cmo - Philippine Army

Civil Military Operations OR 

Civil-Military Operations? 

MAJ RONALD JESS S ALCUDIA 

PA is a member of PMA class 93 

and presently the Operations 

Officer of the Civil-Military 

Operations Group. 

What’s in a Hyphen 

V 

ARMY JOURNAL April - June 2007 

BY: MAJ RONALD JESS S ALCUDIA PA 

arious references in the Armed Forces of the Philippines have alternately—and 

inconsistently—expounded on the abbreviation “CMO” as Civil Military 

Operations (un-hyphenated) and Civil-Military Operations (hyphenated). 

The AFP Manual on Operational Terms and Symbols used the un-hyphenated 

1 

form in its definition of operational terms while in a chapter on operational 

2 

acronyms and abbreviations, the hyphenated form is used. 

The Philippine Army manual uses the hyphenated form in its cover page 

3 

although, throughout the manual, the inconsistent usage is noted. The AFP CMO 

doctrine promulgated in 2006 resorted to using the un-hyphenated spelling 

4 

notwithstanding the hyphenated form found in the official CMO badge. 

It would be most convenient to cite 'inadvertent typographical errors' as the 

simple explanation for such inconsistency. In reality, however, such varied and 

arbitrary usage manifests organizational ignorance on the correct terminology that 

over the years has been dismissed as an inconsequential anomaly. 

“Basta CMO, alam na natin lahat yan,” an officer who did not know any better 

would say. 

So what's in a hyphen? Should a miniscule punctuation mean something, and is 

it worth the bother of writing this piece? 

Negligible punctuations, notwithstanding, consider this: 

1

WHAT’S IN A HYPHEN 

“In 1962, an Atlas-Agena rocket that was carrying the 

Mariner I satellite into space was launched from Cape 

Canaveral. Instead of heading for Venus, it veered off 

course. Ground controllers had to push the self-destruct 

button, only four minutes after takeoff. The whole thing 

exploded. Investigators later discovered that someone had 

left a hyphen out of the computer program (highlight 

5 

supplied). Cost to US taxpayers? $18.5 million.” 

While hyphens may have differing effects on computer 

programs and military operations, this fact aims to stress the 

point that omission of such a minute symbol affects the 

meaning of a term, and can actually result to costly errors. 

This article argues that the proper form is “civil-military 

operations,” and that the continued usage of “civil military 

operations” has led to a misunderstanding of CMO in the 

counterinsurgency campaign. First, however, a quick 

refresher in grammar and punctuation is needed: (1) 

generally, 

hyphenate between two or more adjectives when 

“ 6 

they come before a noun and act as a single idea. and (2) 

Use hyphenated compound adjectives as single 

modifiers. A compound adjective is a group of words 

that provides a single description of a noun that follows. 

Use hyphens between the words to make the words 

7 

appear as a single unit. 

MISUNDERSTANDING CMO 

According to the AFP, Civil military operations are 

planned activities undertaken independently or in 

coordination with civilian entities in support to the 

accomplishment of the AFP mission to gain popular 

support and weaken the will of the enemy to fight. 

CMO is a vital component of the triad characterized 

by activities that influences the beliefs, emotion, 

behaviors, attitudes and opinions of selected target 

audiences; it establishes and maintains good relations 

between military forces, civil authorities (both 

governmental and non-governmental) and the civilian 

populace to facilitate military operations in support to 

the accomplishment of the AFP's mission.” 

Common English usage has led us to expect a noun 

to follow an adjective. 'Blue bag' means 'a bag that is 

colored blue'. In military terms, an 'influenced barangay' 

is 'a barangay that is influenced by the enemy; 'forward 

observer' is an observer that is forward with troops 

trained to call for and adjust supporting fire', etc. 

Guided by hyphen rules as stated above, omitting 

the hyphen in 'civil military operations' will make 'civil' 

into an adjective that modifies the compound noun 

'military operations.' 

Taken at face value, CMO would then be interpreted 

as 'military operations that are civil'. If this is how CMO 

is understood, then the indirect implication is that 

military operations are, by nature, uncivil meaning rude, 

discourteous, lacking in manners or unfriendly. 

Following this view, CMO is portrayed as a 

different, albeit unusual, type of military operation - one 

that is of the refined, good-natured and friendly type. 

CMO as 'military operations that are civil' are 

manifested in soldiers doing works of kindness and 

goodwill such as giving candies and telling stories to 

children, a show of respect for the elderly, non-formal 

education classes like the Army Literacy Patrol System 

and assistance rendered in various forms (i.e. 

transportation, first-aid, etc.). 

By and large, this is the understanding of CMO that 

2 April - June 2007 armY JOURNAL

een imprinted in the consciousness of officers and soldiers. 

A clear example is the explanation given for the soldiers' 

presence in urban communities. To allay anxiety and 

suspicion, the explanation given was that 

the deployments were, in fact, civil 

military operations to make such a 

program palatable to critics and skeptics. 

Inadvertently, though, such 

explanation has succeeded in reinforcing 

the enemy's propaganda that AFP 

operations in the countryside are reckless 

and carelessly destructive. In a way, 

there was an urgent need to present the 

program as 'un-military' to differentiate 

the urban deployments from traditional 

military missions (i.e. war-fighting), and 

to get away from the ingrained notion that 

military operations are always enemydirected 

and offense-oriented. 

As an aside, this perception of CMO 

as being un-military pervades even in young military minds, 

transmitted no doubt by the same mindset of mentors and 

superior officers. 

In an earlier published article in the Corps magazine of 

the AFP cadet corps, this author wrote that based on 

impressions gathered from graduating Army cadets of PMA 



Class of 2006 who undertook the CMO module as part of 

the Platoon Leaders' Course, CMO was associated with 

“the 'civvies' stuff, or activities characterized as “unmilitary,” 

and therefore dispensable and 

unimportant. 

Seen as the anti-thesis to the macho 

warrior culture, there seemed to be Corpswide 

apathy attached to CMO so much so 

that cadets were frank enough to admit that 

in the cadet corps, being the S-7 staff 

carried with it a derisive connotation as the 

9 

'bayot' of the corps. 

“The point of the hyphen is to avoid 

10 

ambiguity for the reader.” 

'Civil-military operations,' on the other 

hand, portends a very different meaning of 

CMO. Expressed in this form, the presence 

of the hyphen leads to having 'civilmilitary' 

as a compound word in adjective 

form that modifies the noun 'operations'. 

The resulting term can then be expressed as 'operations 

of civilian and military forces' , and this is made possible 

by the change in the meaning of 'civil' from an adjective, 

to 'civil-' an abbreviated form of the word 'civilian'. 

“SO WHAT ?” the reader may ask. How is this 

significant? 

3


The author is of the view that the continuous omission of 

the hyphen has led to a misreading of CMO. All too often, 

CMO has been associated with military forces working for 

the civilian populace, instead of military forces working 

with the civilian populace. 

In general, military forces have conducted 

counterinsurgency operations embracing the 

persona of self-styled liberators. In so doing, 

the civilian populace, the mass base, has been 

treated largely as subjects-to-be-won-over 

instead of as partners-to-be-engaged. 

A clear example of this is the 

misconception behind the real purpose of 

military-initiated community projects. In the 

C l e a r - H o l d - S u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n a l 

methodology, military forces committed to 

counterinsurgency are tasked “to facilitate the 

delivery of projects and services for barangay 

11 

development”. These projects are 

considered as important milestones, a key 

result area, in the AFP's interventions to clear 

insurgent-affected areas. 

In most instances, what is lost in the process is the active 

involvement of the communities in project development 

such that they end up treating the enterprise as a 

military/government dole-out, and not as a tangible 

monument of community cooperation or a source of 

personal fulfillment. 

Dole-outs defeat the objective of community 

empowerment, perpetuating the culture of dependence 

and helplessness. Without instilling and nurturing in the 

civilian populace a sense of ownership and participation 

in these undertakings, counter-insurgent 

forces have adopted a formula for 

development that is not sustainable. 

Gawad Kalinga's approach to 

community empowerment is a model that 

AFP counterinsurgency forces should 

emulate. To develop ownership and 

restore dignity in target beneficiaries, the 

spirit of GK is “going beyond conventional 

charity towards helping the poor become 

better stewards of their families and their 

12 

communities”. An example of this is 

when “the poor “ pay for their homes 

13 

through “sweat equity”. Relating this to 

c i v i l - m i l i t a r y a p p r o a c h e s t o 

counterinsurgency, community projects 

are not end-states, but merely tools to achieve a 

sustainable peace. The underlying objective of such 

projects is to harness the cooperation, resources and 


spirit of the populace to accomplish something (i.e. waiting 

shed, day-care center, a water pump, etc.) beneficial to the 

community. The hope is that these small projects will serve 

as foundations for larger, more complex undertakings such 

as an economic activity (a cooperative) or a community 

defense network. 

Adopting the hyphenated spelling is more than jus 

setting a standard for AFP terminologies. It is meant to 

crystallize the understanding that CMO is not simply about 

building a good image of the military through good works, 

but more importantly, forging cooperation and 

commitment of both civilian and military forces toward a 

shared goal. 

Trivial as it may seem, the need to doctrinally 

establish the correct form of CMO could well lead to a 

better appreciation of this dimension of warfare, and this 

can perhaps enable both civilians and military forces to 

develop new, out-of-the-box approaches to confront the 

enemy's subversive-insurgency methodology. 

1 AFP Manual on Operational Terms and Symbols published by the Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations, AFP, p. 14. 

2 Ibid, p. 68. 

3 Philippine Army Manual (PAM) 7-00 

4 AFP CMO Doctrine. 2006 

5 Please visit: 

6 From: “The Blue Book of Grammar and Punctuation”. 

http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/hyphens.asp 

7 From http://www.editfast.com/english/grammar/adjectives_adverbs./htm 

8 Section 3-2 Definition of CMO, AFP CMO Doctrine. 

9 “Misunderstanding CMO”. Cpt Corps magazine Graduation Issue 2006 

10 From: 

11 AFP SOT Manual 


http://www.gocornerstore.com/Inventory_files/June_F/14F.html 

http://www.nyu.edu/classes/copyXediting/Hyphens.htm 

12 "The Eagle Will Not Fly Without the Poor". Speech delivered by Antonio P. Meloto during the 

Ateneo de Manila University Commencement Exercises on 25 March 2006 

13 From http://www.gawadkalinga.org/whatisgk_program.htm 

WHAT’S IN A HYPEN 

5

RESEARCH AND DOCTRINE 

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH is one 

the branches of OG3, PA whose 

functions include, among 

others, documentation of best 

practices in ISO and initiating 

studies on lessons learned from 

military campaigns. 

I 

Community Organizing 

Towards Economic Development 

RDD Branch, OG3, PA 

n line with the national command's thrust of enhancing operational practices of field 

units in Internal Security Operations (ISO), a series of documentations on the best 

practices in the conduct of ISO were undertaken. 

This includes different approaches and methodologies applied by successful 

commanders in different areas using variations that suit each area's needs and 

peculiarities. Reference materials were formulated and lectures on the approaches were 

conducted at the different levels of command to guide field unit commanders in the 

accomplishment of their mission. 

Among these successful concepts is the “Three-Phase SOT Sitio Approach” being 

employed by a Battalion somewhere in the Luzon area. Through this methodology, the 

Battalion was able to recover 71 HPFAs, clear 28 CT-affected barangays and neutralize 

36 CT regulars in a year's time while introducing development-oriented activities in 

support to local government units and local executives. The Battalion was also able to 

file 149 cases against CTM personalities in the area. 

What makes this approach unique is that there were no ideological clashes with 

the civilian populace as only purely economic issues were addressed by the 

Battalion. The SOT Teams were deployed unannounced in three key sitios of the 

barangay at the same time. They were also in “combat mode” as they do not make 

courtesy calls on the Barangay Captains, do not establish command posts and does not 

disclose its presence and activities. 

Anchored by the Community Organizing for Development (COD) strategy that 

aims to establish cooperatives in the target areas, the SOT teams were trained by experts 

from the different government sectors to help the operators appreciate the nuances of 

community organizing. By effectively neutralizing key CT leaders and personalities, the 

barangays were cleared in an average of 45 days. Most significantly, their mass bases 

collapsed due to the imprisonment of hardcore CTM members. 

The “Three-Phase SOT Sitio Approach” was proven to be very effective in the 

clearing of the most successful and the most advanced guerilla front in the region. 

Certainly, the methodologies and the TTPs applied by the Battalion will be very useful to 

other unit commanders in our bid to end once and for all one of the longest-running leftist 

insurgencies in Asia. 

BACKGROUND OF THE AREA 

The Peninsula's terrain is rolling/mountainous and subject to typhoons, the most 

th th 

recent being Reming and Milenyo in 2006. It has more of 4 or 5 class municipalities 

and is largely undeveloped. Agriculture is the main source of income and no major 

industrial project existed in the area although there are Globe/Smart Towers already in 

place. It is devoid of a major road network and the people are dependent on the main 

highway to transport products between towns. 


The Battalion is a former Scout 

Ranger Unit tasked for ISO in the 

Peninsula. When the present battalion 

commander assumed command in March 

2005, there were no SOT Teams in place 

although past unit commanders had 

conducted SOT in various barangays in 

the area. 

The enemy in the area has the 

following characteristics in 2005: 

1. It is the most advanced front in 

terms of organization and 

influence in the region and thus a 

priority for the clearing 

operations of the Division. 

2. Most of its barangays in the 

entire Battalion AOR has in fact 

a C o m m u n i s t s h a d o w 

government in place. 

3. The Guerilla Front confronted had been on 

recovery from the personnel, firearms and logistics 

base losses they suffered in the early 2002 which 

made them very busy; and they also had the support 

of the Regional Party Committee (RPC) of the area 

in terms of manpower and financial/logistical 

support. 

4. The said front was known as the “hacienda belt” of 

the region as it was the prime source of recruits for 

the armed group of the whole RPC. 

5. The CT Plenum was recently conducted in the area. 

Although the enemy corridors were already known, 

there were no active peace and order councils and the 

government line agencies and local government units were 

not visible or active in the area further reinforcing the 

backwardness of the place and consolidating the enemy's 

foothold in the peninsula. 

THE CAMPAIGN PLAN 

The Goal of the Battalion's Action Plan is to “shift the 

people's attention away from insurgency and towards 

economic development.” The rationale for this was to 

redirect the battalion's action from an ISO that is purely 

reactive in nature to a proactive and development-oriented 

campaign that can gain, and be sustained by, public support. 

This re-orientation towards economic growth made both 

troops and the people involved in productive economic 

activities that are more doable instead of abstract sociopolitical 

issues that do not resolve the hardship of the 


COMMUNITY ORGANIZING TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEV’T 

people. 

At the operational level, the goal was anchored on 

decisive engagements that will gain more public support 

for the military initiatives that would clear the area of CT 

influence and jumpstart economic development. 

The Battalion's approach to achieving the goal was 

to engineer a people's coup against the LCM by: 1) 

dismantling the CT socio-political-military structure in 

place that was doing 90% party works such as providing 

recruits and party members for the party's political 

activities and only 10% armed activities (minimal due to 

LCM's control of both people and place); and 2) facilitate 

economic development by linking up line agencies and 

local executives programs with the populace's 

requirements for development. 

The mechanisms for Battalion action were: 1) 

TRIAD operations to force CT elements into a 

containment area where they could be controlled, their 

actions made more predictable, and their responses made 

more in the area of armed combat which is their main 

weakness and the Army's main strength; and 2) modified 

3-phase SOT that netted target personalities right from 

the start instead of the SOT procedure that was too 

reactive, uses up more resources, and took too long to 

accomplish. 

P r i o r t o t h e B a t t a l i o n A c t i o n P l a n ' s 

conceptualization, the following took place: 

a. The Battalion was the Supporting Effort (SE) of 

the Brigade during the Campaign Plan of CY 

2005. 

