Louise;S.FIN;S.HUM;S.MELA;Shine,

Halskov, Saren
Sendt: 25. februar 2003 05:48 l
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Emne: FN-Mis. New York MIS202 - Irak. Sikkerhedsrådet. Resolutionsudkast og memorandum.
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!
-€d &S

Cars ten;Ministersekretariatet;Vagthavende;Shne Susanne
FN-Missionen New York E-post MIS202 af 24. februar 2003 23:48:00
Desk By: 8.00
Irak. Sikkerhedsrådet. Resolutionsudkast og memorandum.
Sammenfatning:
* Amerikansk-britisk-spansk resolutionsudkast fremlagt. Fastslår, at Irak ikke har udnyttet den
sidste chance, man fik med resolution 1441, for at nedruste. 2-3 ugers forhandlinger forventes.
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Forslagsstillerne indikeret, at man ikke er rede ti1 at foretage starre zndringer i teksten.
-
* Fransk - russisk - tysk memorandum om forstzrkede inspektioner og klar tidsplan for l
gennemfarelse af udestående nedrustningsopgaver. Statte fra Kina.
ik Afventende reaktioner under lukkede konsultationer. Udmeldinger forventes farst i forbindelse
med nzste konsultationer, Sandsynligvis på torsdag.
* UNMOVIC krzvet, at dqstruktion af Al Samoud 2-missilerne påbegyndes 1. marts.
1. Udkast til resolution
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under lukkede konsultationer prxsenterede UK på vegne af USA 'og Spanien vedh~ftede resolution.
Forslagsstdlerne fremsatte samtidig hermed officielt resolutionen. Man forventer at genoptage lukkede
konsultationer om resolutionen - og nedenstående memorandum - senere på ugen, sandsynligvis
torsdag d. 27. februar.
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Vedhzftet er også den britiske ambassadars talepunkter, som er offentliggjort. Han gentog synspunkter
om Iraks manglende samarbejde, herunder at Irak ikke siden inspektionernes genoptagelse havde vzret
i stand til at afklare et eneste substantielt punkt. Den umiddelbare baggrund og forventede videre
procedure fremkommer i de tre sidste afsnit i talepunktet. UK håbede gennem resolutionen at fastholde
Sikkerhedsrådets kontrol med processen og skabe konsensus om, at Irak havde valgt ikke at udnytte
den sidste chance for en fredelig nedrustning. Men der var stadig tid for Irak til at vzlge rigugt. Man
onskede således ikke afstemning med det samme. Der skulle vzre tid til at drafte udkastet. På den
anden side var det ikke holdningen blandt forslagsstillerne, at der skulle ske substantielle zndringer til
resolutionen, hvorfor man også havde valgt at fremlzgge den officielt med det samme. En konflikt
kunne stadig undgås, hvis Sikkerhedsrådet gjorde det klart for Irak, hvad konsekvenserne af Iraks
hidtidige forkerte valg ville vzre. [Bemzrkning: Tidligere på dagen oplyste Missionens britiske
samtalepartner, at der endnu ikke var truffet beslutning om, hvorvidt resolutionsudkastet formelt skulle
fremlzgges. Vurderingen er, at fremlzggelsen af nedenstående memorandum har haft en indvirkning
herpå.]
Efter konsultationerne anfarte den britiske ambassadar over for pressen, at resolution 1441 ikke
fordrede en ny resolution, men det przsenterede resolutionsudkast ville vzre et stzrkt politisk signal
om, at FN stod sammen bag kravet om, at Irak skulle afrustes. Derudover ville resolutionsudkastet ville
bidrage ti1 at fokusere Sikkerhedsrådets draftelse.
Som det fremgir, indeholder resolutionen kun to operative paragraffer, hvoraf operative paragraf 2 ("
Remain seized.. .") er en standardparagraf. I operative paragraf 1 fastslår Sikkerhedsrådet, at Irak har
I
I

