Interim Report of Task Force 2 on Hunger - UN Millennium Project

<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> 

<strong>of</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2 on Hunger 

February 1, 2004 

Coordinators 

Pedro Sanchez 

M. S. Swaminathan 

Comments are welcome and should be directed to: 

htf@iri.columbia.edu 

Note to the reader 

This <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> is a preliminary output <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

on Hunger. The recommendations presented herein are preliminary and 

circulated for public discussion. Comments are welcome and should be sent to 

the e-mail address indicated above. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will be revising the contents 

<strong>of</strong> this document in preparation <strong>of</strong> its Final <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> report, due December 

2004. The Final <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> report will feed into the Millennium Project’s Final 

Synthesis <strong>Report</strong>, due to the Secretary-General by June 30, 2005 

Disclaimer 

This publication does not necessarily reflect the views <strong>of</strong> the United Nations 

Development Programme (UNDP), its Executive Board or its Member States.

<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Project Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

H ALVING H UNGER BY 2015: 

A FRAMEWORK FOR A CTION 

February 1, 2004 

Please cite this paper as: 

Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> on Hunger. (2004) Halving Hunger by 2015: A Framework for 

Action. <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong>. Millennium Project. New York 

This report was prepared by: Don S. Doering (Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>), Lawrence Haddad and 

Manohar Sharma (International Food Policy Research Institute) and the Members <strong>of</strong> the 

Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, with final edit by Pedro Sanchez (Columbia Earth Institute). 

ii

The Millennium Project Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

<strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Coordinators: 

Pedro Sanchez, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, New York 

MS Swaminathan, Chairman, MS Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai 

Members: 

Abenaa Akuamoa Boateng, Head <strong>of</strong> 

Nutrition, Ashanti Region, Ghana 

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Health, Kumasi 

Tom Arnold, President, Concern 

Worldwide, Dublin 

Richard Beahrs, President and COO 

(Retired), Court TV, New York 

David Beckmann, President, Bread for 

the World, Washington 

Bo Bengtsson, Swedish University <strong>of</strong> 

Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala 

Roland Bunch, Coordinator, COSECHA, 

Tegucigalpa 

Kevin Cleaver, Director, Agriculture and 

Rural Development and Chair, Rural 

Development Sector Board, The World 

Bank, Washington 

Graeme Clugston, Director, Dept. <strong>of</strong> 

Nutrition for Health and Development, 

World Health Organization Geneva 

William Dar, Director-General, ICRISAT, 

Patancheru, India 

Philip Dobie, Director, Drylands 

Development Centre, UNDP, Nairobi 

Don S. Doering, Senior Associate, 

Winrock International, Washington 

Christopher Dowswell, Sasakawa Global 

2000, Mexico City 

Hans Eenhoorn, Unilever, Rotterdam 

Robert Horsch, Vice President, Product 

and Technology Cooperation, 

Monsanto Company, St. Louis 

Bashir Jama, Senior Scientist and East 

Africa Coordinator, World Agro-forestry 

Centre Nairobi 

Monty Jones, Executive Secretary, 

Forum for Agricultural Research in 

Africa, Accra 

Freddie Kwesiga, Southern Africa 

Coordinator, World Agro-forestry 

Center, Harare 

Justin Lin, Director, China Center for 

Economic Research, University <strong>of</strong> 

Beijing 

Peter Matlon, Deputy Director for Food 

Security, The Rockefeller Foundation, 

New York 

Njabulo Nduli, Deputy Director-General 

for Agricultural Production and 

Resources Management, South Africa 

Dept. <strong>of</strong> Agriculture, Pretoria 

Johnson Nkuuhe, Member <strong>of</strong> Parliament, 

Uganda 

Timothy Reeves, former Director- 

General, CIMMYT, Adelaide 

Sara Scherr, Director <strong>of</strong> Ecosystems 

Services, Forest Trends, Washington 

Meera Shekar, Senior Nutrition Specialist, 

World Bank, Washington 

Kostas Stamoulis, Chief, Agricultural 

Sector in Economic Development, 

Food and Agriculture Organization, 

Rome 

Joachim von Braun, Director-General, 

International Food Policy Research 

Institute, Washington 

Florence Wambugu, Director, A Harvest 

Biotech Foundation International, 

Nairobi 

Patrick Webb, Chief <strong>of</strong> Nutrition, UN 

World Food Programme, Rome 

Lars Wiersholm, Consultant, Retired from 

Norsk Hydro Corporation (Retired), 

Oslo 

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Table <strong>of</strong> Contents ....................................................................................................................................iii 

List <strong>of</strong> Figures ..........................................................................................................................................iv 

List <strong>of</strong> Tables ...........................................................................................................................................vi 

Preface .................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................................... 11 

1 Halving Hunger by 2015 is Possible............................................................................................. 26 

2 The Human and Economic Costs <strong>of</strong> Hunger ................................................................................ 33 

3 The Faces <strong>of</strong> Hunger .................................................................................................................... 42 

4 The African Hunger Hotspots ....................................................................................................... 69 

5 Strategies and Actions for Alleviating Hunger .............................................................................. 82 

6 Creating the political actions for hunger alleviation ...................................................................... 89 

7 Align critical policies to support hunger alleviation objectives .................................................... 103 

8 Improve nutrition <strong>of</strong> mothers and children .................................................................................. 128 

9 Improve markets to benefit poor consumers and food producers .............................................. 146 

10 Raise the productivity <strong>of</strong> smallholder farmers in more- and less-favored lands......................... 163 

11 Early Actions for Africa ............................................................................................................... 189 

12 Work plan for 2004...................................................................................................................... 196 

Annex 1: Major International Anti-Hunger Initiatives .......................................................................... 202 

Annex 2: Measuring Hunger................................................................................................................ 209 

Bibliography......................................................................................................................................... 212 

iii

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1-1: The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Strategy to Halve Hunger by 2015 .............................................. 31 

Figure 1-2: Creating the Context for Ending Hunger............................................................................ 31 

Figure 2-1: The overlapping concepts that describe the hungry and food-insecure............................ 34 

Figure 2-2: Faltering Progress Towards the MDG on Hunger: Undernourishment Data (FAO, 2003). 35 

Figure 2-3: Trends <strong>of</strong> underweight with 95% confidence interval (CI) in children

Figure 3-14: Total Number <strong>of</strong> People Affected by Conflict in Millions (International Disaster Database, 

2001)............................................................................................................................................. 60 

Figure 3-15: Total Number <strong>of</strong> People Affected by Disasters in Millions (International Disaster 

Database, 2001) ........................................................................................................................... 60 

Figure 3-16: Vulnerability Scenarios: Ability to Manage Risk Minus Exposure to Risk....................... 61 

Figure 3-17: Life Expectancy at Birth in Seven Countries.................................................................... 63 

Figure 3-18: Food Security and Governance: The Worst Cases .......................................................... 65 

Figure 3-19: Good governance from a human development perspective............................................. 66 

Figure 3-20: Women-headed village councils in India .......................................................................... 67 

Figure 4-1 Analytical Steps <strong>of</strong> the Hunger Hotspots Selection Process ............................................... 70 

Figure 4-2 Map <strong>of</strong> Percentage <strong>of</strong> Under-five Children Underweight. Data for 96% <strong>of</strong> countries are from 

1995 or later. All data are from 1992(UNICEF, DHS, National HDR, ANDI)............................... 73 

Figure 4-3 Map <strong>of</strong> Total Number <strong>of</strong> Underweight Under-five Children by Sub-national Regions (same 

source + GPW - see other notes). ................................................................................................73 

Figure 4-4 Map <strong>of</strong> Hunger Hotspots Ranked......................................................................................... 74 

Figure 4-5 Map <strong>of</strong> Underweight Densities and Hunger Hotspots (same sources + GPW - see other 

notes) ............................................................................................................................................ 74 

Figure 5-1 Synergistic Action Areas for Hunger Reduction................................................................... 88 

Figure 7-1 Food System Strategies for Reducing Poverty and Hunger: Sub-Saharan Africa ............ 109 

Figure 8-1. International Conference on Nutrition (ICN) Framework for Nutrition............................... 129 

Figure 8-2. Age when growth falters in infancy (Meera Shekar, personal communication)................ 130 

Figure 8-3. Underweight prevalence vs. under-five mortality rate ..................................................... 131 

Figure 8-4 Leading Global Risk Factors and Contributions to Global Burden <strong>of</strong> Disease (GBD): % 

DALYs, World 2000 (Ezzati, et. al., 2002) .................................................................................. 131 

Figure 8-5: Long Term Consequences <strong>of</strong> Early Childhood Nutrition Shocks: Zimbabwe and 

Guatemala .................................................................................................................................. 138 

Figure 10-1 Priorities for agricultural development by regional and national characteristics............. 164 

Figure 10-2 Relative Contributions to Reduction in Child Malnutrition, 1970-95: Selected Regions 

(Smith and Haddad, 2000).......................................................................................................... 165 

Figure 10-3 Ratio <strong>of</strong> number <strong>of</strong> poor reduced per million dollars <strong>of</strong> government expenditure on 

agricultural R&D: Less-favored rural areas compared to all rural areas. ................................... 169 

Figure 11-1 NEPAD Consultancy: How the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Works ............................................ 190 

v

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1-1: The difference between 50% reduction in proportion or absolute numbers <strong>of</strong> 

undernourished in the developing world....................................................................................... 27 

Table 1-2: The contribution <strong>of</strong> nutrition status to the MDG’s................................................................. 28 

Table 2-1: Definitions <strong>of</strong> hunger related terminology ............................................................................33 

Table 3-1: Underweight rates by Farming System, Sub-Saharan Africa .............................................. 48 

Table 3-2: Characterizing Vulnerable Groups (Scherr and the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2003)................... 49 

Table 3-3: Access to food in the quantity and quality necessary for a healthy life................................ 51 

Table 3-4: Summary <strong>of</strong> the ways in which HIV/AIDS may affect agricultural growth............................ 64 

Table 4-1: Areas <strong>of</strong> Sub-Saharan Africa: with the ten highest levels <strong>of</strong> underweight children according 

to various measures...................................................................................................................... 72 

Table 4-2: Selection criteria used in selecting Hunger Hotspots in Africa ............................................ 75 

Table 4-3: Hunger Hotspot names and regions included in each one <strong>of</strong> them..................................... 77 

Table 4-4: Total Underweight Children, Prevalence and Population Density <strong>of</strong> Underweight Under-five 

Children in 81 Hotspots in Africa. ................................................................................................. 80 

Table 5-1: Consensus and Divergence in Major Approaches to Hunger Alleviation ............................ 82 

Table 5-2: Guidelines <strong>of</strong> Selecting Candidate Actions ......................................................................... 85 

Table 6-1: Percentage Share <strong>of</strong> Defense in Government Budgets....................................................... 91 

Table 6-2: Share <strong>of</strong> Agriculture in Total Government. Spending (FAO, “Mobilizing the Resources to 

End Hunger,” 2001) ...................................................................................................................... 92 

Table 7-1Priorities for agricultural development by regional and national characteristics .................. 108 

Table 7-2 Public policies to Improve the Nutrition Status <strong>of</strong> Women .................................................. 114 

Table 8-1. Priority Candidate Actions to Improve the Nutritional Status <strong>of</strong> Women and Children..... 132 

Table 8-2: Innovative strategies to alleviate malnutrition: Community Based Therapeutic Care (CTC) 

.................................................................................................................................................... 137 

Table 8-3. Base Estimates <strong>of</strong> Present Discounted Values (PDV) <strong>of</strong> Seven Major Classes <strong>of</strong> Benefits <strong>of</strong> 

Shifting one low-birth weight (LBW) Infant to non-LBW Status, with 5% Discount Rate. (Alderman 

and Behrman, 2003). .................................................................................................................. 144 

Table 8-4 Return on Nutrition Investments.......................................................................................... 145 

Table 9-1 Summary Table <strong>of</strong> Recommendations................................................................................ 147 

Table 9-2 Basic market indicators in the Countries <strong>of</strong> the African Hunger Hotspots .......................... 157 

Table 9-3. Scope <strong>of</strong> Food Marketing Reform in Selected Countries................................................... 158 

Table 9-4: Current Status <strong>of</strong> Food Market Reforms in Study Countries ............................................. 159 

Table 9-5 Effects <strong>of</strong> liberalization measures (I – importable crop, II- competitive crop, III- non-tradable 

crop)............................................................................................................................................ 160 

vi

Table 10-1 The Poverty Pay<strong>of</strong>f from Investing in Agricultural Research and Development ............... 165 

Table 10-2 Synergies between Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition ............................... 184 

Table 1: Comparison <strong>of</strong> five methods for assessing hunger and malnutrition .................................... 209 

Table 2: Indicators for the Millennium Development Goal for Hunger ................................................ 210 

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

The Millennium Project Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> gratefully acknowledges the assistance <strong>of</strong> many 

colleagues for their contributions, advice, and reviews <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong>. The final draft 

may not necessarily reflect their views. We thank and acknowledge Jock Anderson (The 

World Bank), Todd Benson (IFPRI), Emily Byers (Bread for the World), Kavita Sethuraman 

(ICRW), Marc Cohen (IFPRI), Peter Hazell (IFPRI), Shenggen Fan (IFPRI), Andrew 

MacMillan (FAO), Sumiter Broca (FAO), Lisa Dreier (Columbia Earth Institute), Rafael Flor 

(Columbia Earth Institute), Adam Storeygard (CIESIN), and Nora Simpson (Columbia Earth 

Institute). 

viii

PREFACE 

The mandate <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Project’s Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is to produce a plan—what it 

takes— for humanity to reduce the proportion <strong>of</strong> hungry and malnourished people in half by 

the year 2015. At present 11 children under five die <strong>of</strong> hunger-related causes every minute, 

about 786 million people suffer from chronic hunger, and 60 million from famines (acute 

hunger). The world is significantly behind schedule in meeting the Millennium Development 

Goal for Hunger. This <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> puts forward the current state <strong>of</strong> the analysis and 

recommendations <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> arising out <strong>of</strong> its first year <strong>of</strong> operations, which 

have consisted <strong>of</strong> global analysis with a focus on Sub Saharan Africa. 

Our conclusion so far is that the world can achieve the Hunger MDG if it chooses to do so 

and end hunger in our lifetime. There are proven technologies and policies for hunger 

alleviation that, when implemented in synergistic ways and brought to scale, can dramatically 

reduce hunger in poor countries. The critical constraint to achieving the Goal is political 

commitment and the delineation <strong>of</strong> clear roles and responsibilities. Our recommendations at 

this stage are at three geographical scales: 

At the global level, increased commitment-building work. Political commitment has been 

expressed over many years but there has been little action. We propose that political will is 

the binding constraint, provide analysis <strong>of</strong> how to build political will, and include commitmentbuilding 

activities in its cost estimates. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans further study <strong>of</strong> what it 

takes to build commitment and to do commitment-building work among national leaders and 

in its Early Action Program within selected Hunger Hotspots. The U.N. Secretary-General 

has given his support to a high-level seminar to be convened by the Government <strong>of</strong> Ethiopia 

and the Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> on Hunger prior to the 2004 Africa Union Summit. 

The seminar is entitled “Innovative Approaches to Meet the Hunger MDG in Sub-Saharan 

Africa,” and will be directed at the level <strong>of</strong> Heads <strong>of</strong> State. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> stands ready to 

support the efforts <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Campaign in strengthening global political commitment 

to achieving the MDG. The U.N. food agencies in Rome are promoting an International 

Alliance Against Hunger, national alliances and a related NGO coalition for more and better 

development assistance for agriculture, food and rural development. 

At the poor country level, governments and donors must give budgetary priority to 

investments in agriculture and the rural sector. Priority investments include road 

construction, education, health, research and extension, with emphasis on investments that 

empower women and girls. 

At the sub-national level, governments and civil society must implement interventions that 

simultaneously address nutritional, agricultural and market improvements in ways that create 

9

new and innovative synergies. In African hunger hotspots, for example, they may include: 1) 

school lunches with locally produced food and nutritional supplementation mothers and 

children less than 2 years <strong>of</strong> age; 2) drastically increasing smallholder agricultural 

productivity (initially focusing on soil fertility and small-scale water management), and 3) 

making markets work for the poor (though improved storage facilities, farmer associations 

and market information systems). 

This <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> is clearly work in progress and we ask the readers to provide critical 

feedback. Our work plan for 2004 involves attention to South Asia and other hungry areas, 

testing these ideas with country planning, producing cost estimates, sequencing actions and 

integrating our recommendations with that <strong>of</strong> other task forces to develop additional 

synergies and minimize trade<strong>of</strong>fs with other MDG’s. 

Pedro A. Sanchez and M.S. Swaminathan, 

New York and Chennai 

December 2003 

10

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The objective <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Project’s Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is to create a plan for how the 

nations <strong>of</strong> the world can achieve the Millennium Development Goal for Hunger—to reduce 

the proportion <strong>of</strong> hungry people by half by 2015. Through the Millennium Declaration, the 

world has made a deal. Poor countries commit to good governance and development 

policies based on sound science and the scaling-up <strong>of</strong> best practices, while rich countries 

commit to much greater financial assistance, access to their markets and expanded 

knowledge transfer. This brings hope that inefficiencies <strong>of</strong> the past will be replaced by true 

impact. 

The plan will be presented in our final report in December 2004 and integrated with the plans 

<strong>of</strong> the other nine Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s to produce the final global plan for 

presentation to the Secretary-General <strong>of</strong> the United Nations in mid-2005. This interim report 

summarizes our research and thinking at this mid-point in our work. Specific analysis has 

focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, but will extend to other high-under nutrition regions in the 

coming year. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> seeks to integrate the nutrition, agriculture, economic, 

sustainable development, and rights-based perspectives on how to best reduce hunger. We 

are daunted by the enormity <strong>of</strong> the challenge and the importance <strong>of</strong> the goal for humanity, 

and admire the efforts <strong>of</strong> many institutions and initiatives engaged in the struggle to end 

hunger. We believe that the world community has reasons for both optimism and concern 

when facing the goals to halve hunger by 2015. We <strong>of</strong>fer our own optimism, concerns and 

our work in progress for comment, opportunities for partnership, and refinement. 

THE HUNGER TASK FORCE STRATEGY 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends the following overall strategy to achieve the Hunger 

MDG, which consists <strong>of</strong> three major elements: 

1. Mobilize political action to end hunger —at the global scale as well at the national and 

local scales, in rich and poor countries. 

2. Align national policies that restore budgetary priority to agriculture as the engine <strong>of</strong> 

economic growth, build rural infrastructure, empower women, and build human 

capacity in all sectors involved in hunger-reduction actions. 

3. Implement and scale-up proven actions that improve the nutrition <strong>of</strong> vulnerable 

groups, raise agricultural productivity in smallholder farms and improve market 

functions—in ways that create synergies and result in positive transformations. 

Halving hunger by 2015 will take political mobilization, policy change and effective and 

efficient implementation, and hunger-reduction actions that are synergistic—those that 

address multiple causes <strong>of</strong> hunger, multiple benefits for hunger reduction, and multiple 

11

Millennium Development Goals. We believe that synergistic actions – be they in the policy 

arena or in the field —will <strong>of</strong>ten be more effective at reducing hunger and rural poverty, are 

lower-risk investments, best utilize capacity, and are politically more viable. All three 

elements <strong>of</strong> the strategy are necessary and as a group sufficient, but each one will be 

insufficient if implemented alone. 

The scale <strong>of</strong> hunger in today’s world is a scandal <strong>of</strong> enormous proportions. One in seven 

persons is undernourished, suffering from either chronic or acute hunger, and billions suffer 

from some form <strong>of</strong> vitamin and mineral deficiency—hidden hunger. The scandalous aspect 

<strong>of</strong> this tragedy is that it is preventable. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> reinforces, and builds on, the 

conclusions reached by many past planning and analytical efforts by many institutions; 

namely that it is technically possible to halve hunger by 2015. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> believes that 

there is a general consensus on the range <strong>of</strong> technical actions that can reduce hunger for 

most groups and in diverse contexts. There is also consensus that such technical and 

environmentally sound interventions will only succeed if policy changes create an enabling 

context and remove constraints to progress, and that human and institutional capacity exists 

or is created to expand the scale <strong>of</strong> successful hunger-reduction actions. To bridge the 

commitments made in multiple declarations <strong>of</strong> global and national goals for ending hunger to 

on-the-ground actions requires political actions expressed in additional public investments. 

Too <strong>of</strong>ten, there is a disconnect between commitments and action. We conclude that 

political action to end hunger is a necessary prerequisite for which there must be specific 

plans and new investment. 

WHAT’S NEW IN THIS REPORT? 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> interim report differs from many other studies in four aspects <strong>of</strong> 

emphasis. First, it proposes three critical elements that are necessary and sufficient if they 

are tackled simultaneously, but highly unlikely to achieve the hunger MDG if tackled 

separately. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is using a strong mix <strong>of</strong> science and policy in developing these 

elements. Second, we focus more on entry points, those first-order interventions that are 

essential to start the transformational processes, which should be followed by many other 

important, second-order interventions that can only be effective after the entry points are 

successfully addressed. This sets the stage for the sequencing <strong>of</strong> interventions and 

forthcoming cost estimates. Third, our work will be integrated with that <strong>of</strong> the other nine <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong>s, in ways that foster synergies and minimize trade<strong>of</strong>fs among all the Millennium 

Development Goals. Fourth, our report does not represent the view <strong>of</strong> any particular 

institution, because <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> members from the science, policy, NGO, private sector, 

government, international organizations and development agencies---coming from many 

continents---are acting in their personal capacity. 

What follows is a synthesis <strong>of</strong> our analytical work, and the three elements <strong>of</strong> our emerging 

strategy. 

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 

The Millennium Declaration is an accord among global leaders, which states that rich and 

poor nations share both the responsibility for the hunger reduction goal and the opportunity 

12

to achieve it. Eradication <strong>of</strong> hunger ranks high among international goals because good 

nutrition is essential for the health and human capacity needed to achieve so many <strong>of</strong> the 

other Millennium Development Goals, such as those for child and maternal health, combating 

infectious diseases, empowering women and achieving environmental sustainability. 

Malnutrition and hunger are the top risk factors for illness worldwide and greatest 

contributors to the global burden <strong>of</strong> disease. Freedom from hunger is also a sound 

foundation for economic growth in the world’s most impoverished nations. Well-nourished 

people learn better, produce more, and can provide better care for their children and the 

environment. As Nobel Laureate Norman Borlaug has said: “nobody can be an 

environmentalist with an empty stomach.” 

DEVELOPMENT-AS-USUAL WILL NOT ACHIEVE THE HUNGER MDG 

The Food and Agriculture Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations estimates that current trends 

will reduce the number <strong>of</strong> hungry people from about 842 million today to about 600 million in 

2015—only halfway toward the goals <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Declaration and the World Food 

Summits. Nowhere is the failure to alleviate hunger more glaring than in central, east, and 

southern Sub-Saharan Africa where the number and proportion <strong>of</strong> hungry people are 

forecast to increase in most countries. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 198 million <strong>of</strong> the 

undernourished, India for 214 million, Asia and Pacific regions other than India and China for 

156 million, China for 135 million, Latin America and Caribbean for 53 million, and the Near 

East and North Africa for 41 million, with smaller numbers in OECD countries and the 

economies in transition <strong>of</strong> Eastern Europe and Central Asia. “Business as usual” is not going 

to reach the goal; a paradigm shift is needed to move from the conventional macroeconomic 

improvements to those that increase emphasis on science and public commitment to get out 

<strong>of</strong> the poverty trap. 

THE PROXIMATE CAUSES OF HUNGER 

There are so many hungry people in the world because <strong>of</strong> limits upon their physical, 

economic, social and physiological access to food. The prevalence <strong>of</strong> hunger is very high 

among smallholder farmers, herders, fishers, and forest-dependent people who must rely 

upon a poor or degraded natural resource base, inadequate access to knowledge and 

technology and poor physical access to production inputs and to markets for their goods. 

Lack <strong>of</strong> functioning markets—both physical infrastructure and market institutions—for the 

poorest and most food-insecure leads to hunger among both food-producers and non-food 

producers and hinders employment opportunities for the landless. Even adequate overall 

physical availability <strong>of</strong> food, however, does not guarantee that the rural landless, urban poor, 

or net-food-buying producers will have sufficient access to purchased food. 

Reducing poverty is thus a key strategy for increasing food security. Experience around the 

world shows that broad-based agricultural development is the most important foundation <strong>of</strong> 

economic growth in low-income countries and regions. Thus, rural agriculture-related 

strategies for poverty reduction are a major focus <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, while urban and 

non-agricultural rural strategies to reduce poverty are being addressed in more detail by the 

Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s on Poverty and Improving the Lives <strong>of</strong> Slum Dwellers. 

