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Order
3:13-CV-1479-P
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PAUL HELLER, LESLIE HARRIS, §
DEBORAH BELTRAN, GARY STUARD, §
DIANE BAKER, and MAVIS BELISLE, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
v. § 3:13-CV-1479-P
§
CITY OF DALLAS, §
§
Defendant. §
ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, filed on April 16, 2013. (Doc. 3.) Defendant filed a Response on April
17, 2013. (Doc. 6.) Plaintiffs filed a Reply on April 17, 2013. (Doc. 7.) The parties appeared
before the Court at a hearing held on April 18, 2013. After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the
evidence, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
I. Background
Plaintiffs seek to stage protest activities between April 22, 2013 and April 25, 2013
which include a march, rally, and demonstration to voice their opposition to U.S. policies in a
number of areas. During these dates, the George W. Bush Presidential Center (the “Bush
Center”) located on the campus of Southern Methodist University (“SMU”) will conduct a
number of events culminating in a dedication ceremony. The event will include the attendance
of five men who have served as President of the United States. In preparing for their protest,
Plaintiffs obtained permission from SMU to stage a protest on a portion of SMU-owned property

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(“Expressway Tower”) located at 6116 Central Expressway. 1 Although this space lies on the
east side of the Central Expressway, the proposed protest area affords Plaintiffs a direct line of
sight to the Bush Center. 2 This location is important to Plaintiffs because the planned
demonstrations are being held in connection with the events surrounding the dedication of the
Bush Center.
Order
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In planning for their protest activities at Expressway Tower, Plaintiffs contacted the
Dallas Police Department in order to verify that their conduct would not subject them to citation
or other sanction. Members of the Dallas Police Department informed Plaintiffs that holding any
sign on the sidewalk at or near Expressway Tower would constitute a violation of Section 28-
158.1 of the Dallas City Code (“the Ordinance”). The Ordinance states:
A person commits an offense if he carries or otherwise displays a
sign 3 on, over, or within 75 feet of the roadway of any of the
following streets or highways in a manner intended to attract the
attention of vehicle occupants on those streets or highways. 4
Dallas, Tex., Code § 28-158.1(b).
In particular, Plaintiffs learned that they would be issued a citation if they held signs
within seventy-five feet or less of the access road running northbound on the Central
Expressway. Dallas police officers further noted that Plaintiffs would be able to hold signs in
protest so long as they stood more than seventy-five feet from the access road, which would
place them at or near the parking lot of Expressway Tower, rather than on the sidewalk adjacent
to the Central Expressway access road.
1
Central Expressway is a locally-known alternative name for certain portions of U.S. 75.
2
Several streets and roads on the west side of central expressway near the Bush Center will be inaccessible during
its opening due to either security concerns or crowd-control.
3
The Ordinance defines a sign as “any device, flag, light, figure, picture, letter, word, message, symbol, plaque,
poster, or other thing that is designed, used, or intended to advertise or inform.” Dallas, Tex., Code § 28-158.1(a).
4
The Ordinance contains a specifically enumerated list of highways to which it applies, including Central
Expressway. Dallas, Tex., Code § 28-158.1(b).

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Order
3:13-CV-1479-P
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On April 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant City of Dallas (“the City”) and
sought a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction declaring the Ordinance
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs. Following the City’s removal of this
action on April 16, 2013, the Court expedited the briefing on the preliminary injunction and held
a hearing on April 18, 2013.
II. Jurisdiction
In a separately filed Motion, Plaintiffs have moved to remand this matter to state court,
arguing that the City improperly removed from state court. (Doc. 5.) A defendant may remove a
suit from state court to federal court only if the action could have originally been filed in federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In this case, the City filed a Notice of Removal and claimed that
federal question jurisdiction arises from Plaintiff’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Doc. 1 at 5-6.) The Court finds that this is an adequate showing so as to confer jurisdiction of
this First Amendment case. 5
III. Preliminary Injunction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that the Court may issue a preliminary
injunction to restrain or require certain acts. For the grant of injunctive relief, a movant must
demonstrate the following equitable factors: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
5 Plaintiffs have also noted that they are defendants in an ongoing criminal trial in Dallas Municipal Court for
previous violations of the Ordinance. (Doc. 5 at 2.) As part of this suit, Plaintiffs state that on January 21, 2013
they were engaged in “a peaceful rally in favor of the First Amendment at the intersection of Mockingbird Lane and
Central Expressway.” (Doc. 1 at 17.) Plaintiffs state they were given citations under the Ordinance by members of
the Dallas Police Department and were told they would be arrested if they did not lower or cover their signs. (Id.)
Plaintiffs have raised a defense of the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance in the criminal proceedings. According
to Plaintiffs, the City Municipal Judge is holding the criminal case in abeyance pending the outcome of this suit. As
a result, Plaintiffs have asked the Court to abstain pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). (Id. at 3.) In
the instant ruling, the Court is ruling only on the Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
their planned activities in connection with the opening and dedication of the George W. Bush Library on April 22-
25, 2013. This Order expresses no opinion on the Ordinance regarding the citations given to Plaintiffs on January
21, 2013, as it occurred in a different location and was not a protest conducted in connection with the opening of the
Bush Center.

