Amylou R. v. County of Riverside Appellant's Opening Brief

intentional infliction of emotional distress, certainly the conduct of the officers in this
case falls well short of the mark.7:2'
C. There Is No Substantial Evidence To Support Plaintiff's Claim
For False Imprisonment. Either With Respect To Liability Or
Damages.
1. Liability.
"'The tort of false imprisonment is the nonconsensual, intentional confinement
of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however
short'."
(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1123, quoting City of
Newport Beach v. Sasse (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 803, 810, emphasis added; Novoa v.
County of Ventura (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 137, 142.) Where legal authority for a
confinement exists, there is no false imprisonment.
(Jenkins v. County of Orange
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285 [detention pursuant to authority under Welfare and
Institutions Code cannot be construed as false imprisonment]; Alicia T. v. County of
Los Angeles (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 883.)
Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment appears to rest on two occasions, the
drive to find Diane Harper and the April 2 interview.
With respect to the drive, the
undisputed evidence clearly establishes it was consensual, not only at its inception (RT
1315) but throughout, as plaintiff conceded when she testified that if she had not
wanted to find Diane Harper, why would she have driven around all those hours.
(RT
26/ Conduct amounting to intentional infliction of emotional distress must also be
unprivileged. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d at 593. For a
discussion of applicable privileges and immunities, see, supra, section I and infra,
section IV.
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