Appendixes <strong>Congress</strong>ional Research Service U.S.-<strong>China</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Contacts</strong>: <strong>Issues</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Congress</strong> Appendix. Major <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Contacts</strong> and Incidents Since 1993 ...................................................... 49 <strong>Contacts</strong> Author Contact In<strong>for</strong>mation........................................................................................................... 76 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 76
Overview of and Options <strong>for</strong> Policy U.S.-<strong>China</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Contacts</strong>: <strong>Issues</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Congress</strong> U.S. leaders have applied military contacts as one tool and point of leverage in the broader policy toward the People’s Republic of <strong>China</strong> (PRC). The first part of this CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding such military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts. The second part provides a record of such contacts since 1993, when the United States resumed exchanges after suspending them in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. <strong>Congress</strong> has exercised important oversight of the military relationship with <strong>China</strong>. Cooperation in the Cold War in the 1980s Since the mid-1970s, even be<strong>for</strong>e the normalization of relations with Beijing, the debate over policy toward the PRC has examined how military ties might advance U.S. security interests, beginning with the imperatives of the Cold War. 1 In January 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited <strong>China</strong> and laid the groundwork <strong>for</strong> a relationship with the PRC’s military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intended to consist of strategic dialogue, reciprocal exchanges in functional areas, and arms sales. Furthermore, U.S. policy changed in 1981 to remove the ban on arms sales to <strong>China</strong>. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger visited Beijing in September 1983. In 1984, U.S. policymakers worked to advance discussions on military technological cooperation with <strong>China</strong>. 2 There were commercial sales to the PLA that included Sikorsky Aircraft’s sale of 24 S-70C transport helicopters (an unarmed version of the Black Hawk helicopter) and General Electric’s sale of five gas turbine engines <strong>for</strong> two naval destroyers. 3 Between 1985 and 1987, the United States also agreed to four programs of government-to-government <strong>Foreign</strong> <strong>Military</strong> Sales (FMS): modernization of artillery ammunition production facilities; modernization of avionics in F-8 fighters; sale of four Mark-46 antisubmarine torpedoes; and sale of four AN/TPQ-37 artillery-locating radars. 4 Suspensions After the Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989 The United States suspended mil-to-mil contacts and arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in June 1989. (Although the killing of peaceful demonstrators took place beyond just Tiananmen Square in the capital of Beijing on June 4, 1989, the crackdown is commonly called the Tiananmen Crackdown in reference to the square that was the focal point of the nationwide pro-democracy movement.) Approved in February 1990, the <strong>Foreign</strong> Relations Authorization Act <strong>for</strong> FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) enacted into law sanctions imposed on arms sales and other cooperation, while allowing <strong>for</strong> waivers in the general U.S. national interest. In April 1990, <strong>China</strong> canceled the program (called “Peace Pearl”) to upgrade the avionics of the F-8 fighters. 5 In 1 Michael Pillsbury, “U.S.-Chinese <strong>Military</strong> Ties?,” <strong>Foreign</strong> Policy, Fall 1975; Leslie Gelb, “Arms Sales,” <strong>Foreign</strong> Policy, Winter 1976-77; Michael Pillsbury, “Future Sino-American Security Ties: The View from Tokyo, Moscow, and Peking,” International Security, Spring 1977; and Philip Taubman, “U.S. and <strong>China</strong> Forging Close Ties; Critics Fear That Pace is Too Swift,” New York Times, December 8, 1980. 2 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense <strong>for</strong> East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, Testimony be<strong>for</strong>e the House <strong>Foreign</strong> Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Defense Relations with the PRC,” June 5, 1984. 3 Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1984, and August 2, 1985. The helicopters lacked capability to fly low and fast. 4 Department of State and DSCA, “<strong>Congress</strong>ional Presentation <strong>for</strong> Security Assistance, Fiscal Year 1992.” 5 Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 26, 1990. <strong>Congress</strong>ional Research Service 1
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