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Incentivisation - The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply

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CIPS<br />

Knowledge<br />

Works<br />

Contents<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong><br />

1. Introduction pg3<br />

2. Definition <strong>and</strong> Background pg4<br />

3. Why use <strong>Incentivisation</strong>? pg4<br />

4. What are the Key Features <strong>of</strong> <strong>Incentivisation</strong>? pg5<br />

5. What are the Rewards <strong>and</strong> Benefits? pg6<br />

6. Role <strong>of</strong> Key Performance Indicators pg7<br />

7. What are the Disadvantages? pg7<br />

8. Appraisal <strong>of</strong> Rewards <strong>and</strong> Benefits pg7<br />

9. Putting an Incentivised Contract in Place pg7<br />

10. Conclusion pg8<br />

11. References pg8<br />

Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org JAN 06


Welcome to a<br />

guide on<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong><br />

2 Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org JAN 06


CIPS believes that P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals should be<br />

knowledgeable about the range <strong>of</strong> tools <strong>and</strong> approaches<br />

relevant for incentivisation.<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

<strong>The</strong> CIPS beliefs on incentivisation, which have been formulated with the role <strong>of</strong> the more senior <strong>Purchasing</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Supply</strong> Management (P&SM) pr<strong>of</strong>essional in mind, may be summarised as follows:<br />

• CIPS believes that all P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals should develop/acquire the relevant tools <strong>and</strong> competencies<br />

necessary to manage the incentivisation process effectively<br />

• CIPS believes that the effect on the bottom line is a key determinant in any decision to apply incentivisation<br />

principles<br />

• CIPS encourages P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals to exercise a ‘what if’ approach in the procurement process<br />

• CIPS is in favour <strong>of</strong> incentivisation where a clear business benefit is seen to accrue to the organisation<br />

• CIPS recommends that P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals should adopt a proactive <strong>and</strong> positive approach to the contract<br />

management process – this encourages innovation <strong>and</strong> maximises customer satisfaction<br />

• CIPS believes that P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals should be knowledgeable about the range <strong>of</strong> tools <strong>and</strong> approaches<br />

relevant for incentivisation.<strong>The</strong>y need not necessarily be experts in the application <strong>of</strong> all tools, but they<br />

should know where to obtain that expertise, eg from colleagues in finance.<br />

JAN06 Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org 3


<strong>Incentivisation</strong><br />

2. DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> is defined in CUP (Central Unit on<br />

Procurement – forerunner <strong>of</strong> the OGC – Office <strong>of</strong><br />

Government Commerce) Guidance No 58 -<br />

‘<strong>Incentivisation</strong>’) as:<br />

‘A process by which a provider is motivated to<br />

achieve extra value added services over those specified<br />

originally <strong>and</strong> which are <strong>of</strong> material benefit to the<br />

user. <strong>The</strong>se should be attainable against pre-defined<br />

criteria. <strong>The</strong> process should benefit both parties’<br />

<strong>The</strong>refore there is some form <strong>of</strong> enhanced reward<br />

for the supplier whether it be financial or in some other<br />

form.<br />

It involves a process <strong>of</strong> mutually agreeing targets<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten with respect to cost, schedule, quality <strong>and</strong> safety<br />

or other measurable benefits to the client’s business<br />

such as;<br />

• inventory reduction<br />

• increased sales<br />

• reduced cost<br />

• improved labour utilisation<br />

<strong>The</strong> objective is the achievement <strong>of</strong> superior<br />

performance to the benefit <strong>of</strong> both parties, for which<br />

the supplier will receive additional reward. <strong>The</strong><br />

outcomes <strong>of</strong> the superior performance, whether lower<br />

cost, early delivery, safer or higher quality products are<br />

<strong>of</strong> obvious value to the buyer. <strong>Incentivisation</strong> might in<br />

some cases also lead to a partnering relationship<br />

between buyer <strong>and</strong> supplier.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is a close relationship between incentivisation<br />

