Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara Third ... - Scarecrow Press

Historical Dictionary of
Western Sahara
Third Edition
Anthony G. Pazzanita
Historical Dictionaries of Africa, No. 96
The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Lanham, Maryland • Toronto • Oxford
2006

Contents
Editor’s Foreword, by Jon Woronoff xi
Preface xiii
Reader’s Notes xv
Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii
Map of Western Sahara xxi
Chronology xxiii
Introduction xliii
THE DICTIONARY 1
Bibliography 457
About the Author 523
ix

Editor’s Foreword
While nearly all of the African colonies became independent a long
time ago, there is still one last former colony that is not yet free. Western
Sahara has been firmly lodged on an unpleasant limb for nearly
three decades, having ceased to be part of Spain’s African empire
without becoming a state of its own. During this period, it has been
bitterly fought over by Morocco, Mauritania (until it was forced to
withdraw), and the indigenous people of northwestern Africa, as represented
by the Polisario Front. The result has been an upset in the
population, periodic warfare, constant strife, and regional and continental
conflicts.
For far too long, Western Sahara was a forgotten corner of Africa
whose concerns were largely ignored. Little was known about it and
less was actually written. One of the few efforts to provide an overview
of the country was the first edition of the Historical Dictionary of Western
Sahara in 1982. This and subsequent editions have all brought together
a broad range of information on not only the regional conflict
and attempts to resolve it, but also the essential background on the history,
politics, economy, society, and culture of Western Sahara. There
are hundreds of dictionary entries on key figures, an extensive chronology,
and an in-depth introduction. The bibliography, almost negligible
in the first edition, has expanded to the point where only the most important
titles can be included—at long last, an indication that others are
following the path toward first understanding and eventually solving a
seemingly intractable situation.
The first edition of the Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara
was written by Tony Hodges, among the very first to have carefully
researched the area. The second edition was updated and expanded
by Anthony G. Pazzanita, a specialist on Western Sahara and the
Maghreb and also the author of the second edition of the Historical
xi

xii • EDITOR’S FOREWORD
Dictionary of Mauritania. Although technically a third edition,
this current Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara is an entirely
new book because it was written from scratch by Mr. Pazzanita
alone. After more than two decades, it was necessary to do more than
just revise and update. The final product is both informative and absorbing.
Jon Woronoff

Preface
As was the case in the second edition of this dictionary, the time period
leading to my authorship of this completely rewritten new edition has
been highly eventful with respect to the attempts by the international
community to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. Only an outcome
universally perceived as evenhanded and just would both foreclose the
possibility of renewed war and fully satisfy an African continent sensitized
(by virtue of its own experiences if nothing else) to issues of decolonization
and self-determination. In spite of the fact that this is an
entirely new presentation, I still feel (and readers of this volume should
also feel) a considerable intellectual debt to Tony Hodges, who almost
alone among English-speakers pioneered the study of Western Sahara’s
history during his exhaustive researches beginning in the late 1970s. It
is my hope, therefore, that this edition will be judged to have been faithful
to the firm foundation that Tony Hodges constructed over two
decades ago, although neither he nor anyone else besides myself should
be held responsible for any errors of fact or omission contained in these
pages.
As far as specifics are concerned, the user will find several important
differences in this book as opposed to the two earlier editions. Aside
from the customary deletions from the main body of the dictionary
made necessary by the passage of time and by the emergence of new issues
and personages (and not all the omissions here are from the colonial
or precolonial period), most existing entries have been thoroughly
updated with new information, and there are nearly three dozen entirely
new entries covering a wide sweep of the history and politics of Western
Sahara. The decade plus since the publication of the second edition
has also brought the emergence of scores of new source materials devoted
in one way or another to Western Sahara and the dispute surrounding
it. As a result, I have totally reorganized the bibliography,
xiii

xiv • PREFACE
leaving out a raft of items that mostly either deal with purely technical
or scientific subjects during the colonial period or have lost much of
their relevance over the years.
What is most important—and which is the objective I always kept in
mind during the long process of writing this book—is that the Western
Sahara problem not be consigned to obscurity, despite the other events
in Africa and elsewhere in the world that often threaten to do so.

Reader’s Notes
The Western Saharans (and Mauritanians) whose names appear as entries
in this dictionary are entered under their first names, with other
persons (whether Moroccans, Algerians, or Europeans) appearing in a
form most familiar to Western readers, i.e., last name first.
Saharawi and Mauritanian names are usually in the form of “A son of
B” or “M daughter of N,” as the words “ould” and “mint” mean son and
daughter respectively. Consequently, Khatri Ould Said Ould Joumani is
listed under “K” and Maaouiya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya under “M.” As
examples of the conventional treatment accorded to other names, Driss
Basri is listed under “B” and Jacques Chirac, under “C.”
In a departure from the practice of the first two editions of this book,
most cross-references to the standard Spanish (as opposed to French
and English) spellings of names and places have been eliminated. While
this step will inevitably be thought of as a judgment call by many readers,
it is recognized that over the years more and more of the literature
on the Western Sahara has appeared in English and French, even though
Spanish-language sources continue to be extremely important. Spanish
transliterations of Saharawi names both look and sound different from
their English/French counterparts; thus, Khatri Ould Said Ould Joumani
is rendered in Spanish as Jairi Uld Said Uld Yumani, a spelling that may
confuse a reader more familiar with English and French usage.
There are cases, however, where it was thought prudent to include
cross-references with respect to names. The best example of this is the
Western Saharan capital; it is rendered in this book as El-Ayoun, a
spelling found in many sources. But alternative spellings do commonly
exist, such as the standard Spanish spelling of El-Aaiún, the French usage
of El-Aioun, and the usual Moroccan spelling of Lâayoune. These
are fully set forth as cross-references, with instructions to refer to El-
Ayoun.
xv

xvi • READER’S NOTES
The name of the Saharan capital, along with all other names utilizing
the Arabic definite article (“El-” or “Al-”), is alphabetized under the
first letter of that article. Thus, the entry for the El-Khanga Raid is entered
under “E,” not “K.”
Extensive cross-references have been placed into the body of each
entry itself to facilitate the rapid location of the information contained
therein.

Acronyms and Abbreviations
AMD Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique
ANP Armée Nationale Populaire (of Algeria)
AOE Africa Occidental Española
AOSARIO Association des Originaires du Sahara Anciennement
sous Domination Espagnole
AU African Union
bbl. barrels (of petroleum)
BPL Bone Phosphate Lime
c. circa (about)
CCR Council for the Command of the Revolution (of
the SADR)
CMRN Comité Militaire de Redressement National (of
Mauritania)
CMSN Comité Militaire de Salut National (of Mauritania)
CNR Conseil National de la Résistance (of the Army of
Liberation)
DGED Direction Générale d’études et de Documentation (of
Morocco)
Dh. Moroccan dirham
ENMINSA Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara, SA
FAR Forces Armées Royales (of Morocco)
FLN Front de Libération Nationale (of Algeria)
FLRSM Front de Libération et du Rattachement du Sahara à
la Mauritanie
FLS Frente de Liberación del Sahara (bajo Dominación
Española)
FLU Front de Libération et de l’Unité
Fosbucraa Fosfatos de Bu-Craa, SA
ICJ International Court of Justice
xvii

xviii • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
INI Instituto Nacional de Industria (of Spain)
MINURSO Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un
référendum au Sahara Occidental (United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)
MLS Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and
Oued ed-Dahab (Harakat Tahrir Saguia el-Hamra
wa Oued ed-Dahab)
MND Mouvement National Démocratique (of Mauritania)
MOREHOB Mouvement de Résistance ‘les Hommes Bleus’
MPAIAC Movimiento para la Autodeterminación e Independencia
del Archipélago Canario
OAU Organization of African Unity
OCP Office Chérifien de Phosphates (of Morocco)
P Spanish peseta
PCE Partido Comunista de España
PCM Parti Communiste Marocain
PKM Parti des Khadihines de Mauritanie
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PLS Parti de Libération et du Socialisme (of Morocco)
Polisario Front Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra
y Río de Oro
PP Partido Popular (of Spain)
PPM Parti du Peuple Mauritanien
PPS Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (of Morocco)
PRP Partido Revoluciónario Progresivo (of Spain)
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PUNS Partido de la Unión Nacional Saharaui
RNI Rassemblement National des Indépendants (of
Morocco)
SA sociedad anónima
SADR Saharan/Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
SPLA Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (of the Polisario
Front)
UCD Unión de Centro Democrático (of Spain)
UGESARIO Unión General de los Estudiantes de Saguia el-Hamra
y Río de Oro
UGTS Unión General de Trobajadores de Saguia el-Hamra y
Río de Oro

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xix
UMT Union Marocaine du Travail
UN United Nations
UNFP Union National des Forces Populaires (of Morocco)
UNHCR United Nations High Commission/Commissioner for
Refugees
UNMS Unión Nacional de Mujeres Saharauis
USFP Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (of Morocco)

Administrative Divisions of Mauritania, 1987.

Chronology
c. 5000 BC Beginning of the Neolithic Period.
c. 2500 BC Onset of desertification.
c. 1000 BC Start of Sanhaja Berber migration into Western Sahara
from the north.
c. AD 50–400
haja dominance.
Large-scale introduction of the camel facilitates San-
c. 700–900 Zenata Berbers take control of the Oued Draa.
c. 900–930 Sanhaja Berbers assume control of Aoudaghost in southern
Mauritania.
c. 990 Sanhaja lose Aoudaghost to the Soninké.
c. 1041–42 Abdallah Ibn Yacin founds the Almoravids.
1054 Almoravids seize Aoudaghost from the Soninké and Sijilmasa
from the Zenata.
1056 Almoravid invasion of Morocco.
1061 Almoravids retreat from Morocco.
1062–76 Abu Bakr Ibn Omar leads the Sanhaja into a war against the
Soninké (Kingdom of Ghana).
1069 Fez is captured by the Almoravids.
1076 Almoravids defeat the Ghana Empire.
1082 Algiers is captured by the Almoravids.
1086 Almoravids land in Spain and defeat the Castilian army near
Badajoz.
xxiii

xxiv • CHRONOLOGY
1110 Muslim Spain is reunited under Almoravid control.
c. 1218 Beni Hassan reach the Oued Draa and the Atlantic coast.
c. 1280 Beni Hassan migrate south into Western Sahara and Mauritania.
1346 The first known European explorer, Jaime Ferrer, sails past
Boujdour but never returns.
1434–35 Gil Eannes is the first European to return from south of Boujdour.
1445 João Fernandes is the first European to travel extensively into
Western Sahara’s interior.
1468 Enrique IV of Castile awards Saharan coast to Diego García de
Herrera (April 6).
1476 Diego García de Herrera sets up Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña.
1479–80 African coast south of Boujdour is awarded to Portugal.
1485 Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña is abandoned.
1494 Treaty of Tordesillas awards Spain the Saharan coast south of
Boujdour (June 7).
1496 Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña is rebuilt by Alonso Fajardo.
1498 Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña is sacked by a Portuguese fleet.
1499 Alonso Fernandéz de Lugo appointed Captain-General of Africa
and instructed to set up more forts on the Saharan coast.
16th century Beginnings of Reguibat and Arosien ascendancy.
1500 De Lugo is defeated by Saharawi tribes in the Battle of the Assaka
River.
1509 Spain gives up its rights on the Saharan coast except for Santa
Cruz de Mar Pequeña.
1524 Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña is sacked by local tribes; Spain
abandons the Saharan coast and does not return until the late 19th
century.