forspildt den sidste chance, som man fik ved resolution 1441.
Argumentationen herfor prsesenteres i den prseambulsere del, i sserdeleshed i paragraf 3: "Recakng that
its resolution 1441 (2002) while deciding that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its
obligations, afforded Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant
resolutions". Det gzlder generelt for den prseambulzre del, at det i alt overvejende grad er tale om
formuleringer hentet fra resolution 1441 - formuleringer, der som bekendt blev vedtaget med
konsensus. Men det bar bemserkes, at man i resolutionsudkastet ikke har medtaget formuleringer, der
henviser til inspektionerne.
(Eksempelvis bygger przarnbulzre paragraf 3 på formuleringer fra operative paragraffer 1 og 2 i 1441,
men udelader anden del af operative paragraf 2 vedrarende etableringen af et udvidet
inspektionsregime. Prseambulsere paragraf 4 bygger på operative paragraf 4 og derved også på
paragrafferne 11 og 12, som foreskriver, at det er UNMOVIC og IAEA, der skal rapportere om Iraks
, manglende samarbejde, på hvilket baggrund Rådet skal agere).
2. Memorandum om inspektioner
Frankrig har - i samarbejde med Tyskland - i den forgangne weekend udarbejdet vedhzftede
memorandum vedrarende fredelig nedrustning gennem inspektioner. Det blev przsenteret af den
franske ambassadar under de lukkede konsultationer på vegne af Rusland og Tyskland. Kina udtrykte
statte ti1 papiret, jf. nedenfor.
Tyskland przciserede under art. '19- konsultationer i EU-kredsen, at man havde valgt memorandum-
modellen, fordi der ikke var behov for yderligere resolutioner. Papiret lå inden for rammerne af
resolution 1441. Den tyske ambassadar gik et skridt videre i et interview med pressen og fastslog, at det
lå i forlzngelse af EU7s erklsering, som alle EU-lande jo stod bag! . (Bemzr&ng: Det var vurderingen
, hos flere samtalepartnere, at indholdet i papiret hurtigt kunne omformes ti1 en resolution, hvis der måtte
vise sig behov for en "konkLrrerende" resolution).
Memorandummet fastslår som udgangspunkt, at betingelserne for magtanvendelse ikke er til stede, idet
1) der er intet bevis for, at Irak har masseadelseggelsesvåben eller kapacitet til at udvikle dem; 2)
inspektionerne fungerer farst nu i fuldt omfang; 3) Iraks samarbejde er under forbedring ("is
' improving")
Det understreges, at et enigt Sikkerhedsråd og et aget pres på Irak er vzsentlige betingelser for at opnå
en fredelig lasning.
Herefter opstiller papiret en fremgangsmåde for at sikre en verificerbar, fredelig nedrustning af Irak:
* UNMOWC og IAEA skal udarbejde program for de udestående nedrustningsopgaver i
prioriteret rsekkefalge og med klare kriterier for, hvorledes Iraks efterlevelse kan verificeres.
* Forbedrede inspektioner, jf. eksempelvis franske non-paper.
* Der skal opstilles realistiske og stramme tidsfrister:
- inspekt~rerne
skal senest 1. marts 2003 fremlzgge arbejdsprogram for vzsentligste
nedrustningsopgaver;
- inspektarerne skal rapportere på regelmassig basis - hver 3. uge - om gennemf~relsen
af
programmet;
- UNMOVIC og IAEA skal i henhold ti1 resolution 1284 lave fremskridtsrapport 120
dage efter vedtagelsen af arbejdsprograrnmet; (bemarkning: under EU-koordinationen kunne
forslagsstillerne ikke skabe klarhed over, hvilken 120 dages frist der henvistes ti1 i 1284 );
3

