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UCE extends standard definitions 1/9/13 Bellare, <strong>Stanford</strong> RWC Workshop UCE: • Considers a more general form of leakage than other primitives • Goes “computational” on all fronts. 27
UCE: Features and Limitations Allows instantiation of ROs when the inputs to which the good parties apply the RO are unknown (unpredictable) to the adversary. Good for many forms of encryption: DE, HE, MLE, PKE, KDM, RKA, … Does not handle CCA. Does not handle signatures, IBE. The hard part is usually to prove unpredictability of the source. But this is a ROM claim! 1/9/13 Bellare, <strong>Stanford</strong> RWC Workshop 28
Page 1 and 2: Instantiating Random Oracles Mihir
Page 3 and 4: Contributions in brief UCE (Univers
Page 5 and 6: RSA-OAEP [BR94] Theorem: In the ROM
Page 7 and 8: ROM Critiques Step 1: Prove securit
Page 9 and 10: The debate continues … The RO par
Page 11 and 12: The core problem: Lack of a definit
Page 13 and 14: Want: Instantiable RO Paradigm Step
Page 15 and 16: Contributions in brief UCE (Univers
Page 17 and 18: UCE x1 x x 2 n S H K H K Y 1 Y 0 :
Page 19 and 20: UCE x1 x x 2 n S H K H K Y 1 Y 0 :
Page 21 and 22: UCE: Formally is UCE-secure if is n
Page 23 and 24: UCE generalizes existing definition
Page 25: UCE generalizes existing definition
Page 29 and 30: Instantiating EwH ROM EwH D-PKE sch
Page 31 and 32: Why it works Claim 1: S is unpredic
Page 33 and 34: More instantiations in the same vei
Page 35 and 36: Multi-key UCE We also give a defini
Page 37 and 38: KDM-secure encryption [CL01,BRS02]
Page 39 and 40: Strength of UCE Is UCE too ``close
Page 41 and 42: A vision of ROM-based cryptography
Page 43 and 44: UCE hash functions from ``standard

slides - Stanford Crypto Group

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