1578–1603 Moroccan Sultan Ahmed el-Mansour sends several military
expeditions across the Sahara.
1644–74 The Thirty Years War (Char Bobha) in Mauritania results in
defeat of the Sanhaja by the Beni Hassan.
1664–74 Reign of Moroccan Alawite Sultan Moulay Rachid, who
pursues an active Saharan policy.
1675 Moulay Ismail sends expeditions to Ouadane and Tichit, Mauritania.
late 17th–early 18th centuries Ascendancy of the Oulad Tidrarin
early 18th century Following a rebellion against Moulay Ismail, the
Oulad Bou Sbaa migrate from Morocco to Western Sahara.
late 18th century Oulad Tidrarin in eclipse; they begin paying
horma to the Oulad Delim.
1765 Spain unsuccessfully tries to get Morocco’s agreement to reestablish
Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña.
1767 In the Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of Marrakesh (May 28), the
sultan disclaims the ability to control the tribes south of the Oued Noun.
19th century Rise of the Reguibat to dominant position.
CHRONOLOGY • xxv
c. 1866–1880 Period of internecine warfare among the Reguibat,
Oulad Bou Sbaa, and other tribes.
1881 The Compañía de Pesquerías Canario-Africanas sets up a trading
pontoon at Dakhla.
1882 King Hassan I of Morocco restores the sultanate’s control over
the Oued Noun.
1883 Founding of the Compañ ía Comercial Hispano-Africana.
1884 February: The Compañía Comercial Hispano-Africana establishes
a trading post at Dakhla. December 26: Spain declares a protectorate
over Río de Oro, the Cape Blanc peninsula, and Angra de Cintra.
1885 March 9: The Oulad Delim attack the Spanish installation at
Villa Cisneros (Dakhla). June: Emilio Bonelli reoccupies Dakhla. July

xxvi • CHRONOLOGY
10: Spain declares a protectorate over the Saharan coast from Boujdour
to Cape Blanc.
1887 April 6: Río de Oro becomes a Spanish colony; territory extends
from Boujdour to Cape Blanc and 150 miles inland.
1894 November 2, 13: Villa Cisneros is attacked by the Arosien,
Oulad Delim, and Oulad Bou Sbaa.
1895 Reguibat sack Tindouf and massacre its Tadjakant inhabitants.
March 13: Anglo-Moroccan Agreement leads to the cession of Tarfaya
to Morocco for £50,000; Britain also recognizes Moroccan sovereignty
as far south as Boujdour.
1898 Cheikh Ma el-Ainin begins construction of the city of Smara.
1900 June 27: Franco-Spanish Convention delineates the southern
boundary of Spain’s Saharan territories.
1903 Francisco Bens Argandoña is appointed politico-military governor
of Spain’s Saharan possessions.
1904 October 3: Franco-Spanish Convention extends the border area
northward.
1905 War begins between the Reguibat and the Oulad Bou Sbaa, continuing
until 1908 when a truce is mediated by Ma el-Ainin; Moulay
Abdelaziz, the Moroccan sultan, attempts to assist Ma el-Ainin’s anticolonial
forces in Smara.
1907 September: Cheikh Ma el-Ainin backs the rebellion of Moulay
Hafid against Moulay Abdelaziz.
1909 July: Ma el-Ainin leaves Smara after the French occupy the
Adrar in Mauritania; he settles in Tiznit, Morocco.
1910 June 23: Ma el-Ainin is defeated by the French after declaring
himself Sultan of Morocco. October 28: Ma el-Ainin dies and is succeeded
by Ahmed el-Hiba.
1912 August: Ahmed el-Hiba proclaims himself Sultan of Morocco
and seizes Marrakesh. September 6: el-Hiba is defeated by France but

continues his resistance until 1919. November 14: Franco-Spanish
Convention further demarcates the Western Saharan border.
1913 January 10: A Saharawi ghazzi carries out a massacre at a
French outpost at El-Boirat. February: In retaliation for the El-Boirat
massacre, the French army occupies Smara.
1914 October-November: Francisco Bens arrives in Tarfaya but is
ordered to withdraw to Villa Cisneros.
1916 June 29: Bens occupies Tarfaya.
1919 May 23: Ahmed el-Hiba dies; he is succeeded by Merebbi Rebbu.
1920 November 30: Bens occupies La Guera.
1921–26 Merebbi Rebbu leads anti-French resistance in Mauritania
and in the Anti-Atlas.
1932 August 18: Reguibat and Oulad Delim inflict serious losses on
the French at Oum Tounsi.
1934 March: French occupy Tindouf. March 15: Merebbi Rebbu
surrenders to France. May–July: Under French pressure, Spain begins
to occupy points in the interior of Western Sahara, including Smara, for
the first time.
1936 July: Spanish Civil War begins; Madrid’s delegate in Western
Sahara aligns with the Francoists.
1940 El-Ayoun is made capital of “Spanish Sahara.”
CHRONOLOGY • xxvii
1943 The geologist Manuel Alia Medina begins the search for phosphates.
1946 July 20: Africa Occidental Española (AOE) is created, encompassing
Ifni and Western Sahara.
1949 Tarfaya is renamed Villa Bens after Francisco Bens’s death.
1950 The Spanish dictator, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, visits
Western Sahara.
1956 January: Benhamou Mesfioui is given command of the southern
sector of the Army of Liberation. March: Allal el-Fassi of the

xxviii • CHRONOLOGY
Istiqlal Party enunciates “Greater Morocco” doctrine. June: Army of
Liberation begins its insurgency. October 10: Morocco stakes its claim
to Western Sahara at the United Nations (UN).
1957 February 15: Army of Liberation stages its first attack in Mauritania;
Spain allows French troops to stage reprisal raids into its colony.
June: Smara and other interior points are abandoned by Spain. July 1:
The future Mauritanian president, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, puts forward
his own claim to Western Sahara. December 30: The French cabinet
approves a joint Franco-Spanish military campaign in northwest
Africa, Operation Ouragon.
1958 January 10: AOE is dissolved; Western Sahara is made a
province of Spain. February 10–24: Operation Ouragon is launched;
Army of Liberation is defeated. February 25: King Mohammed V of
Morocco formally lays claim to Western Sahara. April 1: Morocco and
Spain sign the Agreement of Cintra, by which the Tekna Zone (including
Tarfaya) is ceded to Rabat. April 10: Morocco’s army, the
Forces Armées Royales (FAR), attempts to occupy the Tekna Zone but
is barred by Army of Liberation units.
1959–63 Severe droughts wipe out an estimated 60 percent of livestock
herds, encouraging the process of sedentation.
1963 May: First local elections held for El-Ayoun and Villa Cisneros;
Khatri Ould Said Ould Joumani becomes president of the Cabildo
Provincial. July 6: Franco and King Hassan II hold a summit at Barajas
airport near Madrid. July 17: Three Saharawis are seated in the
Spanish Cortes for the first time.
1964 October: The UN adopts its first resolution on Western Sahara.
1965 December 16: The UN General Assembly calls on Spain to decolonize
Ifni and Western Sahara.
1966 April: Spain informs the UN that it accepts the principle of
decolonization but urges a delay, citing Western Sahara’s underdevelopment
and nomadic population. June: Morocco and Mauritania support
Western Saharan self-determination. October–November: The
Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopts its first resolution on
Western Sahara, calling for its “freedom and independence.” Decem

er 20: UN General Assembly calls for a referendum in Western Sahara
for the first time.
1967 May 11: A Spanish decree establishes the Djemaa. July
14–August 20: Elections are held for the Djemaa. September 11: The
Djemaa is inaugurated. December: Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri
returns to Western Sahara and begins organizing the Harakat Tahrir
Saguia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab.
1969 June 30: Ifni is ceded to Morocco.
CHRONOLOGY • xxix
1970 June 17: Several Saharawi demonstrators are killed by Spain in
the Massacre of Zemla. June 18: Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri is
detained after the events in Zemla and disappears permanently. September
14: Nouadhibou Summit Conference: King Hassan, President
Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and President Houari Boumedienne support
the decolonization of Western Sahara.
1972 March and May: Anti-Spanish demonstrations in Tan-Tan,
southern Morocco. July: MOREHOB is founded in Rabat. December
14: The UN General Assembly, for the first time, adopts a resolution upholding
the right of Western Saharans to independence.
1973 May: Phosphate exports begin from Bou-Craa. May 10: The
Polisario Front is founded under the leadership of El-Ouali Mustapha
Sayed. May 20: Polisario stages its first military action against Spain
at El-Khanga. July 23–24: Agadir Summit Conference: King Hassan
and Presidents Ould Daddah and Boumedienne call for self-determination
in Western Sahara.
1974 May 31: Gen. Federico Gómez de Salazar is appointed governor-general
of Western Sahara. July 4: Franco announces plans for internal
autonomy. July 4–6: The Djemea approves Spain’s Estatuto
Político. July–August: Algeria begins sending some low-level aid to
the Polisario Front. August 13: Moroccan officials Ahmed Laraki and
Ahmed Osman fail to dissuade Spain from granting internal autonomy
to the Saharawis. August 20: King Hassan says he cannot accept a vote
in Western Sahara if independence is a possible outcome. August 21:
Spain says it will hold a referendum in Western Sahara during the first
six months of 1975. November: The Partido de la Unión Nacional

xxx • CHRONOLOGY
Saharaui (PUNS) is established. November 19–22: The Djemaa approves
a new Nationality Law. December 13: The UN General Assembly
requests an Advisory Opinion on the status of Western Sahara
from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
1975 January 16: Spain announces the postponement of its planned
referendum in Western Sahara. February 16: PUNS holds its first congress;
elects Khalihenna Ould Rachid as its leader. March 21: A pro-
Moroccan Saharawi party, the Front de Libération et de l’Unité
(FLU) is founded. April 21–27: The Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, objects to the Moroccan claim to the Sahara at an
Arab League summit. May 12-19: The UN Visiting Mission tours
Western Sahara; it says the overwhelming majority of the people want
independence. May 18: Khalihenna Ould Rachid of the PUNS flees
Western Sahara and travels to Morocco. August 16-18: Dueh Sidna
Naucha is chosen the new PUNS leader. September 9: Spain and the
Polisario Front reach a tentative agreement, by which the front would
be awarded the territory in return for economic concessions to Madrid.
October: Spain starts withdrawing its troops. October 12: Ain Ben
Tili Conference: many conservative chioukh declare their backing for
Polisario. October 16: The ICJ issues its Advisory Opinion, reaffirming
the primacy of self-determination; King Hassan announces a Green
March into Western Sahara to press his claim. October 21: A Spanish
official, José Solís Ruiz, meets with King Hassan and hints at compromise
if the Green March is delayed. October 28–30: Ahmed Laraki and
Mauritanian Foreign Minister Hamdi Ould Mouknass hold talks with
Spain. October 30: With Franco gravely ill, Prince Juan Carlos becomes
acting Spanish head of state. Early November: The PUNS collapses.
November 3: Khatri Ould Joumani travels to Morocco and
makes the traditional bayaa to King Hassan. November 6: The Green
March enters Western Sahara. November 9: King Hassan says the
Green March has accomplished its purpose and instructs the marchers
to return to Morocco. November 10: Presidents Boumedienne and
Ould Daddah meet; Ould Daddah is warned of “grave consequences” if
Mauritania annexes Western Sahara. November 12: Negotiations begin
in Madrid between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania on the future of
Western Sahara. November 14: The Madrid Agreement is signed, partitioning
the territory. November 20: Generalissimo Francisco Franco
dies. November 25: A provisional Tripartite Administration (Spain,