<strong>and</strong> risk management. Both techniques can be applied<br />

separately or together to ensure that contracts are<br />

successful. CIPS encourages all P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals to<br />

constantly exercise a “what-if”mentality in relation to<br />

the procurement <strong>of</strong> goods, services or works.<strong>The</strong> “whatif”mindset<br />

will enable P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals to determine<br />

the potential outcome <strong>of</strong> risk management <strong>and</strong><br />

incentivisation by testing the various assumptions,<br />

propositions <strong>and</strong> approaches under consideration.<br />

3. WHY USE INCENTIVISATION?<br />

From the buyer’s point <strong>of</strong> view, incentivisation is used<br />

to foster improvement by binding good suppliers with<br />

the expectation <strong>of</strong> even better reward. For the buyer,<br />

incentivisation <strong>of</strong>fers the possibility <strong>of</strong> self financing<br />

benefits from improved supplier performance <strong>and</strong> it<br />

also attracts good suppliers who see the potential for<br />

better rewards for their efforts <strong>and</strong> capabilities.<br />

<strong>The</strong> supplier might expect to gain extra financial<br />

reward but also an improved reputation as a successful<br />

supplier (which should lead to more work from the<br />

original buyer or from other buyers in the market<br />

place). In some markets, the possibility <strong>of</strong> a long-term<br />

multi contract relationship involving some form <strong>of</strong><br />

partnership sourcing is possible. This however is not<br />

so likely in the construction field where most<br />

relationships are single-project based.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following are examples <strong>of</strong> influential factors<br />

which might lead to incentivised contracts:<br />

Special Circumstances<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> may be a product <strong>of</strong> circumstances<br />

which act to unite the buyer <strong>and</strong> supplier into a team<br />

devoted to the resolution <strong>of</strong> a particular issue. In such<br />

cases, the problem is seen as a common enemy which<br />

can only be overcome by the pooling <strong>of</strong> buyer <strong>and</strong><br />

supplier resources. It may arise from financial<br />

difficulty which threatens to overwhelm the existence<br />

<strong>of</strong> both parties, or it could be the outcome <strong>of</strong> a legal<br />

threat.<br />

Financial<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> may take a purely financial form, for<br />

example, the buyer could have an earlier need for the<br />

product <strong>of</strong> the contract with the supplier than<br />

previously anticipated. Delivery <strong>of</strong> the product<br />

(whether a facility <strong>of</strong> some sort such as a building or<br />

an <strong>of</strong>f-shore installation or simply the supply <strong>of</strong> goods)<br />

could be financially beneficial to the buyer. <strong>The</strong>refore<br />

the buyer might be prepared to share some <strong>of</strong> the<br />

anticipated financial gain with the supplier as a reward<br />

for the effort needed to make earlier delivery.<br />

A specific example might be that <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fshore oil<br />

company finding that it can sell the oil or gas from a<br />

major development earlier <strong>and</strong> more pr<strong>of</strong>itably than<br />

previously anticipated (perhaps the price <strong>of</strong> oil has<br />

unexpectedly risen significantly). It could now be<br />

worthwhile for such a company to l<strong>and</strong> the oil earlier<br />

<strong>and</strong> to achieve this end, the company is prepared to<br />

share some <strong>of</strong> the gain with the suppliers who are<br />

constructing the platform.<br />

At the other extreme, it is possible to envisage a<br />

company which is considering the re-decoration <strong>of</strong> a<br />

meeting room. <strong>The</strong> lead times quoted by the<br />

decorating suppliers would mean that the buyer would<br />

have to hire a room elsewhere for some important<br />

function. If the buyer could strike a deal with the<br />

supplier whereby the buyer would pay the supplier<br />

extra for earlier completion <strong>of</strong> the room, then,<br />

providing the extra amount paid to the supplier were<br />

less than the cost <strong>of</strong> hiring another room, both parties<br />

would gain.<br />

Financial incentivisation could also be used to<br />

stimulate suppliers to beat cost targets embodied in the<br />

contract. This is appropriate in cases where the target<br />

cost acts as a cap to the amount which the buyer is<br />

prepared to pay. If the supplier can deliver the<br />

requirements <strong>of</strong> the contract for less cost than the<br />

target cost, the difference can be divided in some<br />

agreed proportion between the buyer <strong>and</strong> the supplier.<br />

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Non- project incentivisation:<br />

