Encyclopaedia Judaica - Vol.06 (Dr-Feu) - WiccanGeek's Reading ...

extradition
gentiles to contrive plots against the Jewish community, in order
to remove the danger from the entire Jewish community
(Maharah Or Zaru’a, #142). The Shulḥan Arukh rules (ḥM
388) that a Jew who harasses the community, and not merely
one individual, could be delivered into the hands of the non-
Jews in order “to beat, imprison or fine him.” R. Moshe Isserles
adds, in his glosses to the Shulḥan Arukh (ad loc.) that even
a Jew who is engaged in forgery – if there is a danger that the
Jewish community will be harmed by his activities, and he
fails to take heed of the warnings made to him – may be delivered
to the authorities, in order to demonstrate that only he,
the offender, engages in forgery, and no other member of the
community does so. Elsewhere, Isserles writes that the permission
to deliver such offenders to the non-Jewish authorities
is based upon the principle of “rodef ”– i.e., that any Jew
is permitted, if necessary, to kill a person who is pursuing his
fellow with the aim of killing him, in order to save the life of
the pursued: “One who endangers the community, e.g., if he
engages in forgery in a locality where the authorities forbid
it, has the status of a rodef and it is permitted to deliver him
to the authorities” (Rema, ḥM 425.1). R. David Halevi, in his
commentary Turei Zahav on the Shulḥan Arukh (ḥM 157.8)
similarly rules that anyone who transgresses and rebels against
the local law in a manner that endangers the Jewish community
may be turned into the authorities, even if the authorities
do not demand that he be handed over.
WHEN THE COMMUNITY IS THREATENED IF THE WANTED
PERSON IIS NOT DELIVERED. The Tosefta (Terumot 7.20)
deals with a case in which non-Jews demanded that a group
of Jews hand over one of their number to be killed, or else
they would all be killed. The Tosefta rules that it is forbidden
to deliver a single Jewish soul; rather, they should all be killed.
However, if a specific person was designated to be handed
over, they should deliver that individual rather than allow all
of them to be killed. The Jerusalem Talmud records an amoraic
controversy as to whether such a person can only be delivered
if he is in fact deserving of death, as was Sheba son of Bichri
who rebelled against King David’s rule (2 Samuel 20). In other
words the story of Sheba is seen as the source of the ruling by
the Tosefta. The alternative view is that he should be handed
over request, even if he is not liable to the death penalty. It is
noteworthy that the case of the Tosefta does not discuss the
issue of extradition – i.e. deliverance of a suspected criminal
for the purpose of trying him – but only (translating it into
the contemporary context) the case of a terrorist group which
threatens to kill many people unless an individual is handed
over to them. Nonetheless, the halakhic authorities relied on it
in cases where the non-Jewish authorities required the handing
over of a specific individual and threatened the lives of
other Jews in the event that he was not delivered. Maimonides
(Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah 5.5) ruled that, if the wanted person
is deserving of death, he may be handed over in order to prevent
the killing of the remainder of the group; however, “we
avoid ruling this way where possible.” In a case brought before
R. Joel Sirkis (Responsa Ba”ḥ ha-Yeshanot §43), the leaders of
the Jewish community were asked to deliver to the Christian
authorities for trial a Jew who, according to the authorities,
had collaborated in the desecration of Christian religious artifacts.
The authorities demanded his extradition, stipulating
that, if he was not extradited, the community leaders would
have to take his place for any punishment that was decreed.
Sirkis ruled that the words of Maimonides – that a person who
is liable for the death penalty may be extradited – apply even
where the non-Jewish authorities have grounds to kill him under
their laws, even if he is not deserving of death according
to Jewish law. In such a case, it was not certain that handing
over the Jew would result in his death, because the authorities
intended to conduct a trial, and the possibility existed that
he would be proven innocent. Hence, R. Sirkis ruled that his
delivery to the non-Jewish authorities was permitted even de
jure, in contrast to Maimonides’ ruling that we avoid ruling
that way where possible. Furthermore, in this case too permission
to deliver the accused was given only because there
was prima facie evidence of his guilt, and that the grounds for
which the non-Jews sought to judge him were thereby substantiated;
hence, the accused himself was considered responsible
for the allegations made against him.
SAVING JEWS SUSPECTED OF SERIOUS CRIMES FROM THE
LAWS OF THE AUTHORITIES. R. Jair Ḥayyim Bacharach
(Resp. Ḥavvot Yair §146) was asked about a case involving a
Jewish youth, a fugitive murderer, who was later caught by the
authorities. R. Bacharach rejected the possibility that he could
be delivered to the non-Jewish court, even by the relatives of
the murder victim (by virtue of the a fortiori argument that
they could in any event deliver him to the authorities based
on the law of the blood avenger; see *Blood Avenger). At the
same time, based on Rashi’s interpretation of the talmudic passage
about R. Tarfon, he rules that it is forbidden to save the
youth from the authorities, because of the duty to “eradicate all
evil from your midst.” He then raises the possibility that, even
though it is forbidden to save him, it may be permitted to give
him advice on how to escape. In suggesting this possibility,
R. Bacharach relies on the words of R. Tarfon in the talmudic
story, who told those people who sought refuge with him that
they should hide themselves – what may have amounted to
advice on the part of R. Tarfon. R. Jacob Emden (Resp. She’ilat
Ya’avetz II. 9) rejects this possibility out of hand, ruling that it
is forbidden to give advice to a murderer on how to evade the
judgment against him. In the case brought before him, after
one Jew who had murdered another Jew was arrested by the
authorities, he was given the possibility of acquitting himself
by swearing a solemn oath that another person killed the victim
and he was not the murderer. The local rabbi ruled that the
murderer should save himself from death by swearing falsely.
R. Emden vehemently rejects this advice and states that “it is
forbidden to save him from death through any means, even
an [otherwise permissible one],” and certainly not through
making a false oath.
628 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, Second Edition, Volume 6