13

But economic growth alone is insufficient for eliminating hunger because so many <strong>of</strong> the 

hungry are living beyond the reach <strong>of</strong> markets---at the bottom <strong>of</strong> the “poverty trap.” The 

poverty trap is further reinforced by failures in sanitation, health and education that interfere 

with food utilization or proper care and feeding. Grossly unequal social conditions and 

exclusionary practices frequently prevent access to food, health, sanitation, and education 

services to women, girls, infants, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. Inadequate 

health care, nutritional and infant care, sanitation and food intake create a lethal mixture 

resulting in malnutrition and mortality. 

To address the proximate causes, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends synergistic 

actions to relieve hunger and alleviate poverty that raise the productivity <strong>of</strong> 

smallholder farmers, provide nutritional assistance to child-bearing women, children 

and other vulnerable groups, and improve market function to raise farm and non-farm 

income. 

The three principal forms <strong>of</strong> hunger are chronic, acute and hidden hunger. Chronic hunger 

involves constant undernourishment or recurring seasonal undernourishment and results in 

stunted children and high child mortality due to hunger-related diseases, but not starvation. 

Acute hunger involves severe undernourishment over a distinct period, is reflected in wasting 

and starvation, and is caused by punctual emergency situations that require immediate food 

aid. Hidden hunger refers to micronutrient and/or vitamin deficiencies found in vast numbers 

<strong>of</strong> people who otherwise have access to adequate calories and protein. 

THE CONTEXT OF HUNGER 

Hunger reduction plans must not only address the proximate causes <strong>of</strong> hunger, but the 

underlying context <strong>of</strong> vulnerability, shocks, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, poor governance, social 

inequality, and weak capacity to implement hunger alleviation policies. Poor households are 

<strong>of</strong>ten not in a position to withstand shocks in production (e.g. harvest failures), markets (e.g. 

crashing crop prices) or household consumption (e.g. emergency medical costs). Natural 

disasters like droughts, floods and earthquakes destroy household assets and jobs, and can 

push otherwise food-secure families into acute hunger. The single most serious natural 

disaster on a global scale is drought. Violent conflict also displaces large numbers <strong>of</strong> people 

into hunger; conflicts hit Africa especially hard. The chronically food-insecure reside in areas 

where shock exposure is sporadic. Acute hunger <strong>of</strong>ten occurs where shock exposure 

accumulates over time and the effects <strong>of</strong> shock are disproportionately harsh on weaker 

groups. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends policies that provide emergency assistance, and 

social safety nets in ways that do not destabilize local food markets, as fundamental 

approaches to alleviation <strong>of</strong> acute hunger. 

The growing prevalence <strong>of</strong> the HIV/AIDS epidemic adds to the escalation <strong>of</strong> the hunger 

problem in Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS along with malaria are the leading cause 

<strong>of</strong> adult morbidity and mortality. Malnutrition, particularly protein deficiency, increases 

susceptibility to HIV infection and accelerates the development <strong>of</strong> AIDS. Most <strong>of</strong> the 29 

million people in this region now living with HIV/AIDS will have died by the year 2020, in 

14

addition to the 14 million already claimed by the epidemic. More than half those infected are 

women. The losses <strong>of</strong> HIV/AIDS impact every determinant <strong>of</strong> food security including health 

status, income, capacity to care for children, ability to participate in governance, ability to 

labor on farms and other productive work, and to participate in social networks. Social 

inequality, corruption, and prejudice increase vulnerability and confound hunger alleviation. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> supports policies that lead to effective governance that 

ensures voice for the vulnerable and needy, including families affected by HIV-AID and 

is based on inclusive and fair rules, participation in decision-making, transparency, 

and accountability. 

TARGETING THE MOST NEEDY 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is working to identify the location, livelihoods, and vulnerabilities <strong>of</strong> 

the hungry in order to recommend effective hunger-reduction actions and to appropriately 

target policy, capacity building, and investments. Our background paper estimated that on a 

global basis approximately 50% <strong>of</strong> the hungry are in farm households, 22% are the rural 

landless, 20% are urban; and 8% are directly dependent on natural resources such as 

forests, fisheries and pastoral areas. New analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that about 

25% <strong>of</strong> the underweight children under 5 are in urban areas and about 75% are found in 

smallholder farming systems, and landless rural poor, many in marginal and remote areas. 

Farming systems dependent on community resources (forest, pastoral and artisanal fishing) 

account for 20% <strong>of</strong> underweight children under 5—more than twice the rate <strong>of</strong> global 

average. Farming systems that are less favored in terms <strong>of</strong> physical and agro-climatic 

conditions and poor infrastructure such as inadequate schools, extension services, and 

health centers contain at least 30% <strong>of</strong> the underweight children under 5 in Sub-Saharan 

Africa. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends that investment in food-insecure smallholder 

farmers is critical for hunger reduction and that particular attention must be made to 

correct past neglect <strong>of</strong> marginal lands and those with less-favored social and 

economic conditions. Priorities for national and sub-national investment should 

reflect the causes <strong>of</strong> food insecurity in specific hotpots. 

To geographically target policy and hunger-reduction actions, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has 

conducted new analysis to identify “Hunger Hotspots” in Sub-Saharan Africa; priority areas in 

which hunger is most persistent and severe. Hunger Hotspots are defined as the subnational 

units that contain both more than twenty percent <strong>of</strong> children underweight and more 

than 100,000 underweight children under-five years <strong>of</strong> age and where the number <strong>of</strong> 

underweight children under-five per square kilometer is high. Out <strong>of</strong> 81 such sub-national 

areas, 23 hunger hotspots in 8 areas identified by the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> include 

approximately 42% <strong>of</strong> the total population <strong>of</strong> underweight under-five children. The African 

hotspots represent priority areas for achieving the Hunger MDG and also provide test cases 

for the development <strong>of</strong> detailed action plans for hunger reduction that will provide guidelines 

for national plans throughout Africa. The action plans will be based upon detailed 

characterization <strong>of</strong> vulnerable groups, the over-arching and immediate causes <strong>of</strong> their 

hunger, past efforts to relieve hunger, and upon a study <strong>of</strong> the political economy <strong>of</strong> the 

15

hunger hotspot. The action plans, developed in partnership with local stakeholders, will 

include a portfolio <strong>of</strong> interventions including political commitment raising, policy reforms, and 

technical hunger-reduction interventions. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will respond to requests from other 

areas that meet the criteria for hotspots but do not figure in the 8 areas. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends that a hunger hotspots approach be adopted to 

develop and test plans for achievement <strong>of</strong> the Hunger MDG and that these areas be a 

priority for international and national investments to reduce hunger. 

APPLY GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND SELECTION OF INVESTMENT PRIORITIES 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is working towards the development <strong>of</strong> an operational framework to 

guide all nations and development partners to achieve the Hunger MDG. We aim to develop 

guidelines <strong>of</strong> how to select among actions to address hunger in specific urban and rural 

contexts and the hunger <strong>of</strong> different affected groups. The following questions are examples 

<strong>of</strong> criteria to be considered. 

• What synergies may be achieved among elements <strong>of</strong> the intervention and its 

outcomes to ensure success, scalability, and political viability? 

• What is the credibility <strong>of</strong> the action to reduce hunger; what is its relative impact? 

• What are the constraints to implementing the action at sufficient scale for impact? 

• What is the commitment <strong>of</strong> the political leadership to the action? 

• What is the capacity <strong>of</strong> the country and responsible actors for implementing the 

action? 

• What policy context is necessary and sufficient for the success <strong>of</strong> the action? 

What follows describes the three main elements <strong>of</strong> our recommendations. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

emphasizes that all three must be simultaneously addressed in order to meet the hunger 

MDG. 

MOBILIZE POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND ACTION FOR HUNGER REDUCTION 

The world can achieve the Hunger MDG if it chooses to do so. Such a choice is political -- 

and political choices can be influenced by targeted and sustained advocacy. The contrast 

between the commitments made in international summits (Millennium Declaration, World 

Food Summits, International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey, and 

the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg) and the persistence <strong>of</strong> 

hunger leads the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to conclude that specific plans and funding to produce political 

actions for hunger alleviation are as critical to achieve the Hunger MDG as policies or 

specific technical solutions. 

An October 2003 poll by the U.S. advocacy group “The Alliance to End Hunger” indicates 

that 90% <strong>of</strong> Americans consider world hunger a very important issue, and 67% believe that if 

16

ich countries make up their minds to act the Hunger MDG can be achieved by 2015. This 

and similar opinions in other countries <strong>of</strong>fer opportunities for mobilizing political commitment. 

Some countries have developed such commitments recently. A middle-income country, 

Brazil, is placing high priority in its “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger) campaign; Ethiopia, one <strong>of</strong> the 

world’s hungriest countries, has developed and is beginning to implement a highly innovative 

Coalition for Food Security program. The Brazilian President and the Ethiopian Prime 

Minister are providing direct, personally committed leadership <strong>of</strong> such programs. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends the creation <strong>of</strong> coalitions for anti-hunger 

advocacy that are vertical (from community to national and international levels) and 

horizontal (within a given level). These coalitions will increase political pressure on 

decision-makers through communication, mobilization, accountability and 

transparency strategies and through effective communication that hunger alleviation 

is a cornerstone <strong>of</strong> economic growth and poverty reduction. This focuses both on the 

rich nations and donor institutions that need to commit large increases in resources, 

and on hungry nations that must develop and implement effective anti-hunger and 

long-term food security programs. 

ALIGN CRITICAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT HUNGER REDUCTION 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposes the following eight policy improvements that together constitute 

key entry points for countries with high prevalence <strong>of</strong> undernutrition as well as the donor 

agencies that support them. Other broad policies necessary to get out <strong>of</strong> the poverty trap 

such as peace and security, good governance, human rights and the rule <strong>of</strong> law are included 

in the Poverty <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> report as necessary to meet all Millennium Development Goals. 

1. Make agricultural and rural investment a priority. This policy must be reflected in 

major budgetary increases to agriculture and nutrition sectors and to the human and 

institutional capacity to implement policy. National food security plans that genuinely and 

specifically target hunger—not just economic growth---should be developed within the 

context <strong>of</strong> PRSP’s (Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans) or similar instruments. Such policy 

alignment requires the strong and direct support at the presidential or head-<strong>of</strong>-state level. 

Agricultural growth has a larger impact on hunger reduction than does growth in industry 

and service sectors, and provides large multipliers that reduce poverty. The resolution by 

the African Union that member countries must increase their agriculture budget to at least 

10% <strong>of</strong> the government budget is a major step in the right direction. Donors must better 

coordinate agriculture and rural development assistance. 

2. Greatly enhance capacity, particularly for pr<strong>of</strong>essionals and technicians working 

on agriculture, nutrition and markets. The emphasis is on massive on-the-job training 

for specific interventions that will help meet the Hunger MDG for pr<strong>of</strong>essionals and parapr<strong>of</strong>essionals 

in government, NGO’s, private sector and rural communities. Such widescale 

training will result in an adequate absorptive capacity to implement the larger 

investments envisioned to achieve the MDG. This must go hand in hand with major 

capacity-building initiatives for mitigating HIV/AIDS, because they may take away much 

<strong>of</strong> the trained manpower in rural areas. 

17

3. Build and upgrade rural infrastructure. This involves the development or repair <strong>of</strong> 

roads, railroads, energy, information and communications systems, school facilities, 

health posts, agricultural research, and extension services in areas where such 

infrastructure is absent or has deteriorated, as well as development <strong>of</strong> the technical 

capacity to maintain these services. 

4. Empower women and invest in girls, through specifically tailored actions such as 

attracting more girls into school, enhancing women’s property rights, inheritance laws, 

and access to land; interventions that reduce women’s labor burden (growing fuelwood 

on farm, for example); building awareness <strong>of</strong> and access to reproductive rights and 

services, and building their participation in the process <strong>of</strong> governance. 

5. Risk-reducing safety nets, aimed at minimizing acute hunger (food aid, food for work 

programs in lean seasons or after losing jobs), for individuals who are unable to work. 

These policies will be more assistance-oriented in the form <strong>of</strong> pensions, disability 

transfers or child support grants. Safety net food aid policies should ensure that they do 

not distort the local food markets and should be based in local production. 

6. Provide incentives that promote sustainable natural resources management, 

protecting the country’s biodiversity, soils, water, forests, grassland and fisheries, with 

attention to resources critical for food security <strong>of</strong> the poor. Ecologically sound agricultural 

practices recommended in this report can minimize the trade<strong>of</strong>fs between the needs to 

increase agricultural productivity (crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries) and the 

preservation and enhancement <strong>of</strong> the natural resource base. In regions where 

agricultural landscape have been severely degraded by soil erosion, specific investments 

will be needed to bring tem back to productivity. 

7. Strengthening property rights to motivate investment. Policies should promote 

increased access to and ownership <strong>of</strong> land and forests by the poor, especially in 

countries where land is very unequally distributed, and assure tenure. Land ownership 

and tenure policies must promote fair and efficient land markets by facilitating 

transactions (sale, renting, mortgaging and leasing <strong>of</strong> land property) and enhance the 

productive capacity <strong>of</strong> farmers and their incentives to invest in farm and non-farm 

activities. 

8. Stable and fair macroeconomic and trade policies that level the playing field for all. 

This includes maintaining undistorted exchange rates and trade and taxation policies that 

do not discriminate against the agricultural sector. In particular, national policies that 

address issues related to input subsidies, must support the hungry in terms <strong>of</strong> their equity 

effects. Attention should also be paid to subsidies in OECD countries and their impacts 

on the global agricultural trade system in general and on the poor in developing countries 

in particular. 

SYNERGISTIC INTERVENTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 

Re-shaping public policies and investments to promote smallholder agricultural development 

is necessary to create the conditions for long-term poverty reduction and economic growth, 

18

and can result in significant short- and medium-term hunger reduction. However evidence 

shows that when implemented alone, the results will <strong>of</strong>ten bypass the following large groups 

<strong>of</strong> food-insecure people: 

• Food producers who rely on their own production for food security but suffer 

chronically low, erratic or declining harvests due to natural resource degradation, 

inadequate investment or adverse weather. 

• Food producers and consumers whose effective use <strong>of</strong> markets is limited by lack <strong>of</strong> 

infrastructure and efficient and fair institutions. 

• Vulnerable mothers and young children for whom adequate food supply will not 

necessarily ensure adequate nutrition, as well as families affected by HIV-AIDS. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> focuses on three coordinated and mutually reinforcing interventions to be 

carried out simultaneously in a “bottom-up” manner to benefit from the synergies they 

generate. They are “entry points”----actions that must be undertaken first and cannot be 

bypassed, and that would open the way for a plethora <strong>of</strong> other actions. They are not listed in 

order <strong>of</strong> priority as they are mutually reinforcing. 

These interventions are described at two levels <strong>of</strong> specificity, first in general terms and 

second as elements <strong>of</strong> an Early Action Plan for Sub-Saharan Africa in response to a request 

from the UN Secretary-General for a Doubly Green Revolution for Africa. 

1. Community-based nutrition interventions. 

Too many children are underweight either because they are born with low birth weight, or 

because they become malnourished during the first two years <strong>of</strong> life. The effect <strong>of</strong> 

malnutrition at these early ages is mostly irreversible, and actions thereafter have little or no 

impact on underweight rates and physical and mental problems. Therefore, the domain <strong>of</strong> 

community-based and community-driven interventions targeted at life cycle periods between 

pregnancy and the first two years <strong>of</strong> age is the backbone <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s proposed 

nutrition interventions. Countries such as Thailand have experimented successfully with 

several packages <strong>of</strong> community-based interventions targeted at these younger ages. Many 

have successfully improved child-care behaviors and reduced malnutrition rates. These 

packages may include the use <strong>of</strong> growth promotion as a tool for regular contact with mothers 

<strong>of</strong> young children, linked to targeted supplementary feeding and provision <strong>of</strong> nutrition and 

health services. Each package is to be tailored to the local context, building upon existing 

services and capacity for action. Where capacities are limited, specific efforts will be made to 

strengthen the capacity for implementation. Targeted investments must also be made in 

effective monitoring and evaluation to continually assess progress and efficient targeting. 

Other critical groups include pre-adolescents and adolescents, particularly girls. 

A prominent feature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s Early Action Plan for Africa is the provision <strong>of</strong> 

meals through primary schools, made as much as possible from locally produced food to 

address adolescent and pre-adolescent children’s nutritional needs while stimulating local 

agricultural production and markets. The meals will seek to provide a balanced diet <strong>of</strong> macro 

and micronutrients, using culturally acceptable local products for the carbohydrate base, oils, 

19

meat and milk, vegetables and fruits. Foods will be fortified with vitamin A, iodine, iron and 

zinc, if locally produced foods cannot supply these micronutrients in sufficient amounts. 

Take-home rations, provided as part <strong>of</strong> the meals program, are an effective strategy to 

enable vulnerable children (such as child laborers and adolescent girls) to attend and stay in 

school, as well as specific take home rations for children less than 2 years old. In addition to 

improving children’s nutritional status, school feeding programs have been shown to 

stimulate enrollment and retention (particularly for girls), improve students’ ability to learn, 

and provide economic benefits to other family members by <strong>of</strong>fsetting food costs, and also 

through multiplier effects on food and non-food demand. Schools could serve as a focus for 

other key nutritional interventions aimed at pregnant women and children under two (with 

fortified foods, nutrition information, etc), and also to reach adolescent girls before they 

become pregnant with iron supplementation, de-worming, breastfeeding information, 

environmental awareness and hygiene. 

Such “home-grown” school feeding programs will directly stimulate local agricultural 

production by a very significant amount. Early estimates indicate that if such a program is 

implemented throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, it will raise demand for food by 10 million tons 

per year, compared with the current total annual production <strong>of</strong> 71 million tons - a major 

potential stimulus to African agriculture. 

2. Make markets work for the rural poor 

In many low income countries markets do not work effectively for the rural poor. For 

example, crop prices crash when there is a bumper harvest, depriving farmers <strong>of</strong> their 

income while other parts <strong>of</strong> the country are going hungry. Governments need to create an 

environment conducive to the development <strong>of</strong> functioning markets, business enterprises and 

farms, including the legal framework with a commercial code that respects contracts and the 

capacity to enforce them. Governments and the private sector should promote the building <strong>of</strong> 

market institutions and the basic physical infrastructure that links markets effectively. 

Governments also should eliminate prohibitions on transport or marketing <strong>of</strong> foods across 

districts; end mismanagement <strong>of</strong> food aid in ways that depress local prices, and end delays 

in paying farmers by cooperatives involved in cash crops such as c<strong>of</strong>fee, cocoa and sugar. 

The elimination <strong>of</strong> such perverse policies or practices would have an immediate positive 

effect. 

Early Action Planning. Many African farmers in hunger hotspot regions are currently not 

part <strong>of</strong> the market economy, and those who are face major constraints when bringing 

additional production to rural markets. To improve agricultural market infrastructure in the 

selected hotspots, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has identified the following interventions: 

• Develop storage facilities at community level and in district collection points 

• Develop or improve feeder roads, minimizing environmental impacts wherever 

possible. 

• Develop and support the emergence <strong>of</strong> efficient and transparent farmer marketing 

20

associations at community and district levels 

• Develop and provide technical support and capacity building for input dealers 

• Develop, internet-based and other market information systems 

• Extend micr<strong>of</strong>inance services to agricultural investments 

• Promote value-added processing facilities at the local level 

• Develop guaranteed minimum prices for farm products. 

• Guaranteed minimum prices for smallholder farmers 

The absence <strong>of</strong> such guaranteed floor prices---common in rich countries---and the high cost 

<strong>of</strong> fertilizers have decimated small farm pr<strong>of</strong>itability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Offering farmers 

a pre-arranged contract for their produce creates a guaranteed market for output during the 

initial project period. Targeting certain groups <strong>of</strong> farmers (such as women) through this 

approach is also an option. Food for work programs (using locally produced foods) can be 

used for construction <strong>of</strong> feeder roads, local infrastructure, soil conservation and tree planting 

activities. 

3. Increase agricultural productivity in smallholder farms 

Smallholder agriculture is not only the main source <strong>of</strong> food availability in rural areas, it is also 

the main income generating occupation, employing more people than any other productive 

sector in most poor countries. The assertion that increases in smallholder agricultural 

productivity reduces poverty and hunger has a large evidence base. A thriving agricultural 

sector will support the rural non-farm economy through increased demand for products, and 

this will in turn generate increased demand for farm products. A thriving farm economy can 

increase the disposable income <strong>of</strong> all net food consumers, including urban households, by 

reducing the price they pay for their food products, while maintaining farm pr<strong>of</strong>itability 

through lower production costs. A strong evidence base supports that available technologies 

can raise the productivity <strong>of</strong> smallholder farmers. Many new farm technologies----appropriate 

for more marginal and less-favored areas that are poorly served by infrastructure and 

modern inputs---have been developed to enhance soil quality, manage water at the local 

level, improve germplasm, manage pests, all in environmentally friendly ways. Community 

and farmer participation in research and development is essential to develop and adapt 

these technologies to local conditions. 

Scientific and local innovations drawing on a wide range <strong>of</strong> approaches, including natural 

resource management, genetic improvements and ecology (collective called “ecoagriculture” 

or other similar terms--are demonstrating new potentials to increase productivity and 

producer incomes while conserving and restoring ecosystem services and biodiversity in 

agricultural landscapes. 

The original Green Revolution is one <strong>of</strong> the major achievements <strong>of</strong> humankind in the latter 

third <strong>of</strong> the 20 th century. Food production in developing countries tripled during the last 30 

21

years, the number <strong>of</strong> rural poor decreased by half, the proportion <strong>of</strong> malnourished people 

dropped from 30 to 18%, and the real prices <strong>of</strong> the main cereal crops decreased by 76%. A 

small group <strong>of</strong> determined scientists and policymakers identified the key entry point: the need 

for high-yielding varieties <strong>of</strong> rice, wheat and other food crops. When that was attained other 

necessary factors were put in place such as enabling government policies, fertilizers and 

irrigation, better marketing, infrastructure, national research institutions, strong agricultural 

universities and the international agricultural research system. But its success in Africa has 

been very low. The contribution <strong>of</strong> improved crop varieties to crop yield increases has been 

70-90% in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, but only 28% in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Why? There are several major biophysical reasons and a major economic one. The first 

major biophysical reason is that unlike other developing regions, soil nutrient depletion is 

extreme in most <strong>of</strong> Africa and therefore the key entry point is not improved varieties but 

replenishing soil fertility at the lowest possible cost. No matter how good genetic 

improvement is crops cannot grow well without sufficient nitrogen and phosphorus. 

Inadequate management <strong>of</strong> available water and <strong>of</strong> watersheds in rainfed systems is another 

fundamental biophysical cause <strong>of</strong> low productivity and a key entry point in many dryland 

farming systems. In herding, fishing and forest systems, restoring and sustainably managing 

the natural resource base is the key entry point. In areas with higher environmental risks or 

degraded resources, investments to improve the underlying resource base <strong>of</strong> soil, water and 

other natural resources are biological imperatives to ensure positive response to other types 

<strong>of</strong> investments, such as improved seeds and livestock. 

The major economic reason is the poor infrastructure and institutional development in rural 

areas <strong>of</strong> Africa. Road density is about 1/10 th <strong>of</strong> what is in Asia now, markets are weak; 

hence, fertilizer prices are 2 – 4 times at the farm gate in Africa as they are in the rest <strong>of</strong> the 

world, access to information is poor, and prices drop precipitously when crop surpluses 

occur. The same reasoning applies to many marginal and remote areas <strong>of</strong> Central America, 

the Andean Region, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia where hunger has also 

high prevalence. 

The Early Action Plan for Africa calls for drastically increasing the productivity <strong>of</strong> smallscale 

farms in less-favored areas that were largely bypassed by the Green Revolution. It 

starts with tackling two key entry points that allow smallholder farmers to increase yields <strong>of</strong> 

staple crops by 2 to 4 times and generate marketable surpluses. The entry points are the 

proven strategies for restoring <strong>of</strong> soil fertility using organic and mineral fertilizers, and the 

installation <strong>of</strong> small-scale water storage and irrigation facilities at the farm level and microwatershed 

management. 

The key factor is for smallholder farmers to access nitrogen and phosphorus at the lowest 

possible cost. There are agr<strong>of</strong>orestry technologies that use “fertilizer trees” and green 

manures to fix nitrogen and bring nutrients from the subsoil. They are in use by hundreds <strong>of</strong> 

thousands <strong>of</strong> African farmers in subhumid areas with consistently high maize yields and 

deliver important additional benefits like fuelwood production on site, weed control and 

increased water holding capacity <strong>of</strong> the soil. The judicious use <strong>of</strong> mineral fertilizers, both for 

nitrogen and phosphorus, has also been successful in areas where fertilizer prices are 

reasonable and farmers can repay the costs with by selling crops in the market. As such, 

22

oth approaches are recommended. In cases where soil erosion is a serious concern, 

contour hedges and other soil conservation interventions are needed to make sure the 

nutrients are not lost. 

Smallholder farmers can significantly increase their water resources by simple, wellestablished 

water harvesting and small-scale irrigation techniques. They include techniques 

locally known as diguettes, zai holes, stone and biological terraces, simple reservoirs, treadle 

pumps and drip irrigation. 

