Eylem¨Ozaltun - Harvard University

Eylem Özaltun
Contact
Education
Areas of
Specialization
Department of Philosophy
Harvard University
Cambridge MA 02138
+1 (617) 495 2191
95 Dunster Street, # 111
Cambridge, MA 02138
ozaltun@fas.harvard.edu
+1 (857) 523 8758
Harvard University, Ph.D., Philosophy, expected May 2013
Harvard University, M.A., Philosophy, January 2005
Thesis: “Dummett and Davidson on the Dependence of Thought on Language”
Bogazici University, M.A, Philosophy, June 2002
Thesis: “On Hintikka’s Reconstruction of Kantian Intuitions and Ecthesis in
Mathematical Reasoning”
Bogazici University, B.Sc., second of the class, Mathematics, June 1998
Thesis: “Some problems in Coding Theory”
Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action
Areas of Logic, Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy, Early Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of
Competence Language
Dissertation
Publication
Knowledge in Action
It is widely acknowledged that an agent is doing A intentionally only
if she knows she is doing A. It has proved difficult, however, to reconcile
two natural thoughts about this knowledge. On the one hand,
the agent seems to know what she is doing immediately, simply by
doing it. Her knowledge seems to rely upon no evidence, and indeed
to rest upon no specifiable epistemic basis at all. On the other hand,
the agent can be wrong about what she is doing; her knowledge is
fallible. The difficulty is to see how an agent can be wrong about her
action if her knowledge of it is immediate. My dissertation provides
an account of the agent’s knowledge of her own actions that reconciles
these natural, but apparently conflicting thoughts(see attached
abstract).
Committee: Sean Kelly (director), Richard Moran, Matthew Boyle
“On the Reconstruction of Kantian Intuitions: Modern Logic” in Recht und
Frieden in der Philosopie Kants. Akten des X. Internatinalen Kant-Kogresses,
Band 5, edited by Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R.Terra, Guido A. de Almelda,
Margit Ruffing, published by Walter de Gruyter, 2008, pp.175-189.

Fellowships The Star Family Prize for Excellence in Advising, Harvard University (nomiand
Awards nated, expected May 2013)
Graduate Society Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University, 2011-
2012
Richard M. Martin Prize Fellowship, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University,
2010-2011
Travel grant for The nature of practical intelligence Workshop at Wissenschaftskolleg
zu Berlin, 28-30 May 2009, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University
Grant for language study in Munich, Germany, Philosophy Department, Harvard
University, 2007
The Jens Aubrey Westengard Fund Travel Grant 2005, 2006
Graduate Student Prize Fellowship, Harvard University 2002-2007
Travel and tuition grant for VISU 2001, Institut Wiener Kreis, Austria
Honor Student, Department of Mathematics, Bogazici University, 1996-1998
Papers
Presentations
abstracts provided below
“Intention §45” (draft)
“Knowledge in Action and First-person Reference” (draft)
“Self-knowledge as the Condition of Representation in General” (in preparation)
“On Velleman on the Efficacy of Practical Knowledge” Metaphysics and Epistemology
Workshop, Harvard University, January, 2012
“The World-involvingness of Practical Knowledge” Metaphysics and Epistemology
Workshop, Harvard University, March 2011
“Non-cognitivism and the Critique of traditional Metaphysics in Wittgenstein
and Heidegger”, invited presentation, Harvard Workshop in European
Philosophy, December 2010
“Practical Thought and I-talk” Metaphysics and Epistemology Workshop, Harvard
University, September 2010
“On whether “I” refers” Metaphysics and Epistemology Workshop, Harvard
University, March 2010
“Intention §45” Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Harvard University,
December 2009
“How do I know that I am doing something when I know that by doing it?”
Metaphysics and Epistemology Workshop, Harvard University, March 2009
“On Moran on Anscombe on Practical Knowledge” Metaphysics and Epistemology
Workshop, Harvard University, November 2008
“Are explanations of action by reasons causal explanations?” Metaphysics and

