PART 35 - Nymag

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teniiinalion and constructive discharge both constitute adverse employment actions. PlaiiitifTs
pi’operly pleadcd that defendants had authority to fire plaintiffs, and did, in fact, cause Lim and
Bi-ad ford’s tennination, as well as Heimigan’s constructive discharge.
Siinilarly, plaintiffs have not iiiiproperly made their allegations “collcctively.” Plaintiffs
a1 legcd that Muniak and Elkins received complaints regarding Burrell’s discriminatoiy
iiiiscontluct, but (lid not take aiiy action in respect of such complaints, except to fire Liiii and
Bi-acl tbrd and cmse Heiinigaii’s coiistructive discharge. Additionally, plaintiffs’ alleged inany
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ex aiiiples of Burrell’s-sexually Ii~~ssin~Eniarh ariGctio% whicF;forc~~Henlllgan firesigr-
Plainti Tfs also argue that the Coinplaint alleges sufficient facts indicating that clefendaiits’
aclvcrsc employment actions occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination by defendants. Plaintiffs point out that the Coniplaint alleges that (i) plaintiffs
received disparate treatment at Centro, (ii) that male employees were given the positions
fomierly held by female employees, (iii) Burrell made sexually discrimiiiatory reinarks and (iv)
Muniak and Elkiiis failed to investigate the complaints regarding Burrell. Plaintiffs have
demonstrdted all of factors necessary to sustain a retaliation claim. Therefore, plaintiffs’ seventh
and ciglitli causes of action must be upheld.
A plaintiff need not establish that the conduct she opposed was actually a violation or
sexiinl discrimination laws, but only that she possessed a good faith, reasoiiable belief that the
uridci-lying employment action was unlawful.
Plaiiitiffs have also established that they engaged in a protected activity, as Lim and
Bi-adford “complained repeatedly to Hennigan, their supervisor and manager about the
discriminatory treatment that they suffered at the hands of Burrell.” Hennigan, “in turn, passed
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