When the soil and water bottlenecks are sufficiently overcome, other key agricultural 

technologies can be brought to bear: improved varieties <strong>of</strong> crops, livestock and trees; 

integrated pest management, conservation tillage, aquaculture and many others. Major 

gains can be made with improved crop varieties, tissue culture bananas and improved 

livestock breeds. We have seen the impact hybrid maize has had in southern Africa and that 

improved varieties <strong>of</strong> rice, sorghum and soybeans have had in West Africa – when market 

conditions permit sale <strong>of</strong> surpluses. Most improved crop varieties in Africa today are more 

robust and better adapted to difficult conditions – they are <strong>of</strong> shorter duration to escape end 

<strong>of</strong> season drought, drought tolerant, more weed competitive, and tolerant or resistant to 

pests and diseases. 

Through the production <strong>of</strong> staple crops, farmers will achieve food security while using part <strong>of</strong> 

their land to diversify with higher-value products such as vegetables, fruits, trees and 

livestock products for income generation. Strengthening research and reinventing extension 

services will be necessary to ensure effective utilization <strong>of</strong> these strategies. Investments in 

research and extension must at least double, from the present 0.5% <strong>of</strong> the agricultural GDP 

to at least 1%. 

THE WAY FORWARD 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to continue and finish its work through four sets <strong>of</strong> actions: 

developing and testing Early Action plans in interested Sub-Saharan African countries that 

have hunger hotspots; developing more specific recommendations for hungry areas <strong>of</strong> Asia 

and Latin America; sequencing and costing <strong>of</strong> these plans, and tackling a wide array <strong>of</strong> 

unresolved and emerging issues. 

1. Early action planning and capacity building. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposes to “test drive” the early action plans by establishing partnerships 

with African governments who so request it, and then working closely with them to fully 

assess the needs for action programs and build capacities to target hunger hotspots in Sub- 

Saharan Africa. This process will involve a thorough analysis <strong>of</strong> the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger in 

targeted regions, and the constraints to addressing it; extensive stakeholder interaction 

through workshops and other means; and a policy planning process that emphasizes 

capacity building and ownership at the country level. The expected output will be a business 

plan to achieve the hunger MDG in that particular country, or significant improvements <strong>of</strong> 

existing plans. This will give the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> with a realistic way <strong>of</strong> costing; assessing the 

needs <strong>of</strong> what is necessary to achieve the Hunger MDG as well as the sequencing <strong>of</strong> 

23

events—two crucial elements <strong>of</strong> a business plan. These plans will be coordinated with that <strong>of</strong> 

other <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s, in ways that contribute to a full MDG plan. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has initiated preliminary discussions with political leaders in Ethiopia, Kenya, 

Uganda, Ghana and other countries to initiate such assessments starting in 2004. During 

recent discussions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposals, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles deemed them 

potentially “transformational” and invited further collaboration. 

2. Focusing on specific recommendations for hungry areas <strong>of</strong> Asia and Latin America. 

Unlike sub-Saharan Africa, which faces an overwhelming challenge <strong>of</strong> insufficient food 

production, patterns <strong>of</strong> hunger differ in countries that produce enough food in the aggregate, 

such as India and Brazil. Over the next year, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will focus its attention to 

develop more specific recommendations in such areas, particularly on issues facing the 

landless rural and the urban hungry, that are more directly related to <strong>of</strong>f-farm income 

generation and nutritional interventions. Also the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will examine areas in these 

regions where low food production by marginal smallholder farmers is also a major 

constraint, such as parts <strong>of</strong> Central America, the Andes, the Caribbean, and mountainous 

and dryland regions <strong>of</strong> Asia, where Africa-type approaches may be relevant. 

3. Costing, sequencing, and “how-to.” 

The interim report does not address costing, sequencing and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> who should 

do what - all parts <strong>of</strong> a business plan. Through commissioned research and consultation 

these issues will be addressed for the final report. Examples <strong>of</strong> questions to address: What 

are the costs <strong>of</strong> our proposed actions and their likely benefits? How do we develop cost 

models that can be replicated on a national level and aggregated to international estimates? 

What is the sequencing <strong>of</strong> political commitments, policy changes, and hunger-reduction 

actions in the general case and in specific cases? How do we move from our general policy 

arguments to country-specific analysis and recommendations? What are the capacities 

needed for political action, policy change, and specific hunger-reduction actions in specific 

places? 

4. Unresolved and Emerging Issues. 

In the coming year, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will further investigate a series <strong>of</strong> unresolved questions 

and emerging issues that require further analysis, consultation and resolution. Examples <strong>of</strong> 

such issues are: 

ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH. 

• Urban hunger (including urban agriculture); 

• The role <strong>of</strong> livestock and fisheries; 

• The role <strong>of</strong> irrigated agriculture; 

• Environmentally sustainable alternative energy sources (such as biomass). 

24

• The potential participation <strong>of</strong> food producers as stockholders in private-sector 

alliances -- not stakeholders. 

• The projected impact <strong>of</strong> climate change on agriculture, particularly on food production 

and marginal lands. 

ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS. 

• Linking typologies <strong>of</strong> livelihoods with political commitments, policy changes and 

synergistic hunger reduction actions. 

• Identifying trade<strong>of</strong>fs, dependencies and synergies with the recommendations <strong>of</strong> other 

task forces. 

POLICY DESIGN QUESTIONS. 

• Investigating the relative importance <strong>of</strong> targeting hungry smallholder farmers in 

favored lands. 

• Evaluating whether to invest and subsidize more on the input side (increasing 

agricultural productivity), or on the output side. 

• Options for generating more <strong>of</strong>f-farm income in rural areas. 

• Designing and mobilizing safety nets and related insurance policies, and relating 

them to our proposed synergistic actions 

• The two-way linkages between conflict and hunger, including potential synergies for 

reducing both simultaneously. 

• Strategies for increasing and channeling donor funds to agriculture and hunger 

reduction. 

25

1 HALVING HUNGER BY 2015 IS POSSIBLE 

The scale <strong>of</strong> hunger in today’s world is a scandal <strong>of</strong> enormous proportions; one out <strong>of</strong> every 

seven people suffers from chronic or acute hunger. Many more suffer from the “hidden 

hunger” <strong>of</strong> vitamin and mineral deficiencies. The most scandalous aspect <strong>of</strong> this tragedy is 

that it is preventable. The Millennium Development Goal for Hunger (Hunger MDG) is to 

reduce by half the proportion <strong>of</strong> people who suffer from hunger by 2015 (UNDP, 2003). By 

signing the Millennium Declaration, international leaders agreed that rich and poor nations 

share both the responsibility for meeting the hunger reduction goal and the opportunity to 

achieve it (UNDP, 2003). The Millennium Project’s <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2 on Hunger is working to 

develop an operational plan for the international community as well as for individual nations 

to meet the Hunger goal. This <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> presents the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s most recent 

research and emerging recommendations for meeting the Hunger goal and charts the 

projected progress <strong>of</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> work in its final year <strong>of</strong> existence. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommendations reinforce and build on the conclusion reached by 

many past planning and analysis efforts by a variety <strong>of</strong> institutions. The conclusion reached 

many times is: halve hunger by 2015 is technically possible (Scherr and the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> 2003). Significant initiatives already underway (described in Annex 1: Major 

International Anti-Hunger Initiatives) combat hunger and poverty by focusing on the roles <strong>of</strong> 

development policies and practices, enabling the political, social and economic environment, 

implementing specific poverty reduction strategies, facilitating physical and economic access 

to food, facilitating trade, encouraging investment, advocating for the improvement <strong>of</strong> social 

welfare, reducing vulnerability, ensuring timely responses to food security crises, and 

pursuing effective implementation. However, though much knowledge has been gained in 

the design and implementation <strong>of</strong> the myriad technical and policy actions that aim to reduce 

hunger, solutions have not yet reached the 846 million undernourished people and the 2 

billion people suffering “hidden hunger” –vitamin and mineral deficiencies that together affect 

more than one fifth <strong>of</strong> the world’s population with devastating consequences. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has concluded that a general consensus exists on the range 

<strong>of</strong> effective technical actions that can reduce hunger. However, there is also a 

consensus that technical actions invariably fail unless policy changes remove 

constraints to progress and create capacity in order to expand the scale <strong>of</strong> successful 

hunger-reduction actions. 

There is a wide chasm between current political promises to end hunger and today’s 

investments and efforts to do so. To close the gap between intentions and results, the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> has targeted its recommendations toward political actions that create and support 

capacity for anti-hunger actions as well as synergistic technical actions that increase the 

supply and demand for food, assist those most in need, and improve nutrition for the 

vulnerable and hungry. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has concludes that political commitment and 

political action to end hunger must be objectives in their own right for which specific plans, 

investment, and dissemination <strong>of</strong> best practices are necessary. 

26

1.1 The Millennium Development Goal for Hunger 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> – a group <strong>of</strong> scholars, policymakers and practitioners from diverse 

geographical areas and backgrounds (agricultural science, policy, nutrition NGOs, private 

sector, African governments and UN agencies) –was established in October 2002 to deliver 

by June 2005 a practical strategy and implementation plan to achieve the Hunger MDG. The 

<strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has sought to integrate perspectives on nutrition, agriculture, economic 

development and human rights into its plan to reduce hunger and identify strategies likely to 

be most effective in different parts <strong>of</strong> the world with different at-risk population groups. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recognizes that the Hunger MDG calls for halving the proportion <strong>of</strong> the 

world’s hungry people while the World Food Summit goal calls to reduce the absolute 

number <strong>of</strong> hungry people to less than half <strong>of</strong> 800 million. While these quantitative targets 

differ (Table 1-1), the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s broader aim is to advocate for international and national 

plans that will eliminate hunger within our lifetimes, and to focus on the toughest cases first. 

The Millennium Development Goal for Hunger and Target Indicators (UN Millennium indicators 

database) 

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 

Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion <strong>of</strong> people who suffer from hunger 

Indicator 4: Prevalence <strong>of</strong> underweight children under five years <strong>of</strong> age (UNICEF-WHO) 

Indicator 5: Proportion <strong>of</strong> population below minimum level <strong>of</strong> dietary energy consumption 

(FAO) 

Table 1-1: The difference between 50% reduction in proportion or absolute numbers <strong>of</strong> 

undernourished in the developing world 

Population> 

1990 

2015 

World 5,263,593,000 a World Population 7,197,247,000 

Less Developed 4,115,000,000 Less Developed 5,967,000,000 

Numbers 

Undernourished b 

% <strong>of</strong> Population 

Undernourished 

Number <strong>of</strong> 

Undernourished 816,600,000 19.8% 

Numbers 


% <strong>of</strong> Population 


Goal as 

Percentage 

Reduction 

Absolute 50% 

Reduction 408,300,000 6.8% 65.7% 

Proportional 50% 

Reduction 590,733,000 9.9% 50.0% 

a 

Based on UN median variant population projections (http://esa.un.org/unpp/). b FAO, SOFI 2003 

1.2 Food Security and Nutrition Status Underpins the Attainment <strong>of</strong> many 

MDG’s 

Reduction <strong>of</strong> hunger and malnutrition are typically seen as outcomes <strong>of</strong> development efforts. 

However, the alleviation <strong>of</strong> hunger and malnutrition is an essential condition for the 

attainment <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> the other MDG’s: improving primary education enrollment and 

27

attainment, improving gender equity, reducing child mortality risks, improving maternal 

health, improving ability to combat disease and achieving environmental sustainability (SCN 

2003, Webb and Rogers 2003). The role <strong>of</strong> hunger reduction in supporting the pursuit <strong>of</strong> the 

MDG goals is summarized in Table 1-2. 

Table 1-2: The contribution <strong>of</strong> nutrition status to the MDG’s 

Goal 1 

Eradicate extreme 

poverty and hunger 

Goal 2 

Achieve universal 

primary education 

Goal 3 

Promote gender 

equality and 

empower women 

Goal 4 

Reduce child 

mortality 

Goal 5 

Improve maternal 

health 

Goal 6 

Combat HIV/AIDS, 

malaria, and other 

diseases 

Goal 7 

Ensure 

environmental 

sustainability 

Goal 8 

Develop a global 

partnership for 

development 

Malnutrition erodes human capital and reduces productivity by diminishing 

physical and mental capacity. 

Early child malnutrition is <strong>of</strong>ten irreversible and intergenerational, with 

consequences for chronic disease later in life. 

Malnutrition reduces mental capacity; exploration, interaction and learning. 

Malnourished children are less likely to enroll in school. If they do at all, they 

enroll later than other children. Hungry children are also more likely to drop 

out <strong>of</strong> school to seek employment. 

Hunger and malnutrition reduces school performance. Iodine and iron 

micronutrients are critical for cognitive development. 

Gender inequality increases risk <strong>of</strong> female malnutrition, which erodes human 

capital and further reduces women’s access to assets. 

Well-nourished girls are more likely to stay in school. 

Malnutrition is directly or indirectly associated with 56% <strong>of</strong> all child mortality. 

Malnutrition is the main contributor to the burden <strong>of</strong> disease in the developing 

world. 

Micronutrients are key to child survival (particularly vitamin A, zinc). 

Maternal health is compromised by malnutrition and an anti-female bias in 

allocations <strong>of</strong> food, health and care. 

Malnutrition is associated with most <strong>of</strong> the major risk factors for maternal 

mortality. Stunting increases risk <strong>of</strong> cephalopelvic disproportion and 

obstructed labor. There are multiple micro-nutrient associations (iron, vitamin 

A, zinc, folate, iodine, calcium) with maternal health. 

Good nutrition is essential to slow down the transition from HIV infection to full 

AIDS. Poorly nourished people succumb more quickly. 

Malnutrition may increase risk <strong>of</strong> genital ulcers (associated with increased HIV 

transmission). Maternal malnutrition increases risk <strong>of</strong> mother-to-childtransmission 

(MTCT) via effects on maternal immune status (vitamin A). 

Malnutrition may compromise efficacy and safety <strong>of</strong> anti-retroviral (ARV) 

treatment (though not enough research has been done), and weaken the 

resistance to opportunistic infections. Malnutrition reduces malarial survival 

rates. 

Environmental sustainability will only be achieved if agriculture – the largest 

use <strong>of</strong> the world’s land and water – is practiced in an ecologically sustainable 

manner. No one can be an environmentalist with an empty stomach. 

Increased access to safe drinking water and sanitation is critical to alleviating 

malnutrition. 

Malnourished people are unlikely to be fully able to participate in the economic 

opportunities created by global development. By allowing populations to 

remain malnourished, wealthy countries are pre-emptively eliminating 

potential partners and opportunities for pr<strong>of</strong>itable investment. 

28

1.3 The international environment has changed – success is more possible 

now 

Recent global trends have created an opportunity to eliminate hunger that closely ties the 

fortune <strong>of</strong> the world community to ending hunger and poverty. The nascent political force for 

hunger elimination arises from a convergence <strong>of</strong> various trends. The moral argument for 

ending hunger has entered the public discourse as values have assumed greater importance 

in development debates and in political debates. The context for ending hunger has 

changed from an issue <strong>of</strong> moral imperative in rich countries and an issue <strong>of</strong> survival in poor 

countries to a shared cornerstone <strong>of</strong> economic development and growth. The high economic 

costs <strong>of</strong> hunger and economic benefits <strong>of</strong> good nutrition are increasingly understood. In 

addition, there is increased evidence for and growing recognition <strong>of</strong> how national security, 

immigration, disease, and climate change connect the fates <strong>of</strong> the rich and poor. 

Recent years <strong>of</strong> market reform and political liberalization have enabled both new 

opportunities for action, and a greater likelihood <strong>of</strong> success. In the past when poor country 

economies commonly engaged in closed investment and trade regimes, price and exchange 

rate distortions, and policy constraints to private sector activity, it was difficult to initiate propoor, 

economy-wide growth. Today, market regimes are much more open, many 

bureaucratic obstacles have been eliminated, and democratization has spread to many parts 

<strong>of</strong> the developing world. Investments today are <strong>of</strong>ten more economically sound and 

pr<strong>of</strong>itable than they were in the 1980s; governments today are more active in seeking antipoverty 

dimensions to macro-economic growth policies. However, while trade liberalization 

brings the promise <strong>of</strong> much improved markets, there remains considerable skepticism 

whether an integrated global economy (globalization) is yet bringing benefits to the poor. 

Partial developing nation liberalization in combination with continued OECD agricultural 

subsidies and trade tariffs presents obstacles that could very likely increase the 

disadvantages poor farmers in developing countries suffer if action is not taken. 

Thus, hunger is understood today as both a consequence and a cause <strong>of</strong> poverty. 

Among the six policy clusters <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Compact that support the achievement <strong>of</strong> the 

Millennium Development Goals are policies that are central to hunger reduction. These 

policies include investments in human development for nutrition and health, helping small 

farmers increase productivity, investing in market infrastructure, protecting human rights and 

the social equity <strong>of</strong> women and girls, and promoting environmental sustainability (UNDP, 

2003). 

The MDGs themselves demonstrate that it is politically important to both rich and poor 

nations to alleviate hunger and poverty. However, the political mobilization to create 

change has not yet occurred at the national level. Civil society is playing a larger role in 

international politics and in holding other societal institutions accountable for their actions. 

Rights-based approaches in law and in policy create new leverage points to pressure 

governments to act on hunger reduction, while the expansion <strong>of</strong> democracy and democratic 

institutions help make progress more transparent. In addition, there are new constituencies 

ranging from environmental conservationists to HIV/AIDS activists who now argue that good 

nutrition and sustainable food production underpin other international goals, including 

ecosystem conservation and fighting the spread <strong>of</strong> diseases. 

There is new knowledge at the international and national levels born <strong>of</strong> successes and 

failures in hunger reduction; the portfolio <strong>of</strong> successes and <strong>of</strong> best practices is larger than 

29

ever before. Among lessons <strong>of</strong> the past is the acceptance within international development 

organizations and financial institutions that economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient 

condition for hunger reduction and that agricultural development is the foundation <strong>of</strong> 

economic growth in most <strong>of</strong> the countries where hunger is most persistent. Lastly, important 

paradigm shifts have taken place in research and technology, making new agricultural 

technologies more acceptable to smallholder farmers, lowering these technologies’ costs, 

increasing their effectiveness, and accelerating their adoption. 

Improving smallholder agricultural production in both marginal and favored lands lies at the 

heart <strong>of</strong> achieving and maintaining food security in many regions. Severe environmental 

degradation in many marginal lands has become a threat to productivity. Some <strong>of</strong> this 

environmental degradation can be reversed with substantial eco-conservation-oriented 

investments in partnerships between farmers, communities, governments, and donors. 

Much can be done through major eco-conservation projects and new agricultural technology 

for marginal lands. Until recently, an understanding <strong>of</strong> how many food-insecure people were 

poor farmers in marginal lands was truly lacking. Today, a consensus is forming around the 

need for greater research and extension in order to save these ecosystems. It has also been 

acknowledged that improving smallholder agriculture and its natural resource base in 

marginal lands is central to meeting the Hunger MDG by 2015. 

1.4 Objectives and Strategy <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2 on Hunger 

The objective <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is to deliver a final report on December 15, 2004 to 

the Millennium Project that recommends the best operational framework for achieving the 

Hunger MDG. The Final <strong>Report</strong> will be a plan that details the operational priorities, 

organizational means <strong>of</strong> implementation, and financing structures necessary to ensure that 

all countries can achieve the hunger MDG. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> also recognizes the need to catalyze immediate actions that alleviate hunger 

and build the political commitment necessary for achieving the Hunger MDG by acting in an 

advisory capacity to governments and international institutions. Within the context <strong>of</strong> the 

Millennium Project’s overall advisory work, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will provide developing-country 

governments with input for national and regional anti-hunger initiatives, capacity-building, 

and resource mobilization efforts within countries and with development partners. This 

advisory work will focus on hunger hotspot areas and will include advice on policy reforms 

and guidance toward key synergistic hunger-reduction actions that address multiple causes 

<strong>of</strong> hunger and malnutrition as well as linkages with other development problems addressed 

by other Millennium Development Goals. 

Figure 1-1illustrates the strategy that will be the foundation <strong>of</strong> the final report. The <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> believes that mutually reinforcing actions – be they in the policy arena or in the field – 

and actions that create mutually reinforcing outcomes that address multiple causes <strong>of</strong> hunger 

and multiple MDG’s will be more effective at reducing hunger, will lower investment risk, will 

best utilize capacity, and will be more politically viable. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> refers to these 

actions as “synergistic” actions. Figure 1-2 illustrates the different scales and levels <strong>of</strong> 

actions, emphasizing the translation <strong>of</strong> goals set for hunger eradication into policy initiatives, 

policy investments, and impacts on the ground. 

30

Figure 1-1: The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Strategy to Halve Hunger by 2015 

The strategy recommended by the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to achieve the Hunger MDG consists <strong>of</strong> a 

simultaneous, three-pronged approach: 

1) To campaign at all political levels to mobilize the political actions to end hunger, 

2) To reform national policies to prioritize poverty-reducing rural and agricultural 

development, maintain anti-hunger safety nets, empower women and invest in girls and 

other vulnerable groups, remove legal and regulatory constraints, and invest in capacity 

for hunger-reduction actions, and 

3) To implement proven synergistic hunger-reduction actions at a large scale to improve 

childhood nutrition, raise the agricultural productivity <strong>of</strong> food-insecure farmers, and 

enhance market infrastructure and institutions to increase farm and non-farm income and 

access to food. 

Figure 1-2: Creating the Context for Ending Hunger 

Mobilize Political Action 

• International 

• National 

• Local 

Align National Policies to End Hunger 

• Prioritize agriculture and rural investment 

• Build and upgrade rural infrastructure 

• Empower women and invest in girls 

• Strengthen risk-reducing safety nets 

• Enhance capacity for implementation 

• Promote natural resource management 

• Strengthen property rights 

• Stabilize macroeconomic and trade policy 

Hunger-Reduction Actions 

Improve Childhood 

Nutrition & Safety Nets 

Improve Market 

Function 

Increase Agricultural 

Productivity <strong>of</strong> 

Smallholder Farmers 

Setting 

Goals 

Policy 

Declaration 

Policy 

Initiatives 

Synergistic 

Actions 

Impacts on 

the ground 

1.5 What is new in the <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong>? 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> differs from many other studies in four aspects. First, it identifies 

critical elements that are necessary and sufficient for ending hunger if they are tackled 

simultaneously, but if tackled separately, will be highly unlikely to lead to achieving the 

Hunger MDG. Second, we focus on entry points: first-order interventions that are essential 

for initiating the overall process. These entry point interventions must be followed by 

second-order interventions that can only be effective after the entry points are successfully 

addressed. This sequencing <strong>of</strong> interventions will allow for better cost estimates. Third, our 

work will be integrated with that <strong>of</strong> the other nine <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s, in ways that foster synergies 

and minimize trade<strong>of</strong>fs among all the Millennium Development Goals. Fourth, our report 

does not present the view <strong>of</strong> any particular institution or region because the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

31

members contributing to this report come from such a variety <strong>of</strong> distinct sectors (science, 

policy, NGO, private sector, government) as well as a variety <strong>of</strong> continents. 

32

2 THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF HUNGER 

This chapter reviews progress toward achieving the Hunger MDG and reviews the 

conceptual the case for investing in anti-hunger actions. Convincing arguments can be 

made in terms <strong>of</strong> reducing the human costs, improving economic performance, enhancing 

security, and respecting and protecting human rights. There is also the moral case for 

eliminating hunger – out <strong>of</strong> concern for our fellow human beings; it is the right thing to do. 

These arguments are necessary, but by no means sufficient, for catalyzing political actions 

against hunger. In addition to the arguments <strong>of</strong> the costs <strong>of</strong> hunger, there must be a credible 

plan that shows that hunger alleviation is achievable at an acceptable cost to be worth the 

investment <strong>of</strong> public resources. Such a plan is the objective <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. 

This document uses the terms hunger, food insecurity and undernutrition interchangeably 

unless it alters the specific nature <strong>of</strong> the argument being made. Annex 2: Measuring Hunger 

describes the various indicators available to track hunger and their strengths and 

weaknesses. 

Table 2-1: Definitions <strong>of</strong> hunger related terminology 

Food security 

Food Insecurity 

Hunger 

Low birth weight 

Macronutrients 

Micronutrients 

Malnutrition 

Food Security, exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic 

access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 

preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 1996). This definition is in keeping 

with the principle that everyone has a right to adequate food, to be free from 

hunger, and to enjoy general human dignity, enshrined in the International Bill <strong>of</strong> 

Human Rights (U.N. Economic and Social Council 1999). The definition also 

makes it clear that food production does not equal food security. If food is in 

fields and in markets, but families cannot afford to acquire it then they are food 

insecure. 

Food insecurity, then, is the absence <strong>of</strong> food security. 