7


b. As the SE, the unit conducted HOLD operations in 

the AOR, to prevent the Guerilla Front Committee 

(GFC) A from reinforcing GFC B and deter both 

fronts from further expansion. 

c. Companies were redeployed nearer Enemy Bases. 

d. Part of the ISO was the conduct of economy of force 

operation thru Community Organizing for 

Development/SOT at the pinpointed Enemy Center 

of Gravity (Keyhole Approach within the larger 

Holding-By-The-Belt Approach). 

e. A cooperative- based counter organization was 

established at GFC A's main mobility corridor at a 

barangay that became instrumental in jumpstarting 

the Campaign Plan for CY 2006 by being the eyes 

a n d e a r s o f t h e b a t t a l i o n f o r e n e m y 

movements/activities in said corridor. 

Also, the overall methodology of the Division provided 

f l e x i b i l i t y t o g r o u n d 

commanders that would allow 

them to take innovative 

approaches in ISO in their 

AORs. This methodology 

identified three key elements 

of counterinsurgency being the 

government, the people and the 

CTM; and dismantling 

insurgency by a) enhancing 

the legitimacy and credibility 

of the government, b) severing 

the people's support for the 

C P P / N PA / N D F, a n d c ) 

applying the appropriate 

military and police response 

against the enemy. 

The mission of the 

battalion was to “intensify ISO at 

AOR to clear GFC A by yearend 

(2006) in order for legitimate 

government entities to gain 

control of these areas, and 

establish a physically and 

p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y s e c u r e d 

environment conducive to 

development.” 

THE ACTION PLAN 

The plan was to divide the Peninsula into two operational 

TRIAD areas using the road from a municipality on the East 

(bordering the Bay) to a municipality on the West (bordering 

the Gulf) as the belt and Phase I taking place north of the belt 

and Phase II, south thereof. 

Parallel efforts in community organizing and the SOT- 

Sitio Approach were geared to render the enemy elements 

ineffective or constrict their movements towards 

containment areas that allowed for decisive engagements in 

the government's favor. 

The Battalion became the Main Effort (ME) as per 

Brigade's Campaign Plan on Feb 06 to clear GFC A. Thus, 

the mission of the battalion was to “intensify ISO 

at AOR to clear GFC A by yearend (2006) in order 

for legitimate government entities to gain control of 

these areas, and establish a physically and 

psychologically secured environment conducive to 

development.” 

The Battalion's subsequent operations were 

synchronized based on the following Action 

Plan SOPs: 

a. Special Working Groups were initially deployed 

clandestinely to mingle with the populace and get an 

accurate Intel profile of the important CT 

personalities operating in the area, their bases of 

operations, their network of co-CTs and key 

supporters, and their pattern of movement and 

activities. The identification of their corridors of 

mobility made their actions predictable and 

therefore subject to constriction efforts employed 

thereafter by the troops. 

b. GESCON was properly 

organized to clearly analyze the 

battlefield. Thus, mobility 

corridors, mass bases, and 

centers of gravity were defined 

and resulted in the canalization 

of the enemy armed group and 

identification of clustered 

a ff e c t e d b a r a n g a y s f o r 

SOT. 

c. Constriction areas were predesignated 

to canalize the CTs 

who were driven to these areas 

t h r o u g h s y n c h r o n i z e d 

intensified TRIAD operations, and the application 

of deceptions and feint attacks. 

d. Maintenance of a strike force other than the 

reserve force was proven effective in 

addressing/engaging the CTs displaced by the 

larger combat operations. 

e. The Security Forces of the SOT were deployed 

to block and further canalize the enemy towards 

the constriction areas. 

f. Part of the Battalion Action Plan was daily 

combat operations supported by Companybased 

patrols conducted by detachments within 

a radius of 5kms from each detachment. 

The 3-phase SOT Sitio Approach was anchored in 

all phases by the Community Organizing for 



Development (COD) efforts pursuant to the Battalion's 

economic instead of political orientation. Division-trained 

SOT operators underwent retraining in the Battalion's 

modified SOT operation to ensure that these operations 

would complement the TRIAD operations designed to 

canalize the enemy towards constriction points and 

identified containment areas. 

a. Community Organizing for Development 

(COD) Essentials 

1) The cooperative was the core of COD, being a high 

impact PsyOps project and employed as a counter 

organization that had all five Board members on the 

The SOT Teams were deployed in “combat 

mode” in the first or neutralization phase 

of the SOT-Sitio Approach. This meant 

there was no prior announcement of the 

deployment of the SOT, no permanent 

command post like baranggay hall, within 

the baranggay; and no courtesy calls as 

was normally the case in the traditional 

SOT approach 

government side, and through whom the election of 

key positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman as 

well as the coop-officers' positions could be prearranged. 

Here, former rebels also became involved 

except in the President and Treasurer positions 

which were of course occupied by the identified 

leaders in favor of the government. At any one 

time, the Battalion had complete knowledge and 

education in running the cooperative to ensure that 

the Battalion retained control over coop affairs 

because the coop leaders would have to refer to 

them for guidance. 

2) The cooperative that the Battalion initially 

established at the middle of two mobility corridors 

enabled the Battalion to have an Intel anchor to 

observe the movement of CT personalities and GFC 

A activities, and learn about the issues and concerns 

of the people so the proper linkaging with line 

agencies and local executives could be facilitated 

by the Battalion. 

3) COD projects that were established at base areas of 

the enemy, disrupted and/or canalized movements 


of regular guerilla formations in AOR and 

provide constriction areas where the enemy can 

be engaged and neutralized. 

4) SICA conducted at the neutralization/immersion 

phase of the SOT determined the existing 

problems or mainly agricultural and other nonagricultural 

concerns of the particular barangay 

that were to be addressed by cooperative 

approach in the implementation phase of the 

SOT. 

5) There were no ideological clashes with the 

civilian populace as only purely economic issues 

were addressed by the Battalion in the 

immersion and eventually the Pulong-Pulong in 

the implementation phase. 

6) The economic orientation/innovation also aimed 

to create economic activities in the affected 

barangays in order to focus the populace's 

attention towards economic activities rather than 

have them entertain CTM ideologies. 

7) Linkaging, networking and collaboration 

between relevant agencies and offices with the 

needs of the economic goals of the populace 

were emphasized in this operation- BN does the 

legwork while the mayors provide the resources 

and appear as the sponsors of these linkaging 

between the people and the government. 

8) The COD also served as the trap (Venus fly trap 

technique) for the enemy. 

9) Secret neutralization through unannounced 

visits, invitations, or persuasion of target 

personalities were quietly undertaken to turn 

them into assets for the government, or in the 

alternative, submit them for inquest or further 

investigation by the authorities. 

10) A credible hold/strike force was clandestinely 

deployed for the purpose of blocking escaping 

CT elements. 

b. SOT-Sitio Approach Essentials 

1) The Battalion-modified SOT-SItio Approach did 

not follow the traditional 4-phase Reengineered 

SOT but consisted of only three parts: (I) 

Neutralization and Immersion Phase, (II) 

Implementation Phase, and the (III) 

Maintenance and Mobilization Phase. The 

Battalion prioritized the neutralization of 

politico-military structure because the latter was 

9


already well-established and fully aware of SOT 

phases which meant the CTM were prepared to 

evade the SOT operators and mount counter-SOT 

activities. 

2) Holdings (i.e. target personalities, issues to be 

exploited and other requirements for dismantling of 

the enemy mass base at the targeted barangays) 

were prepared prior to immersion of the SOT 

Teams thus hastening the neutralization of target 

personalities 

3) A Task Group was created under the supervision of 

the S7 to direct, monitor and assess SOT progress in 

the targeted barangays. The TCP of the SOT Task 

Group would be in the center of a SOT-Sitio Cluster 

or else near three of the teams deployed. The PNP 

would come in only in cases of tactical interrogation 

at the Battalion level to handle the really difficult 

personalities. 

4) The SOT Teams were deployed in “combat mode” 

in the first or neutralization phase of the SOT-Sitio 

Approach. This meant there was no prior 

announcement of the deployment of the SOT, no 

permanent command post like barangay hall, 

within the baranggay; and no courtesy calls as was 

normally the case in the traditional SOT approach. 

This innovation confused the CTs and their 

supporters as to the intent of the military operation 

because the top personalities who were more into 

socio-political works were more prepared to 

counteract SOT activities in the traditional 

announced manner such as leaving the area when 

SOT operations were announced and coming back 

when it was over. Moreover, since the 

neutralization was done clandestinely using combat 

TTPs of stealth, feint and deception instead of the 

more common firefight and combat maneuvers, the 

CTs who were more into political work, were 

complacent and remained within their respective 

strongholds without realizing that their numbers 

were steadily being reduced through underground 

turning around tactics of the Battalion. 

5) The Centers of Gravity of the CPP-NPA-NDF 

structure in each barangay were identified and 

prioritized for insertion of troops. Then, in the 

initial neutralization phase, at least three (3) SOT 

teams were deployed unannounced at the same time 

in one barangay, and in specific sitios where key 

structures/personalities were found, leaving the 

target personalities constricted or limited in 

space and time with no opportunity to evade the 

operating troops. 

6) Alongside the SOT and TRIAD operations was 

an effective legal offensive due to the 

Commander's recognition of the need to make 

the CTs accountable for their illegal acts as 

another method of neutralizing them. This 

offensive was anchored by a senior NCO doing 

paralegal/liaison work and the Battalion's 

coordination with other peace and order 

stakeholders such as the PNP and the court 

authorities in the area. Specifically: 

6.1) The Battalion utilized witnesses, data from 

DOCEX and other pertinent sources to 

file cases against supporters and the 

armed group elements. 

6.2) The major reason for the legal offensive's 

effectiveness in neutralizing CTs was the 

correct appreciation by the Battalion 

Commander of the importance of making 

the CTs legally accountable for their acts. 

Without such appreciation, the CTM 

would have continued to expand its 

control over the masses in the area and 

eventually could have attained the 

strategic stalemate stage because nobody 

was doing anything about the filing cases 

to stop them. 

6.3) Known Target Personalities were 

continually given focused operational 

attention through constant visitation and 


invitation, making them aware that the 

government knew who they were, what they 

were doing and that there still could be an 

opportunity to turn around or else face all the 

consequences of the law for their illegal acts. 

6.4) The Battalion became very effective in its 

legal offensive against the CTM especially 

against CPP personalities in the area with at 

least 149 active cases to date. With the kind of 

operations (combat and non-combat) 

employed by the Battalion, the support 

system of the enemy was been gravely 

affected especially the armed group in the 

area. 

6.5) The most significant result of such combined 

operations was the collapse of their mass 

bases due to the imprisonment of hardcore 

CPP members in the barangays especially in 

those barangays inside their Center of 

Gravity or their guerilla bases. 

6.6) The resulting collapse of the CT's mass 

organizations resulted in the deprivation of 

the armed group of their mobility corridors 

and most specifically the displacement of 

their sentro de grabidad yunit or the plager in 

the district. 

6.7) Effective legal offensive was implemented 

with the intent to totally dismantle the 

politico-military structure existing in the 

area. 

THE SITIO APPROACH 

The Battalion is SOT-Sitio Approach was conducted in 

only three phases and is very different from the traditional 

seven (7) phases because the CTs were fully knowledgeable 

of SOT and could evade the SOT operators or even 

manipulate the troops through misleading information 

planted amongst the barangay residents. 

Prior to deployment of the Division-trained SOT 

Teams, there was a 10-day Preparation and Retraining Phase 

to orient the SOT operators in the 3-phase Sitio Approach. 

The trainors involved the various LGUs, LGAs and NGOs 

in the area to help the operators appreciate the nuances of 

community organizing as a means to address people's needs 

and community development issues. 

Due to the initial phase of neutralization that effectively 

removed the leadership much more effectively than in 



ordinary SOT, clearing of barangays happened in 

approximately 4-6 weeks or 45 days, resulting in more 

barangays cleared than the original OB-listed barangays 

for SOT for the same amount of funds and resources 

allocated for the purpose in the AOR. 

The entire SOT plan followed the following basic 

phases to Neutralize-Counterorganize-Link Up and 

Sustain the Battalion effort: 

Neutralization & Immersion Phase 

a. Based on the GESCON, established 

A by-product of these secret 

discussions was the knowledge 

gained about the issues of the 

locality/sitio that enabled the 

Battalion to identify the LGU or line 

agency that could provide the 

assistance to resolve the issues. 

personalities and CT structures were identified 

in specific sitios in each barangay. Cases were 

built up by compiling intelligence and dossiers 

on each key CT personality. 

b. SOT Teams/operators were then discreetly put 

in place in the key sitios in the barangays that 

had the key personalities or permanent politicomilitary 

structures (BRCs) in place, which 

barangays formed the Center of Gravity of the 

Plager initially, and later on in the other KSPNs. 

c. The key personalities were rendered ineffective 

through secret/clandestine one-on-one 

discussions showing them they had no choice 

except to work with the government; or through 

legitimate encounters when CT personalities 

were flushed out by parallel TRIAD operations, 

or when these personalities were invited or 

visited for tactical inquiry and eventually 

turned-around to form part of the barangay 

intelligence network, or in the event of 

incorrigibility or refusal to cooperate with the 

military, such personalities were delivered to 

PNP for filing of appropriate charges thru legal 

offensive mentioned above. 

11


This phase was in combat mode as SOT teams were not 

visible since there were no preliminary courtesy calls on the 

Barangay Captains, no harboring or establishing of a 

command post at the barangay hall and such similar SOT 

initial activities that generally involved full disclosure of 

military presence and programs in the subject locality. 

By such “combat mode”, the CT target personalities 

become complacent so they remained in the area. When they 

finally realized that one by one key personalities were being 

flushed out, they fled via expected routes due to constriction 

efforts, or were also burned or flushed out when comrades 

are taken in. 

A by-product of these secret discussions was the 

knowledge gained about the issues of the locality/sitio that 

enabled the Battalion to identify the LGU or line agency that 

could provide the assistance to resolve the issues. 

d. SICA was done by conducting patrols in the target 

Sitios, checking issues with the residents and 

obtaining a social inventory/class profile of the 

residents. 

e. In ten days from the start of this phase, a summing up 

of uncovered personalities was made by the SOT 

Task Group. If according to the SOT Action plan, the 

SOT Teams withdrew except for one team that 

stayed behind to undertake community organizing 

activities for development. The other teams 

transferred to the next target barangay to conduct 

Phase I of the SOT-Sitio Approach again. 

Implementation Phase 

a. The SOT team that remained started operating openly 

to: 

1) Make courtesy calls on local executives and 

potential leaders. 

2) Identify potential leaders for COD purposes. 

3) Organize the residents into a counter-insurgency 

organization and initial barangay defense structure. 

4) Explore the residents' potential for forming and 

sustaining a functional cooperative in the barangay 

and using the same for progressive development 

plans for the community. 

5) Conduct a massive info drive or an initial Pulong-Pulong 

to implement the high impact projects. 

b. Starting in March 2005, the Battalion tapped an LGA to 

conduct seminars on organizing and operating 

cooperatives that would address the issues of the 

residents such as the potentials of certain crops in the 

area and establishing necessary linkages with the line 

agencies who could provide the support 

mechanisms for the purpose. 

c. At this phase, a Community Development Plan was 

formulated and a development report periodically 

submitted to the Battalion to show the progress of 

the residents and their leaders in their own 

economic plans and programs. 

d. The “Pulong-Pulong” during this phase centered on 

discussions largely handled by a Speakers' Bureau 

that tackled law and order/anti-terrorism general 

matters (PNP); dynamics of insurgency (PA), 

Common Goals and Problems (Local Government 

Units), Programming under the Department of 

Agriculture and line agencies if relevant, and 

provided avenues for linking up with the line 

agencies available. 

e. The Youth Leadership Seminar and the other 

continuing dialogues and coordinating activities 

were likewise conducted with the people under the 

sponsorship of the municipal mayors, other local 

government executives, and officers of line 

agencies. 

Maintenance & Mobilization Phase 

a. With the implementation of SOT main programs 

already in place, the Battalion facilitated further the 

community organizing activities per SOT Action 

Plan for a particular barangay, but this time, with the 

mayors playing a major role in funding and 

spearheading of events. 

b. The culminating activity was the grand “Pulong- 

Pulong” financed by the municipality involved and 

whose local executives ensured that the relevant 

government livelihood and sustainable programs of 

line agencies were properly matched with barangay 

requirements. For example, charcoal-making and 

dress-making or tailoring were favorite skills 

programs of the residents that have translated into 

viable start-up industries in the area. 

c. The CVO and the CAFGUS were organized and put 

in the most strategic areas of a cluster of sitios in the 

identified corridors of the enemy further supported 

by the Company-based detachment patrols. 

d. A positive result of the SOT was the mobilization of 

residents for an indignation rally. The purposes 

were to “compromise” the participants as being 

identified with existing government and which also 

burned their bridges with their former comrades. 


