Cfr. Articles 201 and 221, Decision 486/ 2000 of December 14, 2000, Common Regime on<br />

Intellectual Property, GO 20, 1ff. Furthermore, Decision 486 also includes additional protection for<br />

GIs for wines and spirits (Articles 135, 215) in the same line as Article 23 TRIPS.<br />

5 D. VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiations on Geographical Indications in the TRIPs Council and their<br />

Effect on the WTO Agricultural Negotiations – Implications for the Developing Countries and the<br />

Case of Venezuela, in JWIP 2001, 703 ff. at 715. In the same line, M.A. ECHOLS, Geographical<br />

Indications for Food, TRIPs and the Doha Development Agenda, in 47 Journal of African Law,<br />

2003, 199ff. at 200.<br />

6 J. BULLBROOK, Geographical Indications within GATT, in 7 JWIP 2004, 501ff. at 502. See<br />

also, S. REVIRON, Geographical Indications: Creation and Distribution of Economic Value in<br />

Developing Countries, NCCR Trade Working Paper No. 2009/14, 2009, 30ff.


Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno<br />

321<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

As L. SCHÜSSLER points out, for many years coffee producers have faced<br />

low and unsteady coffee prices. 7 Nevertheless, in the case of Colombia the National<br />

Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (NFC), a nonprofit and nonpolitical<br />

organization for the collective of over 560.000 coffee growers of Colombia that<br />

tries to stabilize the market for Colombian coffee, has relied not only in trademark<br />

but also on GI protection in order to increase market shares in the global market. 8<br />

In fact, in 2005 ―Café de Colombia‖ became the first protected DO in Colombia<br />

and in 2007; it was recognized as a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) under<br />

the European Community (EC) system (Council Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006).<br />

―Café de Colombia‖ was the first non- EC application ever filed and the first time<br />

that a product from a country outside from the EC was granted protection as a GI<br />

under the EC system. 9<br />

Other Colombian products may follow the same path. Besides ―Café de<br />

Colombia‖, the Colombian Patents and Trademarks Office (PTO) has granted<br />

protection as DOs for ―Cholupa del Huila‖ an exotic fruit from Colombia and it is<br />

currently examining the applications for ―Queso del Caquetá‖ for cheese, ―San<br />

Agustín‖ for coffee, ―Cristal‖ for an alcoholic beverage, ―Ron de Caldas‖ for rum,<br />

and ―Cacao de Tumaco‖ for Cocoa. Furthermore, protection as DO was granted in<br />

2009 for a type of handicraft as ―Cestería en Rollo de Guacamayas‖. 10<br />

2.2. Geographical Indications under the FTA<br />

The FTA agreement defines GIs as ―indications that identify a good as<br />

originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or locality in that territory, where<br />

a given quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the goods is essentially<br />

attributable to its geographical origin. Any sign or combination of signs, in any<br />

form whatsoever, shall be eligible to be a geographical indication‖ (Note 4 to<br />

Article 16.2). Moreover, Article 16.2 of the FTA establishes that ―each party shall<br />

provide that trademarks shall include collective and certification marks. Each party<br />

shall also provide that signs that may serve, in the course of trade, as geographical<br />

indications may constitute certification or collective marks‖. 11<br />

7 L. SCHÜSSLER, Protecting „Single-Origin Coffee‟ within Global Coffee Market: The Role of<br />

Geographical Indications and Trademarks, in TECJILTP, 10(1), 2009, 149ff. at 150. Retrieved<br />

[December 9, 2009] from the World Wide Web: http://www.esteyjournal.com<br />

8 Ibid. at 165. See also, G.E. EVANS and M. BLAKENEY, The Protection of Geographical<br />

Indications after DOHA: QUO VADIS?, in 9 JIEL 2006, 575 ff. at 607.<br />

9 It is important to note that the NFC originally filed an application for a Protected Designation of<br />

Origin (PDO). Nevertheless, it was changed to a Protected GI application (PGI) since Colombian<br />

coffee is based on Arabica species.<br />

10 Further information on Colombian GI‘s can be found at the website of the PTO Office at<br />

httt://www.sic.gov.co (last visited February 9, 2010).<br />

11 It is also important to note Article 16.3 of the FTA:<br />

1. If a Party shall provide the means to apply for protection or petition for recognition of<br />

geographical indications, through a system of protection of trademarks or otherwise, it shall accept<br />

those applications and petitions without the requirement for intercession by a Party on behalf of its<br />

nationals and shall:<br />

(a) process applications or petitions, as relevant with a minimum of formulations.


322 Analysis of the Geographical Indications in the US-Colombia FTA and<br />

Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

When comparing the above mentioned FTA regulation of GIs with the<br />

current laws under Decision 486/2000, several contradictions arise. First of all,<br />

although the FTA defines GIs as indications that identify a good as originating in<br />

the territory of a Party, it goes beyond to establish that any sign or combination of<br />

signs is eligible for GI protection. The Decision 486 is very specific in requiring<br />

the sign to be either an indication which identifies a good as originating from a<br />

particular territory or to evoke it. Hence, not ―any sign‖ is eligible for GI, but only<br />

those which resort to a geographical area, used to communicate a product's<br />

geographic origins or product characteristics due to a geographic origin.<br />

Secondly, under the FTA GIs can be protected as certification or collective<br />

marks following the US approach under which GIs are not protected independently<br />

from trademarks. 12 Several authors have criticized such approach since it is clear<br />

that this approach favors US. In the words of the Colombian former Intellectual<br />

Property FTA negotiator ―…The European and Andean perspective (in Intellectual<br />

Property matters the Andeans have closely followed the European regulations)<br />

privilege geographical indications over trademarks even if they are subsequent in<br />

time to trademarks. In the FTA such preferential treatment disappears‖. 13<br />

Furthermore, Colombian Professor of Law J.A. Zarama highlights that the<br />

rules contained in the FTA leave open the possibility of monopolize GIs which are<br />

(b) make its regulations governing filling of such applications or petition, as the case may be,<br />

readily available to the public.<br />

(c) provide that applications or petitions, as the case may be, for geographical indications are<br />

published for opposition, and shall provide procedures for opposing geographical indications that<br />

are the subject of applications or petitions. Each Party shall also provide procedures to cancel a<br />

registration resulting from an application or a petition.<br />

(d) provide that measures governing the filling of applications or petitions for geographical<br />

indications set out clearly the procedures for these actions. Such procedures shall include contact<br />

information sufficient for applicants and/or petitioners to obtain specific procedural guidance<br />

regarding the processing<br />

2. Each Party shall provide that grounds for refusing protection or recognition of a geographical<br />

indication include the following:<br />

(a) the geographical indication is likely to cause confusion with a trademark that is the subject of a<br />

good-faith pending application or registration; and<br />

(b) the geographical indication is likely to cause confusion with a preexisting trademark, the rights<br />

to which have been acquired through use in good faith in that Party.<br />

12 The advantages of protecting geographical symbols under a property rights system are<br />

appropriately explored by Prof. Ricolfi , see M. RICOLFI, ―Geographical Symbols in Intellectual<br />

Property Law: the Policy Options”, in SCHUTZ VON KREATIVITÄT UND WETTBEWERB,<br />

FESTSCHFIRFT FÜR ULRICH LOWENHEIM, ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG, 2009, 231 ff, at 233.<br />

13 LA. MADRID, Negociaciones de Propiedad Intelectual en el TLC con EEUU: Proceso,<br />

Resultados y Algunos Mitos, Bogota, Universidad Sergio Arboleda, Retrieved [December 9, 2009]<br />

from the World Wide Web: http://www.usergioarboleda.edu.co


Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno<br />

323<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

signs of common use. 14 He also explains that the protected interest in the case of<br />

GIs and DOs is the one of a community represented by people which elaborate<br />

their products in a specific geographical place. Hence, consumers acquire a<br />

product, induced by the reputation of the product derived from its geographical<br />

origin rather than from the trademark that may identify it. He argues that in the case<br />

of collective trademarks the protected interest is the product quality that has been<br />

developed by the holders of the trademark. Moreover, in the case of certification<br />

trademarks, the protected interest is the public‘s reliance on the certification<br />

organism in regards to the quality of the product without considering the<br />

importance of the geographical origin of the same. 15<br />

Conversely, at the European level Prof. M. Ricolfi stresses out the<br />

importance of collective and certification trademarks as an ideal solution towards a<br />

harmonized protection of geographical signs, which can lead to a system of<br />

multilateral registration of collective and certification trademarks. 16 Undoubtedly,<br />

the certification and collective trademarks system has important advantages over<br />

the GIs Andean and European model. Indeed, as explained by Prof. Ricolfi, with<br />

such system (i) registration of the sign is enough to avoid the need to prove<br />

reputation; (ii) the enforcement of the property right granted by registration is<br />

easier to obtain; (iii) the system contributes to the optimal allocation of resources<br />

by means of lowering consumers search costs, a goal also attained due to the<br />

essential information that collective or certification trademarks provide; (iv) it<br />

―provides an incentive for an investment towards a quality-price combination<br />

satisfactory to consumers‖; furthermore, (v) there are already registration systems<br />

in place for individual trademarks. 17 Additional benefits/distinctions between the<br />

European and the American approach to GIs are highlighted by American professor<br />

J. Hughes. 18 Prof. Hughes explains how certification marks can develop as a matter<br />

of common law without USPTO registration: ―Thus, if an appellation or<br />

denominazione is controlled locally in France or Italy, the producers market in the<br />

United States, and no one else in the United States is using the GI for the same<br />

product, there are probably common law trademark rights under U.S. trademark<br />

doctrine. This means that a European producer can gain common law protection of<br />

its geographical indication in the United States without regard to whether the GI is<br />

protected under an EU member state's trademark law, geographical indications law,<br />

or both‖. 19 Furthermore, Prof. Hughes explains how a certification mark system<br />

14<br />

J.A. ZARAMA, Las Indicaciones Geográficas en el TLC firmado por Colombia y Perú con los<br />

Estados Unidos frente al TLC firmado con Chile, (El problema de la desprotección de las<br />

Denominaciones de Origen)”, in 7 REM (1), Universidad Externado de Colombia, 24 ff, at 23.<br />

Retrieved [December 9, 2009] from the World Wide Web: http://www.emercatoria.edu.co.<br />

15<br />

Ibid.<br />

16<br />

M. RICOLFI, Geographical Symbols in Intellectual Property Law: the Policy Options, supra at<br />

note 12, at 249.<br />

17<br />

Ibid. 233-237.<br />

18<br />

J. HUGHES, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate about Geographical<br />

Indications, in 58 Hastings L.J. 299, 1ff. at 6. Retrieved [January 16, 2010] from the World Wide<br />

Web: http://www.lexis-nexis.com.<br />

19<br />

Ibid.


324 Analysis of the Geographical Indications in the US-Colombia FTA and<br />

Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

polices itself on quality controls as well as GIs do, because both GIs and<br />

certification trademarks share the incentive to maintain quality in order to retain<br />

consumer loyalty and to gain new market share. 20<br />

These advantages will be applied to Colombia as a result of the protection<br />

adopted in the FTA and therefore, Colombia will certainly benefit from such<br />

system. As a matter of fact, the protection of Colombian GIs in the US already<br />

follows the route of the certification trademark while in Europe they follow the GI<br />

European model. 21<br />

Nevertheless, Colombia as part of the Andean Community has the obligation<br />

to follow Decision 486 which, as examined before, provides independent<br />

protection from trademarks to GIs. 22 It is unclear what would be the position of the<br />

other members of the Community (except from Peru that has also signed an FTA<br />

with the US), and how the Decision should be updated in case Ecuador and Bolivia<br />

do not accept the obligations that Colombia has undertaken. 23<br />

2.3. What goes beyond TRIPS?<br />

In general, the analyzed FTA norms with regards to GIs do not provide for a<br />

higher standard of protection compared with TRIPS. However, a provision to fulfill<br />

the obligations contained in Article 22.2 TRIPS was not included within the FTA. 24<br />

20 Ibid. at 15. He also refutes the thesis according to which stronger GIs rights would benefit<br />

developing countries. According to the author, (i) such argument is unproven; (ii) the most<br />

important geographical names are concentrated in Europe and North America; (iii) certification<br />

trademark law provides a legal framework in which GIs from developing countries can construe<br />

reputational capital that to be exploited and (iv) the same type of initial reputational investment<br />

would be needed to build recognition of a country‘s GIs as would be required with new trademarks.<br />

Ibid. at 28.<br />

21 Indeed, the NFC has maintained since 1981 USPTO registration of the certification mark the<br />

COLOMBIAN (1.160.492) for coffee, which has reached incontestable status. Retrieved [February<br />

21, 2010] from the World Wide Web: http://www.uspto.gov.<br />

22 It is important to distinguish the protection that a geographical sign may get in Colombia. A<br />

geographical sign may be registered as trademark or as a part of a trademark. Nevertheless, if the<br />

protection is oriented to value the geographical origin and the product characteristics due to<br />

geographic origin that the sign conveys, then such sign is registered as a GI. On the contrary, if the<br />

protection is oriented to value the ability of the sign to differentiate products or services of one<br />

company from those of another, then the sign is protected as a trademark. Trademarks and GI under<br />

the Andean Community Decision have two separate regimes and requirements. Authors such as K.<br />

Maskus have established that ―In Colombia geographical indications may be registered as<br />

trademarks […]‖. Articles 134 and 201 of Decision 486/2000 have a clear wording on the law not<br />

allowing for such confusion. K. Maskus in Jeffrey J. Schott, Trade relations between Colombia and<br />

the United States Volume 79, Policy analyses in international economics, Peterson Institute, 2006,<br />

145 ff. at 152.<br />

23 F. M. ABBOT, T. COTTIER, F. GURRY, International Intellectual Property in an Integrated<br />

World Economy, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2007. 683 ff. at 394.<br />

24 Art. 22.2 TRIPS reads: ―[…] 2. In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the<br />

legal means for interested parties to prevent: (a) the use of any means in the designation or


Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno<br />

325<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 25 in which Article<br />

1712 requires members to provide means for private parties to prevent the use and<br />

registration of false geographical indications that are misleading to the public, the<br />

FTA is silent in this regard. 26 It is important to note that as a consequence of<br />

Article 1712, US Congress amended the Lanham Act provisions related to the<br />

registration of false geographical indications and trademarks. 27 Nonetheless, no<br />

modification to United States law was made with respect to the use of geographical<br />

indications. 28<br />

As for enforcement provisions regarding IP matters in the FTA, it is<br />

necessary to highlight that the main changes introduced by the FTA which have<br />

some differences with the current Colombian enforcement regulations are in the<br />

field of copyright and neighboring rights which would deserve a separate analysis<br />

from this work (article 16.11).<br />

3. THE CHOICE OF FORUM FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF A GI<br />

DISPUTE: THE FTA OR THE WTO SYSTEM?<br />

3.1. Scope of Application of the FTA Dispute Settlement Provisions<br />

Article 21.2 of the FTA limits the application of the dispute settlement<br />

provisions to the disputes between Colombia and the US regarding the<br />

interpretation or application of the agreement or wherever a party considers that the<br />

obligations contained in the FTA have been violated; this applies to the GI disputes<br />

as well. An obvious but important difference from the WTO system comes out of<br />

this rule. The FTA provisions will be only applied to the disputes that arise on the<br />

bilateral level (Colombia –US) while the WTO dispute settlement provisions aim at<br />

operating at a global or near-global level.<br />

On the other hand the FTA dispute settlement provisions do not apply to<br />

disputes that arise between members of the Andean Community (Art. 21.2). This<br />

is an important clarification since initially all the Andean Community countries<br />

were going to negotiate as a bloc a free trade agreement with the US. However, the<br />

governments could not agree on this possibility and it was determined that every<br />

member would decide whether or not to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the<br />

presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a<br />

geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the<br />

geographical origin of the good; (b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within<br />

the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967).<br />

25 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), adopted on December 1992 by México,<br />

United States and Canada. Enforce since January 1, 1994.<br />

26 Indeed, it prevents the use and registration of similar trademarks or signs similar to a protected<br />

trademark but not prevents the registration of false GIs. cfr. art. 16.2 (4) FTA.<br />

27 P. M. BRODY, Protection of Geographical Indications in the Wake of TRIPs: Existing United<br />

States Laws and the Administration‟s proposed Legislation, in 84 TR 520, 1994, 520 ff. at 522.<br />

28 Ibid.


326 Analysis of the Geographical Indications in the US-Colombia FTA and<br />

Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

US. For that reason, disputes among members of the Andean Community will<br />

continue being decided under the dispute settlement mechanism established by the<br />

Andean agreements.<br />

3.2. Choice of Forum, Timeframes and Enforcement of the Decision<br />

Article 21.3 of the FTA sets out that when a dispute regarding any matters<br />

arises under the agreement or another free trade agreement to which the disputing<br />

Parties are party or the WTO agreement, the complaining party may select the<br />

forum in which to settle the dispute. Once the complaining Party has requested a<br />

panel under an agreement referred to in Art. 21-2 paragraph 1, the forum selected<br />

shall be used to the exclusion of the others.<br />

That means that the two countries may choose both the FTA and the WTO<br />

dispute settlement procedures for settling a GI dispute. In the future if Colombia or<br />

the US is faced up to selecting the forum in a GI controversy, it will be important<br />

to consider the type of GI dispute to settle. Colombia or the US may prefer the<br />

WTO mechanism -which has a multilateral nature- if the type of controversy may<br />

be benefited from the participation of third parties (third countries) with substantial<br />

trade interest. Such would be the case of the members of the Andean Community,<br />

which share similar economic needs and structures as Colombia if the type of<br />

dispute allows such members to be on Colombia‘s side or to defend Colombia‘s<br />

interests. On the contrary, the bilateral procedure could be strategically more<br />

discrete when involving other WTO members may have an undesired international<br />

political effect either for Colombia or the US.<br />

As for the timeframes and enforcement of the decision, the FTA (Art. 21.4 -<br />

21.18) follows the steps of the WTO system. As a first step, the parties commit for<br />

consultations. If consultations are not successful they might request the body<br />

appointed to meet in order to analyze the agreement and if this fails to lead to an<br />

accepted solution the parties can go to a panel. The rules or procedure provide<br />

procedural fairness (right to hearings and submissions) determine the timeline for<br />

issues such as submissions, reports by the panel and if required the suspension of<br />

benefits. 29<br />

Other factors to take into account to select the relevant system will be ―the<br />

specific facts of the case, which include the expertise of adjudicators of each<br />

forum, the need for efficiency and specific remedies, and the procedural aspects of<br />

each forum. In addition, there are other factors of a more political nature that may<br />

29 P. DRAHOS, The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement, 1ff. at 9. Retrieved [February 21,<br />

2010] from the World Wide Web: http://www.twnside.org.sg. A comprehensive list of the WTO<br />

dispute settlement steps is provided in C. BOWN and B.M. HOECKMAN. BOWN, C. and<br />

HOEKMAN, B., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging<br />

the Private Sector, in JIEL, v8, n4, 2005, 861 ff at 863.


Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno<br />

327<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

affect the state‘s choice of forum, such as whether the state will seek a dispute<br />

settlement or a systemic declaration or what type, importance, or influence the<br />

forum will have, which will affect the state‘s choice of forum‖. 30<br />

Also, it will be important to take into account that the WTO mechanism will<br />

be held at the WTO headquarters in Geneva which involves more costs than<br />

choosing as a forum either the US or Colombia. With respect to this issue a<br />

comprehensive analysis of the costs of actual WTO litigation for developing<br />

countries is made by Bown and Hoeckman, arriving to a bill of approximately<br />

US$500,000 (by 2005) for litigation only (to an exporter for a market access case)<br />

without including the pre-litigation phase of investigation and post-litigation phase<br />

to ensure compliance. 31<br />

W. J. Davey points out that in real practice, with the exception of<br />

MERCOSUR 32 dispute settlement in regional trade agreements does not seem as<br />

successful as WTO dispute settlement. 33 Among the reasons that explain such<br />

situation according to Davey are (i) the WTO dispute settlement system is a more<br />

sophisticated mechanism; (ii) it has a more effective enforcement system, and (iii)<br />

the WTO decisions are observed as more legitimate than many other bilateral<br />

dispute settlement systems. 34 Since the FTA provides protection that does not go<br />

beyond TRIPS, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will enforce the standards<br />

at the level provided in the TRIPS Agreement as well as it would do with the<br />

obligations contained in the FTA.<br />

Additionally, as explained by P. Drahos ―Whether two states pursue a trade<br />

dispute in the WTO using the DSU or whether they use the procedure available to<br />

30 K. KWAK and G. MARCEAU, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdictions between the World Trade<br />

Organization and Regional Trade Agreements, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal<br />

System, Edited by L. BARTELS and F. ORTINO, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 465 ff. at<br />

482.<br />

31 C. BOWN and B.M. HOECKMAN. BOWN, C. and HOEKMAN, B., WTO Dispute Settlement<br />

and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, at note 29, at 870.<br />

32 MERCOSUR agreement or Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market) was adopted on<br />

March, 1991 by Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. It came into force in 1995.<br />

33 W. J. DAVEY, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment, in Regional Trade<br />

Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Edited by L. BARTELS and F. ORTINO, Oxford<br />

University Press, Oxford, 2006. 343 ff. at 354.<br />

34 Ibid. at 355. An interesting analysis in regards to the success of developing countries in WTO<br />

disputes is made by C. BOWN; he wonders ―what can developing countries do to increase the<br />

likelihood that they will achieve success as plaintiffs in trade disputes? Can they do anything to<br />

improve the likelihood that developed countries will abide by their market access commitments?<br />

Perhaps an obvious question that is frequently lost in the discussion is that developing countries<br />

should continue to liberalize and expand their own market access commitments in order to receive<br />

more exports from developed trading partners and thus to become more integrate in the world<br />

trading system….Having substantial imports will give developing countries the power to make<br />

credible threats that they will take away valuable concessions from developed trading partners who<br />

refuse to comply with their WTO obligations and whom they might face as defendants in WTO<br />

trading disputes‖, C. BOWN, Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO<br />

Trade Disputes, TWE v27, n1 2004, 1ff at 26.


328 Analysis of the Geographical Indications in the US-Colombia FTA and<br />

Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

them under a bilateral trade agreement, the dispute still remains a bilateral dispute.<br />

In either case, the superior bargaining power of a strong state also remains.‖ 35<br />

Colombia and the US are free to submit their GI disputes regarding matters<br />

concerned by the agreement to the WTO or to use the dispute settlement<br />

environment established by the FTA. Nevertheless, in order to promote the<br />

uniformity in decisions a party should not undergo a process before an arbitral<br />

Panel formed according to the FTA provisions and bring the same controversy<br />

before the WTO. Otherwise, the parties could be encountering different decisions<br />

since the WTO Panelists‘ decisions will be influenced by the WTO goals of trade<br />

liberalization while the FTA Panelists‘ decisions will reflect the FTA objective of<br />

commercial cooperation among two countries: the US and Colombia.<br />

Finally, one major issue to look at when choosing between the FTA or the<br />

WTO forum is that under the FTA the Panel‘s ruling cannot be appealed. It is<br />

interesting to see that countries that have established regional trade agreements<br />

such as MERCOSUR have decided little by little to introduce innovations in their<br />

rulings in order to allow the appeal of the decisions by creating an international<br />

judicial body in charge of issuing a decision on appeal. In fact, just by means of the<br />

Protocol of Olivos in 2004, MERCOSUR introduced the possibility of appeal for<br />

decisions issued by ad hoc arbitration tribunals. 36 Probably with the time Colombia<br />

and the US will include the possibility of appeal for the disputing parties, by means<br />

of the creation of a neutral appeal body. In fact, it would be useful for disputing<br />

parties to have a neutral body to review the decision on points of law and to correct<br />

possible mistakes that the Panel could have made on legal interpretation of GI<br />

provisions.<br />

4. CONCLUSIONS<br />

According to the above analysis, Colombia‘s current GI regime is close to the<br />

European model of protection. Nevertheless, there are many advantages of<br />

adopting the collective and certification trademark system and therefore Colombia<br />

has been benefited from the FTA regime.<br />

However, it is evident that although GIs have been included as a protected<br />

interest in the FTA, there is a substantial difference between the current regulation<br />

contained in the Common Regime for the Andean Community countries and the<br />

type of protection allowed by the FTA. Such difference puts Colombia in a difficult<br />

position since it is bound to comply with Decision 486. Sooner or later, the<br />

35 P. DRAHOS, The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement, supra at 29 at 14.<br />

36 A comprehensive study has been made by G. LUCARELLI and J. GAMA, Considerations of the<br />

Mercosur Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the Impact of its Decisions in the WTO Dispute<br />

Resolution System, 2006, 31ff.


Sofia Rodriguez-Moreno<br />

329<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

government of Colombia will have to address this issue in regards to its Andean<br />

Community partners.<br />

On the other hand, since the GI‘s protection in the FTA does not go beyond<br />

TRIPS, Colombia and the US will have to take a look at different factors that were<br />

described in this work, when adjudicating a controversy regarding GIs in order to<br />

select the relevant dispute settlement system.


330 Analysis of the Geographical Indications in the US-Colombia FTA and<br />

Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

ABBOT, F.; COTTIER, T.; GURRY, F., International Intellectual Property<br />

in an Integrated World Economy, New York, Aspen Publishers, 2007.<br />

BARTELS, L. and ORTINO, F., Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO<br />

Legal System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.<br />

BERCOVITZ, A., El derecho de autor en el acuerdo TRIPS, in Propiedad<br />

Intelectual en el GATT, Buenos Aires, Ciudad Argentina, 2000.<br />

BOWN, C. and HOEKMAN, B., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing<br />

Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, in JIEL, v8, n4, 2005.<br />

BOWN, C., Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO<br />

Trade Disputes, TWE, v27, n1 2004.<br />

BRODY, P. M., Protection of Geographical Indications in the Wake of<br />

TRIPs: Existing United States Laws and the Administration‟s proposed Legislation,<br />

in 84 TR 520, 1994.<br />

BULLBROOK, J., Geographical Indications within Gatt, in 7 JWIP 2004.<br />

CORTES MARTIN, J.M., The WTO TRIPs Agreement – The Battle between<br />

the Old and the New World over the Protection of Geographical Indications, in 7<br />

JWIP 2004.<br />

DRAHOS P., The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement, Retrieved<br />

[February 21, 2010] from the World Wide Web: http://www.twnside.org.sg.<br />

DEVUYST, Y. and SERDAREVIC, A., The World Trade Organization and<br />

Regional Trade Agreements: Bridging the Constitutional Credibility Gap, 18 Duke<br />

J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 1<br />

ECHOLS, M.A., Geographical Indications for Food, TRIPs and the Doha<br />

Development Agenda, in 47 Journal of African Law, 2003.<br />

EVANS, G.E. and BLAKENEY, M, The Protection of Geographical<br />

Indications after DOHA: QUO VADIS?, in 9 JIEL 2006.<br />

FORSYTHE L., KEMP D., Trademarks and Geographical Indications: A<br />

Case of California Champagne, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 257, 2006. Retrieved [January<br />

16, 2010] from the World Wide Web: http://www.lexis-nexis.com.


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________________________________________________________________________________<br />

HOEKMAN, B.; KOSTECKI, M., The Political Economy of the World<br />

Trading System, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.<br />

HUGHES, J. Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate about<br />

Geographical Indications, in 58 Hastings L.J. 299, 2006. Retrieved [January 16,<br />

2010] from the World Wide Web: http://www.lexis-nexis.com.<br />

LAWRENCE, R., Crimes and Punishments? Retaliation under the WTO,<br />

Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2003.<br />

LUCARELLI, G. and GAMA, J., Considerations of the Mercosur Dispute<br />

Settlement Mechanism and the Impact of its Decisions in the WTO Dispute<br />

Resolution System, CEBRI Papers, CEBRI- Brazilian Center for International<br />

Relations, Volume 4, Year I, 2006.<br />

MARTINEZ-GUTIERREZ, A., La tutela comunitaria de las denominaciones<br />

geográficas. Conflictos con otros signos distintivos, Atelier, Barcelona, 2008.<br />

MADRID, L.A., Negociaciones de Propiedad Intelectual en el TLC con<br />

EEUU: Proceso, Resultados y Algunos Mitos, Bogota, Universidad Sergio<br />

Arboleda, Retrieved [December 9, 2009] from the World Wide Web:<br />

http://www.usergioarboleda.edu.co<br />

O‘CONNOR B., The Law of Geographical Indications, Cameron May,<br />

London. 2004 (PRIV 3873).<br />

O‘CONNOR, B. and DJORDJEVIC, M., Practical Aspects of Monetary<br />

Compensation: The US - Copyright Case (March 2005), in JIEL, Vol. 8, Issue 1,<br />

2005.<br />

K. KWAK and G. MARCEAU, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdictions<br />

between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements, in<br />

Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Edited by L. BARTELS<br />

and F. ORTINO, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.<br />

PALMETER, D. and MAVROIDIS, P., Dispute Settlement in the World<br />

Trade Organization, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2004.<br />

PACHON MUNOZ, M. and SANCHEZ AVILA, Z., El régimen andino de la<br />

propiedad industrial, Bogotá, Ediciones Jurídicas Gustavo Ibáñez, 1995.<br />

RUBINO, V. Le denominazione di origine dei prodotti alimentari,<br />

Alessandria, Editrice Taro, 2007.<br />

RINCON CARDENAS, E.; SANTAMARIA ARIZA, E.; CALDERON<br />

VILLEGAS, J., El Tratado de Libre Comercio, la integración comercial y el


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Choice of Forum in Adjudicating a Geographical Indication‟s Dispute<br />

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derecho de los mercados, Bogotá, Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora<br />

del Rosario, 2007.<br />

RAMIREZ, J., Temas no Comerciales en la negociación comercial entre<br />

Colombia y Estados Unidos, Santiago de Chile, Naciones Unidas, 2005.<br />

RICOLFI, M., “Geographical Symbols in Intellectual Property Law: the<br />

Policy Options“, in Shutz Von Kreativität Und Wettbewerb, Festschfirft Für Ulrich<br />

Lowenheim, ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG, 2009.<br />

SHERZOND, S., Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Volume<br />

19 GTL, Kluwer Law International, 2009.<br />

SCHÜSSLER, L. Protecting „Single-Origin Coffee‟ within Global Coffee<br />

Market: The Role of Geographical Indications and Trademarks, in TECJILTP,<br />

10(1), 2009, 149ff. at 150. Retrieved [December 9, 2009] from the World Wide<br />

Web: http://www.esteyjournal.com<br />

SCHOTT, J., ―Trade relations between Colombia and the United States‖<br />

Volume 79, Policy analyses in international economics, Peterson Institute, 2006.<br />

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the Developing Countries and the Case of Venezuela, in 4 The Journal of World<br />

Intellectual Property 2001.<br />

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Universidad Externado de Colombia, Retrieved [December 9, 2009] from the<br />

World Wide Web: http://www.emercatoria.edu.co, 24.


INTRODUCTION<br />

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS:<br />

A REVIEW OF GI PROTECTION IN SWITZERLAND<br />

by<br />

Larissa Thommen<br />

The protection of geographical indications (GIs) has long been the untended<br />

patch of the intellectual property law garden. That is not to say that this branch of<br />

intellectual property law has withered. However, the use of GIs as a means of<br />

protecting intellectual property has not enjoyed the some broad support as<br />

trademarks (TMs) or copyrights. This situation is now changing. 1<br />

Europe has a long history of protecting GIs which have existed for hundreds<br />

of years. So in Yugoslavia, as early as 1222, a Charter of Steven I governed the<br />

sale of wine. So-called ―guild marks‖ were a common means indicating the<br />

geographical origin of products in Middle Ages. Murano glass from the island near<br />

Venice, Italy is an example of those that remain common today.<br />

Marks indicating the geographical origin of goods were the earliest type of<br />

TMs, taking into account that the products of particular regions having special<br />

quality and some features were more saleable. Climate, geology, indigenous raw<br />

materials, food processing techniques local to a region also as manufacturing skills<br />

were by those features identifying the quality of goods creating their<br />

distinctiveness. The evolution of general marks associated with a region to the<br />

specific ―trade‖ marks that apply to the products of individual manufactures, has<br />

not resulted in the disappearance of geographical marks. This is particularly so in<br />

Europe where substantial processed food markets and markets for alcoholic<br />

beverages are dependent upon the continued recognition of GIs. 2<br />

Like TMs or commercial names, GIs are distinctive signs with permit the<br />

identification of products on the market. If they are used in the proper way and are<br />

well protected; they can become an effective marketing tool of great economic<br />

value. GIs indeed convey the cultural identity of nation, religion or specific area.<br />

They make it possible to add value to the natural riches of country and to the skills<br />

of its population, and they give local products a distinguishable identity. 3<br />

1, 2 B. O‘CONNOR, The Law of Geographical Indications, Cameron May Ltd, London, 2004, 1 ff., at<br />

21-22.<br />

3 F. ADDOR, A. GRAZIOLI, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines and Spirits. A Roadmap for a<br />

Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the WTO/TRIPs Agreement, in JWIP 2002, 865<br />

ff., at 865


334 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Starting from a review of the current protection of GIs at the international<br />

level and at the Swiss level, the purpose of this paper is to analyze how the current<br />

reform of the Swiss legislation and the proposed enhanced protection for<br />

the‖Swissness‖ concept fit in the overall debate on the protection of unique<br />

products, whose quality and/or reputation is due to their geographical origin.<br />

1. GENERAL PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (GIs)<br />

1.1. What are Geographical Indications?<br />

A GI is an expression with a ―place-goods‖ connection with permits the<br />

producers of products or offers of services of certain geographical region to claim a<br />

right in such region. A GI, therefore, is a broad term which refers to any type of<br />

expression which connotes a geographical origin of particular product. 4 GIs,<br />

however, do not protect products or methods of production as such, but rather<br />

confer to all producers from a given geographical area the exclusive rights to use a<br />

distinctive sign identifying their products. In case of properly using of GIs and also<br />

if it is well protected, they can receive worthwhile marketing tool, as they enable<br />

the producers to convey the considerable information to the consumers.<br />

Even though the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property<br />

does not provides explicitly the expression of GIs, but the new standard global<br />

definition of GIs is found in the WTO TRIPs Agreement of 15 April 1994, Art. 22<br />

(1), which states: ―GIs are, for the purpose of this Agreement, indications which<br />

identify a good as originating in the territory of a member or a region or locality in<br />

that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good<br />

is essentially attributable to its geographical origin‖. 5<br />

The TRIPs definition of GIs includes also Appellations of Origin (AOs),<br />

since the Lisbon Agreement limits AOs to the criteria of quality or characteristics<br />

of a product attributable to its geographical origin, whereas the TRIPs mentions<br />

also the reputation of the product. Although, the definition of GIs is similar to the<br />

definition of AOs that given in the Lisbon Agreement, but it does not cover all GIs.<br />

Following the wording of Article 22 (1) of TRIPs, not all types of GIs are covered<br />

there being further requirements in relation to goods. However, protection is also<br />

granted to places not known in other countries or by consumers. Services are not<br />

cover by this wording. 6<br />

4<br />

C. LACKERT, Geographical Indications: What does the WTO TRIPs Agreement Require?, in TMW<br />

1998, 22 ff., at 22<br />

5<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing, the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Resultants of<br />

the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].<br />

6 M. BUNDI, Swiss Trade Marks Practice on Misleading Geographical Indications, in JIPLP 2008,<br />

262 ff., at 264


Larisa Thommen 335<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2. The Concepts of Indications of Source (ISs) and Appellations of Origin<br />

(AOs)<br />

There are two multilateral Agreements concerning ISs: the Paris Convention<br />

of 20 Mach 1883 for the Protection of Industrial Property 7 and the Madrid<br />

Agreement of 14 April 1891 for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications<br />

of Source on Goods 8 which do not define the term IS. Nevertheless, Art. 1(1) of the<br />

Madrid Agreement contains elements clarifying that are meant by this term: ―All<br />

goods bearing a false or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to<br />

which this Agreement applies, or a place therein, is directly indicated as being the<br />

country or place of origin shall be on importation into any of the said countries.‖<br />

Based on this, an IS can be defined as: Any expression or sign used to indicate that<br />

a product or a service originates in a country, region or a specific place, without<br />

any element of quality or reputation. 9 This distinguishes them from GIs. However,<br />

like GIs, ISs relate to the geographical area from where the product originates and<br />

not to another type of origin such as the product manufacturer, as for TMs. IS can<br />

be words that directly indicate the origin of the product such as the name of<br />

countries or of regions, and cities therein. Also it can be in another written<br />

figurative form, symbols, emblems that call up to the geographical origin of the<br />

product indirectly – the name of ―William Tell‖ for Swiss products or the ―Eiffel<br />

Tower‖ for products from region of Paris.<br />

AO is a term used in Art. 1(2) of the Paris Convention and identifying in Art.<br />

2 of the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of AOs as follow: ―Appellation of<br />

Origin means the geographical name of a country, region or locality, which serves<br />

to designate a product originating therein, the quality or characteristics of which are<br />

due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including natural<br />

and human factors. 10<br />

Three elements constitute the notion:<br />

7 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, as revised at Brussels<br />

on 14 December 1900, at Washington on 2 June 1911, at The Hague on 6 November 1925, at<br />

London on 2 June 1934, at Lisbon on 31 October 1958, and at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, and as<br />

amended on 28 September 1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, [hereinafter Paris Convention]<br />

8 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods of 14<br />

April 1891, Act revised at Washington on 2 June 1911, at The Hague on 6 November 1925, at<br />

London on 2 June 1934, and at Lisbon on 31 October 1958, Additional Act of Stockholm of 14 July<br />

1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 168, [hereinafter Madrid Agreement]<br />

9 F. ADDOR, A. GRAZIOLI, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines and Spirits, supra at note 3, at<br />

867.<br />

10 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International<br />

Registration of 31 October 1958, as revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, and as amended on 28<br />

September 1979, 923 U.N.T.S. 205, [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement]


336 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

appellations must be direct geographical names;<br />

appellation must serve as a designation of geographical origin of the<br />

product;<br />

quality and characteristics exhibited by the product must be essentially<br />

attributable to the designated area of geographical origin.<br />

This is similar to GIs, but the definition of AO has higher requirements with<br />

regard to the following two main points. First, for AOs, mere ―reputation‖ of the<br />

products is not sufficient to get protection by an AO; specific qualities or<br />

characteristics need to be expressed in the particular product. Second, AOs must be<br />

direct geographical names of countries, regions or localities; mere symbols or<br />

emblems evoking indirectly a geographical origin are nor sufficient. 11<br />

3. PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE<br />

INTERNATIONAL LEVEL<br />

As present below, there are 3 multilateral agreements relating to the<br />

protection of GIs and relatedconcepts in addition to the TRIPs.<br />

The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property<br />

The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris<br />

Convention) of 1883 was the first international agreement relating to the protection<br />

of GIs. Art. 10(1) of the Convention provides for the certain remedies in respect<br />

unlawful use of ISs on goods, meaning that no ISs may be used if it refers to a<br />

geographical area from which the products in question do not originate. It does not<br />

mention AOs expressly; however, they are covered by the term ISs as all AOs are<br />

considered of the source of goods. The basis for protection against misleading ISs,<br />

including AOs is given in Article 11bis and it obliges members to provide protection<br />

against unfair competition containing a non-exhaustive list of acts, which are to be<br />

prohibited. The Paris Convention does not provide for any special remedies against<br />

infringement of this provision.<br />

The Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of<br />

Source on Goods<br />

The Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications<br />

of Source on Goods (Madrid Agreement) of 1891 was the first multilateral<br />

agreement providing specific rules for the repression of false and deceptive ISs and<br />

did not add much to the protection already given by the Paris Convention, but it<br />

extended protection to the deceptive ISs in addition to false indications, which can<br />

11 F. ADDOR, A. GRAZIOLI, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines and Spirits, supra at note 3, at<br />

868.


Larisa Thommen 337<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

be the true name of place where the good originates from ,but nevertheless<br />

confusing the purchaser in respect to the true origin and quality of the good.<br />

The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their<br />

International Registration<br />

The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their<br />

International<br />

Registration gives a proper AO definition reflecting two basis requirements for an<br />

AO to be protected:<br />

the AO should be protected in its country of origin, and<br />

the AO should be registered in the International Register of <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

In accordance with its terms, countries are free to adopt its own system for<br />

AOs designating by juridical and/or administrative decision. Protection against all<br />

usurpation or imitation, including cases there the true origin of a product is<br />

indicated or where the AO is used in translated form or accompanied by terms such<br />

as: ―kind‖, ―type‖, ―make‖, ―imitation‖ or ―like‖ stipulated in Art.3. Once<br />

registered, it is protected in other contracting parties and they have to protect the<br />

AO, to which international protection was required, except if a contracting party<br />

declares, within a period of one year that it can not ensure the protection for a<br />

certain application. There are no specified grounds for refusal to names in the<br />

Agreement. The duration of the protection by international registration is the same<br />

which given in the country of origin of AOs and therefore no requirements for<br />

international renewal.<br />

The TRIPS Agreement on the Protection of Geographical Indications<br />

A specific section of the WTO TRIPs Agreement is dedicated to GIs. It is the<br />

first multilateral text dealing with GIs as such and may be rightly considered an<br />

important first step in this difficult field. Given its groundbreaking nature, this<br />

section of the Agreement begins with a definition of what constitutes a GI. This<br />

should be welcomed because definitions are crucial to distinguish GIs from the<br />

notion of IS and that of AO. At first glance Art. 22 (1) resembles Art. 2 of the<br />

Lisbon Agreement, yet it differs from Lisbon on a number of points: (1) AO under<br />

the Lisbon Agreement are necessarily geographical names of a country, region, or<br />

locality, while GIs under TRIPs are any indication pointing to a given country,<br />

region or locality; (2) AO under Lisbon designates a product, while a GI under<br />

TRIPs identifies a good; (3) Lisbon limits appellations to the quality or<br />

characteristics of a product, while TRIPs also mentions its reputation; (4) finally,<br />

AOs refer to a geographical environment, including natural and human factors,<br />

while TRIPs uses a more general concept of "geographical origin". 12 Art. 22<br />

provides the basis framework for GIs establishing the minimum scope of protection<br />

and is limited if the public misled concerning real geographical origin of goods or<br />

12 D. Cervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Interpretation and Implementation, in EIPR 1999, 156 ff., at<br />

158.