A condition, in which people lack the basic food intake to provide them with the 

energy and nutrients for fully productive, active lives, is an outcome <strong>of</strong> food 

insecurity. All hungry people are food insecure, but not all food insecure people 

are hungry. 

Newborn infants who weigh less than 2.5 Kg at birth 

The proteins, carbohydrates and fats that are required by the body in large 

amounts and that are available to be used for energy. Measured in grams. 

The vitamins, minerals and certain other substances that are required by the body 

in small amounts. They are measured in milligrams or micrograms. 

Malnutrition results from the interaction <strong>of</strong> inadequate diet and infection and is 

reflected in poor infant growth and an excess <strong>of</strong> morbidity and mortality in adults 

and children alike. Undernutrition is malnutrition due to a deficiency <strong>of</strong> calories 

33

Overweight and 

obesity 

Stunting 

Undernourishment 

Under-nutrition 

Underweight 

Vulnerability 

Wasting 

and vitamins and minerals interacted with acute infection, while over-nutrition is 

malnutrition due to an excess <strong>of</strong> certain nutrients such as saturated fats and 

added sugars in combination with low levels <strong>of</strong> physical activity. The vast majority 

<strong>of</strong> malnourished individuals in the developing world experience undernutrition. 1 An 

individual who is food secure, but suffers, say, from frequent and severe bouts <strong>of</strong> 

diarrhea will not be able to use the food for growth and development and will 

experience undernutrition. 

Body weight that is above normal as a result <strong>of</strong> an excessive accumulation <strong>of</strong> fat. 

It is usually a manifestation <strong>of</strong> over-nourishment. Overweight is defined as BMI > 

25-30 and obesity as Body Mass Index BMI > 30. 

Low height for age, reflecting a sustained past episode or episodes <strong>of</strong> undernutrition 

Inadequate consumption <strong>of</strong> food. Individuals in households consuming less than 

about 1900 kcal per capita, depending on age, sex, and height, are considered 

undernourished, using FAO’s measure based on distribution <strong>of</strong> household 

consumption and availability <strong>of</strong> dietary energy. 

The result <strong>of</strong> undernourishment, poor absorption and/or poor biological use <strong>of</strong> 

nutrients consumed. 

Low weight for age in children, and body mass index below 18.5 in adults, 

reflecting a current condition resulting from inadequate food intake, past episodes 

<strong>of</strong> under-nutrition or poor health conditions. 

The presence <strong>of</strong> factors that place people at risk <strong>of</strong> becoming food-insecure or 

malnourished, including factors that affect their ability to cope. 

Low weight for height, generally the result <strong>of</strong> weight loss associated with a recent 

period <strong>of</strong> starvation or disease. 

Figure 2-1: The overlapping concepts that describe the hungry and food-insecure 

Undernutrition 

Undernutrition due 

to non-food reasons 

Hungry, Food 

insecure, & 

Undernutrition 

Hungry 

Temporary 

hunger and 

food insecurity 

Food insecure due to hidden 

hunger undernutrition 

Food insecure due to 

risk <strong>of</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> access 

Food insecure 

1 Although the percent <strong>of</strong> those experiencing over-nutrition is growing fast, especially in Asia. 

34

2.1 A framework to understand causes: Physical, Economic, Sociopolitical, 

and Physiological Access to Food 

Using either indicator “undernourishment” from FAO or “underweight “ from WHO, overall 

progress towards the MDG goal seems steady, but progress is not rapid enough and it is 

highly uneven. Figure 2-2 shows progress in the FAO indicator, with the numbers <strong>of</strong> hungry 

in 2015 predicted to be approximately 600 million, well short <strong>of</strong> the Hunger MDG goal <strong>of</strong> 

approximately 400 million. If China is removed from the data, the numbers <strong>of</strong> 

undernourished are actually increasing. Figure 2-3shows progress using the underweight 

indicator from WHO by region. This indicator is expressed in terms <strong>of</strong> the percentage <strong>of</strong> 

infants that are underweight. It indicates that developing countries are projected to have 20% 

<strong>of</strong> infants underweight by 2015, when the target is approximately 15%. This figure shows 

that there is a huge projected gap in Sub-Saharan Africa where undernourishment is 

increasing, a slight negative gap in Asia where undernourishment is decreasing and where 

the largest numbers are, and an optimistic outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Overall the MDG on hunger will not be met in developing countries. The continental level 

ignores significant national and subnational differences, 

Figure 2-2: Faltering Progress Towards the MDG on Hunger: Undernourishment Data (FAO, 

2003) 

35

Figure 2-3: Trends <strong>of</strong> underweight with 95% confidence interval (CI) in children

(DeLong 2003) and the proportion <strong>of</strong> the world’s population that is hungry—although still 

scandalously high—has never been lower. Global income inequality is growing, both 

between and within countries (Milanovic 2002). Against this backdrop, the arguments against 

ending hunger have never been stronger. In terms <strong>of</strong> Hardin’s “lifeboat” metaphor, there 

have never been more “boats” relative to “swimmers”. In terms <strong>of</strong> the “effectiveness” 

arguments we know that aid and development can work where governance is strong. 

Libertarian arguments relating to the “duties <strong>of</strong> noninterference” are difficult to sustain in the 

face <strong>of</strong> explicit “compacts” agreed to between rich and poor countries. The “moral division” 

<strong>of</strong> labor argument—that it is more efficient to take care <strong>of</strong> those close to us—is worn down by 

international forces for change such as trade, migration, the internet and terrorism. 

The rise <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>of</strong> the Universal Declaration <strong>of</strong> Human Rights to the field <strong>of</strong> food 

security and nutrition have also strengthened the moral case for intensifying actions against 

hunger and malnutrition. In short, the ability <strong>of</strong> the world—rich and poor countries alike—to 

take care <strong>of</strong> its hungry has never been higher and the case against exercising this ability has 

never been weaker. 

2.2.2 Hunger’s human costs <strong>of</strong> mortality and morbidity 

The images <strong>of</strong> hunger that fill TV screens tend to be <strong>of</strong> infants that are acutely malnourished, 

a strong risk factor for childhood death. Research has shown that even moderate and mild 

forms <strong>of</strong> malnutrition in children are important predisposing factors to child death. Figure 

2-4illustrates this for countries around the world. All degrees <strong>of</strong> malnutrition – severe, 

moderate and mild – are linked with 54 percent <strong>of</strong> child deaths, but severe malnutrition on its 

own accounts for barely 10 percent. The bulk <strong>of</strong> child deaths linked to malnutrition are from 

the less visually dramatic manifestations <strong>of</strong> hunger and malnutrition. 

Figure 2-4: Child deaths due to the underlying effects <strong>of</strong> malnutrition on infectious diseases 

Weighted Average 

Jordan 

Nicaragua 

Zimbabwe 

N.E. Brazil 

Mild, moderate and 

severe malnutrition 

Severe malnutrition 

China 

Thailand 

Nigeria 

Indonesia 

Nepal 

India 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 

37

Malnutrition and hunger are the number one risk factor for illness world-wide—greater than 

the combined risks posed by tobacco and alcohol. Inadequate food consumption and 

malnutrition account for seven <strong>of</strong> the 13 leading risk factors associated with the global 

burden <strong>of</strong> disease. Nutrition provides a strong platform for efforts to reduce infection and 

chronic disease throughout the world. 

2.2.3 The Economic Cost 

Freedom from hunger and malnutrition also provides a sound platform for economic growth. 

The social science literature has long established that not only “wealthy is healthy” but also 

that “healthy is wealthy”. The literature provides estimates <strong>of</strong> the lost labor productivity due 

to hunger and malnutrition. The magnitude <strong>of</strong> the year-in year-out losses are large—at a 

lower bound, they are on the order <strong>of</strong> 6-10 percent (Figure 2-5). Gains in productivity <strong>of</strong> this 

magnitude would be headline news in many nations across the world. In terms <strong>of</strong> foregone 

GDP per capita, the negative impact is even more dramatic. Iron deficiency alone amounts 

to between 2 and 7 percent <strong>of</strong> foregone GDP in the 10 developing countries for which good 

estimates are available ( 

Figure 2-6). 

Figure 2-5: The Loss in Labor Productivity due to Malnutrition (%): Estimates from the general 

literature (Horton, 2000) 

18 

17 

16 

14 

Current losses in productivity (manual 

labour) 

Losses based on childhood malnutrition 

(cognitive) 

12 

10 

10 

9 

10 

8 

6 

4 

6 

4 

5 

2 

0 

Protein-energy 

malnutrition 

(moderate stunting) 

Protein-energy 

malnutrition (severe 

stunting) 

iron deficiency 

(heavy labor) 


(blue-collar labor) 

iodine deficiency 

38

Figure 2-6: Foregone economic benefits <strong>of</strong> iron deficiency anemia, discounted present value <strong>of</strong> 

long-term effects attributable to supplementation/fortification in a single year. (Horton and 

Ross, 2003) 

9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

3 

2 

1 

0 

7.9 

6 

5.2 

4.2 

2.7 2.4 

7.2 

3.9 

2 

3.8 

Bangladesh 

India 

Pakistan 

Mali 

Tanzania 

Egypt 

Oman 

Bolivia 

Honduras 

Nicaragua 

Hunger’s impacts upon labor productivity are laid early in life. Undernourished infants tend to 

enter primary school later and drop out earlier. When they are in school they tend to be less 

able to learn as compared to better nourished individuals. These human capital deficits, if 

created in early childhood tend to persist and to affect labor force earnings throughout an 

individual’s lifetime, diminishing them by sizable amounts. Productivity in non-market 

activities such as care for infants, children and other dependents and in other household 

activities will also be reduced. Moreover, because enhanced asset ownership and use tend 

to interact positively, the multiplier effect <strong>of</strong> human capital on the productivity <strong>of</strong> other assets 

(such as financial, social, natural, and physical capital) will be foregone. 

2.2.4 Security and stability 

In the wake <strong>of</strong> the September 11 attacks, we saw an increasing number <strong>of</strong> policy “shapers” 

posit a causal link between deprivation and conflict and violence. Sometimes the link is 

acknowledged as a hypothesis that needs to be tested (Messer, Cohen and D’Costa 1998) 

and sometimes it is not contested because it provides a rationalization for increased 

spending on development—at least in poor countries that contain terrorists. But is there any 

evidence that food and nutrition deprivation, particularly deprivation early on in the life cycle, 

predisposes violence? There are two main sets <strong>of</strong> studies: those looking at levels <strong>of</strong> 

deprivation and those looking at inequalities in deprivation between different groups. 

The impact <strong>of</strong> violent conflict on food insecurity is well-known, and a number <strong>of</strong> studies have 

sought to quantify those impacts on food production in conflict zones in Africa, where farm 

output is a principal source <strong>of</strong> livelihood for the majority <strong>of</strong> poor and food insecure people 

39

(e.g., Messer, Cohen and D’Costa 1998; FAO 2000; Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001). 

Less settled is the question <strong>of</strong> the extent to which food insecurity is, in turn, a cause <strong>of</strong> 

conflict. 

Several analysts have shown, using both econometric and qualitative case study 

approaches, that there is a strong association between conflict and factors closely related to 

food insecurity, e.g., high infant mortality (Esty et al. 1995, 1998) and inter-group competition 

over land and water (Homer-Dixon 1999). Collier (2003) found that a mix <strong>of</strong> extreme poverty, 

inequality, and declining per capita incomes, particularly when combined with heavy reliance 

on a narrow range <strong>of</strong> primary product exports, frequently were associated with civil wars in 

the 1990s and 2000s (Collier 2003). Nafziger and Auvinen (2000) pointed to a similar blend 

<strong>of</strong> variables, along with slow growth <strong>of</strong> food production, high military spending, and a tradition 

<strong>of</strong> military conflict. However, these studies do not specify the precise pathways through 

which food insecurity or the other factors might combine and lead to conflict. 

Other analysts have challenged the notion that food insecurity is a cause <strong>of</strong> conflict. They 

see competition between ethnic groups for political and economic power as the main 

explanation for violence, especially in Africa (Paarlberg 1999; Marshall and Gurr 2003). More 

generally, Gleditsch (1998) has pointed out that most conflicts can be sufficiently explained in 

political, economic, and cultural terms, without reference to environmental scarcities such as 

food insecurity. 

Messer, Cohen, and Marchione (2001) contend that conflict is not an inevitable outcome <strong>of</strong> 

environmental scarcities and food insecurity. For conflict to actually break out, there must be 

present additional forces: (a) human rights violations; (b) oppressive social inequalities; and 

(c) cultural values that legitimate violent resistance as an appropriate response to unjust or 

intolerable conditions, especially those that deny affected populations access to food. The 

trigger condition for violent conflict may be: (a) natural, such as a prolonged drought; (b) 

economic, such as a change in price <strong>of</strong> the principal food (rice in Indonesia) or cash crop 

(c<strong>of</strong>fee in Rwanda), depriving the rebelling population <strong>of</strong> its perceived just standard <strong>of</strong> living; 

or (c) political, such as the denial <strong>of</strong> access to land or social welfare programs in Central 

America. The basic, underlying, and trigger causes <strong>of</strong> conflict are not exclusively 

environmental, ethnic, or political-economic, but interactive. 

The second link between hunger and security relates to the “horizontal inequalities” 

argument (Stewart 2002). This argues that large relative differences in outcomes such as 

nutrition and in access to economic, political and social resources among groups 

differentiated along ethnic, cultural or religious lines is a sets up a structural condition for a 

lack <strong>of</strong> social cohesion. 2 When tied to the means for conflict (such as leaders willing to 

mobilize these groups—<strong>of</strong>ten by constructing or enhancing group identity—for their own 

pursuit <strong>of</strong> power) and triggers such as aid flows or political realignments, conflict ensues. 

Initial studies <strong>of</strong> this hypothesis in Angola and Rwanda suggest it has some validity, at least 

in the countries studies (Cramer 2003). 

Thus, we see that hunger and poverty share many causes with war and conflict and that if 

we can alleviate hunger through its underlying causes, we are likely to make the world and 

developing nations safer and more secure. 

2 Stewart 2002 

40

2.3 More to come….. 

As the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has come to appreciate the importance <strong>of</strong> catalyzing political 

actions for hunger alleviation, we have come to appreciate the importance <strong>of</strong> “making the 

case” for hunger alleviation based on multiple, supporting arguments. In our work in the year 

ahead to prepare the Final <strong>Report</strong> and to act in an advisory capacity we aim to: 

• Sharpen the economic case for the economic costs <strong>of</strong> hunger and the costs and 

benefits <strong>of</strong> hunger alleviation. 

• Improve the moral, economic, human, and social cases for hunger alleviation for 

communication to powerful actors in hunger hotspots, specific country groups, and 

powerful international institutions. 

• Improve the definitions <strong>of</strong> hunger and its causes to better communicate the purpose 

and plans for achieving the Hunger MDG. 

41

3 THE FACES OF HUNGER 

Knowing precisely where the hungry are, something about their livelihoods, and the causes 

<strong>of</strong> their hunger is an important first step in knowing where to focus the formulating <strong>of</strong> contextspecific 

plans and what to focus on in those areas. This chapter expands our knowledge <strong>of</strong> 

where the hungry are. This chapter describes the current locus <strong>of</strong> hunger at the national 

level in Africa and how it has evolved over the past 10 years, using the two key indicators <strong>of</strong> 

the MDG goal on poverty and hunger: “undernourishment” data (from food balance sheets) 

from FAO and infant “underweight” (low weight for age) data from WHO. We present new 

analysis about the location <strong>of</strong> hunger (using the underweight indicator) within sub-national 

administrative contexts, rural and urban locations and farming systems in this chapter and in 

the following chapter on the African Hunger Hotspots. 

3.1 The Location <strong>of</strong> Hunger at the National Level 

The majority <strong>of</strong> the developing world’s 846million hungry (“undernourished”) people reside in 

Asia (see Figure 3-1). However, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region <strong>of</strong> the world that is (a) 

witnessing the largest increases in the numbers <strong>of</strong> the hungry and (b) is the region that is 

farthest from progress to the Hunger MDG. Figure 3-4shows that Eastern, Southern and 

Central Africa have the highest rates <strong>of</strong> undernourishment in the world, with rates over 40%, 

and in all three, the numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished are climbing. 

Figure 3-1 Location <strong>of</strong> undernourishment in the developing world (SOFI, 2003) 

135 

198 

214 

53 

41 

Sub-Saharan Africa 

Near East and North Africa 

Latin America and Caribbean 

Other Asia and Pacific 

India 

China 

156 

The regional situation looks much the same when rates <strong>of</strong> malnourished children under 5 

years <strong>of</strong> age (the other measure <strong>of</strong> ‘hunger’ defined by the MDG’s) are employed as the 

indicator <strong>of</strong> hunger’s prevalence. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region for which rates are 

42

increasing; Sub-Saharan Africa will not stand a chance <strong>of</strong> meeting the MDG goal without 

decisive action and significant investment. 

Figure 3-2 Numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished, 1990-92 to 1998-2000, Sub-Saharan Africa (Source: 

SOFI, 2002) 

45.1 

22 

83 

73.7 

34 37.1 36.730.7 

Central Africa East Africa Southern West Africa 

Africa 

Numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished 1990-92 (millions) 

Numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished 1998-2000 (millions) 

3.1.1 Hunger Trends within Sub-Saharan Africa 

Most <strong>of</strong> the deterioration in the hunger situation within Sub-Saharan Africa is outside <strong>of</strong> West Africa. 

Figure 3-3 shows the most dramatic increases in the numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished (in Democratic 

Republic <strong>of</strong> Congo, f Tanzania and Madagascar) and decreases (Nigeria, Ghana) in the numbers <strong>of</strong> 

“undernourished” within the region. 

Figure 3-3 Percent change in numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished 1990-1992 and 1998-2002, Sub- 

Saharan Africa (extremes) (SOFI, 2002) in millions 

Dem. Rep. <strong>of</strong> the Congo 

24.1 

United Rep. <strong>of</strong> Tanzania 

6.4 

Madagascar 

Kenya 

Burundi 

Zambia 

Somalia 

Uganda 

1.9 

1.7 

1.5 

1.4 

1.2 

0.6 

-1 

Chad 

-1.1 

-1.3 

-3.3 

-4.6 

Malawi 

Sudan 

Ghana 

Nigeria 

Despite encouraging “undernourishment” figures from West Africa, data on the rates <strong>of</strong> 

stunting (low height for age, meaning children remaining too short for their age, which is a 

nutrition indicator <strong>of</strong> long-term deprivation) show just how far <strong>of</strong>f the Hunger MDG goals most 

African countries will be under a business-as-usual scenario (Figure 3-4) 

43

Figure 3-4 Sub-Saharan Africa: Stunting Prevalence Based on 1990s Performance (Sahn and 

Stife, 2002) 

62 

45 

11 

2015 Projection 

MDG Target 

40 

20 

10 

8 

33 

11 

28 

19 

45 

9 

47 

13 

54 

14 

27 

8 

40 

24 

15 14 15 

16 

11 

Burkina Faso 

Cameroon 

Ghana 

Kenya 

Madagascar 

Mali 

Niger 

Nigeria 

Senegal 

Tanzania 

Uganda 

Zambia 

Zimbabwe 

Figure 3-5shows similar negative trends in the rates <strong>of</strong> severe adult female nutrition (also a strong risk 

factor for low birth weight and subsequent malnutrition <strong>of</strong> infants) as measured by body mass index 

(thinness). Of the 11 countries for which trend data are available, the trend shows progress in 

reducing hunger in only Niger, Benin, and Burkina Faso—all West African. 

Figure 3-5: Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in Low Body Mass Index (severe): Women (% below 

cut-<strong>of</strong>f) (DHS) 

2 

1.5 

Benin 

Burkina Faso 

C ote d'Iv oire 

Ghana 

Kenya 

Malawi 

Niger 

Tanzania 

U ganda 

Zambia 

Zimbabwe 

1 

0.5 

0 

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

44

3.2 Who are the hungry? 

The 846 million hungry people can be grouped into four broad types based on their 

household’s principal means <strong>of</strong> obtaining food: 1) food-insecure farm households; 2) foodinsecure 

rural landless; 3) food-insecure urban households, and 4) food-insecure herders, 

fishers and forest-dependent households. While worldwide data are not yet available on the 

prevalence <strong>of</strong> undernutrition in these groups, an assessment based on rough overlays <strong>of</strong> 

demographic, poverty and geographic data performed for the Background <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> the 

Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> suggests that on a global basis: 

• Approximately 50% <strong>of</strong> the hungry are in farm households, mainly in higher-risk 

production environments; 

• Approximately 25% are the rural landless, mainly in higher-potential agricultural 

regions; 

• Approximately 22% are urban; and 

• Approximately 8% are directly resource-dependent. 

Here, we present new analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa to confirm these estimates and to 

categorize the hungry by urban vs. rural location and to categorize them within farming 

systems and livelihoods. 

The majority <strong>of</strong> the population in Sub-Saharan Africa is rural (73% in Eastern and Southern 

Africa and 60% in West and Central Africa--IFAD 2001). Unfortunately undernourishment 

data from FAO are only available at the national level. Sub-national estimates rely on 

poverty data and underweight rates from surveys. Approximately 55% <strong>of</strong> the rural population 

in Eastern and Southern Africa are below the poverty line, while the figure in West and 

Central Africa is 41% (IFAD 2001). The poverty rates in rural areas are higher than in urban 

areas, and combined with the larger rural populations give the proportion <strong>of</strong> poverty that is 

found in rural areas at approximately 75 percent (calculations from IFAD 2001 numbers). 

Ideally, however, numbers on poverty by livelihood type are needed. As the Background 

paper notes, (2003) in the absence <strong>of</strong> this information it is more difficult to think and act 

strategically to reduce hunger. The interim report builds on the typology developed for the 

background report making to determine “hunger” by livelihood type. 3 

3.2.1 Urban Hunger 

First, we validate the urban hunger estimate (20%) and find that approximately 25 percent <strong>of</strong> 

poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is urban. Household level data from a recent 10 sub-Saharan 

African country analysis 4 suggest that 23 percent <strong>of</strong> urban households fall below a household 

calorie cut<strong>of</strong>f and this is roughly similar to the level <strong>of</strong> urbanization in the 10 countries (Smith 

and Adeyoum 2003). In an additional analysis, for a set <strong>of</strong> 22 sub-Saharan countries (Figure 

3-4), underweight data show that approximately 17 percent <strong>of</strong> all underweight children reside 

in urban areas. The percent <strong>of</strong> infants in the urban areas <strong>of</strong> these 22 countries that are 

underweight is 18.4 percent (CIESIN data 2003). 

3 Note that the use <strong>of</strong> the term “livelihoods” follows from Dixon et. al. 2001, which although it captures 

non-farm rural activities, pays much more attention to how farming systems define livelihoods and less 

to assets, institutions and vulnerability as is the norm (DFID 2000). 

4 Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia 

45

Clearly, a sizable proportion <strong>of</strong> hunger is found in urban areas and if the current trend <strong>of</strong> 

urbanization in the absence <strong>of</strong> economic growth continues in the region, the level and share 

<strong>of</strong> hunger that is urban will rise. This matters, because (a) urban hunger is no less important 

to end than is rural hunger and (b) the nature <strong>of</strong> hunger and what to do about it are different 

in urban areas. Compared to rural hunger, in urban areas is more related to an inability to 

purchase food. In addition, the time that women can spend in food purchase, food 

preparation and feeding their infants is also threatened by work that is <strong>of</strong>ten far from home. 

The environment in which food is prepared tends to have a higher disease load, either due to 

street food preparation or environmental contamination (heavy metals from exhaust fumes, 

or from internal smoke in crowded conditions). In terms <strong>of</strong> public goods, the poorest in urban 

areas —in the slums— tend not be served by governments or NGOs, their lack <strong>of</strong> property 

rights acting as a disincentive for even the most committed actors to engage. 

Figure 3-6: Percent <strong>of</strong> underweight children (

in <strong>of</strong> urban numbers will be problematic if urbanization rates and urban underweight rates are 

different in each system. On the other hand, the urban populations in these farming system 

areas are dependent, to some extent, on their local farming system in terms <strong>of</strong> food prices, 

food availability, and <strong>of</strong>f-farm employment opportunities that provide goods and services to 

the farm system. 

Less-favored areas are challenged by difficult biophysical and agroclimatic conditions (e.g. 

poor soils, low and unstable rainfall, steep slopes, and short growing seasons) and/or which 

have poor infrastructure and service support (e.g. roads, irrigation, markets, research and 

extension, credit, schools, and health centers). It is important to note that “less-favored” 

refers not only to the marginality <strong>of</strong> productive resources, but social and economic resources, 

as well. 

Several items are worth noting in the Table: 

• underweight rates are above 20% in every farming system type except large 

commercial farms that include smallholders 

• farming systems dependent on community or public resources (forest, pastoral and 

artisan fishing) account for 20% <strong>of</strong> underweight; twice the rate <strong>of</strong> the global average. 