Under
- at Blix og ElBaradei straks skal rapportere ti1 Sikkerhedsrådet, hvis Irak enten griber ind
i inspektionerne eller ikke opfjdder sine nedrustningsforpligtelser;
- supplerende mader i Sikkerhedsrådet, evt. på hajt niveau, kan indkaldes når som helst.
3. Konsultationerne og den videre procedure
Under de lukkede konsultationer fremkom der ikke nye standpunkter hos de valgte medlemmer. Ikke
overraskende indtog de fleste en afventende holdning - "we will smdy both documents before next
meeting..".
Kina udtrykte statte ti1 memorandummet. Der var stadig tid til en fredelig lasning. Udgangspunktet
måtte vzre at sikre en humanitzr lasning. Det var przmaturt at tale om en endelig lasning.
Inspektarerne var netop begyqdt at opnå resultater.
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Rusland fastslog, at der ikke var behov for en ny resolution. Man afkiste formuleringen i l
resolutionsudkastets przambulzre paragiaf 6 om, at Iraks erklarring indeholdt falske oplysninger. Det
var ikke bevist af inspektarerne. Resolution 1441 - og inspektionerne - virkede efter hensigten, hvis det
var nedrustning, der var m'ålsztningen. Hvis målsztningen var regimeskifte, forholdt sagen sig
naturligvis anderledes. l
I
konsultationerne havde der vzret en vis diskussion af rapporteringsfrister. Der var utilfredshed
med, at 7. marts figurerede som en dato, eftersom inspektarerne havde frem til 27. marts til at aflzgge
rapport om vzsentligste udestående nedrustningsopgaver. Dette måtte vzre op til inspektarerne at
fastslå, om sidstnzvnte rapportering kunne fremrykkes. (Der synes at vzre en vis forvirring om
rapporteringsfristerne. I henhold til 1284 skal inspektarerne pr. 1. marts lave en kvartalsmsessig
statusrapport samt senest p.' 27. marts fremlzgge en oversigt over "key remaining disarmement tasks").
For indevzrende synes alene de genoptagne konsultationer på torsdag d. 27. februar at ligge fast.
Fastlzggelsen af tidspunkterne for UNMOVIC/IAEA's rapportering forventes tidligst at ske i
begyndelsen af naste uge, hvor Guinea har overtaget formandskabet for Sikkerhedsrådet. For så vidt
angår afstemning om resolutionsudkastet er vurderingen, at forslagsstillerne opererer med en tidsramme
på 2-3 uger.
4. Destruktion af Al Samoud 2 missiler mv.
Vedhzftet fremsendes det i pressen omtalte brev af 21. februar 2003 fra Blix til Dr. Al Sa'adi, Irak, om
skrotning af missiler. Det fremgår heraf, at Irak skal forelzgge UNMOVIC bevis for, at alle Al Samoud
2 missiler samt relaterede komponenter er blevet destrueret. Destruktionen, som skal udfares af Irak
under UNMOVICs tilsyn, skal vzre påbegyndt senest den 1. marts 2003. (The appropriate
arrangements should be made so that the destruction process can commence by 1 March 2003.)
Brev fra Blix
210203.pdf
I
Greenstocks Memorandum (Irak IRAK
stemmigt konkluderede, at missilerne har en stmre r~kkevidde,
end den i resolution 687
tilladte, jf. mismail 0159 af 14. februar 2003. Endvidere krzver UNMOVIC destruktion af de
l

genopbyggede stabehaller, som vil kunne producere motorer til missiler med en rzekkevidde på mere
end 150 km.
,
Yderligere tekniske oplysninger og undersagelser udestår, far UNMOVIC kan trzffe beslutning'om,
hvorvidt Al Fatah rnissilsystemet også udgm et brud på resolutionerne.
Det bemxrkes, at den franske ambassadar ti1 pressen efter dagens konklusioner slog fast, at fristen i
Blix' skrivelse og destruktionen var obligatorisk for Irak. Adspurgt af pressen om Husseins udtalelser
under et interview med CBS skulle have udtalt, at Irak ikke ville destruere rnissilerne svarede den
britiske ambassadar, at han stxrkt vdle opfordre Irak til at efterleve fristen i Blix' brev.
Vibeke Rovsing Jargensen/Ellen Margrethe Laj
FN-Missionen New York MIS202

