slides - Stanford Crypto Group

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Deterministic PKE [BBO07] coins R-PKE IND-CPA D-PKE PRIV Semantic-security on unpredictable, pk-independent messages. D-PKE provides efficiently searchable encryption of records in outsourced databases. 1/9/13 Bellare, <strong>Stanford</strong> RWC Workshop 29
Instantiating EwH ROM EwH D-PKE scheme [BBO07]: D-PKE R-PKE coins Theorem [BBO07]: If is IND-CPA-secure and is a RO then is PRIV-secure. Theorem [BK13]: If is IND-CPA-secure and H is UCE-secure then the instantiated scheme is PRIV-secure. First standard-model PRIV-secure D-PKE scheme. Previous standard model schemes achieved security for restricted sources [BoFeON08,BrSe11,FuONRe12]. 1/9/13 Bellare, <strong>Stanford</strong> RWC Workshop 30
Page 1 and 2: Instantiating Random Oracles Mihir
Page 3 and 4: Contributions in brief UCE (Univers
Page 5 and 6: RSA-OAEP [BR94] Theorem: In the ROM
Page 7 and 8: ROM Critiques Step 1: Prove securit
Page 9 and 10: The debate continues … The RO par
Page 11 and 12: The core problem: Lack of a definit
Page 13 and 14: Want: Instantiable RO Paradigm Step
Page 15 and 16: Contributions in brief UCE (Univers
Page 17 and 18: UCE x1 x x 2 n S H K H K Y 1 Y 0 :
Page 19 and 20: UCE x1 x x 2 n S H K H K Y 1 Y 0 :
Page 21 and 22: UCE: Formally is UCE-secure if is n
Page 23 and 24: UCE generalizes existing definition
Page 25 and 26: UCE generalizes existing definition
Page 27: UCE: Features and Limitations Allow
Page 31 and 32: Why it works Claim 1: S is unpredic
Page 33 and 34: More instantiations in the same vei
Page 35 and 36: Multi-key UCE We also give a defini
Page 37 and 38: KDM-secure encryption [CL01,BRS02]
Page 39 and 40: Strength of UCE Is UCE too ``close
Page 41 and 42: A vision of ROM-based cryptography
Page 43 and 44: UCE hash functions from ``standard

slides - Stanford Crypto Group

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?