CHRONOLOGY • xxxi
Morocco, Mauritania) is set up in Western Sahara. November 27: Moroccan
troops enter Smara. November 28: 62 of the 102 members of the
Djemaa sign the Proclamation of Guelta Zemmour, dissolving the
Djemaa and creating a new pro-Polisario Provisional Saharawi National
Council. November–December: Saharawi refugees begin fleeing
to the Western Saharan interior. December 11: Moroccan troops enter
El-Ayoun.
1976 January 9: Moroccan troops enter Dakhla; Spanish troops depart
El-Ayoun. January 12: Last Spanish troops withdraw from Western
Sahara. January 29: Battle of Amgala between Moroccan and Algerian
forces, as Polisario’s guerrilla war escalates. February 26: 57
members of the Djemaa vote to support integration with Morocco and
Mauritania, but this is not accepted by either the UN or Spain; Madrid
formally ends its administration of Western Sahara. February 27:
Polisario proclaims the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
March 4: The SADR’s first cabinet is named; Mohammed Lamine
Ould Ahmed is prime minister. April 14: Morocco and Mauritania officially
divide Western Sahara amongst themselves. June 8: First
Nouakchott Raid by Polisario. June 9: The Mauritanian army attacks
SPLA forces retreating from Nouakchott; El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed is
fatally wounded. August 26–30: Polisario holds its 3rd General Popular
Congress, electing Mohamed Abdelaziz secretary-general of the
front and president of the SADR.
1977 May 1: Polisario guerrillas attack Zouérate, Mauritania, killing
two French citizens and taking six others prisoner. May 13: Morocco
and Mauritania sign a defense pact; eventually, 9,000 Moroccan soldiers
will be stationed in Mauritania. July 3: Nouakchott is attacked for
the second time by the Polisario Front. November 1: France prepares
troops and aircraft in response to Polisario raids on the Zouérate-
Nouadhibou Railway. December: French combat jets strafe Polisario
forces inside Mauritania. December 23: Polisario releases its French
captives in Algiers.
1978 May 4–5: The French air force again attacks Polisario. July
10: Col. Mustapha Ould Mohammed Salek of the Mauritanian
army leads a coup deposing Mokhtar Ould Daddah; a new governing
body, the Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN) is
established. July 12: Polisario declares a unilateral cease-fire against

xxxii • CHRONOLOGY
Mauritania. October 20–21: Secret contacts between Polisario and
Morocco in Bamako, Mali, fail to produce results. December 27:
President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria dies.
1979 January 28: Polisario guerrillas fight their way into Tan-Tan.
February 7: Col. Chadli Benjedid is chosen the new president of Algeria.
April 6: Col. Ahmed Ould Bouceif becomes prime minister of
Mauritania, as Col. Ould Salek remains titular head of state; the CMRN
is replaced by the Comité Militaire de Salut National (CMSN). May
27: Col. Ould Bouceif is killed in a plane crash near Dakar, Senegal.
May 31: Lt.-Col. Mohammed Khouna Ould Heydallah replaces
Ould Bouceif as Mauritanian premier. June 3: Col. Ould Salek resigns
from Mauritania’s presidency and is replaced by Lt.-Col. Mohammed
Mahmoud Ould Ahmed Louly. August 5: Mauritania and the Polisario
Front sign the Algiers Agreement; Mauritania renounces its claim
to Western Sahara. August 12: Mauritania pulls out of its portion of
Western Sahara, called Tiris el-Gharbia. August 14: Morocco unilaterally
annexes Tiris el-Gharbia, renaming it Oued ed-Dahab. August
24: Polisario forces overrun the southern Moroccan town of
Lebouirate. October 6: Polisario briefly captures Smara. October 14:
Polisario captures Mahbes. November 21: The UN General Assembly
urges Morocco and Polisario to engage in direct negotiations.
1980 March 3: King Hassan reaffirms that Western Sahara’s possession
by Morocco is an “irreversible historical reality.” June 14: The
phosphate mines at Bou-Craa are officially shut down after production
is disrupted by Polisario attacks starting in January 1976. July 1–4: At
an OAU summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, 26 of 51 African states declare
their support for the SADR’s admission to the OAU member state;
Morocco threatens to withdraw from the organization if membership is
granted.
1981 May: Morocco claims to have built a continuous system of “defensive
walls” in the north of Western Sahara, encompassing El-Ayoun,
Smara, and Bou-Craa. June 26: King Hassan accepts the principle of an
OAU-sponsored referendum at a summit of the African body in
Nairobi. July–August: Backtracking from his pledge, King Hassan
states that a referendum could only be for the purpose of “confirming”
Morocccan sovereignty. October 13: Polisario stages a series of attacks
on the Moroccan army, overrunning Guelta Zemmour and shooting

CHRONOLOGY • xxxiii
down several aircraft. November 7–9: Morocco abandons both Guelta
Zemmour and Bir Enzaren.
1982 February 22–23: OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo formally
admits the SADR to full membership. May 6: Morocco says its defensive
walls now extend south to Boujdour. October 28: Spanish elections
bring Socialist Felipe González to power. October 29: In an effort
to break an impasse at the OAU over the SADR’s membership, the
Polisario Front says it will “voluntarily and temporarily” absent itself
from the upcoming summit conference. November 25: The OAU summit
in Tripoli collapses in a dispute over Chad.
1983 January 25: Moroccan Gen. Ahmed Dlimi is reported killed in
an automobile accident, but speculation abounds he was assassinated by
King Hassan for plotting a coup. February 26: King Hassan and Chadli
Benjedid meet for the first time to discuss Western Sahara. June 6: An
OAU summit in Addis Ababa fails to start due to continuing disputes
over the SADR’s membership. June 8: The summit goes forward after
the SADR again absents itself. June 10: The OAU adopts Resolution
104, naming Morocco and Polisario as the only two parties to the Western
Sahara conflict; it directs its Implementation Committee to prepare
for a plebiscite in the territory. August–September: Fierce battles between
Morocco and Polisario; Polisario claims that 767 Moroccan soldiers
have been killed.
1984 February 27: Mauritania recognizes the SADR. May–July:
Additional Morocco-Polisario fighting throughout Western Sahara. November
12–16: At the 20th annual OAU summit, the SADR takes its
seat as a full member with no serious opposition; Morocco permanently
withdraws from the organization in protest. December 12: In Mauritania,
President Ould Heydallah is overthrown by Col. Maaouiya Ould
Sid’Ahmed Taya.
1985 January 27: Polisario’s second-in-command, Bachir
Mustapha Sayed, meets secretly in Lisbon with Moroccan Interior
Minister Driss Basri. April 13: Morocco and Mauritania resume diplomatic
relations after a four-year break. May–September: Morocco’s
defensive walls are extended south into the Guelta Zemmour region.
October 1: India recognizes the SADR, although its recognition is
withdrawn in 2000. December 2: The UN General Assembly adopts

xxxiv • CHRONOLOGY
Resolution 40/50, endorsing the OAU’s settlement efforts. December
17: Mahfoud Ali Beiba becomes prime minister of the SADR, replacing
Mohammed Lamine Ould Ahmed.
1986 April: UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar holds indirect
negotiations in New York with Morocco and Polisario, but without
success. October 31: The UN General Assembly adopts Resolution
41/16, endorsing de Cuéllar’s mediation efforts and a referendum in
Western Sahara.
1987 February–April: According to Morocco, all but 12,500 sq km
of Western Sahara are now enclosed by the defensive wall system. May
4: King Hassan and Chadli Benjedid meet again in Oujda, Morocco.
October 1: Pérez de Cuéllar proposes sending a UN Technical Mission
to Western Sahara. November–December: UN Technical Mission visits
the territory.
1988 May 16: Algeria and Morocco resume diplomatic relations after
a 12-year severance. August 11: Pérez de Cuéllar presents his proposals
for a cease-fire and referendum in Western Sahara to Moroccan and
Polisario officials. August 30: Morocco and Polisario accept the UN
plan in principle. September 20: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution
621, accepting the secretary-general’s plans for a referendum.
October 19: Hector Gros Espiell is appointed the first UN Special
Representative for Western Sahara.
1989 January 4–5: Polisario leaders Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Mahfoud
Ali Beiba, and Ibrahim Ghali Ould Mustapha meet with King
Hassan at his palace in Marrakesh; this meeting is not repeated. May
14: Morocco formally ratifies its 1972 border treaty with Algeria. August
8: A high-ranking Polisario official, Omar Hadrami, defects to
Morocco. October–November: The Polisario Front launches numerous
military attacks against Moroccan forces at Guelta Zemmour, Amgala,
and other locations.
1990 January 19: Johannes Manz replaces Gros Espiell as UN Special
Representative for Western Sahara. June 18: UN secretary-general
Pérez de Cuéllar submits a detailed plan for a plebiscite to be carried out
by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MIN-
URSO); it would give the Saharawi people a choice between full independence
and integration with Morocco. June 27: The UN Security

CHRONOLOGY • xxxv
Council unanimously adopts Resolution 658, approving Pérez de Cuéllar’s
June 18 report. July–November: Disagreements between Morocco
and Polisario continue over the implementation of the UN referendum
plan.
1991 April 19: Pérez de Cuéllar issues another report, calling for a
referendum 36 weeks after a cease-fire. April 29: Security Council
Resolution 690 formally establishes MINURSO. June 18–20: The
Polisario Front holds its 8th congress, adopting a new constitution and
instituting other political reforms. June 28: Morocco and Polisario
agree on September 6, 1991, as the date of a cease-fire and the insertion
of a MINURSO peacekeeping force into Western Sahara. August 4–5:
Morocco launches attacks against Polisario-held areas in Western Sahara;
Polisario retaliates. August 21: Morocco demands a delay in the
referendum process and submits the names of 120,000 new allegedly
Saharawi voters. August 30: MINURSO states that Morocco has refused
to allow its personnel and equipment to be unloaded from two
UN-chartered ships. September 6: Cease-fire goes into effect; 240 UN
peacekeepers are deployed to 10 locations in Western Sahara. September–October:
MINURSO is described as being hampered by logistical
and other difficulties. November 15: Pérez de Cuéllar announces that
he wants to expand voter eligibility criteria; the Polisario Front vehemently
objects, saying it amounts to adopting Morocco’s proposals and
that it would skew the referendum results in Rabat’s favor. December
19: Pérez de Cuéllar submits his last report to the UN Security Council,
formally proposing revised voter eligibility criteria and announcing the
resignation of Special Representative Johannes Manz. December 31:
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 725 reserving judgment on
Pérez de Cuéllar’s voter qualification proposals.
1992 January 1: Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt replaces Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar as UN secretary-general. March 23: Sahabzada
Yacub Khan of Pakistan is chosen the new UN Special Representative
for Western Sahara. May 20: Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz rejects
any attempt to enlarge voter eligibility standards, although he hints
at compromise. May 29: In a new report, the UN secretary-general says
that since September 1991, 92 of 102 cease-fire violations were committed
by Morocco. August 11: Ibrahim Hakim, a former foreign minister
of the SADR, defects to Morocco.

