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20 Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments among some members of the elite, who question the wisdom of the new repressive line that Castro and other hard-liners have adopted. 17 Consequently, reliance on the post-totalitarian state’s control apparatus is certain to delegitimize the successor regime, because that reliance will signify that political repression constitutes the only pillar of support available to the new regime. To legitimize itself, therefore, a communist successor regime will need to promote the island’s economic recovery and reconstruction. But here, Castro’s twin legacies of caudilloism and totalitarianism are likely to weaken the new regime politically, impeding its ability to consider needed reforms and embark upon a new economic course. The Burden of Caudilloism on a Successor Communist Regime The most immediate problem that a successor communist regime will face is: Who can fill the comandante’s shoes now that he is gone? Cuba’s caudillo has jealously guarded his power by getting rid of potential rivals––executing Division General Arnaldo Ochoa in 1989, then purging Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina in 1999. Of the remaining contenders, neither Raúl nor others, such as economics czar Carlos Lage, National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcón, or Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque, possess Fidel’s commanding presence or enjoy mass support of their own. Each will find it difficult to reign in what is likely to be intensified infighting among competing elites after Fidel Castro departs. And without strong leadership and _____________ 17 Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz, head of the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation, claims that the crackdown on dissident and opposition leaders has won those leaders support on the streets. In “Preocupa a Comunistas Jóvenes la represión en Cuba” (2003), Contacto Magazine reports an interview with two Cuban officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are in their early 40s, who said their generation was “preoccupied and disoriented” by the crackdown and executions, which recalled the worst excesses of the Revolution’s radical period in the 1960s. They considered the action by Castro and other hard-liners a major strategic mistake that left Cuba isolated and in danger of an attack from the United States. One even wondered whether U.S. troops would be welcomed as liberators in Cuba as they were in Iraq.
Castro’s Political Legacies: Caudilloism and Totalitarianism 21 elite cohesion, the chances are slim that the new regime can embark upon a new economic course. The leadership void could be filled institutionally, but Castro’s personalistic style of governance has been such that there has always existed a tension between caudilloism and institutionalization. Even with the so-called institutionalization of the Revolution, which commenced in the 1970s, the Cuban leader used the reinvigorated Party apparatus and the new 1976 Constitution to formalize his alreadyformidable powers as Commander in Chief, First Secretary of the Party, and head of both state and government. The question thus arises: Can the existing institutional arrangements transcend his passing and assume an institutional coherence and legitimacy of their own? In this respect, institutional governance under Castro has been essentially pro forma over the past 30 years. The National Assembly of People’s Power normally meets but twice a year for two-day sessions, during which it obediently ratifies the laws and decrees issued in the interim by the Council of State. The Party Congresses are largely scripted events, and in recent years they have not been convened as regularly prescribed. 18 Hand-picked by the Castro brothers, the Party’s Political Bureau and Central Committee serve as instruments for wielding the uncontested political power at the top, while Party secretaries and committees at the provincial levels ensure that their orders are carried out by lower Party and state echelons. With its cadres of 780,000, the PCC is designated constitutionally as Cuba’s sovereign, guiding institution. For that reason, the PCC is a select organization rather than a mass party open to ordinary citizens; its candidates are carefully screened for their loyalty, ideological commitment, and political dedication. But the Party experienced an extraordinary surge in membership from 1992 to 1996, when 232,457 new members were enrolled, which suggests that recruiting standards were lowered in order to boost the Party’s rolls in a _____________ 18 Although they are to be held every five years, both the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses were delayed by a year as a result of the crisis of the 1990s, whereas the Sixth Party Congress had also been postponed from December 2002 to an unannounced time in 2003 or 2004.
Page 1 and 2: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS CIVIL JUST
Page 3 and 4: CUBA AFTER CASTRO Legacies, Challen
Page 5 and 6: Preface Cuba is nearing the end of
Page 7: The RAND Corporation Quality Assura
Page 10 and 11: viii Cuba After Castro: Legacies, C
Page 13 and 14: Executive Summary Cuba’s economy
Page 15 and 16: Executive Summary xiii trate, contr
Page 17 and 18: Executive Summary xv An Alienated Y
Page 19 and 20: Executive Summary xvii from the mos
Page 21 and 22: Executive Summary xix adopted, sadd
Page 23 and 24: Executive Summary xxi the island’
Page 25 and 26: Executive Summary xxiii measures--i
Page 27: Acknowledgments The authors wish to
Page 30 and 31: 2 Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Chal
Page 38 and 39: 10 Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Cha
Page 75 and 76: CHAPTER FOUR Cuba’s Racial Divide
Page 77 and 78: The Elusive Subject of Race in Cast
Page 79 and 80: Cuba’s Racial Divide 51 new, more
Page 81 and 82: Cuba’s Racial Divide 53 Blas Roca
Page 83 and 84: Cuba’s Racial Divide 55 emphasizi
Page 85 and 86: Cuba’s Racial Divide 57 holding o
Page 87 and 88: Cuba’s Racial Divide 59 compiled
Page 89 and 90: Cuba’s Racial Divide 61 • None
Page 91 and 92: Cuba’s Racial Divide 63 to ignore
Page 93 and 94: Cuba’s Racial Divide 65 region co
Page 95 and 96: Part II: The Structural Challenges
Page 97 and 98: The Structural Challenges Ahead 69
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CHAPTER FIVE Cuba’s Changing Demo
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Cuba’s Changing Demographic Struc
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CHAPTER SEVEN The Need for Industri
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The Need for Industrial Restructuri
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CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion Both Fidel
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Conclusion 107 the majority of the
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Conclusion 109 1988) were unsustain
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Conclusion 111 would seem to be in
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Conclusion 113 As the experience in
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Conclusion 115 First, the governmen
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Conclusion 117 gime will be unwilli
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Conclusion 119 China. Still, the Un
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122 Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Ch
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