I 

n line with the national command's thrust of enhancing 

operational practices of field units in Internal Security 

Operations (ISO), a series of documentations on the best 

practices in the conduct of ISO were undertaken. 

This includes different approaches and methodologies 

applied by successful commanders in different areas using 

variations that suit each area's needs and peculiarities. 

Reference materials were formulated and lectures on the 

approaches were conducted at the different levels of 

command to guide field unit commanders in the 

accomplishment of their mission. 

Among these successful concepts is the “Three-Phase 

SOT Sitio Approach” being employed by a Battalion 

somewhere in the Luzon area. Through this methodology, 

the Battalion was able to recover 71 HPFAs, clear 28 CTaffected 

barangays and neutralize 36 CT regulars in a year's 

time while introducing development-oriented activities in 

support to local government units and local executives. The 

Battalion was also able to file 149 cases against CTM 

personalities in the area. 

What makes this approach unique is that there were 

no ideological clashes with the civilian populace as only 

purely economic issues were addressed by the Battalion. 

The SOT Teams were deployed unannounced in three key 

sitios of the barangay at the same time. They were also in 

“combat mode” as ENEMY they do BASE not make AREAS courtesy calls on the 

Barangay (NOTE: Captains, NAMES AND do PLACES not establish WERE CHANGED command TO PRESERVE posts and 

OPERATIONAL SECURITY) 

does not disclose its presence and activities. 

COG of 

GFC A 

GFC B 

KSPN 1 

PLAGER 

KSPN 2 

•Inside the PLAGER area (central portion of the 

Peninsula), the series of combat engagements from 5 

Feb 2006 to 8 Feb 2006 resulted in tactical gains at the 

guerilla base. This made the Battalion shift to the 

Keyhole approach to exploit such gains and SOT Teams 

were immediately deployed at the enemy's COG to 

undertake the modified SOT-Sitio Approach. 

•The Sitio Approach and COD concepts were effectively 



employed by the Battalion to dismantle the sociopolitical 

military structure at the PLAGER's center 

of gravity. The intensified TRIAD Operations and 

SOT operations drove GFC A elements from inside 

the area of the PLAGER to pre-designated 

constriction areas to the Battalion Action Plan. 

•The displacement of the PLAGER structure caused 

the PLAGER's elements to share base with KSPN 1 

north of the belt and KSPN 2 south of the belt. At this 

point, 10 baranggays were cleared by SOT-Sitio 

Approach. 

INSIDE THE PLAGER (COG OF GFC1) 

PLAGER 

CLEARED 10 Brgys 

through SOT 

•Of the six (6) baranggays inside the KSPN 1 Center 

of Gravity, only one (1) was OB-listed and 

programmed to be SOTised in said cluster. 

•The SOTs were again employed in the KSPN 1 area 

using the Sitio Approach where known sitios with 

highly organized CT structures within a barangay 

were the priority targets for dismantling through the 

3-phase process. At most 3 SOT teams were 

deployed in one barangay at the same time to prevent 

the Sangay Partido Lokalidad leaders and CTs from 

conniving and planning a strategy to evade the SOT 

operations. 

•Due to the massive TRIAD operations north of the 

belt, the CTs vacated their mass base at KSPN 1 

rd 

around 3 Quarter of 2006. 

•Also, the timely deployment of SR and SF test 

missions coupled with massive TRIAD operations 

constricted and limited the mobility of the LCM thus 

making them vulnerable to government troops. 

Three (3) encounters at the barangays north of the 

13


belt were among the results of these operations. 

•DOCEX from the encounter site in November 2006 

stated that GFC A could not handle the mode of 

operations of the Battalion earlier conducted at KSPN 1. 

The TRIAD success in the KSPN 1 COG pushed the 

PLAGER and its leadership to consolidate at the area of 

KSPN 2 at the southern part of the peninsula. By this 

time, nine (9) barangays south of the belt were cleared by 

SOT. 

•Inside the KSPN 2 area, the unit had already prepared 

information such as key CT personalities, issues to be 

exploited, and other relevant requirements for the 

dismantling of the enemy's last organized mass base in 

the area. This area was also designated to be the 

Battalion's constriction area where the enemy was to be 

eventually canalized. 

•SOT teams were deployed in Combat Mode to avoid 

compromising the SOT operators and avoid counteractivity 

from the CTs. The SOT Task Group was 

deployed at a barangay to complement the combat 

operations. 

•The deployment of SOT Teams displaced the remaining 

elements of the PLAGER who in turn encountered a 

INSIDE KSPN 2 

KSPN 2 

stand-by strike force of the Battalion's Bravo 

Company. With the fall of the enemy' mass base in 

the area being SOTized, the traditional mass base 

and mobility corridors receded leaving the CTs 

nowhere to go except to the pre-designated 

constriction areas. 

All in all, the successful operations eventually led to 

the recovery of 71 HPFAs, clearing of 28 CT-affected 

barangays and neutralization of 36 CT regulars. The 

operations were also intended to support development 

efforts of the government agencies in the AOR. 

EMPOWERING THE LOCAL EXECUTIVE 

Since the Battalion does not have the resources to 

engage in all the community activities, the best route to 

ensure the latter's success would be to involve the local 

executives in the planning and funding of the target 

activity. 

Being a facilitator of tie-ups rather than a main 

principal in jumpstarting development programs, the 

Battalion retains its core function which is in ISO while 

at the same time prompting the local government 

involved to assume its main responsibility to see to the 

economic development of their constituents. 

CONCLUSION 

The Ground Commander's appreciation of the 

situation is vital to the success of any military initiative 

that is carried out in a commander's AOR. Also, 

contributions of past Battalion Commanders in laying 

the foundation and shaping up the unit into what it has 

achieved now is very essential. No Army unit became a 

winner overnight. 

Notably, the Battalion employed different 

approaches to military operations and modified the SOT 

operations to fit the prevailing operational conditions. 

Through such approaches, the three elements of the 

communist movement, the CPP, NPA and NDF 

structures were effectively addressed in countering their 

heavy influence in the AOR. 

Intel notes that GFC A is on the verge of collapse and 

it would take a long time before it may be able to recover, 

if at all. 


An Assessment 

(This article is a shortened and annotated version of a chapter written by Lt. Col Thomas Tirona, PAF which was 

included in the Reference Book published by US Army Command and General Staff College in 1 November 1966. 

Comments (in italics) were inserted to highlight concepts and items deemed important and to make comparison to the 

present situation. The purpose of this article is to revisit the successful campaign launched by the AFP then and hopefully 

gain few insights in our fight against the enemy now) 

MAJ ALVIN V FLORES (INF) 

PA is a graduate of PMA Class 

1992. He is presently the 

Operations Officer of Doctrine 

Center, TRADOC,PA. 

MAJ ALVIN V FLORES (INF) PA 


Background 

“We have met here today to talk about a counter-guerrilla 

campaign which has become a classic in our time- the Huk 

campaign in the Philippines. It is classic in the way it demonstrated 

economy of force. It is classic in its lessons of the strategy and 

tactics that win.” 

BGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF 

n 1945, the United States furnished arms to various guerrilla organizations in 

Iorder to expedite the campaign in the Philippines. Since the Hukbo ng Bayan 

Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap or HUKs- the armed faction of the Communist Party), 

was fighting as vigorously as the others were, they were also given arms. However, 

most of the arms were deposited in secret caches. All HUK units, with the exception 

of one regiment attached to the US Eight Army, showed no more than sporadic and 

token resistance to the Japanese after the receipt of these arms. When these facts 

became evident, the US armed forces came to distrust the HUKs and confined their 

top leaders in a penal colony. The Huk rank and file continued to terrorize the 

countryside. After the war, the HUK leaders were released to help in encouraging 

their followers to surrender and return to the folds of the law. While these leaders 

were ostensibly engaged in the pacification campaign, the Hukbalahap was 

redesignated as Hukbong Magpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army) or 

HMB. All the various HMB units were reorganized under a GHQ and prepared 

intensively for all forms of prescribed communist struggle. The Republic 

subsequently declared the HMB and its affiliate organizations illegal. 

The communist strategy of conquest was laid out in a memorandum to the 

Central Committee by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Secretariat. 

15

INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS THEN AND NOW 

This memorandum read in part: 

Aim: To establish the New Democracy (People's 

Democratic Republic) by overthrowing American 

Imperialism. 

Direction of the main blow: Isolation of the national 

bourgeois and other elements who compromise with 

imperialism and winning over the masses. 

Main Forces: the proletarians and landless peasants. 

Reserves: The middle class and rice peasants, the Soviet 

Union and the New Democracies (other communist States) 

Disposition of the Main Forces and Reserves: Alliance 

of the working class and peasantry. 

Revolution: 

1. Period of preparation- Battle for reserves or 

s t r a t e g i c 

defense. 

2. S e i z u r e o f 

National Power- 

M i l i t a r y 

o f f e n s i v e o r 

strategic offense. 

T h e p r e s c r i b e d 

Communist Party line in 

A s i a s t r e s s e d t h e 

liberation of the masses 

from colonialism. But 

since the country is 

already independent, the 

communists cannot 

present this objective to 

the masses. And so, the 

P a r t y s u b s t i t u t e d 

“American Imperialism” 

in place of “colonialism”, the years 1951-52 were the period 

of military offensive. This was carried out by HMBs in 

central and southern Luzon. The HMB Finance Department 

levied stiff cash and crop contributions on farmers to support 

the military drive. Crops of large estates owned by absentee 

landlords were harvested by HMB units. Loot from highway 

robberies was divided equally between the Party 

Headquarters and the unit involved. These depredations led 

to a new low in agricultural and economic productivity in 

central and southern Luzon. 

Comment: The communists never really changed. 

Its strategy then is not unlike their strategy now. That is, 

to use all means necessary to grab political power by 

using mainly the masses or people in the lower segment 

of society who are basically poor and uneducated, 

hence, easily swayed by propaganda of the enemy. It is 

quite ironic, that, after more than 50 years, they are still 

using the same line of “American Imperialism” as a 

reason to overthrow the government. And it is also very 

ironic that the masses, the very people that the 

communists vowed to “liberate” are the very same 

people that bore the brunt of the so-called 'revolutionary 

tools' such as progressive taxation, intimidation, 

robbery and outright 

liquidation. 

T h e l o c a l 

communists have 

been longing to grab 

power since the first 

communist party was 

organized in the early 

1900s. As a general 

rule, communists 

don't talk peace 

because they really 

don't want peace with 

the government. The 

leaders of the CPP 

were also released 

a f t e r t h e E D S A 

Revolt in 1986 to help 

in attaining peace but, 

like the HUK leaders, 

they again went underground to continue fighting. 

History will show that communists do not stop until they 

have grab power. Just look at countries like the former 

USSR and its satellite countries, China, Vietnam, etc. To 

the enemy, peace talks and truce are just tools to regroup, 

re-arm, recruit, gain time to conduct other 

activities that will strengthen the party and its army. One 

thing that the enemy has a lot of is patience. They can 

wait forever, if necessary, until they gain an advantage 


and launch their own offensive. 

Early Government Counter-HMB Operations 

From 1946 to 1948, the HMBs laid low on their military 

activities as a result of punitive drives by the national police 

force and the Constabulary. However, the Education 

Department of the CPP actively carried out the political 

conversion of the masses. The government then considered 

the campaign an extension of its anti-banditry drive and 

employed quasi-military police 

methods to stamp out the 

menace. But the undermanned 

and lightly armed Constabulary 

soon found itself unable to check 

the worsening situation. 

A government evaluation of 

the campaign showed that it over 

emphasized military operations 

and paid too little attention to the 

socio-economic, political and 

psychological aspects of the 

problem. The CPP capitalized on 

the failure of the government to 

make the needed improvements. 

The communists more than held their own militarily and 

progressed in their political drive by stepping up their 

propaganda activities. In 1950, at the height of their 

successes, the HMB forces stood at 15,000 armed and 

80,000 active HMBs with a mass support of 500,000 (at that 

time, the AFP is only about 50,000 strong and the population 

of the country stood at around 19 million compared to about 

85 million now). In large areas where the people did not 

sympathize with the movement, the CPP used intimidation 

and reprisals to keep them from cooperating with the 

government. They sought to alienate, divide and conquer. 

The HMB Command attacked towns adjacent to the City of 

Manila and threatened it with a force of 10,000 armed 

communists. The plan failed when the government called the 

AFP to defend the city. 

Comment: The government then made a mistake in 

letting the Constabulary and police handle the HUK problem 

during the early post war years. As a result, the HUK grew in 

strength against the lightly armed PC. This was also the 



The communists never 

really changed. Its strategy then is 

not unlike their strategy now. 

That is, to use all means necessary 

to grab political power by using 

mainly the masses or people in the 

lower segment of society who are 

basically poor and uneducated, 

h e n c e , e a s i l y s w a y e d b y 

propaganda of the enemy 

mistake of the government when counterinsurgency was 

turned over to the PNP in the 1990s. The NPA was able to 

regroup, reorganize and recruit new members. The gains 

that we have made during the early 1990s (when NPA 

strength was greatly diminished) were wiped out and we 

are back to square one. The government should learn 

from these experiences, it should let the AFP finish the 

fight up to the last NPA cadre. Remember, the NPA started 

as a ragtag unit with only a handful of ill-equipped 

personnel. 

The Counter-HMB Plan 

A l a r m e d b y 

deteriorating state of peace and 

order, the government adopted 

a new campaign plan. The plan 

welded the socio-economic, 

political and military aspects, 

supplemented by a vigorous 

p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e 

program. To counter the CPP 

propaganda offer of “land for 

the landless” the government 

stepped up the drive to resettle 

farmers from the congested and 

marginal producing farm areas of Luzon to the virgin 

public lands of Mindanao. A long range industrial and 

economic program was financed by new issues of 

government bonds. Health and social welfare activities 

aided indigent families and victims of natural disasters. 

Tenants were assured 70 per cent of the harvest. Smallcrop 

loans and a vigorous anti-usury drive helped the 

tenants finance their farming. A minimum wage law 

prescribing minimum wages for the various categories of 

skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor nullified the 

effects of CPP propaganda on the labor front. As a 

guaranty of order and honesty in elections, the armed 

forces were employed at polls to safeguard the ballot. 

Two clean and orderly elections and rigorous drives 

against corruption, spurred by militant press and aroused 

civic organizations, gradually restored the peoples 

confidence in the ability of the government to counteract 

the menace posed by the insurrection and to offer a 

positive, legitimate social and economic program to 

17


offset Communism's grandiose promises. 

Comment: Again, the only way to win this war against 

the CPP/NPA/NDF is to adopt a holistic approach. Military 

alone cannot solve the insurgency problem. The only way to 

do it is to implement honest to goodness socio-economic 

reforms. Lip service will only further agitate the people and 

aggravate the problem. Ensuring honest elections to restore 

the people's perception of government's legitimacy is major 

factor in re-establishing confidence in the government. 

Wide ranging reforms can't be implemented if the 

government doesn't have the confidence and trust of the 

general populace. Also, with the proper education and reorientation, 

the AFP can again be tapped to ensure honest 

and peaceful election as have been successfully done in the 

past. 

The Revised Military Plan 

At the height of the Communist successes in April 

1950, the government called the armed forces to join the 

Philippine Constabulary in the military campaign. When the 

military considered the overall government plan, they 

realized that socio-economic and political annexes to the 

main military plan would be required. Since the public 

normally looks askance at local military operations by the 

armed forces, a psychological warfare plan with a wider 

coverage was also approved. Prior to the implementation of 

these plans, substantial improvements were made in the 

armed forces. Military Areas were organized. A framework 

for the combined operations of the major commands (PA, 

PAF, PN and PC) was laid out, subject to polishing as the 

campaign progressed. 