• smallholder systems in total account for 74% <strong>of</strong> underweight 

• smallholder systems found in marginal or less-favored lands (sparse (arid), highland 

perennial, pastoral, agro-pastoral millet/sorghum and highland temperate mixed as 

suggested by Dixon et. al. 2001 Error! Reference source not found.) account for 

30% <strong>of</strong> underweight as a conservative estimate 

• the systems that Dixon et. al. (2001) consider to have the potential (medium or high) 

to reduce poverty through developing those systems contain 63% <strong>of</strong> the poverty 

(underweight) in sub-Saharan Africa 

• the less-favored systems considered to have a medium to high potential to reduce 

poverty contain 20% <strong>of</strong> the poverty (underweight) 

In rural areas, the data have implications for the agricultural component <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s 

hunger reduction strategy. First, substantial rates <strong>of</strong> hunger are found in nearly all farming 

systems in sub-Saharan Africa, but some systems are more important than others in terms <strong>of</strong> 

populations employing them, hence Forest-based (7%), Highland-perennial (8%), Pastoral 

(8%), Root crops (10%), Agro-pastoral millet/sorghum (10%), Highland temperate mixed 

(10%), Maize mixed (13%) and Cereal-root crops mixed (15%) account for 81% <strong>of</strong> the 

underweight in sub-Saharan Africa, with all but the first three <strong>of</strong> these thought to be <strong>of</strong> 

medium to high potential in terms <strong>of</strong> reducing poverty and hunger. This suggests that the 

potential for agricultural investments in small-scale agriculture to reduce hunger are 

substantial. But it also suggests that there will be no universal ways <strong>of</strong> raising agricultural 

productivity and that a balanced approach will be necessary. 

Second, a balanced approach to raising agricultural productivity will include a focus on more 

favored and less-favored systems in terms <strong>of</strong> household resource endowments and access 

to agricultural services. Again, an exclusive focus on more-favored systems will not 

maximize hunger reduction, nor will an exclusive focus on less-favored or marginal areas. 

Third, farming systems that are dependent on community or public resources (forest, 

pastoral and artisan fishing) are considered by Dixon et. al. 2001 to have low potential to 

47

educe poverty, and yet account for 20% <strong>of</strong> the hungry in sub-Saharan Africa. Technological 

and institutional solutions have to be found for these systems, if only to avoid large-scale exit 

from agriculture to the cities. 

Fourth, some farming systems have very high incidence <strong>of</strong> hunger and these systems, Rice 

Tree Crop (41.6%), Pastoral (40.2%), and Highland Temperate Mixed (42.9 %) which contain 

one fifth <strong>of</strong> the underweight children may need a high degree <strong>of</strong> interventions to alleviate 

hunger. 

Table 3-1: Underweight rates by Farming System, Sub-Saharan Africa 

Farming Systems in 

Sub-Saharan Africa 

Total population <strong>of</strong> 

children under-5 

Percentage <strong>of</strong> 

children

3.2.4 Hunger by Vulnerable Group 

The Background Paper defined four other categories <strong>of</strong> the hungry that cut across the 

typology by livelihood, many <strong>of</strong> whom live in households which are relatively food-secure: 1) 

especially vulnerable individuals, including pregnant and nursing women and 170 million 

infants and pre-school children; 2) about 35 million individuals living with HIV/AIDS, which 

adversely affects the livelihoods and food security <strong>of</strong> 150 million people; 3) victims <strong>of</strong> 

extreme events: 60 million people each year typically face famine due to natural disasters or 

civil conflict, and 4) about 2 billion people -- including a high proportion <strong>of</strong> the hungry -- who 

suffer from diverse micronutrient deficiencies, in particular Vitamin A, iodine and iron (hidden 

hunger). 

We present the vulnerable group analysis in Table 3-2: Characterizing Vulnerable Groups 

(Scherr and the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2003)as reported in the Background <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> the 

Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> (Scherr and the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2003). The one area that does 

require clarification and further attention is the “victims <strong>of</strong> extreme events” which is listed as 

60 million. This may be an underestimate. Over the past few years, the World Food 

Program has alone distributed food to 40-50 million individuals per year in emergency 

operations and another 20-30 million per year in development and rehabilitation operations 

(www.wfp.org). Perhaps a truer sense <strong>of</strong> the magnitude <strong>of</strong> those that are victims <strong>of</strong> extreme 

events is derived from the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database 

(www.cred.be/emdat). For the first 6 months <strong>of</strong> 2003 over 120 million people have been 

affected (i.e. requiring immediate assistance during a period <strong>of</strong> emergency, requiring basic 

survival needs) by natural or technological disasters alone. 

Table 3-2: Characterizing Vulnerable Groups (Scherr and the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2003) 

Vulnerable Group 

Principal causes <strong>of</strong> 

hunger/undernutrition 

% or # <strong>of</strong> 

undernourished 

Distribution in 

developing 

countries 

Geographic 

“hotspots” 

Pregnant and 

lactating women 

Added dietary needs for 

pregnancy and 

breastfeeding, inadequate 

food and micronutrient 

update 

Several hundred 

million 

60% <strong>of</strong> women in 

South Asia; 40% in 

Southeast Asia are 


South Central 

Asia, Southeast 

Asia 

Newborn infants 

Inadequate fetal nutrition 

due to maternal malnutrition 

30 million Infants born 

undernourished; 

11% <strong>of</strong> developing 

country births; 21% 

in SE Asia 

South Central 

Asia, Southeast 

Asia 

Children under 5 

years 

Inadequate child care, poor 

feeding practices, infectious 

disease, poor water, low 

status <strong>of</strong> women 

170 million 33% <strong>of</strong> under-5 

children are 

malnourished; 

malnutrition a factor 

in 5 million child 

deaths per year 

East Africa, 

South Central 

Asia, West 

Africa, 

Southeast Asia 

Victims <strong>of</strong> extreme Disruption <strong>of</strong> food systems, 60 million 60+ million in 2002 Recent victims 

49

Vulnerable Group 

Principal causes <strong>of</strong> 

hunger/undernutrition 

% or # <strong>of</strong> 


Distribution in 

developing 

countries 

Geographic 

“hotspots” 

events (natural 

disasters, armed 

conflict, economic 

crises_ 

loss <strong>of</strong> assets; low farm 

investment 

(range 52-67 mln, 

1999-2000); 12 mln 

refugees, 25 mln 

displaced people 

in North Korea, 

Horn <strong>of</strong> Africa, 

southern and 

central Africa 

HIV/AIDS and other 

adult disabilities 

Inability to produce or 

access food; increased 

dependency ratio; depleted 

social networks 

36 mln infected 25 mln in Sub- 

Saharan Africa; 150 

mln affected by sick 

family member 

Sib-Saharan 

Africa, but 

moving to Asia 

Micronutrientdeficient 

individuals 

(includes 1.2 billion 

not otherwise 

undernourished) 

Teenage girls and women 

(iron); nutrient-deficient 

diets/soils; lack <strong>of</strong> sunlight; 

lack <strong>of</strong> protein, fruit, 

vegetables 

2 billion people Vitamin A: 100-140 

mln children 

Iodine: 1.6 billion 

Iron: 42% <strong>of</strong> women, 

25% men, 48% <strong>of</strong> 

children under 2 

years 

Widely 

distributed 

3.3 Access to Food 

The hungry do not remain hungry by choice. They are hungry because they lack the means 

to acquire sufficient food. Figure 3-7 captures the ways in which access to food can be 

impeded. Four types <strong>of</strong> access failures are distinguished. 

Figure 3-7 Causes <strong>of</strong> Hunger in Terms <strong>of</strong> Access 

Goal 

Access to food in the quantity and quality for healthy life 

Access 

Types 

Physical Economic Sociopolitical Physiological 

Action 

Areas 

Agriculture, 

Infrastructure, 

Distribution, 

Resource Mgmt 

Non-farm income 

Infrastructure, 

Markets, Stability 

Empowerment 

Rights, Gender, 

Ethnicity, Legal 

Care, Water, 

Sanitation, 

Health 

Context 

Freedom from conflict, freedom from epidemic disease, fair trade policy, political 

will for poverty alleviation, empowerment <strong>of</strong> women and marginal groups. 

There are a number <strong>of</strong> frameworks that can be used to understand the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger, 

food insecurity and malnutrition. The food security community tends to use a food 

availability-food access-food utilization model, which breaks food security into food 

production and marketing (availability), income and prices (access) and food absorption for 

50

growth (utilization). The nutrition community uses the UN conceptual model that breaks the 

determinants <strong>of</strong> malnutrition into immediate (diet and infection), underlying (household food 

security, care and health environment) and basic (physical, economic, political, social, and 

cultural factors). The former framework underplays the political and social determinants <strong>of</strong> 

food security and the latter framework goes well beyond food security. For these reasons, 

this report uses a framework which characterizes food security in four dimensions <strong>of</strong> access; 

this is essentially a simple extension <strong>of</strong> the Availability-Access-Utilization framework. 

Table 3-3: Access to food in the quantity and quality necessary for a healthy life 

Type <strong>of</strong> Access 

Physical 

Economic 

Social 

Physiological 

Issues and Key Questions 

Relates to food production, agricultural productivity and the ability <strong>of</strong> markets 

to deliver food to consumers and inputs to farmers. Is there food in the farm 

and in the markets year-round? 

Relates to prices and incomes—what is the affordability <strong>of</strong> the food in the 

market for poor consumers? Can people afford to consume home production? 

Relates to insufficient access to food because needs are either undervalued or 

because they lack the power to press their claims (women, children, HIV-AIDS 

orphans, ethnic minorities). Can certain groups within the household and 

community get access to food purchased or grown? 

Relates to the body’s ability to use the nutrients for growth and development, 

as infection diminishes access to ingested nutrients. Can the body use food 

consumed for growth and development or are disease loads too high? 

For Africa’s large rural population, many <strong>of</strong> whom are small farmers, physical access to food 

is the biggest problem: their biggest challenge is to grow sufficient food to meet the needs <strong>of</strong> 

their families. Compounding this problem is the absence <strong>of</strong> alternative sources <strong>of</strong> income, 

which means that farmers are unable to afford to buy food to supplement and diversify homegrown 

food. Even if they are able to sell some <strong>of</strong> their production for cash, this seldom brings 

in enough money to feed the family. Poor farmers are joined by landless laborers and the 

urban poor in this economic barrier to access to food. Even when there is food in the market, 

poor families simply cannot afford to buy it. All poor people lack socio-political influence, and 

their lack <strong>of</strong> recognized rights prevents them from forcing action to ensure that people are 

fed. All poor people are exposed to risks <strong>of</strong> diseases, which can seriously affect the way their 

bodies are able to utilize food, and as a result their nutrition suffers. 

3.4 Physical Access 

For millions <strong>of</strong> poor farming households, food production under difficult conditions is the only 

income earning opportunity available. This is because they lack the assets, skills, 

information, and organizations needed to engage in other higher return activities to generate 

the income that they could use to buy food. Public institutions do not assist them. 

Overcoming hunger for such households is therefore a matter <strong>of</strong> increasing their own ability 

51

to grow more food. Raising agricultural productivity—both <strong>of</strong> land and labor--thus, increases 

physical access to food. 

Lack <strong>of</strong> physical access to food is also a common problem in more remote areas where 

supply <strong>of</strong> food is persistently or seasonally cut <strong>of</strong>f due to difficulties in transportation or 

inadequacies in the food distribution markets. This situation puts upwards pressure on food 

prices making it unaffordable to the poor who are dependent on purchasing food from the 

market. The following sections describe some <strong>of</strong> the key natural and physical constraints to 

food production and gains in agricultural productivity. 

3.4.1 Low Agricultural Productivity 

The prevalence <strong>of</strong> hunger is high among farming families that are ill-equipped to grow 

enough food for themselves and their dependents . This inability emanates from two factors: 

the poor quality <strong>of</strong> natural assets owned or used by these families, and lack <strong>of</strong> access to 

information and technologies that provide remunerative returns in the presence <strong>of</strong> such 

resource constraints. This is particularly true <strong>of</strong> sub-Saharan Africa where technologies and 

resource management practices remain underdeveloped. Figure 3-8 demonstrates the 

dramatic difference in the sources <strong>of</strong> agricultural production growth <strong>of</strong> Asia and sub-Saharan 

Africa. For Asia, the vast majority <strong>of</strong> growth has come from productivity increases; in the 

less-densely populated sub-Saharan Africa, most <strong>of</strong> the growth has come from area 

expansion. Expanding the area under food production is inherently unsustainable, as the 

supply <strong>of</strong> new lands in densely populated areas <strong>of</strong> Africa is largely exhausted or must be 

maintained as natural systems for biodiversity conservation and other ecological services. 

The first effect in Africa and elsewhere in the tropics has been to expand into land that was 

previously available for fallows. Leaving land fallow allows land under cultivation the 

necessary time to recover from the effects <strong>of</strong> the crops taking nutrients from the soil. As a 

result <strong>of</strong> the reduction or elimination <strong>of</strong> fallows, soil fertility has fallen dramatically in many 

places, and yields are reducing with time (Nye and Greenland, 1960; Sanchez, 1976; Palm 

et al, 2004). As the land becomes exhausted, there develops a serious tendency to 

continually sub-divide land among family members, which leads to smallholdings that are too 

small to produce a family’s food. The response to overcrowding is <strong>of</strong>ten for people to migrate 

from higher to lower potential areas, for example drylands, where they do not have the skills 

needed to farm under new difficult conditions. Often they come into conflict with pastoralists 

who hitherto had unimpeded access to the land. When pastoralist mobility is limited and 

livestock are restricted in movement there is a considerable risk <strong>of</strong> environmental damage 

caused by over-grazing. As agriculture becomes more intensive, valuable natural resources 

are put under threat. 

The depletion <strong>of</strong> natural resources has further deteriorated agricultural productivity A 

combination <strong>of</strong> rapid population growth and sluggish expansion <strong>of</strong> available economic 

opportunities in non-farm sectors has led to land use and cultivation patterns that have 

contributed to an accelerated depletion <strong>of</strong> natural resources – <strong>of</strong> soils, watersheds, and 

forested land. In sub-Saharan Africa, small scale farmers have over the decades removed 

large quantities <strong>of</strong> nutrients from their soils without replenishing them through application <strong>of</strong> 

manure or fertilizers. This has resulted in a very high average annual depletion rate: 22 Kg 

<strong>of</strong> nitrogen, 2.5 Kg <strong>of</strong> phosphorus, and 15 Kg <strong>of</strong> potassium per hectare <strong>of</strong> cultivated land over 

the last 30 years in 37 countries (Smaling 1993). As noted above, intensification leads to the 

52

abandonment <strong>of</strong> fallows. At the same time, land and fodder scarcity have reduced the 

proportions <strong>of</strong> households with cattle that can provide manure for crop fields. 

There is also degradation and resource conflicts at a landscape and ecosystem scale. 

Watersheds are degrading, contributing to crop and livestock production risks, and 

contaminating sources <strong>of</strong> domestic drinking water. Removal <strong>of</strong> perennial vegetation has 

accelerated sedimentation. Where fuel wood is scarce, households use manure for fuel 

140 

120 

yield 

area 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

-20 

-40 

Sub-Saharan 

Africa 

Asia 

Latin America 

and Caribbean 

Western Europe 

rather than for soils. Land degradation places particular burdens on women responsible for 

collecting water and fuel. Degradation also increases households’ vulnerability to extreme 

events and reduces their capacity to recover from such crises. Finally, population pressure 

has also led many farmers in higher-risk environments to extend cultivation on steep slopes, 

tropical forest margins, high altitudes, in protected watersheds, and in conservation reserves 

and public forests. 

Figure 3-8: Sources <strong>of</strong> agricultural production growth, 1961-2000. 

3.4.2 Seasonality <strong>of</strong> food supply 

In many parts <strong>of</strong> the tropics, chronic hunger has a strong seasonal dimension, peaking 

during the growing season and subsiding after harvest. The causes are three-fold. First, most 

poor farmers are simply unable to grow food in quantities that provides adequate year-round 

consumption. Second, farmers lack the knowledge, technology and equipment needed to 

store a supply <strong>of</strong> food for the “hungry season” and much is lost to diseases and insects in 

store. Third, poor farmers and their families are unable to take advantage <strong>of</strong> employment in 

non-farm sectors to supplement their income to purchase food from the market. This problem 

is exacerbated by the fact that, frequently, poor farmers are forced to sell their output at 

relatively low prices during harvest (in order to finance essential non-food consumption, debtrepayment 

etc.) and purchase food during the growing season when prices are high. It is 

also exacerbated by significant levels post-harvest losses in processing and storage, and 

lack <strong>of</strong> access to credit and saving services that could be used smooth consumption 

53

overtime. Seasonality does not affect farmers alone. Many non-food producers and poor 

urban residents also experience seasonal hunger spells when food prices spike due to 

reduced food supply in the market. 

3.4.3 Inadequacy <strong>of</strong> technologies and adoption 

There have been major technological advances in food and agricultural production in the 20 th 

century, notably under the “Green Revolution”. Productivity increases were stimulated 

through breeding <strong>of</strong> improved crop varieties, chemical inputs, large-scale irrigation, and 

efficiencies achieved through industrial models <strong>of</strong> specialization and simplification in farming 

systems. But the “Green Revolution”” package bypassed many poor farmers in Africa and 

elsewhere either because <strong>of</strong> differences in what they grow (the best technological progress 

were made in rice and wheat cultivation while maize was the dominant crop in Africa) or 

because poor African farmers were suffering from soil fertility depletion and inadequate water 

management, lacking access to appropriate technological packages. Also, local markets and 

marketing infrastructure were very poorly developed in Africa at the time <strong>of</strong> the Green 

Revolution”, seriously limiting the potential <strong>of</strong> technical advances being put into practice. 

Farmers in sub-Saharan Africa use less fertilizer than farmers in any other region <strong>of</strong> the 

world, one <strong>of</strong> the main reasons for soil fertility depletion. During 1996-97, fertilizer application 

in sub-Saharan Africa was at the rate <strong>of</strong> 8 Kg <strong>of</strong> nutrients per hectare <strong>of</strong> arable land 

compared to 93 Kg in south Asia (FAO 1998). Most <strong>of</strong> the fertilizer was not used for food 

crops but for cash crops such as c<strong>of</strong>fee. This is due to several reasons, but particularly, the 

combination <strong>of</strong> higher fertilizer prices in Africa (2 – 4 times the world average at the farm 

gate) and lower prevalence <strong>of</strong> irrigated agriculture there has meant low yield response and 

low financial returns to fertilizer use. Also fertilizer has to be purchased with cash during the 

growing season, precisely when most farmers are the most cash-strapped. Further, because 

fertilizer application can increase production risks when irrigation is not available, poor 

farmers who do not have access to credit or other insurance mechanism cut down risk by not 

using fertilizer. 

3.5 Economic Access 

Physical availability <strong>of</strong> food does not guarantee access to people outside the farm who lack 

the income to purchase food available in the marketplace. Low paying jobs or engagement in 

activities that have very low financial returns mean that poor households do not have enough 

money to buy adequate quantities <strong>of</strong> food from the market. In many instances, the poor are 

forced to sell more nutritious and higher value food or income-earning assets such as land or 

livestock in order to purchase lower quality food to ensure physical survival. Such actions 

permanently depress future nutrition status and income generation capacity, further 

weakening their access to food. Economic access is also affected by supply-related factors. 

Low or unstable supplies <strong>of</strong> food result in higher prices <strong>of</strong> food, making it less affordable – 

that is, less accessible to those that have limited income. 

3.5.1 Poverty 

For both producers and non-producers <strong>of</strong> food, the persistence <strong>of</strong> hunger over time is 

intimately linked with the persistence <strong>of</strong> poverty. In sub-Saharan Africa and many marginal 

areas in Asia and Latin America, the inability to inject new technological advances into 

54

agriculture has meant the perpetuation <strong>of</strong> low agricultural yields. At such low yields, farmers 

have little savings left to make investments in either land improvement and/or irrigation, the 

only ways in which to increase yield response to fertilizer use - and set forward the motion to 

improve agricultural production and food security. 

In the case <strong>of</strong> non-farm consumers, critical improvements in food security rest on enhancing 

their purchasing power to acquire food from the market. Like in the case <strong>of</strong> farming 

households, this enhancement in ability requires not only key investments in human and/or 

physical capital but also effective connection with markets where goods and services can be 

remuneratively sold to purchase adequate amounts <strong>of</strong> food. Lacking any investments or 

market development, poverty, and, therefore, hunger persists. 

The poverty trap is further reinforced by negatively synergistic failures in the sanitation, 

health and education. Basically, the impairment <strong>of</strong> human capital that results from 

inadequate access to sanitation, health, and education services keeps productivity low and 

perpetuates poverty and inadequate access to food. Exclusionary policies that block out 

participation <strong>of</strong> minority groups in mainstream economic and social activities, and population 

growth much in excess <strong>of</strong> economic growth that diminishes the amount <strong>of</strong> natural assets 

available per person also perpetuate hunger and poverty in the same manner. 

3.5.2 Lack <strong>of</strong> Markets: Reduced opportunities for exchange 

If the poor lack basic capacities to produce or purchase sufficient food, the lack <strong>of</strong> wellfunctioning 

markets makes it even more difficult to do so. The importance <strong>of</strong> markets in 

accessing adequate food supplies for non food producers is obvious: it is the only means 

they have to exchange whatever they produce for food. When markets do not function well, 

non-food producers are affected in two ways. First, it depresses demand for the goods or 

services they provide, depressing, in turn, their incomes. Second, poorly functioning markets 

increase the marketing cost <strong>of</strong> food making it more expensive and less accessible to the 

poor. 

Markets are as important for producers <strong>of</strong> food. For poor farming families that are net buyers 

<strong>of</strong> food, high food prices directly reduce their access to food. In addition, ill-functioning 

markets increase the cost <strong>of</strong> agricultural inputs such as seeds, implements, and fertilizer and, 

hence, discourage the adoption <strong>of</strong> productivity-enhancing technology. For farmers who have 

the capacity to produce a surplus, poorly functioning markets depress the price they receive 

and, therefore, the incentives to do so. 

Markets for goods and services are not the only markets that matter. As important are 

financial markets that provide intermediation between savers, borrowers, and between 

different types <strong>of</strong> risk takers. For some households, access to financial markets is important 

in accumulating savings to finance investments and unforeseen expenditures. For other 

households, it provides a way to augment household resources by external resources in 

financing working capital and other types <strong>of</strong> human and capital investments. Financial 

markets also provide insurance coverage against crop failures and different types income 

shocks. 

55

Key factors limiting market development are inadequate infrastructure and lack <strong>of</strong> marketenabling 

institutions. Lack <strong>of</strong> physical infrastructure such as roads and railways imposes high 

transportation costs. In many remote areas, transportation costs are so high that 

communities remain cut <strong>of</strong>f from national and international markets. These high costs 

prevent food from flowing out from food surplus areas to food deficit areas. Hence while 

production is further curtailed in surplus areas, high prices curtail the access <strong>of</strong> the poor to 

food in the deficit areas. 

Even when physical infrastructure exists, competitive markets fail to emerge due to lack <strong>of</strong> 

institutions that disseminate key market information and regulate and enforce different types 

<strong>of</strong> market contracts in a fair manner. In many cases, market development is impeded by 

government policy that limits competition and accords market power to the favored few. In 

the tropics it is common to find elites holding monopolies <strong>of</strong> market functions, such as 

transport. Government <strong>of</strong>ficials and others <strong>of</strong>ten conspire to place significant legal and extralegal 

obstacles in the way <strong>of</strong> the movement <strong>of</strong> food. These are manifest in the control that 

<strong>of</strong>ficials impose on the issue <strong>of</strong> permits, to the collection <strong>of</strong> bribes at police road check points 

and serious bureaucracy involved in the moving food across national borders. 

3.6 Social Access 

Unequal social conditions and exclusionary practices in many developing countries have the 

effect <strong>of</strong> dis-empowering groups such as women, and infants (particularly female infants and 

certain ethnic, regional, and caste groups). Social exclusion results in limiting access <strong>of</strong> such 

groups to food, basic services such as education and health and assets with the effect <strong>of</strong> 

seriously impairing their human capital base and hence their ability to participate in 

mainstream markets to earn a living and secure food for themselves and their dependents. 

Data from South Asia (Figure 3-9) demonstrate that when discrimination in food intake does 

occur between boys and girls it is largely in favor <strong>of</strong> boys, reflecting cultural values and also 

the differential returns <strong>of</strong> male and female adults in the labor market. This type <strong>of</strong> genderspecific 

consumption exclusion does not occur too frequently in sub-Saharan Africa, in part 

because women comprise a large proportion <strong>of</strong> smallholder farm households. But different 

forms <strong>of</strong> exclusion can have similarly negative impacts on food security and nutrition status. 