Teaching
Experience
Epistemology Workshop, Harvard University, November 2007
“John McDowell on Second Nature” invited presentation, Professor Martha
Nussbaums seminar on Virtue Ethics, March 2007
“Operativeness of reason in receptivity: Rationality as second nature” Metaphysics
and Epistemology Workshop, Harvard University, November 2006
“Is Language Necessary for Thought?” refereed International Conference on
Philosophy of Athens Institute for Education and Research, June 2006
“Where do Davidson and Burge disagree?” Metaphysics and Epistemology
Workshop, Harvard University, May 2006
“On the Reconstruction of Kantian Intuitions in Modern Logic.”refereed 10th
International Kant Congress in Sao Paulo, Brazil, September 2005
“Dummett and Davidson on the Dependence of Thought on Language” Metaphysics
and Epistemology Workshop, Harvard University, March 2005
“Is Freges Logic Synthetic in Kant’s Sense?” Vienna International Summer
University(VISU)Scientific World Conceptions, ”Unity and Plurality in
Science”, June 2001
“On the analytic/synthetic distinction in Kant and Frege” Middle East Technical
University, Ankara, Turkey, May 2000
Full Responsibility at Harvard University
Moral Psychology in Plato’s Republic
Aristotle and Anscombe on Action
Anscombe’s Intention
Teaching Fellow at Harvard University
Philosophy 139x: Heidegger: Being and Time (Instructor: Sean D. Kelly)
Phil 129 : Kants Theoretical Philosophy (Instructor: Matthew Boyle)
Phil 144: Logic and Philosophy (Instructor: Warren Goldfarb)
Phil 137: The Later philosophy of Wittgenstein (Instructor: Warren Goldfarb)
MR66 : Are there moral truths? (Instructor: Niko Kolodny)
Quantitative Reasoning 22 (Instructor: Richard Heck)
Teaching Assistant at Bogazici University
Calculus I and II for Math Majors

Sample
Courses
Prepared to
Teach
Calculus I and II for Engineers)
Introduction to Mathematical Structures for Math Majors
Set Theory for Math Majors
Graduate Self-Reference and Self-Consciousness, Disjunctivism in Perception
and Action, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind, Practical and Theoretical
Reason Distinction
Advanced Undergraduate Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Philosophy of
Language; Logic (through incompleteness theorems), Early and Late Philosophy
of Wittgenstein, History of Early Analytic Philosophy, Moral Psychology,
Epistemology, Metaphyiscs
Introductory History of Modern Philosophy, Introduction to Philosophical
Problems, Introduction to Ethics
Graduate
Coursework Taken for Credit
The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein Warren Goldfarb
Intensinal Logic Chales Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics Charles Parsons
Seminar on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Charles Parsons
Seminar on Leibniz Don Rutherford
Aristotle Raphael Woolf
Kant’s Ethical Theory Christine Korsgaard
The Ethical Thought of Hume Christine Korsgaard
Philosophy of Language: Meaning and Communication Richard Heck
Sense and Reference Richard Heck
First year colloquium Richard Heck/ Alison Simmons
Audited
Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics Gisela Striker
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Charles Parsons
Seminar on Philosophy of Action Christine Korsgaard
Seminar on Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge Matthew Boyle
Seminar on Evolution and Cognition Peter Godfrey-Smith
Rationality and Irrationality Matthew Boyle
Seminar on Philosophy of Psychology Charles Travis
Frege Peter Hylton
Seminar on Topics in Philosophy of Language Richard Heck
Seminar on Wittgenstein Warren Goldfarb
Seminar on Quine Warren Goldfarb
Seminar on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Warren Goldfarb
Seminar on Ethics and Action Doug Lavin & Matthew Boyle
Seminar on Virtue Ethics Martha Nussbaum