The Philippine Army reorganized its units into 

battalion combat teams, hard-hitting and well-trained units 

capable of sustained operations. An airborne battalion, a 

cavalry squadron, a dog team (K9), and scout rangers were 

activated and fielded to supplement ground operations. The 

old plan of placing small garrisons in threatened areas was 

abandoned. Military areas were subdivided into sectors with 

two or three battalion combat teams (BCTs) each. These 

BCTs together with the Air Force and Navy units, formed 

task forces to conduct combined operations. Ground forces 

covered the sectors with fast mobile forces supported by 

strong reserves. While Air Force armed reconnaissance 

aircraft scoured the rugged mountains and the plains, the 

Philippine Navy patrolled the long Philippine shoreline. 

Military alone cannot solve 

the insurgency problem. The only 

way to do it is to implement honest 

to goodness socio-economic 

reforms. Lip service will only 

further agitate the people and 

aggravate the problem. 

Dog teams and scout rangers worked together to 

ferret out the HMBs from their hiding places. These 

tactics brought the fighting to the enemy deep in the 

jungles. The cavalry squadron and airborne troops 

provided more mobile troops to seal off enemy 

escape routes or to pursue retreating enemy units. 

These were special operations supplementing the 

combined operations which were conducted 

whenever the enemy was located in sizeable force. 

Military intelligence teams operated in the cities 

and towns, breaking up Communist cells and 

destroying the enemy's communications system. 

Six months after the armed forces took over the 

operations, the military intelligence service 

captured the entire CPP Politburo in Manila. 

Comment: The key to the military success of 

the AFP then is 1) realizing and accepting the fact 

that the old strategy of fighting the insurgents is 

wrong; consequently, 2) crafting winning tactics 

and strategy and 3) effectively implementing them. 

With the formulation of a winning strategy based on 

the operational environment, the AFP proceeded to 

reorganize itself and even organized new units to 

meet the threat. The core strategy is fighting the 

enemy in our own terms and not the other way 

around. The army removed small detachments that 

served only as source of firearms for the enemy; it 

activated new units to find, fix and finish the enemy 

units. Combat operations were conducted without 

let up giving the enemy no time to rest and re-group. 

These incessant operations resulted in decimating 

many HUK units and subsequently breaking down 

the enemy's will to fight. 

To complement the purely military aspect of 


the campaign, the armed forces initiated the policy of 

“attraction and fellowship.” This policy embraced several 

levels of action against individual HUKs, depending on the 

individual's complicity. Against those who knew nothing 

except the language of naked force, a system of rewards was 

instituted for information leading to their apprehension or 

death. The rewards ranged from $50 to $75,000. In 1951, a 

top CPP leader, at the time actively organizing cells in the 

Visayas was killed by a civilian commando unit. The reward 

of $50,000 was distributed among the 21 members of the 

unit. 

Realizing then that there are 

different levels of commitment to the 

communist ideology, the AFP stratified 

the HUK personnel according to their 

complicity in the movement and based 

its actions on that individual's 

complicity. 

Comment: Money is one of the greatest motivating 

factors. It was proven then and it was proven now with the 

Abu Sayyaf Campaign. Plus, it is more economical and cost 

effective to offer reward money than to conduct massive 

operations. The AFP can extensively use this incentive to 

capture high-profile leaders of the CPP. 

For communists who accepted the terms of 

attraction, the AFP provided for their return to peaceful 

society. Several Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) 

settlements were cleared in virgin public lands by the armed 

forces engineers. The ex-HMBs were given 6-8 hectares, a 

modest hut which he helped build, subsistence allowance 

and crops loans to tide him through the first harvest, a work 

animal and farm implements. The engineers also built 

community centers and cooperative marketing buildings. 

The AFP medical personnel provided medical care. To take 

the steam out of local communist opposition, the AFP even 

cleared large tract of swamp around San Luis, Pampanga, 

the hometown of Luis Taruc and hotbed of communist 

insurgents. 



The psychological warfare plan provided 

programs for the following: 

1. Primary Target- the dissident group 

- The hard target- die-hards thoroughly indoctrinated 

in Communist ideology and irrevocably against 

democracy as a political society. These understood 

o n l y t h e l a n g u a g e o f f o r c e . 

- The soft target- misguided peasants, workers, 

opportunists, fugitives from justice and adventurers. 

These were won over by policy of attraction. They 

were encouraged to surrender by shows of force and 

forceful military actions. Surrenderees were given 

good treatment and opportunity for a new and better 

life. 

2. Secondary target- the mass base consisting mostly of 

peasants, laborers, landlords, businessmen, students, 

professionals and government officials. These were 

continuously informed on government activities in 

the fight against Communism. A systematic 

propagation of information on established 

democratic ways and Communist conspiracy was 

pushed in all types of media. Support of the mass 

base was also enlisted. 

Tertiary target- the AFP. The program generally 

presented to the men the reasons for fighting 

Communism, relations with the public and overview of 

the world situation. This contributed to the rise in prestige 

of the armed forces. 

As a result of the intensive implementation of the 

revised military plan, the HMB force was reduced to a 

mere 1,500 armed HMBs, 2,500 active followers and 

around 33,000 mass base. Luis Taruc, relentlessly 

pursued by the AFP and quarrelling with CPP brass, 

surrendered in May 1954. 

Comment: Realizing then that there are different 

levels of commitment to the communist ideology, the 

AFP stratified the HUK personnel according to their 

complicity in the movement and based its actions on that 

individual's complicity. For soft targets or misguided 

elements, the AFP offered peace and reconciliation. They 

were encouraged to surrender and offered a new and 

better life. For the hard core elements who are usually the 

leaders of the movement, the government never 

conducted protracted peace negotiations with them. 

19


Instead, punitive actions were carried out until these were 

killed, captured or surrendered. In contrast, peace talks were 

held since the 1986 EDSA Revolt and, paradoxically, peace 

is still as elusive now as twenty years ago. Twenty years of 

squandered time that should have given the Philippines 

opportunity to prosper and catch up with its Asian neighbors. 

Surely, twenty years is such a long time to realize that we 

have a wrong strategy in fighting this war. 

comprehensive in terms of socio-economic, political and 

military aspects. Government resources were directed 

where they were needed. Long-range industrial and 

economic program was implemented. All the 

government agencies were focused in the objective and 

contributed their share to attain it. AFP personnel were 

given the proper equipment, training and the motivation 

to overcome the HUKs. 

- Paradigm shift in the AFP. Its ability to change tactics, 

craft a winning strategy and reorganize its forces to 

Conclusion and Lessons Learned 

implement this strategy. It abandoned the passive and 

As BGen Lansdale have stated, the HUK Campaign in piecemeal deployment of forces in small detachments 

the 1950s is a classic example of how a counter insurgency and replaced it with highly mobile and hard hitting units. 

campaign can be won by a determined government and This strategy forced the enemy to fight according to the 

highly motivated armed forces. In only about four years the AFP terms and the results were decisive engagements 

HMB was reduced from a high of 15,000 armed personnel to that decimated the enemy and kept it on the run. 

only 1,500; from 80,000 active followers to only 2,500; from - The issue of popular support was a decisive factor in 

about a half million mass base to only 33,000. The victory is the victory. The government undertook steps that restored 

even more remarkable considering that, during that time, the the people's confidence in their government and its ability 

personnel ratio of the AFP to HMB is about 3:1. This is only to protect them from the Communist menace. The shift in 

counting the HMB armed personnel and not including the popular support from the HUKs to the government 

active followers who are about 80,000 at their peak. 

especially in areas controlled by the enemy eventually 

The most notable lessons learned in this victory: won the war. The Republic was able to present a 

- The political will of the government to really defeat the legitimate and caring government that is truly desirous in 

enemy. The government drafted a plan that was giving its people the government that they truly deserve. 


MS. CECILLE AYCOCHO was a 

former Senior Researcher of OG5, 

Plans & Policy, a graduate of 

Journalism in Polytechnic 

University of the Philippines 

T 

Apprehensions Amidst 

a “Peaceful Rise”: 

China's Defense Policies 

and Security Outlook 

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be 

good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” 


MS CECILLE AYCOCHO 

hese words comprise China's “24 Character” strategy, which was a guidance for 

foreign and security policy under then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping during the 

1990s. This appears to be the driving principle of China's defense policies, as proven by 

the little information divulged about China's defense polices and military capabilities, 

until now. 

This 24 Character strategy implies both a short-term desire to downplay China's 

ambitions of what it calls their “peaceful rise” and a long term-strategy to build up 

China's power to maximize options for the future. 

Such a mystery surrounding China's intentions and military capability continue to 

cause apprehensions not just among its neighbors but also with the US and other world 

powers. 

The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a regional political and 

economic power with global aspirations is one of the principal elements in the emergence 

of East Asia. China's emergence has significant implications for the region and the world. 

Amidst all these, questions remain about the basic choices China's leaders will make as 

China's power and influence grow, particularly its military power. 

This article hopes to find some answers, or at least some ideas that can help answer 

these questions, on China's defense policies and security outlook and what it means for 

our security environment. 

Threat Assessment: Cross-Strait Relations as a Major Factor 

China's defense analysts believe that peace and development remain the principal 

themes of current times and that the overall international security environment remains 

stable. Despite these, they believe that some challenges and threats continue to emerge. 

It is viewed that security problems arise from political, economic, geographical, 

ethnic and religious contradictions, while hegemonism and power politics remain key 

factors undermining international security. 

China's defense paper further recognizes the threat of non-traditional actors. Internal 

security problems of neighboring countries also are viewed as key factors influencing 

security. Globalization also remains a driving factor as the degree of economic 

development is uneven, thus affecting the political, security and social fields. Terrorism 

21

APPREHENSIONS AMIDST A PEACEFUL RISE 

is also cited as a grave threat. While natural calamities, 

communicable diseases also continue to present challenges. 

They also recognize the phenomenon of revolutions in 

military affairs that are taking place in the world. Their 

defense paper underscores that, “the imbalances and gaps 

between military capabilities remain. Some developed 

countries have increased their input into the military and 

sped up R&D of high-tech weaponry to gain military 

superiority.” It is also said that many developing countries 

are also upgrading their armaments and modernizing their 

military forces. The threat of weapons of mass destruction 

and their proliferation also is cited as a grave and complex 

one. 

Overall, China's defense analysts believe that the 

security environment in the Asia-Pacific region remains 

stable due to the open and mutually beneficial cooperation 

based on equality and in 

diversified forms taking shape 

in the region. Multilateral 

s e c u r i t y d i a l o g u e a n d 

c o o p e r a t i o n a r e b e i n g 

enhanced. The existence of 

Overall, China's defense 

analysts believe that the 

security environment in the 

Asia-Pacific region remains 

stable due to the open and 

m u t u a l l y b e n e f i c i a l 

cooperation based on equality 

and in diversified forms taking 

shape in the region 

mechanisms for dialogue such 

as the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization and the ASEAN 

are cited as having contributed 

immensely to this relative 

stability in the region. 

On the other hand, Chinese 

analysts continue to perceive 

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h 

suspicion, since besides being a competitor, the US is viewed 

as a potential security threat and believe that US is intent on 

maintaining its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific 

indefinitely and solidifying its global pre-eminence. 

Although Sino-US relations improved post-9/11, the 

Chinese do not believe US security policy in Asia has 

fundamentally changed - that while the US is not presently 

focused on the “China threat," it will eventually return to 

thwarting actively China's "peaceful rise." 

Taiwan seems to be a driving factor in their overall 

defense policy as it maintains in their latest white paper that 

“separatist forces for Taiwan independence and their 

activities remains a hard one”. Taiwan, according to their 

defense paper, remains a challenge that “must not be 

neglected.” 

The paper concludes that the Taiwan threat poses a 

“grave threat” and that the US makes matters worse by 

continuing to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan. As a means 

of dealing with this, the white paper includes in the mission 

of China's military to “stop separation (of Taiwan) and 

promote reunification, among its other missions of 

“guarding against and resist aggression, defending 

national sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime 

rights and interests.” 

China's Grand Strategy: Peaceful Rise or Tipping the 

Balance of Power? 

In January of this year, China issued its defense 

white paper, the fifth of its kind since 1998. But like most 

of its predecessors, the most recent paper provides only 

limited transparency in military affairs. 

The paper gives a bird's eye view of China's grand 

strategy and military strategy in the foreseeable future. 

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely 

defensive in nature, says the paper. 

“China's national defense provides the guarantee for 

maintaining China's security and 

unity, and realizing the goal of 

building a moderately prosperous 

society in an all-round way." Based 

on this, China will pursue a threestep 

development strategy in 

modernizing its national defense 

and armed forces in accordance in 

consonance with the state's overall 

plan to realize modernization. 

The first step involves laying a 

solid foundation for 2010, the 

second is making major progress 

around 2020 and lastly, to reach the 

strategic goal of building 

“informationized” armed forces capable of winning 

st 

“informationized” wars by mid-21 century. 

Outlined in the defense paper is China's overarching 

defense policy for what it calls as a new stage in the new 

century. 

Upholding national security and unity is being 

correlated to national development. Thus, this includes 

guarding against and resisting aggression, defending 

against violation of China's territorial sea and air space, 

and borders. Again, emphasis is put on opposing and 

containing the separatist forces for "Taiwan 

independence" and their activities. Terrorism is also cited 

as an important task as it mentions, “taking precautions 

against and cracking down on terrorism, separatism and 

extremism in all forms.” 

China also interlinks its defense development to its 

economic development since a strong economy will 

sustain their defense modernization. Similar to another 

Asian neighbor, Singapore, China pursues a policy of 

coordinated development of national defense and 


economy. It keeps the modernization of China's national 

defense and armed forces as an integral part of its social and 

economic development, so as to ensure that the 

modernization of its national defense and armed forces 

advance in consonance with their national development. 

Informationization also seems to be a key thrust, which 

takes the same meaning as pursuing their own RMA. It is 

articulated in their defense paper that “the PLA, taking 

mechanization as the foundation and informationization as 

the driving force, promotes the composite development of 

informationization and mechanization to achieve overall 

capability improvement in the fields of firepower, assault, 

mobility, protection and information.” In this sense, 

paramount importance is also given to science and 

technology and defense R&D. 

The PLA is also on its way to stepping up its efforts to 

build a joint operational command system, training system 

and support system for fighting informationized wars and 

enhance the building of systems integration of services and 

arms. A new breed of soldiers are also being trained which is 

said to be a “large contingent of new-type and high-caliber 

military personnel suited to the task of informationization of 

the armed forces and competent for operational tasks under 

conditions of informationization.” Training for its forces 

will also become more “more technology-intensive and 

innovative in training programs, means and methods.” 

China also pledges to implement a military strategy of 

“active defense”. This means that it will undertake all 

possible means to prepare for any military struggle, while at 

the same time winning local wars under conditions of 



informationization and enhancing national sovereignty, 

security, and interests of development. It is also 

strengthening their concept of a “people's war” meaning, 

their reserve force as the PLA is said to be establishing “a 

modern national defense mobilization system that is 

centralized and unified, well structured, rapid in reaction, 

and authoritative and efficient.” Joint and combined 

operations is also another area which they hope to 

develop. Plans for major services of the PLA will be 

discussed in detail in later parts of this article. 

Their defense paper also mentions that they are 

pursuing a “self-defensive” nuclear strategy and that it 

remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of 

nuclear weapons at any time and under any 

circumstances." The goal is deter other countries from 

using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against 

China. China also upholds the principles of counterattack 

in self-defense and limited development of nuclear 

weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective 

nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. 

It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its 

nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear 

deterrent force. 

As part of its overall defense policy as well is 

developing and maintaining military relations with other 

countries. Such cooperation is based on their Five 

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and they hope to 

develop cooperative military relations that are nonaligned, 

non-confrontational and not directed against any 

third party. Participation in regional dialogue, upholding 

UN's principles and supporting its thrusts are also part of 

this policy. 

Despite these well-articulated intentions, observers 

and defense analysts from all over the world still believe 

that there is much that China's authorities are not 

divulging about their defense policy and strategic plans. 

While their defense paper discloses a raft of new details 

about China's opaque military, analysts still believe it has 

failed to either satisfy calls for disclosure of substantial 

information or quell fears about the resurgent Middle 

Kingdom's power projection throughout Asia. 