Iraq: Presentatbn of UWU CISpanish
Draft Securiqr Councii R
By Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permnent ReprasenUWe,
Counal bnsuttations, 24 February 2003,
- I shouid like to explain cerefully to Council colleagues why Viis text is being tabled at
this time and in this fom, and what actbnlwe are then proposing.
- The CO-Sponsors are convinoed thdt lt-aq is not achieving. nor intending to achieve,
the objective ol SCR 1441. 1441 set out that obj8ctive in s W and wmpelling tema:
(OPZ) "bringing to ful1 and verified the disamament p ablished by
SCR 687". 1441 attractsd warld a just because of Its atter and the
ss which led to its adoptiorr, but because its unani message represented a
powerful signal that the UN was in controi. The S ncil was challenged by the
U§ President to ralse iCs game on its most difficutt agenda item: and, by adopting 1441,
it dM so. The Resolution set out the most stringent temis ever decided upon by ttie
United Nations for the proces8 of disarmarnent. But them was also an dive branch in
1441 : Iraq was given @very .incentive to rspair its documented non-compliancs.
- Today, 15 weeks on from 1441, we are no further advanced toymrds that objedive of
oomplete disamment. Indeed, nor is Iraq taking adequate steps to corred its wider
breaches of 687, including its continued support for terrorism. The terms of Resolution
1441 are not being respe , and in parts af the current debate not evm being
re mem be red.
- 1441 deplored 'lraq's past aviour. What we all asksd of Iraq was, firs4 a marked
change from its denial and deception of 1091 to 2002, which had already placed B in
matetial breach of relevant resolutions; and second, ful1 compliance with and
moperation w$h the irnplementation 01 1441. In other words, a decision by Iraq, visibly
and unrnlstakabty. to dhrest d Weapons of Mass Deslruction imrnedbtely,
unwndbnally and acthiely. That means bringing prosaibed material8 or pmgramrnes
to the notie al inspecton and providing a ful! and credible account of Iraq's WMD
adbity backed up by dwurnentary evidenw and testimony from personnel.
- What 1441 was not was the establishment ol a detective or a containment exercise.
Again, the objecti've was to bring disamament to 'wmpletion'
field of WMD are instruments for the effedive delivery end ve n of that complete
disarmarnent. This has ben #e ase sincs 1991. SCR 687
deda re the location, amounts and types of proscribed items. Iraq was asked to yieM
possession of them to UN inspectors tor destrudon, removal or rendering harmless.
This time, 12 years on, mere eaw be ris rebeat into procrastination or parliil resuh. The
final opportunity atlorded in SCR 1411 was not for ihe Counul to slide bad< into
SS, but for imq to remgnise e new dekmination in the Securily Coundl to
complete the business in a way whlch represented a complete change of attitude in
BagMaB.
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- That has not happened. Let me sey why we at8 convind that Iraq has decided to
mmáin in defiancs of the UN:
- Firs$, look at the immediste m-up to ths return af inspedom. In 2002, Iraq began
seriously to dis~cs the issue of inspectbns only when it realised that we, as tha
international cornmunity, muld nat give up on mplete disarmament. For months. Iraq
sought to haggk with the Counal, to set preconditions (the '19 questiansn), and to
negotiate away its non nce of the past. lraq only ag four days
after President Bush's s af 12 September in a cynical attempt to any new
resolution strengthening aem.
- Second. we hoped - certafnly the United Kingdom hoped - that the adoption of 4441
wouid see a change af heart by the Iraqi regime. Iraq's 13 November letter following the
adoption of 1441, ful1 of tirades and complaints. and grudgingly a pung mat muld
'deal with" the resolution, was w ort of the wholehearted cumm*rtment to voluntary
disarrnament we had hoped for. r 23 November letter on how 1441 "~ntradicts'
international law underiined this.
Then Game the responses to the detalled requitements of 1441
- Iraq has produced a 12,000 page declaration that is indisputably inadequate. Dr Blix
called I 'rich in volume but poor in new information .. . and pradically devoid d new
evidente";
- Iraq has done evetything possible to prevent unrestricted Interviews. withwt Iraqi
minders. eavesdropping, or intimidation of potential intervie . UNMOVIC has so far
been abk to oonduct only hree private interview - all of which took place with people
volunteered by the iraqis and all of which tmk place in #e irnmediate runup to Dr Blix's
last visit to Baghdad. Since then nothing;
'
- Iraq has dragged b feet on as many other elernents of p ural mperatK>n as
possible. lnstead of serious mllaboration wiV, the inspectors, Iraq has tried to make the
proces into a lighUy monitored media drcus. with demonstraton ready to herass
inspectors if they come too close to hidden material. As Dr BIU! toid the Council on 27
Jsnuary, 'Demonstrations and outbursts ... are unlikeiy to occur without initiativ8 or
enmuragement from the avthorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be
for these eventsw;
- Iraq's CO-operation on substanw has been non-existent. Since ins s resumed
UNMOVIC have not been aMe to close a single outstanding issue. We not knw
what happened to 8,500 litres of anairax, 2.160 kilograms of bacterial growth media. 360
tonnes of bulk chernical warfare agent. 3.000 tonner of precursor chemicals. 1.5 tonnes
o! VX neme agent, and 6,SM aemial bmbs- ve never had satisfadory answem
about the entire scape of Iraq's BW programme. tkre are now even more
unresolved questions: for exarnple, why has Iraq developed a prohibited missile
programme and why has it refurbished equiprnent - rocket easttng chambers and
chernical processors - destroyed Dy UNSCOM? Does this show anything other than