Figure 3-9: Intra-household Inequalities in Food Intake for Infants in South Asia: Number <strong>of</strong> 

Studies Finding (Haddad et. al. 1995) 

9 

10 

1 

females favored males favored neither favored 

56

Figure 3-10 demonstrates how differences in asset holding in Burkina Faso represent an 

economic loss in terms <strong>of</strong> foregone yield and output <strong>of</strong> all crops, not simply those traditionally 

grown by women. 

Figure 3-10: Increasing Yield and Output from an Equalization <strong>of</strong> Inputs Between Men and 

Women: Burkina Faso (Udry, Alderman, Hoddinott and Haddad, 1996). 

all crops 

sorghum 

vegetables 

18 

16 

20 

11 

9 

4 

% increase in yield from reallocation 

to women 

% increase in output from 

reallocation to women 

Discrimination driven by social processes results not only in differential access to food for 

those disadvantaged individuals but, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it also results in a collective loss 

<strong>of</strong> overall food production. Discrimination in terms <strong>of</strong> food access affects everyone, not just 

those immediately impacted. Hard data are not available on consumption, nutrition status 

and asset discrimination by different types <strong>of</strong> ethnic/political/AIDS groups, and this is an 

information gap that needs to be filled. The TF will begin to fill this gap by undertaking 

research on differences in underweight rates within the subset hot spot samples by 

characteristics such as female headed household, orphan status, and ethnic group. 

3.7 Physiological Access 

There are substantial interactions between food intake, care, sanitation, and health in 

determining an individual’s nutritional status. Poor care to infants limits their ability to eat food 

(infrequent feedings), diminishes the quality <strong>of</strong> the sanitary environment (e.g. no hand 

washing) and lowers the psychosocial stimulation the child receives (e.g. from playing or 

holding) Poor health and sanitation services severely curtail an individual’s capacity to 

absorb and utilize nutrients from food and can result in malnourishment even when food 

intake itself is adequate. 

57

Figure 3-11: Simultaneous Improvements in Sanitation, Water Quantity and water Quality Give 

Large Reductions in Diarrhea Morbidity: Meta Analysis (Esrey, et. al., 1991) 

Sanitation only 

36 

Hygiene practices 

33 

Water quantity and sanitation 

30 

Water quality and quantity 

Water quality only 

15 

17 

0 10 20 30 40 

Figure 3-12 demonstrates the impact <strong>of</strong> poor care on stunting rates in Ghana, holding 

income, education and other factors constant. Figure 3-11 shows the importance <strong>of</strong> water 

quality, quantity, sanitation and hygiene on diarrhea incidence in infants. 

Figure 3-11 demonstrates how diarrhea and household food security interact. The data 

show the diminished impact <strong>of</strong> household food security. on underweight in the context <strong>of</strong> 

moderate to high diarrhea levels. At a given level <strong>of</strong> household food security, the chances <strong>of</strong> 

avoiding underweight are much lower in high diarrhea environments in Pakistan and the 

Philippines. The chances are even more diminished at lower levels <strong>of</strong> household food 

security. In the absence <strong>of</strong> good care and a good health and sanitation environment, gains in 

food security will represent a hollow victory: the gains will be temporary and will not translate 

into improved nutrition status. 

Figure 3-12: Care and Infant Growth: Predicted Z-Score Height for Age: Multivariate Results for 

Poor Households in Ghana (Ruel, et. al., 1999). 

0 

-0.2 

-0.4 

-0.6 

-0.8 

-1 

-1.2 

-1.4 

good care 

average care 

poor care 

58

Figure 3-13: Probability <strong>of</strong> Avoiding Low Child Weight for Age at Different Levels <strong>of</strong> Household 

Food Security and Child Diarrhea Rates: Pakistan and Philippines (Haddad, et. al., 1998). 

0.8 

0.75 

0.7 

Relatively low food security 

Relatively high food security 

0.65 

0.6 

0.55 

0.5 

0.45 

0.4 

Pakistan High Diarrhea Pakistan Low Diarrhea Philippines High 

Diarrhea 

Philippines Low 

Diarrhea 

3.8 The Underlying Context 

All types <strong>of</strong> access mentioned above are affected by the general social, economic, and 

political environment prevailing at the national level. Factors such as the presence or 

absence <strong>of</strong> natural shocks or conflict, the quality <strong>of</strong> commercial and trade polices, the 

commitment <strong>of</strong> political leadership to hunger reduction, and the prevalence <strong>of</strong> institutions that 

enable participation <strong>of</strong> women and marginal groups in decision making processes that affect 

their futures have a direct bearing on type and level <strong>of</strong> access to food. The key factors 

limiting access to food that create the context for hunger <strong>of</strong> vulnerability and shocks, 

HIV/AIDS, and governance are discussed in the remaining sections <strong>of</strong> the chapter. 

3.8.1 Vulnerability, Shocks, and Hunger 

Poor households are most <strong>of</strong>ten not in a position to withstand unexpected individual-specific 

negative shocks in production (e.g. harvest failure), market (e.g. lost employment) or 

household consumption (e.g. emergency medical cost). They are vulnerable in the sense 

that a single big shock or a series <strong>of</strong> small shocks can quickly push them over to an even 

deeper world <strong>of</strong> poverty and hunger. There are also community-wide shocks that tend to 

have larger consequences for the poor in terms <strong>of</strong> their ability to recover from the shock. 

Natural disasters like floods and earthquakes have the effect <strong>of</strong> destroying household assets 

and employment opportunities, pushing otherwise well <strong>of</strong>f families into a world <strong>of</strong> poverty and 

hunger. The single most serious natural disaster on a global scale is drought. The onset <strong>of</strong> 

the effects <strong>of</strong> drought is <strong>of</strong>ten slow and insidious, but the results include crop failure, livestock 

deaths and the temporary or permanent migration from drought-affected areas. Escalation <strong>of</strong> 

violent conflicts in countries also displaces many families in such ways 

Conflicts hit Africa especially hard. As Figure 3-14 shows despite having a population 

approximately 5 times that <strong>of</strong> Africa, Asia tends to have fewer people affected by conflict. 

Indeed, conflict in Africa is as important as natural and industrial disasters in terms <strong>of</strong> people 

59

affected (Figure 3-15). 

Figure 3-14: Total Number <strong>of</strong> People Affected by Conflict in Millions (International Disaster 

Database, 2001)5 

22 

Natural and industrial 

Conflict 

22 

10 

16 

11 

19 

10 

15 

23 

14 

11 

7 

7 

11 9 11 13 13 

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

Figure 3-15: Total Number <strong>of</strong> People Affected by Disasters in Millions (International Disaster 

Database, 2001)6 

21 

17 

22 

14 

19 

16 

15 

13 13 13 

12 

11 

11 

9 

Africa 

Asia 

13 13 

12 12 

11 

5 

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

5 Note: Total Affected= people that have been injured, affected (requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, 

sanitation and immediate medical assistance) and left homeless after a disaster (www.cred.be/emdat/intro.html). International 

Disaster Database. International Disaster Database/2001 IFRC World Disaster <strong>Report</strong>. Table 16. 

6 Note: Total Affected= people that have been injured, affected (requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, 

sanitation and immediate medical assistance) and left homeless after a disaster (www.cred.be/emdat/intro.html). International 

Disaster Database. 

60

In terms <strong>of</strong> their vulnerability to shocks, food insecure households tend to be represented in 

Figure 3-15 and Figure 3-16. They tend to live in areas where shock exposure is sporadic but 

fairly constant or where shock exposure increases over time. They are unable to relocate 

away from natural or conflict shocks, they cannot avail themselves <strong>of</strong> preventative health 

care, nor <strong>of</strong> employment contracts. Moreover their ability to manage risk is low and for 

many, diminishes over time as repeated shocks wear down resilience. 

Figure 3-16: Vulnerability Scenarios: Ability to Manage Risk Minus Exposure to Risk 

Ability to 

manage 

Exposure 

to risk 

time 

Fairly regular shock exposure (e.g. 

climate), declining ability to manage risk 

Increasing shock exposure (e.g. involving 

conflict), declining ability to manage risk 

Fairly regular shock exposure, increasing 

ability to manage risk 

Declining shock exposure, increasing 

ability to manage risk 

Despite the fact that many natural disasters occur repeatedly, the policies <strong>of</strong> many 

governments around the world assume that disasters are unpredictable acts <strong>of</strong> god. 

Governments have an important role to play in rendering societies resilient to shocks. 

Interventions can range from arranging emergency food aid, to ensuring that adequate credit 

is available to finance recovery, to decentralizing decision-making to the level where shocks 

are expected. In the absence <strong>of</strong> strategies to mitigate the effects <strong>of</strong> shocks and with 

insurance prohibitively expensive, farmers are aware <strong>of</strong> their vulnerability and tend to adopt 

safe, conservative approaches to agriculture that risk little investment. This has an impact on 

their livelihood. Economic change more <strong>of</strong>ten than not involves using new technologies, 

entering into new types <strong>of</strong> businesses and partnerships, or exploring or creating new 

markets. Many <strong>of</strong> these actions will be inherently risky and will usually involve learning 

periods that may be even more risky. If poor households lacking insurance coverage are 

those that shy away from these, entrapment in low-paying activities that reinforce poverty will 

result. 

Further, even the “safest” income strategies are not completely immune to shocks, especially 

in rain-dependent agriculture. When eventually hit by negative income shocks, these 

households, which have only the thinnest asset base and lack access to coping 

mechanisms, are most vulnerable to harsh welfare losses and to the danger <strong>of</strong> slipping into a 

poverty spiral. 

Lacking insurance mechanisms, the negative income shock has to be absorbed through 

reductions in household expenditures. Many times, it is food expenditure that has to be 

curtailed. When shocks are larger, not only is increased exposure to hunger preeminent, 

61

there is also an increasing possibility that households may undertake more drastic actions to 

uphold irreducible consumption at the expense <strong>of</strong> future income and consumption. Typical 

actions include forgoing planned investments or selling productive assets. Such actions 

seriously, and irreversibly, compromise future livelihood and lead to further poverty 

entrapment and increased incidence <strong>of</strong> hunger. 

Usually the effects <strong>of</strong> such shocks are disproportionately harsh on weaker groups such as 

women, infants, and children. Children and infants whose consumption is curtailed suffer 

irreversible loss in terms <strong>of</strong> future growth potentials and earning capacity. Women, given 

their weaker positions in societies and households, are made to bear the brunt <strong>of</strong> the shocks 

– in many cases, the entire shock is absorbed by reduction in food intake among female 

family members. 

Mechanisms such as micro-insurance, crop insurance, targeted labor intensive public works 

and conditional cash transfers must be invested in to help the poor and hungry avoid shocks 

and manage risks—i.e. to reduce vulnerability. From a hunger perspective these 

mechanisms must work for those in food production activities, those engaged in child-rearing 

activities and those involved in market exchange. They must build on private actions <strong>of</strong> 

households and communities, build up assets and skills, provide for current consumption 

needs and must not diminish the incentives to work. In their absence, the sustainability <strong>of</strong> 

production, consumption and nutrition activities will be curtailed. 

3.8.2 HIV/AIDS and hunger 

The growing prevalence <strong>of</strong> HIV/AIDS epidemic adds to the escalation <strong>of</strong> the hunger problem 

in Africa in an alarming way. In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS is the leading cause <strong>of</strong> adult 

morbidity and mortality. Most <strong>of</strong> the 29.4 million people in this region now living with 

HIV/AIDS will have died by the year 2020, in addition to the 13.7 million already claimed by 

the epidemic. More than half those infected are women. Figure 4.11 shows the pr<strong>of</strong>ound 

effect that AIDS has had on many countries in the region—affecting perhaps that most basic 

<strong>of</strong> indicators—life expectancy. 

By killing young adults, the key producers and earners in the farm as well as the non-farm 

economies, HIV/AIDS dramatically reduces households’ earning power. On-farm production 

is likely to decline as farmers become ill and unable to work. Indeed, national food supplies 

in stricken countries may decline, leading to a price rise (FAO 2001). Further, expenditure is 

diverted away from other uses to the care and treatment <strong>of</strong> those infected. It is reported that 

households affected by HIV/AIDS not only are eating fewer meals and consuming poorer 

foods, but are investing less in the health <strong>of</strong> surviving members. Most farmers in Africa are 

women, who have a range <strong>of</strong> responsibilities associated with feeding the family: farming, 

collecting fuel-wood, fetching water and cooking. All <strong>of</strong> these activities will be compromised 

as people become ill. HIV/AIDS affected families are also more likely to sell productive 

assets either to uphold expenditures in the face <strong>of</strong> income losses, or to support extra 

expenditures on the care <strong>of</strong> infected household members. It is very likely therefore that 

access to food by poor afflicted families will decline significantly. Furthermore, good nutrition 

is essential in slowing the transition from HIV infection to the full effects <strong>of</strong> AIDS. Poorly fed 

people will succumb to the virus much more quickly. 

62

Figure 3-17: Life Expectancy at Birth in Seven Countries 

Life Expectancy at Birth in the Seven Countries Hit 

Hardest by HIV/AIDS 

Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision, 

forthcoming. 

A closely related issue is the expanding number <strong>of</strong> orphans and the elderly that do not have 

any earning members to support them. This is a precarious situation for the elderly, and the 

orphaned children who lack care and education are likely to be condemned to a lifetime <strong>of</strong> 

poverty and hunger. Finally, because HIV/AIDS is spreading at such a high pace, damage to 

basic national institutions preserving overall social order becomes a possibility. Women are 

the primary producers <strong>of</strong> food and constitute the vast majority <strong>of</strong> caregivers. Data from 

Malawi reveal that 87 percent <strong>of</strong> households in which adult females have died are expected 

to experience a food gap, whereas only 38 per cent <strong>of</strong> households in which an adult male 

has died can expect a gap (UNAID, 2003) 

In terms <strong>of</strong> food production, we can speculate as to the phasing <strong>of</strong> such responses in a 

stylized manner, but context is <strong>of</strong> course crucial. Many <strong>of</strong> the initial responses <strong>of</strong> farmers are 

to look for ways <strong>of</strong> “importing” labor to replace labor lost to mortality, morbidity or to care for 

the infirm. Tibaijuka (1997), for example, reports that within case study households in 

Kagera, Tanzania, containing a person living with HIV/AIDS, between 18 and 57 percent <strong>of</strong> 

the nurse’s time was diverted towards caring for him or her. We can hypothesize that this is 

an initial response to the crisis. More children are pulled into farming and both adults and 

children work longer hours. Concern has been expressed that the rapid mortality <strong>of</strong> adults is 

leaving children without anyone to teach them how to farm, and that future generations will 

lack agricultural skills. Certainly, hungry young people will seek means <strong>of</strong> earning incomes 

and many will be pushed into prostitution and other high risk activities which will in turn 

exacerbate the spread <strong>of</strong> the disease. 

63

Table 3-4: Summary <strong>of</strong> the ways in which HIV/AIDS may affect agricultural growth 

How does HIV/AIDS change the context <strong>of</strong> agricultural Leads to 

growth? 

Labor changes • Shortage <strong>of</strong> household 

labor due to.. 

• mortality 

• surviving adults take 

care <strong>of</strong> infirm 

• Shortage <strong>of</strong> hired labor 

due to.. 

• mortality 

• migration to cities 

• lack <strong>of</strong> cash to pay for it 

Loss <strong>of</strong> farm-specific 

knowledge 

• premature mortality 

curtails period for 

intergenerational role 

modeling and 

knowledge transfer 

Income changes • fewer earners, increase 

in dependency ratio 

• greater expenditure on 

medical, transport, 

special needs <strong>of</strong> ill 

Institutional and 

organizational changes 

• loss <strong>of</strong> institutional 

knowledge, high 

turnover, low investment 

in staff development 

• less land being farmed 

• under-farming <strong>of</strong> land in absence <strong>of</strong> 

labor sharing and well-defined 

property rights 

• more child labor 

• less labor intensive crops grown 

• emphasis on meeting food needs 

first and cash crops later 

• greater emphasis on small livestock 

cultivation 

• decline in marketed output for crop 

processors 

• natural resource mining (the future is 

heavily discounted) 

• less appropriate farming practices 

within a more hostile farming 

environment 

• more farmers who are 

inexperienced and need training, 

role models (e.g. youth) 

• more <strong>of</strong>f-farm income sources 

• migration 

• weaker rural institutions (e.g. 

extension services, micro-finance 

institutions, NGOs) 

• weaker social capital 

• weakening <strong>of</strong> property rights for 

some 

• weakening <strong>of</strong> asset base <strong>of</strong> women 

(especially land) 

The next phase may be characterized by crops and cultivation techniques that depend less 

on labor. So there may be a switch into the cultivation <strong>of</strong> roots and tubers, the raising <strong>of</strong> 

small livestock, and a renewed emphasis on food crops as opposed to cash crops. The 

under-farming <strong>of</strong> land may occur due to labor shortages that may be exacerbated by a 

reluctance to engage in labor sharing arrangements where user and ownership rights are not 

clearly defined. There is a reduced ability to rely on formal and informal institutions to help 

newly minted farmers, whether youth or widows, to understand the opportunities and 

constraints that exist in a rapidly changing agricultural landscape. Any losses in marketed 

output will also cut into the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> local food processors. Losses in agricultural 

productivity will result in lower demand for non-farm rural products and subsequent lower 

demand for farm inputs from the rural non-farm sector. Growth linkages between the farm 

64

and non-farm sectors will be weakened just as more farmers are seeking to diversify 

livelihoods into non-farm activities. Inappropriate crop and livestock management may have 

significant negative externalities in terms <strong>of</strong> the spread <strong>of</strong> plant and animal diseases to non- 

HIV areas. 

When these trends become intensified there may be nothing to be done with land other than 

sell it or leave it fallow. Both <strong>of</strong> these options are likely to exacerbate existing asymmetries in 

property rights, including those that exist between men and women. The incentives to 

manage communal resources so that they support livelihoods over the long term are 

diminished as more and more people do not envisage a long term for themselves. Natural 

resource mining becomes the norm. Households—particularly those with multiple adult 

deaths—may break down as adults die or migrate in search <strong>of</strong> work. Social networks 

fragment and cannot bridge the divides caused by premature adult death on a pandemic 

scale. In sub-Saharan Africa technology and resource management development in the 

areas <strong>of</strong> agriculture and nutrition cannot afford to ignore the ways in which AIDS decimates 

families, communities and institutions. 

3.8.3 Governance 

We have already drawn the link between one dimension <strong>of</strong> failed governance—conflict-- and 

hunger. Indeed it is no surprise that the countries that fared the worst in terms <strong>of</strong> declines in 

the FAO undernourishment indicator in the 1990s were states that are or were failed in some 

pr<strong>of</strong>ound way (Figure 3-18). This section provides examples <strong>of</strong> how governance–in terms <strong>of</strong> 

voice, capacity and accountability–can affect food and nutrition outcomes and the ability to 

address them through public policy. The development <strong>of</strong> hunger-reduction plans cannot 

afford to abstract from the governance structures that they will have to operate in. 

Figure 3-18: Food Security and Governance: The Worst Cases 

Change in number <strong>of</strong> undernourished, from 90-92 to 96-98 as % <strong>of</strong> 

the numbers <strong>of</strong> undernourished in 1990-92 

228 

4 worst performers out 

<strong>of</strong> 99 countries 

105 108 

74 

DR <strong>of</strong> Korea DR <strong>of</strong> Congo Iraq Burundi 

Source: Haddad 2001, using FAO undernourished data from SOFI 2001 

Failed states represent one extreme <strong>of</strong> governance. Good governance (Figure 3-19) is 

frequently cited as a precursor to effective aid use and as a driver <strong>of</strong> development in general. 

Good governance enhances development by promoting the voice <strong>of</strong> all—including those who 

65

are most in need—in decision making processes for many actors—not just governments; by 

devising policies that seek to increase human welfare and can be implemented with existing 

capacity; and by allowing people to hold decision making bodies accountable. 

Figure 3-19: Good governance from a human development perspective 

At its core, good governance from a human development perspective has three components, 

Voice, Capacity, and Accountability 

Voice 

• People’s human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, allowing them to live 

with dignity. 

• Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions. 

• Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres <strong>of</strong> life and decisionmaking. 

Capacity 

• Economic and social policies are responsive to people’s needs and aspirations. 

• People can participate in and shape development processes 

• People can have an effective say in decisions that affect their lives 

• Economic and social policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that 

all people have in their lives. 

Accountability 

• People can hold decision-makers accountable. 

• People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other 

attribute. 

• Decisions are made and communicated in a transparent manner. 

• The needs <strong>of</strong> future generations are reflected in current policies. 

Source: Adapted from UNDP, Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2002 

The concepts <strong>of</strong> voice, capacity and accountability are very relevant to the attainment <strong>of</strong> food 

security and nutrition. Figure 3-20 provides an example <strong>of</strong> the tangible impacts <strong>of</strong> a 

commitment to voice—to including the previously excluded. Within the context <strong>of</strong> a strong 

evaluation design, the study examines the consequences <strong>of</strong> changing women’s access to 

decision-making bodies. In two Indian States in the early 1990s, one in 3 Village Council 

was randomly set aside for female leadership (in 95% <strong>of</strong> all Village Councils with no female 

set asides, males were heads <strong>of</strong> councils), a few years later the impacts <strong>of</strong> this change in 

power were measured. Of the 3 outcomes measured, the number <strong>of</strong> drinking water facilities 

newly repaired and efforts to improve roads were significantly higher in the women-headed 

councils – reflecting the material issues they cared most about. 

66

Figure 3-20: Women-headed village councils in India 

30 

Women-headed Village Councils in India 

Random allocation <strong>of</strong> women-headed councils 

25 

20 

* 

15 

10 

5 

* 

0 

number <strong>of</strong> drinking 

water facilities newly 

repaired or built 

whether roads 

improved*10 

number <strong>of</strong> irrigation 

facilities built or 

repaired 

women-headed Village Councils 

predominantly male-headed Village Councils 

Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2003 

Food and nutrition monitoring systems are an obvious way <strong>of</strong> holding governments and other 

development actors accountable. Early warning systems are obviously important way <strong>of</strong> 

doing this. One way to amplify and add to the messages coming out <strong>of</strong> an effective early 

warning system is to direct them to an effective media. Building on Sen’s ideas, and holding 

a number <strong>of</strong> confounding factors constant within a regression framework, Besley and 

Burgess (2001) find that in India over the period 1958-1992, every 1% increase in the local 

language newspaper circulation resulted in a 5.5 % increase in Calamity Relief expenditure. 

This is a demonstration <strong>of</strong> how newspapers can give voice to those potentially affected by a 

shock. 

3.8.4 Capacity for Hunger Alleviation 

On capacity, in a recent World Bank review <strong>of</strong> health/population/nutrition projects over the 

period 1991-98 found that only 18% achieved their institutional objectives, that is objectives 

related to the effective management <strong>of</strong> Bank resources. •Two thirds <strong>of</strong> these projects cited 

“poor assessment <strong>of</strong> capacity” as the main constraint, entailing inadequate assessment <strong>of</strong> 

implementation ability and commitment, related to the weak structures governing the 

management <strong>of</strong> the resources (Stout 2000). These levels <strong>of</strong> institutional failure were higher 

than those found in other Bank sectors and this may be due to the inter-sectoral coordination 

that is <strong>of</strong>ten required <strong>of</strong> nutrition and population actions in particular. 

Development assistance has had a poor history <strong>of</strong> developing human capacity, as evidenced 

by the continuing dependence <strong>of</strong> many countries on continuing aid. The structure <strong>of</strong> aid 

projects, with foreign experts retaining control <strong>of</strong> design, management and follow-up limits 

the ability <strong>of</strong> national counterparts. Fortunately all donors now recognize the importance <strong>of</strong> 

capacity building as a necessary end in itself, and development programs are limiting 

67

dependence on foreign experts and emphasizing the need for national to take overall 

responsibility for achieving results. In food hunger terms, many local actors have been 

ignored and have weak capacities to intervene in decisions that affect them. Much progress 

will be made by strengthening farmers’ associations, water users’ associations, women’s 

groups, market cooperatives and others. 

3.9 More to come…. 

The analysis presented here is a significant extension <strong>of</strong> the work in the Background paper 

for the case <strong>of</strong> Sub-Saharan Africa. Most significantly, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has not yet connected 

particular policy changes and hunger-reduction actions to vulnerable groups or to classes <strong>of</strong> 

hungry people. The analysis also identifies knowledge gaps that will be addressed in the 

2004 Workplan <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. 

• The confirmation <strong>of</strong> the high levels <strong>of</strong> urban hunger must be addressed specifically in the 

Final <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. Urban hunger is under-represented in this 

interim report and in discussions and planning <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, to-date; it is a 

significant gap in the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s work to date. Efforts are underway to disaggregate 

the urban from rural in the farming systems data analysis and for the specific hunger 

hotspots. In the coming year, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> planning and analysis must address the 

following critical questions: 

1) How do we address urban hunger? 

2) What is the relationship between the urban hungry and adjacent agricultural 

areas? 

3) What hunger reduction actions for urban hunger might create synergies with rural 

nutritional interventions, agricultural productivity improvements, and market 

development? 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will work in close collaboration with the Slum Dwellers <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, to 

determine the precise distribution <strong>of</strong> labor in dealing with the urban hungry. 