<strong>The</strong> above examples all suggest that incentivisation may<br />

only be used for projects or as a component <strong>of</strong><br />

contracts for discrete services. However, this does not<br />

need to be the case. <strong>Incentivisation</strong> can be a part <strong>of</strong><br />

contracts to produce goods. In this case, the<br />

incentivisation could be to reduce cost, improve design,<br />

reduce stocks, speed delivery etc.<br />

Non-financial incentivisation:<br />

While incentivisation can be <strong>of</strong> a straightforward<br />

financial nature, ie money, it can also be for money’s<br />

worth to the supplier. For example, it would be worth<br />

something to suppliers to be assured <strong>of</strong> a continuity <strong>of</strong><br />

business <strong>and</strong> this assurance could be the<br />

incentivisation. Similarly, some suppliers could gain<br />

kudos from an association with an outst<strong>and</strong>ingly<br />

successful contract <strong>and</strong> this can also act as an incentive.<br />

4 WHAT ARE THE KEY FEATURES OF<br />

INCENTIVISATION?<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> is contract based that might, but not<br />

necessarily be based on agreement <strong>and</strong> trust between<br />

buyer <strong>and</strong> supplier. However, without a genuine<br />

meeting <strong>of</strong> minds, an incentivised contract is likely to be<br />

viewed in a negative light, most probably by the<br />

supplier, who could see it as simply another contractual<br />

device imposed by the buyer to enforce performance.<br />

This means that the reward which the supplier receives<br />

must be commensurate with the extra effort required.<br />

Conversely, the value <strong>of</strong> the incentivisation which the<br />

buyer receives should be commensurate with the<br />

amount to be paid.<strong>The</strong> incentivisation must be seen by<br />

both parties to be win-win, with no hidden agendas.<br />

Mutual trust <strong>and</strong> a drive to continuously improve are<br />

desirable. For example, where the incentives are<br />

concerned with cost minimisation, there will be a need<br />

for both parties to practise open book costing.<br />

Contractual incentive schemes need to reflect the<br />

business objectives <strong>of</strong> the buyer <strong>and</strong> coincide with the<br />

business objectives <strong>of</strong> the supplier. <strong>The</strong>y should be<br />

simple <strong>and</strong> measurable so as to avoid dispute both<br />

about their meaning <strong>and</strong> their attainment. <strong>The</strong>y should<br />

preferably be based on outputs so that deliverables can<br />

be easily identified <strong>and</strong> they should take account <strong>of</strong><br />

what might happen during the life <strong>of</strong> the contract.<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> requires closer <strong>and</strong> more detailed<br />

dialogue between the buyer <strong>and</strong> supplier, both at the<br />

pre-contract stage <strong>and</strong> during post-contract<br />

management. This is because <strong>of</strong> the greater need to<br />

attend to performance <strong>and</strong> its measurement if the<br />

milestones associated with the incentives are to be<br />

unequivocally attained, thus clearly justifying payment<br />

<strong>of</strong> the incentive. Lack <strong>of</strong> clarity associated with the<br />

attainment <strong>of</strong> a milestone can, <strong>of</strong> course, breed mistrust<br />

which will sour relationships.<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> arrangements should not be seen as<br />