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merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) the
threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction
is granted, and (4) the grant of the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Janvey v.
Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 445 (5th
Cir. 2009)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy.” La Union del Pueblo
Entero v. FEMA, 608 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 2010). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is
merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Thus, “a preliminary injunction is
customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less
complete than in a trial on the merits.” Id. The Court may accept otherwise inadmissible
evidence, including hearsay evidence, “in the form of deposition transcripts and affidavits.”
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. F.D.I.C., 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993).
Order
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A. Success on the Merits
Government Interest
Regardless of whether the Ordinance is content-based or content-neutral, the City must
demonstrate that it has some meaningful interest in more stringent regulation of traffic at or near
the sidewalk of Expressway Tower. Courts use varying standards in evaluating the propriety of
government regulation of free speech. The most demanding standard of review is known as
strict scrutiny, whereupon the government must demonstrate that “the restriction [is] narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ.
of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, --U.S.--, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n. 11 (2010)
(emphasis added). Where a regulation is content-neutral and restricts the time, place, and
manner of speech, courts apply intermediate scrutiny, which requires the government to

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demonstrate that the regulation (1) serves a significant governmental interest, (2) is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest, and (3) leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added)
(citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535–36 (1980). Considering the
available tests, a showing of only a minimal government interest will not withstand a challenge
on First Amendment grounds. See e.g. Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569,
575 (1987); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Stay the Course W. Va. v. Tennant, No. 1:12-CV-01658, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112147, at *17-
18 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 9, 2012). Under the facts of this case, the interest articulated by the City
would have to be either compelling or significant. Based upon the evidence submitted at the
preliminary injunction hearing, there is inadequate evidence of either a significant government
interest or a compelling government interest in more rigorous signage regulation at the specific
area where Plaintiffs seek to protest.
Order
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Upon considering the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court
finds that the City has failed to demonstrate any need to regulate signs and other displays at or
near the proposed protest venue as strictly as outlined in the Ordinance. In its most general,
abstract form, the Ordinance serves the interest of the City in ensuring traffic safety.
Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 507–08 (describing traffic safety as one of a municipalities
“substantial governmental goals”). This interest would be especially important along
traditionally-defined multi-lane highways, which involve motorists traveling at a high rate of
speed, in frequently changing lanes, entering, or exiting the roadway. However, the City has
failed to adequately and particularly demonstrate that the traffic along the service road near the

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proposed protest venue is in any way different from any busy streets which do not fall within the
Ordinance’s ambit.
Order
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The stretch of the northbound service road between Mockingbird Lane and SMU
Boulevard is approximately 1,500 feet. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (search term
“6116 North Central Expressway”). This stretch of roadway contains no on-ramps or off-ramps
to and from the main highway portion of the Central Expressway. Id. Traffic signals regulate
traffic flow at both the southernmost intersection of this stretch and the northernmost intersection
of this particular stretch of roadway. Id. Plaintiffs submitted video evidence suggesting that this
particular access road is significantly elevated above the main highway thoroughfare and entirely
out of its view, and this evidence was not rebutted by the City. No evidence suggests that traffic
near the site is moving at a rate of speed greater than forty miles per hour. 6 Traffic along the
service road is limited to two lanes, whereas Central Expressway contains three to four lanes in
each direction. Furthermore, the proposed location is near an ordinary traffic intersection—
complete with a stop light—that more closely functions as does any ordinary intersection located
within the Dallas City limits where displaying a sign is not a citable offense under the Ordinance.
Factually, the area in which Plaintiffs seek to display their signs is more analogous to a
commercial setting than it is a highway setting.
Noting these unrebutted facts, the Court finds that the government has failed to meet its
burden to demonstrate even a minimal need to regulate First Amendment activity at or near the
proposed protest site any differently than any other street where Plaintiffs would not be subject
to citation under the Ordinance for bearing a sign. Finding that the government interests
6
Testimony received during the preliminary injunction hearing suggests that the normal speed limit in this specific
stretch is thirty-five miles per hour.

