Kuwait after the war..

104 Lnlzd Forces Since flze Gzky War
scription. U111ess Kuwait takes major new inifiatives to increase its
military manpower, it will atways have "hoII0\141' forces.
* Second, Kuwail. still over-emphasizes weapons and under-emphasizes
support, sustainahility rt?a$.iness, manewer capability, training,
and joint operations. Like most: So&hern Gulf forces, it. ennphasizes
the symholic value of Iarge purchases of modem hiardwarc
over integrated and balanced war-fit;hting capabiliq
* Third, Kuwait is tagng delivery on only enough modern armored
equipment to match one heavy &publican Guards division, The
KUM"aiti eyuipment will be qualitatively superior, hut cannot provide
hwait wilh more than a Lmited seif-defense c~abifity to deal
with low-intensiq land warfare in its border arca. This equipment
aiso will not be fully standarclized with the eguipment in US or
Saudi forces. The rest of Kuwait's equipment will consist of lowgrade
arrnor which may do as much to kill its crcws in intensive
combat with first-line Eraqi armm as to kill the ~lemy and there is
little c~trrent prospect that Kuwait can replace this mix of" low-grade
tanks and OAFVs before the year 2005, This may not be as critical a
probtem as it appears, though, because it is unclear whether Kuwait
really has the manpower to support a lmd force larger than two
first-line active arrnmd brigades. Kuwait" ccurmnt land force procuremat
plans do, however, violate common mse to the extent
that thy fail to use Kuwait's wealth to buy the superim techoloa
it needs to make up for its lirnited manpower.
* Finally, Kuwait will always be the single most vulnerable Gulf state.
Kuwajt City is wiChin a few hours drive of the Iraqi border, and
Kuwaiti population centers could be held. hostage h any conflict. US
and GulE air and land pwer would then have to take such hostages
into account. The US can improve its prcpositionhg cap&ili,ty and
reaction times, but cannot remain in place in Kuwait. This makes the
improvement of the Kuwaiti Army, and the development of Kuwait
forces that can deter and. delay an Iraqi defemse a critical military
prioriity;