Basing on their articulated plans, China's grand 

strategy, is comprised of two main themes; (1) 

maintaining balance among competing priorities for 

sustaining momentum in national economic 

development; and, (2) maintaining favorable trends in the 

security environment within which such economic 

development can occur. 

To understand such strategy, there are two concepts 

23


important first to understand; which are their concepts of 

“comprehensive national power” (CNP) or zonghe guoli and the 

“strategic configuration of power,” or “shi.” 

CNP is the concept of the evaluation and measurement of 

China's national standing in relation to other nations by its 

national planners. It includes qualitative and quantitative 

measures of territory, natural resources, economic power, 

diplomatic influence, domestic government, military capability, 

and cultural influence. Such measurement shows China's keen 

interest in understanding the sources of national power and 

indicates how Chinese strategists measure the relative 

distribution of power in the international system. 

The “shi” or the so-called strategic configuration of power 

could be taken to mean “alignment of forces,” although there is 

no direct Western equivalent to the term. Chinese linguists also 

suggest it refers to the “propensity of things,” “potential,” or the 

“potential born of disposition,” that only a skilled strategist can 

exploit. 

As early as the 1980s China has started its efforts to increase 

its CNP thru national development. They continuously assess the 

broader security environment, or “strategic configuration of 

power,” for potential challenges and threats (e.g., potential 

conflict with Taiwan that involves the United States) as well as 

opportunities (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) that might 

prompt an adjustment in national strategy. The initial decades of 

st 

the 21 Century is viewed by Chinese leaders as a good strategic 

opportunity to further increase China's CNP. 

Further, basing on their articulated plans and actions, 

analysts are also seeing deeper into China's motives and believe 

that China's strategy is driven by certain concepts and principles. 

In a recent RAND study in the US, they found at least eight (8) 

principles that stand out as those that drive China's strategy and 

policies based on their doctrines, and other 

documents. 

First of these is the principle of “seizing 

the initiative” early in a conflict. RAND 

analysts say that Chinese doctrines are 

deplete with reference to this or with 

examples of this. For example, during the 

1991 Gulf War, Chinese military analysts 

noted that, by not seizing the initiative in the 

1991 Gulf War, Iraq allowed the United 

States to build up its forces until it had 

overwhelming superiority. It is therefore, 

believed by China's strategists that if China is 

to be victorious in a conflict with a militarily 

superior power, China must go on the 

offensive from the very beginning. 

China also puts premium in practicing the 

element of surprise, which seems to be what they are 

applying in divulging very little information about 

their defenses. For any nation, surprise is valuable 

not only for the immediate tactical advantage it 

conveys, but also because surprise is an important 

way of seizing the initiative in a conflict. This means 

that in a conflict in the future, China will do what is 

less expected of it to gain initiative. 

Also in connection with the first two principles 

is the element of preemption. If China waits for a 

militarily superior adversary to commence 

hostilities, it will be difficult for China to seize the 

initiative and the adversary will likely have the 

preponderance of forces as well. However, if China 

initiates a conflict before an adversary attacks, 

China can seize the initiative and may also enjoy an 

initial advantage in the local balance of forces. This 

will greatly increase the chances of successfully 

achieving surprise. 

The fourth strategic principle is also related 

particularly significant in the context of those 

previously mentioned principles, the idea of raising 

the costs of conflict. RAND analysts believe that at 

least some Chinese military analysts believe that the 

United States is sensitive to casualties and economic 

costs and that the sudden destruction of a significant 

portion of our forces would result in a severe 

psychological shock and a loss of will to continue 

the conflict. 

Related to the former is the fifth strategic 

principle—the principle of limited strategic aims. A 

country with inferior capability to another cannot 

expect to achieve total victory over a more superior 

adversary. However, if that country has limited 


T 

hese words comprise China's “24 Character” strategy, 

which was a guidance for foreign and security policy 

under then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping during the 

1990s. This appears to be the driving principle of China's 

defense policies, as proven by the little information 

divulged about China's defense polices and military 

capabilities, until now. 

This 24 Character strategy implies both a short-term 

desire to downplay China's ambitions of what it calls their 

“peaceful rise” and a long term-strategy to build up China's 

power to maximize options for the future. 

Such a mystery surrounding China's intentions and 

military capability continue to cause apprehensions not just 

among its neighbors but also with the US and other world 

powers. 

The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 

as a regional political and economic power with global 

aspirations is one of the principal elements in the emergence 

of East Asia. China's emergence has significant 

implications for the region and the world. Amidst all these, 

questions remain about the basic choices China's leaders 

will make as China's power and influence grow, particularly 

its military power. 

This article hopes to find some answers, or at least some 

ideas that can help answer these questions, on China's 

defense policies and security outlook and what it means for 

our security environment. 

Threat Assessment: Cross-Strait Relations as a Major 

Factor 

China's defense analysts believe that peace and 

development remain the principal themes of current times 

and that the overall international security environment 

remains stable. Despite these, they believe that some 

challenges and threats continue to emerge. 

It is viewed that security problems arise from political, 

economic, geographical, ethnic and religious 

contradictions, while hegemonism and power politics 

remain key factors undermining international security. 

China's defense paper further recognizes the threat of 

non-traditional actors. Internal security problems of 

neighboring countries also are viewed as key factors 

influencing security. Globalization also remains a driving 

factor as the degree of economic development is uneven, 

thus affecting the political, security and social fields. 

Terrorism is also cited as a grave threat. While natural 

calamities, communicable diseases also continue to present 

challenges. 

They also recognize the phenomenon of revolutions in 

military affairs that are taking place in the world. Their 



defense paper underscores that, “the imbalances and 

gaps between military capabilities remain. Some 

developed countries have increased their input into the 

military and sped up R&D of high-tech weaponry to gain 

military superiority.” It is also said that many developing 

countries are also upgrading their armaments and 

modernizing their military forces. The threat of weapons 

of mass destruction and their proliferation also is cited as 

a grave and complex one. 

Overall, China's defense analysts believe that the 

security environment in the Asia-Pacific region remains 

stable due to the open and mutually beneficial 

cooperation based on equality and in diversified forms 

taking shape in the region. Multilateral security dialogue 

and cooperation are being enhanced. The existence of 

mechanisms for dialogue such as the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN are cited as 

having contributed immensely to this relative stability in 

the region. 

On the other hand, Chinese analysts continue to 

perceive the United States with suspicion, since besides 

being a competitor, the US is viewed as a potential 

security threat and believe that US is intent on 

maintaining its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific 

indefinitely and solidifying its global pre-eminence. 

Although Sino-US relations improved post-9/11, 

the Chinese do not believe US security policy in Asia has 

fundamentally changed - that while the US is not 

presently focused on the “China threat," it will 

eventually return to thwarting actively China's "peaceful 

rise." 

Taiwan seems to be a driving factor in their overall 

defense policy as it maintains in their latest white paper 

that “separatist forces for Taiwan independence and their 

activities remains a hard one”. Taiwan, according to their 

defense paper, remains a challenge that “must not be 

neglected.” 

The paper concludes that the Taiwan threat poses a 

“grave threat” and that the US makes matters worse by 

continuing to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan. As a 

Taiwan seems to be a driving factor in 

their overall defense policy as it maintains 

in their latest white paper that “separatist 

forces for Taiwan independence and their 

activities remains a hard one”. Taiwan, 

according to their defense paper, remains 

a challenge that “must not be neglected.” 

25


means of dealing with this, the white paper includes in the 

mission of China's military to “stop separation (of Taiwan) 

and promote reunification, among its other missions of 

“guarding against and resist aggression, defending national 

sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime rights and 

interests.” 

China's Grand Strategy: Peaceful Rise or Tipping the 

Balance of Power? 

In January of this year, China issued its defense white 

paper, the fifth of its kind since 1998. But like most of its 

predecessors, the most recent paper provides only limited 

transparency in military affairs. 

The paper gives a bird's eye view of China's grand 

strategy and military strategy in the foreseeable future. 

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely 

defensive in nature, says the paper. 

“China's national defense provides the guarantee for 

maintaining China's security and unity, and realizing the 

goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an 

all-round way." Based on this, China will pursue a threestep 

development strategy in modernizing its national 

defense and armed forces in accordance in consonance 

with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. 

The first step involves laying a solid foundation for 

2010, the second is making major progress around 2020 

and lastly, to reach the strategic goal of building 

“informationized” armed forces capable of winning 

st 

“informationized” wars by mid-21 century. 

Outlined in the defense paper is China's overarching 

defense policy for what it calls as a new stage in the new 

century. 

Upholding national security and unity is being 

correlated to national development. Thus, this includes 

guarding against and resisting aggression, defending 

against violation of China's territorial sea and air space, 

and borders. Again, emphasis is put on opposing and 

containing the separatist forces for "Taiwan 

Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p11. 

China's National Defense in 2006, A Defense White Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 

December 2006, Beijing, available on the internet @ http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194477.html, 

accessed 13 May 

2007. 

Ibid. 

China Strategic Assessment, ADM Policy Group, Canada Department of National Defense, available in the internet @ 

http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content, accessed 15 February 2007. 

Ibid. 

China's National Defense in 2006, A Defense White Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 

December 2006, Beijing, available on the internet @ http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194477.html, 

accessed 13 May 

2007. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

China Outlines Ambitious Objectives in its Defense White Paper, by Willy Lam, China Brief Volume 7, Issue 1, Jamestown 

Foundation., 07 January 2007, available on the internet@ 

http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=422&issue_id=3969&article_id=2371785, 

accessed 20 February 2007. 

Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available on 

the internet @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2006/2006-prc-military-power02.htm 

China's Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, Roger Cliff, Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission on September 15, 2005, RAND p1. 

Ibid., p4. 

Ibid., p5. 

Ibid., p6. 

China Strategic Assessment, ADM Policy Group, Canada Department of National Defense, available in the internet @ 

http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content, accessed 15 February 2007. 

Ibid. 

China's Military Modernization: Major Thrust Areas, Dr. Subhash Kapila, Paper No.2228, South Asia Analysis Group, 05 January 

2007. 

“China's Grand Strategy and Military Modernization”, Dr. Subhash Kapila, paper presented at the “Southern Asia Security Challenges in 

the Coming Decade” Seminar, on March 2003 hosted by Society for Peace, Security and Development Studies, Allahabad & The Indian 

Council for Social Science Research, New Delhi. 

Ibid. 


THE NECESSITY OF 

EFFECTIVE DOCTRINES 

TO ARMY OPERATIONS 

MAJ ANDRES B TABUNDA JR 

(OS) PA is currently the Division 

C h i e f o f t h e D o c t r i n e 

Development Division, Doctrine 

Center, TRADOC, PA. Prior to his 

assignment, he was an instructor 

in the Combat Service Support 

School. 


MAJOR ANDRES B TABUNDA JR (OS) 

he formulation of doctrine in military operations emphasizes the need of an 

Tarmed organization to have direction, structure and action plans in support of 

its national objectives. Factors affecting the operation must focus on dealing with 

the security of the state. 

It is clear that the Philippine Army has its responsibility to defend the Republic 

in times of war and conflict from internal and external threats. The Army must defeat 

or counter any threats to the State and those that may affect the Army's operational 

capability, strategy and tactics. Since doctrine will guide the operations, its 

development and use have to be accorded the utmost importance so that the Army 

get the best results in its day-to-day activities. 

Understanding how doctrine works, how it is formulated, and how it is used will 

broaden the Army commanders' operational perspective and enrich their decision 

making capabilities when it is most demanded and needed. 

Although it is assumed that doctrine is the starting point from which a 

commander develops solutions and options to address specific war fighting 

demands and challenges, its objective is to provide direction towards winning the 

war. 

The Army's Role and the Need for Doctrines 

Winning our war against the threat to security is our contribution to the whole 

effort of national objectives. Our mandate dictates that the Army should protect the 

Philippines and its national interest. Therefore, as the country's main ground force, 

the Army must be prepared to defend the State and swiftly and decisively win the 

combat. 

27

THE NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE DOCTRINES 

The Army must be strengthened by a capable leadership and 

competent personnel that will provide responsible, sustainable 

and survivable fighting force, adaptable to any range of 

operations. And as part of the total force, the Army must 

organize, train, equip, and provide the AFP with soldiers who are 

capable of fighting and winning for the organization. 

During wartime, the army conducts strategic, operational, 

and tactical support operations. These operations follow certain 

doctrinal principles that provide the foundations for execution of 

strategy on the ground. 

Thus, the development of an operational doctrine for units 

and leaders during training is an essential task. These will 

provide the basis for the efficient and effective generation, 

employment, and sustainment of the army. 

Ultimately, the knowledge and application of 

doctrines enables an army to be decisive in battle. 

Sound doctrine will also develop the soldier 

through its rigorous and realistic training. Its 

principles will impart discipline, proper motivation 

and orientation resulting to a well motivated, tough 

and morally upright soldiers. Doctrine will prepare 

the army in combat operations with the adaptability 

of well motivated force structures, functionality of 

weapons and flexibility of supports. 

The Need for Doctrines—The Operational Perspective 

The Army therefore needs doctrine as baseline for 

operations. Our organization's existence can be justified by 

winning the war against the aggressors. Thus the relationship 

between doctrine and the Army operation for a successful 

conduct of war is very significant. This relationship is like the 

brain (the doctrine) dictating coordinated actions to the body 

(operation) on the ground. 

As pointed out by the Prussian king Frederick 

the Great, “the art of war must own certain elements 

of fluid doctrines, therefore let us acquire that 

principles and theory in our head – otherwise we 

will not move forward to win.” 

Doctrine on another plane has a duty to guide 

the operational concept of winning the war. It 

would appear that these two views go hand –in – 

hand and have mutual responsibilities with each 

other in pushing leadership, strategy and combat 

power. 

The correlation of doctrine and army 

operations may be traced back to the successful 

military campaigns in the history of warfare. 

The French emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, 

successfully defeated a larger number of 

Austrian army than his own in the battle of the 

Alps by boldly executing his concept of 

operation—utilizing the high grounds by 

strategically positioning his artillery pieces 

had caused surprise and demoralization to the 

opposition forces. 

Napoleon further said, “I have fought 

several battles and I have learned nothing 

which I did not know at the beginning.” This was 

due to the doctrinal principles on hand for 

implementation. 

In his long successful campaigns, Napoleon 

studied his operations, conjured up plans and 

master executions to defeat larger armies than his 

own. He shrewdly implemented his action plans in 

relation to the situation in the conduct of army 



operations during his time. 

Commanders use doctrinal principles in their action 

plans which when properly implemented can lead them to a 

successful campaign. They utilize the doctrine as their guide 

in commanding and managing an army. The necessity of 

doctrine in army operations stem from leadership, mastery 

of details, control of resources and proper utilization of 

command. Gen. Douglas Mac-Arthur used this concept 

during the liberation of the Philippine Islands. 

Thus, the essential element of his successful 

campaign was strong leadership with the use of doctrinal 

principles and bold application to his operation. 

To sum it up, doctrine can and will influence the 

army operation. As Sun Tzu said, “When you laid down a 

strategy (doctrine), that is a product of your cautious and 

profound estimate of the situation, and then, your 

probability of winning is very high”. 

Given that doctrines serve as the foundation for 

operations, we therefore need to develop our own doctrine 

as framework to our operations. It is a necessity because it 

touches all aspects of army operations. 

In some other considerations, the principles contained 

in doctrine ranges from theoretical to practical such as our 

understanding of the nature of war to the basics of weapons 

handling. In a higher application, doctrine emphasizes the 

importance of judgment in analyzing the whole context of 

warfare. It also offer prescriptive solution to the soldiers on 

the ground since it provides guidance on the tactics and 

techniques to be used in a particular situation. 

As guide to army operations, doctrine must be rooted in 

time tested principles but is forward looking and adaptable 

to changing technologies, threats and missions. With these 

principles, doctrine will be flexible to any situation and will 

guide the operating troops in battle. The nature of doctrine is 

never static always dynamic. Success in battle depends on 

sound doctrine because it provides purpose, direction and 


meaning to the army operation. 

Doctrine provides concepts and pushes all the 

facets of the Army's operations, as can be gleaned from 

several considerations. 

