JOURNAL OF EURASIAN STUDIES Journal of the Gábor Bálint de ...

January-March 2013 JOURNAL OF EURASIAN STUDIES Volume V., Issue 1.
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suspected that the Carter administration would give Israel permanent jurisdiction over the Muslim holy
places and deprive Palestinians of a future homeland, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan spelt more
danger for these nations. Egypt offered military bases and entered into joint military exercises with the
US. Saudi Arabia denounced the invasion and became the first nation to commit itself to a boycott of the
Moscow Olympics. Iraq, which was considered a Soviet ally prior to the intervention condemned the
Soviet act and linked it with Soviet activities in other regions, such as its incursion into North Yemen. A
Conference of Islamic nations convened in Rawalpindi in January 1980, issued a joint denunciation of the
Soviet invasion. Ironically, the same conference issued a milder denunciation of US support for Israel
which happened for the first time. The invasion also led to the institutionalisation of Sino-American
military cooperation. In the US, the priorities of the domestic political debate were shifted away from
economic problems towards foreign security issues. The focus of the defence budget debate was altered
in favour of conventional armaments and logistical programmes at the cost of strategic nuclear weapons
(William H. Overholt, 1980:205-217). An American nation deeply divided since Vietnam and Watergate
responded with remarkable unity to what was seen as a major foreign policy challenge. In Iran, the
Islamic revolutionaries maintained distance from the US and the Soviet Union. Just after Soviet
intervention, Iran provided assistance to various Shiite groups in Afghanistan to thwart the possibility of
a pro-Soviet regime there.
To tide over the emerging situations in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union adopted a three pronged
strategy. Militarily, the USSR followed the policy of defeating the important Mujahideen units,
protecting Soviet lines of supply, particularly the Panjsher Valley and acquiring full control over the
cities and lines of communication. Politically, it tried to install a suitable candidate at the helm of affairs
and broaden the base of PDPA so that it could become more popular. In fact, the Soviet Union instituted
Barbrak Karmal, its preferred man, as the head of the Afghan government and instructed him to broaden
his base. Diplomatically, the Soviet Union worked for the recognition of the Karmal regime, and at the
same time, held out the prospect of negotiated settlement of the Afghan issue. It encouraged the UN to
continue talks towards a settlement of the Afghan crisis until 1984.
As part of its diplomacy, the Soviet Union tried to woo Iran and Pakistan so as they would not take a
hardline anti-Soviet stance against its intervention in Afghanistan. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran
anticipated UN sanctions against it on the issue of hostage crisis and blockade of all of Iran’s ports in the
Persian Gulf. However, the erstwhile Soviet ambassador assured that Iran could use the Soviet Union as
a transit route to Europe. Later, while the Soviet forces occupied most of the important regions in
Afghanistan, it did not dominate the Hazarjat region in central Afghanistan, the stronghold of the Shia
community (Mohsen Milani, 2006: 238). The Soviet Union did not want to antagonise Iran which had
already turned anti-American.
Towards Pakistan, the Soviet Union adopted a carrot and stick policy. Sometimes it offered economic
and technical assistance and other times threatened its independence. Gromyko, the then Foreign
Minister of the USSR, had warned Pakistan that “it will lose its independence if it continues its present
policy of supporting Afghan Mujahiddin in Afghanistan” (Zahid Ali Khan and Shabir Ahmad, 2010).
The Soviet Union to win away non-aligned India to its side raised the spectre of Chinese and US
aggression in the region. The Pravda argued that India's fears of US and Chinese attempts to “encircle
India” were justified. After the intervention, Moscow immediately sent its Foreign Minister Andrei
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