Cuba After Castro - RAND Corporation

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6 Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments evolved into a single-party totalitarian state, starting in the mid- 1960s: It was guided by a ruling ideology that fused fidelismo with a radicalized version of Marxism that aimed at transforming Cuban society. It eliminated pluralism as the private sector was replaced by an increasingly centralized command economy; at the same time, autonomous social institutions were taken over, dismantled, or cowed into submission. And through its state and Party organs, it penetrated deeply into society, providing the Castro regime with far greater control over individual citizens than traditional authoritarian regimes in the rest of Latin America had. Cuba’s powerful state apparatus not only enabled the Castro regime to repel U.S. aggression and ride out the potentially destabilizing effects of the more-than-four-decades-old U.S. embargo. It also enabled Castro to project Cuba’s influence worldwide—including through the dispatch of combat troops to Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Further, it enabled the regime to carry out a radical social revolution that extinguished most of the nonagrarian private sector, redistributed private property either on an individual basis or on a mostly collective basis, and eliminated the vestiges of Cuba’s pre- 1959 civil society. The power and reach of Cuba’s totalitarian state were greatly strengthened by the Castro government’s close ties to Moscow. Begun in 1960 and, after surviving the strains caused by Nikita Khrushchev’s withdrawal of Soviet missiles in the October 1962 crisis, these ties grew steadily to the point that Cuba became a privileged client-state of the Soviet Union. Soviet arms transformed Cuba’s armed forces into Latin America’s most potent, battle-tested military (Suchlicki, 1989). More important in terms of the regime’s political survival at home, Soviet economic largesse enabled Cuba to overcome the effects of the U.S. economic embargo and, just as important, enabled the regime to deliver on the social compact between state and society: Cuban citizens were provided with an array of social goods—free health care and education, low-cost housing, subsidized food rations, and state employment—in exchange for their loyalty and support.
Castro’s Political Legacies: Caudilloism and Totalitarianism 7 Pillars of Support for the Castro Regime, 1959–1991 Seen in retrospect, the Castro regime rested on four pillars of internal and external support during the first three decades of its existence. The first was the great caudillo himself, Fidel Castro, who from the outset enjoyed enthusiastic personal support and loyalty from the majority of the populace when he seized power in 1959. Fidel’s persona was immediately invested with charismatic authority as the young rebel chieftain who had miraculously delivered Cuba from the Batista dictatorship; in the eyes of his followers, he was now the chosen leader, destined to continue performing miracles on behalf of the fatherland. A gifted orator, he articulated the aspirations of the common man and effectively manipulated symbols of nationalism and anti-Americanism to rally popular support. Although his charisma would wane following the 1970 sugar harvest debacle, and although Cubans would become increasingly weary of the personal sacrifices and repression they had to endure, he would remain like China’s Mao Tse-tung––Cuba’s “Great Helmsman.” The second pillar of support was the “Revolution,” which combined nationalistic defiance of the United States with popular, responsive government and a social compact between the state and its people. Under the social compact, the state promised to deliver a better life to its citizens in return for their support and devotion to the Revolution. Hence, the revolutionary government bettered the standard of living of the rural population, committed itself to a policy of full employment, and provided blacks and mulattos with equal access to government jobs, higher education, and the professions. In addition, extensive entitlements were given to all Cubans––from free health care and education, and low-priced rationed foodstuffs, to early retirement with a pension. The third supportive pillar was the totalitarian state apparatus. Its erection greatly strengthened the regime’s control over the population and rid society of pluralism. The movement toward totalitarianism had been under way since the sweeping nationalization decrees that began in 1960 eliminated large and medium-sized privately owned Cuban enterprises, as well as large and medium-sized private
Page 1 and 2: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS CIVIL JUST
Page 3 and 4: CUBA AFTER CASTRO Legacies, Challen
Page 5 and 6: Preface Cuba is nearing the end of
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Page 27: Acknowledgments The authors wish to
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Page 75 and 76: CHAPTER FOUR Cuba’s Racial Divide
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Cuba’s Racial Divide 57 holding o
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Cuba’s Racial Divide 59 compiled
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Cuba’s Racial Divide 61 • None
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Cuba’s Racial Divide 63 to ignore
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Cuba’s Racial Divide 65 region co
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Part II: The Structural Challenges
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The Structural Challenges Ahead 69
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CHAPTER FIVE Cuba’s Changing Demo
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Cuba’s Changing Demographic Struc
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CHAPTER SEVEN The Need for Industri
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The Need for Industrial Restructuri
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CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion Both Fidel
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Conclusion 107 the majority of the
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Conclusion 109 1988) were unsustain
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Conclusion 111 would seem to be in
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Conclusion 113 As the experience in
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Conclusion 115 First, the governmen
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Conclusion 117 gime will be unwilli
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Conclusion 119 China. Still, the Un
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Cuba After Castro - RAND Corporation

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