338 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

if it constitutes acts of unfair competition. Moreover, Art.22 does not prevent the<br />

use of GIs in translation or accompanied by a ―de-localizer‖. 13<br />

Additional Protection for Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits<br />

Art. 23 of TRIPs provides stronger protection than does Art. 22 for GIs used<br />

in respect of wines and spirits. In this regard, member countries are required to<br />

provide interested parties with the legal means to prevent the use of a GI for wines<br />

or spirits not originating in the place indicated by the GI. The most relevant reasons<br />

that GIs for wines and spirits deserve stronger protection under Art. 23 of the<br />

TRIPs are their reputation. Long time ago, wines and spirits from particular regions<br />

have acquired reputation thanks to their qualities. Unlike Art. 22, under this<br />

provision no requirement that the use of the GI is misleading in order to be<br />

enforceable, except in relation to the registration of TMs containing a GI for wines<br />

and spirits. Furthermore, use of a false GI for wines and spirits will be prohibited<br />

even where the true place of origin is indicated or is accompanied by terms such as<br />

―kind‖, ―type‖ or ―style‖. This provision has a purpose to balance between the<br />

producer concerns from misappropriation of the products and consumer<br />

expectations excluding the trickery regarding wines and spirits.<br />

International Negotiations, Exceptions.<br />

In general, Art. 24 of the TRIPs provides exceptions that limit Art. 22 and 23.<br />

Based on Art. 24(4), continued and similar use of a GI in respect of wines and<br />

spirits by other parties in the member countries for 10 years prior to the enactment<br />

of the TRIPs is permitted. This means that, even though Art. 23 specifically<br />

provides greater protection for wines and spirits, but under Art. 24(4), the<br />

protection is limited to the use after entering the TRIPs into force. Another<br />

exception is Art. 24(5) dealing with the relationship of GIs to TMs. With respect to<br />

the registration of TMs, a TM registered in good faith before the enactment of the<br />

TRIPs remains valid and a TM consisting of a GI is valid if the GI has not yet been<br />

registered in its country of origin.<br />

A further possibility of international protection of GIs is the conclusion of<br />

bilateral and/or regional agreements specifying a kind and lists of GIs protected by<br />

the contracting parties. Although, the scope of protection remains de minimis and<br />

often limited to specific products such as wines and/or spirits.<br />

4. PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE<br />

NATIONAL LEVEL<br />

There are a few forms of protection of GIs at the national level: Special Title<br />

of Protection, Registration of Collective Marks or Certification Marks, and the Law<br />

13 M. VITTORI, The International Debate on Geographical Indications (GIs): The Point of View of<br />

the Global Coalition of GI Producers-oriGIn, in JWIP 2009, 1 ff., at 4


Larisa Thommen 339<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

of Unfair Competition (Passing-Off) or the TM Law developing locally and is<br />

limited by the territory of its jurisdiction. Therefore it is impossible to secure<br />

protection of domestic geographical symbols abroad by means of domestic<br />

legislation alone: international cooperation is indispensable. Domestic provisions<br />

may be fashioned in such a way as to optimize the possibility of extension abroad<br />

of domestic protection. Conversely, domestic rules may be fashioned in a way<br />

which is art to minimize the rate of access of foreign GIs to domestic market.<br />

While welfare-economics considerations as to the comparative efficiency of the<br />

different solutions may be to a certain extent be taken into account in this<br />

lawmaking process, they are not likely to be decisive for the ultimate choice. 14<br />

4.1. Unfair Competition<br />

Under the Unfair Competition Law principles, in order to be protected, a<br />

given GI must have acquired a certain reputation or goodwill. In other words,<br />

consumers must associate the GI with the place of origin of its products or services.<br />

Furthermore, it is required that the use of a certain GI on goods or services not<br />

originating from the geographic area is misleading, so that consumers are deceived<br />

against the true place of the product or service. In this regard, proof of damages<br />

caused by such misleading practices is required. In order to be protected under the<br />

Law of Unfair Competition, a GI should have a reputation. Therefore, a GI which<br />

does not have an established reputation yet in the market, may not be protected by<br />

the Law of Unfair Competition. Yet, a GI which has not been used for a certain<br />

time may lose its reputation and may no longer be protected under Unfair<br />

Competition Law principles. Under the TM Law, a GI may be protected by<br />

refusing or invalidating TMs that consist wholly or partly of a GI which misleads<br />

consumers about the real geographic origin of the goods. This kind of protection<br />

may be accorded in members countries pursuant to Article 22(3) of the TRIPs<br />

Agreement.<br />

Protection accorded to GIs following a lawsuit based on unfair competition is<br />

only effective between the parties to the procedure. The entitlement to protection of<br />

a given GI shall be demonstrated every time enforcement is sought.<br />

4.2. Trademarks, Certification Marks and Collective Marks<br />

Most TM Laws, in general, prohibit the registration of a geographical name<br />

because considered descriptive. However, under certain conditions, a geographical<br />

name can be registered as a TM, for instance, if it has acquired a ―secondary<br />

meaning‖. If this is not the case, GI producers have often been forced to seek a<br />

limited protection - for their logo only - via a figurative TM registration. In<br />

addition, experience shows that some IP Offices regularly reject registration<br />

14 M. RICOLFI, Geographical Symbols in Intellectual Property Law: the Policy Options,<br />

in Festschrift für Ulrich Loewenheim zum 75. Geburstag, Schutz von Kreativität und Wettbewerb,<br />

C.H.Beck, Munich, 2009, 321 ff., at 244


340 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

requests from producers on the grounds that GI names are: a simple indication of<br />

the place of origin of the goods (i.e. an IS) and/or a generic name.<br />

GIs are often protected via a Collective or a Certification Mark when such<br />

legal concepts exist and which usually depend on the applicable national law. They<br />

may serve to indicate the origin of goods or services, thus to some extent they may<br />

be suitable for the protection of GIs. A Collective Mark is a mark which may be<br />

only used by members of a collective body: associations, cooperative<br />

manufacturers, producers, traders. The Collective Mark is owned by the association<br />

which exclusively grants its member to use it and is governed by rules, which has<br />

to be submitted to the IP Office together with the application for registration. Once<br />

a GI has been registered as a Collective Mark, the association has the right to<br />

prohibit its use by not member of the association. However, the registration of a GI<br />

as a Collective Mark may not prevent the mark from becoming a generic term. Yet,<br />

this system contains requirements of the use which may be subject to the<br />

cancellation of registration, when the Collective Mark is not continuously used. On<br />

the contrary to Collective Marks, Certification Marks are not owned by a collective<br />

body such as an association of producers, but by a certification authority. Such an<br />

authority may be a local council or an association or a commission which is not<br />

engaged in the production or the trade of the product concerned. In this regard, the<br />

owner of Certification Marks must ensure that the goods bearing the Certification<br />

Mark pose a certified quality.<br />

The geographical character of the symbol is not nor an obstacle to the<br />

registration of Collective and Certification TMs. The reason for this rule, much<br />

more liberal than the opposite one applicable to individual geographical TMs, are<br />

quite straightforward. Once the business located in a certain area has set up the<br />

organization registering the TM and are in principle entitled to obtain an<br />

authorization to use the same, there is no risk that competitors are disadvantaged or<br />

consumers deceived. 15<br />

4.3. Sui generis System<br />

In countries where there is a sui generis system which provides for the<br />

registration of GIs, producers do not encounter major difficulties in protecting their<br />

IPRs on their name. It is much more difficult, monetary and time costly for GI<br />

producers to rely on unfair competition and consumer protection acts, passing off<br />

actions or the TM regime.<br />

The EU has come up with a third sui generis option for protection of<br />

geographical symbols, which is provided by regime initially set up by Reg. No<br />

2081/1992 and later refurbished by Reg. No 510/2006. Under EU law, access<br />

requirements to GI protection are rather low. This is immediately apparent. Indeed,<br />

Art.2 (1) (a) of Reg. No 510/2006 protects as designation of origin only agricultural<br />

15 M. RICOLFI, Geographical Symbols in Intellectual Property Law: the Policy Options, supra at<br />

note 14, at 234


Larisa Thommen 341<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

products which at least in principle are unique, as ―the quality or characteristics of<br />

which‖, according to this provision, ―are essentially or exclusively due to a<br />

particular geographical environment with its natural and human factors‖. 16 The<br />

Regulation 510/2006 17 sets out provisions on agricultural products and foodstuffs<br />

(excluding all wine-sector products, except wine vinegar) from a defined<br />

geographical area. If there is a link between the characteristics of certain products<br />

and their geographical origin, they may qualify for either a protected geographical<br />

indication (PGI) or a protected designation of origin (PDO) and they are different.<br />

The PDOs cover the term used to describe foodstuffs which are produced,<br />

processed and prepared in a given geographical area using recognized know-how<br />

(such as Mozzarella di Bufala Campana).The PGIs indicate a link with the area in<br />

at least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation (such as Turrón<br />

de Alicante). Therefore, the link with the area is stronger for PDOs. Generic names,<br />

that have become common names for a product even though they refer to a<br />

geographical region, can not be granted PDO or PGI status. No exhaustive list of<br />

generic exist and they are defined only when a producer group attempts to register<br />

such names. 18<br />

According to the Art.13 and 14 of Reg. 510/2006 the product is protected<br />

against any practice liable to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the<br />

product, for example: any direct or indirect use of the registered name by a product<br />

not covered by the registration or by any misuse or imitation not only in a language<br />

of the application but also in translation.<br />

Several countries have ex officio protection, where the public authorities can<br />

intervene without being asked to. Such countries are geographically closed to the<br />

EU (exl: Switzerland). Also some countries have an ex officio protection but with a<br />

limited scope (Japan for liquors, Chile for wines and spirits GIs), as a result of the<br />

bilateral agreement signed with the EU. Such countries, as Algeria, Tunisia and<br />

Mauritius, have ex parte and ex officio protection available at the request of the<br />

competent authorities, for example governmental bodies and GI groups, that<br />

however, difficult to know how often and how well the controls are made. In<br />

general, the EU legislation is perceived as the model for the protection of GIs by<br />

third countries. The scope of the protection offered in the EU, in particular the ex<br />

officio protection, is therefore of high importance to these countries.<br />

Over the past years more and more countries around the world have<br />

established sui generis systems for GI protection. This process in ongoing and will<br />

certainly facilitate the protection of GIs around the world demonstrating the fact<br />

16<br />

M. RICOLFI, Geographical Symbols in Intellectual Property Law: the Policy Options, supra at<br />

note 14, at 340<br />

17<br />

Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the Protection of Geographical<br />

Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1 ff.<br />

18<br />

T. Josling, The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Conflict,<br />

in JAE 2006, 337 ff., at 345


342 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

that countries recognize the need for a specific GI protection system that coexists<br />

with TM regimes.<br />

5. GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND TRADEMARKS:<br />

COEXISTENCE AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS<br />

Although GIs and TMs represent different spheres of distinguishing marks,<br />

the efforts to protect them sometimes create conflicts. Such conflicts arise between<br />

TMs and PGIs for identical/similar products containing the same sign.<br />

Nevertheless, it is difficult determining who should have the right to use that sign<br />

as TM or GI. The question whether exclusivity of a registered TM trumps a laterin-time<br />

PGI is also of great significance. The conflicts that arise can be settled from<br />

either a TM perspective or a GI perspective and depending on which perspective is<br />

used, conflicts will be dealt with differently. It is, basically, a matter of either<br />

granting exclusive rights to either the TM or the GI according to a ―first-in-time,<br />

first-in-right‖ scheme, or granting the GI exclusive rights, without taking possible<br />

prior TMs into account, or prescribing a co-existence of the TM and the GI.<br />

TRIPS deals with these conflicts by prescribing that previously registered<br />

TMs containing a PGI can be invalidated, under certain circumstances. Such<br />

circumstances include the situation when the use of a TM ―is of such a nature as to<br />

mislead the public‖ about the origin of the goods carrying it. The burden of proof<br />

lay on the producer claiming that an illegitimate use of the GI is taking place. But if<br />

the GI relates to wine or spirits, no proof regarding risk of misleading is needed;<br />

the TM shall be invalidated anyway. Nonetheless, a TM will prevail, even though it<br />

is ―identical‖ or ―similar‖ to the GI if it is registered or applied for in good faith,<br />

before a certain time, or if rights to it have been acquired through use. 19<br />

Moreover, Art 22 TRIPs allows for the use of a GI by producers from outside<br />

the designated geographical area, provided that such a use is accompanied by a<br />

corrective label. Such a label discloses the true origin of the good, thus disclosing<br />

that it is another than what is actually indicated by the GI that the good carries. The<br />

position of TRIPs is that corrective labels prevent consumers from being misled<br />

about the actual origin of the good. By identifying the true origin, the GI can be<br />

legitimately used on the good, even though it originates from elsewhere. 20<br />

However, corrective labels cannot be used on wines or spirits, according to Art 23<br />

TRIPs. It is further noted that Reg. No 510/2006 proscribes the use of corrective<br />

labels – a prohibition which thus applies to corrective labels on agricultural<br />

products.<br />

19 M. BLAKENEY, Proposal for the International Regulations of Geographical Indications, in JWIP<br />

2001, 641 ff., at 643 20 D. Rangnekar, Demanding Stronger Protection for Geographical Indication:<br />

The Relationship between Local Knowledge, Information and Reputation, UNU-INTECH,<br />

Netherlands, 2004, 1 ff., at 13


Larisa Thommen 343<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Conflicts will at times also be settled in direct favor of the TM. So Parma<br />

Ham is a PGI within the EU, but cannot be used as GI in Canada or Mexico. A<br />

prior Canadian TM registration of the very same connotation renders such use<br />

impossible. Often, countries in support of more limited GI protection measures use<br />

TM Law as the vehicle for protection, which involves a ―first-in-time, first-inright‖<br />

resolution of conflicts. In such situations, producers of GI labeled goods will<br />

be denied the right to use that GI as a direct result of the principle of priority.<br />

Furthermore, TM Law itself sometimes hinders producers of GI labeled<br />

goods to use the GI relating to the goods. Since GIs commonly entail geographical<br />

references, such as names of regions or cities, they cannot be registered under TM Law<br />

since such names are in nature descriptive.<br />

6. PROTECTION OF GIs IN SWITZERLAND 21<br />

6.1. General Legal Framework<br />

Switzerland has a long tradition, since 19th century, for protecting GIs for all<br />

goods and services. Until the adoption of special rules for the registration of GIs for<br />

agricultural products in 1997, legal protection for agricultural GIs was exclusively<br />

granted under the Federal Law on the Protection of Trademarks and Indications of<br />

Source 22 providing general protection. Under this law, protection of GIs is granted<br />

automatically, without a formal notification/registration procedure, provided that<br />

certain conditions are satisfied. In addition to the protection granted by the TM<br />

Law, producers of agricultural products have, since 1997, the possibility of<br />

entering their GIs in a national registry. The first GI for such products was<br />

registered in January 2000. The Ordinance 23 on PAOs and PGIs distinguishes two<br />

different types of GIs, the Appellation d‟origine contrôle (AOC/PAO) and the<br />

Indication géographique protégée (IGP/PGI).<br />

The AOC constitutes the name of a place, region, or traditional denomination<br />

that is used to designate an agricultural product whose quality and character draw<br />

essentially or exclusively from the nearby geographical environment, including<br />

both human and natural factors. Some products had successfully completed AOC<br />

registration, including for the most part cheeses, spirits, bakery products and other<br />

products of vegetable origin.<br />

21<br />

Part II prepared on the base of the materials published by Swiss State Institute of Intellectual<br />

Property: www.ige.ch<br />

22<br />

Federal Law on the Protection of Trademarks and Indications of Source adopted on 28 August<br />

1992 (Status as at 1 August 2008), 1ff.<br />

23<br />

Ordinance on the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications in Respect of<br />

Agricultural Products and Processed Agricultural Products adopted on 28 May 1997 (Status as at 1<br />

January 2008), 1 ff.


344 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

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The IGP concept is based on a slightly weaker linkage between the product<br />

and the territory of origin. This concept applies to products for which the quality,<br />

reputation or other characteristic may be attributed to the region or place of origin.<br />

So some products have enjoyed IGP protection, including for the most part meats<br />

and sausages.<br />

The most relevant laws are the TM Law and Ordinance on the Protection of<br />

AOs and GIs in respect of Agricultural Products and Processed Agricultural<br />

Products. Also, GI protection in Switzerland extends widely to imitations;<br />

fallacious indications; misleading packaging; translations; abusive labeling such as<br />

―like‖, ―type,‖ ―according to the recipes‖; as well as ―other recourses to the<br />

distinctive shape of the product‖ even if the true origin of the product is identified.<br />

Registration of the AOC or IGP is not an easy process. Such applications undergo a<br />

thorough review by the Swiss authorities. Currently, six cheese products, five meat<br />

products, one plant-based product, two alcohol-based products, and one forestry<br />

product are undergoing evaluation.<br />

Also under the Swiss law, foreign GIs are granted the same protection as<br />

Swiss GIs. Thus, foreign GIs may benefit from the general protection provided by<br />

TM Law and may apply for AOC or IGP registration under Ordinance.<br />

6.2. Specific Protection for Agricultural Products and Processed Agricultural<br />

Products<br />

The ordinance on the protection of AOs and GIs for agricultural products and<br />

processed agricultural products of 28 May 1997 establishes a register at the federal<br />

level for PAOs and PGIs for agricultural and processed agricultural products except<br />

wines. This includes all foodstuffs from the agricultural sector, the main categories<br />

being dairy products, fresh meat, salted, smoked and cold cooked meats, fruit,<br />

vegetables and other crops, processed products and spirits. Manufactured products<br />

and wines can not be registered. Under the terms of this ruling, the commercial use<br />

of PAOs and PGIs is prohibited for all comparable products which do not meet the<br />

specifications as well as any other non-comparable product if it exploits the<br />

reputation of the protected indication.<br />

6.3. Specific Protection for Wines<br />

Wine appellations are protected under Ordinance on Viticulture and the<br />

Importation of Wine from 7 December 1998 24 defining the AOC, the country<br />

wines and the table wines. At the federal level, the Federal Office of Agriculture<br />

maintains a register of the Swiss AOCs, which is based on the cantonal AOCs<br />

publishing at regular intervals. At the cantonal level, no similar register exists, but<br />

there is a land registry of wine producing zones which describes among others the<br />

specific properties of the vineyard and the AOC authorized for the designation of<br />

24 Ordinance on Viticulture and the Importation of Wine adopted on 7 December 1998, last<br />

amended on 13 April 2005 (Status as of 17 May 2005), 1 ff.


Larisa Thommen 345<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

the wine stemming from a given wine-growing area. The cantons have own<br />

legislation on AOs. They have issued regulations on the use of the AOC<br />

designation and defined the production areas as well as the authorized blends. The<br />

cantonal legislations include additional conditions to those set out in the federal<br />

wine ordinance. As the production areas are clearly delimited, wine producers<br />

within a given geographical zone have the right to use the AOC in question,<br />

provided the quality criteria is met.<br />

6.4. Specific Protection for Swiss-Watchers<br />

When we think watch, we think Swiss, which label confers a certain status in<br />

the marketplace. What is exactly a Swiss watch? A ―Swiss Made‖ watch is not<br />

necessarily made entirely in Switzerland. In accordance with Ordinance 1971,<br />

modified in 1995 25 and which was issued by Federal Council based on the TM<br />

Law: a watch may legally bear the label ―Swiss‖ or ―Swiss Made‖ if it has a Swiss<br />

movement is cased up in Switzerland, where the manufacturer must have carries<br />

out its final inspection. Furthermore, components of Swiss manufacture must<br />

account for at least 50% of the total value-not number of parts-exclusive of<br />

assembly costs. But with watchmakers importing an even-increasing of parts, the<br />

Federal Council announced that it intended to tighten the legal definition of ―Swiss<br />

Made‖ applicable to all products, including horological. Proposed legislation would<br />

raise the value threshold to 60%. The Federal Council may define the conditions<br />

under which a Swiss IS may be used for certain products if it is in the best<br />

interests of Swiss economy or particular sectors like this was done in the case<br />

which defines the Swiss watch.<br />

6.5. Bilateral Treaties for the Protection of GIs<br />

The seven bilateral treaties on protection of GIs and AOs were concluded<br />

between Switzerland and European countries (Germany, Socialist Republic of<br />

Czechoslovakia, France, Spain, Portugal, and EU). The names of countries and<br />

cantons are granted absolute protection. The protection of the designation<br />

―Switzerland‖ is therefore not limited to certain types of product or goods. This<br />

may include all industrial products, such as watches, chocolate, textiles, etc., as<br />

well as natural products, such as wines and agricultural products. However, there is<br />

a general provision preventing use of ISs which mislead the public. These treaties<br />

specify that GIs must be used in conformity with the law of the country of origin<br />

(re-application of the law of the country of origin). The protection system also<br />

prohibits the illicit appropriation of an IS as a TM. Also, an IS can not be<br />

transformed into a generic name in the country where it is protected as well as the<br />

legislation of the country of origin applies in respect to sanctions.<br />

25 Ordinance on the Use of the Designation Swiss for Watches of 23 December 1971 as last<br />

amended on 29 March 1995 (Status as at 1 July 1995), 1 ff.


346 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

6.6. The Concept of ―Swissness‖<br />

Although according to the criteria of the Madrid Agreement ―made in<br />

Switzerland‖ should be a mere IS without any reference to quality, the concept of<br />

being ―Swiss‖ indicates to Swiss as well as foreign consumers primarily,<br />

associating Swiss products and services with ―top quality‖, as a synonym for<br />

innovation, exclusivity, superior services which economic value is clearly<br />

recognized. Over 50% of all businesses trading in Swiss products affix a ―made in<br />

Switzerland‖ designation and/or the Swiss Cross besides their own TM (cobranding)<br />

and more then 40% of business activities would like to use it in the<br />

future. Moreover, the use of these is neither standardized nor coordinated because<br />

based on the strategy of each individual activity. It is not surprise, that producers<br />

are increasingly using or misusing ―Swiss made‖ as marketing tool. This has led to<br />

a growing realisation that this valuable asset needs to be carefully preserved and<br />

defended. That element of quality is of particular interest and is the reason why it is<br />

mention here in a debate on the protection of GIs.<br />

6.1.1. Project Swissness<br />

Permanent changing market conditions under impact of globalization and<br />

other factors create the strong necessity of amendments in the current legislation.<br />

The origin of legislative revision is the increasing illegal use of the IS<br />

―Switzerland‖ and Swiss Cross 26 both domestically and abroad. On November<br />

1997 was launched a ―Swissness‖ project under motto: „better protection of<br />

designation ―Made in Switzerland‖ and Swiss Cross‖. The Federal Council began<br />

the consultation process for the legislation in respect of it. The draft aims at two<br />

main goals: firstly, protection for ―Made in Switzerland‖ designations and the<br />

Swiss Cross should be strengthened domestically and abroad, secondly, regulations<br />

regarding ―Made in Switzerland‖ designations and the Swiss Cross should be<br />

formulated more precisely in order to create greater legal certainty and clarity. The<br />

Federal Council approved on 18 November 2009 the dispatch for the ―Swissness‖<br />

legislative amendment. The bill strengthens the domestic protection of both the IS<br />

―Made in Switzerland‖ and the Swiss Cross as well as facilitating law enforcement<br />

abroad. It thus provides a basis for preserving the value of the ―Swiss‖ TM for the<br />

future. The Federal Institute of Intellectual Property is working at full speed on<br />

proposed amendments to the legislation .We hope that in the near future this work<br />

will be ended and the new legal instruments allow moreover to strengthen the<br />

positions of ―Swiss made‖ goods and services domestically and abroad.<br />

26 Federal Law on the Protection of Emblems and the Name of the Red Cross of 25 March 1954, 1<br />

ff.


Larisa Thommen 347<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

6.1.2. The use of “Swiss”<br />

Designation ―made in Switzerland‖ belongs to the public domain available<br />

for anyone to use andcan not be monopolized. The conditions for using of ―Swiss‖<br />

for products are defined in the TM Law as follows: the origin of goods shall be<br />

determined by the place of manufacture or by the origin of basis materials and<br />

components used, at least 50%. The origin of services is defined by the<br />

headquarters of the person providing service or by citizenship or the domicile of<br />

the persons actually controlling the policies and management of the business.<br />

Federal Council can specify such conditions if it is justified by general economic<br />

interests or interests of individual sectors, as in case of Swiss-watches.<br />

6.1.3 Enforcement Domestic and Abroad<br />

Any person who comes across an illegal use of an IS may demand a<br />

restraining order to stop the violation or to impede an imminent violation (Art.55 of<br />

TM Law). Illegal use of a IS can said to take place when a third party uses an IS<br />

with a product which does not come from the place in question, or applies a PAO<br />

to a product which does not satisfy the conditions set out in the specifications. In<br />

the latter case, the rightful producers of a PAO or a producer satisfying the official<br />

specifications, may request a court to stop the illegal acts. Any person authorized to<br />

take action against the illegal use of an IS may request the assistance of the<br />

customs office if the case involves imported products. National or regional<br />

consumer associations and organizations can take direct legal action. Also any<br />

person accused of using an inexact IS or a designation which could be confused<br />

with an inexact IS, or of creating a risk of deception by using a name, address or<br />

TM in relation to products or services of a different source may be criminally<br />

liable. If the offender has acted in a professional capacity, the offence is<br />

prosecutable ex officio. So, an importer of products from China affixes a label with<br />

his full Swiss address may also be subject to criminal prosecution because he<br />

misleads the buyer about the actual origins of the goods. Criminal prosecution is<br />

the responsibility of the cantons and it is determined by the codes of criminal<br />

procedure at the cantonal level. In addition to the general provisions of the TM<br />

Law, Art.172 of the Federal Law on Agriculture, 27 lays down specific criminal<br />

sanctions in the event of intentional illegal use of a PAO or PGI for agricultural and<br />

processed agricultural products, as well as for wines. The Federal Law on<br />

Foodstuffs and objects in everyday use 28 also specifies criminal punishment for<br />

acts which risk misleading the consumer on the origins of products. Since foreign<br />

laws differ from Swiss law, also the interpretation and judicature of the<br />

international treaties is often vague that makes the prosecution very expensive and<br />

uncertain. Although no designation ―made in Switzerland‖ exists in legal sense as<br />

27<br />

Federal Law on Agriculture adopted on 29 April 1998 last amended on 24 March 2006 (Status as<br />

of 26 September 2006), 1 ff.<br />

28<br />

Federal Law on Foodstuffs and Everyday Objects of 9 October 1992 last amended on 16<br />

December 2005 (Status as of 20 June 2006), 1 ff.


348 Geographical Indications: A Review of GI Protection in Switzerland<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

well as it is not clear who has a right to enforce it in the foreign courts, such<br />

enforcements are rarely attempted.<br />

In order to deal with issues regarding effectiveness of the current<br />

international regulations, taking into account an increase in the trade the goods<br />

which carry unauthorized country names as result of globalization and trade<br />

liberalization, Jamaica proposed to open discussions in the forum of the SCT 29 for<br />

the provision of Art.6ter of Paris Convention to be amended to reflect the<br />

protection of these country names, in addition to the other categories of protection<br />

already in existence, the widening of the categories of protection considering<br />

different factors of such amendment. That has not only for the value of private<br />

TMs, but on a country‘s ability to properly protect its IP generally.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

GIs, as a valuable commercial instrument, have the capability to acquire a<br />

high reputation. For reasons of misappropriation, counterfeiting, misleading, their<br />

protection is needed to avoid consumers from deceptions. There are many functions<br />

of GIs: as source identifiers, indicators of quality, business interests and an area of<br />

IPRs. GIs can be protected nationally and internationally. At the national level,<br />

they may be protected by special regulations, under the law of unfair competition,<br />

or under the TM law. So, the amendment of current law of Switzerland having<br />

―weaknesses‖ is an example of creating more effective regulation satisfying today‘s<br />

requirements. On the contrary to the protection at the national level, at the<br />

international level, there are three treaties relating to the protection of GIs prior to<br />

the TRIPs Agreement. Since the enactment of the TRIPs, international protection<br />

of GIs has become an important issue because GIs are increasingly recognized as<br />

marketing tools in the global economy, but …the international rules do not provide<br />

in the interested parties with effective legal remedies to stop infringements. As a<br />

result unlawful uses of protected names have been increasing over the year. 30 With<br />

the reality of market globalization, GIs may be used to protect products of certain<br />

regions from misappropriation as well as to protect consumers from deceptions. As<br />

an area of IPRs, the use of GIs is comparable with the use of TMs. GIs and TMs<br />

benefit consumers by providing them with reliable information and assurances of<br />

authenticity. They also respond to concerns of certain producers, particularly local<br />

communities, more effectively than other IPRs do. Especially rights to control GIs<br />

and TMs can be maintained indefinitely and they do not confer a monopoly right<br />

over the use of certain information, but simply limit the people who can use a<br />

specific symbol. Furthermore, they protect goodwill and reputation acquired by<br />

producers over centuries. In this regard, they can serve to maintain traditional<br />

heritages and practices.<br />

29 Proposal by Jamaica to <strong>WIPO</strong> Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Design<br />

and Geographical Indications (SCT), Twenty- First Session , Geneva , 22-26 June 2009<br />

30 M. VITTORI, The International Debate on Geographical Indications (GIs), supra at note 13, at 1


Larisa Thommen 349<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Growing interest to the better protection of country‘s names for commercial<br />

purposes indicating a geographical provenance as well as given quality or<br />

reputation demonstrates the importance of the issues of improvements in the<br />

current international and national rules. These changes would ensure the benefits<br />

from the more sophisticated, efficient and adequate GI protection for all world<br />

community, its value also in the future, that is the potential of debate on protection<br />

of GIs.


THE PATENT RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA<br />

by<br />

Feiyu Lei<br />

1. RECOGNISE THE PATENT RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA<br />

2. COMPARATIVE ISSUES BETWEEN CHINESE PATENT CIVIL LAW<br />

ENFORCEMENT AND TRIPS<br />

2.1. Introduction<br />

2.2. Jurisdiction, Evidence, Pre-Litigation Injunctions<br />

2.3. Disposal of Goods Confiscated by Court<br />

3. COMPARATIVE ISSUES BETWEEN CHINESE PATENT<br />

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TRIPS<br />

3.1. Introduction<br />

3.2. How does Chinese Administrative Law Enforcement Frame comply with<br />

TRIPS?<br />

3.3. The Border Enforcement<br />

4. COMPARATIVE ISSUES BETWEEN CHINESE PATENT CRIMINAL LAW<br />

ENFORCEMENT AND TRIPS<br />

5. SOME IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />

6. CONCLUSION: HOW TO REINFORCE THE PATENT PROTECTION IN<br />

CHINA<br />

6.1. Improve the Patent Administrative Law Enforcement<br />

6.2. Enhance the Assistance of Patent Enforcement


352<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

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INTRODUCTION<br />

In Recent years, China has attached great importance to IPR Protection,<br />

specially the patent protection. The protection level of patent has achieved<br />

remarkable results: In 2008, there were 828,328 applications for patent; the third<br />

amended patent law of the People's Republic of China 1 (hereinafter referred to as<br />

the Patent Law) has been adopted on 27 th December, the smooth completion of the<br />

third amendment of the Patent Law was another milestone in the development of<br />

the Chinese patent system which indicated Chinese patent law became more perfect<br />

and compatible with international law. In 2008, local IP administrations nationwide<br />

received a total of 1,092 patent disputes over infringement and 34 other types of<br />

patent disputes 2 . They investigated and handled 59 cases of counterfeiting patents<br />

and 601 cases of passing off others‘ patents. 3 The trial of IPR cases continued to<br />

make tremendous progress. Courts of law nationwide took 24,406 and resolved<br />

23,518 first-instance IPR civil cases, up 36.52% and 35.2% respectively. Among<br />

them, there were 4,074 patent cases, up 0.82%. 4<br />

This paper will introduce the civil, administrative and criminal law<br />

enforcement of patent rights in China, and put emphasis on discussing how Chinese<br />

norms comply with the TRIPS respectively, and also discuss some implementation<br />

issues, in the end of the paper, it will give some suggestion on how to reinforce the<br />

patent protection in China.<br />

1. RECOGNISE THE PATENT RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA<br />

China is a member of WTO, it should commit to implement the Agreement<br />

on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). As TRIPS<br />

provides in the foreword that ―recognizing the underlying public policy objectives<br />

of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including<br />

developmental and technological objectives‖, accordingly, we need first know what<br />

are the public policy objectives of patent enforcement in China and whether they<br />

comply with TRIPS. Article 1 of Patent Law provides the aims of the Law are to<br />

protect the legal rights of patentees, to encourage invention-creation, to foster the<br />

spreading and application of inventions-creations, to enhance innovation ability,<br />

and to promote the development and innovation of science and technology. They<br />

are all compatible with TRIPS. Furthermore, the patent rights enforcement is the<br />

1 Which was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth Standing Committee of the National<br />

People‘s Congress on Mar 12th, 1984, came into force on Oct 1 st , 1990, the third revised at the<br />

Sixth Session of the Eleventh Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress on Dec 27th,<br />

2008.<br />

2 It is the patent administrative enforcement that will be introduced in the following sections.<br />

3 Counterfeiting patents means counterfeiting any unpatented product as a patented product. the<br />

2008 version Patent Law has combined the passing-off and counterfeiting activities into passing-off<br />

.<br />

4 See China's Intellectual Property Protection in 2008.<br />

http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/whitepapers/200904/t20090427_457167.html


Feiyu Lei 353<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

core part of patent system, it guarantees the public police objectives to be achieved,<br />

so the patent right enforcement is crucial in a national patent system.<br />

For the sake of the above objectives, Article 41 of TRIPS requires the general<br />

obligations of enforcement that the member countries should ensure their law<br />

provides effective, fair, equitable enforcement procedures. Chinese patent rights<br />

enforcement system includes three ways: the civil, administrative and criminal law<br />

enforcement. The Patent Law and the Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law 5<br />

are the special laws on patent system, they defines patent enforcement apply to the<br />

three measures. At the same time, the three measures are regulated in the<br />

departmental laws respectively: the civil law enforcement system is regulated by<br />

General Principles of the Civil Law 6 and the Civil Procedure Code 7 ; the<br />

administrative law enforcement system is regulated by the Patent Administrative<br />

Enforcement Measures 8 ; the criminal law enforcement system is regulated by the<br />

Criminal Law 9 . There is some relevant Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme<br />

People‘s Court to complement the above laws.<br />

2. COMPARATIVE ISSUES BETWEEN CHINESE PATENT CIVIL LAW<br />

ENFORCEMENT AND TRIPS<br />

2.1. Introduction<br />

Patent right is private property, so civil law in each country should apply to<br />

patent civil law enforcement. Civil law enforcement generally refers to actions in<br />

civil court. 10 Article 42 of TRIPS requires that member countries should make<br />

available to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of<br />

patent rights. The Civil Procedure Code gives all the civil procedures which s to<br />

patent civil lawsuits, Article 60-70 of Patent law regulate further rules to detail it.<br />

The civil enforcement of patent in China isn‘t independent or distinct from the<br />

enforcement of law in general, which satisfies Article 41(5) of TRIPS.<br />

2.2. Jurisdiction, Evidence, Pre-Litigation Injunctions<br />

With respect to the competent courts, the Intermediate People‘s Courts in the<br />

CAPITALS of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under<br />

5<br />

Which was published on Jun 15th, 2001, first revised on Sep 28th, 2002, second revised on Jan<br />

9th, 2010.<br />

6<br />

Which was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People‘s Congress on Apr 12th,<br />

1986, came into force on Oct 1st. 1990, the third revised at the Sixth Session of the Eleventh<br />

National People‘s Congress on Dec 27th,2008.<br />

7<br />

Which was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People‘s Congress on Apr 9th,<br />

1991, came into force on the same day.<br />

8<br />

Promulgated by the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) and came into force since Dec 17th,<br />

2001.<br />

9 st<br />

Which was adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People‘s Congress on Jul 1 , 1979,<br />

and revised at the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People‘s Congress on Mar 14th, 1997, came<br />

into force on Jul 1st, 1997.<br />

10<br />

C.HEATH, L.PETIE, Patent enforcement worldwide: a survey of 15 countries; writings in honour<br />

of Dieter Stauder, Hart Publishing Ltd., Oxford, 2005, at 287.


354<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

the central government and those specially designated by the Supreme People‘s<br />

Court have jurisdiction in the first instance of patent infringement cases, and the<br />

second instance acts in the Higher People‘s Courts of which the decision is final.<br />

The Supreme People‘s Court hears particular and significant case in the whole<br />

country. View from practice, the system satisfies the Article 41(2) of TRIPS that<br />

requires procedures should be fair and equitable and not be unnecessarily<br />

complicated or costly or unreasonable time-limits, since the duration of court<br />

proceedings is between 4 and 7 years to receive a final judgment in the patent area<br />

as long as it takes in many other Western countries. 11<br />

Article 43 of TRIPS regulates the principles of presentation of evidence in<br />

civil procedures with which the related regulations of the Civil Procedure Code<br />

comply. First, the interested parties (e.g. patentees assert an infringement) must<br />

bear the burden of proof for the facts to support their claim or the facts to rebut the<br />

claim of the other party. 12 Second, article 64(2) of the Civil Procedure Code(CPC)<br />

of which provides the court shall investigate and collect the evidences on its own<br />

initiative when the party are unable to obtain them themselves because of objective<br />

reasons. A special rule called Burden of proof in reverse presented in Article 61 of<br />

patent law, which stipulates that in infringement cases relating to invention patents<br />

for production processes for new products, manufacturers of identical products<br />

must furnish proof that their production processes are different from the patented<br />

process. 13 It also satisfies Article 34 of TRIPS concerning burden of proof of<br />

process patents.<br />

Article 50 of TRIPS provides that the judicial authorities shall have the<br />

authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures. The Civil Procedure<br />

Code and the Patent Law both provide provisional measures definitely. Article 66<br />

of the Patent Law regulates that patentee or other interested party can request the<br />

court to adopt measures to order the suspension of relevant acts before any legal<br />

proceedings, with the related requirements, providing security, reasonable period,<br />

etc. Article 67 of the Patent Law regulates that patentee or other interested party<br />

can request the court to adopt measures for preservation of evidence before any<br />

legal proceedings, with the related requirements, providing security, reasonable<br />

period, etc. The Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People‘s court on applying<br />

law issues concerning the suspension of infringement patent before any legal<br />

proceedings 14 provides more details in applying the pre-action injunction.<br />

11<br />

T.BENDER, How to Cope with China‟s (Alleged) Failure to Implement the TRIPs Obligations on<br />

Enforcement,, in JWIP 2006, 230 ff., at 233.<br />

12<br />

C.HEATH,L.PETIE, Patent enforcement worldwide: a survey of 15 countries; writings in honour<br />

of Dieter Stauder, supra at note 10, at 299.<br />

13<br />

C.L.LI, Recent Chinese Patent Reform, in JWIP, 2001, 919 ff., at 936.<br />

14 th<br />

Which was adopted on May 5 , 2001, at the 1179nd Session of the Judicial Committee of the<br />

Supreme People‘s Court, and to be effective on Jul 1st, 2001.


Feiyu Lei 355<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

2.3. Disposal of Goods Confiscated by Court<br />

Article 46 of TRIPS provides the requirements related to disposal or<br />

destroying of infringement goods by the judicial authorities. Article 118 of section<br />

3 of chapter 6 of General Principles of the Civil Law of P.R.C provides civil<br />

liability for infringement of IPRS obliges the party infringing such rights to stop<br />

the infringement, to eliminate the ill effects and to pay damages. According to<br />

judicial practice, the utilize of elimination of ill effects in patent infringement<br />

means the right holder enjoys a claim to the elimination of goods and methods of<br />

production that infringe rights if the stop of the infringement action is not sufficient<br />

to prevent a repetition thereof. 15 The word ―eliminate‖ implicates ―dispose‖ or<br />

―destroy‖ in judicial practice.<br />

3. COMPARATIVE ISSUES BETWEEN CHINESE PATENT<br />

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TRIPS<br />

3.1. Introduction<br />

What ―Administrative enforcement‖ means in China is not the same as in<br />

other countries. It is a system of Intellectual Property Rights with Chinese<br />

characteristics while most of the developed countries don‘t adopt it. In China, the<br />

courts and specific authorities each have a parallel responsibility for the<br />

enforcement of IPRS. 16 Right holders have the choice between civil and<br />

administrative enforcement which leads to the description of this system as one of<br />

―dual enforcement‖ which is quite common in Asian countries. 17 The enforcement<br />

of IPRS by means of administrative measures which is very popular amongst<br />

Chinese nationals and foreigners. 18 This situation isn‘t altered from version 2000 of<br />

patent law to version 2008.<br />

The administrative enforcement mainly embodies in Article 3 and Article 60<br />

of the Patent Law and the Patent Administrative Enforcement Measures (PAEM). 19<br />

The rights of Administrative enforcement of IP in China belong to different<br />

competent administrative authorities in every region. The administrative authority<br />

for patent affairs under the people‘s governments of provinces, autonomous regions<br />

and municipalities directly under the Central Government (hereinafter referred to as<br />

―local IP office‖ 20 ) are responsible for the administrative enforcement of patent in<br />

15 L. XIAOHAI, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the People‟s Republic of China, in<br />

32 IIC. 2001, 141 ff., at 150.<br />

16 L. XIAOHAI, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the People‟s Republic of China,<br />

supra at note 15, at 142.<br />

17 C.HEATH,L.PETIE,Patent enforcement worldwide:a survey of 15 countries;writings in honour<br />

of Dieter Stauder, supra at note 10, at 285.<br />

18 L. XIAOHAI, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the People‟s Republic of China,<br />

supra at note 15, at 142.<br />

19 Promulgated by SIPO and in force since Dec 17 th , 2001.<br />

20 Although they are called IP office, they are mainly responsible for patent affairs.


356<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

their respective administrative areas. 21 Article 60 of Patent Law is the primary<br />

article in patent administrative enforcement system, which regulates that the<br />

patentee or any interested party may request the administrative authority for patent<br />

affairs to handle the infringement dispute, the administrative authority may order<br />

the infringer to stop the infringement act immediately if the infringement is<br />

established, the decisions of the administrative authority may be judicially<br />

reviewed by the court. PAEM regulates details on how the administrative<br />

enforcement come into effect, including principles, procedure in handling patent<br />

infringement disputes, procedure in mediating a patent infringement disputes,<br />

procedure in investigating of passing-off and counterfeiting, investigation and<br />

taking of evidence, injunctions, etc.<br />

3.2. How does Chinese Administrative Law Enforcement Frame Comply with<br />

TRIPS?<br />

The related articles about administrative enforcement in TRIPS are Article<br />

41, 49. (Article51-60 are special requirements related to the border measures, they<br />

will be discussed in the following sections.) Article 41 is the general obligations<br />

about enforcement of intellectual property rights; the administrative enforcement<br />

procedures shouldn‘t violate these obligations. Article 41(2) requires the<br />

enforcement procedures shall be fair and equitable, and shall not be unnecessarily<br />

complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. It<br />

gives out the ―low cost‖ and ―high efficiency‖ requirements. Concerning the<br />

administrative enforcement, many opinions tended to favour administrative<br />

enforcement over the courts because this procedure is faster and cheaper. 22 So,<br />

Chinese administrative enforcement complies with this obligation. Furthermore,<br />

administrative competent authorities often play the neutral roles who mediate the<br />

parties in the cases. Most of the time the mediation in the cases is an efficient<br />

method for each parties.<br />

Article 41(4) of TRIPS regulates parties shall have an opportunity for review<br />

by a judicial authority of final administrative decision which being called ―judicial<br />

review‖ principle. Article 61 of the Patent Law and the related clauses of PAEM<br />

regulate if the infringer is not satisfied with the order from patent administrative<br />

authority, he may, within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notification of the<br />

order, institutes legal proceedings in court in accordance with the Administrative<br />

Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (APL) 23 , namely if one of the<br />

parties does not agree with the authority‘s decision he can file an action against it<br />

before the court. APL is the special law on establishing judicial review system to<br />

supervise and restrict the administrative authorities in China. So, the judicial<br />

21 As Article 3 of Patent Law regulates, the patent administration department under the State<br />

Council (SIPO) is responsible for the patent work throughout the country which include<br />

examination applications and grant patent rights, but not for enforcement directly.<br />

22 C.HEATH,L.PETIE,Patent enforcement worldwide:a survey of 15 countries;writings in honour<br />

of Dieter Stauder, supra at note 10, at 285.<br />

23 Which is adopted at the Second Session of the Seventh National People‘s Congress on Apr 4th,<br />

1989, came into force on Oct 1 st , 1990.


Feiyu Lei 357<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

review of patent administrative enforcement in China complies with Article 41(4)<br />

of TRIPS well.<br />

Article 49 of TRIPS is the only special clause about the administrative<br />

procedures which requires that administrative procedures of which any civil<br />

remedy can be ordered as a result shall conform to principles equivalent in<br />

substance to those set forth in section 2. The words ―conform to principles<br />

equivalent in substance‖ gives the obligation that the administrative procedures<br />

must conform to the civil procedures in TRIPS. Although civil and administrative<br />

enforcement of patent are different remedy procedures and the competent<br />

authorities are different, many procedures and principles of the two systems of<br />

China are homologous. The administrative enforcement of patent infringement<br />

disputes has many features of ―quasi-judicial‖ which is different from other IPRS<br />

administrative enforcement. These features comply with the principles equivalent<br />

of civil enforcement, for example, (i)fair and equitable procedures: the basic<br />

principles of administrative enforcement regulated in Article 2 of PAEM that the<br />

administrative authority shall base themselves on facts and regard the law as the<br />

criterion in the conduct of all cases and follow the principles of fair and timely<br />

conform to principles of Article 42 of TRIPS; (ii)evidence: the interested parties<br />

must bear the burden of proof , and the requested party have the right to defend<br />

himself; (iii) injunctions: local IP offices may make the injunctions if the<br />

infringement act exist and order the infringer to stop the infringing act<br />

immediately. If such proceedings are not instituted and the order is not complied<br />

with, local IP offices may approach the people's court for compulsory execution.<br />

(iv) Disposal of infringing goods: the Patent Law doesn‘t provide the remedies<br />

which described in article 46 of TRIPS explicitly, which only says the<br />

administrative authority may order the infringer to stop the infringing act<br />

immediately. But the PAEM concretes the measures what the administrative<br />

authority can do. Article 33 of PAEM says they may order the infringer to stop the<br />

infringing act immediately, and destroy the implements which are used for creation<br />

of the infringing goods, not to sell and use the infringing goods or to launch the<br />

infringing goods into market by other methods, to destroy the infringing goods<br />

which are hard to reserve. If the infringer doesn‘t execute the order, the<br />

administrative authority may approach court for compulsory execution. The<br />

provisions conform to principles equivalent in substance to those in article 46 of<br />

TRIPS.<br />

In the other hand, there are still some procedures don‘t comply with TRIPS<br />

completely, for example, article 45 of TRIPS regulates the authorities shall have<br />

the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequately.<br />

Chinese local IP offices may only, upon the request of the parties, mediate in the<br />

amount of compensation for the damage caused by the infringement of the patent<br />

right, with no fines. It brings right holders a choice that if he is more concerned<br />

with stopping the infringement than with compensation, the administrative route<br />

may be the preferred option. 24 If he is concerned with compensation, he may<br />

24 C.L.LI, Recent Chinese Patent Reform, supra at note 13, at 936.


358<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

choose to claim to court in another independent suit if he wants. So the civil<br />

enforcement complements the insufficiency of the administrative enforcement to<br />

this point.<br />

3.3. The Border Enforcement<br />

In a broad sense, the administrative enforcement of patent includes the border<br />

enforcement. Section 4 of TRIPS provides for special requirements related to<br />

border measures. The Customs IPR Regulations 25 and the Custom IPR<br />

Implementing Measures 26 regulates the border enforcement of IPRS. General<br />

Administration of Customs of the People‘s Republic of China and local customs<br />

responsible for the border protection of patent.<br />

The most interesting topic about Chinese border enforcement of patent is<br />

whether it complies with Article 59 of TRIPS concerning the disposal of<br />

confiscated goods. Article 59 of TRIPS refers specifically to disposal of goods<br />

confiscated by Customs Authorities that infringe IPRs while article 46 with respect<br />

to dealing with infringing goods. Article 27 of the Customs IPR Regulations and<br />

Article 33 of the Custom IPR Implementing Measures set forth the requirements<br />

for the disposal of goods that infringe IPRs and that are confiscated by Chinese<br />

customs authorities. There are four ways to deal with the infringing good: (i)<br />

donate to welfare institutions, (ii) transfer to the right holder, (iii) where the above<br />

two means can‘t be adopted, they may be auctioned after eliminating the<br />

infringement character, (iv) where the infringement character can‘t be eliminated,<br />

the goods shall be destroyed. Although there are a hierarchy of requirements for the<br />

disposal of infringing goods that are confiscated by Chinese customs<br />

authorities 27 and they will give priority to allow such goods to enter the channels of<br />

commerce (for example, auction), however, it still doesn‘t violate the principles in<br />

article 46 and 59 of TRIPS. First, the (i)(ii) ways don‘t make the infringing goods<br />

enter into commercial channels, and the last sentence of Article 33 of the Custom<br />

IPR Implementing Measures regulates that Chinese customs shall make necessary<br />

supervision over them when the (i)(ii) ways are carried out. Second, auction only<br />

can be done when the conditions satisfied that all infringement characters have<br />

been eliminated and customs have asked the attitude of the right holder. So, when<br />

the infringing goods are confiscated that create a deterrent to infringement, the<br />

auctions don‘t make any harm to right holder while at the same time make use of<br />

the resource effectively.<br />

25 Which was adopted at the 30 th Executive Meeting of the State Council on Nov 26th, 2003,<br />

promulgated by Decree No.395 of the State Council of the People‘s Republic of China on Dec 2nd,<br />

2003, and effective from Mar 1st, 2004.<br />

26 Which was adopted at an Administrative Affairs Meeting of the General Administration of<br />

Custom on Apr 22nd, 2004, revised at an Administrative Affairs Meeting of the General<br />

Administration of Custom on Feb 17th, 2009, and effective from Jul 1st, 2009.<br />

27 One of the controversial points between US and China.


Feiyu Lei 359<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

4. COMPARATIVE ISSUES BETWEEN CHINESE PATENT CRIMINAL<br />

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TRIPS<br />

Criminal procedures in China has been provided through the Criminal Law of<br />

PRC which contains a separate section(Sec.7 of Ch.3 of Part 2) named ―Crime of<br />

Infringing upon Intellectual Property‖ and the related judicial Interpretations ―the<br />

2004 Judicial Interpretation‖ 28 and ―the 2007 Judicial Interpretation‖ 29 . With regard<br />

to patent, Article 216 of Criminal Law regulates criminal procedures and penalties<br />

on passing-off and counterfeiting of patent when the circumstance is serious. The<br />

relevant authorities are the Public Security Bureaus (PSBs) and the People‘s<br />

Procuratorate and the People‘s Court. Each local General Brigade of Economic<br />

Investigation under Public Security Bureau responsible for investigating and<br />

prosecuting and punishing for infringement. Some of the criminal cases are filed by<br />

patentees, and the others are transferred from the administrative authorities 30 . Once<br />

a case is transferred and accepted, the rules governing criminal law apply, 31 and the<br />

case starts to go through the judicial procedure.<br />

Article 61 of TRIPS requires an obligation for members to provide for<br />

criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful<br />

trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale, while does not<br />

oblige members to apply the same rule in other field of IP, only ask for ―may<br />

provide‖ term, so in the field of patent, China is free to provide criminal procedures<br />

and penalties in patent.<br />

Article 216 of Criminal Law provides the remedies for crime of passing-off<br />

and counterfeiting of patent including fixed-term imprisonment of not more than<br />

three years or criminal detention, and fine. These remedies comply with which<br />

article 61 of TRIPS require. The seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing<br />

goods and any related materials are the civil law liabilities which can be claimed by<br />

patentee in the civil law system. So, different damages can be available to different<br />

law, and they are complementary.<br />

28 The Interpretation by the Supreme People‘s Court and the Supreme People‘s Procuratorate on<br />

Several Issues of Concrete Application of Law in Handing Criminal Cases of Infringing Intellectual<br />

Property, came into force on Dec 22nd, 2004.<br />

29 The Interpretation by the Supreme People‘s Court and the Supreme People‘s Procuratorate on<br />

Several Issues of Concrete Application of Law in Handing Criminal Cases of Infringing Intellectual<br />

Property(II), came into force on Apr 5th, 2007 .<br />

30 It means a patentee may file to criminal authority for the patent infringement directly, if the case<br />

satisfied the criminal threshold regulates in the Criminal Law, the application will be accepted; he<br />

may also file to administrative authority, if the administrative authorities judge the infringement<br />

have committed the Criminal Law, they will transfer the case to criminal authorities to deal with.<br />

31 C.HEATH,L.PETIE,Patent enforcement worldwide:a survey of 15 countries; writings in honour<br />

of Dieter Stauder, supra at note 10, at 316.