Employment
and Academic
Service
Miscellaneous
References
Resident Tutor Kirkland House, Harvard University, August 2008-present
Sophomore Advisor: I serve as the academic advisor to sophomore students, I
help them to choose a concentration, prepare a study plan toward concentration
declaration and sign their study cards
Philosophy Tutor: I work with Philosophy concentrators in the house helping
them with their course work, and graduate school applications
Drama tutor: I serve as the advisor to the drama society overseeing two productions
per academic year
Intern RWTH Aachen, Germany, Summer 2008
I translated the university website from German to English
Administrative Assistant to Professor Christine Korsgaard, Spring 2008
Philosophy Department Representative Harvard University Mind/Brain/Behaviour
Initiative Graduate Steering committee, 2006-2007
Co-organizer 2007 MBB Graduate Student Conference: ”Finding Perfection:
Perspectives on Optimality from Mind, Brain and Behavior”
http://mbb.harvard.edu/grad/gradstudentconf.php
Coach undergraduate MBB concentrators thesis presentations, 2006-2007
Private tutor in Mathematics for students with learning disabilities, 2000-2002
Languages: Turkish (native), German (research)
Sean Kelly (sdkelly@fas.harvard.edu)
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
Richard Moran (moran@fas.harvard.edu)
Brian D. Young Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
Matthew Boyle (boyle2@fas.harvard.edu)
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
Warren Goldfarb (gorlfarb@fas.harvard.edu)
Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Modern Mathematics and Mathematical
Logic, Harvard University
Martha Nussbaum (martha nussbaum@law.uchicago.edu)
Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of
Chicago
Charles Travis (c.s.travis@gmail.com)
Professor of Philosophy, King’s College London

Dissertation
Abstract
Knowledge in Action
It is widely acknowledged that one feature that distinguishes intentional actions
from other events in the life of an agent is the agent’s special epistemic status
with respect to them. Though we often know with remarkable accuracy what a
person is doing by observing her, when observing her movements is not enough,
we ask “what are you doing?” We expect the agent to know what she is doing;
moreover we expect her to know already, that is, without needing to find out.
Yet how can the agent know contingent facts about the world beyond her own
mind immediately, without observation or inference? Our claims about what we
are doing are clearly fallible: what then entitles us to our normal presumption
that we can speak on this topic without needing to verify that our claims are
true?
In the face of this difficulty, many philosophers distinguish two objects of knowledge
in action: the object of immediate knowledge, which is supposed to be
something interior, and what the agent actually does, which is only known mediately.
Different philosophers take different things to be the object of immediate
knowledge: intention, trying, the description under which my action is intentional,
etc. Moreover, there is disagreement about how the object of immediate
knowledge relates to the object of mediate knowledge: some claim that we know
these two objects in two independent ways, while others seek to show how we
can know the latter on the basis of our knowledge of the former. Nevertheless,
I argue, this common assumption is shared by many different action theorists:
that the object of immediate agential knowledge is not what the agent actually
does.
In my dissertation, I argue that this two-factor framework is unacceptable. I
show that the two-factor framework cannot account for the insight which motivated
the study of intentional action via the agent’s knowledge of these actions:
that it is in virtue of this specific way of knowing that the agent is the agent
of her intentional actions. I argue that it should be a condition of adequacy
on an account of agent’s knowledge of her own actions that it clarifies how this
knowledge contributes to our capacity for agency. I go on to propose an account
of knowledge in action that saves the phenomena we noted above: it allows us
to recognize a way of knowing that is (i) concerned with what the agent actually
does, (ii) immediate, and (iii) fallible.
Whereas the two-factor framework distinguishes two objects of which the agent
has knowledge, I defend a view on which there is only one object known—what
the agent actually does—but two modes of awareness that contribute to this
knowledge. I show that acting itself, in its own right, is a way of knowing how
things are, and therefore that the agent can know what actually happens when
she acts simply by acting, with no need for further epistemic work. I argue
that the agent’s immediate knowledge of her own actions can be accounted for
by a certain “transparency” in action-awareness: although an agent’s primary
awareness is of what she is pursuing—her goal and the steps that must be taken
to achieve it—she is aware of these things in a way that permits her, on reflection,
to recognize that she engaged in the pursuit of this goal. It is this awareness