• The Vulnerable Groups have not been geographically located in any detail and their 

presence in priority countries or the African Hunger Hotspots has not been examined. 

• The less-favored land estimate must be detailed and re-examined. This is based on the 

Dixon analysis and excludes that any <strong>of</strong> the Maize Mixed, Cereal Root Crops Mixed, Root 

Crops, or Root Crop systems are on marginal lands. Merely by the large numbers <strong>of</strong> 

hungry in these areas, we can probably infer that there is significant land degradation and 

less-favored attributes to these farming areas. 

The following gaps will be addressed by the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> during 2004: 

• Diagnosis <strong>of</strong> failures in policy and in capacity-building. In general, capacity is weakly 

defined and explored in this <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong>. We will specifically investigate and assess 

hunger-reduction capacity in the African Hunger Hotspots. 

• Additional exploration <strong>of</strong> the failure <strong>of</strong> political commitment as a cause <strong>of</strong> hunger, notably 

politically-motivated preference for public investment in urban areas (over rural areas), or 

along racial, religious, or ethnic boundaries. 

68

4 THE AFRICAN HUNGER HOTSPOTS 

This chapter describes the new analysis that the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has conducted to 

identify the nature and drivers <strong>of</strong> hunger in a limited number <strong>of</strong> areas in the world where the 

highest levels <strong>of</strong> food and nutritional insecurity are located and where hunger has been most 

difficult to resolve. We have called these areas “Hunger Hotspots.” The identification <strong>of</strong> the 

nature and drivers <strong>of</strong> hunger in Hunger Hotspot areas will allow us to select, design, and 

target cost-effective hunger-reduction actions and policies. The final goal is to guide 

appropriate national, regional and local policy changes and country-specific interventions that 

will reduce hunger in these Hotspots and also be applicable in other places where hunger is 

prevalent. 

Hunger Hotspots are defined as the sub-national units that contain both more than twenty 

percent <strong>of</strong> children underweight and more than 100,000 underweight children under five 

years <strong>of</strong> age, in areas where the density <strong>of</strong> underweight children is high. Children are defined 

as underweight if their weight-for-age z-scores are below minus two standard deviations (-2 

SD) from the median <strong>of</strong> the NCHS/CDC/WHO International Reference Population. 

Hunger Hotspots were identified and selected in Sub-Sahara Africa as an initial step, since 

that region has experienced the greatest increase in hunger in recent decades, and is 

farthest from achieving the Hunger MDG. Hunger Hotspots for Asia and Latin America and 

the Caribbean will be identified in early 2004 

4.1 Purpose 

The analysis presented in this chapter has five objectives: (1) to identify and select Hunger 

Hotspots in Sub-Saharan Africa, (2) to identify and characterize the major vulnerable groups 

in hotspot areas, (3) to diagnose factors causing hunger in these areas, (4) to identify 

effective interventions that can be implemented in these and other similar areas affected by 

hunger, and (5) to identify and select strategies for implementing these interventions (See 

Figure 1). We emphasize that recommended hunger-reduction actions are expected to be 

relevant within and outside <strong>of</strong> Hotspot areas. The identification <strong>of</strong> Hotspots will help 

governments and donors to define priorities and focus their resources on those places where 

hunger is most prevalent. 

4.2 Methodology for Hotspot Selection 

This analysis used total numbers, percentage, and absolute numbers <strong>of</strong> underweight children 

per survey region to identify and select Hunger Hotspots. The percentage <strong>of</strong> underweight 

children combines the effects <strong>of</strong> acute and chronic underlying nutritional processes, and thus 

lacks causal precision. Nevertheless, it was deemed the best measure available for 

comparison across most countries. Other measures such as height-for-age (stunting –a 

measure <strong>of</strong> chronic malnutrition), weight-for-height (wasting –a measure <strong>of</strong> acute 

malnutrition), and the FAO’s percentage <strong>of</strong> population chronically undernourished were also 

69

explored but rejected. Weight-for-height is too short-term a measure, and height-for-age 

could not be used because baseline data exist for very few countries. The FAO measure <strong>of</strong> 

chronic undernourishment applies only at the national level and thus is not useful to examine 

sub-national patterns. 

Figure 4-1 Analytical Steps <strong>of</strong> the Hunger Hotspots Selection Process 

Step 1: 

Step 2: 

Step 3: 

Step 4: 

Identify and Select 

Hunger Hotspots 

Identification Based on: 

1. Percent <strong>of</strong> 

Underweight Children 

2. Total Number <strong>of</strong> 

Underweight 

Under-five Children 

Selection Criteria: 

1. Sub-national units 

with more than 100,000 

underweight under-five 

children 


with higher than 

20% <strong>of</strong> underweight 


with high number <strong>of</strong> 

underweight children 

per survey region 

Additional Filters: 

1. High-Low 

Underweight Densities 

2. Cold-Hot Spots 

Comparison 

3. Agro ecology 


4. Farming Systems 


5. Cross-country 


Characterize the Hunger 

in Selected Hotspots 

1. Identify and 

Characterize Vulnerable 

Groups 

a) Demographics 

b) Location, etc 

2. Characterize the Nature 

<strong>of</strong> Their Hunger 

a) Nutrient Deficiencies 

3. Diagnose the Overarching 

Factors 

a) Availability 

b) Access, etc 

4. Characterize the Main 

Causes 

a) Production 

b) Markets, etc 

5. What is the Political 

Power <strong>of</strong> Vulnerable 

Groups 

6. Priority <strong>of</strong> National and 

Local Governments to 

Reduce Hunger 

Diagnose Factors Causing 

Hunger in Selected 

Hotspots 

1. Which Components 

Have and Have Not 

Been Addressed 

2. What has worked, where 

And Why? 

3. What Have Been the Main 

Constraints to Up-Scaling? 

4. What Has Been Tried but 

Has not Worked and Why? 

5. What are the Main Gaps? 

6. What Problem-Solving 

Research is Needed to 

Fill the Gap? 

Develop an Action Plan 

That Responses to the 

Diagnosis and Analysis 

1. Political Awareness to 

End Hunger 

2. National and Local 

Policy Reforms 

3. Select, Design and 

Target Cost-Effective 

Interventions and 

Policies through 

Synergistic 

Approaches 

4. Define Sequence, 

Scale and 

Approximate Costs <strong>of</strong> 

Priority Actions 

5. Identify 

Responsibilities <strong>of</strong> 

Main Actors 

6. Identify Indicators to 

Monitor and 

Evaluate Progress 

Data sets were obtained from several sources. Data on percentage <strong>of</strong> children underweight 

were obtained from a) Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), b) UNICEF’s Multiple 

Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and c) Africa Nutrition Database Initiative (ANDI) (United 

Nations, 2000). Data on population were obtained from a) the UN’s 2002 World Population 

Prospects 7 and b) CIESIN’s Gridded Population <strong>of</strong> the World (GPW) (CIESIN, 2003). Data on 

farming systems were obtained from a study conducted by Dixon et. al (Dixon, et. al., 2001). 

Data obtained from DHS and MICS were aggregated to the level at which the originally 

surveyed regions were reported – equivalent to the first administrative level units or 

aggregations there<strong>of</strong> – based on raw data or published reports. For some regions 

(departments), data on percentage <strong>of</strong> underweight children for the age group under-five were 

not available, but data for the age group under-three were available. In order to determine 

whether or not these two variables could be used equivalently, they were analyzed for all 

countries for which data were available for both age groups. It was determined that the 

7 Age distribution by country 

70

elationship between two variables is very close to 1:1 (within 2%). Therefore, data on these 

two variables were used equivalently. 

For those regions for which data were available, geospatial boundary files were located or 

created in order to match the reporting regions <strong>of</strong> the surveys as closely as possible. In many 

cases, regions were matched based on maps detailing the survey regions in the survey 

reports. In a few cases, matches were purely name-based. 

Once regional data on underweight were matched with each specific boundary file, a map <strong>of</strong> 

percentage <strong>of</strong> underweight children was created (see Figure 2). The next step was to create 

a map <strong>of</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> underweight under-five children per surveyed region. Total 

population 8 values for each 2.5-minute grid 9 cell were multiplied by the percentage <strong>of</strong> the 

year 2000 population under age five for the appropriate country from the 2002 UN World 

Population Prospects. It was assumed that the proportion <strong>of</strong> population that is under-five is 

evenly distributed throughout the country. Subsequently, child population figures were 

multiplied by the proportion <strong>of</strong> underweight children in each sub-national unit. As a result, an 

African map <strong>of</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> underweight under-five children by sub-national region was 

created 10 (see Figure 3). The combination <strong>of</strong> population figures with the data on underweight 

rates served to pinpoint areas where malnourished children are most concentrated. This 

avoids a sole focus on the rate <strong>of</strong> underweight. 

To control for differences in areas <strong>of</strong> sub-national administrative units, population density <strong>of</strong> 

underweight children was calculated for each one <strong>of</strong> the sub-national units. Population 

density <strong>of</strong> underweight children is defined as the number <strong>of</strong> underweight children under-five 

per square kilometer. 

4.3 Analysis and Results 

To accomplish the first step <strong>of</strong> this analysis -- selecting Hunger Hotspots in Africa -- two main 

criteria were used: (a) sub-national units with more than 100,000 underweight under-five 

children and (b) sub-national units with more than twenty percent <strong>of</strong> children underweight. 

However, concerns that these criteria would not capture differences in concentration <strong>of</strong> 

underweight under-five children per unit <strong>of</strong> area were raised. To control for these differences, 

a third criteria, population density <strong>of</strong> underweight children, was added to the selection 

process. The combination <strong>of</strong> these three criteria allowed us to identify and rank seventy-five 

units (See Figure 4 for spatial location and Table 4 for values). 

Table 1 highlights the different priorities that emerge depending on the choice <strong>of</strong> formulation 

<strong>of</strong> the indicator <strong>of</strong> underweight used. Only one country — Ethiopia — appears in the bottom 

tier <strong>of</strong> all three formulations <strong>of</strong> the underweight indicator. When listed by numbers <strong>of</strong> 

underweight per administrative unit, the more populous countries such as Nigeria, the Congo 

and Madagascar gain significance. With only underweight rates, countries with smaller, but 

hungry populations—such as Burundi, Sudan, Mozambique, Niger and Tanzania gain 

significance. Finally, when using the numbers <strong>of</strong> underweight children per square kilometer 

8 The data <strong>of</strong> GPW v.3 are benchmarked to the year 2000. 

9 2 

Nominally 16 km at the equator. 

10 The percentage <strong>of</strong> population underweight was taken from the UN World Population Prospects. 

71

as a way <strong>of</strong> combining population, area and underweight rates, countries such as Kenya, 

Uganda and Malawi become significant. 

Table 4-1: Areas <strong>of</strong> Sub-Saharan Africa: with the ten highest levels <strong>of</strong> underweight children 

according to various measures 

Numbers <strong>of</strong> underweight preschoolers 

% <strong>of</strong> preschoolers that are 

underweight 

Number <strong>of</strong> underweight preschoolers 

per Sq km 

Country-region 

(10 worst) 

numbers 

Country-region 

(10 worst) 

% Country-region 

(10 worst) 

numbers per 

sq km 

Ethiopia Oromiya 1,699,542 Burundi Middle 54.7 Burundi Middle 28.43 

Ethiopia Amhara 1,504,662 Ethiopia SNNP 52.5 Burundi North 27.47 

Nigeria North East 1,441,178 Ethiopia Amhara 51.5 Kenya Western 13.73 

Nigeria North West 1,420,301 Sudan Northern Kordufan 51.2 Nigeria South West 10.86 

Nigeria South West 1,238,792 Niger Zinder_Diffa 51.0 Sudan Khartoum 10.37 

Ethiopia SNNP 1,142,361 Ethiopia Affar 50.7 Ethiopia SNNP 10.10 

Nigeria Central 849,016 Mozambique Cabo Delgado 49.8 Ethiopia Amhara 9.63 

Congo Katanga 410,949 Sudan Northern Darfur 48.9 Nigeria North West 8.19 

Congo Bandundu 388,163 Ethiopia Tigray 48.3 Uganda Eastern 7.99 

Madagascar Antananarivo 364,040 United Rep. <strong>of</strong> Tanzania Iringa 48.2 Malawi South 6.95 

To select African hotspots that represent priority areas for achieving the Hunger MDG and 

also provide test cases for the development <strong>of</strong> anti-hunger action plans, five more selection 

filters were added to the selection process. The new filters were aimed to select units 

representing high diversity <strong>of</strong> farming systems, ecological zones, and social conditions, 

giving the opportunity to compare Hotspots in terms <strong>of</strong> a) density <strong>of</strong> underweight children 11 

(high-low density), b) prevalence and total number <strong>of</strong> underweight children (cold- and hotspots), 

c) agro-ecological zones, d) farming systems, and e) socio-economic conditions 

(cross-country). These comparisons help indicate the reasons why some areas have higher 

densities <strong>of</strong> underweight children than others, why hotspots in the forest zone has more 

underweight children than a hotspot in the savanna, why some farming systems have more 

percentage <strong>of</strong> underweight children than others, why Nigeria has more underweight children 

than Ghana (See Table 2). 

11 Densities were divided into three categories: 0 to 5.5 (low densities), 5.6 to 11 (intermediate), and > 11 (high). 

72

Figure 4-2 Map <strong>of</strong> Percentage <strong>of</strong> Under-five Children 

Underweight. Data for 96% <strong>of</strong> countries are from 1995 or later. 

All data are from 1992(UNICEF, DHS, National HDR, ANDI). 

Figure 4-3 Map <strong>of</strong> Total Number <strong>of</strong> Underweight Under-five 

Children by Sub-national Regions (same source + GPW - see 

other notes). 

73

Figure 4-4 Map <strong>of</strong> Hunger Hotspots Ranked 

Figure 4-5 Map <strong>of</strong> Underweight Densities and Hunger Hotspots 

(same sources + GPW - see other notes) 

74

Table 4-2: Selection criteria used in selecting Hunger Hotspots in Africa 

Hotspot Cluster 

Name 

Sub regions * Under 5 %<strong>of</strong> Low 

Underweight Underweight 

Population 

(1,000) 

Underweight 

Density 

Farming System 

Cold-Hot 


High-Low 

Density 


Agro 

ecological 


Cross 

Country 


A) West Africa 

Forest Zone 

B) West Africa 

Sudano-Sahelian 

C) West Africa 

Savanna 

D) Ethiopian 

Highlands 

Ghana Ashanti (52) 135 25 5.4 (low) 

Nigeria South West (5) 1239 25 10.8 (med) 

Nigeria North West (4) 1420 45 8.1(med) 

Niger Niamey (40) 181 34 1.9 (low) 

Burkina Faso East (38) 193 33 2.2 (low) 

Tree crop, root 

crops 

Cereal-root crops 

mixed, Agropastoral 

millet/sorghum 

Nigeria Central (7) 849 24 2.6 (low) Root crops, 

Cereal-root crops 

mixed 

Ethiopia Oromiya (1) 1,700 43 4.7 (low) 

Ethiopia Amhara (2) 1,505 52 9.6 (med) 

Highland 

temperate mixed, 

maize mixed 

Yes B, C Yes 

No Yes A, C Yes 

No No A, B No 

No Yes No No 

E) Lake Victoria 

F) Tanzania 

G) Malawi/ 

Mozambique 

H) Madagascar 

Kenya Western (66) 119 22 13.7 (high) 

Uganda Central (51) 301 21 4.8 (low) 

Tanzania Mwanza (15) 136 27 3.9 (low) 

Uganda Eastern (14) 316 27 7.9 (med) 

Tanzania Shinyanga (55) 134 28 2.6 (low) 

Tanzania Dodoma (69) 104 34 2.4(low) 

Tanzania Iringa (57) 132 48 2.3 (low) 

Mozambique Zambezia (41) 180 33 1.7 (low) 

Malawi South (28) 243 25 6.9 (med) 

Mozambique Tete (47) 99 41 1.0 (low) 

Malawi Central (24) 247 28 5.9 (low) 

Madagascar Antananarivo (10) 364 44 6.1 (med) 

Madagascar Fianarantsoa (21) 261 44 2.6 (low) 

Highland 

perennial, Root 

crops, Maize 

mixed 

Root crops, 

maize mixed 

Numbers between parentheses represent the rank <strong>of</strong> the Hotspots among the 81 identified Hotspot areas. 

No Yes Yes Yes 

No No ?/ No No 

Maize mixed No Yes No Yes 

Rice tree crop No Yes No No 

75

It is important to mention that areas that are in or have recently overcome armed conflict 

were excluded from this analysis. The main reason for this decision was that data for these 

regions were largely either unavailable or unreliable. The exclusion <strong>of</strong> areas <strong>of</strong> conflict 

remains open to further discussion and research. Other elements <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> analysis 

and planning may address these areas, and the role <strong>of</strong> peace and security in hunger 

alleviation, in more detail. 

Using the main three criteria and the five additional filters, eight Hunger Hotspot areas were 

identified, encompassing twenty-three units (regions) in Sub-Saharan Africa. These Hotspot 

areas are home to about 42% <strong>of</strong> the total population <strong>of</strong> underweight under-five children 

(approximately 9.5 million; see Figure 5). Table 3 shows the name <strong>of</strong> each Hotspot and the 

units (regions) that they include. African Hunger Hotspots are roughly equal in geographic 

area. 

Figure 4-6 Map <strong>of</strong> Hunger Hotspots 

76

Table 4-3: Hunger Hotspot names and regions included in each one <strong>of</strong> them 

Hotspot Name 

Regions 

a. Ghana Ashanti 

1. West Africa Forest Zone 

b. Nigeria South West 

c. South Benin 

d. South Togo 

a. Nigeria North West 

2. West Africa Sudano-Sahelian 

b. Niger Niamey 

b. Burkina Faso East 

3. West Africa Savanna a. Nigeria Central 

4. Ethiopian Highlands 

a. Ethiopia Oromiya 

b. Ethiopia Amhara 

a. Kenya Western 

5. Lake Victoria 

b. Uganda Central 

c. Tanzania Mwanza 

d. Uganda Eastern 

a. Tanzania Shinyanga 

6. Tanzania 

b. Tanzania Dodoma 

c. Tanzania Iringa 

a. Mozambique Zambezia 

7. Malawi/Mozambique 

b. Malawi South 

c. Mozambique Tete 

d. Malawi Central 

8. Madagascar 

a. Madagascar Antananarivo 

b. Madagascar Fianarantsoa 

The West Africa Forest Zone extends from South West Nigeria to Ashanti Ghana, including 

the south part <strong>of</strong> Benin and Togo. In this Hotspot the following comparison can be made a) 

areas in Ghana and Nigeria that have high prevalence and number <strong>of</strong> underweight children 

can be compared with areas in the South <strong>of</strong> Benin and Togo that have low prevalence and 

number <strong>of</strong> underweight children, b) The high density <strong>of</strong> South West Nigeria can be compared 

with the Ashanti region <strong>of</strong> Ghana, which has low density, c) the agro-ecology <strong>of</strong> the West 

Africa Sudano-Sahelian Hotspot can be compared with the agro-ecology <strong>of</strong> the West Africa 

Savanna Hotspot, d) the tree crop farming system can be compared with the root crop 

farming system, and e) the socio-economic conditions <strong>of</strong> Ghana, Nigeria, Benin and Togo 

can be compared against each other. This Hotspot has a population <strong>of</strong> 1,374,000 

underweight under-five children. 

77

The West Africa Sudano-Sahelian includes North West Nigeria, Niamey Niger and East 

Burkina Faso. In this Hotspot the following comparison can be made: a) North West Nigeria’s 

intermediate density can be compared with Niamey Niger and East Burkina Faso, which 

have low density, b) the agro-ecology <strong>of</strong> the West Africa Forest Zone can be compared with 

the agro-ecology <strong>of</strong> the West Africa Savanna Hotspots, c) the cereal-root crops mixed 

farming system can be compared with the agro-pastoral millet/sorghum farming system, and 

e) the socio-economic conditions <strong>of</strong> Nigeria, Niger and Burkina Faso can be compared. This 

hotspot has a population <strong>of</strong> 625,000 underweight under-five children. 

The West Africa Savanna includes the Central region <strong>of</strong> Nigeria. This region can be 

compared in terms <strong>of</strong> a) agro-ecology with the West Africa Forest Zone and with the West 

Africa Sudano-Sahelian Hotspots, and b) farming systems (the root crops farming system 

can be compared with the cereal-root crops mixed farming system). This Hotspot has a 

population <strong>of</strong> 849,000 underweight under-five children. 

Ethiopian Highlands includes two regions in Ethiopia: Oromiya and Amhara. In this 

Hotspot, the following comparisons can be made a) Amhara’s intermediate density can be 

compared with Oromiya’s low density, and b) the highlands temperate mixed farming system 

can be compared with the maize mixed farming system. This Hotspot has a population <strong>of</strong> 

3,205,000 underweight under-five children. 

Lake Victoria includes Western Kenya, Mwanza Tanzania, Central Uganda and Eastern 

Uganda. In this Hotspot, the following comparisons can be made a) The high density <strong>of</strong> 

Western Kenya can be compared with Central Uganda (low density), Mwanza Tanzania (low 

density), and/or Eastern Uganda (intermediate density), b) the agro-ecology <strong>of</strong> this Hotspot 

can be compared with the agro-ecology <strong>of</strong> other Hotspots, c) the highland perennial farming 

system can be compared with the root crops and maize mixed farming systems, and d) the 

socio-economic conditions <strong>of</strong> Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania can be compared against each 

other. This Hotspot has a population <strong>of</strong> 872,000 underweight under-five children. 

Tanzania includes three regions <strong>of</strong> Tanzania: Shinyanga, Dodoma and Iringa. The root crops 

farming system can be compared with the maize mixed farming system. This Hotspot has a 

population <strong>of</strong> 370,000 underweight under-five children. 

Malawi/Mozambique includes Zambezia Mozambique, South Malawi, Tete Mozambique 

and Central Malawi. In this Hotspot, South Malawi that has intermediate density can be 

compared with Zambezia, Tete, and/or Central Malawi that have low density. Also, socioeconomic 

conditions can be compared since it includes parts <strong>of</strong> Malawi and Mozambique. 

This Hotspot has a population <strong>of</strong> 769,000 underweight under-five children. 

Lastly, the Madagascar Hotspot includes two regions: Antananarivo and Fianarantsoa. 

Antananarivo’s intermediate density can be compared with Fianarantsoa’s low density. The 

population in this Hotspot is 625,000 underweight under-five children. 

As shown in the Figure 1, this analysis has three more steps, which the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to 

complete in 2004. The second analytical step will characterize the extent and nature <strong>of</strong> 

hunger in the selected Hunger Hotspots by (1) identifying and characterizing vulnerable 

groups, i.e., who the hungry are and where they are located, (2) characterizing the nature <strong>of</strong> 

their hunger, i.e., what nutrient deficiencies the children have in these areas, (3) 

characterizing the main causes <strong>of</strong> hunger, i.e., low agricultural productivity, non-functioning 

markets, or other conditions. As our understanding <strong>of</strong> conditions in the hotspots increases, 

78

we will better understand how nutrition, productivity and markets are affected by locationspecific 

conditions. 

The third analytical step will help to diagnose the driving factors behind the high levels <strong>of</strong> 

hunger in these areas. It will help to identify which components have and have not been 

addressed, what strategies and initiatives have worked, where they have worked and why. It 

will also help to identify the main gaps and what problem-solving research is needed in these 

areas to fill the existing gap. 

The characterization and diagnosis <strong>of</strong> the Hunger Hotspots will provide us with the 

information needed to develop detailed hunger alleviation plans in some key Hunger 

Hotspots. The plans to be developed will select, design and target cost-effective 

interventions through synergistic approaches that combine over-arching policy reforms with 

community-level interventions in agriculture, nutrition and market development among 

others. They will define sequence, scale and approximate cost <strong>of</strong> priority actions as well as 

identify main actors and their main responsibilities. A set <strong>of</strong> indicators will be identified and 

selected to monitor and evaluate progress. The plans will be designed in a way that could be 

incorporated into policy processes and poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP’s). 

Throughout the whole plan formulation process, a highly participatory process will be used to 

build awareness, local ownership, and political commitment to carry out the plan. The 

Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to complete four such plans before the end <strong>of</strong> its term, as 

described in more detail in Chapter 11. 

79

Table 4-4: Total Underweight Children, Prevalence and Population Density <strong>of</strong> Underweight 

Under-five Children in 81 Hotspots in Africa. 

Region Country Ranking 

Pop. Under-5 

Underweight 

(1,000) 

% <strong>of</strong> 

Underweight 

Children 

Pop. Density 

<strong>of</strong> 

Underweight 

Under-5 

Children 

Total 

Under-5 

Pop. 

(1,000) 


Pop. 

Under-5 

Area 

(Sq. Km.) 