360<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

5. SOME IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />

In the past 20 years, Chinese government endeavor to establish a perfect legal<br />

system of IP which can promote the technical development and boom the art and<br />

literature. Although the accession to the WTO brought lots of pressure to change<br />

and adjust legislation to comply with the TRIPS, ―Most legal experts agree that<br />

China‘s laws meet most international standards‖. 32 In the other hand, we should<br />

keep a clean head to recognize that the period patent law established in China is so<br />

short that Chinese patent rights enforcement system still face many problems both<br />

in legislation and practice. For example, the legislation still need to perfect to<br />

comply with TRIPS better; the administrative law enforcement is not very effective<br />

in some areas of China because of lack of man-power; a general enforcement<br />

problem which has a detrimental impact on civil law enforcement is the inability to<br />

execute judgments 33 ; counterfeiting always was and until today remains a rampant<br />

problem in the Chinese market 34 ; many patent right holders in China today still<br />

know little about how to enforcement their rights because they are inventors but not<br />

lawyers, or they don‘t have money to protect patents as said the heavy cost also in<br />

European countries, specially the right holders are the smaller firms (SMEs) or<br />

individuals. As a 1999 report by experts to the European Commission stated that:<br />

―In our view, by far the greatest deterrent to the use of intellectual property rights,<br />

in particular patents, by SMEs as well as universities and similar institutions, is the<br />

fear of heavy costs to enforce them.‖ 35<br />

6. CONCLUSION: HOW TO REINFORCE THE PATENT PROTECTION<br />

IN CHINA<br />

6.1. Improve the Patent Administrative Law Enforcement<br />

From the patent system established in China to now, there have been many<br />

controversies about China‘s system of the administrative protection of patent be<br />

―abolished‖ or ―reserved‖? Or ―Strengthen‖ or ―weaken‖? In fact, the 1984 patent<br />

law, the 1992 version, the 2000 version, and the 2008 version all reserved the<br />

administrative law enforcement of patent; it indicates the patent administrative<br />

enforcement is essential and important. There are several reasons need to<br />

recognize: First, Article 49 of TRIPS provides the international norms to patent<br />

administrative enforcement, it doesn‘t deny administrative procedures on the merits<br />

of a case and any civil remedy, and it also gives the requirements of administrative<br />

enforcement. Second, the legal system in China has been imperfect at the present,<br />

32<br />

D.K.CHOW, A Primer on Foreign Investment Enterprises and Protection of Intellectual Property<br />

in China, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002, at 205.<br />

33<br />

T.BENDER, How to Cope with China‟s (Alleged) Failure to Implement the TRIPs Obligations on<br />

Enforcement, supra at note11, at 233.<br />

34<br />

C.HEATH,L.PETIE,Patent enforcement worldwide:a survey of 15 countries;writings in honour<br />

of Dieter Stauder, supra at note 10, at 285.<br />

35<br />

see W. KINGSTON, Improving Patents for Smaller Firms: Insurance, Incontestability,<br />

Arbitration? in IPQ 2007, 1-18, at 2.


Feiyu Lei 361<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

judicial officers are not enough and some of them lack of experiences in judging<br />

patent infringement, so the judicial channel alone is not adequate to enforce patent<br />

rights. Third, viewed from practice, the procedure of administrative enforcement on<br />

patent infringement is quick and saving for parties, and the decision made by local<br />

IP administrations is supported and supervised by court according to law (Article<br />

60 of Patent Law). Fourth, according to the provisions of other related Chinese<br />

laws such as the trademark law and copyright law, the Administrative Departments<br />

for trademark and those for copyright are specifically empowered to impose<br />

administrative sanctions against infringements, and patent administrative<br />

enforcement of law is obviously less powerful than that of trademark and<br />

copyright. To harmonize with other legislation on IP in China, it is necessary to<br />

establish such a power. 36 So, All the above reasons show China‘s patent<br />

administrative law enforcement fulfils international norms and China's actual<br />

conditions, which is important and essential to improve it: (i) to enhance the<br />

authorities of the administrative authority through legislation; (ii) to increase the<br />

resources and man-power to put into the fighting against patent infringements,<br />

provide more training or other measures to establish experienced and competent<br />

enforcement groups; (iii) to establish some cooperation mechanisms of patent<br />

administrative enforcement across different districts.<br />

6.2. Enhance the Assistance of Patent Enforcement<br />

In recent years, Chinese government dedicated to transform its functions to a<br />

service-oriented government, to enhance the public service and social<br />

administration. To supply public and right holders‘ service on IP is IP<br />

administration authorities‘ inevitable option. In this case, the State Intellectual<br />

Property Office published the Guidelines on initiation of assistance for IPRs<br />

enforcement in 2007; soon Chinese Assistance Centers of Intellectual Property<br />

right enforcement (hereinafter referred to as Assistance Center) were established in<br />

many districts. Chinese government hope them can be one of the measures to solve<br />

enforcement issues. Their responsibilities are summarized as to provide intellectual<br />

assistance for Chinese individual or legal person whoever faces problems<br />

concerning IPRs which are difficult to solve, and economic assistance for whom<br />

can‘t afford IP enforcement cost, they may be SMEs or individuals. The main work<br />

pattern is to organize local related governments, law firms, IP agents, research<br />

institutes, social organizations, experts to provide assistance for enforcement for<br />

who satisfies the requirements. As these centers were established one after another,<br />

and have been operated for one or two years, they present some problems lead to<br />

they can not achieve the original aims. First, the assistance center is a new thing<br />

that there is no perfect operation mode and experience to use, every local center<br />

would only ―grope in the blank‖ based on the basic principles. Second, most of the<br />

local centers don‘t have enough funds to enforce assistance.<br />

36 This discuss part see X.Q.FENG,J.Q.LIU, A Review of Recent Developments in Patent Law in the<br />

People‟s Republic of China, in 4 The Journal of World Trade Law, 2001, at 861-863.


362<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

How to solve the above problems and make the Assistance center to play a<br />

big role in patent enforcement? There are some suggestions: (i) to consummate the<br />

assistance system of the assistance centers, give more regulations about the system,<br />

rather than only a guidance; (ii) to establish an assess system to stimulate these<br />

centers to create more effective performance and popularize the good cases in all<br />

the centers; (iii) every center should establish a multi-channel funds to ensure the<br />

operation of the assistance centers, including government support, social donation,<br />

etc.


Feiyu Lei 363<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

F.M.ABBOTT, TH.COTTIER, F.GURRY, International Intellectual<br />

Property in an Integrated World Economy, Aspen publishers, New York, 2007<br />

M.J.ADELMAN, R.R.RADER, I.R.THOMAS, H.C. WEGNER, Cases and<br />

Materials on Patent Law, West Group, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1998 (PRIV 2094)<br />

D.K.CHOW, A Primer on Foreign Investment Enterprises and Protection of<br />

Intellectual Property in China, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002 (PRIV 2446)<br />

M.A.COHEN,A.E. BANG&S.J.MITCHELL, Chinese Intellectual Property Law<br />

and Practice, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, (PRIV 1706)<br />

W. Cornish-D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade<br />

Marks and Allied Rights, Thomson- Sweet & Maxwell, 2007 (PRIV 4605)<br />

A.S. DWYER, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in T.P.<br />

STEWART (a cura di), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-<br />

1994), Vol. IV, The End Game, Kluwer, Deventer, 1999, (INT 539) 461 ff.<br />

T. DREIER, TRIPS and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in<br />

(F.K. Beier & G. Schricker eds.), From GATT to TRIPS: The Agreeement on Trade<br />

Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights, Studies in Intellectual Property and<br />

Copyright Law, 1996, 248 ff. (INT V 455 and PRIV VI 585.18)<br />

P.GANEA,T.PATTLOCH, Intellectual Property Law in China, Kluwer Law<br />

International, The Hague, 2005 (PRIV 3669)<br />

D. GERVAIS, The TRIPs Agreement. Drafting History and Analysis, Sweet &<br />

Maxwell, London, 1998 (INT 563)<br />

C.HEATH,L.PETIE,Patent enforcement worldwide: a survey of 15<br />

countries; writings in honour of Dieter Stauder, Hart Publishing Ltd., Oxford ,<br />

2005<br />

R.P. MERGES, Patent Law and Policy. Cases and Materials, 2 nd edition,<br />

Michie, Charlottesville, 1997 (PRIV 1994)<br />

J.O. NELSON, International Patent Treaties with Commentary, Oceana<br />

<strong>Publication</strong>s, New York, 2007<br />

T. TAKENAKA, Patent Law. A Handbook of Contemporary Research,<br />

Edgard Elgar, 2008 (PRIV 5117)


364<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

S. THORLEY-R. MILLER-G. BURKILL-C. BIRSS, TERRELL on the Law of<br />

Patents, 15th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2006 (PRIV 3986)<br />

C.WADLOW, Enforcement of Intellectual Property in European and<br />

International Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998 (INT 243)<br />

J.WATAL, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing<br />

Countries, Kluwer Law International, The hague, 2001 (INT 1095)<br />

X.T.YIN, Patent rights protection, Intellectual property publisher, Beijing,<br />

2008<br />

N. PIRES DE CARVALHO, The TRIPs Regime of Patent Rights, The Hague,<br />

Kluwer, 2 nd ed., 2005 (INT 1366)<br />

Articles<br />

T.BENDER, How to Cope with China‟s (Alleged) Failure to Implement the<br />

TRIPs Obligations on Enforcement, in JWIP 2006, 230 ff.<br />

D.C. CLARKE, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China<br />

Problem, in LI Am. J. Comp. L. 2003, 89-111<br />

R.J.T.CORBETT, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in<br />

Developing Countries, in The Int. Lawyer 2001, 1083 ff.<br />

J. DREXL, R. HILTY, A. KUR, Proposal for a Directive on Measures and<br />

Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in 34 IIC<br />

2003, 530 ff.<br />

X.Q.FENG, J.Q.LIU, A Review of Recent Developments in Patent Law in the<br />

People‟s Republic of China, in JWIP, 2001, 827 ff.<br />

L.T.C. HARMS, The Role of the Judiciary in the Enforcement of IPRs: IP<br />

Litigation under the Common Law System with Special Emphasis on the<br />

Experience in South Africa, in EIPR 2004, 483-492<br />

C. HEATH, Wrongful Patent Enforcement – Threat and Post-Infringement<br />

Invalidity in Comparative Perspective, in IIC 2008, 307 ff.<br />

R.INNES, Enforcement Costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex<br />

post-liability and ex-ante regulation, in Int. R.. of Law and Economics, 2004, 29-48<br />

W. KINGSTON, Improving Patents for Smaller Firms: Insurance,<br />

Incontestability, Arbitration? in IPQ 2007, 1-18


Feiyu Lei 365<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

W. KINGSTON, How Realistic are EU Hopes for Innovation? in 26 EIPR<br />

2004, 197-202<br />

378<br />

W. KINGSTON, Making Patents Useful to Small Firms, in IPQ 2004, 369-<br />

W. KINGSTON, What Role for European National Patent Offices? in EIPR<br />

2003, 289-291<br />

QUINGJIANG KONG, The Judicial Enforcement of Intellectual Property<br />

Rights in China – on the Eve of WTO Accession, in JWIP, 2001, 809 ff.<br />

A. KUR, The Enforcement Directive – Rough Start, Happy Landing? in 35<br />

IIC 2004, 821 ff.<br />

C.L.LI, Recent Chinese Patent Reform, in JWIP, 2001, 919 ff.<br />

T.MALONEY, The enforcement of patent rights in the United States, in IIC<br />

2000, 723-748<br />

C.H. Massa, A. Strowel, The Scope of the Proposed IP Enforcement<br />

Directive: Torn Between the Desire to Harmonize Remedies and the Need to<br />

Combat Piracy, in EIPR 2004, 244-253<br />

P. MEIER-BECK, Damages for Patent Infringement According to German<br />

Law – Basic Principles, Assessment and Enforcement, in IIC 2004, 113 ff.<br />

S.J. PALMER, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the Politics of<br />

Intellectual Property in China, in 8 Ind. J. of Global Legal Studies, 2001,<br />

M. RICOLFI, The proposed IP Enforcement Directive: tough on legitimate<br />

competitors, weak against pirates, in Italian Intellectual Property, 2004, 3 – 12.<br />

L. XIAOHAI, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the People‟s<br />

Republic of China, in 32 IIC. 2001, 141 ff.


366<br />

The Patent Rights Enforcement in China<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Laws<br />

Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29<br />

April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, available at<br />

:http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/directives_en.htm<br />

Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the<br />

Council on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual<br />

property rights, available at:http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0168:FIN:EN:HTML<br />

Official documents:<br />

Guidelines on initiation of assistance for intellectual property right<br />

enforcement, published by Intellectual Property Office of the People‘s Republic of<br />

China on 7 Nov. 2007<br />

Website:<br />

China's Intellectual Property Protection in 2008<br />

http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/whitepapers/200904/t20090427_457167<br />

.html


THE PROTECTION OF IPRS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET<br />

AFTER PATENT EXPIRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE REVERSE<br />

PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN LIGHT OF COMPETITION LAW<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato<br />

CHAPTER 1<br />

THE PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT<br />

A. USA: The Hatch-Waxman Act<br />

B. Europe<br />

1. The ANDA Process<br />

2. The Paragraph IV-Certification<br />

3. Patent Term Restauration<br />

1. Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC)<br />

2. Regulatory Data Protection, Marketing Exclusivity, „Bolar Scheme―<br />

CHAPTER 2<br />

LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES<br />

A. Patent Filing Strategies, Evergreening<br />

B. Vexatious Litigation<br />

C. Second Generation Products<br />

D. Authorized Generics<br />

E. OTC Switches<br />

F. Reverse Payment Settlements<br />

CHAPTER 3<br />

THE REVERSE PAYMENTS SETTLEMENTS IN DETAIL<br />

A. The Reverse Payments Settlements in U.S.<br />

3.1. Definition of Reverse Payment Settlements


368 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

3.2. Factors proving Incentives for Reverse Payment sSttlements in the Drug<br />

Industry<br />

3.2.1 Innovative Drugs have intrinsically High Social Utility<br />

3.2.2. Barriers to Generic Market Entry<br />

3.3. Reverse Payment Settlements in the FTC‘s Opinions<br />

3.4. Reverse Payment SettlementS in the Courts<br />

B. The Reverse Payments Settlements in Europe<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 369<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

Intellectual property rights - and patents in particular - are arguably more<br />

important to the pharmaceutical industry than to any other industry. There are a<br />

number of reasons for this, which distinguish the pharmaceutical industry from<br />

most other sectors.<br />

The research-based pharmaceutical industry is particularly dependant on<br />

being able to benefit from the full duration of the 20 years patent protection. This<br />

contrasts with many other industries, where a product can enter the market soon<br />

after a patent application is made and where innovation and technological<br />

development can make patented technology obsolete long before the expiry of the<br />

patent.<br />

First, there are significant regulatory and scientific requirements that must be<br />

fulfilled before any new drug can be placed on the market. The drug must complete<br />

a rigorous testing process to establish that it is both safe and effective. It usually<br />

takes 6 to 12 years from the date of patent application until an innovative drug is<br />

put on the market. As a result, effective patent protection is reduced up to only<br />

eight years. 1<br />

Second, the relative speed with which generic producers can enter the market<br />

once the patent has expired given that they do not need to repeat the regulatory<br />

process. This means that the pharmaceutical company which developed the drug<br />

must plan to recoup the cost of its Research and Development (R&D) investment<br />

before patent protection expires.<br />

Third, the very significant cost of developing a new drug, which has been<br />

estimated as being around a billion dollars today. This compares to approximately<br />

$230 million at the end of the 1980s. 2<br />

Obtaining a patent on its invention allows the pharmaceutical firm to benefit<br />

from a monopoly power for a certain period, during which it has the exclusive right<br />

to produce the patented drug and/or to concede licences to other laboratories. In<br />

this case, patents are an efficient tool for innovative firms to make their R&D<br />

investments profitable and represent therefore an incentive for further innovation.<br />

However, this situation totally changes once the patent expires and the<br />

invention falls into the public domain; many generic copies of the originally<br />

patented drug could henceforth be produced by different laboratories in different<br />

countries. The market for this drug turns from a monopole into a competitive<br />

structure. Traditionally, innovative pharmaceutical companies lose 20% to 50% of<br />

1<br />

GARLAND P.,LARUSSON H.K., Data Exclusivity, Bolar Exemption and Generic Drugs in the<br />

EU, 129, EIPR (2007)<br />

2<br />

KILLICK J., SCHULZ A., DAWES A., 7, The Special Regime of Intellectual Property for the<br />

Pharmaceutical Industry, IP & Technology Programme Report (BNA), 2006


370 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

their market share when a first generic pharmaceutical enters the market.<br />

Subsequent generic entries can cause prices to drop by as much as 90%. 3<br />

With patent term expiries in full swing, innovative market players<br />

increasingly have recourse to diverse strategies aimed at reducing the adverse<br />

effects of generic competition. These practices to encounter the entry of generics<br />

have drawn the attention of antitrust authorities, especially in the United States.<br />

The European Commission (EC) in July 2009 issued its Final Report on its<br />

inquiry into competition in the pharmaceutical sector, after having conducted<br />

surprise inspections of certain pharmaceutical companies, seeking evidence of anticompetitive<br />

conduct. 4 . The inquiry, which began in January 2008 under Art.81 and<br />

82 of the ex-EC Treaty (which is now Art.101 and 102 of the Treaty on the<br />

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) was mandated to examine why fewer<br />

novel medicines were being brought to market and why generic entry was<br />

frequently delayed.<br />

The findings of the inquiry indicate that originator companies use a variety of<br />

instruments to extend the commercial life of their medicines. The results of the<br />

sector inquiry suggest that the behaviour of companies contributes to the generic<br />

delay. 5<br />

Our aim in this work is to study, how innovative pharmaceutical firms react<br />

in response to generics competition. A special analysis will be given on the socalled<br />

„Reverse payment settlements―strategy in the light of antitrust law.<br />

First of all, there are the strategies that exploit regulations to maintain market<br />

share or delay the introduction of generic drugs. Therefore, initially we will sum up<br />

the particular regulatory environment of the pharmaceutical industry, with a focus<br />

on the regime in Europe and the US.<br />

3 LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LONGEVAL C., Generic entry - a challenge to traditional EC<br />

competition law?, 81, Cross-Border Handbook Life Sciences (2008/09)<br />

4 EU Commission Final Report, available at<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf<br />

5 EU Commission Final Report, 11


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 371<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

CHAPTER I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY<br />

ENVIRONMENT<br />

A. USA: The Hatch-Waxman Act<br />

The United States in 1984 enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act with the dual<br />

objectives of facilitating entry of generic competition while preserving sufficient<br />

patent exclusivity time to incentivize drug innovation. 6<br />

1. The ANDA Process<br />

The Hatch-Waxman Act changed the regulatory criteria for the U.S. Food<br />

and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of generics, thereby significantly<br />

reducing the costs and time delays of generic entry. This abbreviated new drug<br />

application (ANDA) process requires generic manufacturers to demonstrate that the<br />

generic is ―bioequivalent‖ to an approved brand drug. 7 Prior to passage of the<br />

Hatch-Waxman Act, generic firms could not rely on branded drugs‘ safety and<br />

efficacy data unless this information was published in the scientific literature. In<br />

effect, these safety and efficacy data were given „trade secret―status. Hence a<br />

generic imitator had to undertake many of the same safety and efficacy tests as the<br />

innovator to gain FDA approval. Second, the Act allowed generic manufacturers to<br />

conduct their testing prior to patent expiration without infringing the patent (= US<br />

„Bolar Scheme― 8 ). This allowed generics to enter the market much more quickly<br />

after patent expiration than previously. 9<br />

2. The Paragraph IV-Certification<br />

If the ANDA applicant is seeking approval to market a drug before the<br />

expiration of one or more patents listed in the Orange Book, then for each patent<br />

the ANDA applicant must include a certification (a so-called „paragraph IV-<br />

certification―) which states that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the<br />

proposed generic product. The patent owner may then file a patent infringement<br />

lawsuit within 45 days of receiving a paragraph IV notification. In that case, FDA<br />

approval of the ANDA is automatically stayed for 30 months. During the stay, the<br />

FDA is prohibited from approving another ANDA. Additionally, the first ANDA is<br />

granted a 180-day market exclusivity period, as an incentive whereby the generic<br />

company does not have competition from other generic companies and can both<br />

establish market share and charge a higher price. 10<br />

6 SLOAN F., Pharmaceutical innovation: incentives, competition, and cost-benefit analysis in<br />

international perspective, 153, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007<br />

7 SLOAN F., 153.<br />

8 GARLAND P., LARUSSON H.K., 130.<br />

9 SLOAN F., 154.<br />

10 RUMORE M., The Hatch-Waxman Act - 25 years later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scale<br />

Balanced,<br />

www.pharmacytimes.com/supplement/pharmacy/2009/GenericSupplement0809/Generic-<br />

HatchWaxman-0809; PAVANE M., FERRARI L., Reverse payment settlement agreements, trading


372 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

3. Patent Term Restauration<br />

Hatch-Waxman also provided benefits to innovative firms by restoring some<br />

of the patent life lost during the long clinical and regulatory periods for new<br />

drugs. 11 In particular, new drugs were eligible for a Hatch-Waxman extension in<br />

patent life equal to the sum of the NDA regulatory review time plus one-half of the<br />

IND testing time. The law also constrained extensions to a maximum effective<br />

patent lifetime of 14 years and capped extensions at five years.<br />

In addition, Title I of the law provided for a five-year data exclusivity period<br />

for the drugs‘ safety and efficacy data. In essence, no generic firm could submit an<br />

ANDA and rely on the safety and efficacy data of the innovating firm until five<br />

years after FDA approval. 12<br />

However, the primary impact of the Act has been to foster greater generic<br />

competition, since the patent term extension benefits to innovators were more than<br />

offset by the increased generic competition after patent expiration that was<br />

facilitated by the law. 13<br />

B. Europe<br />

1. Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC)<br />

After the passing of Waxman Hatch innovative European firms were put at a<br />

competitive disadvantage vis à vis the US. Pressure was put on the EC Commission<br />

to provide for extension or restoration of patent terms for pharmaceuticals. 14 The<br />

E.U. responded in 1992 by adopting the Supplementary Protection Certificate<br />

(SPC) Regulation 15 , which grants pharmaceutical products up to five years‘ extra<br />

patent protection (or 15 years from the first marketing authorization in the EU 16 ) to<br />

compensate research-based companies for the delays inherent in the regulatory<br />

system. 17<br />

one litigation headache for another, Managing Intellectual Property, available at<br />

http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=2324934 .<br />

11<br />

SLOAN F., Pharmaceutical innovation: incentives, competition, and cost-benefit analysis in<br />

international perspective, 153, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007.<br />

12<br />

SLOAN F., 165.<br />

13<br />

SLOAN F., 154.<br />

14<br />

MARKS D., Life beyond the patent, 13, Managing Intellectual Property (1994).<br />

15<br />

Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection<br />

certificate for medicinal products.<br />

16 GARLAND P.,LARUSSON H.K., Data Exclusivity, Bolar Exemption and Generic Drugs in the<br />

EU, 129, EIPR (2007).<br />

17 KILLICK J., SCHULZ A., DAWES A., 8, The Special Regime of Intellectual Property for the<br />

Pharmaceutical Industry, IP & Technology Programme Report (BNA), 2006 .


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 373<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

To obtain an SPC on the date of application in the territory concerned, three<br />

conditions must be met. Firstly, a medicinal product must be covered by a basic<br />

patent in force. Secondly, the manufacturer must have been granted a valid<br />

authorization 18 to place the product on the market as a medicinal product and it<br />

must have been the first manufacturer to obtain an authorization for that particular<br />

product. Thirdly, the product may not already have been the subject of an SPC: a<br />

product may only obtain a single SPC for a maximum of five years 19 .<br />

2. Regulatory Data Protection, Marketing Exclusivity and the „Bolar<br />

Scheme“ (Directives 2001/83 and 2004/27)<br />

In addition to patents and SPC, pharmaceutical products in Europe also<br />

benefit from the „regulatory data protection―. Following the example of the US<br />

(five-year data exclusivity period of the Hatch-Waxman Act), Directive 2001/83,<br />

amended by Directive 2004/27, provides 8-years protection of the drugs‘ safety and<br />

efficacy data. An „abridged― application for marketing a generic drug can therefore<br />

be filed only eight years after the first marketing authorization of the innovative<br />

drug upon which the generic drug is based. 20<br />

Art. 8 (3) (i) of the amended 2001 Directive states that the results of preclinical<br />

tests and clinical trials must be submitted with an application for the grant<br />

of marketing authorization of a particular drug. Art.10 (1) - as an exception to this<br />

provision - allows a generic producer, once the data exclusivity period has expired<br />

(as well as the patent protection and the SPC), to submit an application for<br />

marketing authorization for a generic drug submitting the data referred to in Art.8<br />

(3) (i). According to this „abridged procedure― the manufacturer of the generic<br />

drug is not required to repeat pre-clinical tests and clinical trials carried out in<br />

relation to the innovative drug, but can in its application refer to the innovative<br />

pharmaceutical company‘s original research data kept by the relevant marketing<br />

authorization authorities. 21<br />

The eight years of data exclusivity are complemented by an overlapping 10year<br />

market exclusivity 22 which means that a generic drug cannot be placed on the<br />

market until 10 years have elapsed from the initial authorization of the innovative<br />

drug. 23 Therefore, if processing a marketing application for a generic drug takes<br />

less than two years (as is usually the case), generic manufacturers now have real<br />

prospects of being able to put their products an the market as soon as the 10-year<br />

market exclusivity expires.<br />

18<br />

Under either Directive 2001/83/EC or Regulation 726/2004/EC.<br />

19<br />

KILLICK J., SCHULZ A., DAWES A., 8.<br />

20<br />

GARLAND P.,LARUSSON H.K., 129.<br />

21<br />

GARLAND P.,LARUSSON H.K., Data Exclusivity, Bolar Exemption and Generic Drugs in the<br />

EU, 129, EIPR (2007).<br />

22<br />

Directive 65/65/EEC, 87/21/EEC.<br />

23<br />

Art.10 (1) of the Amended 2001 Directive.


374 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

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Law<br />

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However, this two-year window between the end of the data exclusivity<br />

period and the end of the marketing exclusivity period would in most cases be of<br />

no practical use without the simultaneous implementation of the „Bolar Scheme―.<br />

Art.10 (6) of the amended 2001 Directive expressly states that conducting the<br />

necessary studies and trials with a view of marketing an application for marketing<br />

authorization ―shall not be regarded as contrary to patent rights or SPC‘s―. 24<br />

CHAPTER II. LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES<br />

Besides filing for a European SPC 25 or using the patent term restoration and<br />

the 30-month stay provision of the Waxman-Hatch Act, there are other responses<br />

of branded firms, typically referred to as life cycle management strategies. 26 In the<br />

following we will explore some of the prevalent strategies, especially those<br />

mentioned in the European Commissions Final Report on its inquiry into<br />

competition in the pharmaceutical sector. 27<br />

A. Patent Filing Strategies, Evergreening<br />

The findings of the inquiry suggest that in recent years originator companies<br />

developed strategies to extend the breadth and duration of their patent protection.<br />

In order to delay or block the market entry of generics, originators use to file<br />

numerous patent applications for the same medicine (forming so called "patent<br />

clusters" or "patent thickets"). 28 By using this so called „evergreening―-strategy,<br />

the brand-name manufacturer literally ―stockpiles‖ patent protection by obtaining<br />

separate 20-year patents on multiple attributes of a single product. These patents<br />

can cover everything from aspects of the manufacturing process to tablet colour or<br />

way of dosing. Through this tactic the generic manufacturer are forced to choose<br />

between waiting for all the patents to expire and applying for marketing<br />

authorization anyway, running the risks of litigation and the associated costs and<br />

delays. Originator laboratories no longer wait until the end of a product‘s patent life<br />

to begin the evergreening process. In order to maximize revenues from their<br />

24 GARLAND P., LARUSSON H.K., 130.<br />

25 From a competition law perspective, limited risks are involved, but see the misuse case of<br />

AstraZeneca (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/cpn2005_3_54.pdf) In 2006,<br />

the European Commission imposed a € 60 million fine on AstraZeneca for having abused its market<br />

power (or ‗dominance‘) by pursuing certain intellectual property (IP) and regulatory strategies<br />

aimed at keeping generics off the market.<br />

26 SLOAN F., Pharmaceutical innovation: incentives, competition, and cost-benefit analysis in<br />

international perspective, 167, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007.<br />

27 EU Commission Final Report, 11-16.<br />

28 EU Commission Final Report, 11..


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 375<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

products, pharmaceuticals executives begin preparing strategies to extend patents<br />

and stifle generic competition at the outset of product life-cycles. 29<br />

B. Vexatious Litigation<br />

Another common strategy for a patentee to prolong the life cycle of its<br />

pharmaceutical, is to bring or threaten to bring patent infringement actions against<br />

generic competitors that are about to launch substitutes for the patentee‘s<br />

pharmaceutical. The primary purpose of this vexatious litigation is to delay the<br />

entry of generic medicines rather than a serious attempt to enforce legal rights (e.g.,<br />

by obtaining interim injunctions keeping generic companies off the market).<br />

Branded firms often simply question the bioequivalence and reliability of generic<br />

products before the courts. 30<br />

Vexatious litigation is arguably a technique that is more rewarding in the US,<br />

where the Hatch-Waxman Act offers innovative pharmaceutical companies the<br />

opportunity to delay generic entry by filing a patent infringement suit against the<br />

generic applicant within the 45 day-deadline. 31 By providing such infringement<br />

claim, the approval of the generic‘s market authorization can be postponed for 30<br />

months.<br />

In the EU, in contrast, there is no such linkage between the grant of<br />

marketing authorization and alleged patent infringement. The relevant authority<br />

will typically grant marketing authorization, irrespective of such infringement. The<br />

patent holder will need to start litigation and, importantly, seek an injunction<br />

preventing the entry of the generic drug onto the market. This will require a prima<br />

facie case, in contrast with the US, where the stay in the authorization process is<br />

automatic. 32<br />

C. Second Generation Products<br />

The Commissions inquiry discovered that many originator companies launch<br />

second generation or follow-on medicines before loss of exclusivity of the first<br />

generation product. 33 Thereby branded firms try to switch patients to nextgeneration<br />

drugs with little or no added therapeutic value, prior to the market entry<br />

29<br />

RUMORE M., The Hatch-Waxman Act - 25 years later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scale<br />

Balanced,<br />

www.pharmacytimes.com/supplement/pharmacy/2009/GenericSupplement0809/Generic-<br />

HatchWaxman-0809; SLOAN F., 167 ff.<br />

30<br />

EU Commission Final Report, 12; LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LONGEVAL C., Generic entry -<br />

a challenge to traditional EC competition law?, 82, Cross-Border Handbook Life Sciences<br />

(2008/09)<br />

31<br />

LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LONGEVAL C., 82.<br />

32<br />

VAN KERCKHOVE M., VARMA A., Getting The Deal Through: Pharmaceutical Antitrust -<br />

Overview, 4, Global Competition Review 2009, available at<br />

http://www.blakes.com/pdf/Getting_the_Deal_Through-Pharmaceutical_Antitrust_09.pdf<br />

33<br />

EU Commission Final Report, 15.


376 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

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An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

of a generic version of the first generation product. 34 Through this tactic generic<br />

companies are less able to gain a significant share of the market.<br />

If on the other hand generic companies enter the market before the patients<br />

are switched, originator companies may have difficulties in convincing doctors to<br />

prescribe their second generation product or in obtaining a high price for the<br />

second generation product. 35<br />

D. Authorized Generics<br />

Authorized generics are pharmaceutical products commercialized under a<br />

generic product name by the manufacturer of the original branded pharmaceutical,<br />

or by a generic manufacturer under a licensing agreement with the original<br />

manufacturer. Pharmaceutical companies can decide to launch an authorized<br />

generic as part of a strategy to secure competition in the generics market on patent<br />

expiry. Alternatively, an innovator can license an authorized generic to a generic<br />

competitor as a way to terminate patent infringement litigation. 36<br />

The authorized generic is sold at a lower cost, and as an alternative to the<br />

branded product. The brand companies may choose to launch an authorized generic<br />

for a variety of reasons, including to settle patent litigation with a generic company<br />

by partnering with it, to participate in the generic market once generic competition<br />

starts, or to maintain manufacturing capacity for the drug substance or the drug<br />

product. 37<br />

Arguably, it is mostly US firms that have resorted to this strategy because it<br />

allows them to undermine the 180-day exclusivity period granted by the Hatch-<br />

Waxman Act to the first generic manufacturer, as they do not have to abide by this<br />

provision. 38 The introduction of an authorized generic during the 180-day period<br />

indeed results in a situation where two generic companies directly compete on the<br />

34 SIPKOFF M., Big Pharma uses effective strategies to battle generic competitors, available at<br />

http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.comSipkoff, Big Pharma uses effective strategies to battle generic<br />

competitors.<br />

35 EU Commission Final Report, 16.<br />

36 LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LONGEVAL C., Generic entry - a challenge to traditional EC<br />

competition law?, 85, Cross-Border Handbook Life Sciences (2008/09); SLOAN F.,<br />

Pharmaceutical innovation: incentives, competition, and cost-benefit analysis in international<br />

perspective, 160, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007; NARINDER S.,<br />

Authorized Generics: Antitrust Issues and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 1, available at<br />

http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/IP/Authorized_Generics.pdf; EU Commission Final<br />

Report, 12,13.<br />

37 NARINDER S., 1.<br />

38 LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LOGEVAL C., 85; NARINDER S., 1.


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 377<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

same market. This substantially reduces the economic incentive warranted by the<br />

180-day rule and possibly deters generic competition.<br />

Yet, the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the US courts<br />

have stated on several occasions that authorized generics appear to promote rather<br />

than to impede competition. The introduction of authorized generics to the EU<br />

market would probably provoke less resentment from generic competitors than in<br />

the US, given that there are no Hatch-Waxman type rules in the EU. 39<br />

E. OTC Switches<br />

Another basic option available in the case of some therapeutic categories is to<br />

develop an over-the-counter (OTC)-version of a product subject to patent<br />

expiration. The strategy has been employed for example for anti-inflammatory pain<br />

relievers such as Motrin and Naprosyn. A key driver of success in the OTC market<br />

is the ability to capitalize on the brand loyalty enjoyed by the prescription<br />

product. 40<br />

F. Reverse Payment Settlements<br />

Among the practices identified in the Commissions Report that possibly lead<br />

to delay of generic entry were also listed so-called „reverse payment<br />

settlements―between brand pharmaceutical manufacturers and generic entrants. 41<br />

Via such an - also referred to as „pay for delay - agreement a brand company pays<br />

a substantial amount of money to a potential generic entrant (and alleged infringer)<br />

to delay entry of a competing generic version of the brand-name drug. 42 The<br />

Commission noted that this type of settlement has attracted antitrust scrutiny in the<br />

United States. However, unlike in the U.S., cases of reverse payment agreements in<br />

Europe only recently have drawn attention.<br />

In the US, patent litigation settlements are extremely rewarding as they may<br />

result in a complete foreclosure of the market for generics manufacturers. Under<br />

the Hatch-Waxman Act, if the generics manufacturer decides to delay market entry<br />

for some reason, the 180-day period will not begin to run, which results in other<br />

generics manufacturers being prevented from entering the market. Therefore, if an<br />

39 LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LOGEVAL C., 85, 86.<br />

40 SLOAN F., Pharmaceutical innovation: incentives, competition, and cost-benefit analysis in<br />

international perspective, 167,168, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007; MARKS D., Life<br />

beyond the patent, 18, Managing Intellectual Property (1994); RUMORE M., The Hatch-Waxman<br />

Act - 25 years later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scale Balanced, available at<br />

www.pharmacytimes.com/supplement/pharmacy/2009/GenericSupplement0809/Generic-<br />

HatchWaxman-0809.<br />

41 GATES S., JAECKEL J., BETETA D., Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements Under Fire on Both<br />

Sides of the Atlantic, available at http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/15791.html .<br />

42 RUMORE M., The Hatch-Waxman Act - 25 years later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scale<br />

Balanced; DUXBURY P., MADAWELA Y., Patent misuse in the pharmaceutical industry:<br />

developments in US & EU (2007), available at<br />

http://www.wragge.com/published_articles_2852.asp.


378 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

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An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

innovator succeeds in keeping the first generics manufacturer from entering the<br />

market, he can almost indefinitely maintain his monopoly status on the product<br />

under attack. This is why in the US most patent litigation settlements contain<br />

exclusionary payment features by which the innovator offers payment to the<br />

generics manufacturer in exchange for the latter not entering the market, if it<br />

obtains marketing authorization. 43<br />

In the following chapter the reverse payment settlements strategy will be<br />

analyzed in detail and in the light of competition law.<br />

CHAPTER III. THE REVERSE PAYMENTS SETTLEMENTS<br />

A. The Reverse Payment Settlements in the US<br />

3.1. Definition of Reverse Payment Settlements<br />

The term ―reverse payment‖ is used to define a variety of diverse patent<br />

settlement agreements that involve a transfer of money from the patent owner to<br />

the alleged infringer.<br />

In a broader sense, it can be used to define any agreement between patent<br />

litigants, or potential litigants, wherein the patent owner agrees to provide some<br />

compensation to the alleged infringer, and the alleged infringer agrees to delay<br />

developing or marketing a product. The ―reverse‖ designation refers to the<br />

direction of the payment from the patentee to the alleged infringer. In most patent<br />

litigation settlements, any payments typically flow from the alleged infringer to the<br />

patentee 44 .<br />

Although reverse payment settlements can and probably do occur in other<br />

contexts, it appears that all of the reverse payment settlements that have been<br />

challenged as antitrust violations have occurred in the context of challenges by<br />

generic drug companies of branded drug patents.<br />

The most extreme example of reverse payment settlements would be an<br />

agreement terminating litigation, pursuant to which the potential generic competitor<br />

would agree to stay off the market for the full duration of the patent term in<br />

exchange for cash payments.<br />

43 LAMOTE A., L‘ECLUSE P., LONGEVAL C., Generic entry - a challenge to traditional EC<br />

competition law?, 81, Cross-Border Handbook Life Sciences (2008/09).<br />

44 C. S. HEMPHILL, Paying for delay: pharmaceutical patent settlement as a regulatory design<br />

problem, 81 N.Y.U.L.R. 1553 (2006); C.M.HOLMAN, Do Reverse Payment Agreement violate the<br />

Antitrust Laws?, 23 Santa Clara Comp. & High Tech. L.J. 490 (2007).


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 379<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

But a closer look to the facts of individual cases reveals that few, if any,<br />

reverse payment settlements are as simple as that or as clearly anticompetitive.<br />

For example, most agreements that terminate a patent dispute involve a<br />

negotiated market entry date for the generic product that substantially occurs later<br />

than would have likely occurred if the generic company had prevailed in the patent<br />

dispute, i.e. the parties split the remaining patent term. Settlements such as this,<br />

involving a negotiated generic entry date prior to patent expiration, can promote<br />

competition by providing a guaranteed reduction in the effective patent term that<br />

would not have occurred absent the patent challenge.<br />

In other cases, the litigants do not settle the underlying dispute, but the<br />

generic company agrees to stay off the market for some period of time while the<br />

patent litigation remains pending. These types of agreements are often referred to<br />

as ―interim settlements‖ or ―partial settlements agreements‖ and can take on the<br />

attributes of a privately negotiated preliminary injunction. Various attributes of<br />

partial settlements agreements can render them potentially more or less procompetitive<br />

than final settlements agreements. On the positive side, partial<br />

settlements agreements can allow the parties to diligently pursue the underlying<br />

litigation to final judgment without exposing both parties to the huge potential<br />

losses facing each party if the generic enters the market but is subsequently found<br />

have infringed a patent. On the other hand, interim settlements can tend to prolong<br />

litigation. Because the generic company is benefiting from a steady, and typically<br />

substantial, incoming flow of cash payments and the branded company is<br />

continuing to reap supra-competitive profits as the sole purveyor of the patent drug,<br />

there is little incentive for either party to push for a speedy resolution of the matter.<br />

Moreover, in many cases these agreements affectively restrict market entry by third<br />

generic manufacturers. The anticompetitive potential of interim settlements<br />

agreements is substantial, and both the FTC and the courts have treated them as<br />

generally more problematic than final agreements 45 .<br />

Other deviations from the simple model occur when the payment is not a<br />

simple transfer of cash. For example, in some interim settlements, the payment is<br />

contingent upon the defendant prevailing on appeal. In other cases, payment is<br />

contingent upon the generic company achieving final approval from the FDA.<br />

In many cases the ―payment‖ comes in the form of a side deal, i.e., an<br />

agreement ancillary to the patent settlement. For example, in some cases there is an<br />

ancillary agreement pursuant to which the defendant licenses one or more of its<br />

products to the patentee. If the licensing payments exceed the fair market value of<br />

the in-licensed technology, one may infer that the excess amount represents a<br />

camouflaged payment for the delayed generic market entry. For example, one<br />

agreement at issue in the Schering-Plough involves a payment of $ 600 million that<br />

Schering agreed to make in exchange for the right to market several of the generic<br />

45 See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, available at<br />

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.


380 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

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Law<br />

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company‘s proprietary drug products 46 . The FTC went to great lengths in an<br />

attempt to establish that the size of the Schering‘s payment exceeded its actual<br />

valuation of the in-licensed drug products. On appeal, however, the court rejected<br />

the FTC‘s conclusion that the terms of the ancillary agreements were anything but<br />

the product of legitimate arm‘s-length business negotiations.<br />

There are potential pro-competitive aspects to these ancillary agreements. For<br />

example, the licensing of the products to the branded drug company could facilitate<br />

their commercialization, fostering competition in the ancillary drug market. To the<br />

extent the ancillary agreements were legitimate business deals, the Schering-Plough<br />

agreements were effectively cross-licensing agreements, a form of patent licensing<br />

that the FTC and courts have found to be generally pro-competitive.<br />

In some cases, reverse ―payment‖ takes the form of an ancillary agreement<br />

pursuant to which the patent owner grants the defendant a license to sell a drug<br />

other than the one that is subject of the patent dispute. As with case where the<br />

generic company licenses a product to the patent owner, these agreements can<br />

promote competition in the ancillary market. Of course to the extent the payment is<br />

less than a legitimate valuation of the product, the license to sell the other product<br />

can function as a disguised payment for delay in the marketing of the product<br />

allegedly covered by the disputed patent.<br />

Furthermore, in other cases the reverse payment is an ancillary agreement<br />

pursuant to which the patent owner grants the defendant a license to sell the<br />

patented drug, manufactured by the patent owner, under a generic label. This type<br />

of agreement has procompetitive potential, because this generic labelled product<br />

will typically come at a price lower than the branded drug product 47 .<br />

In some cases, the parties characterize reverse payments a ―saved litigation<br />

expenses‖. The FTC and some commentators have proposed that reverse payment<br />

should not raise a presumption of illegality where the payment is limited to the<br />

litigation costs that the patentee would expect to save by discontinuing the<br />

litigation. The rationale is that even a patent owner convinced of the merits of its<br />

patent case might still legitimately settle a nuisance suit by paying the patent<br />

challenger an amount representing the amount of money that would otherwise be<br />

spent on litigation costs.<br />

46 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, , 402 F.3d at 1060 (11 th Cir. 2005).<br />

47 It must be noted that, however, the price discount is limited by the terms under which the branded<br />

company supplies the drug to the generic company, and the drop in price is generally much less than<br />

would be expected in the case of true generic competition. Nevertheless, there will generally be<br />

some consumer benefit, at least compared to an alternative where the patent owner ultimately<br />

prevails in the litigation.


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 381<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In other cases, an alleged reverse payment takes the form of an ancillary<br />

agreement, pursuant to which the generic company receives payments to copromote<br />

the branded drug company‘s product. Sometimes the co-promoted product<br />

is the product at issue in the litigation; at other times, it is another product.<br />

In further cases, the reverse payment comes in the form of an ancillary<br />

agreement under which the generic receives compensation for agreeing to supply<br />

the branded drug company with either raw materials for the manufacture of the<br />

brand product or with finished drug product. In some cases, the compensation to<br />

the generic company consists of an agreement by the brand company not to launch<br />

an authorized generic during the first-filer generic company‘s 180-days exclusivity<br />

period for the product at issue in the litigation.<br />

Further, in other cases the payment is actually an agreement on the part of the<br />

brand company to pay the generic up-front payments, milestones, sale percentages,<br />

or development fees for unrelated products to be developed using the generic<br />

company‘s technology.<br />

3.2. Factors proving Incentives forRreverse Payment Settlements in the<br />

DrugIindustry<br />

3.2.1. Innovative Drugs have intrinsically High Social Utility<br />

A fundamental issue driving large reverse payment is the amount of profit<br />

that can be made in the sale of prescription drugs, particularly ―blockbuster‖ drugs<br />

that offer unique and substantial therapeutic benefit relative to other product in the<br />

market 48 .<br />

A branded drug company‘s profit margins are to a large extent dependant<br />

upon the market exclusivity provided by patents. When patent protection expires,<br />

generic competition quickly erodes margins and market share, resulting in<br />

precipitous declines in profitability. The high profitability of branded drugs<br />

motivates drug patent owners to take extreme measures to maintain and enforce<br />

their patent rights.<br />

High profit reflects the relative inelasticity of consumer demand for patented<br />

prescription drugs, particularly in the case of a true blockbuster drug with no<br />

reasonably acceptable substitute.<br />

It is important to remain cognizant of the high social utility in drug<br />

innovation. The patent system is the primary engine driving the highly risky and<br />

expensive machine that is modern drug development. Any attempts to restrict the<br />

rights of pharmaceutical patent owners should only be taken while bearing in mind<br />

the potential harm to incentives for innovation, and ultimately the impact this might<br />

have on the next generation of innovative drugs.<br />

48 C.M.HOLMAN, Do Reverse Payment Agreement violate the Antitrust Laws?, cit., 504.


382 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The introduction of generic competition dramatically reduces the profitability<br />

of a prescription drug. According to FDA, analysis of retail data shows that the<br />

price of a generic drug averages 94% percent of the brand price when there is one<br />

generic competitor in the market and that the entry of a second generic competitor<br />

reduces priced to 52% of brand price 49 .<br />

It follows that the existence of reverse payments, and their sizeable<br />

magnitude can in large part be attributed to the branded and generic companies‘<br />

exposure to enormous potential financial losses and gains respectively, should the<br />

patent challenge succeed.<br />

3.2.2. Barriers to Generic Market Entry<br />

Substantial barriers to market entry confront potential generic drug<br />

competitors, and these barriers tend to incentivize reverse payments settlements.<br />

These barriers to entry are unique to the drug industry and depend on the regulatory<br />

provisions that interact with the drug development process, in the context of the<br />

Hach-Waxmac patent challenges.<br />

Moreover, it must be noted that a consideration of barriers to market entry<br />

and the source of these barriers, is critical in any assessment of the anticompetitive<br />

potential of a specific agreement, as well as reverse payment settlements in general.<br />

In the context of a Paragraph IV litigation, barrier to third parties generic<br />

entry are very high and the appearance of reverse payments settlements in<br />

Paragraph IV disputes is due to the fact that –unique to pharmaceutical patents- a<br />

properly defined settlement-plus-exit-payment keeps not only the immediate<br />

infringement defendant out of the market for a time, but also keeps generic firm<br />

from entering as well. By making reverse payments pharmaceutical patentees are<br />

able to achieve ―a guaranteed insulation from competition, without the risk that the<br />

patent will be held invalid‖ 50 .<br />

In fact, in the context of Hatch-Waxman there is one barrier to third party<br />

generic entry that has the potential to dominate over all others and that is the ability<br />

of a first Paragraph IV filer or a first filer to indefinitely ―park‖ its 180-day<br />

exclusivity period. A parked GE (generic exclusivity) can create a bottleneck in<br />

FDA regulatory process preventing the approval of any third party generic<br />

competitor, at least until the expiration of the challenged patent.<br />

49 See FDA, Generic Competition and Drug Prices, available at<br />

http://www.fda.gov/CDER/ogd/generic_competition.htm.<br />

50 H. HOVERKAMP, M. JANIS, M. LEMLEY, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual Property<br />

disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1761-62 (2003).


