Civil-military Coordination in the Common Security and ... - ETC Graz

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Civil-military Coordination in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union The most important testing ground for CMCO was BiH, where the EU for the first time conducted a military operation and civilian mission in the same country: the police mission EUPM (starting in 2003) and the military operation EUFOR Althea (starting at the end of 2005). In this case, CMCO proved to be difficult due to different, but overlapping mandates. EUFOR had an executive mandate, while EUPM was monitoring and mentoring the local law enforcement agencies, but both were simultaneously engaged in the fight against organized crime. The manner in which EUFOR implemented its mandate caused critique on the side of EUPM. EUFOR carried out its executive mandate very actively, which somehow hindered the implementation of a basic idea inherent in EUPM, namely that the local authorities should have the prime responsibility. 31 It was also reported that a lack of coordination led to situations, in which the EU police mission received information about EU military operations from the local police, not from EUFOR itself. 32 Furthermore, the integrated police units of EUFOR were criticized by EUPM for carrying out operations without informing EUPM or the local authorities. 33 Thus, the first year of coexistence of two EU missions in BiH was characterized by contrariness in the mandates and the executions of the missions. However, with the adoption of principles and guidelines for cooperation between EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR real progress has been achieved. Especially the EUSR’s role in mediation increased and regular meetings at different levels were established, indicating the evolution and progress of CMCO in BiH. 34 Overall, it seems that the main problem with regard to CMCO in BiH was that there was no comprehensive planning right from the beginning. With today’s concepts and the CMPD at hand, it may well be assumed that integrated planning would play a more substantial role from the beginning. Although BiH and further case studies 35 show that progress has been made in the field, it is difficult to evaluate to which extent the EU has learned the lessons on CMCO. This is also due to the fact that pertinent reports by the EU are not available to the public. 36 civil missions and military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 31 Jari Mustoneni, Coordination and cooperation on tactical and operational level: Studying EU-ESDP crisis management instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crisis Management Centre Finland, 2008, 22. 32 Jari Mustonen, Coordination and cooperation on tactical and operational level, 22. 33 Jari Mustonen, Coordination and cooperation on tactical and operational level, 22. 34 Jari Mustonen, Coordination and cooperation on tactical and operational level, 28. 35 CMCO was reported to be successful during EUFOR RD Congo at large. In this case, the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region again played a key role and weekly meetings of representatives of EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL and EUSEC proved to be highly valuable. Cf. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Civil-military co-operation and co-ordination in the EU and in selected member states, Study for the European Parliament, 2007, 18 et seqq. 36 In 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted Doc. 9885/07 EXT 1 on “Civilmilitary Coordination in the EU Supporting action to the AU in Darfur - Case Study and 37
Markus MÖSTL F Conclusions Concepts like human security have changed our understanding of how to best tackle today’s threats and crises. The growing demand for civil-military missions and the qualitative requirements for CMCO pose a real challenge for the EU. On a conceptual level, it seems that CMCO is taken very seriously within the EU and the potential value added by CMCO seems to be undisputed. It appears that it became a common understanding of the MS that CMCO should be on the agenda not only for the planning and conduct of a concrete operation, but also during the routine phase. In institutional terms, some serious problems still remain. The Lisbon Treaty diminished the pillar structure of the EU, but did not alter the still separate responsibilities of the Commission and the Council of the EU. Due to the different competences of these institutions, none of the actors may oblige the other to coordinate or to be coordinated. All documents adopted in this regard are therefore only recommendations and in no way binding. Although it seems that all actors involved basically agree on the importance of CMCO, the question remains where the limitations for coordination lie in practice. 37 The readiness and ability to coordinate may vary from one instance to another, and might therefore hinder permanent and systematic solutions paying due attention to CMCO. The coordination between the civil and military institutions of the CSDP, however, seems to be less problematic. 38 It is noteworthy that the institutional framework for military crisis management was developed more vigorously from the beginning. It may well be argued that the civilian dimension came in later and for a long time was not able to alter the basic approaches for crisis management, e.g., for the planning of operations. With the establishment of the CMPD real progress was made, as this body encompasses civil and military experts that have established contacts with the main civilian and military structures of the EU. The CMPD will therefore also have a key role in further advancing CMCO. 39 Looking at the mere numbers of civilian and military capabilities the MS committed themselves to provide for EU operations and missions, one is tempted to conclude that the EU indeed has the ability to deploy integrated packages of civil and military instruments. Yet, when taking a closer look at the capability development process, the picture is not that encouraging anymore. In practice, not all of the personnel committed by the MS will be made available to the EU and there is no guarantee that the personnel will be trained in CMCO to any extent. How should they live and implement a “culture of coordination”? Recommendations”. The part including the case study and the resulting recommendation has, however, not been declassified. 37 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Civil-military co-operation and co-ordination in the EU and in selected member states, 10 et seq. 38 See Radek Kohl, Civilian crisis management: the EU way, 127. 39 Despite this progress, some argue that only a joint civil-military headquarter would reflect a truly successful institutionalization of CMCO. 38
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