Abstracts of
Individual
Papers
the agent makes explicit to herself and others in a report like “I am doing A”
when prompted by the question “What are you doing?” Moreover, I argue that
this immediate knowledge is no obstacle to fallibility: just as my perceptions
are available to me immediately, but constitute knowledge only if I perceive
successfully, so my actions are available to me immediately, but “I am doing A”
expresses knowledge only if I act successfully, that is, only if I am actually doing
A.
This account of knowledge in action also allows us to clarify the connection between
this knowledge and the capacity for agency itself. To know one’s actions is,
on my account, to be aware of the world actingly. The reason that is involved in
action is thus not aimed at depicting what is happening but at doing what makes
sense, and in this respect, it is practical. That is why the relevant reasoning in
question is means-end reasoning, the kind of reasoning that guides the action in
the pursuit of an end. The efficacious knowledge in action is the understanding
of the kind of action the agent set herself to bring about. For example, if the
action is building a house, the efficacious knowledge is the agent’s understanding
of the concept house in such a way that he can produce an instance of it here
and now. I argue that it is by exercising this general knowledge the agent settles
the particulars of this house that she is building here and now. If all goes well,
this general knowledge determines the activity of building and exhausts itself in
the construction of a particular house. So it is through an exercise of productive
knowledge of the general one knows what one is doing on particular occasions.
Moreover, the practical and goal-oriented character of this guiding knowledge
also explains the agent’s ability to not only know what she is doing but also why
she is doing what she is doing. Thus we can say that acting intentionally is not
acting and also knowing that one is acting, but rather exercising one’s power to
know in making something tangible happen.
“Intention §45” (draft)
On the basis of the fourth paragraph of §45, several commentators have claimed
that practical knowledge is non-factive. Some other commentators have tried
to avoid this reading by claiming that the object of practical knowledge is independent
of what actually takes place, and therefore practical knowledge implies
truth but of something short of what happens. I think none of these options
fits well with the central claims of Anscombe’s Intention. I provide a reading
of §45 by which we can resist the idea that practical knowledge is of some interior
thing which is short of what is happening while also rejecting the idea
that there can be knowledge without truth or fallibility. I argue that according
to Anscombe, we have practical, non-observational knowledge of what happens
when what happens is our intentional doing. When what we think we are doing
is not what happens, we do not have knowledge.

“Knowledge in Action and First-person Reference” (draft)
In this paper I explore the consequences of my account of the agent’s knowledge
of her own actions for the semantic analysis of the first person action sentences.
I further argue that the semantic structure we discover in the first person action
sentences can be extended to all I-talk. Along the way I provide a new take on
the debate on whether “I” refers, and a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
object-subject use of “I” distinction that challenges the dominant view that the
distinction is meant to isolate the phenomenon coined as “immunity to error
through misidentification” by Shoemaker.
“Self-knowledge as the Condition of Representation in General”(in preparation)
According to the analysis I give in my dissertation, practical knowledge is a
way of knowing objective reality in its own right by being the author of it.
This points to a very different relationship between the knower and the known
compared to the relationship characteristic of observational knowledge. In this
paper I investigate this relationship to expose practical knowledge as a form
of self-knowledge. By reflecting on the peculiarities of the use of first person
pronoun “I” in general, I explore whether some important aspects of practical
knowledge as self-knowledge in action can be extended to the whole self-thought
towards an understanding of what self-consciousness is in both its theoretical
and practical guises. I start by defending the view that the reflective capacities
are not invoked in action to give a reflexive representation of the agent herself as
acting, and generalize this view to a characterization of self-consciousness not as
reflexive consciousness but as the form of our human consciousness in general.
In other words, our ability to have self-knowledge will turn out to be not the
ability to represent ourselves among other objects of knowledge. Instead, it will
be portrayed as the very condition of representing or doing anything in the first
place.