U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress - Foreign Press ...

U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress
Still, some continue to believe there could be benefits in fostering relationships with PLA
officers, both at the senior level and with younger, future leaders. While in Beijing in January
2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, said that “it’s always an
advantage to be able to pick up a telephone and talk to somebody that you know fairly well. The
relationship that I have with General Liang [Chief of General Staff], the relationship that Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld has with his counterpart, General Cao, is going to be helpful in that regard.” 56
Likewise, visiting Beijing in September 2005, Admiral William Fallon, PACOM Commander,
hoped for the value for his regional responsibilities to “pick up the telephone and call someone I
already know.” 57 During his visit to Beijing in July 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, still said he wished that he could “pick up the phone” in a crisis. 58
MMCA
Much attention has been on the MMCA for resolving tension and preventing crisis or conflict.
The MMCA, initialed at the first DCT in December 1997 and signed by Secretary Cohen in
Beijing in January 1998, only arranged meetings to discuss maritime and air safety (i.e., to talk
about talking). There was no agreement on communication during crises or rules of engagement.
Despite the 2001 crisis, the Defense Department encountered difficulties with the PLA in
discussions under the MMCA, including simply setting up meetings and PLA objections to U.S.
activities in China’s claimed 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (even beyond the
territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from the coast). 59 In spite of the MMCA meetings since the
late 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Air Force have faced increasing challenges to operational safety
and freedom of navigation. The Defense Secretary told Congress in an annual report submitted in
August 2010 that “the United States and China continue to have differences over the rights of
coastal states in their exclusive economic zones, and the appropriate response to such
differences.” The report also emphasized that “the United States remains vigilant in its watch for
behavior that puts at risk the safety of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, or is in clear
violation of international norms. The Department will continue to use all available channels, in
particular an invigorated MMCA and Defense Policy Coordination Talks process, to
communicate the U.S. Government position on these and other matters to the PLA, while taking
advantage of opportunities for the two sides to discuss practical ways to reduce the chances for
misunderstanding and miscalculation between our armed forces.” 60
However, another assessment is that not only have dangerous confrontations occurred despite the
MMCA but that the tension have been based on different national interests rather than any
misperception or misunderstanding. The PLA has tried purposefully to keep U.S. military
operations farther from China and restrict them even beyond the PRC’s territorial seas. The
Defense Secretary reported to Congress in August 2010 that his department did not observe a
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55
CDR Thomas Henderschedt and LTC Chad Sbragia, “China’s Naval Ambitions,” Armed Forces Journal, September
2010.
56
Jim Garamone, “China, U.S. Making Progress on Military Relations,” AFPS, January 15, 2004.
57
Pacific Command, Adm. William J. Fallon, “Roundtable at Embassy PAS Program Room,” Beijing, September 7,
2005. Fallon also said he consulted “extensively” with retired Adm. Prueher, former Commander of PACOM.
58
Admiral Michael Mullen, Media Roundtable, Beijing, China, July 10, 2011.
59
Chris Johnson, “DOD Will Urge China to Conduct Joint Search and Rescue Exercise,” Inside the Navy, March 13,
2006.
60
Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2010,” August 16, 2010.
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