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 383<br />

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The potential to park GE arises out of the criteria used to trigger the awarding<br />

of GE and the initiation of the GE period. Recall that GE is awarded to first-filer<br />

and generally does not commence until after the first-filer begins marketing a<br />

generic version of the drug, or a decision is reached in a lawsuit filed in response to<br />

the Paragraph IV litigation. If the parties to Paragraph IV litigation reach an<br />

agreement pursuant to which the first-filer agrees to delay or forgo market entry,<br />

the 180-day GE period will not begin until after the patent litigation is a final<br />

settlement, resulting in dismissal of the infringement action, the 180-day GE period<br />

is never triggered; if it never begins, it can never end. As a consequence, the parties<br />

can agree to ―park‖ the GE indefinitely, creating a bottleneck that will prevent any<br />

generic third party from entering the market, even if that party is never sued for<br />

patent infringement, or succeeds in establishing in court that the patent is invalid or<br />

not infringed.<br />

The ability to park GE creates a huge incentive for collusive settlement<br />

agreements between branded drug companies and first-filer generic companies. By<br />

effectively creating an insurmountable barrier to third party generic entry, it allows<br />

the settling parties to share in supra-competitive profit made possible by market<br />

exclusivity. In fact, were it not for fear of antitrust liability, it would probably<br />

always be in the interest of a branded drug company and the GE owner to reach<br />

such an agreement 51 . The profit margins available under monopoly conditions<br />

generally exceed those available in a market with two or more competitors, and<br />

with only a single potential generic competitor both parties would be better off<br />

sharing those profits than competing.<br />

Moreover, also the ANDA approval process acts can be considered as a<br />

relevant barrier to generic market entry. Even if the reformed process has reduced<br />

the regulatory burden on generic drug companies, it still imposes its own<br />

substantial monetary and temporal barriers to entry for third party generic<br />

competition. The process typically requires a would-be generic competitor twelve<br />

months and around $1 million just to generate and compile the data necessary to<br />

file an ANDA. If that is the case and the ANDA includes a Paragraph IV<br />

certification that results in an automatic thirty-month stay, a time lag of at least<br />

forty-two months between commencement of approval process and ability to<br />

market the drug can be expected.<br />

Another way in which drug regulation encourages reverse payment<br />

settlements of Paragraph IV litigation is by bolstering the effective exclusionary<br />

potential of drug patent. In fact, while designating around a generally a legitimate<br />

means to circumventing a competitor‘s patent, it is often difficult to accomplish in<br />

the context of prescription drugs. Strict regulatory controls make it heavily difficult<br />

more the competitor to design around an Orange Book-listed patent. If the design<br />

around process involves any change to the chemical structure of the active<br />

ingredient of the drug or results in a product that is not bioequivalent to the original<br />

patented product, the competitor will generally not be able take advantage of the<br />

51 C. SHAPIRO, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 Rand J. Econ. 391, 391 (2003).


384 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

ANDA process. Instead, it will be required to get through the regular NDA process,<br />

resulting in a drastic increase in the time and expense to secure marketing approval.<br />

This, in part, explains why generic companies expend so much energy challenging<br />

patents, rather than attempting to design around them: in fact, any design around<br />

involving an alteration of the structure of the active ingredient or lack of<br />

bioequivalence will preclude marketing approval by means of an ANDA.<br />

3.3. Reverse payments settlements in the FTC‟s opinions<br />

Over the last ten years, FTC scrutiny of the pharmaceutical industry has<br />

expanded dramatically, driven by a rapid rise in the nation‘s expenditure on<br />

prescription drugs.<br />

The FTC originally focused only on settlements agreements that parked<br />

Generic Exclusivity or covered non-infringing products, not reverse payments. Its<br />

scrutiny in fact focused primarily on terms in patent settlements that either had the<br />

potential to park the 180-day GE or that extended to activities and/or products not<br />

covered by the patent, for example by requiring the generic company to refrain<br />

from marketing any form of the generic drug, even forms not covered by patent,<br />

founding both of them anticompetitive 52 .<br />

In a prepared statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 17,<br />

2003, Commissioner Muris stressed that all of the early enforcement actions<br />

against reverse payment settlements ―alleged that the brand-name company used<br />

the generic company‘s right to the 180-day exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman to<br />

impede entry by other generic competitors. Commissioner Muris made a number of<br />

recommendations for congressional action with respect to Hatch-Waxman,<br />

including revisions to the 180-day GE provisions. Many of these proposals were<br />

adopted in the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act. For example, the FTC<br />

recommended that the brand-name companies and first generic applicants be<br />

required to provide copies of settlements agreements to the FTC and the DOJ in<br />

order for them to ensure that the 180-day provision is not manipulated in a way to<br />

delay entry of additional generic applicant. There was no suggestion that the review<br />

provision was intended to police against reverse payment per se.<br />

More recently, the FTC has shifted his position on reverse payment<br />

settlements. It has come to equate reverse payments settlements with horizontal<br />

market allocation agreements, which are normally per se antitrust violations when<br />

no patent is involved. The FTC advocates a rule that would essentially find such<br />

agreements presumptively illegal independent of the existence of GE parking or<br />

restrictions extending beyond the exclusionary potential of the patent 53 .<br />

52 See FTC Generic Drug Study, cit.<br />

53 See, e.g. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990).


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 385<br />

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This is in contrast to the position taken by most courts, which have generally<br />

held that an agreement settling a legitimate patent dispute does not violate the<br />

antitrust laws. Although an agreement to stay off the market would be illegal per se<br />

in the absence of a patent, most courts would recognize that a patent provides a<br />

legitimate and independent basis foe excluding an alleged infringer, and that a<br />

settlement agreement is legal so long as it does not restrict competition to an extent<br />

exceeding the reasonable exclusionary potential of the patent. Courts tend to point<br />

the fact that patents are, in a sense, anticompetitive by their very nature, but this is<br />

part and parcel of their ability to incentivize innovation. They also point the<br />

presumption of validity conferred by the statute to the issued patent 54 .<br />

In contrast, the FTC evinces considerable scepticism regarding the<br />

presumption of patent validity, and points out that any exemption from the<br />

application of normal antitrust rules to patent settlements does not apply if the<br />

patent is invalid, or does not cover the restricted activities. The agency points to<br />

statistics showing that courts routinely find asserted patents to be invalid or not<br />

infringed, particularly in the case of Paragraph IV patent challenges, and would<br />

infer form a patent owner‘s willingness to make sizeable reverse payments that it<br />

considers its patent case to be weak. For example, the FTC in its petition for writ of<br />

certiorari in Schering-Plough cites to a leading treatise of antitrust law for the fact<br />

that a firm ―certain that a patent was valid (…) would have no incentive whatsoever<br />

to pay another firm to stay out of the market‖ 55 .<br />

The FTC‘s position relies on a body of scholarly literature that stresses the<br />

uncertainty of patent litigation and the probabilistic nature of a patent right in<br />

respect to its validity and scope prior to court‘s decision. As expressed by<br />

Hovenkamp et al., a patent is not a right to exclude competition, but more correctly<br />

it is a ―right to try to exclude competition‖ 56 . The FTC has essentially taken the<br />

position that in every Paragraph IV litigation, consumers have an expectation<br />

interest in the finite probability that the patent challenge will succeed. The FTC<br />

argues that any settlement between parties that deprive consumers of the value of<br />

this expectation interest is a presumptive violation of the antitrust laws. Under the<br />

FTC‘s approach, essentially any reverse payment settlement will be found illegal,<br />

regardless of the strength or weakness of the patent, as an inquiry into the merits of<br />

the underlying patent case is inappropriate, except in cases of an objectively<br />

baseless or sham patent suit.<br />

On July 20, 2006, in a prepared statement before the Senate‘s Special<br />

Committee on Aging, the FTC reiterated its position that reverse payment<br />

agreements are anticompetitive and ought to be presumptively illegal, and warned<br />

that the Second and Eleventh Circuits‘ rejection of this position in In re Tamoxifen<br />

54 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, , 402 F.3d at 1066-76 (11 th Cir. 2005).<br />

55 In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9207, slip. op. at 30 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003).<br />

56 H. HOVERKAMP, M. JANIS, M. LEMLEY, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual Property<br />

disputes, cit., 1761.


386 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Citrate Antitrust Litigation and Schering-Plough had ―staggering‖ negative<br />

economic implications and would result in ―tremendous‖ cost to consumers,<br />

insurers, employers and the government 57 .<br />

A number of academic commentators have taken even a stronger position<br />

against settlements including reverse payments. For example, Hoverkamp et al.<br />

have suggested the following rule. In an antitrust challenge, a payment from a<br />

patentee to an infringement defendant for the latter‘s exit from the market is<br />

presumptively unlawful, shifting the burden of proof to the infringement plaintiff.<br />

The infringement plaintiff can defend by showing both (1) that the ex ante<br />

likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the<br />

size of the payment is no more than the expected value of litigation and collateral<br />

costs of the lawsuit 58 .<br />

Taken literally, this standard would apparently render any patent settlement<br />

involving a reverse payment exceeding litigation costs per se illegal.<br />

In contrast, the FTC would recognize pro-competitive justifications for<br />

sizeable reverse payments in certain circumstances. For example, in Schering-<br />

Plough, the Commission accepted, in principle, that, in certain cases, a reverse<br />

payment to a ―cash-starved‖ generic company might enable the latter to enter the<br />

market earlier and more effectively, and such payment could be pro-competitive.<br />

B. Reverse Payments Settlement in the Courts<br />

Courts have repeatedly refused to find a basis for antitrust liability in reverse<br />

payments. Generally, courts will only find an antitrust violation if terms of the<br />

agreement restrict competition to an extent exceeding the exclusionary potential of<br />

the patent. This most typically occurs when the agreement is found to result in a<br />

parking of GE, creating a bottleneck blocking all third party generic market entry,<br />

or when the agreement requires generic company to refrain from marketing or<br />

developing products that would not infringe the patent. This standard is consistent<br />

with a line of earlier court decisions that have generally found the agreements<br />

involving patents o not violate the antitrust laws, so long as the term of the<br />

agreement do not extend beyond the exclusionary potential of the patent. It is also<br />

consistent with the FTC‘s early enforcement actions, which only targeted<br />

agreements with restrictions alleged to exceed the exclusionary potential of the<br />

patent.<br />

57 See Jon Leibowitz, Comm‘r, FTC, Prepared Statement of the FTC bifore the Special Committee<br />

on Aging of the United States Senate on Barriers to Generic Entry 17-19 (July 20, 2006).<br />

58 H. HOVERKAMP, M. JANIS, M. LEMLEY, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual Property<br />

disputes, cit., 1759.


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 387<br />

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The emerging consensus test for analyzing the legality of reverse payment<br />

settlements under the antitrust laws, which focuses on the extent to which the terms<br />

of the agreement exceed the exclusionary potential of the patent is exemplified by<br />

the Eleventh Circuit‘s holding in Schering-Plough according to which ―the proper<br />

analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: 1) the scope of the<br />

exclusionary potential of the patent; 2) the extent to which the agreements exceed<br />

that scope; and 3) the resulting anticompetitive effects 59 . The court cited as an<br />

agreement exceeding the potential of the patent an agreement intended merely to<br />

circumvent antitrust laws, or where the settlements resolves a patent litigation<br />

involving a patent which the patent owner knows is almost certainly invalid. The<br />

court noted that when a patent is involved the mere existence of anticompetitive<br />

effects cannot be the basis for antitrust liability, since patents are by their very<br />

nature anticompetitive. Antitrust liability only attaches when anticompetitive<br />

effects exceed the exclusionary potential of the patent.<br />

Recently, the Second Circuit has adopted the same standard, ruling that a<br />

patent settlement, regardless of whether it includes a reverse payment, is generally<br />

not in violation of the antitrust laws so long as the patent holder is not acting in bad<br />

faith beyond the limits of the patent monopoly to restraint or monopolize trade, for<br />

example in case of sham or baseless litigation involving a patent that would<br />

certainly not survive a judicial challenge 60 .<br />

Courts cite to a variety of rationales supporting the consensus rejection of<br />

presumptive illegality based on reverse payment. For example, they typically point<br />

to a general policy in favour of the settlement of litigation, particularly with respect<br />

to complex and judicial resource intensive patent dispute.<br />

In Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit, noted that rules restricting the ability of<br />

parties to settle might actually delay generic entry and be contrary to the goals of<br />

the patent system. In that decision, the court stressed the public‘s interest in<br />

encouraging settlements, particularly in the context complex and expensive<br />

litigation, as patent litigation are 61 .<br />

Furthermore, a number of courts express scepticism as to the existence of any<br />

distinction between reverse payment settlements and ordinary patent settlements, as<br />

long as, if not all, settlements agreements include some form of compensation from<br />

the patent owner to the alleged infringer.<br />

Courts have also been reluctant to infer from the presence of reverse<br />

payments that the patent owner must have viewed the patent case as weak, even in<br />

cases involving very large payments, relying on the statutory presumption of patent<br />

validity, in contrast with the FTC, which relies on the probabilistic character o<br />

patent rights.<br />

59 Schering-Plough, 402 F. 3d at 1066 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312).<br />

60 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2 Cir. 2006).<br />

61 Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 207 n. 20.


388 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned against inferring from the size<br />

of reverse payments that the parties lacked faith in the validity of the patent. The<br />

court pointed out specifically to the uncertainty inherent in any attempt to<br />

accurately assess: 1) a branded drug company‘s lost profit, (2) potential profits for<br />

the generic companies, (3) the risk of the defendant‘s ability to satisfy a judgment,<br />

(4) the true cost of litigation, or (5) how much of the payment might have been in<br />

exchange for provisions of the agreements other than an acknowledgement of the<br />

patent validity 62 .<br />

The Second Circuit in Tamoxifen specifically considered and rejected the<br />

argument that excessive reverse payments could lead to a presumption of antitrust<br />

liability. Essentially, the court found that the antitrust laws do not prevent a patent<br />

owner from paying to protect even a weak patent claim. Under this approach the<br />

size of the payment becomes irrelevant, because even if one were to take it as<br />

evidence of a subjective lack of confidence in the merits of the patent case, a mere<br />

lack of confidence does not lead to antitrust liability foe settling the case.<br />

Essentially, courts have not been receptive towards the FTC‘s theory of<br />

antitrust liability based on the probabilistic nature of the patent right, not the related<br />

theory of a consumer expectation interest in the possibility that the patent challenge<br />

might have succeeded were it not for the settlement.<br />

One issue on which the courts and the FTC are in substantially agreement is<br />

that the analysis of the legality of a reverse payment settlement under the antitrust<br />

laws should generally not entail any evaluation of the merits of the underlying<br />

patent case, at least in cases where the patent case does not appear be a sham or<br />

objectively baseless, or the patent does not appear to have been obtained by fraud.<br />

In Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit stressed the importance of the<br />

presumption of validity of issued patents and concluded that ―patent litigation is<br />

too complex and the results too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether<br />

enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will expose them to treble<br />

damages if the patent immunity were destroyed by the mere probability of the<br />

patent‖ 63 . The courts advocates a very high threshold to find antitrust liability based<br />

on the merit of the patent case.<br />

Finally, a consideration of barriers to third party generic entry is relevant in<br />

any assessment of the potential anticompetitive effect of a settlement agreement. In<br />

the absence of significantly barriers to third party generic entry, a reverse payment<br />

settlement with one generic company might have little effect on competition<br />

62 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).<br />

63 Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 1294.


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 389<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

overall, whereas, in the presence of substantial barriers to third party generic entry,<br />

an agreement with a single generic company might effectively foreclose any<br />

generic competition. Agreement with potential to park GE are of most concern, but<br />

there are also other substantial barriers to third party generic entry, primarily<br />

arising from the lengthy FDA pre-marketing approval process. The FTC and other<br />

critics of reverse payment agreement implicitly assume very high barriers to third<br />

party generic entry, which facilitates a reverse payment settlement between two<br />

parties with the potential to effectively block all generic competition. However,<br />

aside from parking GE, they normally do not explicitly point out and assess other<br />

specific barriers to third parties generic entry.<br />

Courts, on the others side, often implicitly assume that barriers to third party<br />

generic entry are not overly high, with the exception of cases of GE parking, which<br />

are considered in violation of antitrust laws. For example, a number of courts noted<br />

that, in general, a reverse payment settlement should not be effective in foreclosing<br />

competition, particularly where the merits of the patent case are weak, because of<br />

the ability of the third party to challenge the patent. This, of course, ignores the<br />

issue of the regulatory barrier to third party generic entry mentioned above.<br />

Moreover, in Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit noted that a challenged reverse<br />

payments agreement was not in violation of antitrust laws, because it did not<br />

entirely foreclose competition in the market for the patented compound. The court<br />

argued that a strategy of simply paying potential generic competitors to stay off the<br />

market would ultimately fail, because, at some point, the cost of paying off<br />

subsequent generic challengers would exceed the ability of the patentee‘s supracompetitive<br />

prices to support them 64 . Essentially, the court challenged the<br />

plaintiff‘s implicit assumption that an agreement with one generic firm could block<br />

all generic competition. To the extent that this analysis is interpreted ad applying to<br />

reverse payment settlements in general, however, it seems unrealistic in assuming<br />

minimal barriers to subsequent third party generic entry and it seems also<br />

inconsistent with the general antitrust doctrine. In general, it is true that horizontal<br />

market allocation agreements would not negatively impact competition were it not<br />

for some barriers to third party market entry, but courts have classified such<br />

agreements as per se illegal regardless the size of entry barrier. In Ciprofloxacin,<br />

the court ruled that: ―it is unlikely that the holder of a weak patent could stave off<br />

all possible challengers with exclusion payment because the economics simply<br />

would not justify it‖ 65 . The reasoning is surely correct, if we assume that barriers to<br />

third party generic entry are not prohibitive. However, to the extent barriers to<br />

entry impede subsequent generic challengers; the Second Circuit‘s rationale would<br />

appear to fail. In fact, as previously noted, the barriers to entry for subsequent<br />

generic competitors would be high, and, as a consequence, a reverse payment<br />

strategy could be economically feasible and highly effective even in situation<br />

where the merits of the patent case are weak, raising substantial competition<br />

concerns.<br />

64 Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 207 n. 20.<br />

65 Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 252.


390 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In conclusion, as now, arguments for presumptive illegality of reverse<br />

payments settlements agreements have met with little success in the courts, where<br />

the current consensus would not condemn such settlements merely on the existence<br />

or excessiveness of reverse payments.<br />

B. The Reverse Payments Settlements in Europe<br />

As mentioned above, in 2008, the EU Commission launched an inquiry to<br />

investigate any possible anticompetitive conditions in the pharmaceutical sector.<br />

The Commission‘s report presented detailed findings and proposed several ways to<br />

improve patients‘ rapid access to safe, innovative and affordable medicine 66 . The<br />

inquiry tied with other EU initiatives aimed at improving patients with safe,<br />

effective and affordable medicines, but also was aimed at creating a business<br />

environment in order to stimulate research, innovation and competition in the<br />

pharmaceutical industry.<br />

One of the findings of the inquiry was that generic medicines take too long<br />

time to reach the market: on average, consumers have to wait seven months for<br />

cheaper generic medicines to become available once patents for brand-name<br />

medicine has expired. According to the inquiry, pharmaceutical companies are<br />

manipulating the intellectual property rights system and are actively trying to delay<br />

the entry of generic medicines onto their markets. As a result, there has been a<br />

decline in the number of innovative medicines getting to the market. In an<br />

immediate action related to the findings, the European Commissioner for<br />

Competition, Mrs Neelie Kroes announced the pending of a first antitrust case<br />

resulting from the inquiry. It alleged breaches of European rules on ―restrictive<br />

business practices‖ and ―abuse of a dominant market position ―by a French<br />

branded- company -Les Laboratoires Servier- and other five generics with which it<br />

had made anticompetitive deals.<br />

The sector-wide inquiry was opened because the Commission suspected the<br />

slowdown in novel medicines entering the market - 27 annually since 2000 as<br />

compared to 40 annually between 1995 and 1999- was a systemic problem, and<br />

they sought to find out what was causing it.<br />

The European Generic Medicines Association (EGA) in a subsequent release<br />

emphasised the Commission‘s finding showing that: ―originator companies use a<br />

variety of instruments to extend the commercial life of their products without<br />

generic entry for as long as possible‖. The EGA called for quick implementation of<br />

the recommendations. The organisation had itself made several, including more<br />

66 EU Commission Final Report, available at<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf.


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 391<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

stringent patentability requirements (especially on inventive step), timelines for<br />

oppositions and litigation procedures, controls for medical advertisement, sanctions<br />

of misbehaviour, as well as community patents and a unified EU patent court.<br />

The European Commission found that companies engaged in delaying<br />

strategies such as loading up a single medicine with up to 1,300 patents or<br />

engaging in litigation. These are won by generics about two-thirds of the time, but<br />

can last up to three years. Meddling with regulators was also an issue, as the<br />

Commission found ―originator companies intervened in national procedures for the<br />

approval of generic medicines in a significant number of cases, which on average<br />

led to four months of delay for the generic medicine.‖ The inquiry found that<br />

companies would release claims about the generic product‘s safety and quality. The<br />

Commission also found ―at least 200 settlement agreements between generic and<br />

originator companies,‖ many of which restrict generics, driving up prices for<br />

consumers. The vast majority of the settlements were reached in the context of<br />

litigation cases, the remaining settlements were concluded out of court disputes<br />

and/or during an opposition procedure. In approximately half of these settlements<br />

the generic company‘s ability to market its medicine was restricted, a significant<br />

proportion of these settlements contained –in addition to the restriction- a value<br />

transfer from the originator company to the generic company, either in the form of<br />

a direct payment or in the form of a license, distribution agreement or a ―side-deal‖.<br />

Direct payments occurred in more than 20 settlements and the total amount of these<br />

direct payments from Originator Company to generic companies exceeded euros<br />

200 million.<br />

In the view of this inquiry, there is an urgent need for an EU patent and<br />

unique patent litigation systems that will cut costs and improve efficiency for drug<br />

companies. In fact, nearly a third of national court cases on patents are happening<br />

in parallel in other jurisdictions, and in 11 percent of cases they ―reach conflicting<br />

conclusions.‖ All stakeholders, including originator companies also supported the<br />

idea of a community patent and a unified litigations system.<br />

Suspected anti-competitive behaviour across Europe's pharmaceutical<br />

industry has now led the European Commission to confirm that it has started<br />

surprise inspections at the offices of various companies. According to reports,<br />

officials say they "have reason to believe" that those companies now under<br />

investigation are "abusing their dominant positions in the marketplace by illegally<br />

delaying the launch of generic competitors‖. However, the suspicions include<br />

backhand deals with makers of cheaper copycat versions of branded medicines that<br />

keep them off the market; a practice which is thought could cost healthcare systems<br />

in Europe billions of euros. The EC‘s report, published earlier this year, notes how<br />

at least 200 settlement agreements between generic and originator companies were<br />

known, and that ―a good number‖ of these were formed to restrict generic entry<br />

onto the market.


392 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

In that occasion, the Commission took the initiative to scrutinise the sector<br />

more closely and -where appropriate- to prosecute specific companies for alleged<br />

violation of competition law; to focus on enforcing deadlines for evaluating safety,<br />

quality and efficacy of medicines and granting them pricing and reimbursement<br />

status; to help the European Medicine Agency and National agencies to assess how<br />

to solve resources and capacity problems.<br />

At the same time, EU countries were required to take actions against<br />

misleading campaigns questioning the quality of generic medicine, to introduce<br />

mechanisms to accelerate approval procedures for generic medicines and<br />

streamline trials that test the added value of medicine and improve price<br />

competition.<br />

In its Report it strongly implies that reverse payment settlements run afoul of<br />

EC competition law (Art.81 and Art.82 EC Treaty) , especially if ―the motive of the<br />

agreement is the sharing of profits via payments from [patent-holding<br />

pharmaceutical companies] to generic companies to the detriment of patients and<br />

public health budgets.‖ Thus, the Report suggests and the Commission has<br />

committed itself to undertake ―further focused monitoring of settlements that limit<br />

generic entry and include a value transfer from [a patent-holding pharmaceutical]<br />

company to a generic company.‖ Simultaneously to issuing the Report, the<br />

Commission announced the initiation of formal proceedings against Servier (a<br />

pharmaceutical manufacturer) and five generics manufacturers (Krka, Lupin,<br />

Matrix Laboratories Limited, Niche Generics and Teva) on suspicion of conduct<br />

contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Among other things, the<br />

Commission alleges that Servier abused its dominant position by entering into<br />

"reverse payment" settlement agreements with the generics manufacturers in<br />

respect of its patented cardiovascular medicine. 67<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

With regard to US case law, we found that courts are generally unreceptive to<br />

characterize patent settlements as illegal based on the mere presence or amount of<br />

reverse payments, or to theories of antitrust liability based on the probabilistic<br />

nature of patents or a consumer expectation interest in the chance a patent<br />

challenge will succeed in the absence of a settlement. On the other hand, courts will<br />

find reverse payments settlements in violation of the antitrust laws to the extent that<br />

the agreement contains restrictions on competition that exceed the exclusionary<br />

potential of the patent. This typically occurs when the agreement extends to clearly<br />

non-infringing products or activities, or when the parking of GE creates a<br />

substantial, or even insurmountable, barrier to third party generic entry.<br />

67 GATES S., JAECKEL J., BETETA D., Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements Under Fire on Both<br />

Sides of the Atlantic, available at http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/15791.html


Karoline Brandi and Federica Lorenzato 393<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Absent GE parking or restrictions on non-infringing products, the courts are<br />

reluctant to find reverse payment settlements fundamentally different than patent<br />

settlements in general, because the reverse payment is viewed as a natural byproduct<br />

of the Hatch-Waxman scheme.<br />

At the same time, the FTC and most courts conclude that any detailed<br />

assessment on the merit of the underlying patent dispute is probably unwise in the<br />

context of antitrust laws, at least when the patent litigation does not appear to be<br />

objectively baseless and the agreement‘s restrictions do not exceed the nominal<br />

boundaries of the patent. Nevertheless, in some cases, these agreements seem<br />

clearly to impede the introduction of generic drugs on the market, and with the<br />

rising cost of drugs and healthcare in general, some level of antitrust scrutiny might<br />

well be in order.<br />

Moreover, a focus on barriers to third party generic entry would help to<br />

quantify the anticompetitive potential Paragraph IV settlements, in order to<br />

convince a court that a particular agreement, by effectively excluding all<br />

competition for multiple years, is sufficiently anticompetitive to violate antitrust<br />

laws.<br />

A prime target for any reform of Hatch-Waxman intended to reduce barriers<br />

to third party generic entry would, of course, be the 180-day GE provision. The<br />

ability to park GE represents the most substantial Paragraph IV litigation-specific<br />

barrier and many commentators have suggested to simply eliminate it in order to<br />

avoid the problem of parking that courts have had trouble correcting.<br />

Turning our attention to the EU scenario, there‘s actually a lack of case law<br />

on reverse payment settlements. Unlike in the U.S., cases of reverse payment<br />

agreements in Europe only recently have drawn attention. In its Report, the<br />

Commission noted that this type of settlement has attracted antitrust scrutiny in the<br />

United States. The Report strongly implies that reverse payment settlements run<br />

afoul of EC competition law Art. 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of<br />

the European Union (TFEU) (previous Art.81 and Art.82 EC Treaty), especially if<br />

the motive of the agreement is the sharing of profits via payments from the patentee<br />

to generic companies to the detriment of patients and public health budgets. The<br />

Report suggests and the Commission has committed itself to undertake further<br />

focused monitoring of settlements that limit generic entry and include a value<br />

transfer from a branded company to a generic one. However, it remains to be seen<br />

whether the Commission will follow in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)‘s<br />

footsteps.


394 The Protection of IPRs in the Pharmaceutical Market after Patent<br />

Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

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Expiration.<br />

An Analysis of the Reverse Payment Settlements in Light of Competition<br />

Law<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

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Diritto industriale, 2007, 39;<br />

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YVON A.-M.C., Settlements between brand and generic pharmaceutical<br />

companies. A reasonable antitrust analysis of reverse payments, Fordham, 2008.


INTERPLAY BETWEEN IPRS AND COMPETITION: CASE OF ICT<br />

STANDARDS 1<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Author: Larysa Kushner<br />

Supervisor: Paolisa Nebbia<br />

The aim of this paper is to examine the role competition law and policy can play in<br />

the interrelation between IPRs and ICT standards in the context of international<br />

trade. Reflecting the trend of growing number of IPR that are included in ICT<br />

standards respective issues of potential competition concerns have been intensively<br />

researched and analyzed over the last years. There is an abundant set of studies of<br />

economic and legal nature devoted to the practices of standard setting organization<br />

in different levels, including RAND, FRAND (RF), ex-ante disclosure and open<br />

standards models, competition in the networking economies, related patent pooling<br />

and cross-licensing practices, legislative and judicial approaches in the main<br />

jurisdictions towards anticompetitive licensing practicing and abuse of<br />

dominance/refusal to deal 2 . At the same time with globalization of ICT markets and<br />

1 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the <strong>WIPO</strong> and WTO officials who thought<br />

discussions and sharing of the visions on the issue have inspired and influenced on the final<br />

perspective of the paper, to Professor Marco Ricolfi , Professor Paolisa Nebbia and Profesor Craig<br />

Nard for their continuous support as well to my colleague Simon Qobo for his critical and valuable<br />

comments at the early stage of the work.<br />

2 There are just some examples: Gibson, Christopher S., Globalization and the Technology<br />

Standards Game: Balancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International<br />

Standards. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 22, p. 1401; Suffolk University Law School<br />

Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-39. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010125;<br />

Lemley, Mark A., Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations (April 2002).<br />

California Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 1889, 2002. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=310122 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.310122;Shapiro, Carl, Navigating the Patent<br />

Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting (March 2001). Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=273550 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.273550; Lemley, Mark A. and Shapiro, Carl,<br />

Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking. Texas Law Review, Vol. 85, 2007; Stanford Law and<br />

Economics Olin Working Paper No. 324. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923468;<br />

Nimmer, Raymond T., Technical Standards Setting Organizations & Competition: A Case for<br />

Deference to Markets (September 14, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473431;<br />

Layne-Farrar, Anne, Padilla, A. Jorge and Schmalensee, Richard, Pricing Patents for Licensing in<br />

Standard Setting Organisations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments (October 2006). Available<br />

at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=937930; Geradin, Damien, Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent<br />

Holders in a Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe (July 2008). Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1174922; Priest, George L., Rethinking Antitrust Law in an Age of<br />

Network Industries (2007). Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 352. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031166; Weiser, Phil, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T,<br />

Microsoft, and Beyond (February 16, 2009). Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 49, 2009; U of Colorado<br />

Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-04. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344828l; Hovenkamp, Herbert J., Patent Continuations, Patent Deception,<br />

and Standard Setting: The Rambus and Broadcom Decisions (May 2008). U Iowa Legal Studies<br />

Research Paper No. 08-25. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002l Merges, Robert


398 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

its winning importance as a strategic factor for the economic efficiency and<br />

development the antagonism between the IPR and standards emerges not just in the<br />

main jurisdictions but appears on the international level in form of conflicting<br />

interest of foreign IP right holders on technologies incorporated in ICT standards<br />

and those who would like to or is obliged to implement the standards. Recent<br />

development in the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee,<br />

UNCTAD, APEC, and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as well as the<br />

increasing attention of the <strong>WIPO</strong> Standing Committee on Patents (SCP) to the<br />

issue shows relevance and importance of IPR and standards overlapping in the<br />

context of international trade. In the light of this development the research at hand<br />

aims to analyze the role of competition law as one of the possible solution internal<br />

to the IPR system3 for possible conflicts between IPRs and ICT Standards in<br />

international trade with a special attention to the development considerations.<br />

PROBLEM SETTING: OVERVIEW OF THE FACTUAL LANDSCAPE IN<br />

THE FIELD<br />

The International Standardization Organization (ISO) defines standard as ―a<br />

document established by consensus and approved by a recognized body that<br />

provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for<br />

activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order<br />

in a given context‖ 4 . In the modern information economies ICT standards play an<br />

essential role for interoperability, security, privacy, user interfaces, platforms and<br />

architectures, content migration/data portability, content sustainability, general<br />

accessibility and thereby supporting market acceptance that all together leads to<br />

efficient and effective use of ICT applications and services. Hereby ICT standards<br />

enable innovation and prevent lock-in facilitating in the economic growth 5 .<br />

P. and Kuhn, Jeffrey M., An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards (March 2008). California<br />

Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134000<br />

3<br />

A number of possible solutions to establish a more predictable and effective interrelation between<br />

IP and Standards were identified in the <strong>WIPO</strong> Report. They include self-regulatory mechanisms<br />

within the SSOs in form of IP Policies, contractual market solutions in forms of patent pooling and<br />

cross-licensing, legislative approaches internal to the IPR system, namely patent law, such as<br />

exceptions and limitations of exclusive rights, compulsory licensing and governmental use and<br />

suggested ―license of right‖. Competition law is regarded in this context as another possible mean to<br />

invoke that presents a legislative approach external to the IPRs system..See: Standards and Patents,<br />

A report prepared by the Secretariat of <strong>WIPO</strong> for the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents<br />

Thirteenth Session Geneva, March 23 to 27, 2009 (SCP/13/2) //<br />

http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf; For comment on the report see<br />

http://keionline.org/taxonomy/term/288 ; For the analysis of the shortages of the available solutions<br />

see: Xuan Li and Baisheng An (2009) IPR Misuse: The core Issue in Standards and Patents, South<br />

Centre <strong>Publication</strong>, Geneva (Reseach Paper 21) //<br />

http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1405<br />

(Access on 20.11.2009)<br />

4<br />

EN 45020:1998 ‗Standardization and related activities - General vocabulary‘ (ISO/IEC Guide<br />

2:1996)<br />

5<br />

The Momentum of Open Standards - a Pragmatic Approach to Software Interoperability by Trond<br />

Arne Undheim and Jochen Friedrich // The European Journal of ePractice. Nº 5, October 2008. P.2


Larysa Kushner 399<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Standardization is a voluntary cooperation for the development of technical<br />

specifications based on consensus among stakeholders. Traditional way of de jure<br />

standard development is coordination and approval of standards in formal standard<br />

setting organizations (SSOs) of national, regional or international level, e.g. ANCI,<br />

CEN, CENELEC, ETSI, ITU or ISO. When a certain ICT standard is approved on<br />

the national or regional level companies are often interested in setting it as an<br />

international standard to make the technology most widely used on the globalized<br />

ICT market. At the same time responding to the particular characteristics of the<br />

ICT standards 6 , the rapid pace of innovation and short life circles of ICT<br />

technologies new forms of informal ICT SDOs (so called fora and consortia) 7<br />

emerged dramatically changing and making the landscape of ICT standardization<br />

complex and not always transparent. Winn pointes on general prevalence and more<br />

successful operation of the US originating consortia due to their market oriented<br />

approach in standard setting 8 . Additionally a right holder of a particular, especially<br />

advanced ICT technology might try intensively to commercialize and to market it<br />

with the aim of turning the respective technology through wide acceptance of the<br />

public into de facto standards even without adaptation by a formal standard setting<br />

body. When a certain ICT standard concerns crucial issues of public interest like<br />

security, privacy etc governments might approve certain standards as mandatory<br />

technical regulations (mandatory standards) obligatory for implementation by all<br />

relevant players within the jurisdiction. Otherwise industries are free to choose<br />

what technology and standard (voluntary standards) available and competing on<br />

the market to imply.<br />

While the 20th century shows rare cases of incorporation of IP in the<br />

standards the ICT e (re)-volution of the 1990 th has changed the situation<br />

significantly. Intensive practices of patent and copyright protection on the different<br />

aspects of ICT technologies has resulted in growing number of IPR included into<br />

ICT standards. Since, opposite to the exclusive nature of the IPRs, standards are<br />

made by ―everyone for use by everyone‖ 9 their potential users are diverse and<br />

numerous. Among potential implementers of ICT standards might be other<br />

technology innovators for reaching interoperability between the protected<br />

technologies in the standard with their complementary or substitute technologies or<br />

6 Shapiro and Varian identifies the magnitudes of externalities, or network effects, created by the<br />

need for interoperability of different systems and products, and the problem of switching costs, or<br />

―lock-in‖ . See Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A strategic Guide to the<br />

Network Economy 13, 104 (Harvard Business School Book Press 1999) Cited based on Jane K.<br />

Winn. Globalization and Standards: The Logic of two-Level Games. 2009<br />

7 World Wide Web Consortium (W3T) is an illustrative examples of the informal ICT SSOs that<br />

has gained the leading position in ICT field related with the Internet operation and development<br />

8 Winn, Jane K. , Globalization and Standards: The Logic of Two-Level Games (June 6, 2009). I/S:<br />

Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 2009. P.8-10Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415424 (Access on 19.01.2010),<br />

9 Study of the Specific Policy Needs for ICT Standardisation. Final Report. Brussels. 2007. P.108-<br />

109 // http://ictstandardisation.eu/full_report.pdf (Access on 13.11.2010)


400 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

products 10 as well as manufacturers of the ICT goods. Beside this, government<br />

agencies, network service and multimedia content providers and related vendors<br />

can be interested in or forced to implement the standards. If an IP protected<br />

technology is incorporated into a standard it is impossible for the implementer to<br />

comply with the standard without employing the protected technology and<br />

requiring a license. This overlap between patent and standards due to their different<br />

philosophy and nature arise tension when implementation of a standard calls for the<br />

use of the patent protected technology. Besides the ICT technology boom of the<br />

1990 th a number of economic factors are named as increasing this tension in recent<br />

years. Thus, separation of technology input production from technology<br />

implementation and appearance of separate technology markets and markets for the<br />

technology based goods with proliferation of IPR-based business models is<br />

identified as the most influencing factor. The global IPR explosion and arguably<br />

declining quality of patents together with the amalgamation of different ICT<br />

sectors, e.g. hardware and software, content and technology, telecommunications<br />

and computers also influence on the growing tension area between ICT standards<br />

and IP 11 .<br />

It should be also considered that participation in the standard setting activities<br />

especially on international level requires technical capacity and recourses that is<br />

demanding and challenging task for many countries, but is of special difficulty for<br />

developing and transitional countries. As the result the field leading transnational<br />

corporations are often the most active players which are capable to influence<br />

national and international standardization and introduce their technologies into new<br />

standards From the perspective of international trade possibility to set a standard<br />

correlates with facilitated access to the international ICT market due to the lower<br />

transaction and production costs and possibility to control over the ICT products<br />

manufacturing and trading 12 . Such overlapping might cause closing or capturing of<br />

a standard by a number of strong right holders on the technology generating a<br />

potential for high or abusive fees that in many cases can be considered tantamount<br />

to refusal to deal, or discriminatory pricing. In light of globalization of ICT market,<br />

and quick restructuring of the ICT industry and shift to new countries (China and<br />

India are identified as major suppliers of information and communications<br />

technology (ICT)-related goods and services in 2008 13 , while other Asian countries<br />

10<br />

Samuelson, Pamela, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability? Minnesota Law<br />

Review, Forthcoming; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1323838. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838 (Access on 23.01.2010)<br />

11<br />

Comments to the 19 November Workshop by Center for European Law and Economics (Mattias<br />

Ganslandt) //<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=3679&userserv<br />

ice_id=1&request.id=0 (Access on 23.01.2010)<br />

12<br />

Addressing the Interface between Patents and Technical Standards in International Trade<br />

Discussions policy brief. Number 3. February 2009. UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and<br />

Sustainable Development. P. 5-7 // http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iprs_pb20093_en.pdf (Access<br />

on 20.02.2010)<br />

13<br />

OECD Information Technology Outlook. 2008. //<br />

http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_33757_41892820_1_1_1_1,00.html (Access on<br />

8.12.10)


Larysa Kushner 401<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

and some South American courtiers also actively develop their ICT industries) this<br />

tension should be understood and considered by the developing and transitional<br />

countries in terms of consequences for the national economies and participation<br />

in the international trade of ICT goods and services.<br />

A case of China is a representative illustration in these considerations. While<br />

China had a strong industry for manufacturing DVD players, these particular ICT<br />

products incorporate standards that require special decoder chips technology that is<br />

protected by patents. Consequently, Chinese DVD player manufacturers had to pay<br />

royalty fees to the international patent holders that represent about 20 to 50 percent<br />

of production costs. It makes the Chinese ICT goods not compatible on the<br />

international market, while any attempt to export the DVD players based on the<br />

reverse-engineered technology has faced a law suite or border measures 14 .<br />

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK<br />

Intellectual property law and policy is shaped nowadays by international law<br />

that prescribes an extensive minimum standard of protection by means on<br />

international treaties, in particular the WTO TRIPs Agreement of the. Beside this<br />

even more extensive protection for intellectual property (TRIPs Plus standards) are<br />

introduced through coercion or as pre-condition to preserve or get access to larger<br />

markets 15 in the context of free trade agreements or bilateral investment treaties. At<br />

the moment there are no special references in the IPR system set by international<br />

treaties specially dealing with standards. An interesting example of special<br />

regulation dealing with the interoperability in software provides EU Software<br />

Directive 16 .<br />

Though strategic role of standards for international trade was recognized<br />

already in GATT 17 , mandatory obligations governing technical standards were<br />

introduced only in a special Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT<br />

14 Addressing the Interface between Patents and Technical Standards in International Trade<br />

Discussions policy brief. Number 3. February 2009. UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on APRs and<br />

Sustainable Development. P. 7-8 // http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iprs_pb20093_en.pdf (Access<br />

on 20.02.2010)<br />

15 E.g. see analysis of Nicaragua and Jordan FTAs the US, and the EC Mexico FTA in ―Bilaterism<br />

in Intellectual Property‖ by Peter Drahos, 2001<br />

//www.marketradefare.com/assets/English/bilaterism.pdf (Access on 23.01.2010)<br />

16 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parlament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal<br />

protection of computer programs. See analysis in comparative perspective with the US approach in<br />

Samuelson, Pamela, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?. Minnesota Law Review,<br />

Forthcoming; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1323838. P.19-27<br />

//http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838 (Access on 23.01.2010)<br />

17 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade //http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17tbt.pdf<br />

(Access on 13.12.2009) Charnovitz, Steve, International Standards and the WTO (March<br />

29, 2005). GWU Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 133. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=694346 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.694346 (Access on 23.01.2010) ; The<br />

Course on Dispute Settlement in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property. WTO.<br />

3.10 Technical Barriers to Trade // http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add22_en.pdf<br />

(Access on 23.01.2010)


402 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Agreement) 18 as a part WTO trade law system. It stipulates the obligation of the<br />

members to use existing international standards as a basis for their technical<br />

regulations, except when such international standards would be an ineffective or<br />

inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued 19 .<br />

Thus both IP and Standards are covered by the WTO international trade law<br />

but there is a gap related to their overlapping and conflicting tension that might<br />

arise when states carry their obligations or use the flexibilities under both<br />

Agreements. Experience of China illustrates possible related areas conflicts of<br />

interests within this two field of WTO trade law. Learning on the case of DVD<br />

production about possible competitive disadvantages in the international ICT<br />

market because of to the IP rights in ICT standards, China decided to implement its<br />

own domestic security standard WAPI and tried to introduce it on the international<br />

level facing strong pressure from the related WIFI community and main trade<br />

partners 20 . While a possibility to bring a case before the WTO was mentioned the<br />

situation was solved by diplomatic means. China submitted a proposal to the WTO<br />

Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade inviting Member States to discuss the<br />

IPR issues in standardization so as to develop proper approaches and policies to<br />

promote the development and implementation of international standards 21 . The<br />

proposal was practically blocked and since then the issue has not been discussed<br />

again in the WTO. It is remarkable that when analyzing the WAPI case and making<br />

a suggestion about introducing a special link between the IP and Standards in the<br />

TBT, Gibson argues that presence of IP right in the international ICT standards<br />

hardly would be a justification for implementation a national standard disregarding<br />

the existing international standard 22 . The current legislative initiative of China on<br />

the national standard activities is kept in focus by many interested parties 23<br />

18 Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, Annex 3 to<br />

WTO Agreement requires that technical regulations and international standards should be developed<br />

and implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, and without creating unnecessary obstacles to<br />

trade.<br />

19 In terminology of TBT technical regulations are mandatory while international standards are not.<br />

20 DeLacey, Brian J., Herman, Kerry, Kiron, David J., Lerner, Josh and Lo, Wai-Shun, Government<br />

Intervention in Standardization: The Case of WAPI (September 2006). Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=930930 ; Gibson, Christopher S., Technology Standards - New Technical<br />

Barriers to Trade?. The Standards Edge: Golden Mean, Sherrie Bolin, ed., 2007. Available at<br />

SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=960059 (Access on 12.01.2010)<br />

21 See: Intellectual Property Right Issues in Standardization, ―a Communication from the Peoples<br />

Republic of China‖ to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (Reference<br />

no.G/tbt/WW/251 and no.G/tbt/WW/251Add.1)<br />

22 Gibson, Christopher S., Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns<br />

of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards. Berkeley Technology Law<br />

Journal, Vol. 22, p. 1401; Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-39.<br />

P. 75-83 // Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010125 (Access on 20.02.2010)<br />

23 China Standards and IPR Chapter. John Ure. Telecommunications Research Project. University of<br />

Hong Kong // www.trp.trpc.com.hk/papers/2006/china_ipr_stds_2006.pdf ; China‘s Standards And<br />

Patent Innovation Proposals: Problems For IPR And Global Trade? By Dr. Ruth Taplin<br />

//http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/12/21/china%E2%80%99s-standards-and-patentinnovation-proposals-problems-for-ipr-and-global-trade/;<br />

Take Two: China‘s Proposed Regulations<br />

For Patent-Involving National Standards By George T. Willingmyre, P.E. // http://www.ip-


Larysa Kushner 403<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

As for the competition policy and IP, though it took more then hundred years<br />

of evolution of theoretical and legislative approaches 24 it has been already for long<br />

regarded in developed countries as an external but complementary tool to the IP<br />

system that might be used for counterbalancing extensive IPRs for the common<br />

objective of promoting technical progress for the benefit of consumers and society<br />

at large. Nevertheless because of the differences in national approaches all attempts<br />

during the 20 th century to introduce on the international level a set of agreed norms<br />

dealing with anticompetitive practices has failed so far 25 .<br />

In this context it is remarkable that though some antitrust rules can be found<br />

in the GATS regulating telecommunication, TRIPs Agreement is the most<br />

important agreement pertaining to competition law in the multilateral system 26 . The<br />

role of competition policy for IP is reflected in Articles 8.2, 31(k) and 40 of the<br />

TRIPS. Article 8.2. recognizes the right of the states to take appropriate measures,<br />

provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, which be<br />

needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the<br />

resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the<br />

international transfer of technology. Thus respecting the only limitation implied by<br />

TRIPs Agreement, namely principle of proportionality, the WTO members have a<br />

very large extent severing to make, implement and enforce competition rules.<br />

Article 40 of the TRIPs Agreement deals with contractual licenses and<br />

stipulates that ―some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to IPRs which<br />

restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer<br />

and dissemination of technology‖ and thus might be defined as illegal. As<br />

examples of such practices the TRIPs Agreement refers to exclusive grant back<br />

conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package<br />

licensing, the refusal to license, the discriminatory grant of licenses and the<br />

imposition of discriminatory terms, as well as restrictive conditions in general 27 .<br />

Important operational competition policy provisions are to be found in the<br />

Article 31 related to compulsory licensing in respect to patents. Article 31 leaves<br />

the members freedom to define motives for compulsory licensing but sets detailed<br />

watch.org/weblog/2009/12/21/take-two-china%E2%80%99s-proposed-regulations-for-patentinvolving-national-standards/;<br />

see also public comments on China National Institute of<br />

Standardization (CNIS)―Notice of Intent to Solicit Comments on National Standard ―Disposal Rules<br />

for Inclusion of Patents in National Standards‖ (Draft) at GTW Associates //<br />

www.gtwassociates.com/.../CNISProposal.html (Access on 12/02.2010)<br />

24 Innovation for the 21 st century: harnessing the power of the intellectual property and antitrust law<br />

/ Carrier, M.A. Oxford University Press. 2009 P.71-99<br />

25 Competition Law and the World Trade Organization: The Limits of Multilateralism by Kevon. C.<br />

Kennedy, London. Sweet & Maxwell. 2001 P.127-180<br />

26 Thomas Cottier, Christophe Germann, Teaching IP, Unfair Competition and Anti-Trust Law<br />

//Teaching of intellectual property. Principles and Methods. Edited by Yo Takagi, Larry Allman,<br />

Mpazi A. Sinjela. Cambridge University Press.<strong>WIPO</strong> 2008 P. 158<br />

27 See detailed analysis in Pires de Carvalho, Nuno. The TRIPS regime of antitrust and<br />

undisclosed information.. - The Hague : Kluwer law international, 2008.