First, doctrine provides direction by defining 

the collective intent of the Army to fight and by 

providing a common reference point in the conduct of 

war. It guides the combatant commanders to establish 

the priority of movement of forces in the operation. It 

will also be the determining factor for the commander to 

identify if his troop is suitable for a particular mission 

and will sustain the force in emerging victory. 

Moreover, doctrine gives structure to the Army's 

organization; it influences the acquisition of personnel 

and assignment of personnel. It also establishes change 

in the organization by laying down the fundamental 

principles in the conduct of operation. It sets the 

potential parameters of employing an army unit and its 

weapon system. It also moves to permeate the entire 

organizational structure, guide the direction for 

modernization, and set the standard for leadership 

development. 

At the Army schools, doctrine influences the 

training of personnel and facilitates academic discussion 

among soldiers no matter where they serve to act as one 

in a particular purpose. It will facilitate training as basis 

for instruction since it is a practical standard that soldier 

must understand, use and teach. It serves as basis for 

curricula in the Army school system instilling to the 

students a common language and a common 

understanding of how army forces conduct operations. It 

facilitates a common lingo between army personnel and 

establishes a shared professional culture and approach to 

operations. And it stimulates thinking and discussion 

that may lead to the improvement of doctrine itself. 

At he command level, Doctrine directs the 

operations and provides the starting point from which a 

commander develops solutions and options to address 

specific war fighting demands and challenges faced 

within the conduct of war. It also aids the commander in 

categorizing the equipment to be used and determining 

the right organization and sequence of units for a 

mission. 

Finally, understanding the relationship between 

doctrine and technology begins with the premise that 

doctrine must be the “brain” that drives the utilization of 

technology. As the effect of technology becomes evident 

in weapons and equipment advances, so must it be in the 

doctrine and principles in order to gain operational 

advantage. Thus, the Army can best use the technology 

in the future especially if it is integrated with doctrine. 

Sources in Formulating Doctrines 

29


Since the formula of winning wars can be 

derived from doctrine, this must be so because it 

is derived from interrelated sources that guide 

military actions. Doctrine is derived from a 

variety of sources which have different effects 

throughout its development: 

History and lessons learned are evaluated 

considering current environment, assessment of 

the threats, the resources available and the 

objectives and policies of the state. Wars reviews 

providing tactical and technical reflections of 

success are also studied in the development of 

doctrine. 

Environment and threat assessment must be 

continuously evaluated in order to monitor possible and 

probable threats. Gathering of current and accurate 

information with careful study and analysis of the changing 

environment can result to a well founded estimate and 

anticipation of events that might occur in the future. 

Government policies cover the conduct and use of 

military forces, and the development of doctrine must be 

reflected in the Constitution, laws and national directives. 

Doctrine development is also influenced by culture, 

customs, traditions and characteristics of a nation and its 

people. Political goals and decision of the government also 

dictate the monetary consideration for doctrine 

development. 

Doctrine is further derived from the strategic context, in 

which the Army forces will operate based on AFP joint 

operational concepts, procedure and strategy. Moreover, 

doctrine is based on the National Defense Strategy which is 

formulated based on national interest and objectives. 

The availability of resources can 

affect the development of doctrine. Its 

creation will be optimized by the availability 

of resources and the capability of support 

given by the higher headquarters. Doctrine is 

also influenced by military organizations' 

intent to make the use of doctrine in their 

operations. 

Technology should reflect on the 

development of doctrine's potential effects 

in the Army operations for the present and 

future. Doctrine should exploit 

technological opportunities that may give 

our organization battlefield advantages for 

protection of forces and from lethal forces of 

the enemy. 

Policy-Making in Doctrine Development 

In order to justify our development of doctrine, there 

are laws, directives and policies that dictate its 

formulation for use of Army operations. In Republic Act 

No. 7898, the law which provides for the modernization 

of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Section 2 

specifically states the objectives for the development of 

doctrines. 

Doctrine development is one of the components of 

The AFP Modernization Program which specifically 

dictates that the AFP shall be responsible for the 

generation, evaluation, consolidation and formulation of 

doctrines and the conduct of periodic review and 

validation of doctrine through field manuals, testing and 

exercises and the dissemination of approved doctrines at 

all levels of command. 

The Doctrine Development Strategy (PAM 8-012) 

2000 of the Philippine Army formulated by the Doctrine 

Center has provided the methodology that guides the PA 


Doctrine Development Program. This manual sets the 

doctrine hierarchies and dimensions and outlines the stages 

that would redefine the Philippine Army Manuals (PAM) 

development process. This is a strategy that provides a 

common reference in implementing various projects (for 

development of manuals) of the program that is anchored on 

practicable measures and procedure that would expedite the 

process for the eventual evolution of our doctrine. 

The Philippine Army Letter of Instructions (LOI) 01- 

01, 2001 has provided general guidelines in the 

implementatio 

n of Philippine 

Army Doctrine 

Development 

Strategy which 

t a s k s t h e 

D o c t r i n e 

C e n t e r , 

TRADOC, PA 

to: Act as the 

d o c t r i n e 

development 

i n t e g r a t i n g 

d e v i c e w h o 

shall determine 

the nature of 

demands and 

requirement; 

chart the course 

of the doctrine 

development 

effort; facilitate 

availability of 

the necessary 

resources as 

programmed; and evaluate the performance of the other 

components against requirements and bring about changes 

in cases where performance does not meet the requirements 

for doctrine development. 

Systematizing the Process: The Doctrinal Framework 

Military doctrine is defined as body of central beliefs 

that guides the application of leadership, combat power, 

employment of military resources designed for continuing 

mission, and a mixture of collective concept to employ 

military organization in war. When in use, doctrine 

establishes a framework to understand planning in the 

conduct of operation, provides common approach on 

methodical thinking, and lead to mutual understanding and 

collective action. 

The doctrinal framework is a guide in the conduct of 

Army operations. It operationalizes the strategies of 



doctrinal principles in winning the war. In this 

framework, for area commander, the concept of 

leadership, efficient organizational set up, use of combat 

power, and efficient services and support systems are 

integrated within a doctrine while moving in one 

direction are very significant for operational purposes. 

Likewise, it prescribes the inter-connection with 

other AFP services, government agencies, civilian 

populace, and defines the functions of each command 

within one commander inside an area of operation (AOR) 

to strengthen the 

t e a m e f f o r t s 

w h i l e 

implementing the 

o p e r a t i o n a l 

concepts in the 

accomplishment 

of the mission. 

Thus, in totality, 

the framework 

d e v e l o p s t h e 

desired effect in 

t h e w h o l e 

spectrum of the 

battlefield that 

would result to 

the systematic 

coordination of 

e v e r y 

organization to 

win the war. 

F o r 

t a c t i c a l 

c o m m a n d e r s , 

d o c t r i n a l 

framework is a valuable reference where they can derive 

their strategy in planning and executing their concept of 

operations. In the aspect of planning, it provides with a 

clear direction in the conduct of military operations. On 

the other hand, coordination with other agencies, higher 

ups and subordinates units within an AOR could be easily 

arranged since command relationships are defined. 

As such, they could identify the critical tasks to be 

accomplished and effective organization and support 

system while doing the mission can be easily undertaken. 

In the execution of their plan, they could align their 

strategies to the framework for a guide and direction and 

in the process attain coordinated effort in their 

operations. By putting this into implementation, tactical 

commanders would be able to systematically accomplish 

their mission and win the war. 

31


GOV’T AGENCIES,CIVILIAN POPULACE 

LEADERSHIP 

TO WIN THE WAR IN AN AOR 

DOCTRINE 

ORGANIZATION 

COMBAT 

POWER 

OTHER COMMANDS/AFP SERVICES 

SERVICE 

AND 

SUPPORT 

SYSTEM 

MISSION 

ACCOMPLISHMENT 

Conclusion 

Doctrine will lead the organization with other agencies to 

share a common operating picture, and to share each common 

effort quickly whenever necessary at the tactical and operational 

levels to win wars. The command relationship in an operational 

area is a great starting point. In the age of internal security 

operation (ISO) for all of us, this is an extremely effective way to 

coordinate, conferences, redirect and review our doctrine of 

command relationships, and inter-operability in an area 

command. 

References: 

Even more important than the technological 

challenges that face us in a multi-operational 

environment are the critical relationships of 

commands, units, government agencies, other 

military services and the populace in an area of 

operations. Thus, their cooperation to achieve a 

common goal of peace, security and development 

will make the difference. 

If our national goals are in doctrinal alignment, 

as they often are, our habitual cooperation and 

relationships will provide a much greater chance of 

success in accomplishing our mission, thereby 

assisting us in attaining our common goals. The 

amazing by-product is almost inevitably an 

improvement in the readiness of all our forces 

through a common direction provided by our fluid 

doctrines, which ultimately works to ensure 

efficiency of operations that can thrived 

throughout every AOR. 

Thus, the doctrinal principle of coordinated 

efforts for a one purpose definitely will lead us to 

victory. What more that doctrine could do, as these 

concepts become a shared reality? Truly, the 

importance of doctrine in the Army operations is a 

necessity and never be over emphasized. 

1. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 1987 

2. Republic Act 7898 – An Act Providing the Modernization of the AFP 

3. Philippine Army Basic Doctrine (PAM 0-1) 

4. Philippine Army Doctrine Development Strategy (PAM 8-012) 2000 

5. Writers and Editors Guide to PAM Preparation (PAM 8-011) 2004 

6. FM 1-100 US Field Manual on Army Operations 

7. Napoleon 1, Emperor of France accessed at http:// www. Yahoo.com// library 

8. Frederick the Great – Wikipidia, the free Encyclopedia at http:// www. Fredericksociety.com great.html 

9. Douglas Mac Arthur (1880-1964) The Legendary Army General at http:// search yahoo.5 douglasm 

10. Sun Tzu: The Art of War at http://Sonshi.com 


DR. STEVEN METZ is the 

Chairman of the Regional 

Planning Department and 

Research Professor of national 

Security Affairs at the Strategic 

Studies Institute. He has been 

with SSI since 1993, previously 

serving as Henry L. Stimson 

professor of Military Studies and 

SSI's Director of Research. Dr. 

Metz has also been on the faculty 

of the Air War College, the U.S 

Army Command and General 

Staff College, and several 

universities. He has been an 

advisor to political campaigns 

and elements of the intelligence 

community; served on many 

national securities policy task 

forces; testified in both houses of 

Congress and spoken on military 

and security issues around the 

world. 

w 


THE PRINCIPLES 

ST 

OF WAR AND 21 

CENTURY CONFLICT 

DR. STEVEN METZ 

ar is mankind's most taxing endeavor. It places severe challenges on those forced 

to undertake it, not only in terms of intellectual activity and physical courage, but 

also ethically. All except the most primitive militaries have developed methods for 

identifying those with the ability to become warriors and expanding, developing, 

honing, and refining the skills of those who exercise leadership. Military education plays 

the role of weeding out those unfit for leadership and augmenting the skills of those who 

are fit. 

As with any kind of education, military education involves those with experience 

and wisdom identifying what their acolytes need to know to perform their function, then 

imparting these lessons to them. There are many ways of doing that but, for at least the 

past century, many militaries have used what became known as the “principles of war” in 

the process of leader development and education. 

Throughout history, military practitioners, philosophers, and historians have 

struggled to comprehend the complexities of warfare. Most of these efforts produced 

long, complicated treatises that did not lend themselves to rapid or easy understanding. 

This, in turn, spurred efforts to condense the "lessons" of war into a short list of 

aphorisms that could be used to guide the conduct of warfare or, at least, to think about 

how to plan and conduct war. The principles of war, then, were simply a distilled version 

of complex lessons which could be easily remembered. They were designed to provide 

general guidance for strategists, commanders, and planners. 

Over the centuries military thinkers reached a general agreement on the principles of 

war. In 1920 the British Army, spurred by the thinking of J.F.C. Fuller, codified their 

version which was derived, in large part, from the experience of World War I. A year 

later the U.S. Army followed, integrating the principles of war in its Army Training 

Regulations (and, several decades later, into its capstone war-fighting doctrine 

publication--Field Manual 100-5, Operations). Even other militaries which did not use 

the British list shared its general ideas. 

But in the 1990s, military theorists, particularly within the U.S. Army, began to 

wonder whether the longstanding principles of war were due for revision. After all, this 

was a decade when military leaders and theorists around the world became convinced 

that an historic “revolution in military affairs” was underway. This, they contended, 

demanded that militaries “transform.” It only made sense that if warfare was undergoing 

a revolutionary change and armed forces were transforming, the principles of 

th th 

war—which had taken shape in the 19 and 20 century when large-scale, conventional 

33

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR 

warfare between the armed forces of sovereign nationstates-- 

should be re-looked as well. 

This made sense but also represented a small step in a 

much broader re-thinking. To understand how the principles 

of war should be revised, one first had to ask how the security 

environment and armed conflict had evolved. Did war still 

play the same function as it did when the veterans of 

European wars first codified its principles? 

Military theorists often say that the essence of war does 

not change but its nature shifts over time. That makes sense 

but what does it mean? War is and always will be about the 

use of violence for political purposes. This is part of its 

"essence." It is always characterized by what Clausewitz 

described as “fog” (factors which complicate decisionmaking 

and force strategists to rely on assumptions), 

“friction” (the tendency of everything to operate less 

efficiently than in peacetime), 

and the “trinity” of rationality, 

passion, and chance. This, 

too, is part of the essence. 

But operational methods, 

strategies, organizations, and 

technology change. Linear 

formations gave way to loose 

ones, columns and rows 

eventually to swarming by 

battalions and brigades; 

human and animal power were 

replaced by mechanization; 

hand written and personal 

communications were replaced by electronic ones. Limited, 

seasonal operations gave way to global power projection. 

And so forth. These things are all part of war's "nature." 

The principles of war reflect both its essence and its 

nature. The key is to find a set of principles which balance 

war's enduring essence and its changing nature. That 

requires the collective effort of warriors and military 

theorists from around the world. The most effective 

principles are not those developed by an individual or even a 

small group of thinkers, but which reflect a consensus on the 

part of those who must undergo the traumas of war (and those 

who seek to understand it). 

Given that, I will, in this essay, sketch the traditional 

approach to the principles of war, outline what I consider to 

be the most salient changes taking place in the global 

security environment and the nature of armed conflict, and 

Throughout history, military 

practitioners, philosophers, and 

historians have struggled to 

comprehend the complexities of 

warfare. Most of these efforts 

produced long, complicated treatises 

that did not lend themselves to rapid 

or easy understanding. 

then suggest some ways that warriors and military 

theorists might consider revising the principles of war. 

My goal is not to offer my own set of new or revised 

principles, but to stoke thinking, discussion, and debate. 

The Tradition 

There were nine principles in the set initially 

codified by the British and then integrated into American 

military education and doctrine: 

Objective. Military leaders should direct every 

operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and 

attainable objective. Combat operations seek the 

destruction of the enemy's armed forces' capabilities and 

will to fight. Objectives must directly, quickly, and 

economically contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid 

actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the 

objective. 

Initiative. Military 

leaders should seize, retain, 

and exploit the initiative. 

Offensive action is the most 

effective and decisive way to 

attain a clearly defined 

objective. Offensive 

operations are the means by 

which military forces seize 

and hold the initiative while 

maintaining freedom of 

a c t i o n a n d a c h i e v i n g 

d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s . 

Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary 

expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize 

the initiative. 

Mass. Military leaders should concentrate the 

effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve 

decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize 

appropriate force capabilities where they will have 

decisive effect in a short period of time. Massing effects, 

rather than forces, can enable even numerically inferior 

forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human 

losses and waste of resources. 

Economy of Force. Military leaders should allocate 

minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. 

Economy of force is the judicious employment and 

distribution of forces. 

Maneuver. Military leaders should place the enemy 


ar is mankind's most taxing endeavor. It places severe 

challenges on those forced to undertake it, not only in terms 

of intellectual activity and physical courage, but also 

ethically. All except the most primitive militaries have 

developed methods for identifying those with the ability to 

become warriors and expanding, developing, honing, and 

refining the skills of those who exercise leadership. Military 

education plays the role of weeding out those unfit for 

leadership and augmenting the skills of those who are fit. 