clear jntent to restart prohibited programmes? lnstead of providing ful] dommentation.
induding admlnistratlve documente relating to personnei and funding. Iraq has providd
substantivs new sviden-. It has sattered its documents into private huses and
vehides to hide the scope of its programmes and to provide a basis for extending them
Men the pressure is off. And it has In public pretended that Mre are no wbtanding
issues, even though many uf these have been well known for years.
- Thls continues the 12-year pattem ol lraq seeking to decelve the Councii: an all tac
farniliar pattem of Iraq wing to get us to focus m smal1 concessions d prucess. rather
than on the bi$ picture. The cerdinal point is ttlat there is no sernblance sf
peration; nothing like voluntary end active disarmament; nothing like a
regime with nothing to hide; nothing like the South Africa model referred to by Dr Bllx.
- Tb8 United Kingdom, Virough tabling this draR in thi$ form. seel

MISION
Memorandum
1. Ful1 and effeetivc disarmament in accordanee with tbe rdevint WSC rerolutions
remains the imperative objectivc of the international community. Our pnonty
obould be to ichicvt air peacefully tbrough thc inspection regimc The milihry
option should only be a last resort So far, tbe conditions for ushg force against Irrq
art not fulfiUed:
Wile suspicions sin, no evidence has b givm &at Irag still possasa wepm
ction or capabilities in this field;
Inspations have just rrached Iheir ful1 pace; they ue functioning without hin
they have alrcady productd ruults;
le not yet tully satisfanory. hqi co-
chief inrpstors in their last report.
2. The Seenrity Council must step up its effoa to give a real chance to the peactful
settlemeot of the crisis. In thic conterf tbe followuig conditions are of pnramount
importance:
the unity of the Security Council must be presaved;
the pressure tha! is put on Traq must be increased.
3. Tbese conditions caii be met, and our common objective - the veriliable ditumme~t
of Irrq - ean be reaebcd through tbe implemkntstion of tbe following proposals:
A) Cltar program of action for thc inspcctions:
According to resolution 1284, have to submit their pro
of work for approval of the Coun thi3 program of work sh e
spctdcd up, in puticulu thc key rem tasics to be completed by Iraq
pursuant to its obligations to comply with r requirements of resolution
687 (1 991) and otha related resolutions.
g aks shall be dehed accordiog to their degree of priority.
of Iraq for implementation of each task be clcarly debed uid pecise.
Such a c$ew ida~fica~on
of to be completed will obligc Iraq to cooperate
more aetively. It will also provide a clear means for the Council to assess the CO-
operation of Iraq.
\