404 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

conditions to respect if States grant compulsory licensing. According to the<br />

paragraph 31(k) where compulsory license aims to remedy a practice determined<br />

after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive, members are not<br />

obliged to apply with the following conditions: (b) requirement of showing that a<br />

proposed user has made efforts to obtain voluntary authorization from the right<br />

holder on reasonable terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been<br />

successful within a reasonable period of time; (f) requirement that any such use<br />

shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market, that in<br />

other words implies possibility of exportation of the product. The provision entitles<br />

to reduction of the amount of remuneration in such cases and the refusal of<br />

termination of such authorization when conditions which led to the compulsory<br />

license are likely to recur. At the same time either Article 8 (2) nor Article 40 (2)<br />

indicates that specific practices shall be treated as abuses or specific remedial<br />

measures that must be taken 28 .<br />

Thus international regulatory framework provide the Members with a wide<br />

freedom to apply competition policies for rebalancing exercising of IPRs that<br />

restrains competition in their economies giving just some frames for it and leaving<br />

the details of that balance for the national level. The developed countries have a<br />

long and extensive experience of application of the competition law in general and<br />

to IP in particular. Nevertheless the discussion on the proper balance between<br />

competition and IP never ends there reflecting the dynamic and evolving nature of<br />

their interplay. Reflecting different socio-economic interest national practices in the<br />

main jurisdictions, e.g. the US, Canada, EU, Japan, though having certain<br />

approaches in commons, varies significantly. Jurisprudence generally develops<br />

case by case the detailed analysis within general national legislation on<br />

competition. In order to provide the industries with some predictability major<br />

jurisdictions, have developed a number of guidelines on national enforcement<br />

policies introducing certain safe harbors and block exemptions 29 though certain<br />

level of harmonization was thereby achieved, as UNCTAD report identifies, a<br />

global harmonization of the interface between competition policy and IPR seems<br />

unlikely in the near terms 30 . Due to very limited practice of application of<br />

competition law to the IP and those incorporated in ICT standards in developing<br />

and transitional countries the national practice of the developed countries would be<br />

28 Anderson, Robert D. Competition policy and intellectual property in the WTO: more guidance<br />

needed? / Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law. Josef Drexl (Ed).<br />

Edward Elgar. 2008 P. 456<br />

29 E.g. US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission ―Antitrust Guidelines‖ for<br />

Licensing of Intellectual Property, 6 April 1995; Commission Notice –Guidelines on the<br />

application of the Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, OJ 2004 No. C<br />

101, p.2; Canadian Competition Bureau ―Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines‖, 2000;<br />

Japanese fair Trade Commission (1999), ―Guidelines for Patent and Know-How Licensing<br />

Agreements under Anti-Monopoly Act‖, 30 July 1999; Japanese Fair Trade Commission<br />

‖Guidelines on Standardization and Patent Pool Arrangements‖, 2005<br />

30 Competition policy and the exercise of intellectual property rights. Report by the UNCTAD<br />

Secretariat. TD/B/COM.2.CLP/68. P.5 // http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clpd68_en.pdf (Access<br />

on 12.01.2010)


Larysa Kushner 405<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

introduced further following with some considerations for the developing<br />

countries.<br />

NATIONAL APPLICATION<br />

In the context of ICT standards and IP different situations arise and were<br />

addressed in the main jurisdictions when through activities of the IP holders on<br />

different stages of the standard development and following implementation of ICT<br />

standards competition might be hindered. Among them are activities of the<br />

participants during the standards setting procedures, patent pooling and cross<br />

licensing related to ICT standards, as well as refusal to provide access to essential<br />

for the implementation of standard IPRs. Relevant set of specific case law has been<br />

developed that might be considered by the developing and transitional countries.<br />

Prohibition of Certain Agreements or Practices Restraining Competition<br />

In relation to the standard setting practices the attention of the competition<br />

authorities might be attracted for companies collaboration in the framework of<br />

SSOs IPRs which are called to prevent ―patent hold-up‖ or ―patent-ambush‖ on the<br />

technologies included in the standard and to prevent enforcement of related patents<br />

rights it in a manner that would discouraging the implementation of standard. The<br />

provisions of such policies might involve two non exclusive categories: disclosure<br />

rules and licensing rules 31 . Non-disclose of essential patents involves<br />

considerations if unilateral conduct of failing to disclose or by deceptive conduct of<br />

concealing or not adequate disclosing with following aggressive enforcement and<br />

licensing practices harms competition 32 . Number of cases in the US involved issues<br />

of non-disclose of essential patents, namely In re Dell33, In re Union Oil Co of<br />

Cal (Unical)34.In re Rambus35, Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.36. In number<br />

31 E.g. at the international level the ITU, the ISO and the IEC in 2007 established a Common Patent<br />

Policy which provides a harmonized approach to address the inclusion of patented technology in<br />

standards. The Policy states that any party participating in the standardization should, as early as<br />

possible during the development of standards, draw the attention of the ITU/ISO/IEC to any known<br />

essential patent or pending application which may be owned or applied by them or by another party.<br />

Licensing rules of the Policy intend to assure the terms and conditions that IP holders can demand,<br />

such as which are reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) or sometimes on royalty-free terms.<br />

The ITU/ISO/IEC Common Patent Policy and its Guidelines // http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/<br />

32 It should be also considered that depending on national law other legal mechanisms may be<br />

available to deal with the hold up in the context of SSOs, e.g. in the US the it may be depending on<br />

the factual situation may be actions for fraud, contractual actions, doctrine of equitable estoppel,<br />

doctrine of implied license or patent misuse. See Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property<br />

Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade<br />

Commission, April 2007, p. 44<br />

33 Decision and Order, In re Dell 121 F.T.C.<br />

34 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: In the Matter of Union Oil Company of California,<br />

Dkt. No. 9395 and Chevron/Unical File No. 051-0125<br />

35 In re Rambus, Inc., No.9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at 67. To be noted that In 2008 the D.C.<br />

Circuit reversed this decision finding that JEDEC might have adopted Rambus‘s technology even<br />

absent of any deception and therefore any ―loss of an opportunity to seek favorable licensing terms‖<br />

did not constitute ―antitrust harm‖. Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C. 522 F.3d 456, 466-67 (D.C. Cir.2008)


406 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

of these cases a right holder were prevented from enforcing its patent and<br />

demanding royalties against those implemented the standard because of nondisclosure<br />

of patents and therefore deceptive conduct that causes illegal obtaining<br />

of monopoly power. At the same time, it also became obvious that issue of<br />

―toothless disclosure policy‖ of SSOs due to its common vague wording is crucial.<br />

As a result after D.C. Circuit Rambus Opinion (Apr. 2008) that vacated the FTC<br />

Decision on the issues the courts in the US express reluctance to make IPRs<br />

unenforceable based on violation of vague disclosure policies 37 ..<br />

Ex-Ante Negotiation and Disclosure of Licensing Terms involves joined<br />

conduct and evaluation whether ex ante negotiation of licensing terms by SSO<br />

participants that might be required by the SSOs 38 hinder competition. Due to the<br />

strong potential for precompetitive benefits joined ex ante negotiations for<br />

establishing the licensing terms are normally evaluated under the rule of reason.<br />

Therefore as long as such ex ante discussions don‘t turn into a sham to cover up<br />

naked agreement on the licensing terms that each IP holder will offer the SSO or to<br />

reach side price-fixing agreements, their strong competitive effect might be<br />

prevailing. At the same the case of Nokia Corp. versus InterDigital Technology<br />

Corporation 2006 39 shows that it might be also not an easy task for a court to<br />

decide whether patents declared to be essential to an international standard actually<br />

are essential. To be noted that In re Negotiated Data Solutions 40 related to<br />

aggressive practices of enforcement of a parent on the technology included in the<br />

widely spread computer networking standard by the successor of the original right<br />

holder, who negotiated and later on followed the RAND, FTC found an unfair<br />

method of competition and unfair act of practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act<br />

but not the violation of the of the Sherman Act 41<br />

36 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).<br />

37 U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Policies Involving IPR and Standards by Suzanne Michel //<br />

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=3631&userserv<br />

ice_id=1&request.id=0; Hovenkamp, Herbert J., Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and<br />

Standard Setting: The Rambus and Broadcom Decisions (May 2008). U Iowa Legal Studies<br />

Research Paper No. 08-25. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002 (Access on<br />

20.02.2010)<br />

38 Acknowledging the importance of ex ante practices and in order to minimize the risk of violation<br />

of the competition law during ex ante disclosures of licensing terms by licensors of essential IPRs<br />

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) provides Guidelines for Antitrust<br />

Compliance, which contains background information on competition law in Europe, implication of<br />

competition law for ETSI and its members, as well a short list of ―do‘s‖ and ―don‘ts‖ for the<br />

participants in the standard-setting process, available at<br />

http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/IPRsInETSI/IPRsinETSI.aspx<br />

39 Nokia Corp v Interdigital Technology Corp, Court of Appeal - Patents Court, December 21, 2007,<br />

[2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat); Nokia v IDC: an essentially English judgment by Jelf and Stevenson //<br />

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice.2008; 3: 457-46<br />

40 Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008 WL 258308 (FTC, Jan. 22, 2008)<br />

41 The decision is nevertheless controversial that is reflected in the disserting statement of the<br />

former Chairman of the FTC, who worried about not correct identification of meaningful limiting<br />

principle‖ for the determination an unfair method of competition, allegation of improper or<br />

exclusionary conduct as well as existence of market power.


Larysa Kushner 407<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

What concerns Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the area of ICT<br />

Standards, the overall trend in jurisprudence from the main jurisdictions, mainly<br />

US and EU is to treat such practices on case-by-case or ―rule of reason‖ basis. In<br />

the US both types of agreements under the rule of reason considering their<br />

procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects focusing on the relationship<br />

between pooled technology and their relationship with technologies outside the<br />

pool. Combining complementary patents within a pool is generally regarded to be<br />

precompetitive, while including substitute patents in a pool does not make the pool<br />

presumptively anticompetitive and the effects will be ascertained on the rule of<br />

reasoning 42 . According to the European approach the stronger the market position<br />

of the pool is the greater is the competition risk. Pools that hold a dominant<br />

position on the market royalties and other licensing terms should be open and nondiscriminatory<br />

(in general terms); licensees and licensors must be free to develop<br />

competing technologies and to grant and obtain licenses outside the patent; grantback<br />

obligation obligations should be non-exclusive and be limited to<br />

developments that are essential or important to the use of the pooled technologies<br />

independent experts or licensed administrator for the institutional arrangement (e.g.<br />

organization and operation) of the pool 43 .<br />

Unilateral refusal to license essential patents and compulsory licenses to<br />

remedy anti-competitive practices: It is an understanding that the unilateral right to<br />

refuse to grant a patent license is a core part of the patent right. Nevertheless in<br />

certain circumstances the owner of an IPR can be compelled as a matter of<br />

competition law to grant a license to a third party. ―Essentially facility doctrine‖,<br />

originally developed by jurisprudence n the US and that is not limited to the IP,<br />

may be used to impose restrictions on companies exclusively controlling an<br />

essential facility (e.g. infrastructure as a port, railway or a bus station, a network).<br />

Pires de Carvalho claimes e.g. that in context of ICT standards the ―essential<br />

facility‖ doctrine might plays important role in cases concerning mandatory<br />

standards 44 , since regulatory requirement to use specific technology is stipulated<br />

and competitors cannot adopt different technical solution. In case of voluntary ICT<br />

standards access the patented technology wouldn‘t be indispensible.<br />

In general although compulsory licenses were often used in the US 45 the<br />

interface between the antitrust law and intellectual property law appears more rigid<br />

in the IS the in the EU, in part because the US has not adopted the European<br />

42<br />

E.g. in 1998 FTC challenged a pool created by Summit Technology Inc. and Visx Inc on the<br />

ground that it was anticompetitive.<br />

43<br />

Geradin, Damien, Abusive Pricing in an IP Licensing Context: An EC Competition Law Analysis<br />

(June 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=996491<br />

44<br />

Pires de Carvalho, Nuno. The TRIPS regime of antitrust and undisclosed information. . - The<br />

Hague : Kluwer law international, 2008. P.146<br />

45<br />

Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploring Some Issues of Relevance to Developing<br />

Countries, by Carlos M. Correa, ICTSD Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series<br />

By Carlos M. Correa, Issue Paper No. 21, October 2007 ICTSD Programme on IPRs and<br />

Sustainable Development, October 2007, P. 20 //<br />

http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/corea_Oct07.pdf (Access on 20.02.2010)


408 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

doctrine of abuse if a dominant position After public hearings and the Supreme<br />

Court Trinko 46 decision the general consensus in the US is that unconditional<br />

refusal to license did not violate the competition law. However conditional refusals<br />

to license that cause competitive harm are subject to antitrust liability 47 . Number<br />

cases were decided that involved in certain extend IP issues and standards and in<br />

some of the ―essential facility‖ doctrine or similar reasoning was invoked. Data<br />

General v. Grumman Systems Support Corp. 48 ; Image Technical Services Inc. v.<br />

Eastman Kodak Co 49 ., In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation<br />

(Xerox). It should be noticed that in a recent decision in eBAY Inc et al v.<br />

Mercexchange 50 , the US Supreme Court denied injunctive relief in case of patent<br />

infringement and the decision effectively amounts to granting a compulsory license<br />

on ―equity‖ grounds 51 .<br />

In Europe courts may well impose a duty to license that interferes with the<br />

scope of the IPR in the exceptional circumstances required are presented 52 .<br />

Representative cases in this context are IBM 53 , Magill and IMS Health 54 , Microsoft<br />

2004, 2007 55 as well as an example of current investigation on the Microsoft<br />

document standards.<br />

DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE<br />

Developing countries may draw some lessons from the applications of the<br />

competition law to IP in the developed countries and they are free to elaborate their<br />

own approaches on the matter responding their social and public needs. Microsoftinvolved<br />

cases in developing countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Croatia,<br />

46<br />

Verizon Communication inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (Trinko) 540 U.S. 398<br />

(2004)<br />

47<br />

Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition,<br />

U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2007, p.15-32<br />

48<br />

Data Gen.Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Corp., 761 F.Supp. 185 (D.Mass. 1991)<br />

49<br />

Image Technical Services Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co 504 U.S. 451 (1992).<br />

50<br />

MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).<br />

51 Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploring Some Issues of Relevance to Developing<br />

Countries, by Carlos M. Correa, ICTSD Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series<br />

By Carlos M. Correa, Issue Paper No. 21, October 2007 ICTSD Programme on IPRs and<br />

Sustainable Development, October 2007, P. 2 //<br />

http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/corea_Oct07.pdf (Access on 20.02.2010)<br />

52<br />

Gallego, Beatriz Conde, Unilateral refusal to license indispensable intellectual property rights US<br />

and EU approaches / Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law. Josef<br />

Drexl (Ed). Edward Elgar. 2008 P. 215-238<br />

53<br />

In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979)<br />

54<br />

RTE & ITP v. Commission, 1995 ECR I-743 (ECJ); IMS Health v.NDC Health, 2004 ECR I-<br />

5039 (ECJ)<br />

55<br />

European Commission Decision 2007/53/EC relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 83 [EC]<br />

and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement Against Microsoft Corp., Case COMP/C-3.37.792—<br />

Microsoft), OJ 2007 L 32, p. 23 (March 24, 2004). The Commission‘s order was affirmed in<br />

Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case No. T-201/04, Court of First<br />

Instance, Sept. 17, 2007


Larysa Kushner 409<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

present enacting and application of the national competition law that serves<br />

national development goals within the available flexibilities 56 .<br />

In reality application of competition policy to IP is one of the most complex<br />

and technically challenging area of competition law and might be difficult task for<br />

the developing countries, especially having no or little tradition of the application<br />

of competition law and policies in general. According to the UNCTAD Report<br />

there are competition cases in the developing and transitional countries are rare and<br />

even smaller amount of them is dealing with IP 57 . In case of IP, developing<br />

countries are being led into a highly complex multilateral/bilateral web of<br />

intellectual property standards that are progressively eroding and they must balance<br />

the interest of domestic industry and innovation capacity within the TRIPs<br />

flexibilities.<br />

It should be also considered that competition law enforcement by developing<br />

countries especially in cases involving interests of foreign and transnational IP<br />

holders, what is almost always the case in case of ICT standards, might face<br />

external obstacles and fear of some kind of retaliation or other pressure. While<br />

situations of anticompetitive practices in SSO as well as in patent pooling and<br />

cross-licensing are so far of minor relevance in the areas of ICT standards for the<br />

developing and transitional countries use of competition law for rebalancing the<br />

exercise of the foreign IP right incorporated in the standard might be of most<br />

interest for them might be. A rare but important example of seeking balance by the<br />

developing countries for a appropriate balance between IP protection and national<br />

public interests, besides others invoking competition law, were the cases of grating<br />

compulsory licenses in the public health area, e.g. by South Africa or Brazil 58 that<br />

facilitated the negotiation of the Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs<br />

Agreement and public health. Reliance upon competition remedies such as<br />

permitted in Article 31(k) of the TRIPS to access to IPR technology incorporated in<br />

ICT standards, especially for the further exportation of the ICT products, might be<br />

problematic and challenging for the developing world.59. The case of strong<br />

negative reaction from the European Commission on the providing by the national<br />

authority compulsory licenses on five patents on the core technology used in CD-<br />

56 Nguyen, Tu T. and Lidgard, Hans Henrik Gunnar, WTO Competition Law Revisited: From<br />

TRIPS Competition Flexibilities and Singapore Issues to the WTO Agenda of a Post-Doha Round<br />

(May 1, 2009). Lund University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009:51. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1455366<br />

57 Abuse of Dominance. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. TD/B/Com./CLP/66. 2008 P/ 13-15 //<br />

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clpd66_en.pdf (Access on 23.01.2010)<br />

58 Competition policy and the exercise of intellectual property rights. Report by the UNCTAD<br />

Secretariat. TD/B/COM.2.CLP/68. P.5 // http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clpd68_en.pdf P.6-7<br />

(Access on 12.01.2010)<br />

59 Nguyen, Tu T. and Lidgard, Hans Henrik Gunnar, WTO Competition Law Revisited: From<br />

TRIPS Competition Flexibilities and Singapore Issues to the WTO Agenda of a Post-Doha Round<br />

(May 1, 2009). Lund University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009:51. Available at SSRN:<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1455366 P.11


410 Interplay between IPRs and Competion: Case of ICT Standards<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Rs owned by Philips to the Taiwanese company Gigastorage60 can show that it<br />

might be sensitive issue for the developing countries. As Anderson argues, in the<br />

absence if the unified competition law on the international level61., development of<br />

certain additional agreed guidelines on the enforcement issues in IP and<br />

competition area, whatever their form might be, might be one of the possible and<br />

desirable way to confer legitimacy on (well-founded) interventions by developing<br />

country competition authorities with respect to anticompetitive abuse of IPRs62.<br />

Besides this it should be also noted that competition law matter related<br />

matters may be also the subject of TRIPS-plus agreements. The US has recently<br />

introduced stipulations in free trade/investment agreements, limiting compulsory<br />

licensing as a perceived threat to US interests. For example, the Jordan FTA<br />

provision on compulsory licensing is more restrictive than the equivalent provision<br />

in TRIPS or NAFTA 63 . This may also extend to compulsory licensing as a<br />

competition law remedy. 64 .<br />

CONCLUSIONS<br />

The relation between completion and IP is a complex one, that requires a<br />

proper balance between the means and objectives of two for the general goal of<br />

technical innovation and economic growth. This relation implies operational<br />

tension that has been a subject for analysis and evolving consideration in the<br />

developed countries on all stages of development of national IP systems. It gives<br />

possibility to the leading jurisdictions on the case by case basis effectively apply<br />

competition law to the issues of IP incorporated in the ICT standards in the<br />

framework of their national socio-economic traditions. On the international level<br />

while a way of effective protection of related interests of IPRs holders on essential<br />

technologies incorporated in ICT standards based on violation of TRIPs Agreement<br />

and additionally TBT agreement is open and actively used (so far as an effective<br />

threat) by developed countries where the main right holder on incorporated in ICT<br />

60 Liu, Kung-Chung, Rationalizing the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by the Essential<br />

Facilities Doctrine // IIC Vol.39., 7/2008 P.761-764; EU Threatens Taiwan With WTO Case Over<br />

Law On Compulsory Licences // http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/01/31/eu-threatens-taiwanwith-wto-case-over-law-on-compulsory-licences/<br />

61 More on Competition Law within the WTO system see: Interaction between Trade and<br />

Competition Policy http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm; Abbott, Frederick<br />

M Are the competition rules in the WTO TRIPs Agreement adequate? // Journal of International<br />

Economic Law 7 (3), 2004. 687-703; Gerber, David J. Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking<br />

the Relationship // Journal of International Economic Law 10(3), 2007. 707–724<br />

62 Anderson, Robert D. Competition policy and intellectual property in the WTO: more guidance<br />

needed? / Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law. Josef Drexl (Ed).<br />

Edward Elgar. 2008 P. 459<br />

63 Bilaterism in Intellectual Property‖ by Peter Drahos, 2001 P.14<br />

//www.marketradefare.com/assets/English/bilaterism.pdf (Access on 23.01.2010)<br />

64 US model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2004. Available per:<br />

www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf See also Barton, J. H. (2008) ‗Antitrust, Patents,<br />

and Developing Nations‘. In: Netanel, N. W. ed. The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual<br />

Property and Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press at 408-409.


Larysa Kushner 411<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

standards technologies are originated there is almost absent international<br />

framework in the field of competition. Though it is provides wide freedom for the<br />

developing and transitional countries to implement competition law and policy as a<br />

counterbalancing tool for strong IP protection, including the cases of IP on ICT<br />

standards, learning on the experience of the developed countries, the task might be<br />

too challenging for them and the result of reliance on competition law, although<br />

might work for the local ICT market, appears to be not sufficiently predictable in<br />

the context of international trade. Identification of common interest of all members<br />

on the international level in area of completion in any achievable some form is<br />

required in response to globalization driven by technological innovation. Till that<br />

time and gaining of appropriate experience in the area of competition by the<br />

developing and transitional countries it hardly can be used by them with all its<br />

positive potential to rebalance the interests in the interplay of IP and ICT standards<br />

in the context of international trade and should be supplemented by agreed<br />

solutions within already internationally unified legal framework of IP system and<br />

partly unified framework for standardization.


CHALLENGE(S) OF ACCESS TO PATENTED TECHNOLOGIES<br />

INCORPORATED IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION<br />

TECHNOLOGIES (ICTS) STANDARDS: APPLICATION OF<br />

COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY<br />

1. ABSTRACT<br />

2. INTRODUCTION: ISSUES<br />

by<br />

Simon Z. Qobo 1<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

3. THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR LIMITS<br />

3.1. Legislative Approach within the IPRs System<br />

3.2. Common Patent Policy of the Internaitonal SSOs<br />

4. THE ALTERNATIVE POLICY: APPROCH AND LOCUS OF CHANGE<br />

4.1. The Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

4.2. Linkage of the Standard-Setting Process with the WTO Technical<br />

Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT)<br />

5. SYNTHESIS OF PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS THE THEIR DRAWBACKS<br />

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

1 Simon Z. Qobo is currently, an employee (Assistant Director: Economic Relations and Trade) in<br />

the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa.


414 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

Information and Communicatin Technoologies (ICTS) Standards:<br />

Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

1. ABSTRACT<br />

The paper examines the interface between the competition law (policies) and<br />

intellectual property rights to enable access to IP protected technologies<br />

incorporated in the ICT standards. These two policy areas are widely viewed as<br />

complementary, sharing a common objective of promoting technical progress for<br />

the benefit of consumers and society at large. A theoretical obstacle and a source of<br />

controversy between intellectual property and competition law is the<br />

monopolization inherent in intellectual property rights. The challenges related to<br />

the interaction between intellectual property and competition law are basically<br />

rooted in the apparent antinomy of respective goals such as fostering innovation<br />

through the attribution of exclusive rights on the one hand, and preserving freedom<br />

of access to the market, on the other. This situation poses a great challenge of<br />

access to IP protected technologies incorporated in ICT standards. This then<br />

necessitates the application of competition law and policy to safeguard the interest<br />

of consumers and SMEs which play a crucial role in job creation.<br />

The limited access to IP protected technologies incorporated in the ICT<br />

standards affect mostly the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly<br />

from developing countries since most of them are manufacturers of the ICT<br />

products. The developing countries‘ SMEs have both small and negligible IP assets<br />

due to their limited research and development (R&D) capacity. The developed<br />

countries‘ SMEs on the other hand, have IP asset-portfolios that may be used for<br />

cross licensing in order to bargain for lower royalties and other favourable terms.<br />

This is also confirmed by looking at the number of patents filed by developed<br />

countries‘ enterprises compared to developing countries. In this connection, the<br />

paper will demonstrate the limitations of the existing policy solutions and explore a<br />

possibility of employing competition law and policy to enable access to standards<br />

incorporating IP protected technologies.<br />

2. INTRODUCTION: ISSUES<br />

The ICT firms collaborate to establish ICT standards by working through<br />

standard-setting organizations (SSOs) to develop a standard that all firms can use<br />

in making (ICT) products. These standards incorporate intellectual property (IP)<br />

protected technologies often referred to as patented technologies. The agreement to<br />

set an ICT standard helps ICT firms avoid many costs and delays resulting from<br />

standard conflicts, thus substantially reducing transaction costs for consumers and<br />

firms 2 . Standards are crucial for manufacturing of ICT products for export due to<br />

their interoperability. It is more profitable to manufacture standardized ICT<br />

products for global export to earn sufficient revenues to pay for royalties.<br />

2 Competition concerns when patents are incorporated into collaboratively set standards, ―in Anti<br />

Trust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights‖, United States Department of Justice and<br />

Federal Trade Commission, Published in April 2007 by BiblioBazaar (United States) Page34.


Simon Z. Qobo 415<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The most essential objective in standard-setting is the encouragement of<br />

innovation and wide implementation of standards, taking into account the interests<br />

of: (i) patent holders in exploiting and enjoying benefits of their patents; (ii) third<br />

party producers (users) which want to make and sell products compatible with the<br />

relevant standards at a reasonable price or lower royalty payments; and (iii) the<br />

public which seeks affordable and interoperable products 3 . In this context, it is a<br />

difficult task to balance the interests of the abovementioned stakeholders.<br />

Generally, standards are referred as a ―document approved by a recognized<br />

body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or<br />

characteristics for products or related processes and production methods…‖ 4 . The<br />

WTO 5 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Code of Good Practice for the<br />

Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards further dictates that ―where<br />

international standards exist or their completion is imminent, the standardizing<br />

body shall use them or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for the standards it<br />

develops‖. The Agreement also asserts that the standardizing body shall ensure that<br />

standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating unnecessary<br />

obstacles to international trade.<br />

The goal of this paper is to examine the interface between competition law<br />

(policies) and intellectual property rights to enable access to IP protected<br />

technologies incorporated in ICT standards. These two policy areas are widely<br />

viewed as complementary, sharing a common objective of promoting technical<br />

progress for the benefit of consumers and society at large. A theoretical obstacle<br />

and a source of controversy between intellectual property and competition law is<br />

the monopolization inherent in intellectual property rights. The challenges related<br />

to the interaction between intellectual property and competition law are basically<br />

rooted in the apparent antinomy of respective goals such as fostering innovation<br />

through the attribution of exclusive rights, on the one hand, and preserving freedom<br />

of access to the market, on the other 6 . The intersection between IPRs and<br />

competition law (policy) is an issue which has been widely researched with a view<br />

to finding correct balance that would enhance consumer welfare without tampering<br />

with the exclusive IP rights. The intellectual (academic) contribution in this field<br />

did not focus per se on ―challenge(s) of access to patented technologies<br />

incorporated in ICT standards‖ as is the case with this paper; however, the<br />

available research 7 has provided a broad analysis which has served as a useful<br />

foundation in writing this paper.<br />

3 Standards and Patents, A report prepared by the Secretariat of <strong>WIPO</strong> for the Standing Committee<br />

on the Law of Patents Thirteenth Session Geneva, March 23 to 27, 2009 (SCP/13/2) Page 18.<br />

4 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (accessed on 09 December 2009) Page 135 –<br />

137.<br />

5 World Trade Organisation<br />

6 Ghidini, G. (2006) Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The Innovation Nexus, published<br />

by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, United Kingdom Page 99.<br />

7 For an extensive literature covering the tissue related to intersection between IP and competition<br />

law and policy:


416 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

Information and Communicatin Technoologies (ICTS) Standards:<br />

Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

There are inherent challenges in manufacturing ICT products incorporating<br />

IP protected technologies. This paper seeks to make a unique contribution in<br />

finding a solution to addressing a challenge associated with the implementation of<br />

the ICT standards 8 incorporating IP protected technologies. The challenges which<br />

this paper alluded to arise when the owner of IP protected technology incorporated<br />

in the standard extract unreasonable royalties or other licensing terms that reflect<br />

the absence of alternatives. This phenomenon could unduly limit access to<br />

standards that are essential for manufacturing ICT products. It is argued that<br />

excessive royalties and other unreasonable licensing terms may limit access to<br />

standards incorporating IP protected technologies; raise prices of ICT products for<br />

consumers since the manufacturer may transfer the costs (high royalties) to<br />

consumers 9 .<br />

This paper is subdivided into available policy options and their limits in<br />

enabling access to standards. These are: 1. patent policy of the international SSOs,<br />

and 2. legislative approach within the IPRs system. The other part of the paper<br />

provides alternative policy approaches in which changes could be effected through:<br />

3. mainstreaming competition law and policy principles in the standard-setting<br />

process, and 4. establishing a linkage between the standard-setting process and the<br />

WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT). This paper then synthesizes<br />

Economic theory and competition law / edited by Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot, Joël Monéger. -<br />

Cheltenham; Northampton: Elgar, 2009; Innovation for the 21st century: harnessing the power of<br />

intellectual property and antitrust law. / Carrier, Michael A. New York: Oxford University Press,<br />

2009; Research handbook on intellectual property and competition law / edited by Josef Drexl. -<br />

Cheltenham ; Northampton : E. Elgar, 2008; The governance of global competition: competence<br />

allocation in international competition policy / by Oliver Budzinski. - Cheltenham, UK;<br />

Northampton, Mass : Edward Elgar, 2008; The interface between intellectual property rights and<br />

competition policy. / Anderman, Steven D. Singapore; | Cambridge, UK; | New York: IP Academy;<br />

| Cambridge University Press. 2007; Intellectual property, competition and growth / edited by<br />

Roberto Cellini and Guido Cozzi. - Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007;<br />

Competition law and economics: advances in competition policy and antitrust enforcement<br />

/Mateus, Abel Moreira. Moreira, Teresa. International competition law series. Alphen aan den<br />

Rijn : Kluwer Law Internat., 2007; Ricolfi M. (2006) Is there an Antitrust Antidote Against IP<br />

Overprotection Within TRIPs? Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol.10:2; The TRIPS<br />

regime of antitrust and undisclosed information / by Nuno Pires de Carvalho. - The Hague: Kluwer<br />

law international, 2008; Intellectual property and competition law: the innovation nexus / Gustavo<br />

Ghidini; preface by J.H. Reichman. - Cheltenham (UK); Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar, 2006;<br />

Intellectual property and competition law: the innovation nexus. / Ghidini, Gustavo. Cheltenham:<br />

Elgar. 2006; Blind, K., & Thumm, N. (2004). Interrelation between patenting and standardisation<br />

strategies: Empirical evidence and policy implications. Research Policy, 33(10), 1583-1598;<br />

Antitrust and competition policy / edited by Andrew N. Kleit. - Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2005.<br />

8 In this context implementation of ICTs standard denotes manufacturing of the ICTs products<br />

incorporating patented technologies which have been agreed upon as a standard in the SSO by<br />

participating firms.<br />

9 ―Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition‖,<br />

U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, published by BiblioBazaar (US)<br />

April 2007, Page 36.


Simon Z. Qobo 417<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

proposed interventions (or solutions) and highlights their drawbacks. Lastly, it<br />

provides concluding remarks.<br />

It is often costly for users of the standard to switch to an alternative or<br />

different technology after the standard is set. Switching to an alternative standard<br />

would require abandoning that standard which could be costly and may delay the<br />

introduction of new products. The profits lost by such a delay may represent a<br />

significant portion of the cost of developing the alternative standard. In essence the<br />

greater the cost of switching to an alternative standard, the more an IP holder can<br />

charge for a license, which presupposes a dominant position. This, unwittingly,<br />

may hinder innovation.<br />

The potential of a dominant position is the ability to raise prices above those<br />

that would be charged in a competitive market. The higher cost of licensing could<br />

be transferred to the consumers in the form of higher prices for ICT products, as<br />

indicated previously. The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the most<br />

affected in this regard, particularly from developing countries where the ICT<br />

products are manufactured. The developing countries‘ SMEs have both small and<br />

negligible IP assets due to their limited research and development (R&D) capacity.<br />

The developed countries‘ SMEs on the other hand have IP asset-portfolios that may<br />

be used for cross licensing in order to bargain for lower royalties and other<br />

favourable terms. This could be confirmed by looking at the number of patents<br />

filed by developed countries‘ enterprises compared to developing countries 10 .<br />

The situation elaborated above necessitates the application of competition<br />

law and policy to safeguard the interests of consumers and SMEs which play a<br />

crucial role in job creation. In this connection, this paper demonstrates the<br />

limitations of the existing policy solutions before exploring a possibility of<br />

employing competition law and policy to enable access to standards incorporating<br />

IP protected technologies.<br />

3. THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR LIMITS<br />

The international community have pinned their hopes on the legal<br />

mechanisms internal to the patent system such as the Paris Convention and the<br />

WTO TRIPs Agreement to address the challenges associated with abusive behavior<br />

of the IP rights-holders. These legal mechanisms did not address the issue of IP<br />

incorporated in ICT standards and furthermore these legal mechanisms have<br />

safeguard measures that protect IP rights-holders an issue covered in the next<br />

subheading. On the other hand, standard-setting organizations at the international<br />

level such as ITU 11 , the ISO 12 and the IEC 13 agreed to establish in March 2007 a<br />

10 OECD ICT Outlook Report, 2008, Pages 155 – 164.<br />

11 International Telecommunications Union<br />

12 International Organization for Standardization<br />

13 International Electrotechnical Commission is the international standards and conformity<br />

assessment body for all fields of electrotechnology.


418 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

Information and Communicatin Technoologies (ICTS) Standards:<br />

Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Common Patent Policy to address these challenges. This has proven difficult since<br />

the parties that did not participate during the standard-setting would not be bound<br />

by the patent policy and could subsequently enforce their patent rights<br />

accordingly 14 . In addition, the patent policy could not address the challenges<br />

associated with third parties which may be assigned the IP rights within the life of<br />

the standard.<br />

3.1. The Legislative Approach within the IPRs System<br />

The WTO TRIPs Agreement as the legal mechanism internal to the patent<br />

system contains several articles which attempt to regulate abusive behavior of the<br />

IP rights-holders. The international legal framework provided in the TRIPs<br />

Agreement and the Paris Convention has proven to be insufficient to deal with the<br />

issue, due to tight safeguard measures which protect IP rights-holders. The<br />

limitation in the application of the legislative approach is that it must achieve a<br />

balancing act of fostering innovation through the attribution of exclusive rights on<br />

the one hand, and preserving freedom of access to the ICT standards in reasonable<br />

and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms, on the other. In this context, interfering too<br />

much in the standard-setting process via legislative measures could have an adverse<br />

impact on incentives to investment and innovation. This could also be a<br />

disincentive on the part of major innovators to participate in the standard-setting<br />

process and the ultimate adoption of optimal technologies contained in a<br />

standard 15 . Members of the WTO are given fairly free hand to determine the<br />

grounds for granting compulsory licenses. On a similar vein ―there is no doubt that<br />

there are constraints posed on Members‟ discretion to enact legislation at the<br />

intersection between IP and antitrust (or competition law) which belongs to the<br />

mandatory component of the TRIPs Agreement and they should be taken<br />

serious” 16 .<br />

Articles 8.1 and 2, and 40.2 of the TRIPs Agreement indicate that Members<br />

may not use antitrust regulation as a pretext to undermine the protection of IP<br />

rights as guaranteed by the TRIPs agreement‖ 17 . It seems that only social and<br />

collective interests justify the granting of compulsory licenses not for profit<br />

making. 18 For example the TRIPS Agreement provides that appropriate measures –<br />

―in the judgment of Members in the process of ―formulating or amending their laws<br />

14<br />

Standards and Patents, A report prepared by the Secretariat of <strong>WIPO</strong> for the Standing Committee<br />

on the Law of Patents Thirteenth Session Geneva, March 23 to 27, 2009 (SCP/13/2) Page 37.<br />

15<br />

IBID. <strong>WIPO</strong> report, March 23 to 27, 2009 (SCP/13/2) Page 37.<br />

16<br />

Ricolfi M. (2006), Is There an Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?<br />

Marquette Intellectual Property Law<br />

Review, Vol.10:2, Page 326.<br />

17<br />

IBID. Ricolfi M. (2006), Page 320.<br />

18<br />

Kung-Chung Liu (2008) Rationalizing the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by Essential<br />

Facilities Doctrine in International Review of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law<br />

(IIC) Vol.39, Pages 758.


Simon Z. Qobo 419<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

and regulations 19 ‖ - may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property<br />

rights by rights-holders or resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or<br />

adversely affect the international transfer of technology, provided they are<br />

consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.<br />

In addition, Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allow Members to<br />

provide exceptions to exclusive rights conferred but with preconditions such as<br />

―…provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal<br />

exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonable prejudice the legitimate interests<br />

of the patent owner…‖; ―…use of subject matter of patent without authorization of<br />

the right holder… (Only) in cases of public non-commercial use.‖ The safeguards<br />

cited above make it impossible to provide access to IP protected technologies<br />

incorporated in the standard with a view to manufacturing ICT products containing<br />

these standards, particularly for export. Terms like ―national emergency‖ or ―other<br />

extreme urgency‖ close the possibilities of manufacturing ICT products containing<br />

the standard for export, since this would not constitute a national emergency or<br />

extreme urgency. The measures could only apply to satisfy domestic demand;<br />

however, most SMEs are interested in exporting their products to global markets.<br />

The Phillips case cited at the end of this paper provides a good example of the<br />

limitation of legislative approach within the IP system. The case also demonstrates<br />

that developed countries could exert considerable pressure on the developing<br />

countries‘ SMEs derived from their monopsony power 20 . This pressure could<br />

make it impossible to invoke Article 31.k of the TRIPs Agreement even when<br />

(anticompetitive) practices have been determined after judicial or administrative<br />

process. Finally, the legislative approach is very long and protracted since it needs<br />

a consensus agreement of all Member States within the multilateral process.<br />

3.2. The Common Patent Policy of the International SSOs<br />

The Common Patent Policy provides a harmonized approach to addressing<br />

the inclusion of IP protected technologies in standards. The Policy states that any<br />

party participating in the standardization process should, as early as possible during<br />

the development of standards, draw the attention of the ITU/ISO/IEC to any known<br />

essential patent or pending application which may be owned or applied by them or<br />

by another party 21 . These efforts seek to encourage the disclosure of IP protected<br />

technologies before the standardization process is completed.<br />

19 IBID. Ricolfi M. (2006), Page 311.<br />

20 Monopsony: Of, relating to, or being a market in which there is a single buyer of a particular good<br />

or service. Businesses selling in a market characterized by monopsony are likely to suffer belowaverage<br />

profitability because of the lack of alternative outlets for their products. In the context of<br />

this paper, Monopsony power is an economic term which refers to buying power of developed<br />

countries including United States of America and the European Union associated with their market<br />

size. http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Monopsony+power (accessed on 02 February<br />

2010).<br />

21 The Common Patent Policy and its Guidelines are available at the websites of the ITU, ISO and<br />

IEC, for example, http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/dbase/patent/patent-policy.html (accessed on 02<br />

February 2010).


420 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

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The patent policy intends to extract assurances and commitments from<br />

participants in the standardization process that they would adhere to certain<br />

licensing terms and conditions, such as those which are reasonable and nondiscriminatory<br />

(RAND). The limitation of the RAND principle is its dependency<br />

on interpretation by the contractual parties, and the power play which privileges IP<br />

rights-holders tend to influence this interpretation to enable the rights-holders to<br />

gain more concessions. The patent policy of the international SSOs attempt to<br />

restrain potential abuse by the IP rights-holders due to the absence of alternative<br />

standard. The limitations in patent policy are also rooted in the balancing act of<br />

encouraging participation of technology holders and promoting access to standards<br />

incorporating IP protected technologies. For example, if a patent policy is too<br />

stringent to technology holders; it may slow down standards development, raise<br />

costs, and scare away the technology holders from the standardization process. On<br />

the other hand, if the policy is too much in favor of the technology holders, wide<br />

implementation of standards may be at risk.<br />

There is a growing view that standards bodies should consider improvements<br />

to their intellectual property rights (IPRs) policies in a studied and thoughtful way 22<br />

to achieve this balancing act. Some possible areas for improvement relate to<br />

transparency, clarity and certainty of patent policies. There are also ambiguities<br />

with respect to the obligations of the participants to the standardization process<br />

which could trigger serious disputes after the standards are adopted. The weakness<br />

of Patent Policies of SSOs is that they are self-regulating mechanisms based on<br />

contractual arrangements among parties designed to increase legal certainty for the<br />

sake of efficient and effective implementation of technologies contained in ICT<br />

standards.<br />

The patent holders of technology incorporated in standards have more power<br />

and can extract unreasonable royalties or other licensing terms that reflect the<br />

absence of alternatives, as previously indicated. Although a contractual approach<br />

provides flexible solutions agreeable by both parties that best fit to the needs under<br />

each specific situation, power asymmetry may expose weaker parties to abuse by<br />

the IP rights-holders and the application of competition law and policy becomes<br />

relevant. The limitation of contractual arrangements is exacerbated by the fact that<br />

most SSOs do not have a formal mechanism to adjudicate disputed issues and<br />

therefore are often reluctant to impose severe sanctions on a participant when there<br />

may be different views as to the exact requirements of the IPR policy 23 .<br />

22<br />

ITU Workshop: ―ICT Standards and Intellectual Property Rights‖ (Geneva, 1 July 2008) Meeting<br />

Report.<br />

23<br />

Standards Development Patent Policy Manual, American Bar Association, Committee on Technical<br />

Standardization Section of Science & Technology Law, Jorge L. Contreras (ed.), Page.29.