As with any kind of education, military education 

involves those with experience and wisdom identifying what 

their acolytes need to know to perform their function, then 

imparting these lessons to them. There are many ways of 

doing that but, for at least the past century, many militaries 

have used what became known as the “principles of war” in 

the process of leader development and education. 

Throughout history, military practitioners, philosophers, 

and historians have struggled to comprehend the 

complexities of warfare. Most of these efforts produced 

long, complicated treatises that did not lend themselves to 

rapid or easy understanding. This, in turn, spurred efforts to 

condense the "lessons" of war into a short list of aphorisms 

that could be used to guide the conduct of warfare or, at least, 

to think about how to plan and conduct war. The principles 

of war, then, were simply a distilled version of complex 

lessons which could be easily remembered. They were 

designed to provide general guidance for strategists, 

commanders, and planners. 

Over the centuries military thinkers reached a general 

agreement on the principles of war. In 1920 the British 

Army, spurred by the thinking of J.F.C. Fuller, codified their 

version which was derived, in large part, from the experience 

of World War I. A year later the U.S. Army followed, 

integrating the principles of war in its Army Training 

Regulations (and, several decades later, into its capstone 

war-fighting doctrine publication--Field Manual 100-5, 

Operations). Even other militaries which did not use the 

British list shared its general ideas. 

But in the 1990s, military theorists, particularly within 

the U.S. Army, began to wonder whether the longstanding 

principles of war were due for revision. After all, this was a 

decade when military leaders and theorists around the world 

became convinced that an historic “revolution in military 

affairs” was underway. This, they contended, demanded that 

militaries “transform.” It only made sense that if warfare 

was undergoing a revolutionary change and armed forces 



were transforming, the principles of war—which had 

th th 

taken shape in the 19 and 20 century when large-scale, 

conventional warfare between the armed forces of 

sovereign nation-states-- should be re-looked as well. 

This made sense but also represented a small step in 

a much broader re-thinking. To understand how the 

principles of war should be revised, one first had to ask 

how the security environment and armed conflict had 

evolved. Did war still play the same function as it did 

when the veterans of European wars first codified its 

principles? 

Military theorists often say that the essence of war 

does not change but its nature shifts over time. That 

makes sense but what does it mean? War is and always 

will be about the use of violence for political purposes. 

This is part of its "essence." It is always characterized 

by what Clausewitz described as “fog” (factors which 

complicate decision-making and force strategists to rely 

on assumptions), “friction” (the tendency of everything 

to operate less efficiently than in peacetime), and the 

“trinity” of rationality, passion, and chance. This, too, is 

part of the essence. 

But operational methods, strategies, organizations, 

and technology change. Linear formations gave way to 

loose ones, columns and rows eventually to swarming 

by battalions and brigades; human and animal power 

were replaced by mechanization; hand written and 

personal communications were replaced by electronic 

ones. Limited, seasonal operations gave way to global 

power projection. And so forth. These things are all 

part of war's "nature." 

The principles of war reflect both its essence and its 

nature. The key is to find a set of principles which 

balance war's enduring essence and its changing nature. 

That requires the collective effort of warriors and 

military theorists from around the world. The most 

effective principles are not those developed by an 

individual or even a small group of thinkers, but which 

reflect a consensus on the part of those who must 

undergo the traumas of war (and those who seek to 

understand it). 

Given that, I will, in this essay, sketch the traditional 

approach to the principles of war, outline what I consider 

to be the most salient changes taking place in the global 

security environment and the nature of armed conflict, 

and then suggest some ways that warriors and military 

35


theorists might consider revising the principles of war. My 

goal is not to offer my own set of new or revised principles, 

but to stoke thinking, discussion, and debate. 

The Tradition 

There were nine principles in the set initially codified 

by the British and then integrated into American military 

education and doctrine: 

Objective. Military leaders should direct every 

operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable 

objective. Combat operations seek the destruction of the 

enemy's armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. 

Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically 

contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not 

contribute directly to achieving the objective. 

Initiative. Military leaders should seize, retain, and 

exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective 

and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. 

Offensive operations are the means by which military forces 

seize and hold the initiative while maintaining freedom of 

action and achieving decisive results. Commanders adopt 

the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek 

every opportunity to seize or re-seize the initiative. 

Mass. Military leaders should concentrate the effects 

of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive 

results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate force 

capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short 

period of time. Massing effects, rather than forces, can 

enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive 

results and minimize human losses and waste of resources. 

Economy of Force. Military leaders should allocate 

minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. 

Economy of force is the judicious employment and 

distribution of forces. 

Maneuver. Military leaders should place the enemy in a 

position of disadvantage through the flexible application of 

combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in 

relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional 

advantage, usually in order to deliver–or threaten delivery 

of–the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. 

Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off-balanced and thus 

protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in 

exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and 

reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems 

for the enemy. 

Unity of Command. Military leaders should ensure 

unity of effort under one responsible commander for 

every objective. Unity of command means that all 

forces operate under a single commander with the 

requisite authority to direct all forces employed in 

pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, 

requires coordination and cooperation among all forces 

toward a commonly recognized objective, although they 

are not necessarily part of the same command structure. 

Security. Military leaders should never permit the 

enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security 

enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly 

vulnerability to hostile acts, influences, or surprise. 

Staff planning and understanding of enemy strategy, 

To understand how the principles 

of war should be revised, one first 

had to ask how the security 

environment and armed conflict 

had evolved. Did war still play the 

same function as it did when the 

veterans of European wars first 

codified its principles? 

tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is 

inherent in military operations. Application of this 

principle includes prudent risk management, not undue 

caution. 

Surprise. Military leaders should strike the enemy 

at a time or place or in a manner for which it is 

unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the 

balance of power and thus achieve success well out of 

proportion to the effort expended. 

Simplicity. Military leaders should prepare clear, 

uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure 

thorough understanding. Simple plans and clear, 

concise orders minimize misunderstanding and 

confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest 

plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better 

understanding and execution planning at all echelons. 

Other nations used similar sets of principles, with 

some slight variations: 


U.S. and Australia 

Selection and maintenance of aim 

Offensive action 

Economy of force 

Flexibility 

Cooperation 

Security 

Surprise 

Maintenance of moral 

France 

Concentration of effort 

Surprise 

Liberty of action 

China 

Selection and maintenance of aim 

Offensive action 

Initiative and flexibility 

Coordination 

Security 

Surprise 

Morale, mobility, political mobilization, and 

freedom of action 

Forces of Change 

Even the most casual observer of the global security 

environment senses that deep change is underway. To 

understand the direction this is likely to take and the 

transformation that military forces must undergo in response, 

it is first necessary to distill the drivers or locomotives. There 

are many of these, most interlinked, but eight are most 

salient. 

I n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s a n d t r a n s p a r e n c y . 

Interconnectedness simply means that the people of the earth, 

and the states and regions in which they live are more 

connected than at any point in history, both in qualitative and 

quantitative terms. In large part this derives from the 

profusion of information technology and its availability to a 

steadily increasing proportion of the world's population. 

Even those without email, instant messenger, and web 

browsing can often gain a vivid picture of far-away events 

through satellite television or relatively old fashioned 

technology such as telephones and faxes. 

But interconnectedness also means that people rely on 



and expect far flung connections to a much greater 

extent than in the past. Now insular individuals are the 

exception rather than the rule, with most of them 

concentrated in the world's less developed regions. 

International travel and migration—whether permanent 

or temporary—is easier and more common than it has 

ever been. The world is crisscrossed by networks, some 

based on ties like ethnicity or nationality, others on 

shared ideas, or ideology. These provide not only a 

source of information, but also a means to mobilize 

economic and political support for an organization or an 

idea. 

Interconnectedness, by eroding the control that 

authoritarian regimes can exercise over their citizens, is 

both liberating and destabilizing. The information 

revolution helped destroy Marxism-Leninism by 

stoking discontent and allowing opposition movements 

to form coalitions both within their states and outside it. 

It may not necessarily represent the global ascendance 

of truth, but it certainly shortens the lifespan of lies. 

With the exception of dinosaurs like North Korea which 

tolerates opprobrium rather than surrender control of its 

citizens, world public opinion matters. Increasingly, 

states which practice repression do so through quick, 

spasmodic campaigns as in Rwanda. In so many ways, 

the information revolution brings both good news and 

bad news, speeding the accumulation of information 

and, by increasing the data that must be considered and 

the range of available options, slowing the pace of 

decision making. 

While interconnectedness can be liberating, it also 

has costs and risks. For instance, the information 

revolution has brought information overload. Everyone 

with a PC and an Internet connection is inundated, with 

ideas and images. This can broaden an individual's 

perspective by providing access to different points of 

view and sources of information but it also can reinforce 

delusions or stereotypes by showing that others hold 

similar thoughts. Bizarre ideas and outright lies can be 

propagated much more easily than in the past. One has 

only to look at the plethora of conspiracy or racist web 

sites to see this at work. 

The world's advanced democracies are finding that 

interconnectedness creates a degree of transparency that 

dramatically affects policies and actions. As the rapid 

emergence of global opposition to American plans for 

37

military intervention in Iraq shows, it is extraordinarily 

difficult to mobilize and sustain support for the use of force 

when its potential victims—whether intended or 

unintended—have a real face and when opponents of the 

use of force can communicate, coordinate, and form 

alliances. This elevated standard for support and 

legitimacy means that armed forces must develop the 

means to limit unintended damage and keep high cost 

forms of force—especially large-scale war-fighting—as 

short as possible. Phrased different, interconnectedness 

and transparency shorten the grace period between a 

decision to use force and the coalescence of internal and 

external opposition. Thus military operations must be 

either quick or low key and small. 

Globalization. Globalization is the economic 

The principles of war reflect both 

its essence and its nature. The key is 

to find a set of principles which 

balance war's enduring essence and 

its changing nature. That requires the 

collective effort of warriors and 

military theorists from around the 

world. 

manifestation of interconnectedness. It is the most 

important, encompassing, and extensive economic shift 

since industrialization. Today every state must choose 

between participation in the globalized economy or 

persistent poverty. Participation means that the state—not 

just businesses within a state, but the government itself-must 

follow certain rules of behavior, including things like 

limiting corruption, opening markets, and implementing 

transparent budgeting and financial procedures—what 

writer Thomas Friedman calls the "golden straitjacket." 

“Transparency,” write Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 

“is becoming a key asset for countries seeking investments. 

The ability to hoard information, which once seemed so 

valuable to authoritarian states, undermines the credibility 

and transparency necessary to attract investment on 

globally competitive terms.” This has immense 

implications. Decisions made by multinational financial 

institutions, overseas banks, or investors on the other side 


of the world now determine the economic health of a 

nation nearly as much as decisions made by its own 

leaders. As Jessica T. Mathews writes, “National 

governments are not simply losing autonomy in a 

globalizing economy. They are sharing 

powers—including political, social, and security roles at 

the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with 

international organizations, and with a multitude of 

citizen groups, known as nongovernmental 

organizations.” In a sense, all states have taken on some 

of the weakness, vulnerability, and lack of control that 

traditionally characterizes small states. 

Globalization has both winners and losers. These 

can be regions, states, sections of nation states, segments 

of society, and even individuals. As the losers see their 

standard of living, power base, influence, and prospects 

erode, they sometimes will lash out against those they 

hold responsible such as institutions like the World Bank 

or, more often, the United States. A loose network 

opposed to globalization is already taking shape and 

eventually this could coalesce into a more formal 

movement and even spawn some sort of new, radical 

ideology. After all, communism emerged from the 

attempts to mobilize the losers from the process of 

industrialization and globalization's losers are just as 

th 

frustrated and angry as 19 century Europe's industrial 

proletariat. If a new radical ideology does take shape, it 

is likely to provide a foundation for violence ranging 

from terrorism and sabotage to full blown war. 

In fact, a case can be made that this is already 

happening: the Islamic world has proven unable to adapt 

to modernization and globalization, and thus remains 

mired in stagnation, anomie, poverty and repression. 

This leads to frustration, resentment, anger and 

terrorism. But rather than changing the culture that 

causes the failure, radicals seek to bring down those who 

have succeeded in the globalizing world down to their 

level. It is no coincidence that al Qa'ida targets the 

economies of the developed nations since their collapse 

would diminish the daily reminders that Islamic culture 

in its current form cannot provide a foundation for 

modern, powerful democratic states. Without an 

historical cultural shift in the Islamic world akin to the 

Protestant Reformation and Enlightenment in Europe, 

this will not change. 

Like industrialization, globalization has political, 


cultural, social, and military effects as well as economic 

ones. For instance, it has created such tight linkages that 

armed violence in one part of the world has a ripple effect, 

often causing price increases or inflation elsewhere. This 

increases the pressure on hostile parties—particularly those 

integrated into the global economy--to refrain from war or 

seek a speedy end to one already underway. Undoubtedly 

there will be times when states consider the interests at stake 

in a conflict so important that they are willing to accept the 

costs of going to war. But the frequency of conflicts where a 

state sees its vital interests at stake and where war is seen as 

an acceptable means of promoting or protecting these 

interests is declining. When the interests at stake are less 

than vital, the economic and political costs of armed conflict 

may serve as a brake. Ironically, though, these same 

constraints may prevent states from mobilizing and 

deploying overwhelming force in all but the most extreme 

cases, and thus cause those armed conflicts that do occur to 

be protracted. Armed conflicts in the first few decades of the 

st 

21 century wars thus may drag on for extended periods of 

time. 

Demographic and ecological pressures. While the 

world's population is growing at a slower rate than a few 

decades ago, it will exceed 8 billion by 2030, with almost all 

of the increase in the poorer regions. Urbanization also 

continues unabated. By 2030 over the three fifths of the 

world's people will live in cities. This growth is 

accompanied by degradation of the physical environment, 

particularly in areas facing demographic pressure. The 

mounting stress on the world's water supplies, deforestation, 

desertification and the erosion of farmland are particularly 

troubling. These, in turn, fuel further urbanization and 

migrations. They also undercut economic development, 

further destabilizing fragile regimes. So far, attempts by 

governments to control and manage the adverse effects of 

these trends have proven ineffective. Should this 

continue—and everything suggests it will—the competition 

for resources, whether land, water, or capital, can provide a 

foundation for future conflicts. This might take the form of 

state aggression as regimes seek access to needed resources. 

Human flows Interconnectedness, globalization, and 

demographic and ecological pressures have combined to 

form historically unprecedented human flows. Two forms of 



this are most important for security. One is the flow of 

individuals from the “losing” parts of the world to the 

“winning” ones in search of economic opportunity. This 

exacerbates the gap between winning and losing regions 

by stripping the latter of their most talented, educated, 

and industrious individuals. The movement of 

individuals from losing to winning parts of the world can 

actually exacerbate conflict between the two. Rather 

than exporting the economic, political, and social 

factors that help the developed world succeed back to 

their homeland, many émigrés, particularly those from 

the Islamic world, simply grow more angry and 

resentful at the West during their time there. For a tiny 

proportion of them, these feelings are so intense that 

they turn to terrorism or other forms of violence. 

Factors like this, when combined with the broader 

economic shifts associated with globalization, are 

fueling increasing anti-immigrant feelings in many of 

the host countries in North America, Europe, and 

Oceania. 

The second important type of human flow consists 

of refugees driven by insecurity or conflict. In 2006, the 

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) identified 20.8 million “people of 

concern” including 12 million refugees (the conflict in 

Iraq has probably made this number higher since the 

data were collected). With the end of the Cold War, it 

has become harder to mobilize sustained interest in 

resolving conflicts in the developing world by outsiders. 

Often these conflicts are based on religion, ethnicity, 

nationality, race, clan, language, or region, often 

sustained by the economic interests of the warring 

parties. This form of violence tends to be particularly 

brutal, especially to noncombatants who are both 

defenseless and defined as enemies. In addition, the 

difficulty of mobilizing effective, long term intervention 

in such conflicts allows them to fester, sometimes for 

years or even decades, adding to the plight of refugees 

and creating multi-generational refugees with little 

notion of life in a stable society. Today, many of the 

developing world's youth—which constitutes the largest 

proportion of the population there by a significant 

number—considers conflict rather than security the 

normal human condition. Violence thus beget more 

violence. This cycle will take decades to break. 

