PART 35 - Nymag

second causes of action are against Centro and Burrell and are unlike the remaining six, third
through eighth causes of action, wherein plaintiffs have specifically'and only made collective
allegations against all defcndants. If plaintiffs wish to assert sucli causes of action against
Muniak and Elkins, plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their complaint
The cases on which plaintiffs rely do not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff who
expeiieiices discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in
order for those incidents to support her claim, or involve plaintiffs which had personally
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experienced sexual harassment in support their own claims (and inanyOfkh31 WEeTemab~&---
graphic in nature). Since Hennigan has not experienced discriminatory harassment herself based
upon the conduct of Burrell, her claims should be dismissed.
Plaintiffs' claims against Muniak and Elkins for sexual harassment, adverse employment
action discrimination, and retaliation should be dismissed, given that Muniak and Elkiiis did not
engage in any sexual harassment of plaintiffs or that plaintiffs' claims of adverse einploynient
discrimination and retaliation ayainst Muniak and Elkins are only alleged collectively. Muiiiak
and Elkins cannot be held personally and vicariously liable for all such claims.
To the extent the Court determines that Muniak and Elkins may be held personally and/or
vicario~isly liable, then Hemiigan's Causes of Action against them should otherwise be dismissed.
With respect to plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of action for sexual harassment, nowhere
do plaintiffs dispute that Muniak or Elkins sexually harassed them. Plaintiffs' allegations that
Muiiiak and Elkins were "employers" (under Section 296(1) of the State HRL) and that they
failed lo investigate and address plaintiffs' alleged coniplaints relating to Burrell IS insufficient to
hold Muniak and Elkins personally and vicariously liable.
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