INSTITUTE FOR

Thus the consequences of disobedience were immediate and salient. As members chose the
course of obedience their norms of behavior as members of Synanon gradually changed, just
as the norms of behavior of Milgram's subjects changed according to the level of punishment
they had previously administered. The process was aided, in Synanon as in Milgram's
laboratory by the absence of dissent. In Synanon the absence of dissent was ensured in usual
circumstances by the Game and in unusual circumstances by forced expulsions.
VI. Crime and Drugs
Economists modeling crime (see Becker, 1968) and drug addiction have viewed the
decisions to engage in these activities as individually motivated. Becker and Murphy (1988),
following Stigler and Becker (1977), have even viewed the decision to pursue addictive
activities as both rational and forward-looking. The Milgram experiment and the behavior of
cult groups, if nothing else, serve as warning. It is inconceivable that the participants in
Milgram's experiment were forward-looking. These participants could not imagine that
anyone--least of all themselves--would behave as they ultimately did. Likewise, the flower
children of Synanon of the 1960's could not have conceived of themselves turning into guntoting
toughs in the 1970's. The assumption of forward-looking rationality r.garding the
change in their consumption capital, to use Stigler-Becker terminology, is totally violated.
The analogy between cult groups and the behavior of teenage gangs, where most criminal
activity and drug addiction begin, is fairly complete. A member of a teenage gang typically
finds himself (much less frequently herself) in a position very similar to that of a member of
Synanon. The typical member of a gang makes a sequence of decisions which results in an
escalating obedience to the gang leadership. At each stage of his career as a gang member,
he makes the choice whether to obey or to disobey. In extreme cases disobedience leads to
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