39


Weakening and collapse of fragile states. The past 

decade has seen a tidal wave of economic and political 

reform around the world as state after state began the 

transition to free enterprise economic systems and open 

government. While this is a tremendously beneficial trend, 

all indicators are that it has peaked—reform has reached a 

high water mark. Many states are finding that sustaining an 

open government is infinitely more difficult than creating 

one. As fragile new democracies and the remaining 

authoritarian regimes struggle to meet the expectations of 

their publics which are escalating rapidly due to the 

information revolution, and to adjust to economic 

globalization, they are likely to face mounting frustration 

and outright opposition. 

The result will be an expanding array of internal 

conflicts with international dimensions, most arising from 

interconnectedness, globalization, and the profusion of 

information. Some advanced states may attempt to avoid 

involvement in these conflicts, but interconnectedness and 

globalization will make this difficult. Thus the armed 

forces of the advanced states will find themselves 

increasingly involved in promoting internal stability and 

helping beleaguered regimes in the developing world 

confront internal enemies, whether separatists, militias, 

insurgents, terrorists, armed criminal cartels, or something 

similar. 

Rapid diffusion of technology and information All 

forms of technology and information spread more rapidly 

today than at any time in the past, shrinking the period of 

time when the creator of a new idea or technology has a 

monopoly on it. This applies as much to armed conflict as 

to any other endeavor. Rather than the periodic military 

revolutions that characterized the past, coming decades are 

likely to be one of “permanent revolution” (to borrow 

Trotsky's phrase), with each following rapidly on the heels 

of its predecessor. Already there are signs that a new 

revolution based on robotics, non lethality, new materials, 

and biotechnology make burst forth before the current 

revolution in military affairs, based on inform technology, 

is finished. 

Because most of the technologies used by 

militaries are also important in the commercial world, most 

of the development and innovation will emerge from the 

private sector. This means that less advanced states and 

non-state entities with cash or resources to trade will have 

4 

In the old security system, the two 

primary threats for most nations 

were interstate war and crime. The 

organization of the security forces 

generally reflected this duality. 

access to advanced technology. The day when Western 

militaries could count in an across-the-board 

technological superiority is drawing to a close. 

Networks of violence. Globalization, the 

sustained conventional military preponderance of the 

advanced, mostly Western nations, and the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of 

advanced technology are making large scale, sustained 

warfare between states less and less likely. Ironically, the 

very wealth and power that gives a state the capacity to 

wage conventional war also gives it a stake in the 

globalized economic and political system. This 

constrains the use of the military power. By contrast, nonstate 

entities, especially those not constrained by 

traditionally political or ethical considerations, will be 

free to undertake armed aggression. The major 

aggressors of the new security environment, then, will be 

terrorists, insurgents, militias, anti-globalization radicals, 

and a growing range of criminal cartels and nodes. Taken 

in isolation, few of these can challenge to the armed forces 

of an advanced state. But few of them will operate in 

isolation. Instead, information technology will provide 

the means to form loose or tight networks of violence. 

Networks of violence will have no shortage of recruits 

during the seismic shift of globalization. Access to arms, 

technology and information will also be easy so long as 

there is money. This is a vital point: networks of violence 

will not need to control territory. They will have easy 

access to recruits, information, and technology. But their 

weakness will be money. Defeating networks of violence 

will require cutting off their funds. This entails a very 

different structure for the security forces of advanced 

states than the current one with its rigid division between 

the military and law enforcement. 


Privatization Privatization of the security environment 

has several dimensions. One is the rise of non-state 

networks of violence. Another is the trend toward 

contracting many functions previously done by uniformed 

military. The United States military has already reached a 

point that it cannot undertake a major operation without also 

deploying the battalions of contractors necessary to operate 

vital weapons, mechanical, and information systems. The 

conflict in Iraq, for instance, has seen a greater reliance on 

private military companies than any counterinsurgency 

campaign in history. Military providers like Blackwater 

U.S.A., a company founded in 1998 by former Navy 

SEALs, provided security details for American and Iraqi 

officials, private contractors, nongovernmental 

organizations, and journalists. They also guard oil fields, 

convoy banks, residential compounds and office buildings. 

The United States and other advanced nations also tend to 

rely on contractors for many of the engineering and 

infrastructure tasks necessary in peacekeeping, postconflict 

stabilization, and reconstruction. Even outside of 

the surge required by major operations, nearly every U.S. 

military organization, from service headquarters to staff 

colleges, rely on contractors. This trend is spreading to 

other nations as well. 

A related dimension of privatization is the growth of 

intelligence and security firms willing to work for a variety 

of clients. Some of these are very constrained in who they 

serve. There are corporations around the world willing to 

work for anyone able to pay. In all likelihood, nearly every 

state will come to rely on private consultants, intelligence 

organizations, and providers of specialized or surge 

capabilities. This has immense implications for civil 

military relations and for national control over security. 

Finally, there is a strong possibility that transnational 

corporations will develop their own intelligence and 

security forces. History suggests that whenever wealthy 

corporations feel that no state is willing or able to defend 

them, they build their own capabilities. Two hundred years 

ago, for instance, the British East India Company and Dutch 

East Indies Company had militaries that could have 

defeated those of most states. If coming decades bring the 

emergence of truly transnational corporations with no clear 

nationality, this may recur. 

The Emerging Operational Environment 

In the old security system, the two primary threats for 



most nations were interstate war and crime. The 

organization of the security forces generally reflected 

this duality. With a few exceptions such as the 

gendarmerie of France and former French colonies, the 

Italian car bineri, and Soviet Internal Security and 

Border forces, state security forces were divided 

between militaries and law enforcement agencies, each 

with different organizational cultures, organizations, and 

career patterns. Admittedly a few security functions 

overlapped the two—counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, 

and counter-terrorism—but the norm was a rigid 

distinction between the military, with its focus on 

external defence and warfighting, and law enforcement, 

with its focus on internal order and fighting crime. 

The emerging operational environment might be 

described as “4+1.” Four interlinked missions will be 

most important, particularly for the armed forces of 

advanced states: (1) countering the proliferation of 

dangerous technologies, particularly nuclear and 

biological weapons; (2) countering terrorism; (3) 

countering organized crime, particularly networked, 

transnational criminal enterprises; and (4) stability 

operations in weak or fragile states. These four 

functions are all “non-traditional” ones for the armed 

forces of the advanced states. Because they are nontraditional 

and interlinked, they will demand nontraditional 

and interlinked responses, including the use 

of integrated intelligence networks relying heavily on 

open sources. Barriers between armed forces, law 

enforcement, intelligence, and other elements of the 

security forces must be destroyed. 

At the same time, the militaries of the advanced 

states must retain some capability for traditional 

interstate war. While trends suggest that this is in its 

twilight, it will remain a serious threat for at least several 

more decades. A state that allows its capabilities at 

traditional interstate war to atrophy will be dependent on 

others for its security. All nations need not to follow the 

American pattern and retain across-the-board 

capabilities for sustained, large-scale warfighting, but 

will at least need to be able to contribute to coalitions 

designed to deter or defeat conventional aggression. 

Even this may be passing. By 2030, many states may 

decide that they do not need to retain the capability for 

traditional warfighting. 

The 4+1 operational environment will generate a 

41


number of specific requirements: 

•The ability to undertake rapid decisive operations when 

a conflict is politically and legally unambiguous, and 

clear aggression has taken place; 

•The ability to restore and sustain stability in a weakened 

or collapsed state in order to forestall humanitarian 

disasters, prevent terrorism, and support the restoration 

security; 

•Effectiveness at urban operations (including the use of 

advanced technology such as non-lethality, robotics, 

advanced sensor webs, and information fusion); 

•The ability to operate in an environment made “dirty” 

by the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; 

•The ability to operate seamlessly with law enforcement 

in countering nontraditional threats; 

•The ability to counter an asymmetry of time by 

sustaining a protracted operation; 

•The ability to deter or defend against terrorism by 

supporting civil authorities in promoting homeland 

security. 

Decisive Characteristics of Future Armed Forces 

The emerging global security system and the 

4+1 operational environment that will exist within it 

suggest four characteristics that successful armed forces 

will have. 

Vision. Vision has several dimensions. The most 

widely analyzed is operational and tactical vision which 

generates a near-perfect picture of the battle space derived 

from multi-platform sensor webs and fast, effective 

information analysis, fusion, and distribution. The 

objective is "information superiority" which will be the key 

to battlefield success. Deriving from a "system of systems" 

that connects space-based, ground-based, and air-based 

sensors and decision-assistance technology, information 

superiority—should it be realized—would allow 

commanders to use precision weapons—many fired from 

safe locations far from the battlefield—to strike the enemy's 

decisive points at exactly the right time. The idea is that 

armed forces with operational and tactical vision will be 

nearly omniscient while their enemies are confused, blind, 

and weak. 

But this approach to vision, however much it dominates 

American thinking, is incomplete. To be fully successful, 

future armed forces must also have strategic vision. This 

entails anticipating and preparing for future force 

structure, concept, doctrine, and technology 

requirements. Strategic vision also entails cross cultural 

understanding to prepare for, deter, and prevent emerging 

threats. This type of vision can only come from an 

integrated, multi-source intelligence system using both 

open and closed sources. A revolution in security, in 

other words, is inextricably linked to a revolution in 

intelligence. 

Persistence. In the contemporary security 

environment, asymmetric conflict is the norm. 

Asymmetry can take several forms. One of the most 

important forms is an asymmetry of time perspective may 

occur when one antagonist enters a war willing to see it 

continue for a long period of time while their opponent is 

only able to sustain their will for a short war. This means 

that modern armed forces must have the ability to sustain 

operations for the extended period of time almost always 

demanded by counterinsurgency and often required by 

stabilization operations. 

Precision. Precision is vital against enemies who 

believe that protracted warfare in physically, ethically, 

legally and politically complex environments offers 

protection against advanced militaries. This is not a new 

idea: precision has long been considered a central 

element of the current revolution in military affairs. 

George and Meredith Friedman, for instance, rank the 

development of precision guided munitions along with 

the introduction of firearms, the phalanx, and the chariot 

To be fully successful, future 

armed forces must also have 

strategic vision. This entails 

anticipating and preparing for 

future force structure, concept, 

d o c t r i n e , a n d t e c h n o l o g y 

as “a defining moment in human history.” Tactical 

precision grows from improved intelligence, guidance 

systems and, increasingly, from the ability to adjust or 

“tune” the effects that a particular weapon has. 


But precision has at least two other equally important 

dimensions. One is strategic, specifically the ability to 

undertake military operations without damaging or 

disrupting neighboring states, or the global economy. 

Globalization and interconnectedness are increasing the 

importance and the difficulty of strategic precision. If the 

only option available is to crush an opponent by pummeling 

its infrastructure and economy, the result will be unintended 

damage to neighboring states and the global economy, and 

thus a rapid erosion of support. Such operational methods 

may appear attractive, particularly if they are based solely 

on stand-off strikes and thus promise to limit casualties, but 

they will be counterproductive in the long term. 

A third form of precision is psychological. This entails 

shaping a military operation and campaign to have the exact 

desired psychological effect. Like so much of the 

revolution in military affairs, this is a new variant of an old 

idea. Military thinkers have long understood that war is 

integrally, perhaps even essentially psychological. Sun 

Tzu, of course, crafted the quintessentially psychological 

approach to strategy, contending that “all warfare is based 

on deception.” While some disciples of Clausewitz, 

particularly German military strategists, acted with 

disregard for the psychological dimension of strategy, the 

Prussian theorist himself clearly understood that war was a 

psychological struggle and the objective is to break the 

enemy's will. 

Psychological precision requires tactical precision but 

also other capabilities such as non-lethality, other new 

technologies, a certain pace and intensity of activity, or even 

refraining from the use of force if that is what is required to 

have the desired effect. Psychological precision often 

requires extended, direct human contact in order to gauge 

and adjust effects. It also demands extensive and intensive 

cross-cultural understanding of the psychological effect of 

an action which is, to some extent, culturally determined. 

What causes fear in one cultural context, for example, might 

cause anger and intensified resistance in another. 

Psychological precision demands long-standing, hands-on 

engagement with other cultures, and a willingness on the 

part of commanders and planners to incorporate the advice 

of cultural experts and social psychologists. 

Compatibility The 4+1 operational environment can 

only be confronted by a breaking of barriers between armed 

forces and other elements of state security forces, 

particularly law enforcement and intelligence. While 



advanced militaries have long understood the 

importance of cooperation with diverse partners, 

particularly jointness (cooperation between services) 

and interoperability (cooperation between militaries in 

alliances or coalitions), the future will require 

cooperation with an even wider range of organizational 

partners to include not only law enforcement, but also 

nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary 

organizations, and a wide range of other private entities. 

“Compatibility” is probably the best work to describe 

this. Success at this demands common concepts, 

education, and training (although this will be difficult to 

attain with some partners). It also requires that 

militaries continue to refine their capability to serve as a 

supporting organization rather than as the lead one as in 

conventional warfighting. This is, as much as anything, 

a shift in attitudes. Finally, compatibility demands 

integrating intelligence and knowledge with diverse 

partners. 

Revisions 

Where does this leave us in terms of the principles of 

war? One of the first attempts to revise the principles of 

war as the nature of armed conflict shifted was a 1995 

study from the U.S. Army War College (of which I was a 

co-author). Given that the contours of change in the 

nature of war were only barely discernible at that 

time—after all, the Cold War was only a few years in the 

past—the team from the Strategic Studies Institute 

suggested only modest changes. Since the focus of the 

study was at the strategic rather than the operational or 

tactical level, the authors kept “objective,” “initiative,” 

“surprise,” and “security,” much as they were in U.S. 

doctrine while replacing “economy of force” with 

“economy of effort,” “mass” with “focus,” “maneuver” 

with “orchestration,” and “simplicity” with “clarity.” 

A few years later Lieutenant Colonel Robert 

Leonhard of the U.S. Army offered a more ambitious 

revision. In a way, though, his book was misnamed. 

While “principles” had normally been relatively simple, 

easy-to-grasp concepts which sought to capture the 

essence of much more complex ideas, Leonhard 

proposed a more comprehensive method for thinking 

about war. He argued that human conflict is “governed 

by three laws”—the law of humanity, the law of 

economy, and law of the duality of conflict. His 

principles were dualities which needed to be balanced 

43


within the framework of the “laws” rather than guidelines 

which should be followed. “The principles of war,” he wrote, 

“when properly used as arguments rather than aphorisms, 

provide a dynamic framework for the development of creative 

solutions in conflict.” Reflecting Clausewitz's “trinity” of 

rationality, emotion, and chance (which dominate war), 

Leonhard divided his new principles into “principles of 

aggression” (dislocation and confrontation, 

distribution and concentration); “principles of 

interaction” (opportunity and reaction, activity and 

security); and “principles of control” (option 

acceleration and objective, command and anarchy). 

Following Operation Enduring Freedom in 

Afghanistan, the U.S. DOD's Office of Force 

Transformation sponsored the most comprehensive 

examination of the principles of war since they had first 

been codified 80 years earlier. Contending that the 

existing principles were so deeply imbued with the 

thinking of Clausewitz that they were dangerously 

close to reflecting ideas "frozen in the nineteenth 

century," retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, who 

headed the Office of Force Transformation, argued that 

the "time is ripe" for rethinking them. But because the 

book included chapters from 31 well known American 

and British strategic thinkers and military experts, its 

findings ranged widely and many of them dealt with the 

American "way" of war or other aspects of armed 

conflict in the contemporary security environment 

(from an American perspective) rather than with the 

principles of war. Those did offer diverse perspectives. 

Antulio Echevarria, for instance, argued that the United 

States actually has and follows "principles of battles" 

rather than principles of war. Americans do not, in 

other words, do a very good job of harnessing military 

effort for policy ends. 

Article contributions are welcome. They should ideally be not more than 10 pages, Arial 12-font, doublespaced, 

in A4 sized bond paper; excluding, pictures, charts and tables. Kindly send your manuscripts to: 

In hard copy: The Editorial Staff 

The Army Journal 

OG5, PA, HPA Compound, 

Fort Bonifacio 

Metro Manila 

In soft copy: og5@army.mil.ph 

44 April - June 2007 2007 armY JOURNAL

cmo - Philippine Army

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