REPORT ON IN NAVAL NUCLEAR JUNE, 1995
REPORT ON IN NAVAL NUCLEAR JUNE, 1995
REPORT ON IN NAVAL NUCLEAR JUNE, 1995
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which is technically acceptable for Naval fuel, to be highly desirable. Any use of this material for other<br />
purposes, such as blending down for commercial use, would accelerate the need for construction of a very<br />
expensive and politically sensitive HEU production facility. .<br />
One consideration worth noting regarding the use of LEU versus HEU for Naval nuclear propulsion is that<br />
an LEU fuel cycle produces a signficant amount of plutonium while an HEU fuel cycle does not. Thus,<br />
having used HEU for energy production, the resulting spent fuel is in a form which is protected from<br />
diversion through final disposal with no significant plutonium present.<br />
ll. IMPACT <strong>ON</strong> SECURITY OF US<strong>IN</strong>G AN LEU VERSUS REU FUEL CYCLE<br />
A Discussion: !<br />
Security of nuclear material is accomplished with two complementary programs:<br />
-Material Control and Accounting (MC&A», and<br />
-Physical protection<br />
There are separate requirements for both of these areas. Overall security is achieved based on the<br />
combination of both.<br />
B. Materia] Control and Accounting Reguirements:<br />
Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) is the process of keeping track of the amount and location of<br />
nuclear material. MC&A is applied in the U.S. to ~ enriched material; LEU and HEU. Thus, the use of<br />
an LEU fuel cycle does not eliminate the need to keep track of the material through this formal accounting<br />
process.<br />
In general, the amount of effort needed to implement the MC&A requirements is directly related to the<br />
amount of material being handled and the number of transfers of material between sites. An LEU fuel<br />
cycle would require considerably more material than the HEU cycle and would have more transfers<br />
between sites (larger cores with more fuel modules, or more cores). Thus, an LEU fuel cycle would<br />
logically require a greater MC&A effort.<br />
c. Phvsical Protection Reguirements:<br />
The requirement for physical protection depends on the material which is being protected. Naval fuel<br />
requires protection due to three potential concerns:<br />
1. theft of nuclear material<br />
2. loss of a high value component due to sabotage<br />
3. loss ofU.S military technology of significant interest to other nations<br />
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