xxxvi • CHRONOLOGY
1993 January 26: A report by Boutros-Ghali proposes three alternatives
to ending the impasse over the Sahara conflict, including ending
MINURSO’s mandate. March 2: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution
809, declining to directly comment on the new voter eligibility
criteria. May: Erik Jensen is appointed chairman of MINURSO’s
Identification Commission. July 16–19: Moroccan and Polisario representatives
meet in El-Ayoun in an unsuccessful attempt to narrow their
differences. August–September: Polisario begins to soften its opposition
to the voter eligibility criteria set forth in December 1991 by Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar. November 4: The UN announces that the Identification
Commission has begun work in Western Sahara.
1994 March 29: The UN Security Council unanimously instructs the
secretary-general to continue his efforts to reconcile Morocco and Polisario.
August 10: Polisario’s Bachir Mustapha Sayed sharply criticizes
secretary-general Boutros-Ghali for his alleged bias in favor of Morocco.
August 11: Moroccan Foreign Minister Abdellatif Filali rejects all efforts
by the OAU to intervene in the Western Sahara dispute, saying the
organization “no longer exists.” August 16: Algeria’s new president,
Liamine Zéroual, states that Western Sahara “is still an illegally occupied
country.” November 5: A UN report states that almost 4,000 applications
by Saharawis to vote have been processed, about 2 percent of the
estimated total number. December 14: Boutros-Ghali, in a report to the
Security Council, says he is encouraged by the progress in voter registration,
but warns of the complexity of MINURSO’s mandate.
1995 January: Frank Ruddy, a former member of the UN Identification
Commission, strongly criticizes Moroccan behavior in Western
Sahara in testimony to the U.S. Congress and believes that the UN lacks
the resolve to confront Morocco. March 30: The UN secretary-general
reports that by mid-March, 21,300 Saharawis had been identified formally
by MINURSO. May 26: The UN announces that 35,851 persons
have been identified as voters. June 3–9: A special mission is sent to
Western Sahara by the UN Security Council; it reports (on June 21) of
a “continuing suspicion and lack of trust” between Morocco and the
Polisario Front. July–August: The pace of MINURSO’s voter identification
process slows due to Morocco-Polisario frictions. September
22: In Resolution 1017 the UN Security Council states that the parties
to the Western Sahara conflict “must have a vision of the post-referendum

CHRONOLOGY • xxxvii
period.” November: The voter identification process comes virtually to
a halt. November 17: Polisario releases 186 Moroccan prisoners of war
at the request of the Italian government.
1996 January 31: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1042
reaffirming MINURSO’s mandate. May 8: In another report to the Security
Council, Boutros-Ghali states that it has proven impossible to
restart voter identification; over 60,000 persons have already been identified.
November 5: Voter eligibility process remains suspended.
1997 January 1: Kofi Annan of Ghana replaces Boutros-Ghali as the
new UN secretary-general. February 27: Annan issues his first report
on Western Sahara. March 1: Bachir Mustapha Sayed is appointed the
SADR’s foreign minister. April 2: Kofi Annan appoints former U.S.
Secretary of State James A. Baker III as his Special Envoy to Western
Sahara; Baker tours the region on April 23–28. June 23, July 19–20,
and August 29–30: James Baker holds indirect negotiations with Morocco
and the Polisario Front in Lisbon and London. September 14–16:
Baker holds a round of talks in Houston, Texas; these result in the socalled
Houston Accords on the resumption of voter registration. December
3: Registration of Saharawi voters recommences. December
26: Former U.S. diplomat Charles Dunbar is appointed the new UN
Special Representative for Western Sahara, replacing Erik Jensen.
1998 January 15: In a report to the Security Council, Kofi Annan
states that 13,277 more Saharawi voters had been formally processed by
MINURSO between December 3, 1997, and January 10, 1998. February–March:
The pace of voter identification again begins to fall behind
expectations. June 8–10: At an OAU summit in Burkina Faso, a Moroccan-inspired
attempt to have the SADR’s membership in the organization
revoked is unsuccessful. August: Voter identification of noncontested
tribes ends; disputes remains as to the H41, H61, and J51/52
tribes. September 11: In another report to the Security Council, Kofi
Annan states that more than 147,000 persons have been processed so
far, with approval given to about 85,000. December 11: The secretarygeneral
notes a continued deadlock on the H41-H61-J51/52 tribes.
1999 January: The UN Identification Commission reduces its staff in
Western Sahara owing to the new registration impasse. March 31:
Charles Dunbar resigns as UN Special Representative; he is replaced on

xxxviii • CHRONOLOGY
May 18 by William Eagleton, another former U.S. diplomat. June 15:
The identification process resumes at El-Ayoun and in Tindouf; two more
registration centers are opened in southern Morocco on June 21. July 15:
The UN publishes a list of 84,251 Saharawis “provisionally” entitled to
vote and invites appeals. July 23: King Hassan II of Morocco dies and is
succeeded by his son and heir, Mohamed VI. September: Violent
protests against the Moroccan occupation are reported in El-Ayoun and
Smara; they reportedly involve thousands of Saharawis and allegations of
police brutality are made. November: Some participants in the September
demonstrations are given long prison sentences; the Polisario Front
strongly protests. December 6: Kofi Annan reports that since the start of
the identification appeals process in June, 42,774 applicants from the
H41, H61, and J51/52 tribes have been identified, but many more await
processing. December 14: The UN Security Council extends MIN-
URSO’s mandate until February 29, 2000, pending further developments.
2000 January 17: SADR Foreign Minister Mohammed Salem Ould
Salek, in an interview, says Polisario may resume hostilities if a referendum
is not held and MINURSO collapses; MINURSO releases a second
provisional voter list, with Morocco “dismayed” at the small number
of Saharawis found eligible to vote. February 17: In a report to the
Security Council, the secretary-general summarizes the Western Sahara
conflict since 1991; he states that MINURSO has so far cost over $437
million and additional appeals of voter eligibility could extend the UN’s
tasks indefinitely. March 1: Anti-Moroccan demonstrations are held in
Smara; dozens of Saharawis reported arrested. April 8–11: James
Baker visits northwest Africa, seeking either to restart the referendum
effort or search for alternative solutions. May 22: Kofi Annan reports
that the identification appeals process is continuing and that James
Baker’s mediation efforts are so far not successful. June 26: India withdraws
its recognition of the SADR. June 28: Morocco and Polisario
once again hold talks in London under James Baker’s auspices; he urges
an alternative to the referendum plan. July 12: Another report by the
secretary-general says that neither Morocco nor Polisario shows any
willingness to compromise. September 28: A meeting between Morocco
and Polisario, sponsored by James Baker in Berlin, ends in failure.
October 25: In a report to the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan
says the Saharan conflict is still deadlocked and all of James Baker’s efforts
to broker a settlement have failed; he then asks the parties whether

CHRONOLOGY • xxxix
they would support “some devolution of governmental authority” in the
territory that would be a departure from the 1990–91 referendum plan.
December 17: The Polisario Front releases 201 Moroccan prisoners of
war as a goodwill gesture.
2001 January 1–7: War almost erupts in Western Sahara as the annual
Paris-Dakar road rally is scheduled to pass through the territory and
Polisario states that this is a violation of its sovereignty; hostilities do not
resume after appeals from the OAU and Algeria. February–May: UN
Special Envoy James Baker continues his efforts to find an alternative
solution to the conflict outside the original peace plan. June 20: James
Baker’s Framework Agreement Proposal for Western Sahara is made
public by the UN; it calls for autonomy in purely local matters by the Saharawi
people while reserving overall sovereignty to Morocco under a
provisional executive-legislative arrangement for a five-year period; after
this time, a referendum would be conducted; the proposal is immediately
denounced by Algeria and by the Polisario Front; Baker later admits
that key elements of his plan had their origins in Morocco. June 29:
The UN Security Council, neither accepting nor rejecting Baker’s proposal,
extends the mandate of MINURSO to November 30, 2001 (Resolution
1359). August 27–29: James Baker meets with Moroccan and
Polisario representatives at his ranch at Pinedale, Wyoming; Algeria and
Mauritania also take part. October 30: William Eagleton resigns as UN
Special Representative; William Lacy Swing takes his place. November
7: Sidi Mohammed Daddach, a prominent Saharawi political prisoner,
is freed after being jailed for 25 years.
2002 January 29: In a letter to the UN Security Council, the UN’s
undersecretary-general for legal affairs, Hans Corell, states that Morocco
may not enter into contracts for the extraction of petroleum
from Western Sahara while the status of the territory remains unresolved;
the opinion is considered a clear victory for the Polisario Front.
April 19: In a further report to the Security Council, Kofi Annan warns
of grave humanitarian difficulties in Polisario’s Tindouf-area refugee
camps; he also says James Baker is still attempting mediation. June
18: Polisario releases a further 104 Moroccan prisoners of war. July
30: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1429, extending MIN-
URSO’s mandate to January 31, 2003, an unusually long period of
time. September 30: Ayoub Lahbib, a top Polisario official, defects

xl • CHRONOLOGY
to Morocco. November 3: In a ceremony in Bergen, Norway, Sidi Mohammed
Daddach receives the prestigious Rafto Human Rights Prize.
November 8: In a televised speech, King Mohamed VI of Morocco
says that the UN referendum plan for Western Sahara is no longer valid
and that his country will never accept a plebiscite.
2003 January 14–17: James Baker visits Western Sahara and the
adjoining region. January 30: The UN Security Council votes to extend
the MINURSO mandate to March 31, 2003, as Baker attempts to
modify his Framework Agreement Proposal to the satisfaction of Morocco
and the Polisario Front. May 23: James Baker formally presents
his Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara;
it calls for internal autonomy under Moroccan rule for 4–5 years
prior to a referendum but delineates the responsibilities of both parties
to a greater extent than Baker’s June 2001 plan. June–July: Morocco
rejects Baker’s second plan; Algeria and Polisario criticize some elements
of it, but to a lesser degree than Baker’s first plan. Late July:
The Polisario Front, in a desire to politically isolate Morocco, and under
Algerian pressure to compromise, officially accepts the second
Baker Plan. July 31: The UN Security Council passes Resolution
1495, urging all parties to work toward the implementation of Baker’s
second peace proposal. August 7: Alvaro de Soto, a Peruvian diplomat,
replaces William Lacy Swing as UN Special Representative for
Western Sahara. September–December: Morocco continues to reject
the implementation of James Baker’s second settlement proposal,
calling it incompatible with its “territorial integrity” and “sovereignty”;
Rabat’s position is supported by French President Jacques
Chirac and his Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin. November
8: Polisario releases 300 Moroccan prisoners of war to the custody of
the International Committee of the Red Cross in Tindouf; the son of
Libyan leader Col. Muammar el-Qadaffi, Seif al-Islam el-Qadaffi,
plays a critical mediation role.
2004 March 5: MINURSO and UNHCR begin a series of reciprocal
“confidence-building” visits by Saharawi families living both in the
Tindouf-area refugee camps and in the Moroccan-administered areas of
Western Sahara. April 23: Morocco reiterates its rejection of James
Baker’s second peace plan; Kofi Annan asks the Security Council for a
10-month extension of MINURSO’s mandate and says the mission

CHRONOLOGY • xli
could be disbanded if no further progress toward a settlement is made.
April 29: The Security Council adopts Resolution 1541, declining to issue
an ultimatum to the parties regarding the possible end of MIN-
URSO and extending the mission’s mandate until October 31, 2004.
June 11: James Baker resigns as the UN secretary-general’s personal
envoy to Western Sahara. September 15: South Africa formally recognizes
the SADR.
2005 May 20–June 4: At least 100 Saharawis are injured in anti-Moroccan
protests inside Western Sahara, with dozens of arrests also reported.
June 23: Kenya recognizes the SADR. June 30: Hametti Ould
Abedelaziz Rabbani, a former SADR minister of justice and high Polisario
official, defects to Morocco. July 26: Kofi Annan appoints Peter
van Walsum, a retired diplomat from the Netherlands, as his new personal
envoy to Western Sahara, replacing James Baker. August 3: In
Mauritania, President Ould Taya is overthrown in a bloodless coup
de’ètat led by Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall; this was not expected to result
in any substantive change in Mauritania’s Western Sahara policy.
August 5: A longtime UN official, Francesco Bastagli of Italy, is appointed
the new UN Special Representative for Western Sahara, replacing
Alvaro de Soto. August 18: The Polisario Front releases all 404 of
its remaining Moroccan prisoners of war; some had been in detention
for as long as 23 years. September–October: Protests against the Moroccan
government continue inside Western Sahara. October 28: Despite
continuing overall pessimism on the prospects for a peace settlement,
the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1634, extending
MINURSO’s mandate to April 30, 2006.

