CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

94 OLEKALNS, PUTNAM, WEINGART, AND METCALF
Hyder, & Genovese, 1999) or when they adopt a cooperative orientation
(Olekalns & Smith, 2003a; Weingart et al., 1993). On the other hand, reciprocal
use of contentious tactics or aggressive arguments blocks cooperative
behaviors (e.g., Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Olekalns & Smith,
2000; Putnam & Jones, 1982a, 1982b; Weingart et al., 1999). In the same
way that negotiators need to sustain cooperative sequences, bargainers
need to disrupt contentious sequences. Negotiators can accomplish this
process through using strategies that mismatch the other party’s contentious
moves or responding with a cooperative move or with a two-part
message that combines contentious with cooperative tactics (Brett et al.,
1998). This finding attests to the power of transformational sequences to
move negotiators to a productive bargaining pattern (see also, Olekalns
& Smith, 2000).
Sequences and Negotiated Outcomes. Paralleling the studies on frequency-outcome
relationships, a small body of research examines the
relationship between strategy sequences and outcomes. Sequence-outcome
research also focuses on the role of context and information management
in reaching negotiated agreements and in shaping the quality of
these outcomes. It extends the frequency-outcome research by showing
that sequential patterns are not simply adding structure to the strategies
that negotiators use; but rather, they make a unique contribution to how
the bargaining unfolds and ends.
Different patterns of sequences distinguish between resolved and unresolved
negotiations. Compared with dyads that settle, impasse dyads
are characterized by two distinct patterns: the frequency of competitive
reciprocity (Putnam & Folger, 1988; Putnam & Jones, 1982b) and strategic
inflexibility (Olekalns & Smith, 2000). Competitive reciprocity is evident in
the matching of defensive tactics such as substantiation, commitment, and
retraction. Strategic inflexibility surfaces in the pairing of these defensive
strategies with offensive strategies such as threats, attacks, and rejections
to create complementary competitive sequences (Putnam & Jones, 1982b)
and in a greater emphasis on the use of both competitive and complementary
sequences (Olekalns & Smith, 2000). The observation that impasse
dyads are more likely to match strategies and less likely to mismatch strategies
(use transformational sequences) implies that tight communication
structures, particularly the inability to blend cooperative and competitive
strategies, result in impasse.
Research on strategy sequences also adds to our understanding of how
joint gains are realized. Negotiators who reciprocate positional information
obtain lower joint gains than do those who reciprocate priority information
and trade-offs (Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Weingart et al., 1990).
Low joint gains also characterize outcomes for negotiators who engage in
asymmetric information exchange, specifically sequences in which concessions
and proposal modifications elicit information (Olekalns & Smith,