Simon Z. Qobo 421<br />

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4. THE ALTERNATIVE POLICY APPROACH AND LOCUS OF CHANGE<br />

This paper has discussed the legislative approach within the IP system, and<br />

the common patent policy of the international standard-setting organizations and<br />

has identified limitations. The next step is to look at an alternative policy approach,<br />

which relates to the application of competition law and policy to close gaps that are<br />

highlighted in other policy approaches.<br />

4.1. The Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

There has been a certain convergence in the last couple of decades between<br />

the United States of America (US) and the European Community (EC) on the issue<br />

of the purpose of antitrust (or competition law); that it ensures lower prices, better<br />

products, wider choice, and greater efficiency by promoting allocative, productive<br />

and dynamic efficiencies, as well as preventing the creation of the market power<br />

that could hinder competition. In this connection it has been the political legitimacy<br />

of monopolist power that has been questioned as incompatible with democratic<br />

forms of government 24 .<br />

Collaborative standard-setting activities, if properly conducted, may yield<br />

satisfactory benefits to society at large. Before a standard is adopted, various<br />

companies compete to develop the best technology so that it can be incorporated in<br />

the standard. Once a standard is adopted, there may be less incentive among<br />

competitors to develop technologies alternative to the standard. There would then<br />

be rivalry among the existing competitors, competing up the value chain in the<br />

form of technological upgrading through development of added value 25 on the<br />

common platform provided by the standardized technology to establish their<br />

competitive advantage. The common platform for technological upgrading<br />

provided by the standardized technology highlights the positive externality related<br />

to the collaborative work of the standard-setting organization. Competition could<br />

occur in the form of after-sale service rather than in the cost of manufacturing the<br />

ICT products, which in most cases would be influenced by different royalty prices<br />

charged by the IP rights holder. Competition in the after-sale service would<br />

promote consumer satisfaction and possibly create job opportunities.<br />

Therefore, standard-setting activities by SSOs do not per se appear to be<br />

prohibited by competition law because of the positive externality referred to above.<br />

However, if a standard-setting process is manipulated or disguised so that one of<br />

the participants (or some participants), which are often competitors, could gain<br />

unfair competitive advantages vis-à-vis other competitors, such a process should<br />

24 IBID. Ricolfi M. (2006), Page 334.<br />

25 Porter M.E (2008) ―Five competitive Forces that Shape Strategy‖, On Competition: Updated and<br />

Expanded Edition, Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, United States of America,<br />

Page 85.


422 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

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fall under the scrutiny of a competition authority 26 . The absence of competition law<br />

or policy regime at the international level poses a major challenge to the<br />

application of competition law or policy in the international standard-setting<br />

process and currently there is no political will to create it. The question is whether<br />

the international community should wait for the emergence of a political will to<br />

create competition law or policy at the international level.<br />

This paper contends that it would be detrimental to the consumer‘s interest<br />

and the public welfare to wait for such an emergence of political will. It is further<br />

suggested that an alternative route to achieving the same goals should be explored.<br />

The noble principles and objectives contained in competition law and policy should<br />

not be undermined by the absence of international competition law or policy<br />

regime. This paper then proposes the mainstreaming of competition law and policy<br />

principles in the standard-setting process which could yield similar results. To<br />

achieve the mainstreaming objective, the first step should be to create some caveats<br />

in the international standard-setting process. The main obstacle is that the<br />

international SSOs do not allow ex ante discussions on licensing terms for the fear<br />

of being viewed as facilitating price fixing amongst competitors. On the other<br />

hand, private sector companies may not be willing to participate in ex ante<br />

discussions for the fear of Competition Authorities 27 in their home countries.<br />

The Competition Authorities should allow discussions on ex ante disclosure<br />

of licensing terms in the international SSOs as they often allow it at the national<br />

level. This approach seems to be compatible since ex ante disclosure of licensing<br />

terms could advance the objectives of competition law and policy. An ex ante<br />

disclosure of licensing terms may facilitate informed decisions by participants in<br />

the standard-setting process, and enables competition based on the efficiency of<br />

technology, price of royalties and other favourable licensing terms when deciding<br />

on a standard. This may avoid disputes over licensing terms after a standard has<br />

been adopted and facilitate the rapid implementation of adopted standards based on<br />

clear and predictable licensing terms which would be applied universally to all<br />

licensees without discrimination.<br />

The EC is agreeable to this approach, for example Article 81.3 of the EC<br />

Treaty establishes possible derogations from the main rule of the Article 81.1<br />

providing that when related agreement or category of agreements between<br />

undertakings / decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings/<br />

concerted practice or category of concerted practices which (a) contributes to<br />

26 The guidelines on the application of competition law to standardization agreements in Europe are<br />

found in Section 6 of the ―Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal co-operation<br />

agreements‖.<br />

27 ―Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and<br />

Competition‖, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2007, Page 51.


Simon Z. Qobo 423<br />

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improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or<br />

economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;<br />

which (b) does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not<br />

indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (c) and afford such<br />

undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial<br />

part of the products in question. The EC bloc exemption provides a balanced<br />

approach which looks at the effect of the actions rather than dogmatic application<br />

of rules without looking at the causal and effect outcomes. It therefore sifts out<br />

carefully the effect that may retard the attainment of the objectives of competition<br />

law and policy geared towards maximization of consumer welfare 28 . In this sense it<br />

does not throw away the proverbial baby with the dirty bath-water but saves the<br />

baby, which is consumer welfare. The European Commissioner for Competition<br />

Policy further stated in her speech that ex ante disclosure may help those involved<br />

to make a properly informed decision. It appears that competition authorities do not<br />

deny all ex ante licensing negotiations before the adoption of a standard 29 .<br />

Paragraph 225 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC<br />

Treaty to technology transfer agreements underpins this assertion by stating that, in<br />

connection with patent pools, undertakings setting up a technology pool and any<br />

supporting industrial standard are normally free to negotiate and fix royalties for<br />

the technology package and each technology‘s share of the royalties either before<br />

or after the standard is set. It acknowledges that such agreement is inherent in the<br />

establishment of the standard and cannot in itself be considered restrictive of<br />

competition and may in certain circumstances lead to more efficient outcomes‖ that<br />

achieve the objectives of competition, such as an establishment of common<br />

platform (provided by standard) in which competitors may compete to create value<br />

addition in the form of technological upgrading (emphasis added). At the same<br />

28 Abbott, F.M (2004) Are the Competition Rules in the TRIPs Agreement Adequate? Journal of<br />

International Economic Law 7 (3) Page 692.<br />

29 http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/Neelie%20Kroes%20-%20Munich_tcm29-173210.doc<br />

accessed on 06 December 2009. Extract from the speech delivered by Neelie Kroes, European<br />

Commissioner for Competition Policy Open Forum Europe - Breakfast seminar Brussels, 10 th June<br />

2008. Standardization agreements (or adoption of standards) should be based on the merits of the<br />

technologies involved. Allowing companies to sit around a table and agree technical developments<br />

for their industry is not something that the competition rules would usually allow. So when it is<br />

allowed we have to look carefully at how it is done. If voting in the standard-setting context is<br />

influenced less by the technical merits of the technology but rather by side agreements,<br />

inducements, package deals, reciprocal agreements, or commercial pressure … then these risk<br />

falling foul of the competition rules. In addition, if we are to include proprietary technology in a<br />

standard, then ex ante disclosure may help those involved make a properly informed decision.<br />

Competition law should not stand in the way. This will almost always entail ex ante disclosure of<br />

the existence of essential patents. And it may increasingly entail ex ante disclosure of maximum<br />

royalty rates. Both can increase the effectiveness of the standard-setting process, lead to more<br />

competitive solutions and reduce the risk of later antitrust problems. Standards bodies could very<br />

often require disclosure without fear of competition law intervention. Standards bodies do important<br />

work in difficult circumstances. But like all of us their rules need to keep pace with the changing<br />

commercial environment. If they need help in tightening up their rules to avoid being manipulated<br />

by narrow commercial interests, or to design the right ex ante rules, then they have my support. My<br />

door is always open.


424 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

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time, the Guidelines also state that ―licensees must remain free to determine the<br />

price of products produced under the license‖. Similarly, the Competition<br />

Authorities in the US recognize that joint ex ante activities to establish licensing<br />

terms as part of the standard-setting process will not warrant per se condemnation<br />

under the antitrust law, although the Authorities take no position as to whether<br />

(international) SSOs should engage in joint ex ante discussions of licensing<br />

terms 30 . It suffices that, because of the strong potential for pro-competitive<br />

benefits, the Competition Authorities would evaluate joint ex ante activities to<br />

establish licensing terms under the rules of reason.<br />

Complete information about technologies and their associated costs must be<br />

secured before standard development and adoption is completed, so as to ensure the<br />

quality and the efficient implementation of standards 31 . The Ex ante disclosure<br />

could yield so-called racing to the bottom results, whereby lower royalty price and<br />

other favourable terms could also form part of the adoption of the standard. The<br />

benefits would be affordable prices for ICT products, due to potential lower royalty<br />

payments which could be secured in ex ante discussions. The Ex ante disclosure is<br />

also needed in order to ensure fair competition of technologies.<br />

The remaining question is how do we resolve the challenge of third parties<br />

which did not participate in the standard-setting process? This paper has identified<br />

two kinds of third parties, (a) the one, which get assigned IP rights incorporated in<br />

the standard and (b) the other, which may own IP rights not incorporated in the<br />

standard but necessary for implementation of the standard. It could be less<br />

challenging to deal with the third party (a) by building within the ex ante licensing<br />

terms obligations of the third parties who get assigned IP rights incorporated in the<br />

standard. A suggestion is offered on how to deal with third party (b) challenge in<br />

the proposal dealing with Possible Linkage of the Standard-Setting Process with<br />

the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) below.<br />

4.2. The Linkage of the Standard-Setting Process with the WTO Technical<br />

Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT)<br />

This linkage could help avoid disputes after the standard has been adopted<br />

and facilitate rapid implementation of adopted standards. The spirit of the WTO<br />

TBT Agreement seeks to advance fair competition in international trade by<br />

discouraging and removing technical barriers to trade with a view to leveling the<br />

playing field so that competition takes its own course in ensuring lower prices,<br />

30 IBID. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2007, Pages53-56.<br />

31 Gibson, G.S (2007) Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns of<br />

Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, Berkeley Technology Law<br />

Journal, Vol. 22, p. 1401 Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-39,<br />

Page 77.


Simon Z. Qobo 425<br />

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better products, wider choice, and greater efficiency by promoting allocative,<br />

productive and dynamic efficiencies. It asserts that the standardizing body shall<br />

ensure that standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with<br />

the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Firstly, there<br />

exists a direct linkage between standard-setting processes with the WTO TBT<br />

Agreement. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Code of Good<br />

Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards further dictates<br />

that before adopting a standard, the standardizing body shall allow a period of at<br />

least 60 days for the submission of comments on the draft standard by interested<br />

parties within the territory of a Member of the WTO.<br />

The TBT Agreement is silent on the issue of IP rights in international<br />

standard-setting. In this sense, there is a ―disconnect‖ between TBT Agreement<br />

obligation to use international standards and the IP rights that can be embedded in<br />

those standards, particularly in the ICT sector. The TRIPs Agreement is limited in<br />

the sense that it does not address issues relating to standards issues. The TRIPS<br />

Agreement only secures Member countries‘ obligations to protect and enforce IP<br />

rights within their territories hence it becomes relevant to insert IPRs in the TBT<br />

Agreement as they relate to standards. Although the obligation to use relevant<br />

international standards as a basis for standards arises under the TBT Agreement,<br />

this obligation is not predicated on whether a particular standard is encumbered by<br />

IP rights and therefore could be costly to implement. If one firm in the market can<br />

dominate through the creation of a de facto standard, or alternatively secure a<br />

patent which covers key aspects of the preferred standard, it can exert substantial<br />

leverage. At the extreme, if that firm secures critical control points in a network<br />

standard through proprietary IP claims, it can threaten to block implementations<br />

altogether unless royalties are paid 32 .<br />

Therefore, it is proposed that the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to<br />

Trade Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of<br />

Standards be amended to include IPRs as they are relevant to standard-setting. This<br />

amendment should address the third party (b) challenge referred above by<br />

integrating the following language adapted from Article 15 of <strong>WIPO</strong> Performances<br />

and Phonograms Treaty on the Right to Remuneration for Broadcasting and<br />

Communication to the Public as follows: ―The owner of the IP rights essential or<br />

complementary for the implementation of the international standard which did not<br />

participate in the standard-setting process shall enjoy the right to equitable<br />

remuneration for the direct or indirect use of IP rights for the purposes of<br />

implementing the standard‖.<br />

This right would be different from the right to prevent or right to authorize<br />

the use of IP rights. The IP right owner would be obliged to tolerate the use of IP<br />

rights as soon as the standard is adopted for implementation. This would be an<br />

example of non-voluntary licensing by which the IP right-holder loses a degree of<br />

control and cannot negotiate a royalty fee for the use of IP rights in the<br />

32 IBID. Gibson, G.S (2007) Page 72.


426 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

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implementation of standard, but is instead compensated by an equitable<br />

remuneration for the use of the IP rights in the implementation of standard. This<br />

could encourage and improves participation in the standard-setting process and<br />

further enhance the quality of standards as many IP right owners could prefer to<br />

influence the ex ante discussions and its outcomes.<br />

The net effect of this would be optimal harmonization with the ex ante<br />

discussions of licensing terms in the standard-setting process previously discussed,<br />

and that this would create a basis to resolve disputes within the WTO Dispute<br />

Settlement Mechanism. This would potentially discourage abuse by IP rightsholders<br />

incorporated in the standard as well as those which did not participate in<br />

the standard-setting process. The playing field would be leveled so that competition<br />

takes its own course in ensuring lower prices, better products, wider choice, and<br />

greater efficiency by promoting allocative, productive and dynamic efficiencies.<br />

5. SYNTHESIS OF PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR<br />

DRAWBACKS<br />

This paper has discussed available solutions that attempt to regulate or limit<br />

the abuse of IPRs by rights-holders during and after the standardization process. In<br />

this context, it has been found that existing solutions does not adequately address<br />

this challenge. The relevant Articles of the TRIPs Agreement have been examined<br />

such as: 8; 30; 31; 40 and discovered that they have limits in regulating the abuse<br />

of power by IP right-holders in standard-setting process and after the standard have<br />

been adopted. The first challenge is that the TRIPs Agreement is applicable at the<br />

national level and does not deal with situations that emerge at the international<br />

level, such as the standardization process. In this regard, it is worth highlighting<br />

that the TRIPS Agreement does not deal with standardization or standards at all.<br />

The other challenge is that there are tight safeguard measures which protect IP<br />

rights-holders. The case of Gigastorage, a Taiwanese company and Phillips<br />

Company is cited at the end of this paper to illustrate this point.<br />

The challenge of the absence of competition law or policy regime at the<br />

international level has been addressed by proposing full disclosure of patented<br />

information and ex ante discussions on licensing terms during the standard-setting<br />

process to ensure lower price of royalties and other favourable terms as a basis for<br />

adoption of the standard. This paper has advanced the mainstreaming of<br />

competition law and policy principle during (ex ante) and after the standard-setting<br />

process as an alternative route to attain the same objectives to address the abuse of<br />

power by IP rights-holders. This would ensure that the noble principles and<br />

objectives contained in competition law and policy could not be undermined by the<br />

absence of competition law or policy regime at the international level. Drawback of<br />

ex ante discussions on licensing terms has been identified as follows:


Simon Z. Qobo 427<br />

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(i) The Multilateral ex ante negotiations on licensing terms would likely<br />

require lawyers, business, and marketing personnel to also participate in the<br />

process 33 . It is underscored that such participation would likely increase costs<br />

associated with travelling and accommodation and lengthen significant amount of<br />

time that it takes to adopt the standard which may dissuade some firms from<br />

participating. The costs for the SMEs could be significant, given that SMEs have<br />

few personnel for day-to-day running of their business as a result this could<br />

generate a shortfall on operational activities. For those SMEs which are interested<br />

in participating in terms of bidding for their technologies to be included in the<br />

standard, it would be advisable that governments could shoulder some of the cost<br />

to enable their SMEs to effectively participate. In case these SMEs have their<br />

technology incorporated in the standard which may gain them experience to play<br />

on an international stage. If their technologies are not incorporated, they would<br />

have gained multilateral experience and possibly build essential relationships<br />

leading to collaborative research activities with other SMEs.<br />

Lastly, an amendment of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement<br />

(TBT) Code of Conduct to include IPRs as relevant to standards is proposed. Interlinkages<br />

between WTO TBT and standard-setting process could close the gap<br />

opened by the absence of a formal mechanism to adjudicate disputed issues of fact<br />

related to compliance with the patent policy of the international SSOs. Therefore,<br />

the WTO Dispute Settlement could have bases to address some of these challenges,<br />

including creating liability rule in cases where IP rights incorporated in the<br />

standard are transferred to third parties. It is in this regard that the linkage of<br />

standard-setting process with the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement to<br />

include IPRs as applicable to standards becomes imperative.<br />

It could be anticipated that once issues that are under considerations in the<br />

WTO Doha Round of Trade Negotiations are agreed, future negotiation process<br />

may focus more on issues related to supply-side constraints, including technical<br />

standards and regulations. In this context this paper identified the following<br />

drawback:<br />

(ii) Developing countries generally lack negotiating skills and agenda-setting<br />

capacity which makes it difficult to engage in the multilateral negotiation process.<br />

Therefore, they need to develop capabilities in setting of international standards<br />

and regulations. To succeed in these processes, national delegations require<br />

technical expertise, diplomatic skills, good institutional memory, and strong policy<br />

analysis and design as well as evaluation capacity. In some respects, this would<br />

require technical cooperation under Article 67 of TRIPs to be extended to the<br />

preparation of laws and regulations on the prevention of abuse of intellectual<br />

property rights, including anti-competitive abuses so that these countries would<br />

have a basis and interests to advance at the multilateral level. It has been suggested<br />

that Members with antitrust expertise should give independent (and disinterested)<br />

advice to help developing and least-developed Members distinguish measures that<br />

33 IBID. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2007, Page50.


428 Challenge(s) of Access to Patented Technologies Incorporated in<br />

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are economically expedient under their specific domestic circumstances from those<br />

that are likely to backfire 34 .<br />

In order to improve the performance of developing countries‘ diplomats in<br />

negotiations, they need to improve coordination between national policymaking<br />

and multilateral negotiations. Greater co-ordination between ministries relevant to<br />

negotiating sessions would make delegations more effective. In most countries, coordination<br />

amongst various government departments on common issues that are<br />

cross-cutting tends to be weak 35 .<br />

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS<br />

It is hoped that interventions proposed in this paper would enable access to<br />

ICT standards incorporating IP protected technologies; and that perspectives<br />

articulated in this paper could make a significant contribution in the ongoing<br />

discussions that seek to address challenges related to the implementation of ICTs<br />

standards. Since the proposed interventions would require effective participation of<br />

developing countries, it is anticipated that the experience gained through that<br />

participation would enhance their confidence and provides them with impetus to<br />

engage in possible future multilateral discussions related to the global<br />

harmonization of competition law and policy. As to what extent the developing<br />

countries would benefit from such a harmonization process, would be an issue of<br />

further research, which is beyond the scope of this paper.<br />

34 IBID. Ricolfi M. (2006), Page 337.<br />

35 Latif A. (2005), ―Developing Country Coordination in International Intellectual Property<br />

Standard-Setting ―, South Centre Working Paper, published in Geneva, Page 38.


Simon Z. Qobo 429<br />

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Case Study: The Phillips Case: In 2002, Phillips subsidiary in the US filed complaints<br />

with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) in order to stop Gigastorage<br />

from exporting CD-Rs to the US market, alleging violations of Sect.337 of the Tariff<br />

Act of 1930. On 24 October 2003, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the USIC<br />

issued its final initial determination (ID), finding no violation of Sect.337 because all<br />

the asserted patents were not enforceable due to misuse by Phillips. On review, the<br />

Commission affirmed the ALJs conclusion on the ground that Phillips practice of<br />

mandatory package licensing constituted a tying agreement between a license for<br />

essential and non essential patents. Phillips appealed the Commissions decision before<br />

the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which on 21 September 2005 reversed<br />

the Commissions decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. On 05<br />

February 2007, USITC reversed the ALJs findings of patent misuse, found a violation<br />

of Sect. 337 and imposed a general exclusion order prohibiting the entry of CD-Rs<br />

made by Gigastorage. This followed a termination of Phillips patent license to<br />

manufacture CD-Rs by a Taiwanese company Gigastorage in 2001, which in 2002 filed<br />

an application for compulsory licensing of five patents owned by Phillips and was<br />

granted in 2004 to satisfy domestic demand. Philips, the Dutch electronics giant which<br />

holds patents for the core technologies used in CD-Rs, filed a complaint with the EU in<br />

early 2007 over the activities of a Taiwan-based company Gigastorage. After<br />

investigating Philips‘ complaint, the EU‘s executive, the European Commission,<br />

warned that it could start dispute proceedings against Taiwan in the World Trade<br />

Organization unless its patent law is swiftly amended.<br />

The EC objected to a provision in the Taiwanese law allowing national authorities to<br />

grant a compulsory license if a rights-holder has refused a voluntary one. EU officials<br />

believe this clause is not compatible with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related<br />

Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as it permits patent-holders to withhold licenses<br />

in most situations. It also suggested compulsory licenses should be limited to products<br />

intended primarily for the domestic market, and that it was not the case. In this context,<br />

Peter Mandelson, the European commissioner for trade said ―The EU fully supports the<br />

use of compulsory licensing in specific circumstances; in particular to facilitate access<br />

to medicines, however, we cannot accept the abuse of this system. I hope that the<br />

Taiwanese authorities will move quickly to bring their law and practice into line with<br />

WTO rules. I cannot rule out seeking WTO dispute settlement if they do not.‖ Phillips<br />

still pursued its earlier appeal with the Taipei Administrative High Court to avoid<br />

creation of precedent until a decision was made overturning the earlier decision by<br />

TIPO of granting Gigastorage a compulsory license. The effect of the decisions by the<br />

US International Trade Commission and Taiwanese Administrative High Court: It<br />

is inconceivable that the above dispute dented Taiwanese position in the CD-R world<br />

market, of which in 2003 it held a market- share of 80%. However Taiwanese total<br />

output decreased sharply since then to 36% in 2004, 33% in 2005, and 28% in 2006.<br />

Gigastorage reported loss per share for the third quarter of 2007 which may have been<br />

influenced by the dispute and its outcomes.<br />

http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337-TA-474.Notice.1170697224.pdf<br />

(Accessed on 05 December 2009)<br />

EU Threatens Taiwan with WTO Case over Law on Compulsory Licenses, 31 January<br />

2008, Intellectual Property Watch; http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/01/31/euthreatens-taiwan-with-wto-case-over-law-on-compulsory-licences/<br />

(Accessed on 05<br />

December 2009)<br />

IBID. Kung-Chung Liu (2008) page 763.


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Simon Z. Qobo 431<br />

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BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

Anderman, S.D. (2007) The interface between intellectual property rights and<br />

competition policy. Cambridge University Press. United Kingdom<br />

Budzinski, O. (2008) The governance of global competition: competence<br />

allocation in international competition policy. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton,<br />

Mass : Edward Elgar<br />

Carrier, M. A. (2009) Innovation for the 21st century: harnessing the power<br />

of intellectual property and antitrust law. New York: Oxford University Press<br />

Cellini, R. and Cozzi, G. (eds) (2007) Intellectual property, competition and<br />

growth. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke; New York<br />

Drexl, J., Idot L., Joël M. (eds) (2009) Economic theory and competition<br />

law,.Cheltenham; Northampton: Elgar<br />

Drexl, J. (ed) (2009) Research handbook on intellectual property and<br />

competition law. Cheltenham; Northampton: Elgar<br />

De Carvalho, P.N. (2008) The TRIPS regime of antitrust and undisclosed<br />

information. Kluwer law international The Hague<br />

Ghidini, G. (2006) Intellectual property and competition law: the innovation<br />

nexus. Cheltenham, United Kingdom<br />

Kleit, A.N. (2005) Antitrust and competition policy. Cheltenham: E. Elgar,<br />

Moreira, M. A. and Moreira, T. (2007) Competition law and economics:<br />

advances in competition policy and antitrust enforcement / International<br />

competition law series. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International<br />

Porter, M.E. (2008) ―Five competitive Forces that Shape Strategy‖, On<br />

Competition: Updated and Expanded Edition, Harvard Business School Publishing<br />

Corporation, United States of America<br />

Paper <strong>Publication</strong>s<br />

Abbott, F.M. (2004) Are the Competition Rules in the TRIPs Agreement<br />

Adequate?, Journal of International Economic Law 7 (3) page 692<br />

Blind, K., & Thumm, N. (2004). Interrelation between patenting and<br />

standardization strategies: Empirical evidence and policy implications. Research<br />

Policy, 33(10), 1583-1598;


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Information and Communicatin Technoologies (ICTS) Standards:<br />

Application of Competition Law and Policy<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Gibson, G.S. (2007) Globalization and the Technology Standards Game:<br />

Balancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International<br />

Standards, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 22, p. 1401 Suffolk University<br />

Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-39, page 77<br />

Kung-Chung, L. (2008) Rationalizing the Regime of Compulsory Patent<br />

Licensing by Essential Facilities Doctrine in International Review of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights and Competition Law (IIC) Vol.39, pages 758.<br />

Latif, A. (2005), ―Developing Country Coordination in International<br />

Intellectual Property Standard-Setting ―, South Centre Working Paper, published in<br />

Geneva.<br />

Ricolfi, M. (2006) Is there an Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection<br />

Within TRIPs? Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol.10:2<br />

Reports<br />

Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting<br />

Innovation and Competition‖, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade<br />

Commission, April 2007, page 51.<br />

ITU Workshop: ―ICT Standards and Intellectual Property Rights‖ (Geneva, 1<br />

July 2008) Meeting Report<br />

OECD ICT Outlook Report, 2008 pages158 - 164<br />

Standards and Patents, A report prepared by the Secretariat of <strong>WIPO</strong> for the<br />

Standing Committee on the Law of Patents Thirteenth Session Geneva, March 23<br />

to 27, 2009 (SCP/13/2) page 37.<br />

Standards Development Patent Policy Manual, American Bar Association,<br />

Committee on Technical Standardization Section of Science & Technology Law,<br />

Jorge L. Contreras (ed.), page 29.


IPR INFRINGEMENT ON TRADE EXHIBITIONS IN CHINA:<br />

IN SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Hua Yu, Qing Yang<br />

An exhibition is the organization of premises and other resources set to<br />

gather in a single event and to display new products with the goal of strengthening<br />

the exchange of ideas, technologies and commercial negotiations 1 .<br />

The World Expo is an important platform for demonstrating the latest<br />

innovations. The holding of World Expos is closely related to the global IP systems<br />

in the international communities. Accompanied with the development of World<br />

Expos, some international treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection<br />

of Industrial Property came into being. When the Vienna Expo was organized in<br />

1873, there was no harmonized standard for the protection of industrial property in<br />

the world. Many foreign inventor were unwilling to take part in the Expo just<br />

because of the concerns over the possibility that their own industrial property might<br />

be torted. Thus the organizing of the Expo entered into an awkward situation. Then<br />

the Austrian government published a special law to provide special provisional<br />

protection for foreign inventions, trade marks and industrial designs on the<br />

previous exhibition. In 1878, the Second Seminar on Industrial Property was held<br />

in the Paris Expo. Based on the above-mentioned two Expos, the first international<br />

IP treaty, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property , was formally<br />

concluded 2 .<br />

China's exhibition industry has been developing rapidly in recent years. The<br />

exhibitions have greatly promoted local economy and fostered the development of<br />

local pillar industries 3 . But in recent years, the frequent appearance of infringing<br />

products in the exhibitions seriously damaged the normal trading order on<br />

exhibitions.<br />

The protection of intellectual property rights is to improve the ability of<br />

independent innovation. It is an important tool to foster China's economic and<br />

social development. IPR protection on exhibitions is one of the important tasks of<br />

the IPR related legislation, and it will help build up the confidence of domestic and<br />

foreign exhibitors and protect the legitimate rights of other IPR owners. In<br />

addition, it will guarantee a healthy, harmonious and sustainable development of<br />

China's exhibition industry.<br />

1<br />

Y. MA, H. YU, Basic knowledge of International Trade Exhibition, China Business Publishing<br />

House, Beijing,2008, 11 ff.<br />

2<br />

M. HU, The World Expos accelerate the conclusions of international IP treaties.<br />

http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/mtjj/2009/200911/t20091130_482923.html<br />

3 D. SHEN, H. YU, Report on the Development of China Exhibition Industry between (2001-2005),<br />

Publishing House of Economy Daily, Beijing, 2007, 28 ff.


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2. BACKGROUND<br />

2.1. Definitions<br />

2.1.1. Exhibition<br />

●An exhibition is an instance of exhibiting, or something exhibited.<br />

●It is a large scale public showing of objects or products.<br />

2.1.2. Trade Show (Fair )<br />

In the English language of some countries(America, Canada, etc. ), ‗show‘<br />

and ‗exhibition‘ are interchangeable.<br />

A trade show (fair ) is an exhibition for businesses;. Its purpose is to<br />

exchange information and negotiate trade deals. The visitors are mainly from a<br />

certain business community.<br />

2.2. Relevatn Chinese Laws<br />

2.2.1. Measures for the Protection of IPRS during Exhibitions<br />

The Measures for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) during<br />

Exhibitions, which were adopted by the Ministry of Commerce, the State<br />

Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Bureau of Copyright and the<br />

State Intellectual Property Office upon deliberation, are hereby promulgated and<br />

shall come into force as of March 1, 2006. This is China's first administrative<br />

regulation governing IPR protection on exhibitions, providing a legal tool for<br />

future actions4.<br />

The Measures provide:<br />

a) The proceedings handling IPR infringement on exhibits will be<br />

incorporated into the current legal proceeding with regard to the relevant IPR<br />

infringement according the enforceable laws and regulations.<br />

b) When organizing exhibitions, the organizer should strengthen the protection<br />

over the exhibitors‘ IPR and the IPR examination of the exhibits (including the<br />

products, show-boards and relevant leaflets). For exhibitions lasting for more than<br />

3 days (including 3 days), the organizers of the exhibitions should establish<br />

divisions for IPR Complaints when necessary. The competent authorities for<br />

exhibitions shall warn an exhibition organizer of its weakness in IPR protection<br />

4 H. YU, The comments on Measures for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights during<br />

Exhibitions, Public business information leader,2006-02-14(3)


Hua Yu and Qing Yang 435<br />

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and reject its application for holding the next exhibition according to circumstances<br />

provided in the law.<br />

c) Competent local authorities for IPR protection should provide cooperation<br />

with regard to patent protection during exhibitions and accept complaints about<br />

suspected patent infringement, handle reports on suspected counterfeit patents by<br />

the exhibits, or punish counterfeit patents according to their respective competence.<br />

d) Competent local authorities for industry and commerce shall strengthen the<br />

trademark protection during exhibitions, and accept complaining on suspected<br />

trademark infringement cases transferred from exhibition organizers and handle the<br />

cases according to the relevant laws and regulations.<br />

e) The competent local authorities for copyright should cooperate to strengthen<br />

copyright protection during exhibitions, accepting complaints on suspected<br />

copyright infringement in line with the relevant provisions of the Copyright Law<br />

and handle the case according to the provisions of the Copyright Law.<br />

f) When infringement is found, the exhibition organizer can give a public<br />

notice about infringement by the exhibitor concerned. When the exhibitor infringes<br />

IPR for two or more times, the exhibition organizer shall ban the exhibitor<br />

concerned from participating in the next exhibition.<br />

Local governments in Beijing City, Guangdong Province, Sichuan Province,<br />

Yiwu City of Zhejiang Province and elsewhere have promulgated relevant local<br />

supporting rules with regard to IPR protection in exhibitions..<br />

Some of China's largest exhibition organizers have also developed their own<br />

IPR protections rules. For example, the organizer of the Canton Fair promulgated<br />

the Complaining and Handling Procedures for Suspected IPR Infringement.<br />

2.2.2. Other intellectual Property laws<br />

The Chinese Patent Law, Trademark Law, Copyright Law and other specific<br />

laws and regulations on IPR protection on exhibitions also provide good legal<br />

support.<br />

Article 66 of the Chinese Patent Law provides: "Where any patentee or<br />

interested party has evidence to prove that another person is infringing or will soon<br />

infringe the patent right and that if such infringing act is not checked or prevented from<br />

occurring in time, it is likely to cause irreparable harm to it or him, it or he may, before any<br />

legal proceedings are instituted, request the people's court to adopt measures for ordering the<br />

suspension of relevant acts." The provision is in line with Articles 41 and 50 of TRIPS<br />

which provides the "relief" and "provisional measures" on patent infringement,<br />

whereby law enforcement agencies may request the infringing parties to take<br />

"interim measures."


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3. CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS<br />

3.1. IPR Infringement on Exhibitions in Mainland China<br />

Patent infringements appear quite frequently in trade fairs in China. For<br />

example, the exhibits may be a simple modification of patented products, or they<br />

may be a simple copy of others‘. When this happens, a complaint is filed against<br />

the exhibitor. Most of the IPR disputes arise on exhibitions concern with patents<br />

and trademarks. Both of them are exclusive. Once the right is granted, either it is a<br />

patent or a trademark, the right is protected by law. The holder enjoys an exclusive<br />

right. Without the holder‘s permission, no one should use, produce, sell, import or<br />

export patented products or products with resembling trademarks for commercial<br />

purpose; otherwise, the action will construct infringement and be punished by law.<br />

3.2. Infringements of IPRs by Chinese Exhibitors on Overseas Exhibitions<br />

Some Chinese firms do not have a good awareness of IPR protection. They<br />

bring copies of others‘ products to international exhibitions and show the ―copied‖<br />

exhibits on the same exhibition with the ones of the original producers. The<br />

behavior has greatly damaged the reputation and credibility of the Chinese firms.<br />

There are a number of cases in which Chinese exhibitors have been kept out of the<br />

international exhibitions held in European countries such as Italy and Germany. On<br />

Aug. 29th, 2008, some of the participating Chinese electronics firms were checked<br />

for suspected patent infringement. 69 Chinese exhibitors were subject to<br />

investigation, and many of the exhibits were examined or confiscated 5 . As a result,<br />

the Chinese firms had to withdraw from the exhibitions, suffering from economic<br />

losses, personal safety threats and psychological stress. The consequence also<br />

includes loss of overseas market by the Chinese firms involved and damage on<br />

China‘s reputation.<br />

3.3. Lack of Provisions on Practical Enforcement Details in Chinese Laws<br />

There are a number of shortcomings in the Measures for the Protection of<br />

Intellectual Property Rights during Exhibitions.<br />

First, Article VI of the Measures provide that it applies for exhibitions with a<br />

show time of 3 days or more. When the event organizer deems it necessary, he<br />

should establish an IPR complaining division during the exhibition. The provision<br />

means that if Show management believes that when ‗there is no need‘, there will be<br />

no complaining mechanism. Moreover, if the exhibition time is less than 3 days, it<br />

is not required to set up a complaining body.<br />

The second is a lack of feasibility implementation details. For example, the<br />

Measures authorize the complaint handling division to withdraw the alleged<br />

5 Y. Feng Enterprises meeting IP Problems while participating in overseas exhibition.<br />

http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/mtjj/2009/200908/t20090831_474129.html


Hua Yu and Qing Yang 437<br />

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exhibits from the exhibitions, but there is no provision on how the IPR holder can<br />

exercise his right afterwards. The Approach provides that the handling procedure<br />

should be expedited and easy, but most of the 3-day long exhibitions will be held<br />

on Friday, Saturday and Sunday. As the government agencies do not work on<br />

weekends, the above mentioned provision is actually not enforceable.<br />

Thirdly, the legislative level is still low. In China, there are 3 levels of<br />

legislation, namely laws, administrative regulations, departmental rules and<br />

regulations. Legislation on each area will have a high level, comprehensive<br />

parental law, some administrative regulations or some departmental rules and<br />

regulations. The Measures belong to the category of the lower level--specific<br />

administrative or departmental rules and regulations. It does not constitute a basis<br />

for court cases.<br />

3.4. The Common Issue<br />

3.4.1. Establishment of Infringement by Persons and Entities without Government<br />

Powers<br />

Protection of intellectual property rights in exhibitions and fair competition<br />

are very much related. Therefore government should conscientiously strengthen<br />

IPR protection in exhibitions. If government does not seriously strike infringement<br />

on exhibitions, it will encourage those opportunistic to take, free of charge,<br />

possession of someone else‘s rights by taking advantage of others‘ intellectual<br />

property rights with a lot of financial and human resources to seize the market with<br />

their low cost production and low prices. Thus, they will make intellectual property<br />

right holders suffer heavy losses, eventually leading to the consequence of rampant<br />

counterfeiting in the whole society, an empty talk on independent innovation and a<br />

lack of technological innovation in national development.<br />

To crackdown IPR infringement depends on a strong push by the<br />

government. Exhibitions time usually last for about a few days. The competent<br />

authorities for IPR protection need to take on-site enforcement of interim measures<br />

against infringements on exhibitions. Some show infringement cases can not wait<br />

to be handled in a few days‘ time. The penalties against infringers and tort<br />

compensation in certain circumstances need to be delivered immediately. After the<br />

exhibition, administrative complaint or civil proceedings needs to be dealt in the<br />

court. If the violations constitute a serious infringement of intellectual property<br />

crimes, the public security authorities should be reported, which will lead to<br />

criminal penalties for perpetrators.<br />

3.4.2. Standard to be Applied<br />

An effective solution to the problem of intellectual property protection in<br />

exhibitions in China can be dealt with in many ways. The state should further<br />

improve intellectual property laws; judicial institutions should strengthen


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enforcement of intellectual property rights in exhibitions. Exhibition organizers<br />

should strengthen intellectual property management, while exhibitors should<br />

strengthen intellectual property protection 6 .<br />

4. PRACTICES AND EXPERIENCE IN EU DURING EXHIBITIONS<br />

4.1. Protection Mechanisms in the EU<br />

4.1.1. Existing IP Enforcement Systems in Europe at Trade Shows<br />

The need to establish a harmonized system of IP protection first arose in<br />

trade fairs, in particular the Paris Convention, where the principle of the ―priority‘<br />

was designed (in 1883) in order to avoid the risk that any visitor might<br />

misappropriate the inventions or the trademarks exhibited in the Universal Expo of<br />

Paris (abusively) IP applications in their native countries.<br />

At present, to guarantee an effective and efficient IPR enforcement is a key<br />

issue for government and business groups.<br />

Trade fairs represent a risky but a convenient venue for piracy and/or<br />

counterfeiting. According to ―Recommendations for the Protection of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights at Exhibitions‖ edited by UFI (The Global Association of the<br />

Exhibition Industry) in February 2008, the final list of recommendations expressly<br />

cites the following activities to be taken by trade fair organizers:<br />

1. Before the event, organizers should provide exhibitors with information on<br />

IPR protection via a specific brochure to be sent out with the registration/<br />

participation forms, on the organizer‘s website, in the exhibitors‘ manual, or in the<br />

tradeshow‘s General Terms and Conditions. This information should contain<br />

advice to exhibitors, such as:<br />

-Exhibitors should protect and register trademarks, patents or designs before<br />

the tradeshow starts, to obtain a valid right (an exhibition destroys novelty) and to<br />

be able to make use of all the forms of legal protection, in general and during the<br />

event.<br />

-For that purpose, the consulting and advice of a specialized patent and<br />

trademark attorney regarding registration alternatives, requirements, procedures<br />

and maintenance is highly recommended.<br />

6 H. YU, CH. LU, Who should be in charge of IPR during exhibitions, International Business Daily,<br />

2006-01-04(7)


Hua Yu and Qing Yang 439<br />

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-Contact details of the person responsible for IPR issues within the organizing<br />

company should be provided, as well as the contact details of local/national IPR<br />

organizations, customs authorities and patent and trademark attorneys.<br />

-Before the exhibition, an exhibitor who believes that another exhibitor will<br />

infringe his rights should make an appropriate application to the customs<br />

authorities (when applicable), who can then stop suspicious consignments,<br />

investigate them, take samples, and destroy copies.<br />

-Exhibitors should bring to the trade fair original documents or certified<br />

copies of their patent or trademark rights, so that a possible infringement may be<br />

established during the event. Any verdict already obtained against an exhibiting<br />

pirate should also be included.<br />

2. Furthermore, in order to assist exhibitors to address IPR complaints or<br />

infringements during trade fairs, organizers should offer a list of local IP attorneys<br />

willing to represent exhibitors who wish to pursue legal action against an alleged<br />

infringer.<br />

3. Organizers should provide on-site or on-call experts (IP attorneys, customs<br />

authorities) to be available during the event, so as to offer legal advice to those<br />

affected by an IPR infringement to identify any counterfeit products during the<br />

trade fair.<br />

4. Organizers should be able to provide a neutral arbitration, arbitrator, or<br />

judge to help determine if there is a violation or to resolve IPR disputes during the<br />

trade fair.<br />

5. Organizers should provide interpreters to facilitate communication in the<br />

case of disputes with foreign exhibitors.<br />

6. When appropriate and if possible, organizers should provide an on-site<br />

office, a special stand or a point of contact, to deal with any IPR requests or<br />

complaints for the entire duration of the trade fair.<br />

7. In order to protect exhibitors from counterfeiting or IPR infringement<br />

practices during trade fairs, exhibitors should be encouraged to indicate that their<br />

products or services are protected by IP rights, where applicable.7<br />

7 PGCEIPPP, How to Protect Your Intellectual Property at Trade Fairs: Experience and Practice<br />

in Europe.2009, 7-8 ff.


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4.2. General Exdperience of IPR Protection at Exhibitions<br />

4.2.1. Presentation of the General Enforcement Rules<br />

In Germany the enforcement of IP rights at trade fairs can be achieved mainly<br />

through civil but proceedings, supplemented by criminal and administrative<br />

proceedings.<br />

4.2.1.1. Civil Proceedings<br />

4.2.1.1.1. Extrajudicial Proceedings<br />

It is possible to enforce IP rights in an extrajudicial way by sending to the<br />

infringer a warning letter according to Article 12 paragraph 1 of Act against Unfair<br />

Competition (UWG) (analog) at his booth on the trade fair. Such a warning letter is<br />

regularly combined with a cease-and-desist-declaration that needs to be signed<br />

from the infringer under accepted contractual penalty for each case of noncompliance<br />

within a certain period of time. In urgent cases like a trade fair the<br />

respite can only be one day or a few hours. If the infringer accepts the warning<br />

letter and signs the cease-and desist- declaration unconditioned and irrevocable the<br />

presumed danger of recurrence of the infringement is disproved. The IP right‘s<br />

owner has no reason and no need for taking legal action anymore. In each case of<br />

recurrence the contractual penalty falls due. The costs for this extrajudicial<br />

proceeding have to be reimbursed by the infringer, according to Art. 12 paragraph<br />

1 of Act against Unfair Competition (UWG) or according to the principle of agency<br />

of necessity.<br />

If the infringer does not comply with the warning letter, the right‘s owner can<br />

still try to take legal actions; especially try to obtain a preliminary injunction.<br />

If the warning letter is unfounded, it can make the right‘s owner liable to pay<br />

compensation for damages on grounds of an illegal and culpable interference with<br />

the right to operate an established and running business.<br />

4.2.1.1.2 Preliminary Court Proceeding<br />

The court competent for the main proceedings is also competent for the<br />

issuance of the preliminary injunction, according to Art. 937, German Code of<br />

Civil Procedure (ZPO). This is in almost all cases a District Court according to the<br />

value in dispute so that it is necessary to be represented by a lawyer in the legal<br />

proceedings, according to Art. 78 of ZPO.<br />

In urgent cases, which is basically the rule regarding infringements on trade<br />

fairs - the court can decide with only one - the presiding - judge, according to Art.


Hua Yu and Qing Yang 441<br />

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944 of ZPO, and the court/judge can decide to abstain the opponent from hearing,<br />

according to Art. 937 paragraph 2 of ZPO.<br />

If the court rules for the preliminary injunction, it is necessary to execute this<br />

decision within one month, according to Art. 929 paragraph 2, Art.936 of ZPO.<br />

The preliminary injunction decision is per se preliminarily enforceable.<br />

Enforcing a Preliminary Injunction:<br />

The bailiff generally fills in a standard form to prove the service, and the<br />

other party has to sign it at the booth. Usually the bailiff firstly delivers the<br />

decision for purpose of execution of the preliminary injunction.<br />

Secondly it can be the case that the bailiff at the same time obtains the<br />

instruction for a sequestration. Then the bailiff will also enforce that claim<br />

according to Art. 57 of operation guidelines for bailiffs (GVGA). He will search for<br />

the respective items at the booth and will take them with him, if possible, or will<br />

have it picked up to store it afterwards till the legal dispute will be finalized. For<br />

the storage, the bailiff regularly demands an advance payment from the claimant.<br />

Defense of the Opponent:<br />

If the opponent does not want to accept an issued and served preliminary<br />

injunction, he has the following possibilities of defense:<br />

a) Filing an objection according to Art. 924, 936 of ZPO to the issuing court;<br />

b) Claiming at the respective court that a deadline will be fixed for the<br />

claimant to take the main action so that a final decision can be brought about<br />

(instead of only a preliminary one), according to Art. 926 paragraph 1, Art.<br />

936 of ZPO;<br />

A claim for a temporary abandonment of the enforcement according to Art.<br />

769 of ZPO is usually not successful in preliminary injunction proceedings because<br />

it would contradict the order to cease and desist.<br />

Regarding the jurisdiction in urgent cases like trade fairs, it should be<br />

possible to warn the opponent before taking legal action, e.g. by bringing the<br />

warning letter directly to the booth and giving the other party a very short deadline<br />

to put the potential infringing items away or at least cover them and refrain from<br />

(furthermore) presenting them at the fair.<br />

Costs and Compensation:<br />

All costs have to be reimbursed by the opponent if he accepts the court‘s<br />

decision, including the court‘s costs as well as the costs of the bailiff and naturally<br />

the attorney‘s costs of the claimant, according to Art. 91 of ZPO.