Introduction
THE TERRITORY
Western Sahara, or, as Morocco would prefer to call it, the “Saharan
provinces” of that country, is one of the most remote, arid, and thinly
populated territories in the world, encompassing 266,000 square kilometers
of desert; that is, roughly the size of Great Britain or half the size
of Spain yet without a single permanent river or an oasis of any consequence.
The Western Saharan terrain contrasts sharply with the preconceived
notions of many persons who would expect such a land to be
covered entirely by sand dunes, but instead, dune belts are found for the
most part only in the general vicinity of the 1,062 km Atlantic coastline,
with the rest of the territory being primarily flat gravel, albeit with several
lowlying mountain ranges. The waters off Western Sahara are extremely
dangerous, as swift currents, a steep drop-off of the continental
shelf, and an often rock-strewn coast have spelled doom for many generations
of seafarers. Western Sahara also has only two natural harbors
along the Atlantic (Dakhla and La Guera), and the climate of the territory
is legendary for its harshness. Temperatures can soar during the
daytime to over 50 degrees Celsius and drop to zero at night, and annual
rainfall seldom exceeds 50 mm per year and is often much less, with
some areas not seeing rain for years at a time.
Western Sahara also has long and poorly demarcated borders with
neighboring countries, stretching a total of 2,045 km, of which 1,570
km are with Mauritania in the south and east, 435 km are with Morocco
in the north (at any rate, before the 1975–76 occupation and annexation
of the territory by Rabat), and only 30 km with Algeria far to the northeast.
In addition, the ex-colony hosts some of the largest deposits of
phosphate ore in the world, is suspected to hold substantial amounts of
other minerals which as yet have not been exploited, and, starting in the
xliii

xliv • INTRODUCTION
1960s and extending into the early 21st century, has been the object of
serious exploration for possible petroleum reserves, a search which by
2005 had not resulted in the discovery of commercially viable deposits
but which has greatly raised the stakes in the overall political equation
surrounding the future of Western Sahara, given that the conflict between
Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-
Hamra y Río de Oro (Polisario Front), which seeks an independent Saharan
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the territory, was at the
threshold of entering its fourth decade. And finally, the efforts to resolve
the Morocco-Polisario dispute by the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and the United Nations highlighted some of the limitations on
the effectiveness of those international bodies, particularly with regard
to a situation in which a sense of diplomatic urgency was mostly lacking
and there were strong temptations on the part of the great powers to
accept the political status quo, even though Western Sahara was Africa’s
last substantial issue of decolonization and had a refugee population
which had been waiting to leave its encampments in southwestern Algeria
for upwards of 30 years.
FROM THE PRECOLONIAL ERA TO THE LATE 19TH CENTURY
In spite of the austere conditions characterizing Western Sahara in modern
times, the territory has known a period when it enjoyed a far gentler
climate and a richer variety of plant and animal life than during the last
3,000 years or so. So far as can be inferred from the archaeological and
geological record, the Neolithic period in Western Sahara featured
nearly unending grasslands, abundant animal life, and a relatively stable
(if very small) population of nomadic hunter-gatherers known as the
Bafour, a dark-skinned people who left behind paintings and drawings
in caves and on rocks to remind observers of their presence. But beginning
in about 2500 BC, these peoples were obliged by the ongoing
southward expansion of the desert to migrate far to the south, into what
is presently sub-Saharan Africa. From 2500 to about 1000 BC, the region
gradually became less and less hospitable to life, as watercourses,
larger wildlife, and forests and savannas were slowly replaced by the
deserts found there today. But just as the process of desertification was
reaching its conclusion in Western Sahara, another group of people, the

INTRODUCTION • xlv
Berbers, arrived there and made a permanent imprint upon the land. Migrating
from their ancestral homes along the Mediterranean littoral,
they found their survival extremely difficult, although their presence
was secured by the importation of the camel from the east. A beast of
legendary stamina and a good source of food (which made it the ideal
means to perpetuate a nomadic way of life), camels also were scarce
and useful enough to become a major source of wealth for the Berbers.
In addition, camels, because of their value as pack animals and due to
their potential for rapid movement, were adopted for military purposes
as well, and from the first to the sixth centuries AD, they played a key
role in the seemingly incessant internecine warfare in which the Berbers
engaged, divided as they were into the Sanhaja, Zenata, Lemtouna, and
Messoufa groupings, among others. Soon, surprise attacks (ghazzis)
and military action generally became the preferred method by which a
tribe could enhance its wealth and social status. With this warfare also
went commerce, and the caravan-based trade which the Berbers conducted
with Morocco and the Black African empires to the south also
brought with it Islam, which had gained a fairly secure foothold in
Western Sahara by the eighth century, although adherence to its precepts
could not be said to have been particularly devout, as there was
still no group of fervent advocates that called the area their home.
But starting in 1039, the situation changed significantly. Abdallah Ibn
Yacin, a nearly fanatical Muslim, traveled to Western Sahara and Mauritania
to preach to the reluctant Berbers. Not receiving a warm welcome,
Ibn Yacin and some of his followers retired to a ribat (religious
retreat) for the next two years to plan their strategy for achieving dominance
over the peoples of the region. This promised to be a difficult
task, for the early Saharawis, like their latter-day counterparts, were
highly independent and not amenable to outside rule. But after they left
their enclave (thought to be along the coast of modern-day Mauritania),
they inflicted one military defeat after another on their rivals, which included
not only the Berbers but also the Ghana Empire in the south,
dominated by the Soninké. Abdallah Ibn Yacin was killed in battle in
1059, but his followers, notably Abu Bakr Ibn Omar and Yusuf Ibn
Tashfin, carried the banner of the Almoravids (as they had become
known) to new heights by 1110, conquering not only Western Sahara
and Mauritania but also most of Morocco, portions of Algeria, as well
as Muslim Spain, the latter being the personal accomplishment of Yusuf

xlvi • INTRODUCTION
Ibn Tashfin, who set the Castilian army to flight in 1086 and unified—
if only briefly—all of Muslim Spain under Almoravid rule.
The Almoravids, for all their fervor, overextended themselves by occupying
such a broad swath of territory. Subject to periodic revolts
against their authority, the adherents of Ibn Yacin could not maintain
their hold on Morocco or Spain longer than the 12th century, as the Almohad
movement in Morocco and the Catholic reconquista in Spain
proved too powerful for them to resist. As for Western Sahara and Mauritania,
Almoravid rule lasted about a century longer, due in large part
to the sheer isolation of those territories. But many Berbers in the region
had never fully reconciled themselves to Ibn Yacin’s followers, and by
the 14th century, the resistance to any form of supra-tribal rule had reasserted
itself, and the Almoravids were soon relegated to memory,
leaving behind as one of the only reminders of their existence a puritanical
form of Islam imported to the area by Ibn Yacin.
With the Almoravids gone, another contestant for primacy in the region
appeared. The Maqil Arabs (sometimes known as the Beni Hassan after a
component part of the Maqil), who had originated in Yemen and who possessed
a martial inclination that made the Almoravids seem almost benign
by comparison, filtered into Western Sahara in the 14th and 15th centuries,
at times amalgamating with the still-dominant Sanhaja Berbers,
and at other times reducing them to the status of vassals or tributaries
(znaga) and forcing them to pay a humiliating tribute known as horma to
the hassan, or warrior, tribes who had defeated them on the battlefield.
This subordinate status was not altered until well into the 20th century,
and its presence was still felt in Mauritania and elsewhere into the 21st.
In an attempt to salvage at least a degree of their once-proud status, some
of the defeated Berbers, by the inventive use of genealogies and religious
study and teaching, made themselves into zawiya or “people of the book”
who renounced the use of arms and instead practiced and propagated Islam.
The zawiya then came to occupy a place in the social hierarchy only
slightly below that of the hassan tribes, and could nearly always count on
them for help in times of adversity. Other occupational castes existed in
Western Sahara, but the implantation of this form of social stratification
was by far the most important development in the region since the conquests
of the Almoravids several hundred years before.
While all this was transpiring mostly in the Saharan interior, another
form of struggle for supremacy was taking place, this time on the part of

INTRODUCTION • xlvii
Spain and Portugal, two of the primary seafaring and imperial powers of
the time. Lured to the northwest coast of Africa by the (fictional) promise
of great riches, both Madrid and Lisbon strove over the next century
(that is, from the 1400s to the early 1500s) to establish themselves in the
area, although they restricted themselves to small trading enclaves along
the coast. Known as “counters,” these outposts were highly vulnerable to
raids by either rival European powers or Saharawi tribes angry with the
presence of outsiders. In 1476, for example, Diego García de Herrera
founded a trading center known as Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, the exact
location of which is still not known to historians and which functioned
only for about a decade when, in 1485, it was abandoned until
1496, when it was re-established in an especially contentious era of
Spanish-Portuguese rivalry. But the Portuguese fleet sacked Santa Cruz
de Mar Pequeña two years later, and, discouraged, Spain soon relinquished
all of its concessions along the African coast except for Santa
Cruz itself, which it still hoped to resuscitate. Even a reopening of Santa
Cruz de Mar Pequeña, though, was to prove short-lived, as the post was
conquered and looted in 1524, this time by a Saharawi raiding party led
by the Beni Hassan and the increasingly powerful Reguibat and Arosien
tribal confederations. Madrid finally gave up all attempts to seek any
kind of commercial or strategic advantage on the Western Saharan coast,
and departed the region for the next 350 years.
In contrast to these halting and incomplete European attempts to establish
a presence in the Sahara, the early Moroccan sultans made substantial
efforts to do so in the 16th century. Their occasional expeditions
to Western Sahara (and areas that encompassed modern-day southern
Morocco, Mauritania, and northern Mali), though, did not succeed in
securing the fealty of many Saharawi tribes, although the makhzen (as
the sultan’s government was known) cemented many ties with some of
the Tekna tribes who straddled the Moroccan-Western Saharan frontier.
But the numerically predominant tribal confederation in Western Sahara,
the Reguibat, as well as most of the other groups, never accepted
the authority of the sultan in any way, much less accept (as did the Ait
Oussa, a branch of the Tekna) the appointment by the sultan of caids
(governors) to oversee their affairs and to collect taxes.
Freed of any real contact with either the European powers or with surrounding
countries and territories, the Saharawi people developed their institutions
in nearly complete isolation from the 1500s to the latter part of

xlviii • INTRODUCTION
the 19th century. Nomadic animal husbandry and a barter-based commerce
continued to be the norm, although the pace of inter-tribal warfare picked
up considerably by the middle 1600s as the Beni Hassan renewed their
campaigns against the Berbers. This instability culminated in the 1644–74
Char Bobha (Thirty Years’ War), in which the Beni Hassan finally vanquished
the Berbers and extended the already existing Moorish Saharawi
social structure. Located far from any commercial center and with its vast
fishing grounds almost completely unexploited by the native inhabitants,
Western Sahara seemed destined to stay out of the view of foreigners, as
the territory’s scorching interior and hazardous coastline strongly discouraged
travel. Life for the Western Saharans might have gone on indefinitely
as before, but things were to change drastically in the 1880s.
THE SPANISH OCCUPATION
Its influence flagging in the Americas, and desirous of securing a
foothold in Africa, a continent which by the late 19th century was becoming
the target of aggressive colonization by the other European
powers, Spain in 1884 declared a “protectorate” over most of Western
Sahara. This step, however, appeared to be more significant than it really
was at first, since only the coastal settlement of Dakhla (which
Spain called Villa Cisneros) was occupied immediately, and was administered
by a “politico-military governor” residing in the nearby Canary
Islands, cost factors being too intimidating to justify any further
forays into the hinterland. The meagerness of the new Spanish presence
in Dakhla did not keep it from being regularly attacked by the Saharawis,
though, and successive Spanish administrators—notably,
Francisco Bens Argandoña—did reach a modus vivendi with various
tribes to protect Madrid’s outpost. This included a temporary arrangement
with the great Saharawi anticolonial leader, Cheikh Ma el-Ainin,
who was later to offer the Spanish (and the French in Morocco and
Mauritania) determined resistance and who was only defeated at the
hands of the French army in 1910.
It was pressure from France, more than any other factor, that obliged
Madrid to finally move into the Western Saharan interior starting in
about 1915, since Ma el-Ainin’s activities against the Paris government
often used nominally Spanish territory as a base of operations. There

