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sources doctrine in order to insulate law from external influences. That way, law’s<br />

objectivism could be forcefully defended. <strong>The</strong> rigidity, however, with which the<br />

sources doctrine was dealt, rendered law unresponsive to societal permutations. 73<br />

<strong>The</strong> soft law thesis seems to fill this gap though at the expense of objectivism, since it<br />

seems to reflect too close State practice, making law a means of apology. 74 In<br />

addition to this, soft law is much more dependent on State intention, because<br />

logically it is intention that distinguishes soft law from hard or non-law. While in the<br />

case of treaties the existence of a formalized framework simplifies the work of a<br />

lawyer in distilling the legal from the non-legal, soft law due to its informal nature is<br />

heavily based on intention. In order to balance these traits, international lawyers try<br />

to breathe objectivity to soft law by returning to a logic of formalism. 75<br />

Different answers, opposing form to volonté, have been given to the question<br />

about which acts are such as to establish binding relations under international law.<br />

While most scholars vehemently defend the view that the non-binding nature of an<br />

instrument should be determined on the basis of the existence or not of an intention<br />

to be bound regardless of the form 76 , some scholars suggest that it is the absence of a<br />

specific form that leads to softness. According to this view, a specific form bestows<br />

bindingness to an instrument. 77 For example, Boyle and Chinkin speak of the form of<br />

a non-binding agreement. 78 But one wonders what is meant with that, since we<br />

know very well that there is no standard form for treaties, let alone for the broader<br />

category of binding agreements. 79 Some others, while theoretically placing consent at<br />

73<br />

See, for exemple, the debate on the way law should accommodate the idea of humanitarian intervention;<br />

Simma, Bruno, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”, 10 EJIL (1999), pp. 1-22; Cassese,<br />

Antonio, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian<br />

Countermeasures in the World Community?”, 10 EJIL (1999), pp. 23-31; Koskenniemi, Martti, '<strong>The</strong> Lady Doth<br />

Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law", 65 Modern Law Review (2002), pp.<br />

159-175.<br />

74<br />

For the idea of apology, see Koskenniemi, Martti, <strong>The</strong> Politics of International Law, 1 EJIL (1990), pp. 1-32.<br />

75<br />

See Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986), Cambridge Mass.: Harvard<br />

University Press, at 86.<br />

76<br />

See, among others, Rosenne, Shabtai, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES: 1945-1986 (1989), Cambridge:<br />

Cambridge University Press, at 86; Fitzmaurice, Malgosia <strong>The</strong> Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty<br />

Obligations between States in International Law, 73 BYIL (2002), pp. 141-185, at 165: “<strong>The</strong> crucial element in<br />

distinguishing between formal and informal instruments is the element of intention”; Virally, Michel, Sur la<br />

notion d’accord, in Von Emanuel Diez, Jean Monnier et al. (eds.), FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BINDSCHEDLER: ZUM<br />

65. GEBURTSTAG AM 8. JULI 1980, 1980, Bern: Stämpfli, pp. 159-172, at 172; Widdows, Kelvin, What Is an<br />

Agreement in International Law?, 50 BYIL (1979), pp. 117-149, at 121. Contra Klabbers, Jan, THE CONCEPT OF<br />

TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1996, <strong>The</strong> Hague: Kluwer Law International, at 13, where he claims that when<br />

the external form of a document provides reasons to regard it as a treaty, the question arises how it would be<br />

possible that the signatories do not intend to be a treaty.<br />

77<br />

In the same vein, some authors claim that treaties providing for soft obligations cannot be considered part of<br />

soft law, since treaties are always binding, thus stressing the importance of form for bindingness; see Boyle,<br />

Alan, ibid., at 901; Klabbers, Jan, <strong>The</strong> Redundancy of Soft Law, op. cit., note ??, at 172.<br />

78<br />

Boyle, Alan, Chinkin, Christine, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2007, Oxford, OUP, at 213.<br />

79<br />

Chailley, Pierre, LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DES TRAITES INTERNATIONAUX (1932), Paris, Sirey, at 5 ( : la pratique<br />

nous enseigne, en effet, que les traités peuvent être conclus…dans les formes les plus souples). Contra Aust,<br />

15

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