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In case of enforcement of a preliminary injunction and a contradictory final<br />

decision of the court (e.g. after an objection of the opponent) the claimant is<br />

obliged to compensate the damages to the opponent, according to Art. 945 of ZPO.<br />

4.2.1.1.3. Preservation of Evidence Proceeding<br />

If the right holder discovers a probably-infringing item at a trade fair but is<br />

not too sure about the fact of infringement, a way to obtain certainty is the<br />

preservation of evidence directly on the fair; especially if the assumed infringer<br />

comes from another country far away, and it seems to be difficult or very expensive<br />

to order the respective item as an example later on. Art. 485 of German Code of<br />

Civil Procedure (ZPO) provides for the so called independent proceedings for the<br />

taking of evidence - independent from and in the run-up to the main action. The<br />

right‘s owner can claim for the order of an inspection of the item by an expert<br />

according to Art. 809 German Civil Code (BGB). A certain probability of an<br />

infringement is sufficient for such a claim.<br />

Such a court order regarding the inspection of an item by an expert also<br />

includes the interdiction for the defendant to make modifications or changes. The<br />

expert is usually allowed per court order to take photos and make notes and e.g. to<br />

ask, if necessary, to start the operation of a machine. The defendant can take notice<br />

of the written expert‘s opinion afterwards and gets the opportunity to inform the<br />

court about interests of nondisclosure. The court then has to decide whether the<br />

expert‘s opinion can be handed out to the claimant.<br />

4.2.1.1.4. Main Court Proceeding<br />

Enforcing IP rights in a main legal proceeding in Germany regularly takes at<br />

least a few months or more, depending on the IP right and on the seized court. But<br />

if a defendant is an exhibitor at a German trade fair, claimants often take advantage<br />

of having a writ served upon the defendant at the fair. Thus, the claimant spares a<br />

formal delivery abroad, which is expensive and can take a very long time.<br />

Furthermore, the writ does not need to be translated, because exhibiting in<br />

Germany implicates that at least someone in the booth is able to speak German.<br />

4.2.1.2.. Criminal Proceedings<br />

In Germany, penal provisions of infringement proceedings of IP rights are<br />

rare, because the Public Prosecution Office hardly sees any public interest in the<br />

criminal prosecution of an infringer of IP rights.<br />

4.2.1.3. Administrative Procedings<br />

Confiscation / border confiscation by customs may be taken. An application<br />

of a border confiscation by the customs is possible according to the European


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Regulation Nr. 1383/2003 or according to the - subordinate - national German<br />

regulations for confiscation, Art. 142 a Patent Act (PatG), Art. 25a Utility Patent<br />

Act (GebrMG), Art. 55 ff Design Act (GeschmMG), Art. 146 ff Trademark Act<br />

(MarkenG), Art. 111b Copyright Act (UrhG).<br />

It is better for the application to be filed in advance; that is, in the run-up to<br />

the fair. But under the requirements of article 4 of the European Regulation,<br />

customs can occasionally move before the application or before the approval of the<br />

application. Customs can be active not only at the borders but also in Germany,<br />

especially when the goods in question are only temporarily imported from a third<br />

state for presentation at a German fair. The goods can be confiscated by the<br />

German customs, if a suspicion of an infringement of IP rights is confirmed 8 .<br />

5. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO IPR INFRINGEMENTS AT<br />

EXHIBITIONS IN CHINA<br />

5.1. Improve Laws and Regulations on IPR Protection at Exhibitions<br />

China should improve laws of intellectual property protection at exhibitions.<br />

Provisions for implementation should be added to the Measures for the Protection<br />

of Intellectual Property Rights during Exhibitions. For example, regarding<br />

exhibitions with a show time of less than 3 days, if a complaint-taking section at<br />

exhibition has not set up on-site, a complaining telephone must be set up on-site at<br />

the exhibition. The complaint telephone should connect directly to the local<br />

intellectual property authorities. For the shows on Saturdays or Sundays, if<br />

complaint-taking section is set up on-site at the exhibition, the enforcement at the<br />

exhibition site has no problem. If there is no complaint-taking section set up onsite,<br />

when the local intellectual property authority receives a complaint call, it must<br />

immediately dispatch its members to the exhibition site to carry out enforcement.<br />

When it is appropriate, the Measures should be upgraded to the Law of IP<br />

Protection at Exhibition promulgated by the NPC Standing Committee. Thus it will<br />

enjoy more legal authority.<br />

5.2. Judicial Institutions to Strengthen Enforcement of IPR Protection at<br />

Exhibitions<br />

Intellectual property authorities should strengthen administrative enforcement<br />

of IPR laws at exhibitions, establish assistance mechanisms, accountability<br />

mechanisms, coordination mechanisms, evaluation and incentives mechanism and<br />

information exchange mechanism of IPR protection enforcement of during<br />

exhibitions.<br />

8 PGCEIPPP, How to Protect Your Intellectual Property at Trade Fairs: Experience and Practice<br />

in Europe.2009, 13-18 ff.


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Courts should decide quickly on the cases of IPR infringement at exhibitions,<br />

and provide the IPR holder with provisional injunction for the infringement of IPR<br />

during exhibitions.<br />

The customs should increase the intensity of investigation and handling of<br />

infringing products of exhibitors. When suspected infringing exhibits are found at<br />

the border, the customs authority should take measures to confiscate the goods.<br />

5.3. Exhibition Organizers to Strengthen the IPR Management at Exhibitions<br />

●To develop protection rules. Exhibition organizers should develop fair rules<br />

of intellectual property protection during the exhibition. In the merchants menu of<br />

exhibition, there should be a notice that exhibitors should not infringe upon<br />

intellectual property rights. For some sensitive products, exhibitors must provide<br />

relevant documents of patent, trademark and copyright for the exhibits. The<br />

suspected infringing products should be prohibited from entering the exhibitions.<br />

●Signature guarantee. Exhibitors should sign intellectual property agreement<br />

with exhibition organizers. Infringing exhibitors will not pass the pre-trial and can<br />

not enter the exhibition; thus it constitutes a deterrent against infringers, preventing<br />

them from storing infringing products on the exhibition.<br />

● Rigorous on-site management. The organizer should apply Intellectual<br />

Property Accountability Mechanism; ask any trade mission, business associations<br />

and exhibitors to appoint persons responsible for intellectual property rights. Once<br />

infringement complaints are filed, in accordance with the fair rules of intellectual<br />

property protection at exhibition, the organizers have the authority to order the<br />

infringing exhibitors to withdraw the alleged infringing exhibits from the<br />

exhibition.<br />

● Provide consulting services of intellectual property. Establish the legal<br />

advisory office on the exhibition site, promptly mediate disputes in a variety of<br />

infringement case of IPR, and widely publicize related laws and regulations of<br />

intellectual property.<br />

If the Chinese IP officials away from work on weekends, the exhibition<br />

organizer could set up ―IP Service Point‖ on the site of the exhibition. ―IP Service<br />

Point‖ may consist of 1 service coordinator and 3 IP lawyers (having more than 5<br />

years‘ experience in IPR area). Exhibitors must respect the services and actions<br />

from ―IP Service Point‖. If the injured party complains, ―IP Service Point‖ should<br />

first preliminarily judge whether the IPR exists and remains in force in China; then<br />

accompanied by the complainant, services representatives (it should be more than 2<br />

persons) go the booth of the defendant and make investigation. Services<br />

representatives show the complaint to the persons responsible for the booth, and<br />

then record the argument of the defendant, take photographs upon the


Hua Yu and Qing Yang 445<br />

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argumentative exhibits according to the identification of the complainant, and hold<br />

a hearing on the same day. The claimant and the defendant should present their<br />

view on the conflict of benefits and technical issues in front of 3 specialists from<br />

the IP Service Point. Both sides could debate with the help of their respective<br />

lawyers. Specialist group should make a written ruling within 1 hour after the<br />

completion of the hearing, and send the ruling to the claimant and the defendant.<br />

The ruling comes into force immediately. If an infringement act is identified by the<br />

specialist group, the defendant should withdraw the debatable exhibit; if the<br />

defendant refuses to execute the ruling, the organizer may request the police to<br />

confiscate the infringement exhibits from the booth.<br />

● Help the government agencies with on-site enforcement. During the<br />

exhibition, exhibition organizers should actively assist the intellectual property<br />

office and other government departments to carry out joint enforcement, strengthen<br />

the co-ordination, supervision, inspection of IPR protection during the exhibition<br />

and maintain the normal trading order of the exhibition.<br />

5.4. Exibitors to Strengthen their own IPR Protection<br />

5.4.1. Exhibitors‟ IPR Document Preparation<br />

Before participating in an exhibition, exhibitors should get a full<br />

understanding of the competitors to avoid infringing the intellectual property of the<br />

competitor.<br />

When leaving for the exhibition, exhibitors must prepare documentation of<br />

intellectual property rights. They should prepare the enterprise's business license,<br />

proving its legal status. IPR related documents should be prepared to prove that<br />

they have the intellectual property rights. If the exhibitors are not the original rights<br />

holders, but only licensed users, they should also carry the license agreements, etc.<br />

They need to bring a blank commission of authorization with a seal so that<br />

exhibitors have the right to deal with infringement matters. Other supporting<br />

documents should be prepared as well.


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5.4.2. Take Actions when Infringed<br />

First of all, the exhibitor should obtain evidence of infringement. During the<br />

process of forensics, he should not disturb the infringer, or else the infringers can<br />

easily destroy evidence. He should not be engaged into direct conflict with the<br />

infringer. The handling of the evidence should have audio and video records as<br />

valid proof. He should call in external fixation by asking a lawyer or notary to<br />

accompany during the process of forensics.<br />

Secondly, make the complaint to IP office on the exhibition site. The<br />

infringed exhibitors should submit the relevant materials. If patent rights are<br />

involved, one should submit the patent certificate, patent announcement text, proof<br />

of patent holder and proof of the legal status of the patent. If a trademark is<br />

involved, he should submit trademark registration certificate documents signed by<br />

the complainant and the identification proof of trademark rights holder. If a<br />

copyright is involved, he should submit the proof of the rights of copyright and the<br />

identification of copyright owner. In addition, the reasons and evidence of alleged<br />

infringement provided by the exhibitor should be as full and accurate as possible.<br />

5.4.3. Recommendation for Exhibiting Outside China<br />

● Before participating in the exhibition, exhibitors must get the necessary<br />

legal advice to understand and get familiar with the relevant intellectual property<br />

laws of the exhibition host countries.<br />

● Prepare all the necessary documents. Before exhibiting abroad, exhibitor<br />

must be sure to bring the business license, the relevant written material of the<br />

products, product patent, trademark certificates and other documents. If the exhibit<br />

used to be involved in property rights dispute and the court or authority confirmed<br />

that the exhibit has not infringed, be sure to bring that verdict. In case recurrence of<br />

intellectual property disputes, these documents can make a great help.<br />

● Actively respond to infringement claims. When a Chinese exhibitor receives<br />

a warning letter of infringement of intellectual property, as a precautionary<br />

measure, he needs to ask for legal counsel immediately and to determine two<br />

points, namely whether the exhibits are an infringement, and whether the target<br />

value is too high.<br />

If the warning is considered justified, and the target value is appropriate, the<br />

exhibitor may sign the warning letter in order to avoid the enterprise issued the<br />

warning letter asking the court for provisional injunction, and thus he can guarantee<br />

that other non-infringing exhibits could be shown on the exhibition so as to reduce<br />

losses as much as possible. If the exhibitor is sure of not infringing, he should write<br />

a protection letter to the court, or to let the court confirm that the products of the<br />

exhibitor are not infringing, or even initiate litigation based on the anti-unfair<br />

competition law of the host country of the exhibition.


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6. CONCLUSIONS<br />

In recent years, China has been paying great attention to the IPR protection at<br />

exhibitions, and many governmental departments have contributed to the<br />

enforcement of IPR protection at exhibition. The Chinese government will<br />

continuously improve national laws to protect IPR at exhibitions. The judiciary<br />

institutions will strengthen enforcement of protection of IPR at exhibitions.<br />

Exhibition organizers will strengthen the management of protection of IPR at<br />

exhibitions. While the exhibitors will take more care of their own protection of IPR<br />

at exhibitions. We have reasons to believe that as the protection of intellectual<br />

property during Chinese exhibitions improves, China's exhibition industry will<br />

develop rapidly and in a sustainable manner in the future.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

D. Gervais, The TRIPs Agreement. Drafting History and Analysis. Thomson,<br />

2008, 3d ed. (PRIV 5185)<br />

K. HOFFMEISTER, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Co-<br />

Operation with Customs Authorities, in A. DIETZ (ed.), Enforcement of Copyright.<br />

The Role of National Legislation in Copyright Law, Actes du Congres de Berlin de<br />

l‘ALAI, 16-19 June 1999, ALAI, Munich, 2000, 182 (PRIV 1779)<br />

T. TRAINER, Border Enforcement of Intellectual Property, Oceana<br />

<strong>Publication</strong>s, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1999 (PRIV 1692)<br />

D. SHEN, H.YU, Report on the Development of China Exhibition Industry<br />

between (2001-2005), Publishing House of Economy Daily, Beijing,2007.<br />

Y. MA, H. YU, Basic knowledge of International Trade Exhibition, China<br />

Business Publishing House, Beijing,2008.<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong>, the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Case book (2nd<br />

Edition-2008), <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 791E<br />

Articles<br />

A. CLARK, Parallel imports: a new job for customs? in EIPR 1999, 1 ff.<br />

X. Yu, The New Regulations Regarding Customs Protection of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights in the People‟s Republic of China, in 36 IIC 2005, 835-841 ff.<br />

K. Daele, Regulation 1383/2003: A New Step in the Fight Against Couterfeit<br />

and Pirated Goods at the Borders of the EU, in EIPR 2004, 214-225 ff.<br />

A. CLARK, The Use of Border Measures to Prevent International Trade in<br />

Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Implementation and Proposed Reform of Council<br />

Regulation 3295/94, in EIPR, 1998, 414 ff.<br />

H. YU, Difference between Chinese Exhibition Industry and Foreign<br />

Exhibition Industry. in SC 2006(6), 62-67 ff.<br />

H. YU, CH. LU, Who should be in charge of IPR during exhibitions<br />

.International Business Daily, 2006-01-04(7)


Hua Yu and Qing Yang 449<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

H. YU, The comments on Measures for the Protection of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights during Exhibitions, Public business information leader,2006-02-<br />

14(3)<br />

PGCEIPPP, How to Protect Your Intellectual Property at Trade Fairs:<br />

Experience and Practice in Europe.2009<br />

Several enforcement programs of IPR Protection in Europe<br />

(http://www.ipr.gov.cn/jwzh/zhzdzscqbh/oz/459571.shtml)<br />

German system and the judicial protection of intellectual property rights :<br />

Particularly Preliminary Injunction during<br />

exhibition(http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/journal-show.asp?id=173)<br />

Y. Feng. Enterprises meeting IP Problems while participating in overseas<br />

exhibition.<br />

http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/mtjj/2009/200908/t20090831_474129.html<br />

Legislation:<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Signed<br />

in Marrakesh on Apr. 15, 1994.Up to Mar. 1, 2005,148 states have adhered to it.<br />

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Signed in Paris on<br />

March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on<br />

June 2, 1911,at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934,<br />

at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended<br />

on September 28, 1979.Up to Jan. 1993, 107 states have adhered to the it.<br />

Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29<br />

April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. This Directive is<br />

addressed to the Member States. Done at Strasbourg, 29 April 2004 . came into<br />

force on the 20th day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the<br />

European Union ( Official Journal of the European Union L 157 of 30 April 2004).<br />

The Code of Civil Procedure Rules of the Federal Republic of Germany.<br />

Adopted at January 30, 1877. Revised on Dec. 3, 1976.<br />

Patent Law of the People's Republic of China. Adopted at the 4th Meeting of<br />

the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on March 12,<br />

1984. Amended for the 3rd time in accordance with the Decision of the Standing<br />

Committee of the Eleventh National People‘s Congress on Amending the Patent<br />

Law of the People‘s Republic of China at its 6th Meeting on December 27, 2008.<br />

The revised Law came into force on Oct. 1, 2009


450<br />

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Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China. Adopted at the 24th<br />

Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress on 23<br />

August 1982, revised for the first time according to the Decision on the<br />

Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China adopted at<br />

the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's<br />

Congress, on 22 February 1993, and revised for the second time according to the<br />

Decision on the Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of<br />

China adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National<br />

People's Congress on 27 October 2001.<br />

Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China. Adopted at the Fifteenth<br />

Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on 7<br />

September 1990, and revised in accordance with the Decision on the Amendment<br />

of the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China adopted at the 24th Session<br />

of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on 27 October,<br />

2001<br />

Measures for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights during<br />

Exhibitions. adopted by the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration for<br />

Industry and Commerce, the State Bureau of Copyright and the State Intellectual<br />

Property Office upon deliberation, are hereby promulgated and shall come into<br />

force as of March 1, 2006


ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING SYSTEM UNDER THAI PLANT<br />

VARIETY PROTECTION ACT 1999<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

1.1. Rationale and Background<br />

by<br />

Setthabut Ittithumwinit<br />

Article 27.3(b) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) states that Members shall provide for the<br />

protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system<br />

or by any combination thereof. The Thai Plant Variety Protection Act 1991 (PVP<br />

Act) was enacted to comply with Article 27.3(b).<br />

Thailand has endorsed the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) since<br />

1992. The PVP Act has established a scheme for the access and benefit sharing<br />

(ABS) in case of plant genetic resources, in which a negotiation will take place<br />

between the party seeking access and the Government Agency. A profit-sharing<br />

agreement is required to be in accordance with the rules, procedure and conditions<br />

prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation. However, the Ministry of Agriculture and<br />

Cooperatives has not passed such Ministerial Regulation yet. As a result, these are<br />

loopholes once the PVP Act has been in force.<br />

1.2. Purposes and Objectives of Study<br />

This study will find the possible solutions to fill the gap and give the<br />

recommendations to Thailand for the enactment of the Ministerial Regulation<br />

regarding access and benefit-sharing.<br />

1.3. Research Methodology<br />

This research will study the TRIPS Agreement, CBD, Bonn Guidelines, and<br />

International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture<br />

(ITPGR). There will be the review related articles, journals and textbooks.<br />

1.4. Thai Plan Variety Protection Act<br />

The ABS exists under The PVP Act which is in the compliance with the<br />

CBD. Article 52 of the PVP Act states that a person who collects, procures or<br />

gathers general domestic plant varieties, wild plant varieties or any part of such<br />

plant varieties for the purposes of variety development, education, experiment or<br />

research for commercial interest shall obtain permission from the competent<br />

official and make a profit-sharing agreement under which the income accruing<br />

there from shall be remitted to the Plant Varieties Protection Fund in accordance<br />

with the rules, procedure and conditions prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation.


452 Access and Benefit Sharing System under Thai Plant:<br />

Variety Protection Act 1999<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The profit-sharing agreement shall at least have the following particulars:<br />

(1) the purposes of the collection and gathering of the plant variety;<br />

(2) the amount or quantity of samples of the intended plant variety;<br />

(3) the obligations of the person to whom permission is granted;<br />

(4) the stipulation as to intellectual property rights in the products which<br />

result from the development, study, experiment or research of or into the<br />

plant variety and which are derived from the use of the plant variety under<br />

the agreement;<br />

(5) the stipulation as to the amount or rate of, or the term for, the profitsharing<br />

under the profit-sharing agreement in respect of products derived<br />

from the use of the plant variety hereunder;<br />

(6) the term of the agreement;<br />

(7) the revocation of the agreement;<br />

(8) the stipulation as to the dispute settlement procedure;<br />

(9) other items of particulars as prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation.<br />

2. INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF ABS<br />

2.1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights<br />

The TRIPS Agreement is a multilateral intellectual property right treaty<br />

which is one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trade<br />

agreements. The TRIPS Agreement requires Members to provide the protection for<br />

intellectual property. It covers copyright and related rights; trademarks;<br />

geographical indications; industrial designs; patents including the protection of new<br />

varieties of plants; the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed<br />

information including trade secrets and test data.<br />

With regard to the patent provisions under the TRIPS Agreement, patent is<br />

available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of<br />

technology. The inventions eligible for patenting must be new, involve an<br />

inventive step (or be non-obvious) and be capable of industrial application (or be<br />

useful). 1 Members may exclude plants, animals and essentially biological<br />

processes from patenting. Micro-organisms and non-biological and<br />

microbiological processes are eligible for patents. However, Members shall<br />

provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective<br />

sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 2<br />

1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of<br />

the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement] Art. 27.1.<br />

2 Id. Art. 27.3 (b).


Setthabut Ittithumwinit 453<br />

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Some inventions utilize plant genetic resources and then patents are granted<br />

to such inventions. It is noted that most valuable genetic resources originated in<br />

developing countries, including Central and South America and many Asian<br />

countries. 3 Generally, companies in developed countries hold patents of plant<br />

genetic resource related inventions. It has become a common practice for<br />

companies to access plant genetic resources and then conduct bio-prospecting in<br />

genetically rich countries. As a result, developing nations have argued that there<br />

should be fair and equitable benefit sharing arising out of the use of genetic<br />

resources. The TRIPS Agreement does not mention the principle of ABS but this<br />

issue is addressed in the CBD.<br />

2.2. The CBD and Bonn Guideline<br />

The CBD is not a strict treaty but rather a process by which its Parties agree<br />

to take certain actions at the national level. 4 The objectives of the CBD are the<br />

conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the<br />

fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic<br />

resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate<br />

transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources<br />

and to technologies, and by appropriate funding. 5<br />

According to Article 15 of the CBD, State has the authority to control access<br />

to genetic resources through national legislation. Access to genetic resources<br />

requires the prior informed consent (PIC) of the providing country and where<br />

granted, will be on mutually agreed terms (MAT). The access is linked to the fair<br />

and equitable sharing of benefit. Benefits derived from genetic resources may<br />

include the result of research and development carried out on genetic resources, the<br />

transfer of technologies which makes use of those resources, participation in<br />

biotechnological research activities, or monetary benefits arising from the<br />

commercialization of products based on genetic resources. A number of<br />

developing countries have passed national laws fulfilling the CBD mandates. 6<br />

The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable<br />

Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (the Bonn Guidelines) were<br />

adopted in 2002. 7 The Bonn Guidelines assist Parties when establishing<br />

3 K. NI, The Incorporation of the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing into TRIPS Regime:<br />

An Appraisal of the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich Genetic Resources, in Asian J. WTO<br />

& Int'l Health L. & Pol'y 2006, 433 ff., at 434.<br />

4 K. KATE –S. A. LAIRD, The Commerial Use of Biodiversity: Access to Genetic Resources and<br />

Benefit-Sharing, Earthscan, London, 2000., at 14.<br />

5 Convention of Biological Diversity, Art.1.<br />

6 K. NI, The Incorporation of the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing into TRIPS Regime:<br />

An Appraisal of the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich Genetic Resources, supra at note 3,<br />

at 436.<br />

7 Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological<br />

Diversity, at 262, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CDB/COP6/20 (27 May 27 2002), available at<br />

http://www.biodiv.org/doc/decisions/COP-06-dec-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).


454 Access and Benefit Sharing System under Thai Plant:<br />

Variety Protection Act 1999<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

administrative, legislative or policy measures on access and benefit-sharing and/or<br />

when negotiating contractual arrangements for access to genetic resources and<br />

benefit-sharing. 8 Hence, these could be used to advise Thai Government on how to<br />

establish generally accepted norms that set fair and practical conditions.<br />

2.3. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and<br />

Agriculture<br />

The objectives of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for<br />

Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) are the conservation and sustainable use of plant<br />

genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of<br />

benefits derived from their use, in harmony with the CBD, for sustainable<br />

agriculture and food security. 9<br />

The ITPGR Treaty provides that the Contracting Parties agree to establish a<br />

multilateral system, which is efficient, effective, and transparent, both to facilitate<br />

access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and to share, in a fair and<br />

equitable way, the benefits arising from the utilization of these resources, on a<br />

complementary and mutually reinforcing basis. Thailand is not a Party to the<br />

ITPGR Treaty and so there is no obligation.<br />

3. ABS UNDER THAI PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT<br />

3.1. Ownership and Scope<br />

According to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, natural resources<br />

are owned by the State and the Constitution provides the community the right to<br />

participate in the management, maintenance, preservation and exploitation of<br />

natural resources, the environment and the biological diversity in a balanced and<br />

sustainable fashion 10 . The State shall pursue directive principles of State policies<br />

in relation to natural resources and the environment:<br />

- to provide a plan for managing natural resources systematically and in a<br />

manner generating public interests, provided that the public shall have due<br />

participation in the preservation, maintenance and exploitation of natural<br />

resources and biological diversity in a balanced fashion;<br />

- to promote, maintain and protect the quality of natural resources in<br />

accordance with the sustainable development principle, control and eradiate<br />

8 M. B. ROJAS, International Expert Workshop on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing<br />

: record of discussion : Cuernavaca, Mexico, October 24-27, 2004, CONABIO, Mexico, 2005., at<br />

320.<br />

9 Report of the ad hoc open-ended working group on access and benefit-sharing, at 8, U.N. Doc.<br />

UNEP/CDB/WG-ABS/1/INF/4 (4 October 2001), available at<br />

http://www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=ABSWG-01 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).<br />

10 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Art.66.


Setthabut Ittithumwinit 455<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

polluted conditions affecting health, sanitary conditions, welfare and the<br />

quality of life of the public, provided that members of the public, local<br />

residents and local government organizations shall have due participation in<br />

determining the direction of such work 11<br />

A local government organization has powers and duties in connection with<br />

the promotion and maintenance of the quality of the environment as<br />

provided by law. The law shall at least contain the following matters as its<br />

substance:<br />

- the management, preservation and exploitation of the natural resources and<br />

environment in the area of the locality;<br />

- the participation in the preservation of natural resources and environment<br />

outside the area of the locality only in the case where the livelihood of the<br />

inhabitants in the area may be affected;<br />

- the participation by local communities. 12<br />

The ownership of the natural resources determines access conditions, rules<br />

and procedure. Thai laws consider the general domestic plant varieties and wild<br />

plant varieties as property of the State. The main implication is that access to these<br />

plant varieties is regulated for public and communal lands. As mentioned in<br />

Article 52 of the PVP Act, the collectors are required to have the permission from<br />

the Department of Agriculture and the scope of access activities covers the general<br />

domestic plant varieties and wild plant varieties including mushroom and seaweed<br />

all over the country.<br />

3.2. Access Procedure and Prior Informed Consent (PIC)<br />

These are directly relevant obligations and commitments under the CBD and Bonn<br />

Guidelines. Access to genetic resources shall be subject to PIC. 13 PIC shall be<br />

obtained from the competent national authority 14 and the procedure for obtaining<br />

an access permit should be transparent and accessible by an interested party. 15 The<br />

competent authority could grant access by issuing a permit or license. 16<br />

Thailand has implemented such obligations and commitments mentioned<br />

above into the ABS regime. The Bonn Guidelines propose possible elements of a<br />

11 Id. Art.85.<br />

12 Id. Art.290.<br />

13 CBD, Art.15.5.<br />

14 The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the<br />

Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, para 28 and 32.<br />

15 The Bonn Guidelines, para 40.<br />

16 The Bonn Guidelines, para 39.


456 Access and Benefit Sharing System under Thai Plant:<br />

Variety Protection Act 1999<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

PIC system as well as procedure. 17 The PVP Act defines access as collect, procure<br />

or gather the plant varieties. The local or foreign prospectors have to file the access<br />

application with the Department of Agriculture in order to obtain PIC. PIC is<br />

required when any person accesses general domestic plant varieties, wild plant<br />

varieties or any part of such plant varieties for the purposes of variety development,<br />

education, experiment or research for commercial interest. It is noted that Thailand<br />

does not require bioprospectors to obtain PIC from local communities. The<br />

applicants are required to obtain the prior informed consent only from the<br />

competent official at the Department of Agriculture. The access procedure must be<br />

in accordance with the rules, procedure and conditions prescribed in the Ministerial<br />

Regulation. However, the Ministerial Regulation has not been passed yet and<br />

therefore the rules, procedure and conditions for the access need to be established.<br />

Recommendation<br />

Based on the CBD and Bonn Guidelines, the Ministerial Regulation should at<br />

least contain the matters of the application submission and application approval as<br />

its substance:<br />

a) submission of application<br />

- An applicant shall be with the qualifications: (1) being of Thai nationality<br />

or being a juristic person having a head office in Thailand; (2) having a<br />

domicile or place of residence in Thailand; and (3) not being an<br />

incompetent or quasi-incompetent person.<br />

- An access application shall be submitted to the competent official at the<br />

Department of Agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative.<br />

The application may be submitted either by hand at the Department of<br />

Agriculture or by registered mail or by any other means prescribed by the<br />

Director-General of the Department of Agriculture.<br />

- An application for access to genetic resources through PIC shall be<br />

documented in written form. 18 An applicant shall submit the documents<br />

where the following information to be provided: (1) Legal entity and<br />

affiliation of the applicant and/or collector and contact person when the<br />

applicant is an institution; (2) Type and quantity of genetic resources to<br />

which access is sought; (3) Starting date and duration of the activity; (4)<br />

Geographical prospecting area; (5) Evaluation of how the access activity<br />

may impact on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, to<br />

determine the relative costs and benefits of granting access; (6) Accurate<br />

information regarding intended use (e.g.: taxonomy, collection, research,<br />

17 M. DROSS - F. WOLFF, New elements of the international regime on access and benefit-sharing of<br />

genetic resources the role of certificates of origin, Federal Agency for Nature Conservation, Bonn,<br />

2005., at 17.<br />

18 The Bonn Guidelines, para 38.


Setthabut Ittithumwinit 457<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

commercialization); (7) Identification of where the research and<br />

development will take place; (8) Information on how the research and<br />

development is to be carried out; (9) Identification of local bodies for<br />

collaboration in research and development; (10) Possible third party<br />

involvement; (11) Purpose of the collection, research and expected results;<br />

(12) Kinds/types of benefits that could come from obtaining access to the<br />

resource, including benefits from derivatives and products arising from the<br />

commercial and other utilization of the genetic resource; (13) Indication of<br />

benefit-sharing arrangements; (14) Budget; and (15) Treatment of<br />

confidential information. 19<br />

Such information will help the Department of Agriculture, the competent<br />

authority, to determine whether or not to grant the access to general domestic plant<br />

varieties, wild plant varieties and it will ensure that benefits are equitably shared<br />

and give transparency to bioprospecting project.<br />

b) approval of application<br />

- The competent official shall examine and review the application and<br />

supported documents within a reason period of time.<br />

- Decisions on applications for access to plant varieties shall be taken within<br />

a reason period of time. 20<br />

- Decisions by the Department of Agriculture to grant access to plant<br />

varieties or not shall be documented in written form. 21<br />

3.3. Mutually-Agreed Terms (MAT) and Benefit-Sharing<br />

The benefit-sharing regime under the Article 52 of the PVP Act applies to<br />

collectors of general domestic plant varieties and wild plant varieties for the<br />

purposes of variety development, education, experiment or research for commercial<br />

interest. Generally, an agreement is concluded after some form of negotiation. The<br />

negotiation implies a dialogue whereby alternatives are put forward and the parties<br />

to the negotiation have the freedom to choose other solutions. 22 The PVP Act<br />

provides the opportunity for negotiation in order that parties may reach the<br />

agreement on the terms of benefit-sharing on a mutually agree basis. MAT for<br />

access to genetic resources involve, by definition, at least two parties. 23 So, MAT<br />

has to be signed between the bioprospector and the Department of Agriculture.<br />

The profits derived from any benefit-sharing agreement must be paid to the Plant<br />

19 The Bonn Guidelines, para 36.<br />

20 The Bonn Guidelines, para 33.<br />

21 The Bonn Guidelines, para 38.<br />

22 M. I. JEFFERY, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing under the<br />

Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, in Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 2002, 747 ff., at<br />

786.<br />

23 K. KATE – S. A. LAIRD, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: Access to Genetic Resources and<br />

Benefit-Sharing, supra note 4, at 22.


458 Access and Benefit Sharing System under Thai Plant:<br />

Variety Protection Act 1999<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Varieties Protection Fund. The main objective of this Fund is to promote the<br />

conservation, research and development activities of plant varieties of local<br />

communities. The profit-sharing agreement under the PVP Act shall at least have<br />

the following particulars: (1) the purposes of the collection and gathering of the<br />

plant variety; (2) the amount or quantity of samples of the intended plant variety;<br />

(3) the obligations of the person to whom permission is granted; (4) the stipulation<br />

as to intellectual property rights in the products which result from the development,<br />

study, experiment or research of or into the plant variety and which are derived<br />

from the use of the plant variety under the agreement; (5) the stipulation as to the<br />

amount or rate of, or the term for, the profit-sharing under the profit-sharing<br />

agreement in respect of products derived from the use of the plant variety there<br />

under; (6) the term of the agreement; (7) the revocation of the agreement; (8) the<br />

stipulation as to the dispute settlement procedure; (9) other items of particulars as<br />

prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation.<br />

Recommendation<br />

The Ministerial Regulation should prescribe additional items as follows: (1)<br />

Any limitations on the possible use of the material; (2) Recognition of the<br />

sovereign rights of the country of origin; (3) Capacity-building in various areas to<br />

be identified in the agreement; (4) A clause on whether the terms of the agreement<br />

in certain circumstances (e.g. change of use) can be renegotiated; (5) Whether the<br />

genetic resources can be transferred to third parties and conditions to be imposed in<br />

such cases, e.g. whether or not to pass genetic resources to third parties without<br />

ensuring that the third parties enter into similar agreements except for taxonomic<br />

and systematic research that is not related to commercialization; (6) Whether the<br />

knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities have<br />

been respected, preserved and maintained, and whether the customary use of<br />

biological resources in accordance with traditional practices has been protected and<br />

encouraged; and (7) Treatment of confidential information. 24<br />

The fair and equitable benefit-sharing is to be on mutually agreed terms on a<br />

case by case basis. The contract also must be consistent with national and<br />

international laws governing biodiversity and contract formation. 25 The types of<br />

benefits are divided into monetary and non-monetary categories. 26 Thus, the<br />

parties could agree on benefit-sharing in the form as follows: (1) Access fees; (2)<br />

Up-front payments; (3) Milestone payments; (4) Payment of royalties; (5) License<br />

fees in case of commercialization; (6) Special fees to be paid to trust funds<br />

supporting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; (7) Salaries and<br />

preferential terms where mutually agreed; (8) Research funding; (9) Joint ventures;<br />

(10) Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights; (11) Sharing of<br />

24 The Bonn Guidelines, para 44.<br />

25 M. A. GOLLIN - S. A. LAIRD, Global Policies, Local Actions: the Role of National Legislation in<br />

Sustainable biodiversity Prospecting, in B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1996, 16 ff., at 74.<br />

26 The Bonn Guidelines, para 46.


Setthabut Ittithumwinit 459<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

research and development results; (12) Collaboration, cooperation and contribution<br />

in scientific research and development programs; (13) Participation in product<br />

development; (14) Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in education and<br />

training; (15) Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases;<br />

(16) Transfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and technology<br />

under fair and most favorable terms; (17) Institutional capacity-building; (18)<br />

Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the administration<br />

and enforcement of access regulations; (19) Training related to genetic resources<br />

with the full participation of providing Parties, and where possible, in such Parties;<br />

(20) Contributions to the local economy; (21) Social recognition; (22) Joint<br />

ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.<br />

4. CONCLUSION<br />

Article 52 of the PVP Act establishes ABS system. Collectors are required to<br />

obtain the permission to access the general domestic plant varieties and wild plant<br />

varieties and then they have to negotiate with the Department of Agriculture in<br />

order to conclude MAT including benefit-sharing terms. It can be seen that Article<br />

52 stipulates only the board and general principle of ABS and the procedures for<br />

ABS must be in accordance with the Ministerial Regulation. However, such<br />

Ministerial Regulation has not been promulgated yet and hence the bioprospectors<br />

are unable to obtain the permission from the Department of Agriculture. The<br />

Department of Agriculture has to follow the laws and regulations concerning the<br />

ABS. The Government and its officials are accountable under the law. Since there<br />

is no regulation, the ABS of general domestic plant varieties and wild plant<br />

varieties is unable to initiate. The Government needs to set the substantive and<br />

procedural requirements for any person wishing to access the plant varieties.<br />

Thailand can implement the obligations under the CBD and Bonn Guidelines by<br />

passing the Ministerial Regulation concerning the ABS. The recommendations<br />

aforementioned for the enactment of the Ministerial Regulation are based on the<br />

CBD and Bonn Guidelines. When the national ABS regime is consistent with<br />

international ABS regime, it will promote best practice.


460 Access and Benefit Sharing System under Thai Plant:<br />

Variety Protection Act 1999<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books<br />

K. KATE –S. A. LAIRD, The Commerial Use of Biodiversity: Access to<br />

Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing, Earthscan, London, 2000.<br />

M. B. ROJAS, International Expert Workshop on Access to Genetic Resources<br />

and Benefit Sharing : record of discussion : Cuernavaca, Mexico, October 24-27,<br />

2004, CONABIO, Mexico, 2005.<br />

M. DROSS - F. WOLFF, New elements of the international regime on access<br />

and benefit-sharing of genetic resources the role of certificates of origin, Federal<br />

Agency for Nature Conservation, Bonn, 2005.<br />

Articles<br />

K. NI, The Incorporation of the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing<br />

into TRIPS Regime: An Appraisal of the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich<br />

Genetic Resources, in Asian J. WTO & Int'l Health L. & Pol'y 2006, 433 ff.<br />

M. A. GOLLIN - S. A. LAIRD, Global Policies, Local Actions: the Role of<br />

National Legislation in Sustainable biodiversity Prospecting, in B.U. J. Sci. &<br />

Tech. L. 1996, 16 ff.<br />

M. I. JEFFERY, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-<br />

Sharing under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, in Sing. J.<br />

Int'l & Comp. L. 2002, 747 ff.<br />

Laws and Treaties<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.<br />

15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,<br />

Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125,<br />

1197 (1994)<br />

Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable<br />

Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.<br />

Convention of Biological Diversity (enter into force 29 December 1993).<br />

Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (enter into force 24 August 2007).


Setthabut Ittithumwinit 461<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Reports<br />

Report of the ad hoc open-ended working group on access and benefitsharing,<br />

at 8, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CDB/WG-ABS/1/INF/4 (4 October 4 2001),<br />

available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=ABSWG-01<br />

Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the<br />

Convention on Biological Diversity, at 262, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CDB/COP6/20 (27<br />

May 27 2002), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/decisions/COP-06-decen.pdf.


THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: FRIENDS<br />

OR ADVERSARIES IN THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT?"<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson<br />

WHAT IS TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (TK)?<br />

WHAT IS THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (PD)?<br />

DISTANT RELATIVES OR NEXT OF KIN? Do the two concepts relate to<br />

each other and if so, in what<br />

way?<br />

What are the similarities or<br />

differences in the character<br />

origin and function of the two?<br />

ACCESS VERSUS PROTECTION Is a balance point achievable<br />

equally desirable and useful<br />

for development?<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

What a good thing Adam had - when he said a good thing, he knew nobody had said it<br />

before…. - Mark Twain


464<br />

The Public Domain and Traditional Knowledge:<br />

Friends or Adversaries in the Quest for Development?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

For sure Adam would have been fine until Eve arrived, and if not Eve, then<br />

all the other humans that came following after her (including the ―serpent‖), at<br />

which point he would need to begin to seek the protection for the expression of the<br />

wonderful Ideas he may have had. Was this where the problems we face today of<br />

protection of Intellectual Property began?<br />

Whatever the source, there has been for a long time an increasing antagonism<br />

between those who believe that knowledge should be free and those who believe<br />

that creative activity and expression ought to be secured to the benefit of the<br />

creator. In the latter grouping there are those who believe that some things naturally<br />

qualify for protection and other things do not. Several reasons are posited for these<br />

positions, but chiefest among them is the fact that knowledge or creative expression<br />

has in it some intrinsic value that is useful for improving the lives and fortunes of<br />

humans and that there is some incentive to the ability to either secure or to access<br />

this.<br />

It is this scenario on the global scale that this paper seeks to examine. Here<br />

we seek to explore whether improving the social and economic circumstance of<br />

humans can be achieved by a multifaceted approach to the use of man‘s Intellectual<br />

creations. In this context we examine concepts such as Traditional Knowledge and<br />

the Public Domain in the International Framework context, to determine whether<br />

they are in fact thesis and antithesis or whether they are compatible theories or<br />

concepts in the quest for development.<br />

WHAT IS TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (TK)?<br />

The discussion in myriad circles concerning the Intellectual and cultural<br />

assets of indigenous communities invariably involves a discussion on Traditional<br />

Knowledge, but rarely is there a clear picture of the complexity of this subject<br />

matter that is so often carelessly and politically manipulated. This scenario often<br />

emanates from sheer ignorance or from selfish ill intent. Whatever the rationale,<br />

what must be appreciated is the variety of textures, meanings and perceptions<br />

attendant to this area. In seeking to define it, we must appreciate the difficulty in<br />

shrinking Traditional Knowledge into a simple or single definition ―without losing<br />

the diversity that is its lifeblood‖ 1 . For the purposes of this discourse we will<br />

therefore seek to appreciate TK as a composite concept consisting of two parts: A)<br />

Traditional Knowledge (in the strict sense) and B) Traditional Cultural<br />

Expressions.<br />

In the narrower perspective (or strict sense), TK may be seen as ―a body of<br />

knowledge built by a group of people through generations living in close contact<br />

1 <strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Knowledge‖, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 920<br />

E at 4.


Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson 465<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

with nature. It includes a system of classification, a set of empirical observations<br />

about the local environment, and a system of self management that governs<br />

resource use. 2 ‖ In this respect the concept of Traditional Environmental<br />

knowledge 3 is posited and concerned mainly with man, his physical environment,<br />

and the body of knowledge created, developed, honed and preserved through<br />

generations. 4 This may be confined to specific Indigenous Peoples as defined under<br />

the International Labour Organization (ILO) convention 169, Article 1.1 (a & b) 5 or<br />

may be a less peculiar feature found in most (if not every) society as is suggested<br />

by some scholars. What is certain however is that this phenomenon is brought<br />

about by the continuous environmental connection of a group of people in a<br />

particular Geographical region, with ―Traditional technical know-how‖ or<br />

traditional ecological, scientific, or medical knowledge. 6<br />

In a less restrictive sense, Traditional Knowledge also includes Traditional<br />

Cultural Expressions (TCEs 7 ), sometimes referred to as folklore, a term which has<br />

an offensive resonance 8 in some communities. So, in this regard we will confine<br />

the discourse to the more neutral phrase of Cultural Expression. This product of<br />

inter-generational and fluid social and communal creative processes reflects and<br />

identifies a community‟s history, cultural and social Identity and values. 9<br />

From an IP perspective much of TK (in both the restricted and broad senses)<br />

is often considered to be unqualified for protection, and this has been the subject of<br />

many contentious debates. While TK definitions may vary, there is a common<br />

thread binding most if not all definitions, and this seems to be a combination of<br />

innovation, culture and works passed through generations. From the copyright and<br />

patent perspectives in particular these works/systems/knowledge may not qualify in<br />

many ways for protection and so may well fall into the Public Domain (which we<br />

are about to try to define as indefinite). What cannot be questioned, however, is the<br />

value that has been added to this knowledge by the careful and guarded means of<br />

2<br />

M. Johnson, ―Research on Traditional Environmental Knowledge: Its Development and its Role,<br />

in Lore: Capturing Traditional Environmental Knowledge” 3, 3-4 (M. Johnson ed., IDRC 1992).<br />

3<br />

M. Johnson, ―Research on Traditional Environmental Knowledge: Its Development and its Role,<br />

in Lore: Capturing Traditional Environmental Knowledge”, note2 supra<br />

4<br />

In this respect I humbly submit that the qualifying requirements for protection of Geographical<br />

Indications, an area properly covered under Intellectual property laws, equate to Traditional<br />

Knowledge.<br />

5<br />

International Labour Conference, Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in<br />

Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 72 ILO OFF.BULL. 59, 28 I.L.M. 1382.<br />

6<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Knowledge‖, note 1 supra at 4<br />

7<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Cultural expression/Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

<strong>Publication</strong> No. 913 E at 5<br />

8<br />

M. BLACKENEY, The protection of Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property, in EIPR<br />

2000, 251 (the term folklore is often seen as a Western derogatory term used to negatively describe<br />

or demean traditional culture)<br />

9<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Cultural expression/Folklore‖, note7<br />

supra, at 5


466<br />

The Public Domain and Traditional Knowledge:<br />

Friends or Adversaries in the Quest for Development?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

preservation refinement and transmission. 10 This is undoubtedly of significant<br />

economic and social value as recognized not just by The World Intellectual<br />

Property Organization (<strong>WIPO</strong>) in its many and varied studies and conferences, but<br />

also by The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization<br />

(UNESCO) which has commissioned and spearheaded initiatives for TK<br />

protection. 11 It is little wonder then that TK has become a jealously guarded area<br />

by some who insist that commercial exploitation of TK where permissible is<br />

pivotal to the social and economic development of the communities that are<br />

repositories of such TK. 12<br />

WHAT IS THE THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (PD)?<br />

The concept of Property which is fundamental to law and Intellectual<br />

Property in particular is challenged by an amazing phenomenon which may be<br />

considered as it‘s opposite. Just as Property in the IP context is definite in its<br />

circumscription with borders and limits, defined contents and ownership, its<br />

opposite appears equally contrary in its evasion of such restraints. That which is<br />

not confined by rules of Property refuses to be constrained by definition and so<br />

must be described but not prescribed; hence it is quite aptly suggested to be<br />

anything that Intellectual Property is not 13 .<br />

This antonym of property 14 often referred to as the Public Domain (PD) is<br />

ascribed an equal number of definitions as the number of scholars who seek to<br />

write about or define it. What is clear is that the contents of the Public Domain are<br />

considered to be available or accessible for general use 15 . But it may well be more<br />

than just being simply available since IP subject matter is often available but not in<br />

the Public Domain. It may therefore be seen as elements of IP that are disqualified<br />

from proprietary control and whose contents may be freely exploited legally by<br />

anyone 16 .<br />

10 D.E LONG, Traditional Knowledge and the fight for the Public Domain, in J Marshall Rev Intell.<br />

PL 2006, 317.at 321.<br />

11 <strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―Consolidated analysis of the legal protection of Traditional Cultural<br />

expressions/ expressions of Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 785 E at 6<br />

12 D.E LONG, Traditional Knowledge and the fight for the Public Domain, note 10 supra at 322<br />

13 E. Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, in 41 J. COPR. SOC‘Y U.S.A. (1993), 137ff,<br />

at 138.<br />

14 J. BOYLE, The Public Domain: enclosing the commons of the mind, Yale University Press, New<br />

Haven & London, 2008, at xiv.<br />

15 A. CHANDER-M. SUNDER, The Romance of the Public Domain, in Cal. L. Rev. 2004, 1331ff, at<br />

1333<br />

16 <strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Cultural expression/Folklore‖, note7<br />

supra, at 13


Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson 467<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The idea is that its (PD) function should be that of a fertile depository which<br />

is necessary for human creative endeavor, facilitating humans to think and to<br />

imagine, to remember and appropriate, to play and to create. 17<br />

“The best things in life are free”…anon.<br />

It is this facility that the PD provides to human creativity that we believe to<br />

be central to its developmental function and that which therefore makes the Public<br />

Domain an attractive and indispensible component in any modern discourse on<br />

development. It is a matter of fact that humans learn from each other as well as<br />

from their own experiences. Trial and error are a part of mankind‘s creative legacy.<br />

The Public Domain therefore acts as a storehouse of such experiences serving as a<br />

rich reservoir of ideas and concepts and their expressions. The more such a<br />

reservoir is available and the richer its contents, the better the resulting innovations<br />

and creations which flow from works based on or inspired by this source.<br />

The basis, on which the principle of disclosure of patents is founded, is one<br />

which recognizes that adding to the body of public knowledge is a desirable<br />

element for future innovations and development. The TRIPS 18 agreement which is<br />

one of the most important international agreements regarding Intellectual Property<br />

recognizes this and so enshrines disclosure in its clauses to this effect. The fact that<br />

in copyright and other more traditional forms of IP a monopoly is given for a<br />

limited period with an understanding that at the end of this period subject matter<br />

will fall to the common use of all members of that society, is an acknowledgement<br />

of a greater principle of Law that Knowledge Truths and Ideas once expressed<br />

should be free as the air to common use. 19 That is to say it should be a public<br />

nonrivalrous good from which all should feel free to benefit without cost or with<br />

little cost, even with its attendant economic ―unsoundness‖. 20 It appears then that<br />

freely available or accessible knowledge and Intellectual creations may well be one<br />

of the cornerstone tools in the quest for development.<br />

DISTANT RELATIVES OR NEXT OF KIN?<br />

We are now left to consider the possible relationship between the two<br />

concepts and ask some fairly obvious but pertinent questions. Do TK and the PD<br />

have anything in common? Do they actually relate to each other? Is there an extent<br />

to which there is some common thread of benefit to be gained from the operation of<br />

both legal constructs by the Developing World? Or are they simply double edged<br />

swords of fire being wielded at each other by the Public Domain and TK<br />

17 D. Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the<br />

Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Spring 1992)<br />

18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh<br />

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of<br />

the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], Article 29.1.<br />

19 Y. BENKLER, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the Enclosure of<br />

the Public Domain, in N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1999, 354 ff., at 354<br />

20 J. BOYLE, The Public Domain: enclosing the commons of the mind, note 14 supra at 2.


468<br />

The Public Domain and Traditional Knowledge:<br />

Friends or Adversaries in the Quest for Development?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

proponents, while being oblivious to the fact that IP overprotection spirals out of<br />

control to the detriment of all?<br />

It appears that misunderstandings akin to those resulting in all the world‘s<br />

major wars (or to bigotry in general) have led to the often mistaken perception that<br />

if we don‘t say the same things, then we are not on the same side, and if we are not<br />

on the same team then we are necessarily enemies. The question often asked by<br />

defenders of TK to the Public Domain Proponents is this: ―why is it (always)……<br />

your „Public Domain‟ versus my „cultural heritage‟? How come „public domain‟<br />

is my stuff? Yours is copyrightable and mine is in the public domain. How did<br />

that happen? 21<br />

The ever increasing fear of valuable innovation, knowhow and creations in<br />

general, being exploited or not receiving sufficient protection under traditional IP<br />

principles has led to the tendency to ―follow fashion‖ and press for increased<br />

protection upstream 22 in a ―monkey see-monkey do-fashion‖ 23 . There appears to be<br />

a perceived need to contain some great risk of abuse of creative expression or<br />

innovation (to the detriment of the creator) on one hand and on the other hand, a<br />

need to save the word from the ‗hard- nosed‘ and greedy owners of IP rights who<br />

would seek to extend IP protection ad infinitum. This leads to the feeling that what<br />

we have are two competing forces on the conceptual ‗outside‘ of Intellectual<br />

Property that are seeking to either shelter within the walls of IP or to consume a<br />

part of this citadel and break down some of its stronghold. In actuality , there<br />

appears on closer scrutiny to be a lot more held in common by the Public Domain<br />

or ‗access to knowledge‘ movement on the one hand and TK proponents on the<br />

other , than seems to be obvious on the face of it. 24 Consider that both sides of this<br />

debate may well have as their central motive, a softening of the rigidity of<br />

proprietary rights conferred by the IP regime, 25 in an attempt to achieve some sense<br />

of balance and fairness. If so, each side ought not to see the other as the adversary,<br />

but may well be better served by seeing an over protective IP rights regime as the<br />

real enemy. In fact, the third but latent (for the purposes of this paper) side of this<br />

triangle which also ought to be considered are those who clamor for more stringent<br />

IP protection per se. They ought to appreciate that increased monopoly invariably<br />

leads to market failure and as such we are trotting down a slippery slope in respect<br />

of overprotecting IP rights 26 and run the risk of destroying the very system that is<br />

21<br />

D.E LONG, Traditional Knowledge and the fight for the Public Domain, in J Marshall Rev Intell.<br />

PL 2006, 317ff., at 320<br />

22<br />

M. Ricolfi, Is there an antitrust antidote in trips? Available at<br />

http://law.marquette.edu/ip/Ricolfi.pdft at page 3<br />

23<br />

Jamaica proverb describing the act of simply doing what others do without adding analysis or<br />

thought or without modifying to suit ones circumstance.<br />

24<br />

D.E. Long, Traditional Knowledge and the fight for the Public Domain note 21 supra at 321<br />

25<br />

ibid<br />

26<br />

See the works on over extending monopolies in the context of patent protection by Dr. Edith<br />

Penrose in her Book ―The Economics of the International Patent system‖ The Johns Hopkins Press<br />

1951 p0. 101-107, 162-169.


Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson 469<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

meant to protect innovation, innovators and indeed those who would wish to have<br />

access to creative endeavor, i.e., all of us. If we can appreciate this scenario then<br />

we will be able to see both sides as “comrades in a different camouflage” as<br />

opposed to enemies.<br />

Is it not reasonable to say that both the Public Domain and Traditional<br />

Knowledge share very similar traits and so one ought to be more minded to explore<br />

their possible relationship than some perceived variance of objectives? Does it not<br />

appear that both systems are considered to be: a) related to, but outside of<br />

Intellectual Property, b) are seen to be: owned by everyone or by no-one, c) are<br />

generally treated as both a source of IP inspiration and d) as a place where creative<br />

endeavor that is unqualified for IP protection is quarantined? Is it not true to say<br />

that there must be some relationship between them since they both appear to be<br />

treated by IP purists as some two-way creative ‗purgatory‘ where ideas pass from<br />

one existence to another or from life into oblivion? Are they not both movements<br />

seeking to secure a future of innovation to innovators and to the world and seeking<br />

to provide a safe space within which such innovation can be germinated, incubated<br />

and nurtured? May it not well be further suggested that both TK and the Public<br />

Domain have a cross-generational and cross cultural characteristic to them, a)<br />

developing over time, b) being a source of connection between generations of<br />

innovators and c) connecting innovators of different geographical locations?<br />

If the all too obvious conclusion is yes then we are left with little option but<br />

to apply the old mantra ―unity is strength‖ and seek ways to achieve a softening of<br />

the rigidity of the IP regime or a functioning and strengthening of the flexibilities<br />

that are in fact built into the formal IP system.<br />

In this connection, the ―Access and Benefit- sharing‖ considerations where<br />

appropriate may well be a related concept to the ―fair use doctrine‖ in copyright<br />

and to the limitations to the doctrine of equivalents (prosecution history estoppels<br />

and public dedication rule) 27 , as well as prior art considerations in patent Law. This<br />

focus, along with the thrust toward a preference for competition law considerations<br />

in the protection of geographical indications as opposed to the more proprietary<br />

style once adopted, may well represent a recognition that a softening of the edges<br />

may well be the future for the protection of IP and related creative and intellectual<br />

expression and know-how.<br />

TOWARDS A BALANCING ACT<br />

Before proper bring fight mek grung sipple (inflexibility often leads to a bad<br />

result)….Sislyn Simpson<br />

It could be argued however that the softening already exists and nothing<br />

further is needed. Free access to knowledge and to creative products is well<br />

counterbalanced by the earlier monopolies given. Additionally, these respective<br />

periods of monopoly and free use plus fair or free use exceptions (even during the<br />

27 C. Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publishers, New York 2008 at 458


470<br />

The Public Domain and Traditional Knowledge:<br />

Friends or Adversaries in the Quest for Development?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

monopoly period) represent the ideal of balancing access with protection. The<br />

provisions in the international framework agreements particularly TRIPS for the<br />

employment of antitrust considerations 28 as opposed to more rigid proprietary<br />

considerations alone, may well signal an understanding in the international IP<br />

system of the need to avoid extreme positions in the interest of not just the rights<br />

we seek to protect, or the rights holders who seek to optimize protection, but also in<br />

the interest of the international IP system.<br />

The question may well be asked at this stage: ―what is the central argument<br />

of this paper?‖ The answer may be as simple to present as a definition for the<br />

Public Domain or Traditional Knowledge. The response, in essence, is to distill the<br />

collective benefits to the developing world of its own IP related resources (whether<br />

TK or PD material), or those falling safely within the walls of the IP regime as we<br />

have it today. Our aim is to determine how we can use a multipronged tripartite<br />

approach to achieving the goals of development.<br />

Hence, we ask ourselves: ―is there a necessary divergence of objectives by<br />

the Access- to- knowledge and Traditional Knowledge movements respectively, or<br />

is there a way in which both together can serve the ends of Developing societies<br />

and economies?‖ Is there a way that both movements and the Formal IP system as<br />

the Trinity can be of benefit to us in the Developing world without doing violence<br />

to each other?<br />

There are many examples of the answer being NO! But there is sufficient<br />

reason in existence for us to say Yes! There is a great discourse on the Tragedy of<br />

the commons 29 which is often used as one of the rationales for stronger proprietary<br />

protection of intellectual creations. This must be balanced against potential<br />

conflicts between Intellectual Property Rights and human rights, and the possible<br />

threat to amenities such as basic food security and access to health 30 . This is<br />

especially if we head in the direction of over protection since under the current<br />

trend of creating monopolies over genetically modified seeds and plants, as well as<br />

DNA, may well result in monopoly control over food and medicinal sources 31 . On<br />

the other hand, custodians of TK insist that their knowledge is being exploited,<br />

misappropriated, pirated and monopolized, and that they therefore require propertylike<br />

protection, which is the exact protection that TRIPS gives to the developed<br />

world. The cry is for reciprocity, 32 such that the developing world can benefit in<br />

much the same way as the developed world got a chance to develop. One good turn<br />

deserves another they say, and it is argued that this is not simply emotional but may<br />

well be sound economic reasoning. 33 It appears to me that the objective of securing<br />

28<br />

M. Ricolfi, Is there an antitrust antidote in trips? note 22 at page 3<br />

29<br />

J. BOYLE, The Public Domain: enclosing the commons of the mind, note 14 supra at xv<br />

30<br />

V. SHIVA, TRIPs, Human Rights and the Public Domain, in JWIP 2004, 665 ff., at 668<br />

31<br />

Ibid. at 667<br />

32<br />

P. Kuruk, Bridging the Gap between Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights, Is<br />

Reciprocity an Answer?, In JWIP 2004 , 439 ff at 430<br />

33<br />

Ibid. at page 431


Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson 471<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

a better functioning IP system is the common denominator, but how to get there is<br />

where there seems to be real divergence of views.<br />

CONCLUSION.<br />

I think he bought his doublet in Italy, his round hose in France, his bonnet in Germany,<br />

and his behaviour everywhere…….The Merchant of Venice,<br />

In the same way that TK is a dynamic concept 34 , changing from time to time<br />

and having a different composition from place to place, the PD is equally varied<br />

and represents a multicolored and multifunctional creative collection. This means<br />

that the solutions to the aims they wish to achieve are not diabolically opposed, but<br />

are necessarily textured and nuanced. We ought to avoid hard and fast rules and<br />

instead seek to take situations on their merit. The examples that are set by the use<br />

of Open Source Software 35 , or the operation of the Creative Commons are great<br />

ones to learn from in this matter. While we attempt to find solutions to the<br />

problems of the developing world, it is clear that we ought to engage in a balancing<br />

act. We ought to expand the balancing efforts of the antitrust provisions that may<br />

well be in TRIPS and where TK (which is the rich resource base of many<br />

developing countries) is not achieving sufficient protection, we ought to consider<br />

more creative, nuanced and less draconian or proprietary methods of optimizing the<br />

benefit. We can learn from many TK communities that have a ―strong sharing<br />

ethos‖, but whose people understand that not all things are shared in the same way<br />

with everyone. 36 It is also important to appreciate that in order to achieve the ends<br />

of increased opportunities for development, the global scenario is one in which<br />

developed countries have a competitive advantage. It is therefore important to<br />

appreciate that scientific technological and institutional capacity is a critical factor<br />

in determining who benefits from any Global IP framework or any bilateral or<br />

regional agreements associated with such a framework. 37<br />

In the end it is important to obtain from this discourse that in the modern<br />

world, to achieve development it will be important to employ a combination of<br />

appropriately strong IP rules, softened by the appropriate exceptions, and tempered<br />

by the application of relevant antitrust and unfair competition rules. It must be<br />

noted that in order for there to be real reciprocity, the intellectual stock of the<br />

developing world, ie. TK, ought to be protected not just by sui generis means but<br />

also by carefully using the concept of the Public Domain, not merely as a broad<br />

brush or as the place you put intellectual creations for which a real definition<br />

cannot be found. In the end the collective positive attributes of each area will result<br />

in the optimal benefit to the cause of development.<br />

34 D.E. Long, Traditional Knowledge and the fight for the Public Domain note 21 supra at 321<br />

35 J. BOYLE, The Public Domain: enclosing the commons of the mind, note 14 supra at 186<br />

36 G. DUTFIELD, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, in EIPR<br />

2006, 258 ff.<br />

37 O.B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge:Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and<br />

Global<br />

Intellectual Property Frameworks, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889384, at page 159


472<br />

The Public Domain and Traditional Knowledge:<br />

Friends or Adversaries in the Quest for Development?<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Books and Articles<br />

Y. BENKLER, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints<br />

on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, in N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1999, 354 ff.<br />

M. BLACKENEY, The protection of traditional knowledge and Intellectual<br />

Property, in EIPR 2000, 251 ff.<br />

J. BOYLE, The public domain: enclosing the commons of the mind, Yale<br />

University Press, New Haven & London, 2008.<br />

A. CHANDER-M. SUNDER, The Romance of the Public Domain, in Cal. L.<br />

Rev. 2004, 1331 ff<br />

G. DUTFIELD, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional<br />

Knowledge, in EIPR 2006, 258 ff.<br />

International Labour Conference, Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous<br />

and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 72 ILO OFF.BULL.<br />

59, 28 I.L.M. 1382.<br />

M. JOHNSON, ―Research on Traditional Environmental Knowledge: Its<br />

Development and its Role, in Lore: Capturing Traditional Environmental<br />

Knowledge” 3, 3-4 (M. Johnson ed., IDRC 1992).<br />

P. KURUK, Bridging the gap between Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual<br />

Property Rights, Is Reciprocity an Answer?, in JWIP 2004, 439 ff<br />

D. Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction<br />

of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.<br />

139 (Spring 1992)<br />

D.E LONG, Traditional Knowledge and the fight for the public domain, in J<br />

Marshall Rev Intell. PL 2006, 317ff.<br />

C. Nard, The Law of Patents, Aspen Publishers, New York 2008<br />

E. Penrose ―The Economics of the International Patent system‖ The Johns<br />

Hopkins Press 1951 p0. 101-107, 162-169.<br />

E. Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, in 41 J. COPR. SOC‘Y<br />

U.S.A.(1993), 137ff


Ewan Danny Anthony Simpson 473<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

ff.<br />

V. SHIVA, TRIPs, Human Rights and the Public Domain, in JWIP 2004, 665<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―Consolidated analysis of the legal protection of<br />

Traditional Cultural expressions/ expressions of Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No.<br />

785 E<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Cultural<br />

expression/Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 913 E<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Knowledge‖, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

<strong>Publication</strong> No. 920 E<br />

Legislation:<br />

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.<br />

15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,<br />

Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125,<br />

1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]<br />

Internet based Material:<br />

O.B. AREWA, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities,<br />

Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, available at<br />

http://ssrn.com/abstract=889384,<br />

M. RICOLFI, Is there an antitrust antidote in trips? Available at<br />

http://law.marquette.edu/ip/Ricolfi.pdft<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural<br />

expression/Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 913 E<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> Secretariat, ―Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge‖,<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 920 E


CREATIVE COMMONS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE: AN APPRAISAL<br />

OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN TENSIONS AND CUSTOMARY PRACTICES<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

by<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu<br />

The panoramic sight given to the discourse of the public domain has given it<br />

a somewhat complex flavour. Scholars have defined it variously, from the crumbs<br />

theory-the public domain consists in the scraps left over after property rights have<br />

consumed their share 1 - to public domain as corrective to market failure 2 , and<br />

finally to public domain as worlds muse 3<br />

One of the angles to the discourse on public domain is the question of the<br />

existence of one public domain, or multiple? This is attributable to the vast<br />

definitions by different scholars 4 so if there is only one public domain, but many<br />

definitions, perhaps one objective of scholarly discourse about the public domain<br />

should be to seek consensus on the one "true" definition. 5<br />

The boundaries and interface between the public domain and intellectual<br />

property rights is mostly a victim of spitfire public domain advocates (access to<br />

knowledge movement), and it is in this context that the discourse on traditional<br />

knowledge, genetic resources and traditional Cultural expression (TCEs) constantly<br />

meets its southern waterloo.<br />

The main goal of this paper is to have an enriching discourse on the public<br />

domain and its perceived interoperability with Traditional Knowledge (TK), with a<br />

view to finding a platform within which both concepts can function satisfactorily.<br />

In achieving these, indigenous people‘s commons 6 will be discussed and seen as a<br />

1<br />

D. LANGE, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 470 (2003)<br />

2<br />

W. GORDON, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax<br />

Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 20041 1337<br />

3<br />

A. CHANDER-M. SUNDER, The Romance of the Public Domain, in Cal. L. Rev. 2004, 1331 ff page<br />

1337<br />

4<br />

See generally J. E. COHEN, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public<br />

Domain, in The Public Domain Of Information (P. B HUGENHOLTZ – L. GUIBAULT eds.,<br />

forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Duke Law Journal); D. LANGE, Recognizing<br />

the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981); J. LITMAN, The Public<br />

Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); T. T. OCHOA, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain,<br />

28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002); M. POLLACK, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting<br />

the Modern First Amendment and the Original Progress Clause (a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent<br />

Clause), 45 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (2004). Cited in P. SAMUELSON, Enriching discourse on Public<br />

domain, in Duke LJ 2006, 786 ff. 783<br />

5<br />

P. SAMUELSON, supra note 4, page 783<br />

6<br />

The Traditional knowledge commons proposed by International Development Law Organization<br />

(IDLO) and Natural Justice; a South African based NGO facilitating the legal empowerment of<br />

indigenous peoples and local communities.


476 Creative Commons of Indigenous People: An Appraisal of the<br />

Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

possible program that gives the balance between the public domain concept and<br />

traditional knowledge.<br />

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN<br />

Just as "property" is not susceptible to a uniform legal meaning, public<br />

domain" is also a protean concept. 7 The difficulty is that, in most countries, the<br />

public domain receives no positive definition, either in its contents, or in its regime.<br />

The growth of intellectual property rights has led to the paradoxical situation where<br />

the principle has become an obscure notion and the exception to the rule of<br />

intellectual property. 8 This accounts for the various definitions and growing<br />

recognition of the public domain which is usually a function of perspectives and<br />

agenda. However central to all postulation is the common feature of territoriality,<br />

used mostly in the copyright and traditional knowledge context and as an opposite<br />

relationship to intellectual property. Going through the myriad of definitions of the<br />

public domain, it has been defined by UNESCO as the realm of all works and<br />

objects of related rights which can be exploited by everybody without<br />

authorization. It has also been defined as whatever intellectual property is not 9 , as<br />

an orphan 10 . Some have the expectations that the public domain however it may be<br />

defined, should secure some elemental aspirations which they believe innate in<br />

humankind: to think and to imagine, to remember and appropriate, to play and to<br />

create. 11 Central to most epistemology of the public domain is the notion that<br />

resources therein are available broadly for access and use. 12 Thus the recognition of<br />

a strong and vivid public domain as a central element of the common heritage of<br />

humanity; available to all, which should be preserved from undue privatization and<br />

encroachment has been promoted by many writers 13<br />

The various definitions of public domain cluster around three main foci:<br />

a) The legal status of information resources<br />

7 J. BOYLE, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain ,66 LAW<br />

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 33note 12, at 68 ("Just as there are many 'properties,' so too there are many<br />

'public domains."'); D. LANGE, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.<br />

463,at 463 ("In its usage to date, the term 'public domain' is elastic and inexact."); P.<br />

SAMUELSON, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW &<br />

CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148 (2003) ("The public domain is... different size at different times and<br />

in different countries.") cited in A. CHANDER-M. SUNDER, The Romance of the Public Domain, in<br />

Cal. L. Rev. 2004, 1331 at 1333<br />

8 V.L. BENBOU - S. DUSOLLIER, Draw Me a Public Domain, P. TORREMANS (ed.), Copyright<br />

Law. A Handbook of Contemporary Research, Edward Edgar, Cheltham, 200 at 163<br />

9 E. SAMUELS, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPR. SOC‟Y U.S.A. 137 (1993)<br />

10 Statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America),<br />

available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/447.htm.<br />

11 D. LANGE, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in<br />

the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Spring 1992)<br />

12 A. CHANDER- M. SUNDER, supra note 1 at 1338<br />

13 V.L BENABOU – S. DUSOLLIER, note 2 at 162


477<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

b) Freedom to use information resources even if protected by intellectual<br />

property rights and<br />

c) Accessibility of information resources 14<br />

In recognizing the public domain and what should be its parameter, its<br />

content has been held to likely comprise of the following elements:<br />

Elements not protected by copyrights (ideas or non original works)<br />

Works whose term of protection has expired<br />

Works excluded from protection<br />

Exceptions to the exclusive rights<br />

Freedom of use not covered by the exclusive rights 15<br />

Works that fail to comply with very specific formal requirement<br />

Materials provided before protection was available<br />

The public domain rather than being an afterthought of intellectual property<br />

rights, should be seen as an essential part of the creative process which ensures that<br />

raw materials can be used as a basis for further creativity and innovation. 16 It is the<br />

availability of public domain resources that enables exchange and creativity 17<br />

TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL<br />

COMMUNITIES<br />

Traditional Knowledge may be seen as ―a body of knowledge built by a<br />

group of people through generations living in close contact with nature. It includes<br />

a system of classification, a set of empirical observations about the local<br />

environment, and a system of self management that governs resource use. 18 The<br />

term traditional knowledge according to Article 8(j) of the Convention of<br />

Biological Diversity defines this term as ―knowledge, innovations and practices of<br />

indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the<br />

conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.‖ 19<br />

Traditional Knowledge also Includes traditional cultural expressions (TCEs)<br />

sometimes referred to as folklore, this is normally represented in the work of<br />

Artists and practitioners who pass down cultural and social practices, skills,<br />

symbols products and artifacts through generations. In many respects this is an area<br />

where an active exchange between the present and the past is indispensable to<br />

maintaining the life and identity attributable to these expressions. The exchanges<br />

14 P. SAMUELSON, supra, at 785.<br />

15 V.L BENABOU – S. DUSOLLIER, note 2 at 173<br />

16 <strong>WIPO</strong>/GRTKF/IC/5/3, 6, para 23(a)<br />

17 <strong>WIPO</strong>/GRTKF/IC/5/3, Annex, 10, para 33<br />

18 M. JOHNSON, ―Research on Traditional Environmental Knowledge: Its Development and its<br />

Role, in LORE: CAPTURING TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 3, 3-4 (M.<br />

JOHNSON ed., IDRC 1992).<br />

19 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 8, 31 I.L.M. 818, 825-826.


478 Creative Commons of Indigenous People: An Appraisal of the<br />

Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

are also not just generational but also occur between individual members of the<br />

community and the community itself in working reworking and refining these<br />

cultural ―products‖. It may therefore be useful to identify characteristics of these<br />

TCEs as described by <strong>WIPO</strong> 20 as<br />

a) handed down from one generation to another either orally or by imitation<br />

b) reflective of a community‘s cultural and social identity<br />

c) consisting of characteristic elements of a community‘s heritage<br />

d) made by ―authors unknown‖ and/ or by communities and/or by individuals<br />

communally recognized as having the right, responsibility or permission to<br />

do so,<br />

e) often not created for commercial purposes, but as vehicles for religious and<br />

cultural expression, and<br />

f) constantly evolving, developing and being recreated within the community.<br />

There have been several attempts to define indigenous peoples 21 and<br />

admittance that a single definition of the term cannot cater for the diverse<br />

indigenous people in different territories; however The Convention No 169 of the<br />

International Labour Organization has attempted to give a definition of indigenous<br />

peoples as:<br />

‗… peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on<br />

account of their descent from the population which inhabited the country, or<br />

a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest<br />

or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who,<br />

irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social,<br />

economic, cultural and political institutions ….‘<br />

With the aim of capturing the distinction of indigenous people from dominant<br />

societies.<br />

Indigenous people therefore have the following characteristics:<br />

20<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> secretariat, ―intellectual property and Traditional Cultural expression/Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong><br />

<strong>Publication</strong> No. 913 E at 5<br />

21<br />

Definations has been proffered by United Nations Special Rapporteur Matinez Cobo but his<br />

definition was held to be limiting to indigenous people with European colonization and excluded<br />

indigenous peoples in Asia and Africa, the World Bank stated that ‗Because of the varied and<br />

changing contexts in which indigenous peoples are found, no single definition can capture their<br />

diversity, they therefore gave a list of criteria in their operational directive 4.20 which takes a<br />

functional view of indigenous people for the specific purpose of World Bank developmental<br />

activities, all these are stated in S.V LEWINSKI, indigenous Heritage and intellectual property:<br />

genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands,<br />

2004 at 10 -11


479<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

a) They live in small societies and may not have access to formal education.<br />

They are unaware of the worth of the knowledge they possess. Such<br />

communities are often found in developing and underdeveloped countries<br />

where there is a concentration of ethnocentric societies.<br />

b) Most often, the knowledge in question will be known to the entire<br />

community and remains exclusively within it. However, within the society,<br />

the knowledge is in the public domain.<br />

c) Occasionally, knowledge of a special skill or art is limited to a few<br />

members of the community.<br />

d) The knowledge and its components are normally required for a regular<br />

lifestyle within the society. It is passed down through generations while still<br />

retaining its original individuality.<br />

e) Knowledge present in one form, such as art, music, or folklore, can be<br />

developed into other forms more understandable to the rest of the world.<br />

However, these informal innovations do not get formal recognition.<br />

f) Indigenous people often believe that intellectual property law is neither a<br />

necessary, nor a desirable, means of encouraging innovation within their<br />

communities. As a consequence, they are sometimes easily willing to share<br />

this knowledge, which leads to its exploitation. This situation gives raise to<br />

concern because, although the original holders have not acquired any<br />

benefit, the exploiters have benefited from the knowledge. 22<br />

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN TENSIONS<br />

The public domain though initially had a negative perception as the residual<br />

of material undeserving, ineligible or no longer protected by intellectual property,<br />

has been recasted as a positive productive space that promotes the enterprise of<br />

authorship. The public domain has come to be seen as an essential part of a creative<br />

process, it ensures that raw materials can be used as a basis for further creativity<br />

and innovation 23<br />

Traditional knowledge on the other hand focuses on innovation, culture and<br />

works that has been passed through generation, which the access to knowledge<br />

22 See D. DOWNES, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge,<br />

25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253, 254-57 at 258-59. See also ANIL GUPTA, Building Upon What<br />

Poor are Rich in: Honey Bee Network Linking Grassroots Innovations, Enterprise, Investments and<br />

Institution (visited May26, 2001) < http://csf.Colorado.edu/sristi/papers/building.html>., See N.<br />

ROHT-ARRIAZA, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical<br />

Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 919, 926 (1996). Cited in<br />

S. RAGAVAN, Protection of Traditional knowledge available at SSRN-id310680 at pages 4 to 5<br />

23 B.SHERMAN – L. WISEMAN, "Towards an Indigenous Public Domain?"in The Future of the<br />

Public Domain: Identifying the Commons in Information Law, LUCIE GUIBAULT, P. BERNT<br />

HUGENHOLTZ (eds), Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2006 at 260


480 Creative Commons of Indigenous People: An Appraisal of the<br />

Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

advocates view in the public domain, another view believes that traditional<br />

knowledge, deserves protection and control by the holding indigenous group which<br />

is in line with the Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 24 .<br />

Indigenous and traditional knowledge has emerged as critical subject matter in<br />

international trade and development. While presenting significant commercial and<br />

research potential in various areas of knowledge and technology – including<br />

medicine, agriculture and creative industries – such cultural resources are also<br />

intrinsic to the integrity and identity specific to local and traditional communities. 25<br />

In appraising the public domain tensions, it is pertinent to discuss two<br />

schools of thought on traditional knowledge which are; access to knowledge<br />

movement, and Traditional knowledge protection movement. The access to<br />

knowledge group believes traditional knowledge is an archaic public good and in<br />

the public domain which is legally and morally impossible to prevent access to 26<br />

and they construe traditional knowledge as ‗public‘ common knowledge within the<br />

public domain and is built upon essentially commercial concerns for that public.<br />

The public domain is, in and of itself, a question of commercial construction,<br />

composed as it is of those goods for which the monopoly has expired. It is<br />

therefore implied that the commercial utility of anything within the public domain<br />

has passed, while the value and priority continues to attach to knowledge that is<br />

protected by intellectual property rights. Thus the public domain is a strategic<br />

factor not only in arguments for access but also in industry rhetoric, to support<br />

commercial interests seeking access to traditional knowledge and genetic resources<br />

as public resources. 27 There is a misconception that to protect traditional<br />

knowledge is to protect old things that never change and Traditional knowledge is a<br />

reflection of things done in the good old days but this is untrue as traditional<br />

knowledge also changes in response to culture, environment and the passage of<br />

time. 28<br />

The Traditional knowledge movement believes that traditional knowledge<br />

deserves protection and control by holding indigenous groups; the right of<br />

indigenous people to participate in their culture through the critical rights of self<br />

determination or any other form of control, therefore the question of access should<br />

not be legitimized and prioritized over questions of cultural integrity. 29 Calls have<br />

been made for the protection of traditional knowledge, not only as a matter of<br />

property but also, and more critically, as a matter of intrinsic importance to the<br />

24<br />

Universal Declaration of Human Rights<br />

25<br />

J. GIBSON, Audiences in tradition: traditional knowledge and the public domain, in Intellectual<br />

Property: the many faces of public domain, C. WAELDE – H. MACQUEEN, Edward Elgar,<br />

Cheltenham, 2007 at 174<br />

26<br />

J. GIBSON supra , note 19 at 176<br />

27<br />

J. GIBSON supra, note 19 at 177<br />

28<br />

D.E LONG, Traditional knowledge and the fight for the public domain, in 5.J Marshall Rev.<br />

Intell. Prop. L. 2006 at 327e fight for the public domain<br />

29<br />

J. GIBSON, supra at 175


481<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

dignity and cohesion of traditional and indigenous communities. 30 There is no<br />

dispute to the fact that traditional knowledge if protected will actually plough back<br />

some perceptions of what is in the public domain and therefore access to traditional<br />

knowledge might be burdensome which will depend on the type of traditional<br />

knowledge for which access is sought and the holder. 31 They acknowledge that<br />

traditional knowledge belongs to the specific public domain that operates within<br />

specific communities or holders.<br />

The tensions between the public domain (access to knowledge advocates) and<br />

traditional knowledge (protection advocates) is extinguishable and can become<br />

informative as opposed to contradictory through a balanced regime of protection<br />

and enhanced informational demands of the digital aids. The two movements are<br />

calling for flexibilities in intellectual property rights that allow access, recognize<br />

welfare benefits and allow the development of new technology and all of the new<br />

works one wants which will ultimately develop into a strong and fairer system. 32 It<br />

is therefore essential that there is a nuanced system that will guarantee a balance<br />

between protection and access in order to curtail the warring tensions between the<br />

two concepts (public domain and traditional knowledge).<br />

TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS<br />

Traditional knowledge holders may elect to allow uncompensated uses of<br />

their knowledge, so long as such uses are not deculturizing and as long as the users<br />

properly identify the source of the knowledge at issue. With the appropriate models<br />

in place, parties can obtain authentication and use models from the access to<br />

knowledge arena, modify them, and devise a protection system that may actually<br />

solve some of the present disputes over protection of traditional knowledge. 33<br />

Based on the fact that a great deal of Traditional knowledge has no<br />

commercial potential whatsoever, the core values system of most indigenous and<br />

local communities essence of sharing knowledge and the need to find a balance<br />

between the public domain and Traditional knowledge, I will be appraising the<br />

traditional knowledge commons (Tk commons) 34 as an avenue for a half way<br />

system for the satisfaction of the access to knowledge movement and traditional<br />

knowledge movement. Tk commons is a community approach to sharing traditional<br />

knowledge for non-commercial research and quite a good approach to maintain<br />

balance to the two warring parties. Tk commons is prototype of the creative<br />

commons ideology 35 . It is a platform that has an institutional form of structuring<br />

30 J.GIBSON supra at 175<br />

31 D.E LONG supra at 321<br />

32 D.E Long supra at 323<br />

33 D.E Long supra at 327<br />

34 I refer to ‗imagining a traditional knowledge commons‟ published by International Development<br />

Law Organization and Natural justice in October 2009. This is available at nj-tkc.a5bookpdf[1].pdf,<br />

will be cited as IDLO publication, ‗imagining a traditional knowledge commons, 2006<br />

35 Creative commons is a non profit organization that makes copyright works available to the public<br />

on standardized policies by providing a platform that allows authors or creators to grant copyright


482 Creative Commons of Indigenous People: An Appraisal of the<br />

Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

the rights to access, use and control resources. It would require a community of<br />

holders to develop in accordance to their bio spiritual virtues 36 the terms and<br />

condition for non commercial access to their traditional knowledge. These terms<br />

and conditions would be in form of a license 37 that would be complied with by non<br />

commercial users. The general characteristics of the license could include:<br />

a) Permissions and conditions of use<br />

b) Effects of violating the conditions of use<br />

c) Conditions for subsequent use<br />

d) Recognition terms, and<br />

e) Environmental compliance issues 38<br />

It is expected that Tk commons will be established in accordance to<br />

customary laws or biocultural community protocols 39 of that of community which<br />

access is sought. The elements of a Tk commons licence can be;<br />

a) Non-appropriation<br />

b) Enduring recognition and environmental soundness<br />

c) Use according to licence terms & any change in use requires prior<br />

informed consent, and<br />

d) Subsequent users have to comply 40<br />

The elements of the TK commons license will however depend on what type<br />

of traditional knowledge access is sought as conditions for use varies and<br />

ultimately different Tk commons. TK commons can also be made available<br />

through an online licensing system with some key elements 41 .<br />

permission to their creative works, this is usually achievable by allowing certain use of the work by<br />

a creative common license; information bout creative commons can be found at<br />

www.creativecommons.org<br />

36<br />

Biospiritual virtues are virtues at the heart of the spirituality of biocultural communities and form<br />

the ethical foundation of customary law and cultural practices of these communities e.g. rituals to be<br />

performed before access, some sites are forbidden or exclusive of certain people in the<br />

communities, or special timing for access etc<br />

37<br />

This is akin to having visa to a foreign country with the expectation that one abides by the rule of<br />

that country in that country.<br />

38<br />

Supra, Note 34 at 19<br />

39<br />

A biocultural community protocol is a protocol that is developed as a result of consultative<br />

process within a community that outlines the community‘s core cultural and spiritual values and<br />

customary laws relating to their traditional knowledge and resources based on which the community<br />

provides clear terms and conditions under which access to their knowledge and resources shall be<br />

provided.<br />

The biocultural community protocols are pursued by indigenous people by virtue of section 8(j) of<br />

the convention on biological diversity (1994) See supra 27 at page 7.<br />

40<br />

Supra note 34 at 20<br />

41<br />

The online licensing system will provide some key elements such as users agreement to the online<br />

license, storage of a copy of the license and link to the license, share alike terms, conditions for<br />

further users, license terms for works based on the traditional knowledge, accessibility of researched


483<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

The TK commons is a good platform for traditional knowledge holders and<br />

indigenous communities to share their knowledge for non commercial purposes to<br />

non profit academic researchers, archivist and students. It gives the public<br />

information that the communities wants available for view, taking into<br />

consideration that the traditional knowledge holders or communities don‘t want to<br />

unnecessarily withhold knowledge but want to share, but in sharing their traditional<br />

knowledge they want to be recognized and the maintenance of their dignity and<br />

cohesion intact. Traditional knowledge is also susceptible to dilution by some<br />

factors; westernization of the communities and the children of the holders of<br />

traditional knowledge 42 , therefore TK commons will help in the preservation of<br />

those Traditional knowledge that are going extinct due to the above factors or<br />

passage of time.<br />

There is a possibility that the knowledge from the TK commons will be used<br />

at variance with the licence terms, but these already exist considering the large<br />

amount of traditional knowledge available ex situ in books and journals.<br />

One point of concern is mechanism for enforcement and private international<br />

law issues since protection of the TK commons would most likely fall under a sui<br />

generis protection of traditional knowledge. Article 27:3 of TRIPS provides for<br />

protection by sui generis system, but questions as to the clarity of the general<br />

nature and outline of sui generis rights and mechanism for enforcement still<br />

remains vague and poses serious concern.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

Some groups maintain that everything is a part of their heritage and culture<br />

and should therefore be protected against unauthorized uses. Such broad based<br />

claims are not only doomed to failure, they may well taint the traditional<br />

knowledge protection process to such an extreme that no workable system arises. If<br />

everything is protectable, then realistically nothing will be protected. 43<br />

Once we have developed these models (TK Commons), it will be easier for<br />

indigenous groups to examine their own traditional knowledge and make informed<br />

decisions on which uses they are willing to allow, and under which conditions It<br />

may well be that once such a process is in place many of the concerns over<br />

reduction of the public domain will prove evanescent. 44<br />

works by other communities, information about communities and their needs by having a request<br />

link, the management board and trustees of the TK commons website. See supra note 27 at page 23<br />

42 Due to western influence, many children in indigenous societies want to be educated the western<br />

way and have no interest in continuing in the traditions of their communities or parents, and as such<br />

the impartation of these traditional knowledge dies with the old generation who are dying fast.<br />

Many communities are having western influences such new buildings, roads, deforestation, and<br />

through these acts, many traditional knowledge are lost.<br />

43 D.E LONG, supra at 328<br />

44 D.E LONG, supra at 327


484<br />

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Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

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485<br />

Yewande Gbola-Awopetu<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

V.L. BÉNABOU - S. DUSOLLIER, Draw Me a Public Domain, P. TORREMANS (ed.),<br />

Copyright Law. A Handbook of Contemporary Research, Edward Edgar, Cheltham, 2007,<br />

A. CHANDER-M. SUNDER, The Romance of the Public Domain, in Cal. L. Rev. 2004,<br />

1331 ff<br />

Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 8, 31 I.L.M. 818, 825-826<br />

J. GIBSON, Audiences in tradition: traditional knowledge and the public domain,<br />

in Intellectual Property: the many faces of public domain, C. WAELDE – H.<br />

MACQUEEN, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007<br />

W. GORDON, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of<br />

the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 20041 1337<br />

IDLO publication, ‗imagining a traditional knowledge commons, 2006<br />

D. LANGE, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463,<br />

470 (2003)<br />

M. JOHNSON, ―Research on Traditional Environmental Knowledge: Its<br />

Development and its Role, in LORE: CAPTURING TRADITIONAL<br />

ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 3, 3-4 (M. JOHNSON ed., IDRC 1992).<br />

D. LANGE, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of<br />

Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Spring<br />

1992)<br />

S.V LEWINSKI, indigenous Heritage and intellectual property: genetic resources,<br />

traditional knowledge, and folklore, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2004<br />

D.E LONG, Traditional knowledge and the fight for the public domain, in 5.J<br />

Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 2006<br />

S. RAGAVAN, Protection of Traditional knowledge available at SSRN-id310680<br />

E. SAMUELS, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPR. SOC‟Y U.S.A.<br />

137 (1993)<br />

P. SAMUELSON, Enriching discourse on Public domain, in Duke LJ 2006, 786<br />

B.SHERMAN – L. WISEMAN, "Towards an Indigenous Public Domain?"in The<br />

Future of the Public Domain: Identifying the Commons in Information Law, LUCIE<br />

GUIBAULT, P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ (eds), Kluwer Law International, Netherlands,<br />

2006<br />

Universal Declaration of Human Rights<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong> Secretariat, ―Intellectual property and Traditional Cultural<br />

expression/Folklore‖, <strong>WIPO</strong> <strong>Publication</strong> No. 913 E


486 Creative Commons of Indigenous People: An Appraisal of the<br />

Public Domain Tensions and Customary Practices<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong>/GRTKF/IC/5/3


ALBANIA<br />

Giselda METALIAJ<br />

ARMENIA<br />

Shushik MKHITARYAN<br />

BANGLADESH<br />

Mohammad FARUQUE<br />

BELARUS<br />

Larysa KUSHNER<br />

BOLIVIA<br />

Pablo KYLLMAN<br />

BOSNIA/CROATIA<br />

Dragan CORIC<br />

BRAZIL<br />

Marcio CHAVES MELLO<br />

BULGARIA<br />

Fanny KOLEVA<br />

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS<br />

I. PARTICIPANTS


488<br />

List of Participants<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

CHINA<br />

Hua YU<br />

Qing YANG<br />

Yu Fey LEI<br />

COLOMBIA<br />

Sofia Carenza RODRIQUEZ MORENO<br />

EGYPT<br />

Ahmed Abd Eltawab ELSISI<br />

GHANA<br />

Alfred KUMI-ATIEMO<br />

GERMANY<br />

Karoline BRANDI<br />

ITALY<br />

Angela SALTARELLI<br />

Chiara GAIDO<br />

Federica LORENZATO<br />

Luigi MASTROIANNI<br />

JAMAICA<br />

Ewan Danny Anthony SIMPSON<br />

NIGERIA


List of Participants 489<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Eno-Obong USEN<br />

Jewande O. OLUFADEJO<br />

OMAN<br />

Shaikha Nasser Ali AL-AKZAMI<br />

PAKISTAN<br />

Saad NUSRULLAH<br />

RUSSIA<br />

Larisa THOMMEN<br />

SOUTH AFRICA<br />

Simon Zwelivumile QOBO<br />

THAILAND<br />

Setthabut ITTITHUMWINIT<br />

UKRAINE<br />

Valentyna KRYZHNA<br />

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA<br />

John GRAZIADEI<br />

Layne R. RANDOLPH<br />

Emily ZELENOCK


490<br />

List of Participants<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

UZBEKISTAN<br />

Djakhangir ARIPOV<br />

VIET NAM<br />

Thi Mai Khanh PHAM


List of Participants 491<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

II. RESOURCE PERSONS<br />

Luca BARBERO, Trademark Attorney, Domain Names and Internet Consulting,<br />

Studio Barbero, Turin, Italy<br />

Jorgen Savy BLOMQVIST, Director, Copyright and Related Rights Sector,<br />

Copyright Law Division, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Enrico BONADIO, Attorney-at-Law, Bonelli, Erede e Pappalardo Law Firm,<br />

Milan, Italy<br />

Luciano BOSOTTI, Patent Attorney, Buzzi Botaro e Antonielli d‘Oulx, Turin, Italy<br />

Sven BOSTYN, Associate Professor, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands<br />

Alberto CAMUSSO, Attorney-at-Law, Jacobacci Law Firm, Turin, Italy<br />

Martha CHIKOWORE (Ms.), Training Officer, <strong>WIPO</strong> Academy, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva,<br />

Switzerland<br />

Denis COHEN, Senior Legal Officer, Office of Legal Counsel, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva,<br />

Switzerland<br />

Thomas COTTIER, Professor, World Trade Institute, Berne, Switzerland<br />

Ignacio DE CASTRO LLAMAS, Deputy Director and Head, <strong>WIPO</strong> Arbitration<br />

and Mediation Center, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Estelle DERCLAYE (Ms.), School of Law, University of Nottingham, United<br />

Kingdom<br />

Antoine DORE, Legal Officer, International Telecommunication Union (ITU),<br />

Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Niva ELKIN-KOREN, Professor, Director, Haifa Center of Law & Technology,<br />

Faculty of Law, Haifa, Israel<br />

Carsten FINK, Chief Economist, Economic Studies, Statistics and Analysis<br />

Division, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Marina FOLTEA (Ms.), World Trade Institute (WTI), Berne, Switzerland<br />

Luigi Alberto FRANZONI, Professor, Department of Economic Sciences,<br />

University of Bologna, Italy


492<br />

List of Participants<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

GAO Hang (Ms.), Acting Director, Copyright Development Services Division,<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Paola GELATO (Ms.), Attorney-at-Law, Jacobacci Law Firm, Turin, Italy<br />

Elena GRIMME (Ms.), Anti-Piracy Attorney, Western Europe, Microsoft Europe,<br />

Milan, Italy<br />

Francis GURRY, Director General of <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Fabrizio JACOBACCI, Attorney-at-Law, Jacobacci Law Firm, Turin, Italy<br />

George JADOUN, Assistant Director-Postgraduate Programs, International<br />

Training Centre of the International Labour Organization (ILO - ITC), Turin, Italy<br />

Rolf JÖRDENS, Vice Secertary General, International Union for the Protection of<br />

New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Lise McLEOD (Ms.), Head <strong>WIPO</strong> Library, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Luigi, MANSANI, Professor, University of Parma, Italy<br />

Giulio MARTELLINI, Trademark Attorney, S.J. Berwin LLP (Italian Office),<br />

Milan, Iraly<br />

Laurent MASSON, EMEA Anti-Piracy Director, Microsoft Europe, Paris, France<br />

Craig Allen NARD, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Technology<br />

and Arts, Case Western Reserve University, School of Law, US<br />

Paolisa NEBBIA (Ms.), Professor, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom<br />

James OTIENO-ODEK, Managing Director, Kenya Industrial Property Institute<br />

Nuno PIRES DE CARVALHO, Acting Director, Intellectual Property and<br />

Competition Policy Division, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Marco RICOLFI, Professor, University of Turin, Italy<br />

Pier Luigi RONGAGLIA, Studio Legale, SIB, Florence, Italy<br />

Yo TAKAGI, Assistant Director General, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Toshiko TAKENAKA, Professor, University of Washington School of Law<br />

Antony TAUBMAN, Director, Intellectual Property Division, WTO


List of Participants 493<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

Paul TORREMANS, Professor, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom<br />

Massimo TRAVOSTINO, Attorney-at-Law, Studio Legale Pecoraro - Travostino,<br />

Turin, Italy<br />

Benedetta UBERTAZZI (Ms.), Professor, IULM University, Milano, Italy<br />

Jayashee WATAL (Ms.), Counsellor, Intellectual Property Divison, WTO, Geneva,<br />

Switzerland<br />

Wend WENDLAND, Director, Traditional Knowledge Division, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva,<br />

Switzerland<br />

Giulio ZANETTI, Head of Anglophone Department and Intellectual Property<br />

Specialist, IDLO, Roma<br />

III. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT STAFF<br />

Dario FERRERO, University of Turin, Turin, Italy<br />

Ilaria IANNAZZO (Ms.) Secretary, ILO International Training Center, Turin, Italy<br />

Simonetta SABBADINI (Ms.), Secretary, ILO International Training Center,<br />

Turin, Italy<br />

Sarah ZOCCO (Ms.), University of Turin, Italy


494<br />

List of Participants<br />

________________________________________________________________________________<br />

University of Turin<br />

IV. MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE<br />

Gianmaria AJANI, Professor, University of Turin, Italy<br />

Paolo MONTALENTI, Professor, University of Turin, Italy<br />

Marco RICOLFI, Professor, University of Turin, Italy<br />

Government of Italy<br />

Pasquale D‘AVINO Minister Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative,<br />

Permanent Mission of Italy in Geneva, Switzerland<br />

<strong>WIPO</strong><br />

Hang GAO (Mrs.), Deputy Dean, <strong>WIPO</strong> Academy, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva, Switzerland<br />

Martha CHIKOWORE (Mrs.), Training Officer, <strong>WIPO</strong> Academy, <strong>WIPO</strong>, Geneva,<br />

Switzerland (Committee Secretary)

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