INTRODUCTION • xlix
fore, Spain occupied Daora, Smara, and a few other locations well inland,
signed border treaties with France starting in 1900 (with the final
agreement coming in 1912), ended the seemingly perpetual cycle of
ghazzis among the Saharawi tribes in 1934 in concert with Paris, and,
finally, merged the administration of its desert possession with Spain’s
other small colonies on the northwest African coast and placed them under
the authority of a governor-general based in Tetuan in northern Morocco.
In 1946, this administrative evolution continued when Spain
gave Western Sahara its own governor-general as part of a reorganization
that saw the establishment of Africa Occidental Española (AOE), a
counterpoise of sorts to the much larger French presence in neighboring
Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco.
Through all this, the Saharawi people carried on much as before, albeit
without the possibility of engaging in raids. They could still not be
said to be living under direct Spanish rule, since the vast majority of
Western Saharans still led nomadic lives which only infrequently
brought them into contact with Madrid’s isolated outposts and enclaves.
But all this changed fairly rapidly with the independence of Morocco
from France in 1956. Motivated by nationalistic feelings stemming
from the successful anticolonial efforts in Morocco, some Western Saharans,
Mauritanians, and Moroccans organized themselves into the
Army of Liberation (in Arabic, the Jaich at-Tahrir), which aimed to expel
both France and Spain from the entire region. It presented a substantial
challenge to the armies of France and Spain, and was all the
more frustrating for the colonial powers in that both Spain’s colony was
used as a sanctuary by the guerrillas fighting the much more powerful
French army and the Moroccan monarch at the time, King Mohammed
V, proved either unable or unwilling to halt the incursions into Western
Sahara and Mauritania from southern Morocco. Consequently, France
pressured Spain into joining a short and brutal counterinsurgency campaign,
code-named Operation Ouragon (Hurricane) which defeated the
Army of Liberation in February 1958. This, in turn, brought about additional
changes in the daily lives of the Saharawis, since many were
forced to become refugees in surrounding countries and, for those still
in Western Sahara, were now increasingly obliged to live under direct
Spanish rule in the developing population centers of the colony.
The late 1950s and early 1960s brought additional changes to the Saharawis’age-old
manner of living. In the first place, the entire Sahel region

l • INTRODUCTION
was afflicted by a severe drought between 1959 and 1960, decimating
livestock herds and radically accelerating the ongoing process of sedentation
on the part of the population. Secondly, Spain began to try to offset
some of the costs associated with administering its desert colony by exploiting
the vast reserves of phosphate which had been known to exist near
the settlement of Bou-Craa for some time. The opening of the phosphate
mines—which were highly labor intensive from the start—added still
more impetus to the gradual abandonment of nomadism on the part of the
Saharawi people, as more and more of them flocked to the territory’s
towns (such as Bou-Craa and the capital of El-Ayoun) to partake in the enhanced
employment opportunities which the mines produced. Since these
new arrivals were obliged to live under the watchful eye of the Spanish police
and army, and because the economy of Western Sahara sharply expanded
during the middle and late 1960s, the Saharawis were politically
quiescent, and the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco in
Madrid doubtless felt that it could remain in Western Sahara indefinitely.
Any signs of dissent—such as the one offered by Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim
Bassiri’s Harakat at-Tahrir Saguia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab between
1967 and 1970—were ruthlessly crushed, and the entreaties of the United
Nations starting in 1964 to grant self-determination to the territory were
simply ignored.
INCREASING ANTICOLONIAL FERMENT
The elimination of Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri’s shadowy nationalist
movement in June 1970 (and Bassiri’s probable murder in prison)
turned out to be the opening shot in what was to become a long-running
dispute over the status of Western Sahara, not only involving the people
of the territory itself but also the governments of Morocco and Mauritania,
both of which claimed the entire colony as their own, relying on
the supposed historical ties between it and their own countries and by
the ethnic and tribal affinities that straddled the long, poorly policed
frontiers of the area. Having largely mollified both Morocco’s King
Hassan II and Mauritania’s President Mokhtar Ould Daddah with a variety
of economic and diplomatic concessions that did not endanger
Madrid’s grip on Western Sahara in the least, Generalissimo Franco had
managed by and large to ensure that the territorial claims of Rabat and

INTRODUCTION • li
Nouakchott remained largely rhetorical. This situation, however, did
not last much beyond the early 1970s, as the criticism aimed at Spain
from the United Nations and elsewhere in the developing world did not
relent, and—even more importantly—more and more educated Saharawis
were embracing the anticolonial cause. These students and
other youths, who had earlier formed a loosely constituted group that
styled itself the “Embryonic Movement for the Liberation of the Sahara,”
went even further on May 10, 1973, when they founded the
Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro,
known as the Polisario Front, with the objective (at first implied but
later made explicit) of securing full independence for the desert colony.
To drive this point home, they immediately set about mounting smallscale
armed attacks on Spanish forces in the territory, to little real military
effect but with significant practical and political consequences, as
would soon be made clear.
The rising tide of international attention to the colonial status of
Western Sahara, the 1974 coup d’état in Portugal that was to presage
Lisbon’s final pullout from its own empire in Africa and elsewhere, and
the increased level of Polisario activity within the colony itself, finally
induced Spain to alter its course. Late in 1973, the Franco régime decided
to devolve a certain amount of real authority to the Djemaa, a
hitherto purely consultative body made up of conservative tribal
choiukh who were willing to colloborate with the Spanish and which
had been established back in 1967. Wider internal autonomy (and perhaps
even independence) would come later, on Spanish terms to be sure,
and to this end a pro-Spanish political grouping, the Partido de la Unión
Nacional Saharaui (PUNS), was established as a competitor (albeit an
ineffective one, as matters turned out) to the ever-increasing popularity
of the Polisario Front. Mere internal autonomy under Spanish authority
was not acceptable to Polisario, though, and giving ground to the Saharawi
nationalist organization, Spain announced on August 21, 1974,
that it was accepting the longstanding calls from the UN and Polisario
to hold a referendum in the territory during the first half of 1975. Confronted
with this, and mindful of their own claims to Western Sahara,
Morocco and Mauritania swung into action to prevent the possible
emergence of an independent Saharawi-run state in North Africa. The
two countries successfully induced Spain to postpone the referendum
while the controversy was shunted to the International Court of Justice

lii • INTRODUCTION
(ICJ) for a decision on the “legal ties” between the territory and Morocco
and Mauritania. While this was occurring, King Hassan and
Mokhtar Ould Daddah worked to reconcile their mutually exclusive
claims to the desert territory, a task made harder by Ould Daddah’s
wariness of Moroccan intentions, particularly since Rabat had espoused
a claim to all of Mauritania until 1970. Moreover—and adding fuel to
the fire—the UN sent a Visiting Mission to Western Sahara in May
1975 and reported that the overwhelming majority of the population
wanted independence and was favorably disposed toward the Polisario
Front, which amply demonstrated its hold on the loyalties of the Saharawis
in whichever location the mission traveled. Spain, too, was becoming
friendlier to Polisario, but events were soon to take a drastic and
tragic turn.
PARTITION, INVASION, AND WAR
By late 1975, Morocco and Mauritania had secretly reached an agreement
with Spain to divide Western Sahara between them, with Rabat
receiving the northern two-thirds of the colony (including El-Ayoun
and the phosphate mines) and Mauritania the southern one-third, a
slab of desert practically without natural resources. Saharawi public
opinion generally, and the Polisario Front in particular, was to be totally
disregarded. Madrid’s attitude had initially proved a stumbling
block to the realization of the two countries’ ambitions in Western Sahara,
but with Franco on his deathbed and Spain about to enter a period
of democratization that would transform it by the 1990s into one
of the most prosperous nations in Europe, the country’s leaders decided
they did not need a “colonial war” with Morocco to distract
them at this important juncture. Spain also capitulated to pressure
from Morocco’s King Hassan in October and November 1975, when
he organized a “Green March” of 350,000 unarmed civilians into the
border zone of Western Sahara to illustrate the supposedly unanimous
feelings of ordinary Moroccans on the Sahara issue. Adding to this
confused picture was the issuance, on October 16, 1975, of the ICJ’s
Advisory Opinion, which, after reviewing the evidence, declined to
endorse the territorial claims of either Morocco or Mauritania and restated
the need for self-determination.

INTRODUCTION • liii
On November 14, 1975, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed a secret
treaty known as the Madrid Agreement, providing for the partition
of Western Sahara and the final pullout by Madrid from its last African
colony no later than February 1976. It contained only one reference to
indigenous public opinion: a statement that the wishes of the Saharawis,
expressed through the Djemaa, would be respected. However, a fortnight
later (on November 28), a majority of the Djemaa deputies issued
the Proclamation of Guelta Zemmour, dissolving the assembly and casting
their lot with the Polisario Front. In addition, the United Nations
never recognized the Madrid accord and strove until early 1976 to head
off the occupation and annexation of the territory against the manifest
desires of its people. But this was not to happen: because the Moroccan
Green March had already served as a smokescreen for the military invasion
of Western Sahara by Rabat’s Forces Armées Royales (FAR), additional
Moroccan and Mauritanian soldiers streamed into the colony
immediately after the Madrid Agreement was signed, setting tens of
thousands of Saharawis to flight and forcing them to take eventual
refuge in camps operated by Polisario and situated in southwestern Algeria,
whose government, led by President Houari Boumedienne, had
decided to give all-out assistance, both humanitarian and military, to the
Polisario Front and to back Western Saharan independence. Algeria
turned out to be the only country that offered the Saharawis a safe
haven.
On February 26, 1976, with the territory already engulfed in war,
Spain made its final departure. Seeking to fill the legal and diplomatic
void created by this, the Polisario Front, on the following day, proclaimed
the independence of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) at the Western Saharan settlement of Bir Lehlou. Polisario
sought—and soon received—the formal recognition of several dozen
countries, mostly in the Third World, of its infant Saharan state. Its
ranks swelled by the many Saharawis who had fled to Algeria as well
as former members of the Spanish-led army and police forces in the territory
who were ready to contribute their military expertise, the Polisario
Front soon went on the offensive. Its leader, El-Ouali Mustapha
Sayed, reasoned (correctly) that Mauritania was the front’s weakest foe,
and so from 1976 to 1978, Polisario’s Saharawi Popular Liberation
Army (SPLA) waged a destructive and extremely costly guerrilla war
across Mauritania and the sector of Western Sahara it had annexed,

liv • INTRODUCTION
bringing the country’s economy to its knees in short order by choking
off the iron ore exports upon which it depended. In addition, Polisario’s
fighters inflicted a major embarrassment upon Mokhtar Ould Daddah
when, in June 1976 and again in July 1977, they mounted direct attacks
on Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. Although El-Ouali was killed
in battle after the first of these raids, Ould Daddah’s position had become
so precarious that he felt obliged to call upon direct French military
support, which alienated public opinion in his country still further
but did little to lessen the dangers to his rule.
Beyond the economic damage inflicted on Mauritania, Polisario’s
war had the crucial effect of fueling discontent among the small army
officer corps, who saw the conflict as unwinnable and looked increasingly
for a political solution that Mokhtar Ould Daddah was unwilling
or unable to give them. On July 10, 1978, they peacefully overthrew the
Mauritanian president, instituted what would become a 14-year period
of army governance, and sought, fitfully at first, a way to withdraw
from Western Sahara and make peace with the Polisario Front at the
same time. After the first Mauritanian army leader, Col. Mustapha Ould
Mohammed Salek, proved unequal to the task, his successor, Col. Mohammed
Khouna Ould Heydallah, was finally able, on August 5, 1979,
to sign the so-called Algiers Agreement with the Saharawi nationalists,
bringing to an end Mauritania’s ill-starred involvement in the former
colony. Although Ould Heydallah had to contend with constant complaints
by King Hassan that he inordinately sympathized with Polisario
(he was in fact a member of a Saharawi tribe, the Arosien), and created
a minor sensation when he extended recognition to the SADR on February
27, 1984, Mauritania, from then on, was not a direct participant in
the conflict. Morocco and Polisario from now on would fight their war
alone.
MOROCCO AND POLISARIO:
WAR AND DIPLOMACY, 1979-84
The conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front reached new levels
of intensity in the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s. Possessing
highly motivated troops and relatively modern weaponry given to them
by Algeria (and until 1983 by Libya), the SPLA generally had little trou

