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16 Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments emptive strike he decapitated the ranks of the political opposition (Bond, 2003, p. 123): The recent crackdown has left Cuba’s most courageous civilsociety activists in jail for decades (three others arrested in the same roundup are still awaiting trial). . . . Those behind bars come from all races and walks of life: Catholics and Freemasons, intellectuals and peasants. Some are only in their twenties; others are in their sixties. Less than half of the prisoners lived in Havana—proof that their cause represents not an elite occupation but a broader movement, albeit one now decapitated. Adhering to his usual modus operandi, he sought to mobilize public support and justify his crackdown on dissidents by raising the specter of a U.S. invasion of Cuba––this time by broadcasting European and Arab television coverage of the Iraqi War and by ordering air-raid drills at primary schools. But the aging leader may also have had a longer-term objective in mind in launching the March 18, 2003, dragnet: to ensure that his anointed, successor communist regime can take power without having to confront an internal political opposition. That way, both his place in history and his Revolution would survive his passing. The Outlook for a Successor Communist Regime A successor communist regime that takes power after Castro departs the scene will initially possess a number of political advantages. It will inherit the apparatus of the post-totalitarian state, whereas the political opposition, now largely shattered, is likely to remain weak along with what little there is of civil society. It will control the state’s coercive instruments of power––the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Ministry of Interior (MININT), the 780,000-member Communist Party of Cuba, and the millions who belong to the PCCcontrolled mass organizations, such as the CDRs. As his elder brother’s designated successor, Raúl Castro has had his anointment further strategically buttressed by his control over
Castro’s Political Legacies: Caudilloism and Totalitarianism 17 both the FAR and MININT. However, even if he outlives his brother, 12 Raúl lacks Fidel’s personal magnetism and moral authority, has little visible public support of his own, and is an unlikely candidate as another caudillo. He will need to compensate for his weaknesses by presiding over a coalition of fidelista and raulista loyalists of both hard-line and centrist orientation, from which the reformists, at least initially, are likely to be excluded. 13 But whatever its composition, the new regime is likely to find itself crippled from the outset by the loss of two out of the three remaining pillars of support––Fidel and the Revolution––because only the apparatus of the posttotalitarian state will remain in place. The successor regime will be weakened in the first instance by the absence of the comandante, who in 2003 is still able to infuse his regime with legitimacy, direction, and cohesiveness. With his passing, the popular legitimacy that was invested in his person will be gone. The regime could well become rudderless as factions emerge and struggle for power and authority in the absence of his unifying presence. If the regime falters, then the military is likely to step in and rule directly. 14 Second, the Revolution no longer is the great legitimizing force that it once was. Although reliable attitudinal survey data are unavailable, the Revolution has surely become a disillusioning experience for millions of Cubans. Especially under the Special Period that began in _____________ 12 Raúl turned 72 years of age in June 2003; Fidel became 77 the following August. However, Raúl is not in the best of health. Were he to leave the scene before Fidel, his passing would greatly upset succession dynamics and calculations while also removing a constraining, pragmatic influence on Fidel. 13 One clue as to the coalition’s future composition is in the new 31-member Council of State, which was approved by Cuba’s National Assembly on March 6, 2003. Handpicked by Fidel, at least one-third of the new Council was made up of old fidelista and raulista followers who date back to the anti-Batista struggle. The reappointment of Economics and Planning Minister José Luis Rodríguez, who is not a reformer, is one more indication that the regime intends to continue holding out against liberalizing reforms even as the island’s economic situation is worsening. 14 On elite divisions and how different succession scenarios may play out, see Edward Gonzalez (2002a).
Page 1 and 2: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS CIVIL JUST
Page 3 and 4: CUBA AFTER CASTRO Legacies, Challen
Page 5 and 6: Preface Cuba is nearing the end of
Page 7: The RAND Corporation Quality Assura
Page 10 and 11: viii Cuba After Castro: Legacies, C
Page 13 and 14: Executive Summary Cuba’s economy
Page 15 and 16: Executive Summary xiii trate, contr
Page 17 and 18: Executive Summary xv An Alienated Y
Page 19 and 20: Executive Summary xvii from the mos
Page 21 and 22: Executive Summary xix adopted, sadd
Page 23 and 24: Executive Summary xxi the island’
Page 25 and 26: Executive Summary xxiii measures--i
Page 27: Acknowledgments The authors wish to
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Page 75 and 76: CHAPTER FOUR Cuba’s Racial Divide
Page 77 and 78: The Elusive Subject of Race in Cast
Page 79 and 80: Cuba’s Racial Divide 51 new, more
Page 81 and 82: Cuba’s Racial Divide 53 Blas Roca
Page 83 and 84: Cuba’s Racial Divide 55 emphasizi
Page 85 and 86: Cuba’s Racial Divide 57 holding o
Page 87 and 88: Cuba’s Racial Divide 59 compiled
Page 89 and 90: Cuba’s Racial Divide 61 • None
Page 91 and 92: Cuba’s Racial Divide 63 to ignore
Page 93 and 94: Cuba’s Racial Divide 65 region co
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Part II: The Structural Challenges
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The Structural Challenges Ahead 69
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CHAPTER FIVE Cuba’s Changing Demo
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Cuba’s Changing Demographic Struc
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CHAPTER SEVEN The Need for Industri
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The Need for Industrial Restructuri
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CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion Both Fidel
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Conclusion 107 the majority of the
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Conclusion 109 1988) were unsustain
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Conclusion 111 would seem to be in
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Conclusion 113 As the experience in
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Conclusion 115 First, the governmen
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Conclusion 117 gime will be unwilli
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Conclusion 119 China. Still, the Un
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