an end in themselves <strong>and</strong> should only be used where<br />

appropriate. This means that the cultures which exist<br />

within both the supplier’s <strong>and</strong> the buyer’s organisations<br />

must be compatible. Above all, the concept needs wide<br />

acceptance within many departments <strong>and</strong> at many<br />

levels <strong>of</strong> management in both organisations. It <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

needs to include all stakeholders. Agreement between<br />

the buyer’s purchasing <strong>and</strong> contracts department <strong>and</strong><br />

the supplier’s sales department is not sufficient.<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> is naturally dependent on the buyer’s<br />

ability to pay. This requires the buyer to carefully assess<br />

the likely cost <strong>of</strong> any incentivisation <strong>and</strong> to take steps to<br />

ensure that the purchasing organisation provides the<br />

funds to make any payment. Where the incentivisation<br />

does not have some form <strong>of</strong> cap, or upper limit, ie is<br />

open-ended, there could be the possibility <strong>and</strong> risk <strong>of</strong><br />

the amounts <strong>of</strong> payment exceeding the funds allocated<br />

for this purpose. This could have severe repercussions,<br />

particularly if the incentivisation is associated with the<br />

completion <strong>of</strong> the project on cost target.<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> could be multi-target in nature. This<br />

means that there could be more than one target for the<br />

supplier to achieve. <strong>The</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> each target is<br />

considered individually. So, failure to achieve one target<br />

does not impact on the supplier’s reward for some<br />

other target should that target be achieved. <strong>The</strong><br />

supplier is thus not de-motivated by failure <strong>and</strong>, because<br />

the overall scheme is fair, it might be that motivation is<br />

enhanced.<br />

With respect to projects, the buyer needs to<br />

consider carefully the implications to all the<br />

participants (client, contractors, consultants, key<br />

subcontractors, ultimate customers etc ) <strong>of</strong> the<br />

incentivisation process. For example, there is little<br />

point in independently incentivising some aspect <strong>of</strong> a<br />

contractor’s contract if that part is crucially dependent<br />

upon another party, say a consultant or the client,<br />

neither <strong>of</strong> whom are a party to the incentivisation. <strong>The</strong><br />

involvement <strong>of</strong> the other participants might require<br />

them to be incentivised themselves, the most likely<br />

examples being subcontractors <strong>and</strong> consultants.<br />

Alternatively, in the case <strong>of</strong> clients, there is a need for<br />

an awareness <strong>and</strong> an underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> the<br />

incentivisation <strong>and</strong> the reasons for it.<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> <strong>of</strong> many contracts within a project<br />

requires careful management. Multiple incentivisation<br />

must lead to complementary outcomes if disruption is<br />

to be avoided. This is because all the parties in a project<br />

tend to rely on others <strong>and</strong> the consequence <strong>of</strong><br />

uncoordinated incentivisation can upset this reliance.<br />

Organisations which have not previously used<br />

incentivisation need to proceed with caution until a<br />

level <strong>of</strong> experience is achieved. A policy <strong>of</strong> ‘keeping it<br />

simple’ is advisable.<br />

JAN06 Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org 5


<strong>Incentivisation</strong><br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> can work across a series <strong>of</strong> contracts.<br />

This assists in the learning <strong>of</strong> the buyer <strong>and</strong> the<br />

supplier, assuming that the same supplier has been used<br />

for each <strong>of</strong> the contracts. This can lead to greater levels<br />

<strong>of</strong> efficiency in the later contracts.<br />

In a study undertaken by the Treasury <strong>and</strong> other<br />

government departments some time ago, the following<br />

were identified as key factors in successfully using<br />

incentivisation as a technique:<br />

• a firm <strong>and</strong> detailed basis for costing a contract both<br />

for the buyer <strong>and</strong> the supplier<br />

• effective measurements <strong>and</strong> setting <strong>of</strong> milestones<br />