INTRODUCTION • lv
ble inflicting severe losses upon the less-trained FAR. On several occasions,
Polisario was able to fight its way into the center of such towns
as Smara inside Western Sahara as well as Tan-Tan and Lebouirate in
undisputed Moroccan territory to the north of Western Sahara, and took
many prisoners of war and captured large amounts of Moroccan
matériel. Morocco, cowed by this display of military might—and seeing
their American- and French-supplied air force temporarily neutralized
by Polisario’s surface-to-air missiles at Guelta Zemmour in October
1981—withdrew its forces to a few easily defended enclaves,
mostly on the Atlantic coast of its “Saharan provinces,” leaving the rest
to the Saharawi guerrillas, who numbered between 10,000 and 15,000
during this period. But after about 1982, this situation began to change
to Polisario’s detriment, as Morocco began the construction of an immense
series of “defensive walls” or earthen berms in certain parts of
Western Sahara in order to restrict the Saharawis’ freedom of movement.
The plan, as even Polisario was compelled to admit, was impressive
in its simplicity. Equipped with traps, land mines, and remote sensing
devices (the latter, however, not being as effective as Rabat alleged),
and accomodating garrisons of hundreds of FAR soldiers at many locations
with reserve units deployed behind the lines, the walls made it extremely
difficult over time for the Polisario Front to penetrate very far
into areas of the former colony where it had previously roamed at will.
And although the SPLA did turn the presence of Moroccan troop garrisons
along the walls to its advantage—they made tempting targets for
armed assaults and in any event were more thinly spread as the berms
expanded in size—they fundamentally altered the character of the war
into one of attrition; in other words, a conflict in which Morocco held
more than a few advantages. This development, though, did not herald
the collapse of Polisario, nor did it make the diplomatic road any
smoother for King Hassan.
The Organization of African Unity was the first international organization
to attempt seriously to resolve the Western Sahara conflict after
the failure of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim’s efforts in late
1975 and early 1976. Although the OAU was more or less deadlocked
on the issue during the late 1970s, the coup in Mauritania, and the Algiers
Agreement which followed it, opened up new opportunities, particularly
after King Hassan, at a June 1981 OAU summit in Nairobi, accepted
(verbally, at any rate), the idea of a referendum in the territory to

lvi • INTRODUCTION
decide its future status. Despite the fact that the Moroccan monarch
qualified his offer significantly by stating that he saw the plebiscite as
one that would be a “confirmation” of Moroccan sovereignty, the OAU
set up an Implementation Committee to prepare for a referendum under
the auspices of the African body. But an increasing number of OAU
member states, disappointed with what they saw as King Hassan’s intransigence,
gave their full recognition to the SADR between 1981 and
1984, impelling an emboldened Polisario Front to petition for the
SADR’s admission to the OAU as a member state. The stage was thus
set for a debilitating and bitter political impasse.
In February 1982, Edem Kodjo, the OAU’s secretary-general, formally
admitted the Saharawi Republic to membership status, given that
a simple majority of the other OAU member states had given their assent
to it. Morocco, refusing as always to recognize Polisario as a legitimate
actor in the Western Sahara conflict, immediately boycotted the
OAU in protest, and was joined by a substantial number of fellow
African countries. For the rest of 1982, no further OAU business could
be transacted, for although the Saharan question was not the only contentious
issue faced by the OAU in that year (Libya and Chad were the
others), the split between the boycotters and the supporters of the
SADR persisted. The Polisario Front, for its part, agreed to “voluntarily
and temporarily” absent itself from the OAU until the matter was resolved.
The OAU made another try at holding a summit meeting in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1983, but again, a Moroccan boycott threatened
the entire organization with collapse. Again, Polisario rescued the
situation by agreeing to stay away from the OAU temporarily. The summit,
after some intense behind-the-scenes maneuvering, did go forward,
and it went on to administer a telling blow to Morocco in the form of
Resolution 104, which called for direct Morocco-Polisario negotiations
and a free and fair referendum. It also—critically—named both Morocco
and Polisario as the only two parties to the conflict, contrary to
King Hassan’s expressed view that the Saharawi nationalist group was
made up only of Algerian-supported “mercenaries.” During 1984, the
political balance gradually shifted further and further away from Rabat
as more African countries (including Nigeria) recognized the SADR.
On November 12–14, 1984, the regularly scheduled OAU summit conference
(again in Addis Ababa) was held without incident. The SADR

INTRODUCTION • lvii
finally took its seat as a full member of the group, no large-scale boycott
took place, and Morocco withdrew permanently from the organization
in protest. Deprived of one of the parties to the dispute, the OAU’s
settlement efforts came to an abrupt and final conclusion.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND WESTERN SAHARA, 1985-2005
During the greater part of 1985, no appreciable diplomatic activity took
place relative to Western Sahara at any level. But apparently at the instigation
of Morocco, the United Nations became involved later in the
year. King Hassan, according to some reports, believed that if the UN
approach to resolving the dispute avoided the OAU’s Resolution 104,
he might succeed in continuing his prior stance of not dealing directly
with the Polisario Front. But this gambit failed when, on December 2,
1985, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 40/50, adopting
the OAU approach as its own and regarding Morocco and Polisario as
the only two “real parties in interest” in the conflict. Some believed that
at this point, the UN’s diplomatic endeavors would come to the same
unhappy end as the OAU’s, but this did not happen. Indeed, the situation
evolved into one of the longest, most controversial, and inconclusive
political issues to be directly confronted by the world body in its
history.
The UN secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, refused to
be discouraged by Morocco’s negative reaction to Resolution 40/50 and
embarked on an aggressive round of mediation efforts in the spring of
1986, in which Morocco and and the Polisario Front exchanged views
through Pérez de Cuéllar’s good offices, being spared the necessity of
meeting directly. These “proximity talks” did not produce substantial
results, as the two disputants were still far apart on questions relating to
the referendum as well as such matters as refugee repatriation, troop
withdrawal and supervision, and the role of the United Nations generally.
The General Assembly, though, passed another resolution in 1986
urging a continuation of the secretary-general’s work, and in the following
year—with the possibility of a peacekeeping mission by the
world body firmly in mind—both Morocco and Polisario consented to
host a UN Technical Mission that toured Western Sahara along with the
surrounding region in late 1987 and submitted a confidential report on

lviii • INTRODUCTION
the characteristics of the territory and the problems likely to be faced by
UN peacekeeping troops and administrators.
Armed with this new data, and encouraged by the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations on May 16, 1988, by Morocco and Algeria after a
12-year break caused by the Western Sahara war, Pérez de Cuéllar resumed
work on a comprehensive settlement plan, one which would culminate
in a referendum of self-determination. But questions of voter eligibility
for the plebiscite and other modalities kept any agreements
from being reached from 1988 to 1991, even through both parties accepted
in principle to a peace plan put forward by the secretary-general
in August 1988; each side, as it turned out, placed such differing interpretations
on the blueprint as to make it seem at times that they had each
approved separate documents, at least in the opinion of a high-ranking
UN official at the time, Marrack Goulding of Great Britain.
The UN Security Council approved the formation of the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by
means of Resolution 658 on June 27, 1990, but progress was interrupted
once again, this time by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent
diplomatic crisis that placed enormous demands on Pérez de Cuéllar
and the rest of the United Nations bureaucracy. But after the end of the
Gulf War in February 1991, the UN once more turned its attention to
Western Sahara. The secretary-general submitted a detailed settlement
proposal, one lasting for about 35 weeks from the date of a Morocco-
Polisario cease-fire and which provided for the introduction of soldiers
and administrators from MINURSO and the confinement of both FAR
and SPLA troops to designated locations in the former colony. All restrictive
laws were to be repealed, all political prisoners and prisoners
of war were to be freed, all refugees repatriated, and a campaign phase
would begin, during which time each side would be free to urge either
integration with Morocco or full Western Saharan independence. Several
weeks later, the actual vote would take place, and depending on the
outcome, the Polisario Front would either be disbanded or Rabat would
be obliged to accept a Saharawi Republic on its southern flank.
In Resolution 690 of April 19, 1991, the UN Security Council accepted
Pérez de Cuéllar’s plan and authorized MINURSO to deploy to
the territory; the actual date was later set at September 6. But over the
summer of 1991, things went badly wrong, as Morocco conducted military
attacks against Polisario positions beyond the “defensive wall”

INTRODUCTION • lix
network (which now encompassed about three-fifths of the entire territory)
and inflicted additional civilian casualties and property damage,
some of it against buildings which MINURSO itself had planned to utilize.
Moreover, on and after September 6—when the formal cease-fire
went into effect—MINURSO was given only limited cooperation by
Morocco (and after a time by the Polisario Front as well, as the front
perceived its own cooperation was not being reciprocated), and its 300
or so blue-helmeted peacekeeping troops were unable to do much more
than monitor the military forces of both sides and try to survive in the
nearly unbearable desert heat. When the civilian staff of MINURSO got
down to ascertaining voter eligibility, the situation became even worse,
as Morocco and Polisario held—and would continue to hold over the
next decade and beyond—radically differing approaches to determining
which Saharawis were entitled to cast ballots. In particular, the types of
documents to be used by MINURSO in its work proved controversial,
as did the mission’s plans to use the oral recollections of tribal elders
from both Polisario-controlled and Moroccan-administered areas. Both
Rabat and the Saharawi nationalists obviously believed that these elders
were susceptible to undue outside influences.
A long diplomatic drama thus began, with the end of the first act
coming on December 19, 1991, when outgoing Secretary-General Pérez
de Cuéllar submitted a progress report to the UN Security Council. Recounting
the problems attending MINURSO and the slow progress it
was making toward holding a referendum, he also proposed to institute
new voter eligibility criteria. Essentially, this plan would open the voter
rolls to any Saharawi who could establish that he or she had resided
continuously in Western Sahara for six years continuously or 12 years
intermittently prior to 1974 (the date of the last Spanish census); contrary
to what Morocco wanted, this opportunity would be given to one
generation of Western Saharans only. Polisario reacted furiously, calling
into question Pérez de Cuéllar’s impartiality (and indeed, the UN
leader’s own memoirs published several years later revealed a marked
pro-Moroccan bias) and stating that Morocco’s alleged “importation” of
either Moroccans or Saharawis from Morocco proper prior to the arrival
of MINURSO would fatally tilt the outcome of any plebiscite conducted
under the new proposal. Acting on December 31, just before
Pérez de Cuéllar left office to be succeeded by Boutros Boutros-Ghali
of Egypt, the Security Council basically sided with Polisario (and its

