We Have No Orders to Save You - Human Rights Watch

Police] Force and SCF [Security Commando Force] had already taken possession of the
complex. 182
The police and commandos then escorted hundreds of visitors from around the complex to safety and help
transport the injured to nearby hospitals. As the security forces were escorting the visitors out from the main
monument, the attackers opened fire again but no one was hit. Periodic cross-firing continued throughout the
night. At around 6:45 a.m., Black Commandos of India’s national security guard—who had been airlifted from
Delhi to join the operation—shot and killed the two attackers. Of the thirty-three people killed, one was a
member of the special reserve police, one of the national security guard, and one of the state commando force.
Parmeshwar Swami, a religious teacher of the institution, four volunteers, and several children were also among
those killed. 183
Two separate letters written in Urdu were found in the pockets of the two attackers that claimed that they
belonged to a group called Tehreek-e-Qisas-Gujarat, or “Movement for Revenge in Gujarat.” 184 Brigadier Raj
Sitapati of the NSG, who led the operation, told the Times of India that “The letter mentions that the killings were
to avenge what happened during the Gujarat riots” and that they planned the attack “for the satisfaction of their
souls because they could not tolerate what happened to children, women and Muslims during the Gujarat riots.” 185
The letters, dated August 2, 2002, are reportedly addressed to the “thousands of conscienceless enemies of
Muslims in India.” 186 On September 26, 2002, Chief Minister Modi moved quickly to rule out the theory that the
attackers were local or that the incident was meant to avenge the killing of Muslims in the state. He added that
the letters in Urdu were intended to “mislead” those carrying out investigations. 187 Not unlike the state’s initial
statements about the attack in Godhra, the government was promoting the theory that the attack was the product
of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. 188
An article in the newsmagazine Frontline explains why Akshardham might have been chosen as a target for the
attacks:
It is not hard to see why terrorists might have considered the Akshardham temple a high-value
target. The complex, for one, is close to Narendra Modi's residence. It is also near the Gujarat
police headquarters. Spread over 23 acres (9.2 hectares) of land, the elaborate Akshardham
complex is structured around a temple with a golden statue of Lord Swaminarayan. It also has
multimedia shows, an exhibition hall, cafes and a vast landscaped garden. “Several foreign
dignitaries have visited Akshardham, including Bill Clinton and Prince Philip. Any attack on it
would invite international attention,” a police officer said. The Swaminarayan sect is also one of
the most prosperous and powerful in Gujarat, with a strong following among the Patel community
and Gujarati non-resident Indians. Both Patels and NRIs are in large measure seen to be strong
BJP supporters. Sections of the Patel community aligned to the Sangh Parivar are perceived to
have played a significant role in much of the communal violence in the State. 189
The article goes on to claim that “elements within the State Police seem to have gone out of their way to
misinform. Officials claimed, for example, that a radio intercept had identified the two killed terrorists as
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 “Terrorist outfit identified for temple attack,” Times of India , September 25, 2002. Urdu is the primary language of
Muslims in India, and the national language of Pakistan.
185 Ibid.
186 R. Prasannan, “Fatal error,” The Week, October 6, 2002 [online], http://www.the-week.com/22oct06/cover.htm (retrieved
May 20, 2003).
187 “Attack not a revenge: Modi,” The Hindu, September 27, 2002.
188 Human Rights Watch interviews in Ahmedabad, January 2-5, 2003.
189
Dionne Bunsha, Praveen Swami, “The Terror Trail,” Frontline, October 12 - 25, 2002 [online],
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1921/stories/20021025007001200.htm (retrieved May 20, 2003).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 37 JULY 2003, Vol. 15, No. 3 (C)