Gamini Dissanayake (Petitio... - Human Rights Commission of Sri ...
Gamini Dissanayake (Petitio... - Human Rights Commission of Sri ...
Gamini Dissanayake (Petitio... - Human Rights Commission of Sri ...
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<strong>Gamini</strong> <strong>Dissanayake</strong> (<strong>Petitio</strong>ner In Sc 4/91) V. Kaleel, M.C.M. And Others file:///C:/Documents and Settings/kapilan/My Documents/Google Talk ...<br />
the purpose <strong>of</strong> explaining their conduct. On the other hand their object was to legally restrain those bodies pending a<br />
judicial determination <strong>of</strong> the dispute. I do not mean to blame them for seeking such relief. The point I make is that if<br />
the petitioners themselves were not prepared to submit to the party councils, then, there is no force in their complaint<br />
that the Working-Committee had failed to give them a hearing. I hold that the Working Committee acted fairly and<br />
reasonably in taking disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners in the way it did.<br />
I am also <strong>of</strong> the view that the petitioners' rights were not materially affected by the order <strong>of</strong> expulsion. I have<br />
earlier explained the state <strong>of</strong> their rights pending the determination <strong>of</strong> this Court. All the issues here relate to legal<br />
matters arising upon admitted facts. In the circumstances, the subsequent hearing by this Court is in substance the<br />
right to an antecedent hearing. Mr. de Silva submitted that had a hearing been given, the petitioners could have<br />
explained to the Working Committee why they failed to first raise the issues before the Party Organizations ; their<br />
explanation to this Court is that<br />
they were not free to discuss matters within the party ; but this is bald statement and I see no injustice<br />
caused to the petitioners in being deprived <strong>of</strong> an opportunity to give an explanation before the working Committee, in<br />
the particular circumstances <strong>of</strong> this case. I hold that there has been no violation <strong>of</strong> the rules <strong>of</strong> natural justice.<br />
BIAS AND MALA FIDES<br />
There is a wealth <strong>of</strong> authority on the traditional concept <strong>of</strong> 'bias'; as such it is unnecessary to discuss the<br />
many decisions cited by Counsel. Suffice it to observe that these decisions relate to Courts and other tribunals<br />
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power examples <strong>of</strong> the latter being licensing justices in local bodies and authorities<br />
in public institutions or trade unions vested with quasi judicial power. The situations in which 'bias' arises may be<br />
summed up as follows:<br />
(a) Licensing justices : bias results where particular justices having functioned as a Committee thereafter display an<br />
obvious interest in the making <strong>of</strong> the final decision e.g. by retaining Counsel to oppose the application on their behalf.<br />
They also either sit as Judges or are present with the Judges at the final hearing.<br />
(b) The presence <strong>of</strong> an interested person with the tribunal e.g. accuser, the person who made the original decision<br />
coming up for consideration by the tribunal or the Solicitor who conducted the case. Such situations may' arise in<br />
connection with a dismissal, suspension <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice or other punishment <strong>of</strong> a statutory employee or the removal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
authority to engage in a trade e.g. supplying milk to a statutory board.<br />
(c) The Judge having some interest or connection with a party or the subject matter which affects his impartiality or<br />
detachment. Examples <strong>of</strong> orders vitiated by such bias are a conviction <strong>of</strong> an accused by a Court or a fair rent order<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> a house made by the Rent Assessment Committee.<br />
The two broad tests <strong>of</strong> 'bias' are (a) the real likelihood <strong>of</strong> bias (<strong>of</strong>ten arising by a breach <strong>of</strong> the rule 'nemo<br />
judex in causa sua' and (b) reasonable suspicion <strong>of</strong> bias (arising by a breach <strong>of</strong> the principle 'Justice should<br />
manifestly be seen to be done'). Lord Widgery CJ said-<br />
" Those two tests are <strong>of</strong>ten overlapping, and it may be that one is appropriate to one situation and another is<br />
appropriate to another situation."<br />
R. v. Altrincham Justices ex p Pennington (106) .<br />
Mr. de Silva sees no room for relaxing the above rules in their application to the case before us and submits<br />
that the decision <strong>of</strong> the Working Committee is vitiated by reason <strong>of</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong> the President who is the accuser<br />
and the participation <strong>of</strong> the Disciplinary Committee in the final decision. Mr. Choksy submits that these rules cannot<br />
be generally applied to all quasi judicial bodies with the same rigour and that a distinction should be made between<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional disciplinary tribunals which bear a closer resemblance to Courts and other bodies. In R. v.<br />
Leicestershire Fire Authority ex p Thompson (100) Griffiths J. said -<br />
" Clearly, when one is dealing with a quasi judicial body, there has to be some degree <strong>of</strong> flexibility and there<br />
may be exceptional circumstances in which it will not be right to apply the rule in its full rigour."<br />
There are certain forms <strong>of</strong> conduct which do not necessarily constitute bias. Examples are (a) mere general<br />
interest in the object to be pursued by a tribunal e.g. in the case <strong>of</strong> a business association. (b) the interest which a<br />
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