FEB-24-2883 15: 47 MISSION 212 S188 P.83
I
Resolution 1441 established an intnisive and
ossibilitics have not ytt bem explor
ould include , as exemplified in th
commwcated to the chief
to d~eck 0x1 truck;
system of auial sweillmce; systematic processing of data
an expertise; establishment gned in particul~
completion of the n w
provided by the newly established system of atrial sweill
C) Timelines for inspections and assessment:
ework of resolution 1284 and 1441, the implementation of the program ,
sequmced accordllig to a realistic and ngorous timeline:
- the inspecton should bc asked to submit the pro of ~~ork outlikg the key
Iraq to accomplish, including missiles / delivery systems, chemical
, biological weapons I matnial and nuclear weapons in the context
I
4
- the chief inspectors shall report to the Council on implementation of the program of
work on a regular basis (every 3 weeks);
report of UNMOVIC and IAEA asse the progress made in completing the
hall be submitted by the inspectors 1 s after the adoption of the program of
work according to nsolution 1284;
- at any time, according to paragraph 1 1 of tion 1441, the executive Ch
of UNMOVC,and the Director General of the &all report immediately to
Council any interfrrence by Iraq with inspections activities as well as failure by Iraq to
camply with its dis ent obligations;
- at any time, additional meetings of the Secunty Council could be decidad,
including at high level.
To render possible ii peaceful solution inspections should be given tbe neccrsary time
and resources. Howtver, they can not eontinue indermitely. Iraq must disarm. Its ful1
and aetive eooperation Is ocecssary. Tbis must include tbe provision of iU the sddiuonal
and spe~fie hformation on issues raised by the inspeetors as well ao complianee with
their requests, ar expressed in pnrticulnr in Mr. Blir' letter of Februrry 21" 2003. The
rombination af a clear program ol action, reinforced inspections, a clcar timeline and
#e military build-up providt a realistic rneans to reunite the Security Council and to
exert marimum pressure on Inq.
I

02/21/03 FRI &7:13 FM 2128633922 OV I C-NY
r
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNXES
NATIONS Et CA'flON ANID D8VECLION STON
United Nations, Rmm 53 120, NCW York, New York 10017
(212) 963-3922 dk (212) 963-9192
Telbp)rone (212) 963-3a7; F~x
con~1Iusions reached by the Vi
VlC to conduct a techni p of thc Al Samoud 2 and'Al Fatah
rs, conitruction of a missile test-stand and
. . .
I have now address matter, a copy of whi& is
o for your in sidcnt of the Security Council.
Accept, Excellency, the as ces of my highest c
His Excellency
t of the Security Council
United Nations
New York, New York

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
The Executive Chai I
I
Re c: OVIC /O3 21 F 2003
Excellency ,
X have the l
His Excellency,
l
l
l
l
smit herewith a letter of today's date addressed to
grateful if p muld atch to.Baghhd,
His Excellency
Mr. Mo rsd A. Aldouri
Ambassador Extráord and Plenipotenti ary
resentative of Iraq
to the United Nations
New York, New York +
s of my highest consideration.
Hans BIY,
cxfice* 3 wI3uld be
x
l

URITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
owc
NATIONS M
United Nations, S-312O,NwYo~NwY& 10017
Tclcphone (212) 963-3017; Fax (2 12) 963-3922 & (212) 963-9 192
Dcar Dr. Al Sa'adi,
our latest discussions in Baghdad on 9 and 10 F
that a panel of inkrnati
uct a tecMcal asses
stems. The assessment was also to include. thc
bers associated with the promibed Badr-2000
stroyed under LMSCOM supervision, as well as-the
under constnictim at tht Al Liquid Engine
Test Facility .
The panel, which met on 10 and 1 1 Febniary, c
nomhmted by the Govrrnmmts of China, France, Gemany,
gdom and the Unibcd States. The Russian expert
attend.
provided p& with backgr~~d mfo
's missile pro
was also advised W, in 1994, UNSCOM
es and hfbstnicture. The panel
formed Iraq that any increme
Dr. Amir H. Al-Sa'adi
Advi sor
Presidential Office
Baghdad, Iraq

UNITED N A T ~ ~ N S NATIONS 'UNIES
Tht was ~1animous in its assessmcnt in
. Thest ~cmc1usi0;~ wcre
Cornmisqioners on 1 3 - February.
Al Samoud 2, which domot ca.&
, to tk Security Council that the two declared
2 missile system wm capable of ex
ere therefore prosmibed pursiiant to
(1 99 1) and tht monitoririg plan adopted by resolution 7 15 (1 99 1).
Accordingly , the Govemment o f Jraq should
on d 2 missiles and
follows:
2. Fuel and oxidizer, where deployed with Al Samoud 2 missiles;
r

-02/21/03 FRI 17314 FM 2129633922
UNITED NATIONS NATI-ONS UNIES
in the proccss of bemg so c
$ide of the expo
cation of the SA-2
d 2 system, such as
regulaton, gas gem and air pressure rcgdators;
and other guidance and contro1 items, such as
.
al at and so importcd
or developed for d2
cct to iaunchers, that
tue designed
plafforms of the vehiclcs need not bc destroycd, but be tagged
Y"U--iri.W-----,
red;
7. Those components specific to the Al Samoud 2, which a n
inwrporated M the logistic vehicles, such as f'l, oxidizer,
and conirol vehicles requ 033 of the Al Samoud 2
missile force;
components design4 for tb e pr
d 2 missile; and
9. All software and documentation con e conc@on, research and
devclopment tion and quality contro1 related to the Al Samoud
2 missile pro

I
02/21/03 FRI IR14 FM 2129633822 OVIC-m
UNITED NATIONS NATI0N.S UNIES
I
thai had becn deemed
S
The panel found tbat clmification of Al Fatah missile data supplied by
Iraq was required before the capability uf the missil& system could be assissecl:
OVIC wili request such clxificati#n.
., I
The.-pyel also assessid that the !. .q
would be capable of
that Ol tb $A-2
... 2bhCS
' tructiti&
l
l
-ed out by Iraq under
léct k m a:varictyl
be destmyed, such as explosive
ts should bc made so the destruction
2003.
. .

02/21/03 FRI IR15 FM 2129633942 1.WOVIC-NY
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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
Conclusims from the Int ational Panel of Missile Experts
10 to 11 Febmary 2003
A group of international missile experts h m 6 countnes, including China,
and the U'ted States, johed
es of Iraq's liquid proptllan t
the Al Fatah. Specifically,
150 kilometres.
began thc confixence by bing the two missile
Nations, and .
lopmcnt, testing, production q d
on was then employed by the panel of experts to
uter models; each capable of
Ababil 100 missile, the predecessor to the A3 Sarnoud
.N Samoud 2
The Al Samoud 2 is a liquid propellant missile b
by the Soviet Union for use in the SA-2 anti- missile. The SA-2
mistainer engine's operating parameters and perfonmm
well, understood and documented.

