Islam and the Bomb - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

20 The Court of Public Opinion “Conventional wisdom holds that organizations such as al-Qaeda can not be deterred because they are not focused on self preservation, do not value human life as most state leadership do, do not have territory over whose sovereignty they wish to preside, and live as parasites on relatively innocent bodies of host communities that cannot be justified to be targeted for massive reprisal. However, this assumption should be questioned logically and empirically….Terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda and Hezbollah evince a strong commitment to justice as they perceive it. Wanting others to see the justice of their cause requires some constraint on behavior so as to win sympathy with their constituencies and with those in the international community that they are trying to influence.” 21 Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons Andrea Phlebani Extreme religious views deeply influence nuclear intent, but terrorists also have pragmatic goals to consider. Like states, Islamist extremists seek sovereignty, status, and prestige. They seek to deter their enemies from attacking them. They aspire to hold territory, and to govern. Ayman Zawahiri has repeatedly stressed that in order for al-Qaeda to flourish, the movement must develop a vanguard of believers and build popular support for its ideology. 22 Presum- ably, such considerations also introduce constraints in employing weapons that may well change the game in ways that are inimical to their objectives. Yet, the leadership’s unwavering commitment to WMD suggests that they have taken all these considerations into account, and have determined that the benefits of WMD outweigh the risks. The evidence of al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire WMD for over a decade overwhelmingly suggests that the senior leadership’s intent is focused on developing high end WMD, not chemical weapons or “dirty bombs” that lack the game changing qualities of nuclear or biological weapons. In this context, a possible explanation of Zawahiri’s puzzling cancellation of a small scale chemical attack on the New York City subway in 2003 is that it simply wasn’t worth doing. 23 Or, perhaps Zawahiri recalled the impatience of Shogo Asahara, who failed to fulfill his prophecy to bring down the Japanese government by launching a hastily planned chemical attack on the Tokyo subway. 24 Al-Qaeda is not likely to make the same mistake. Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir hinted as much when he noted that whatever one thinks of al-Qaeda, “they always do what they say they are going to do”. 25 Mir, who has interviewed Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri, added that the al-Qaeda leader’s favorite Quranic verse is: “I will be patient until patience is outworn by patience.” 26
Yet, it is quite conceivable that al-Qaeda is seriously underestimating the likelihood of nega- tive popular reaction to a WMD attack. The group’s leadership has made such mistakes in the past. For instance, al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, launched a cam- paign to incite civil war between Sunni and Shia in Iraq that was so excessively violent that it turned the Iraqi population against al-Qaeda. After Zarqawi was killed by US forces in 2006, the senseless violence tapered off, but Al-Qaeda never recovered its former position. 27 Ayman Zawahiri’s efforts to convince al-Zarqawi that violence had become counter-produc- tive might have been drawn from his own experiences in Egypt, where he suffered a similar dissociation from the people’s mood. As the author Lawrence Wright explained: The Luxor Massacre took place on 17 November 1997 in Luxor, Egypt. Ayman Zawahiri, Mustafa Hamza, the new emir of the Islamic Group, and Rifai Ahmed Taha, the military leader of the Islamic Group, all hoped a massive terror attack would devastate the Egyptian economy and provoke the government into repression that would kill the initiative and strengthen support for anti-government terrorism. The massacre, however, marked a decisive drop in Islamic terrorists’ fortunes in Egypt by turning Egyptian public opinion overwhelmingly against them. Organizers and supporters of the attack reacted with denial. The day after the attack, Rifai Taha claimed the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage, despite the evidence of the immediate and systematic nature of the slaughter. Others denied Islamist involvement completely. Ayman Zawahiri maintained the Egyptian police had done it. 28 Zawahiri’s misreading of the public’s appetite for violence played a significant role in the diminution of his group’s influence in Egypt. Today, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is vying for power through the electoral process. Not surprisingly, Zawahiri has denounced this decision in the course of an acrimonious series of public exchanges with his old colleagues. 