<strong>and</strong> targets for both buyer <strong>and</strong> supplier, this means<br />

that a good quality specification is essential <strong>and</strong><br />

there should also be a good audit trail<br />

• the need for effective contract management within<br />

an incentivised contract which commences at the<br />

correct time<br />

• a requirement for transparent structures in respect<br />

<strong>of</strong> cost <strong>and</strong> performance by both parties operating<br />

within this sphere<br />

• good payment procedures to ensure that payment is<br />

made as agreed<br />

• willingness on the part <strong>of</strong> the supplier to participate<br />

in the incentivisation scheme.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re can also be an incentive to avoid a negative<br />

consequence. <strong>The</strong> most usual form could be liquidated<br />

damages. Other examples could be loss <strong>of</strong> reputation,<br />

or withdrawal <strong>of</strong> any further business.<br />

5. WHAT ARE THE REWARDS AND BENEFITS?<br />

Both buyers <strong>and</strong> suppliers are able to benefit from<br />

incentivisation.<br />

From the buyer’s point <strong>of</strong> view, the benefits to the<br />

buying organisation are likely to include:<br />

• lower cost, faster or more timely delivery <strong>of</strong> service<br />

• improved quality or safety<br />

• earlier delivery with the possibility <strong>of</strong> an earlier<br />

revenue stream<br />

• a more knowledgeable <strong>and</strong> skilful workforce arising<br />

from the experience <strong>of</strong> open book costing<br />

• additional services from the supplier<br />

• possibly a longer relationship with a good supplier<br />

• less time spent resolving contractual disputes<br />

• better price stability<br />

• improved management information<br />

• improved monitoring <strong>and</strong> control.<br />

From the supplier’s point <strong>of</strong> view, the benefits are likely<br />

to include:<br />

• faster payment<br />

• better reputation<br />

• longer relationships with the buyer possibly<br />

• less time spent on contractual disputes.<br />

CIPS defines a “benefit”as that which the buying<br />

organisation receives as a result <strong>of</strong> the supplier<br />

delivering something desirable over <strong>and</strong> above the basic<br />

contract requirement. Benefits can be shared with the<br />

supplier if, for instance, a greater margin is achieved<br />

through the supplier achieving a target for innovation in<br />

respect <strong>of</strong> a particular product.<br />

CIPS encourages incentivisation where a real<br />

business benefit accrues to the buying organisation ie<br />

constructing a contract so that the supplier has an<br />

incentive to deliver not only what is required by the<br />

buying organisation, but - as appropriate or necessary –<br />

exceed those requirements. CIPS believes that if this is<br />

done correctly it will deliver the best possible contract<br />

<strong>and</strong> value for money.<br />

In practice, incentivisation usually involves the<br />

employment <strong>of</strong> rewards, benefits or sometimes<br />

liquidated damages, or equivalent, in contracting.This<br />

policy encourages the use <strong>of</strong> rewards <strong>and</strong> benefits<br />

when incentivising contracts.<br />

CIPS defines a reward as something, usually money,<br />

which the supplier receives from the buying<br />

organisation, for achieving an objective, or a desirable<br />

outcome, which is over <strong>and</strong> above the basic<br />

requirements <strong>of</strong> the contract.<br />

Financial return is the biggest incentive for most<br />

suppliers. If the buying organisation would benefit from,<br />

for example, eg a construction project completed earlier<br />

than the contract states, then a financial incentive for an<br />

early finish can encourage suppliers <strong>and</strong> facilitate a winwin<br />

situation. However, P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essionals should<br />

ensure that incentives are not introduced too early in a<br />

negotiation as there is a danger that the original<br />

contract requirement may get diluted as the supplier<br />

seizes an opportunity to obtain more from the contract.<br />

Indeed, CIPS emphasises the fact that negotiators must<br />

not give away the essence <strong>of</strong> the deal when negotiating<br />

incentives.<br />

CIPS recommends that in the early stages <strong>of</strong> a<br />

procurement process the P&SM pr<strong>of</strong>essional should<br />

identify, whether or not there are any real business<br />

benefits to be had from incentivising a contract; this<br />

should also determine the extent <strong>of</strong> such incentives.<br />

If there is little to be gained, over <strong>and</strong> above that<br />

which is required from the st<strong>and</strong>ard contractual<br />

arrangement, then there may be no point in pursuing<br />

incentivisation. CIPS would argue, however, that any<br />

contract should be subject to proactive contract<br />

management <strong>and</strong> continual improvement. It should<br />

encourage innovation <strong>and</strong> the delight <strong>of</strong> customers, <strong>and</strong><br />