lx • INTRODUCTION
sponsor, Algeria), refusing to ratify the new proposals and instead urging
the incoming UN leadership to take a fresh look at the Western Sahara
conflict. The departure, apparently out of frustration, of UN Special
Representative Johannes Manz at the end of 1991 also added to the
overall atmosphere of gloom.
Under Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the UN made little more
progress toward its goal, although some voter-registration activity resumed
after Polisario, during 1994, retreated from its earlier categorical
rejection of Pérez de Cuéllar’s December 1991 criteria as a gesture of
good faith and also to show flexibility. Impediments kept cropping up,
though, as previous objections made by the parties over the reliability
of documents and oral recollections by tribal elders made the process
extremely slow-moving. In addition, the Polisario Front suspended its
participation in the peace process after anti-Moroccan demonstrations
in El-Ayoun and elsewhere were repressed by the Rabat authorities despite
the presence on the ground of MINURSO peacekeeping soldiers
and UN civil police. Although this period of non-cooperation soon
ended, during 1995 and 1996 Boutros-Ghali was often reduced to issuing
threats that the whole MINURSO endeavor might be abandoned,
something that would probably have led to the resumption of armed
conflict, as Polisario had repeatedly warned. But the Security Council,
mindful that the preservation of the cease-fire was MINURSO’s one
substantial and lasting contribution to date, never seriously considered
terminating the mission’s mandate, and kept on granting extensions
even as the costs incurred by the UN rose to an estimated $1.3 billion
by March 2005.
The departure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN secretary-general in
late 1996 and his replacement by Kofi Annan of Ghana opened up new
possibilities for a settlement in a rather unexpected way. In March
1997, Annan requested that former U.S. secretary of state James A.
Baker III serve as the secretary-general’s special personal envoy to
Western Sahara and attempt to move the referendum process forward.
Setting to work, Baker held many meetings with Moroccan and Polisario
officials in several world capitals as well as in his home city of
Houston, Texas, eventually producing (in September 1997) the socalled
Houston Accords, which provided for the resumption of voterenrollment
activity (particularly with respect to four hotly contested Saharawi
tribal groupings) and the adherence by both sides to a new Code

INTRODUCTION • lxi
of Conduct during the run-up to the planned referendum. Some degree
of optimism was generated by this agreement, and indeed, MINURSO’s
Identification Commission was able to resume its activity during late
1997 and 1998, qualifying over 86,000 voters before the process broke
down again, this time over the UN mission’s disqualification of another
130,000 or so Saharawis and Morocco’s threat that it would lodge appeals
with the UN against this negative action. This implied many more
months of work by the UN, with no assurance either that Rabat would
not repeat its prior conduct with regard to appeals or that the Polisario
Front would not behave in much the same manner, by way of response.
Meanwhile, charges made by international human rights organizations,
as well as such former UN employees as Charles Dunbar and Frank
Ruddy, that MINURSO had been largely supine in the face of persistent
Moroccan intimidation of the Saharawi population (and even of UN
peacekeepers themselves) during the 1990s could only lead to more
questioning of the world body’s sincerity and determination to bring the
Western Sahara dispute to a fair conclusion.
In October 2000, with the Identification Commission in full shutdown
and with less than 200 MINURSO troops policing the cease-fire
in the territory, Kofi Annan proposed that James Baker once again attempt
to reconcile the parties, this time by going outside the original
1990–91 referendum plan entirely, instead formulating a proposal that
would offer “some devolution of governmental authority” on the part of
Morocco that would be “genuine, substantial, and in keeping with international
norms.” In other words, this represented the first time that
the United Nations had explicitly embraced the concept of possibly
granting internal autonomy to Western Sahara under overall Moroccan
rule, either permanently or (as turned out to be the case) for an interim
period preparatory to a decision on the desert territory’s final status. After
an extensive series of consultations, Baker presented a so-called
Framework Agreement Proposal to the UN Security Council in June
2001, which would set up a transitional Western Sahara Authority to
handle purely local administrative affairs, while leaving foreign relations,
defense, and other key attributes of territorial sovereignty to Rabat’s
government. The proposal, which covered less than two pages,
was vague on whether the UN would have any role in this process, provided
for significantly different (and more lenient) voter-eligibility criteria
than Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s 1990–91 referendum plan, and also

lxii • INTRODUCTION
made no mention of the Polisario Front, which the Security Council had
recognized time and again as one of the primary parties to the Western
Sahara conflict. As might be expected, Polisario’s response to Baker’s
plan was blisteringly critical, and, bolstered by an equally negative response
by Algeria, it was able to induce the members of the Security
Council to withold their endorsement. James Baker also had his own
impartiality come into question, given that Morocco was in 2001–2002
entering into petroleum exploration contracts with international oil
firms, including a Texas-based company, Kerr-McGee, with whom
Baker had apparent business connections. A 1997 letter from Kofi Annan
to Baker, which was unearthed in 2002 and mentioned the idea of
granting internal autonomy to Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty
several years before the 2001 Framework Agreement Proposal
was submitted, only added to a climate of suspicion in some quarters.
Baker, though, refused to concede defeat on the question of an alternative
settlement, and after yet another round of meetings with the various
actors, produced a second blueprint, this time called the Peace Plan
for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara, which had
many of the same elements of the earlier autonomy plan except that it
imposed upon Morocco some additional responsibilities with respect to
its overall conduct, sought to establish an independent judiciary and legislature
in Morocco’s “Saharan provinces,” and provided in so many
words for at least some role for the UN and for Polisario, although again,
the exact roles of both were not entirely clear and the voter registration
criteria were about the same as with the Framework Agreement Proposal.
Put forward in May 2003, it was Morocco’s turn to be strongly
critical of the plan, as it clearly did not relish the prospect of having essentially
non-Moroccan political and legal institutions implanted onto
what it considered its own territory, under international supervision no
less. In a related way, it rejected the increased responsibilities it would
have to shoulder if and when the peace plan was implemented. As an intriguing
aside, it was this imposition of at least the rudiments of parliamentary
norms on Morocco’s administration of Western Sahara that
made it attractive to some Moroccan dissidents who largely backed Rabat’s
sovereignty over the ex-colony, including the well-known (and oftimprisoned)
Moroccan Jewish activist, Abraham Serfaty.
Morocco may have disparaged the second Baker plan, but the Polisario
Front criticized it even more, scoring the proposal for conceding

INTRODUCTION • lxiii
any legitimate authority to Rabat since, in the front’s view, it had illegally
invaded Western Sahara in 1975–76 and had maintained its position
there since that time purely by force of arms. Otherwise the Saharawi
nationalists’ objections largely duplicated those which they had
enunciated to James Baker’s first plan of June 2001, but Algeria, interestingly,
did not reject the plan outright as it had done with the Framework
Agreement Proposal, but instead put forth criticisms, made suggestions
for improvement, and warned in the conclusion to its remarks
that the plan represented “a gamble for peace in the Maghreb.” Polisario,
illustrating once again that it had sufficient diplomatic support in
the Security Council to at least block the implementation of proposals
it found completely unacceptable, induced the Council to give only
qualified acceptance to the plan, preserving the stalemate but also making
clear that additional diplomacy—at the very least—would be necessary.
In the diplomatic arena in 2003, the Polisario Front also showed that
it was capable of some surprises of its own. A short time after the presentation
of James Baker’s Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the
People of Western Sahara, the Saharawi organization announced that it
was formally (and conditionally) accepting the plan despite its earlier
and vehemently expressed objections to many of its provisions. No
doubt urged on by its Algerian backers, Polisario thus deftly isolated
Morocco, whose rejection of the Baker blueprint became all the more
strident as the months passed. The Saharawis also gained substantial political
leverage by two other developments. The first was an opinion by
the United Nations that Morocco lacked the legal authority to extract
any oil reserves that might be found in Western Sahara, dealing a blow
to Rabat’s aspirations and forcing some multinational corporations to
rethink their participation in the venture. Secondly, Polisario was able
to capitalize on King Mohamed VI’s statement in November 2001 that
his country was no longer open to the idea of a referendum of any kind
in Western Sahara, a significant rhetorical retreat from even the policies
of his father and predecessor, Hassan II (who had died in 1999). In sum,
Polisario was able to appear as the more accommodating and pragmatic
party, as diplomatic efforts continued into early 2005 to extract some
sort of favorable sign from Morocco that it would entertain the implementation
of perhaps a modified version of James Baker’s second autonomy
proposal.

lxiv • INTRODUCTION
THE FUTURE
By early 2006, the situation in Western Sahara looked decidedly unpromising.
With the UN Identification Commission out of business and
its files transported to safe storage in Geneva, MINURSO’s only function
was to supervise the so-far intact cease-fire and to carry out a series
of “confidence-building” measures in the territory, including reciprocal
visits by Saharawi family members on both sides of the
Morocco-Polisario divide who had not seen each other since the outbreak
of the Saharan war in 1975.
In addition, the diplomacy surrounding the territory was moving at an
even more glacial pace in the first half of 2004, due not only to the
many competing demands on the time and resources of the UN but also
to the continued reluctance of France and the United States to put any
real political pressure on Morocco to induce it to allow self-determination;
both countries had long seen Morocco as a key Arab and African
ally, either for historical reasons (as with Paris) or for either Cold War
or anti-Islamic fundamentalist strategic reasons. But there were a few
small signs that Morocco’s star was dimming.
The new régime of King Mohamed VI had not proven itself the
diplomatic equal of Hassan II’s government. Having allowed itself to be
outfoxed by Algeria and the Polisario Front over the second peace plan
authored by James Baker, Rabat seemed blind to the possibility that accepting
the plan might allow it to soften its heavy-handed reputation on
the Western Sahara problem. Moreover, it was joined in its intransigence
most enthusiastically by French President Jacques Chirac, who
pointedly called Western Sahara “the southern provinces of Morocco”
during a 2001 state visit to Morocco. But France’s backing could not
provide much comfort for King Mohamed, as Paris was in disfavor with
the American administration led by President George W. Bush owing to
its opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Morocco also
rashly induced a military confrontation in July 2002 with Spanish Prime
Minister José María Aznar when it occupied the contested islet of Perejil
in the Mediterranean, obliging Aznar (who had previously been lukewarm
toward Morocco on other issues), to forcibly, albeit bloodlessly,
eject Moroccan forces from the uninhabited territory several days later.
Aznar’s government, to make things somewhat worse for King Mohamed,
was closely aligned with the Bush administration over Iraq and

INTRODUCTION • lxv
on the so-called “war on terrorism.” Even this political equation,
though, looked susceptible to change in the spring of 2004, as Aznar’s
center-right régime was unseated by the Socialist Party headed by José
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, whose attitudes on Western Sahara were already
the subject of speculation in the spring and summer of 2004.
By the early years of the 21st century, then, there was still no sign that
the Western Sahara conflict was any closer to a final resolution, one
way or another, than it had been virtually since the beginning of the dispute.
As an essentially secular organization that had always eschewed
terrorism as a tactic since its founding 30 years before, the Polisario
Front had succeeded in attracting the support of some persons and
groups in the United States who were believed to be close to the center
of Republican Party power (just about the only place where it had made
any progress at all inside the United States), but could not yet seriously
challenge Rabat’s still-formidable position. If Morocco’s continuing rejection
of James Baker’s second settlement proposal were to further
anger hitherto-friendly Western countries, and if Polisario could in
some way further improve its standing (beyond being able to head off
proposals which directly threatened its interests), then the path could
one day open for a just and lasting resolution to the problem of Western
Sahara. But even if this did not transpire, it was clear that Morocco
could expect little respite from conflict, as the resistance by the Saharawi
people to outside control—whether by Moroccan sultans and
kings or by Europeans—was a historical fact and would continue for
generations more. Seen in this light, Polisario’s campaign for independence
was only a manifestation of the Saharawis’ ethnic and social distinctiveness
writ large.