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advanced by the City are not implicated at this location, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
Order
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Vagueness
The City has taken the position that the term “Central Expressway” in the Ordinance
includes not only the main traffic lanes of the highway itself, but also all of its access and/or
service roads. Claiming that the Ordinance is constitutionally void for vagueness, Plaintiffs
argue that the Ordinance does not sufficiently apprise them as to where they may hold their signs
during their planned protest. (Doc. 7 at 19-20.) Regulation of speech must be through laws
whose prohibitions are clear. Flexibility in a statute is permissible, but the statute must provide
“fair notice” so that its prohibitions may be avoided by those who wish to do so. Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1972). Vagueness challenges usually must show that the law
has a capacity “to chill constitutionally protected conduct, especially conduct protected by the
First Amendment.” Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 546 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988)).
For criminal statutes, the Fifth Circuit uses a two-part void-for-vagueness test: (1) a penal
statute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness so that an ordinary person
may understand what conduct is actually prohibited; and (2) a penal statute must define a
criminal offense in a way that does not encourage discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.
United States v. Rudzavice, 586 F.3d 310, 314–15 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)); Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 507 (5th Cir.
2001). “But perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations
that restrict expressive activity.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (quoting
Ward, 491 U.S. at 794).

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Order
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Having examined both the Ordinance itself and the evidence presented at the preliminary
injunction hearing, the Court preliminarily finds that ample support exists to permit a preliminary
finding that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. First, the plain
language of the Ordinance itself does not contain any reference to the terms access road or
service road. 7 To support its position that the Ordinance includes service and access road
portions of Central Expressway, the City has cited the General Provisions portion of the Dallas
City Code, which defines a highway as:
identified as:
…any street, alley, highway, avenue or public place or square,
bridges, viaducts, tunnels, underpasses, overpasses and causeways
in the city, dedicated or devoted to public use. Dallas, Tex., Code
§ 1-5.
Further confusing the issue is the Dallas City Code’s definition of a roadway, which is
…that portion of a street improved, designed or ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic and that portion of a street used for drainage. Id.
Yet another definition contained in the Dallas City code notes that a street includes:
…any highway, boulevard, alley, street, avenue or public place or
square, bridges, viaducts, culverts, underpasses, overpasses,
tunnels and causeways in the city, dedicated to or devoted to public
use. Id.
These definitions flow in an entirely circular fashion, many containing identical language
or portions of other definitions, as is the case with the definition of a highway and a street. Each
definition uses the very term it defines in the definition section. Notably, none of these
definitions clearly or adequately suggest that a highway includes both the main thoroughfare as
7 Evidence in the record suggests that service roads are unique to Texas highways. Recognizing this fact, a
statutorily defined term such as “highway” would need to account for this feature when regulating which conduct
may occur in certain areas near the road.