so some mechanism to encourage such commitment<br />

from suppliers should appear in most contracts.<br />

It is useful to structure the reward package so as to<br />

align the objectives <strong>of</strong> the buying organisation <strong>and</strong> the<br />

supplier.<strong>The</strong> first step is to choose an appropriate<br />

contract form. For example, a lump sum will align the<br />

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parties if the lowest cost is the prime concern, but not<br />

if the highest quality is what is required from the<br />

contract. Having set a basic form, the next step is to<br />

provide further encouragement to align. This can<br />

facilitate, for instance, the buying organisation paying<br />

additional fees to the service provider, eg architects, if<br />

the cost <strong>of</strong> the total project is reduced or if the faults<br />

occurring after completion are less than x%.<br />

6. ROLE OF KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs)<br />

KPIs are fundamental to incentivisation.<strong>The</strong> supplier’s<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it <strong>and</strong> possibly overheads <strong>and</strong> even direct costs<br />

should be at risk if the contractual KPIs are not met.<strong>The</strong><br />

KPIs can be graduated so that poor, satisfactory, good<br />

<strong>and</strong> excellent performance may be determined.<strong>The</strong><br />

supplier earns, for example, a lesser amount <strong>of</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it/overhead (or none at all) for poor performance as<br />

opposed to excellent performance where the<br />

contractor might expect to receive their normal margin<br />

plus the extra amount. So the term ‘risk’ applies to the<br />

amount <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it/overhead the supplier is prepared to<br />

risk in the incentivisation scheme <strong>and</strong> the reward is<br />

what they actually receive; this will vary depending on<br />

their performance from a poor rate <strong>of</strong> return to an<br />

excellent one.<br />

It is normal to balance such schemes so that the<br />

amount the supplier puts at risk (the downside) is equal<br />

to the amount they could earn over <strong>and</strong> above the<br />

normal margin expected for a satisfactory or good<br />

performance (the upside).<br />

<strong>The</strong> KPIs are measures <strong>of</strong> business-critical<br />

deliverables such as:<br />

• Achieving the scope <strong>of</strong> work within budget<br />

• Delivering the required amount <strong>of</strong> production per<br />

month every month<br />

• Performing work without any safety <strong>and</strong> production<br />

critical maintenance work every month<br />

KPIs should be easily measurable, tangible <strong>and</strong> critical<br />

for the success <strong>of</strong> the contract <strong>and</strong> business.<br />

7. APPRAISAL OF REWARDS/BENEFITS<br />

CIPS suggests that for any significant contract the P&SM<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>essional should produce a strategy for that<br />

procurement, including a business case as appropriate.<br />

<strong>The</strong> business case should include an investment<br />

appraisal which should illustrate what is required from<br />

the contract; <strong>and</strong> what other benefits are required in<br />

addition, eg working with supplier to reduce costs <strong>of</strong><br />

product X over the contract period. By defining the<br />

investment in this way at the outset, the management<br />

<strong>and</strong> monitoring <strong>of</strong> the contract should be much easier<br />

as the buying organisation will have the information<br />

with which to measure progress.<br />

When developing a business case, P&SM should seek<br />

the assistance <strong>of</strong> their colleagues in finance particularly<br />

when undertaking the investment appraisal, as financial<br />

modelling <strong>and</strong>/or sensitivity analysis may be required.<br />

<strong>The</strong> financial modelling <strong>and</strong> sensitivity analysis may<br />