29 For the old Egyptian terrorist leader, the new position adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood, explicit or implied, is tantamount to a rejection of al-Qaeda’s strategy and tactics; as such, it represents a potential foreshadowing of al-Qaeda’s waning influence globally. Such concerns about their future as a global movement may help explain why the al-Qaeda core leadership seems more determined than ever to ratchet up the level of violence as far as it will go. Al-Qaedda’s core statements and actions that endorse ever increasing levels of violence do not appear to be resonating with the Muslim street. Given such a state of mind, free of the distractions of running a large organization, what kind of decisions are two fading, self-radicalized, and isolated figures likely to make? Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 21
Page 1: Islam Islam and the Bomb Religious
Page 4 and 5: Belfer Center for Science and Inter
Page 6 and 7: AUTHOR’S NOTE Threats cannot be f
Page 8 and 9: CONTENTS Foreword 9 Living in an Ag
Page 10 and 11: 8 Islam and the Bomb: Religious Jus
Page 12 and 13: 10 ing nuclear weapons? Has a decis
Page 14 and 15: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE 21 ST CENTUR
Page 16 and 17: 14 The Allure of Nuclear Weapons Th
Page 18 and 19: 16 Islam. They claim to represent t
Page 20 and 21: 18 In applying this hierarchy of mo
Page 24 and 25: THE QURAN AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTR
Page 26 and 27: 24 The first Caliph (successor to t
Page 28 and 29: 26 both Saudi radical cleric Nasir
Page 30 and 31: AL-QAEDA’S RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIO
Page 32 and 33: 30 On that basis, and in compliance
Page 34 and 35: 32 ings of US and Saudi targets in
Page 36 and 37: 34 In November, 2007, Sayid Imam Ab
Page 38 and 39: 36 He offers a meticulously researc
Page 40 and 41: 38 Zawahiri’s Three Operational M
Page 42 and 43: 40 they have done good for their re
Page 44 and 45: 42 Because the document was written
Page 46 and 47: SUNNI VOICES REJECTION OF TERRORIST
Page 48 and 49: Chronology of Sunni Voices Against
Page 50 and 51: Reactions to the anti-WMD Fatwa Dr
Page 52 and 53: SHIA VOICES IRAN AND THE BOMB Follo
Page 54 and 55: 52 “The decree by Khamenei “pro
Page 56 and 57: 54 “From all I can see, it’s no
Page 58 and 59: president of the Kayhan chain of ne
Page 60 and 61: Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yaz
Page 62 and 63: you can do whatever you want to def
Page 64 and 65: Comment: For additional information
Page 66 and 67: APPENDICES Appendix A - Background
Page 68 and 69: 66 Early Muslim scholars developed
Page 70 and 71: 68 located in Yemen, Iraq, and part
Page 72 and 73:
70 Appendix B: Al-Qaeda Nuclear Pla
Page 74 and 75:
Appendix C: Events from 2003-2010 -
Page 76 and 77:
In his book “Cosmology and Human
Page 78 and 79:
76 and hidden matters, the conseque
Page 80 and 81:
78 pressed. Thus, this prohibition
Page 82 and 83:
80 Appendix E: Sunni Biographies Dr
Page 84 and 85:
82 despite our strong oppositions t
Page 86 and 87:
84 to the United Nations. He presen
Page 88 and 89:
86 losophy and in particular Sadra
Page 90 and 91:
88 nied him food and drink until he
Page 92 and 93:
90 Zawahiri: Page 5, 8, 25, 26, 50,
Page 94 and 95:
92 “As everyone knows, whoever at
Page 96 and 97:
94 fought with fire, and Khalid ibn
Page 98 and 99:
96 Sa’id reported to us that al-L
Page 100 and 101:
98 “The Prophet, may God bless hi
Page 102 and 103:
100 and to refrain from them if the
Page 104 and 105:
102 permissible, and one may setup
Page 106 and 107:
104 “Al-‘Ayni said in ‘Umdat
Page 108 and 109:
106 C. The third position on the is
Page 110 and 111:
108 the prophet (may God bless him
Page 112 and 113:
110 facilitate victory over them. T
Page 114 and 115:
112 “In this Hadith there is perm
Page 116 and 117:
114 The Imam al-Nawawi (may God hav
Page 118 and 119:
116 Referencing Al-Ayni Al-Fahd: Pa
Page 120 and 121:
118 board with them. Malik said tha
Page 122 and 123:
120 “They said that this is a gen
Page 124 and 125:
122 that a tradition from the proph
Page 126 and 127:
124 “Similarly, if an non-believe
Page 128 and 129:
126 The second aspect: Muslim leade
Page 130 and 131:
128 beginning of the verse, God giv
Page 132 and 133:
130 book “Consensus on Matters of
Page 134 and 135:
132 Ibn Qudamah also said: “Chapt
Page 136 and 137:
134 Referencing Muhammad Ibn Isma
Page 138 and 139:
136 in the Name of God and in God
Page 140 and 141:
138 Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mer
Page 142 and 143:
140 a martyr. Anyone undeserving of
Page 144 and 145:
142 Zawahiri: Page 35, 80, 82, 83,
Page 146 and 147:
144 Similar to this is what Muhamma
Page 148 and 149:
146 ENDNOTES 1. Tzu, Sun. The Art o
Page 150 and 151:
148 Times. 29 May 2003. http://www.
Page 152 and 153:
150 115. Intelligence and Terrorism
Page 154 and 155:
152 163. Gomaa, Ali. “Biography.
Page 156 and 157:
154 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report wo
Page 158:
156 Islam and the Bomb: Religious J
show all

Islam and the Bomb - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?