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well as all of its access and/or service roads. Applying this understanding to Plaintiffs and other
putative sign-bearers along the Central Expressway, the Court is not convinced that an ordinary
person of even extraordinary intelligence would understand that the restricted seventy-five foot
sign-free zone actually begins from the outside sidewalk of Central Expressway’s access road.
Order
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The vagueness of the Ordinance also encourages its improper enforcement. As noted
above, a penal statute must define a criminal offense in a way that does not encourage
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement. During the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court
received evidence that even those tasked with enforcing the ordinance struggled to uniformly
apply its plain terms. On cross-examination, Chief Shedd, head of the Dallas Police Department
division tasked with enforcement of the Ordinance, demonstrated noticeable discomfort and
confusion when presented with several hypothetical situations 8 regarding display of signage
along the sidewalk of the Central Expressway service road. Many of Chief Shedd’s answers to
these hypotheticals were either unresponsive or inconsistent. Furthermore, other evidence
suggests that the Plaintiffs specifically asked Dallas Police Department officers if they would be
cited under the Ordinance if they were to stand with their backs facing the Central Expressway
access road with their signs facing the parking lot, not oncoming traffic, to take a photograph.
Dallas Police Department officers stated that this would be a violation and that such conduct
would subject Plaintiffs to citation. 9 During her testimony, Chief Shedd stated that she did not
believe that this would be a violation.
8 The hypothetical situations were not difficult to imagine as having actually occurred, such as football fans bearing
signs while on their way to Ford Stadium on the SMU campus or signs left unattended at the proposed protest site.
9 The officers expressed this belief notwithstanding the Ordinance’s plain language which requires a sign-bearer to
act “in a manner intended to attract the attention of vehicle occupants” on the highway.

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Order
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The Court finds that this inconsistent enforcement and the confusion surrounding what
constitutes a violation of the Ordinance is a result of its vagueness. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the Ordinance does not adequately outline the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
so that an ordinary person may understand what conduct is actually prohibited, nor does the
Ordinance define a criminal offense in a way that does not encourage discriminatory and
arbitrary enforcement. These shortcomings suggest that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
B. Irreparable Harm
To satisfy the second element of the preliminary injunction standard, a plaintiff must
show “that if the district court denied the grant of a preliminary injunction, irreparable harm
would result.” Janvey, 647 F.3d at 600 (citing Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777
F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985)). Injuries are irreparable only when they “cannot be undone
through monetary remedies.” Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312
(5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for a minimal
period of time, constitutes irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
The evidence before the Court is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs would suffer
irreparable harm. Notably, the parties do not dispute that the Bush Center dedication ceremonies
will host five men who have served as President of the United States, as well as plentiful other
dignitaries. The parties also do not dispute that the Bush Center ceremonies will receive a
substantial amount of media attention over the course of the week. For Plaintiffs, this presents a
unique opportunity to express themselves to an audience whom they may not be able to
otherwise reach. Common sense dictates that an event of this magnitude will not occur again
whereupon Plaintiffs will be able to convey their message under similar circumstances. Finally,

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Plaintiffs have provided evidence confirming their personal belief that displaying a sign will be a
very effective and powerful medium of expression. Curtailing this powerful means of expression
at this important time would constitute irreparable harm as to Plaintiffs. In light of the foregoing
evidence, Plaintiffs have met their burden on this element.
Order
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C. Balancing
The third element requires a preliminary injunction applicant to show that the threatened
injury outweighs any harm the injunction might cause. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc,, 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008). “The First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” Snyder
v. Phelps, --U.S.--, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)). Indeed, “speech on matters of public concern . . . is at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection.’” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758–59 (1985) (quoting First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). “That is
because ‘speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.’” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75
(1964)).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden as to the balancing of the harms for
purposes of a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs have presented evidence supporting the serious
injury that would occur to Plaintiffs if they were denied their fundamental right to free speech.
When weighing this serious injury against the minimal harm incurred in enjoining enforcement
of the Ordinance for a period of four days, the result favors Plaintiffs. This is especially true in
light of the City’s failure to provide sufficient evidence of its interest in regulating the use or
display of signs at the proposed protest site more strictly than at other traffic locations.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the threatened injury outweighs any harm caused by enjoining
the Ordinance’s enforcement for the dates of April 22, 2013 through April 25, 2013.
Order
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D. The Public Interest
Finally, the fourth element requires a preliminary injunction applicant to show that the
injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. As noted above, there is a strong
public interest in the freedom of expression, especially as it relates to protest speech. Bearing
this in mind, the Court finds that the public interest will be served by allowing Plaintiffs to fully
exercise their right to engage in speech, including the bearing of signs, along the sidewalk at the
proposed protest venue.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant City of Dallas and its police officers are hereby temporarily enjoined from
issuing citations under Dallas City Code Section 28-158.1 to any and all protestors bearing signs
on the sidewalks within the area donated by SMU, including Expressway Tower, for the purpose
of staged protest activities between April 22, 2013 and April 25, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 19 th day of April, 2013.