QfL21/03 FRI 1735 FM 2149633922 LrNIIOVIC-NV
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
2002 CAFCD. The fint variant,
on ofthe missile
s to deploy a system that
Both versions of thc Al S 2 wcre evaluated using four independcnt
wmputer.models. Cd declared by kiq, show
that both versions are inh
range limit as defined
Uie Al Samoud 2 w& det
average kmge calculated Is. This is consistent with the
maxirnum range achi
detmed by an
achieving a range
The four in
flighi simulations
the Al Samoud 2 are capable of cxceeding the 150-kilometre range limit.
Moreover, it should be noted that the input parameters for the models relied on

02/21/03 FRI 17:15 FM: 2129833922
b
UNITED NATIONS- NATIONS UNIES
information declared by Iraq, even when this i
welldocumented information con
of the CAFCD. The
Al Fatab
is a solid propellant rocket c
cm pages 817 to 821
dcclared by Iraq, which stak that the AJ Fatah has flom as Em as 161 kilometres
with a different co
eclaration. To this end, the international panel
of experts recommends that c efforts to verify the input
Casting chamb
motors. During the 1
production of the BA
missile system under UNSC Resolution 687, these casting chambm wcle
destroyed under

!
I tion
02421/03 FRI 17:16 FM 2128635922
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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
refurbished the ex-B
one of them to b&ce a
than 150 kilometres. For
esently casts the Al Fatah and its othcr solid propel1
I
Al Rafah Liquid Engine Test Stand
of a new Liquid Usmt Test Stand at
test stand presently tped at
stroyed undcr UN G
supavision. The expert panel revimed the C stics of the new teststand.
and concluded that it will be capable of testing liqllid propeuant engh
exhibiting a thmt of 1 5 tons &ex completion, with
to 30 tons force could be acco ed. (Note:
tons of thrust). One cxpert also noted that each O
the test smd has afi es
oxidizer. This is about 3 times ,t used by the Al Samoud 2 missile.
store 2.2 eubic meters of liquid fwl or

The Semity Gouncil,
PPI : Recalling all its pnvious relevant resolutions, in pdcular its rcsolutions 66 1 (1
of August 1990,678 (1 990) of 29 November 1990,686 (1991) of 2 March 199 1,687
(1991) of 3 April 1991,688 (1991) of 5 April 1991,707(1991) of IS August 1991,
71 S(1991) of 1 1 Uctober 1991,986 (1995) of 14 April 1995,12 f1
1999 and 1441 (2002) of 8 Novembex 2002, and all the relevant o f
PP2: Recalling that in its resolution 687(1991) the Council declared that a ceaseh would
be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the
obligations on Xraq containad therein,
PP3 : Recdling that i t . resolution 144 1 (2002), wKle aclmowladging that Iraq has b-
remains in materiai breach of its obligations, afforded Iraq a final oppe
and
with its at obligations under relevant resolutions,
PP4: Recalling that in its resolution 1441(2002) thc Council decided that false stakments
or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq pursuant to that resolution and hilure by
Irq a! any time to comply with, and w~perate hiily in the implementation of, hat
resolution, would constitute a flrther material bmh, -.
PP5: Noting, in that context, that in its resolution 1441(2002), the Council dled that it
has repeatadly warnd Iraq that it will face serious consqucnces as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations,
PP6: Noting that lraq has submitted a declaration puisuant to its resolution 144 l(2002)
containing false statements and omissions and has failed to comply with, and c0-0
fully in the implementaiion of, that resolution,
PP7: RedErming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring states,
PP8: Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of intamtional peace and secuiity,
PP9: Racognising the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and
proliferation of weapons of mass destmction And long-range missiles poses to international
pwe and sechty, e
PPIO: Determined to securc hil1 compliance with its decisions and to restore international
peace and security in the area,
PPI 1 : Acting under Chaptcr VII of the Charter of thc UMted Nations,
OP1 : Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity affordal to it in resolution
1 44 l(2002);
OP2: Decides to remain seized of the matter.
C