identify that a cut-<strong>of</strong>f point is needed in respect <strong>of</strong><br />

rewards to suppliers to prevent super pr<strong>of</strong>its being<br />

generated. Similarly, cost-benefit analysis may be<br />

appropriate for those benefits which are not an obvious<br />

advantage.<br />

CIPS suggests that all benefits/rewards within a<br />

contract should be:<br />

• tangible<br />

• achievable<br />

• measurable<br />

• agreed by all parties<br />

Even s<strong>of</strong>ter benefits can be measured such as<br />

improved communications between supplier <strong>and</strong> end<br />

users as evidenced by improved scores on a feedback<br />

survey.<br />

If additional incentivisation is required mid-contract,<br />

then a contract amendment or change order may be<br />

required.<br />

8. WHAT ARE THE DISADVANTAGES OF<br />

INCENTIVISATION?<br />

It must be stressed that incentivisation should not be<br />

seen as a panacea for the many problems which can<br />

impact on large-value, long-term contractual<br />

arrangements. It is not easy nor is it a quick fix because<br />

it requires time, considerable thought <strong>and</strong> planning for<br />

it to work effectively. It is a co-operative <strong>and</strong> collective<br />

approach rather than a unilateral process, which means<br />

that it cannot be imposed by the purchasing<br />

department acting independently. Rather, it needs the<br />

support <strong>and</strong> active participation <strong>of</strong> colleagues within<br />

the buying organisation <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the staff within supplier<br />

organisations.<br />

For the supplier, there is the risk <strong>of</strong> investing this<br />

time <strong>and</strong> not winning any business. For the buyer, the<br />

investment <strong>of</strong> this time could be with many suppliers <strong>of</strong><br />

which only one will get the business.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is also the risk that the effort involved in<br />

establishing an incentivised arrangement will not equate<br />

with the extra outcomes from this arrangement.<br />

9. PUTTING AN INCENTIVISED CONTRACT IN PLACE<br />

As part <strong>of</strong> the process <strong>of</strong> establishing an incentivised<br />

contract, it has been suggested that the following<br />

questions should be asked by the party initiating this<br />

type <strong>of</strong> relationship::<br />

JAN06 Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org 7


<strong>Incentivisation</strong><br />

• From the buyer’s point <strong>of</strong> view, is incentivisation<br />

worth doing?<br />

• Can the contract objectives/deliverables be defined<br />

in such a way that incentivisation is possible?<br />

• What would the incentives be?<br />

• Is there sufficient time to develop an incentivised<br />

contract strategy?<br />

• Are there any constraints such as culture within the<br />

buyer’s organisation to the use <strong>of</strong> incentives?<br />

• Are the suppliers likely to be receptive to a proposal<br />

that they undertake an incentivised contract?<br />

• Will the proposed incentives be <strong>of</strong> interest to the<br />

supplier?<br />

• Can the incentivised targets be measured objectively<br />

by both parties to the contract <strong>and</strong> is an audit trail<br />

possible?<br />

• What are the risks associated with using<br />

incentivisation? Are they acceptable?<br />

• Do both buyer <strong>and</strong> supplier have the skills to<br />

manage an incentivised relationship?<br />

• Are there terms <strong>and</strong> conditions suitable for an<br />

incentivised contract <strong>and</strong>, if not, can they be<br />

developed?<br />

For incentivisation to be a realistic tool there must<br />

be real, achievable <strong>and</strong> measurable targets <strong>and</strong> stated<br />

benefits with both parties being willing to sign up to<br />

them.<strong>The</strong>re are contracts for which incentivisation<br />

might not be suitable <strong>and</strong> there is clearly little point in<br />

using incentivisation if the desired results can be<br />

achieved by other means.<br />

For utilities <strong>and</strong> for the public sector, incentivisation<br />

should not conflict with the EU Procurement Directives<br />

provided the method <strong>of</strong> awarding a contract is the most<br />

economically advantageous <strong>and</strong> provided that the<br />

method <strong>and</strong> criteria for assessing which bid is the most<br />

economically advantageous have been clearly publicised<br />

in accordance with the requirements <strong>of</strong> the Directives<br />

<strong>and</strong> subsequently adhered to.<br />

It has been suggested in a review <strong>of</strong> incentivisation<br />

undertaken by a Treasury working party some time ago<br />

that the following can act as constraints to the use <strong>of</strong><br />

incentivisation in the public sector:<br />

• European procurement legislation: This will affect<br />

the public sector, utilities <strong>and</strong> the oil <strong>and</strong> gas<br />

exploration <strong>and</strong> production industries<br />

• <strong>The</strong> requirement for public accountability<br />

• Existing cultures in both the buyer <strong>and</strong> the supplier<br />

organisations. <strong>The</strong>re could be opposition from the<br />

client or the user department within the buyer’s<br />

organisation who might not like the concept<br />

• A perception that the process is in some way unfair<br />

• Insufficient time to plan <strong>and</strong> to implement the<br />

processes needed to generate the incentivised<br />

rewards<br />

• <strong>The</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> the contracts is too limited for<br />

incentivisation to apply<br />

• Fear that it will cost too much. This has been partly<br />

addressed above by the reference to the need to<br />

ensure that adequate funds are made available<br />

• A concern that it might not be possible to have<br />

contracts without incentivisation with a supplier, if<br />

already involved in incentivised contracts with that<br />

supplier. <strong>The</strong> result being a loss <strong>of</strong> flexibility.<br />

It is worth noting that many <strong>of</strong> the above<br />

considerations could also apply to organisations in the<br />

private sector.<br />

10. CONCLUSION<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong> is a key element in the P&SM<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>essional’s toolkit. He or she has an important<br />

role to play in maximising the benefits <strong>of</strong> any<br />

incentivisation process. It is stressed that<br />

collaboration with other departments (typically,<br />

finance) is a key factor – the P&SM function cannot<br />

<strong>and</strong> should not be expected to operate on a<br />

st<strong>and</strong>alone basis: ‘CIPS believes that P&SM<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>essionals need not necessarily be experts in the<br />

application <strong>of</strong> all tools, but should know where to<br />

obtain that expertise’.<br />

11. REFERENCES<br />

Books<br />

Why Use St<strong>and</strong>ard Forms <strong>of</strong> Contract<br />

P Capper FIDIC, (French acronym for ‘International<br />

Federation <strong>of</strong> Consulting Engineers)<br />

Management <strong>of</strong> Procurement<br />

D Bower,Thomas Telford Services<br />

Construction Contract Incentive Schemes – Lessons<br />

from Experience<br />

D Richmond-Coggan, CIRIA<br />

Value Management <strong>of</strong> Construction Contracts<br />

John Kelly et al<br />

<strong>Incentivisation</strong><br />

CUP Guidance No 58<br />

Office <strong>of</strong> Government Commerce<br />

Articles<br />

Articles on incentivisation, again with a construction<br />

industry emphasis, may be found in the CIOB<br />

(<strong>Chartered</strong> <strong>Institute</strong> <strong>of</strong> Building) publication<br />

‘Construction Information Quarterly’ (website<br />

www.extenza.eps.com)<br />

8 Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org JAN 06


Websites<br />

<strong>The</strong>se include:<br />

• www.rics.org<br />

• www.ciria.org<br />

• www.fidic.org<br />

• www.ogc,gov.uk<br />

• www.pwcglobal.com<br />

• www.constructingexcellence.org.uk<br />

AUTHOR<br />

CIPS Pr<strong>of</strong>essional Practice Team<br />

JAN06 Tel +44(0)1780 756777 Fax +44(0)1780 751610 Email ckw@cips.org Web www.cips.org 9

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