Oromiya Ethiopia 1 1,698 42.9 4.84 3,959 18.0 350,771 

Amhara Ethiopia 2 1,503 51.5 9.83 2,919 18.0 152,907 

North East Nigeria 3 1,438 38.0 6.47 3,784 17.3 222,142 

North West Nigeria 4 1,418 45.2 8.23 3,138 17.3 172,282 

South West Nigeria 5 1,237 25.1 11.15 4,930 17.3 110,978 

SNNP Ethiopia 6 1,139 52.5 10.39 2,170 18.0 109,629 

Central Nigeria 7 849 23.9 2.69 3,553 17.3 315,851 

South East Nigeria 8 760 18.3 10.25 4,154 17.3 74,151 

Katanga Congo, DRC 9 412 34.3 0.88 1,201 18.8 469,827 

Bandundu Congo, DRC 10 387 35.5 1.33 1,091 18.8 291,891 

Antananarivo Madagascar 11 363 43.8 6.20 828 17.9 58,527 

Equateur Congo, DRC 12 347 33.0 0.87 1,052 18.8 397,445 

Oriental Congo, DRC 13 344 27.9 0.70 1,232 18.8 491,356 

Tigray Ethiopia 14 317 48.3 6.46 657 18.0 49,142 

Eastern Uganda 15 317 27.3 10.60 1,162 20.5 29,937 

Central Uganda 16 301 21.1 7.60 1,425 20.5 39,544 

Western Uganda 17 285 23.8 6.29 1,197 20.5 45,287 

Nord-Kivu Congo, DRC 18 274 35.5 4.77 771 18.8 57,334 

Rift Valley Kenya 19 267 24.9 1.58 1,073 15.0 169,187 

Kasai Oriental Congo, DRC 20 262 31.0 1.57 844 18.8 166,496 

Fianarantsoa Madagascar 21 259 44.1 2.56 587 17.9 101,201 

Região Sul Angola 22 258 39.9 0.84 648 19.6 308,172 

Affar Ethiopia 23 250 50.7 2.00 493 18.0 125,049 

Sud-Kivu Congo, DRC 24 249 37.5 4.30 665 18.8 58,054 

Central/South Somalia 25 247 27.5 1.21 898 20.1 203,413 

Zinder/Diffa Niger 26 247 51.0 0.86 484 21.1 287,411 

Central Malawi 27 247 27.9 6.80 884 19.1 36,253 

South Malawi 28 244 25.0 7.50 976 19.1 32,562 

Kasai Occidental Congo, DRC 29 243 34.8 1.61 699 18.8 151,058 

Sikasso Mali 30 233 40.7 3.28 572 19.7 70,829 

North/ Extreme north/ Adamaoua Cameroon 31 228 33.4 1.43 683 15.8 159,896 

Eastern Kenya 32 228 29.6 1.52 770 15.0 150,104 

Central/South Burkina Faso 33 228 33.1 5.03 688 19.8 45,236 

Khartoum Sudan 34 220 37.1 10.20 593 15.2 21,586 

Northern Uganda 35 219 31.6 3.53 692 20.5 61,935 

Bas-Congo Congo, DRC 36 215 37.0 4.04 581 18.8 53,160 

West Burkina Faso 37 205 36.2 2.44 566 19.8 84,025 

Maradi Niger 38 201 46.0 5.15 436 21.1 38,937 

East Burkina Faso 39 193 32.9 2.21 587 19.8 87,435 

Toamasina Madagascar 40 184 40.2 2.59 459 17.9 71,177 

Tillaberi (incl. Niamey) Niger 41 181 33.6 2.01 537 21.1 89,673 

80

Region Country Ranking 

Pop. Under-5 

Underweight 

(1,000) 


Underweight 

Children 

Pop. Density 


Underweight 

Under-5 

Children 

Total 

Under-5 

Pop. 

(1,000) 


Pop. 

Under-5 

Area 

(Sq. Km.) 

Zambezia Mozambique 42 180 33.2 1.75 543 16.8 103,135 

Kinshasa Congo, DRC 43 179 19.0 16.59 944 18.8 10,815 

Somali Ethiopia 44 169 43.4 0.68 390 18.0 247,560 

Nampula Mozambique 46 159 29.1 2.02 547 16.8 78,637 

Nyanza Kenya 47 157 19.9 13.07 788 15.0 11,996 

Al-Gazira Sudan 48 149 43.8 6.06 341 15.2 24,676 

Região Norte Angola 49 149 32.1 0.82 463 19.6 181,743 

North Burkina Faso 50 148 36.8 2.59 402 19.8 57,049 

Arusha Tanzania 51 143 35.1 1.76 407 17.4 81,241 

South Cote d'Ivoire 52 142 18.4 3.75 772 15.3 37,925 

Middle Burundi 53 140 54.7 28.85 256 17.7 4,851 

Região Capital Angola 54 138 25.0 2.07 554 19.6 66,721 

Mwanza Tanzania 55 136 27.0 7.54 505 17.4 18,085 

Ashanti Region Ghana 56 135 24.7 5.52 547 14.6 24,514 

Shinyanga Tanzania 57 134 27.8 2.66 480 17.4 50,265 

Toliary Madagascar 58 132 34.3 0.81 386 17.9 163,788 

North/East Somalia 59 132 26.8 0.53 492 20.1 250,943 

Koulikoro Mali 60 131 25.8 1.43 509 19.7 91,962 

Tahoua Niger 61 131 33.2 1.26 395 21.1 103,933 

Iringa Tanzania 62 130 48.2 2.32 271 17.4 56,118 

Kagera Tanzania 63 129 36.0 4.68 360 17.4 27,655 

White Nile Sudan 64 129 45.2 3.20 286 15.2 40,374 

Southern Darfur Sudan 65 127 41.2 0.99 308 15.2 128,022 

Northern Kordufan Sudan 66 125 51.2 0.66 244 15.2 190,120 

Kigoma Tanzania 67 125 43.1 3.25 289 17.4 38,326 

Cabo Delgado Mozambique 68 124 49.8 1.59 248 16.8 77,726 

Dosso Niger 69 119 37.7 4.16 316 21.1 28,601 

Western Kenya 70 119 21.5 14.07 553 15.0 8,446 

Segou Mali 71 118 36.5 1.90 323 19.7 61,873 

Central, South, & East Cameroon 72 113 19.5 0.51 580 15.8 221,259 

Central Kenya 73 104 15.4 8.11 676 15.0 12,849 

Northern Region Ghana 74 104 38.2 1.53 272 14.6 68,003 

Northern Darfur Sudan 75 103 48.9 0.33 212 15.2 315,242 

Tanga Tanzania 76 103 36.2 3.86 286 17.4 26,778 

Região Oeste Angola 77 103 32.9 1.09 312 19.6 94,574 

Dodoma Tanzania 78 103 34.2 2.49 300 17.4 41,238 

Mahajanga Madagascar 79 102 34.2 0.67 300 17.9 152,628 

Tete Mozambique 80 100 41.4 1.02 241 16.8 97,710 

Sinnar Sudan 81 99 46.4 2.44 213 15.2 40,638 

81

5 STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS FOR ALLEVIATING HUNGER 

5.1 Review <strong>of</strong> Ongoing Strategies 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has reviewed recent strategies and action plans developed by nine 

international organizations to reduce hunger, food insecurity, and poverty. This was done in 

order to assess conceptual and practical consensus and divergence as to what needs to be 

done to sustainably reduce hunger and malnutrition and achieve the Hunger Goal. 

The international organizations and programs examined vary in size and scope. They range 

from the globally focused development mandates <strong>of</strong> the FAO and the World Bank to 

international institutions with much narrower concerns, such as the World Food Programme 

and the International Food Policy Research Institute, to organizations with a regional 

mandate and broad latitude <strong>of</strong> action, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 

(NEPAD), the Asian Development Bank, and the USAID and IFAD regional programs. The 

background paper that was drafted to guide the initial work <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Project Hunger 

<strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> was also included. 

There are several broad commonalities across the strategies in spite <strong>of</strong> their somewhat 

distinct approaches and objectives. In order to compare the strategies and action plans, a 

complete matrix table <strong>of</strong> the strategies and action plans divided into eight categories is 

presented in Annex 1: Major International Anti-Hunger Initiatives. Below is a synopsis <strong>of</strong> the 

consensus positions and issues <strong>of</strong> divergence by category. 

Table 5-1: Consensus and Divergence in Major Approaches to Hunger Alleviation 

Development policies 

& practices 

Enabling political, 

social, and economic 


Areas <strong>of</strong> consensus 

• Agriculture is main engine <strong>of</strong> rural economic 

growth - enhance agricultural productivity and 

competitiveness. 

• Catalyze non-farm economic growth. 

• Help poor improve their well-being, manage 

risk, and reduce vulnerability 

• Enhance sustainable management <strong>of</strong> natural 

resources. 

• Rapid economic growth. Sound macroeconomic 

policy framework and an open 

economy. 

• Good governance – participation, accountability, 

sound management, transparency, rule <strong>of</strong> law. 

Issues <strong>of</strong> divergence 

• Differences in degrees <strong>of</strong> emphasis 

on the importance <strong>of</strong> economic 

growth to reduce hunger. Sufficient 

in itself, or necessary, but not 

sufficient. 

• Differing emphases on the 

importance <strong>of</strong> integrated, crosssectoral 

approaches. 

• Participatory policy processes 

important in some strategies, absent 

in others. 

• Gender issues treated inconsistently. 

82

Reduce poverty, 

facilitate physical and 

economic access to 

food 

Areas <strong>of</strong> consensus 

• Improve access to and management <strong>of</strong> land and 

water. 

• More productive agriculture to boost incomes <strong>of</strong> 

rural producers and to benefit poor consumers. 

• Strengthen capacity for self-reliance through 

building basic human capabilities. 

Issues <strong>of</strong> divergence 

• The importance <strong>of</strong> direct and 

immediate food assistance programs 

as an element <strong>of</strong> improving access to 

food is treated variably. 

• Targeting investments. Priority <strong>of</strong> 

investment in which specific areas? 

Facilitate trade • Remove barriers to agricultural market 

development – fair pricing, deregulation, level 

playing field for market participation, invest in 

market infrastructure. 

• Calls for “unleashing market forces” 

stand in contrast to reminders <strong>of</strong> 

strong role for government in 

providing necessary market-oriented 

public goods. 

Encourage 

investment 

Improve social 

welfare, reduce 

vulnerability 

Response to food 

security crises 

• Create policy framework and conditions for 

optimal public and private investment 

• Production-related investments must be 

complemented by targeted safety nets – direct 

assistance to the most food insecure. 

• Invest in human resources – healthy, wellnourished, 

literate citizens are essential for 

economic growth. 

• Directly enhance nutrition for vulnerable groups. 

• Remove constraints women face in carrying out 

their household food security responsibilities. 

• Save lives in crisis situations. 

• Identify vulnerable regions and establish 

prevention & preparedness strategies. 

• Ensure transition from relief to development. 

• Where investment will come from – 

internal, foreign, development 

assistance? 

• Targeting investments. Invest 

where? 

• None <strong>of</strong> note. 

• Different perspectives as to whether 

famine can be successfully 

eliminated. Some documents treat 

famine as a part <strong>of</strong> the landscape, 

others as exceptional shocks. 

Implementation • ·Commit increased budgetary resources to 

agriculture. 

• ·National and regional diversity to guide 

implementation. 

• Varying attention to issue <strong>of</strong> access 

to food as a human right. 

Other Areas <strong>of</strong> 

Divergence 

• Importance <strong>of</strong> investing in urban agriculture. 

• Community-driven vs. top-down strategies. 

• Desirability <strong>of</strong> investing in environmentally-sensitive areas. 

• Relative investment in favored/less-favored areas. 

• Reliance on market-oriented and market-driven development. 

• Relative emphasis on food aid, reducing social vulnerability, protection <strong>of</strong> natural assets. 

83

Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive nor do all strategies neatly fit into this 

framework. Moreover, the particular objectives <strong>of</strong> the institutions cannot be easily compared. 

Nevertheless, it is clear that the consensus is much stronger than the points <strong>of</strong> divergence. 

In sum, aggregate economic growth is seen as a necessary component <strong>of</strong> any strategy to 

sustainably and permanently reduce hunger. Those factors conducive to economic growth, 

particularly in rural areas, will also be conducive to reducing hunger – building human capital, 

good governance, establishing effective market institutions and rural infrastructure, enlarging 

the range <strong>of</strong> economic opportunities both on and <strong>of</strong>f-farm, and providing the poor with secure 

access to their primary resources. However, it is also necessary to ensure that the safety 

nets are in place to provide sufficient food security to those individuals who do not have 

access to adequate food, whether due to a generalized food security crisis or due to 

individual shocks pushing vulnerable households into hunger and poverty. Such safety nets 

are necessary both for the potentially productive to allow them to take advantage <strong>of</strong> the 

opportunities <strong>of</strong>fered by a growing economy and for the destitute and non-productive 

members <strong>of</strong> society to accord them their rights to food as members <strong>of</strong> society. 

It is important to highlight that the strategic documents reviewed do not investigate in any 

great detail how the political will to fight hunger more aggressively can be mobilized. This is 

a foundational assumption that goes unexamined. However, as is argued in this document, it 

is precisely the lack <strong>of</strong> political will that has resulted in our world today where 846 million are 

hungry. 

The consensus highlighted here centers on reducing hunger. However, these actions can 

only be effective through the exercise <strong>of</strong> broad political will. There is much less consensus 

on how this political will is to be fostered. 

5.2 Guidelines for Selecting Among Candidate Actions 

The previous section describes the universe <strong>of</strong> potential actions that are known to improve 

nutrition and reduce hunger. The challenge for national governments and for donor nations 

is to select appropriate actions to achieve the Hunger MDG. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has 

assembled six principles to guide the choice <strong>of</strong> hunger-reduction actions that build political 

rationale and commitment, reform policy, and increase physical, economic, social, and 

physiological access to food: 

1. What is the credibility <strong>of</strong> the action to reduce hunger? 

2. What are the constraints to implementing the action at sufficient scale for impact? 

3. What is the commitment <strong>of</strong> the political leadership to the action? 

4. What is the capacity <strong>of</strong> the country and responsible actors for implementing the 

action? 

5. What policy context is necessary and sufficient for the success <strong>of</strong> the action? 

6. What synergies may be achieved among elements <strong>of</strong> the action and its outcome to 

ensure success? 

Applying these six guiding principles to the wide range <strong>of</strong> actions proposed to cut hunger, we 

arrive at a set <strong>of</strong> recommended strategies <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> as summarized in the following 

Table 5-2 

84

Table 5-2: Guidelines <strong>of</strong> Selecting Candidate Actions 

GUIDELINE 

KEY QUESTIONS 

1. Credibility • Is there proven technical feasibility and cases <strong>of</strong> success and failure? 

• Is there cost and impact data? 

• Is the activity environmentally sound and proven in the target environment? 

• What types <strong>of</strong> hunger and which vulnerable groups can be addressed? 

• Are there resources and measures for monitoring and evaluation? 

• How can this action be implemented in the Hunger Hotspots? 

2. Constraints • What are the political, financial, capacity, technical, and social constraints? 

• What are the constraints to implementation and to scaling-up <strong>of</strong> this action? 

• At what scale has this been implemented? 

• Is scaling-up linear, are there increasing or decreasing marginal returns? Is 

there a self-scaling, market-driven, or synergistic element to scale-up? 

3. Commitment • What is the evidence <strong>of</strong> presence or absence <strong>of</strong> political commitment? What 

resources have been mobilized? By whom? 

• Is the hunger-reduction action plan socially acceptable? Culturally acceptable? 

Politically viable? 

• Is there commitment and support at the national level and with implementation 

partners? 

• Is there a specific plan for mobilizing political action and support? 

• Who is committed to this action? To bearing responsibility? 

4. Capacity • What is the national and local capacity for planning, monitoring, and managing 

hunger alleviation strategies? 

• What is the national and local capacity for implementation <strong>of</strong> the action? 

• Is there clarity <strong>of</strong> who will implement actions and who has authority, 

responsibility, and accountability? 

• What are the barriers to mobilizing capacity? 

• What is the linkage to other hunger-reduction initiatives? 

5. Context • Can this hunger-reduction action succeed in the current policy context? 

• What policy must be reformed for to increase likelihood <strong>of</strong> success? At what 

scale? 

• Is the context macro-economic stability and growth sufficient for the action? 

6. Synergy • Does this hunger-reduction action contain mutually reinforcing activities that 

address multiple causes <strong>of</strong> food insecurity? 

• Does this hunger-reduction action create mutually reinforcing outcomes that 

alleviate hunger? 

• Does this hunger-reduction action create synergistic effects by addressing 

multiple Millennium Development Goals and reinforcing the recommendation <strong>of</strong> 

other Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s? 

85

GUIDELINE 

KEY QUESTIONS 

• Does the action increase multiple arenas <strong>of</strong> access to food (physical, economic, 

social, and physiological)? 

• Does the action create synergies among community-level and national-level 

capacities to reinforce and scale-up the activity and its outcomes? 

5.3 Recommended Actions <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s broad strategy to achieve the Hunger MDG has elements that take 

place at the international, national, regional, and local levels. The priority for all <strong>of</strong> these 

actions is to alleviate the severe and persistent hunger in the Hunger Hotspots—identified 

only in Sub-Saharan Africa in this report (the 2004 workplan will define hotspots in Asia and 

Latin America). The broad strategy has three main elements: 

1. Mobilize political action to end hunger—at the global scale as well as at the national 

and local levels, in rich and poor countries. 

2. Align national policies that restore budgetary priority to agriculture as the engine <strong>of</strong> 

economic growth, build rural infrastructure, empower women, and build human 

capacity in all sectors involved in hunger-reduction actions. 

3. Implement and scale-up proven actions that improve the nutrition <strong>of</strong> vulnerable 

groups, raise agricultural productivity in smallholder farms, and improve market 

functions—in ways that provide synergies and result in positive transformations. 

Some <strong>of</strong> the principal components <strong>of</strong> the three elements follow, indicating the Chapters 

where they are elaborated. 

1. Mobilize political action to end hunger—at the global scale as well at the national and 

local scales, in rich and poor countries (Chapter 6). 

• Create coalitions for hunger alleviation advocacy that are vertical (i.e., from 

community to national and international levels) and horizontal (within a given level). 

• Increase political pressure through communication, mobilization, requests to 

parliaments and the executive branch—at national, state or provincial and local 

levels. 

• Communicate the case for hunger alleviation as a cornerstone <strong>of</strong> economic growth, 

poverty reduction and international peace. 

• Implement specific plans for creating political commitment that include specific roles 

for political actors. 

2. Align and reform national policy in rich and poor countries to create the context for the 

synergistic hunger-reduction actions (Chapter 7). 

• Restore budgetary priority to agriculture as the engine <strong>of</strong> economic growth, 

particularly in marginal lands. 

86

• Greatly enhance capacity for policy implementation. 

• Build and upgrade the rural infrastructure. 

• Empower women and invest in girls. 

• Improve risk-reducing safety nets. 

• Provide incentives that promote sustainable natural resources management and 

restore degraded lands. 

• Strengthen property rights to motivate investment . 

• Stabilize macroeconomic and trade policy that levels the playing field for all. 

3. Implement and scale-up proven hunger reduction actions in ways that provide 

synergies and result in positive transformations. 

3.1.1 Community-Based Nutrition Interventions (Chapter 8): Ensure that mothers, 

infants, and children receive adequate nutrition for health and development 

through: 

• Community-driven programs for pregnant women and children under 2 years 

to improve the nutrition <strong>of</strong> adolescent girls, increase birth weight, and improve 

infant growth, using locally procured foods whenever possible. 

• School-based programs to reach children and adolescents (based on local 

food production to stimulate local demand). 

• Fortification <strong>of</strong> complementary feeding foods with vitamins and minerals using 

local foods and processing whenever feasible. 

• Programs that reduce household nutrition vulnerability to crises and shocks. 

3.1.2 Improve market function to increase farm and non-farm income (Chapter 9) 

through: 

• Reduction <strong>of</strong> costs, operating risks, and vulnerability through the supply 

chains <strong>of</strong> food and food production inputs, focusing on the entry points <strong>of</strong> 

improved physical infrastructure and information infrastructure. 

• Increased capacity for market participation such as cooperatives, business 

associations, and farmers’ organizations and development <strong>of</strong> market 

institutions for standards and dispute settlement. 

• Increased farm income and reduced risks with cultivation <strong>of</strong> high-value crops, 

beneficial contracting systems, and post-harvest processing. 

• Smoothing food supply and increasing demand by linkage <strong>of</strong> food and 

nutritional assistance programs to locally produced food and secure physical 

infrastructure. 

• Increasing non-farm income though enterprise development mechanisms 

such as access to capital, business development centers, and training. 

3.1.3 Raise productivity <strong>of</strong> smallholder farmers and food-insecure farmers on marginal 

lands (Chapter 9) through: 

• Improved methods and production inputs, focusing on the entry points <strong>of</strong> soil 

fertility restoration, small-scale water management, and locally adapted seed, 

87

seedlings, and animal stock. 

• Restoration and conservation <strong>of</strong> natural assets for production: soil, water, 

forests, and fodder. 

• Development <strong>of</strong> farmer-driven extension services and appropriate technology 

development and transfer. 

• Reduction <strong>of</strong> vulnerability to shocks by use <strong>of</strong> non-emergency assistance to 

protect and renew the assets <strong>of</strong> the poor that generate income and by use <strong>of</strong> 

farming methods that diversify and protect food supply and fodder. 

Figure 5-1 Synergistic Action Areas for Hunger Reduction 

Principal Hunger Reduction Action Areas 

Enabling environment created by political commitment, policy change, and capacity for 

hunger reduction 

Generate 

demand 

Lower 

costs 

Provide 

Information 

Generate 

supply 

Synergistic Action Areas 

Improve Mother and Child 

Nutrition & Safety Nets 

• Community-driven programs 

• Fortification 

• School-based young girls 

• Locally procured foods 

Improve Market Function 

• Rural markets the poor can access 

• Lowers food and input costs 

• Generate non-farm income 

Increase Agricultural Productivity 

• Expand focus to food-insecure 

households on marginal lands 

• Natural asset conservation 

• Farmer-driven extension 

• Non-staple crops, livestock, staples 

Synergistic Outcomes 

• Improved Nutrition 

Throughout Lifecycle 

• Increased Farm and 

Non-farm Incomes 

• Development <strong>of</strong> Rural 

Areas 

• Education for Girls 

• Environmental 

Conservation 

88

6 CREATING THE POLITICAL ACTIONS FOR HUNGER 

ALLEVIATION 

In its Background <strong>Report</strong>, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> described how trends toward 

democratization, recognition <strong>of</strong> food as a human right, and emerging anti-hunger advocacy 

and political action are converging to create a receptive international context for achievement 

<strong>of</strong> the Hunger MDG. It also recognized the important role <strong>of</strong> local communities and groups 

as the locus <strong>of</strong> many hunger-reduction actions and for political action to elevate hunger on 

the political agenda. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> concluded that “to launch and sustain a major effort to 

reduce hunger will require strong political support and proactive lobbying in both developed 

and developing countries.” One <strong>of</strong> the new elements in this <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> is a preliminary 

analysis, set <strong>of</strong> recommendations, and workplan for creating strong political support and 

action for hunger alleviation. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> seeks to define a strategy for building public 

support and political action to end hunger. This effort is still in a preliminary stage, and the 

group will work to strengthen it through further definition and a full consensus in the year 

ahead. 

6.1 The MDGs and The Millennium Compact 

The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs are a declaration <strong>of</strong> goals and intentions by 

political leaders. One <strong>of</strong> the MDGs calls for a Global Partnership for Development, 

committing wealthy countries to support – through increased aid, trade policy reforms, debt 

forgiveness, technology sharing, and other strategies -- developing-country efforts to meet 

the MDGs. This goal, affirmed by subsequent international declarations, forms a commitment 

which the Millennium Project has defined as “a Compact through which the world community 

can work together to help poor countries achieve the MDGs.” Through the Millennium 

Declaration, and as elaborated in the Millennium Compact, the world has made a deal. Poor 

countries commit to good governance and development policies based on sound science 

and the scaling-up <strong>of</strong> best practices, while rich countries commit to providing greater financial 

assistance, market access and knowledge transfers. This Compact brings hope that 

inefficiencies <strong>of</strong> past development efforts will be replaced by true impact, based on shared 

responsibility and partnership. 

The UN has a four-pronged strategy for implementing the Millennium Declaration: 

• The Millennium Project analyzes policy options and is developing a plan <strong>of</strong> action to 

meet the MDGs. 

• The Millennium Campaign mobilizes political support for achieving the MDGs. 

• The UN Development Group oversees country-level monitoring to track individual 

countries’ progress toward meeting the MDGs. 

• Involvement in country-level planning to meet the MDGs is carried out by numerous 

89

UN agencies and coordinated by the UN Development Group. 

While the Millennium Project’s primary role is that <strong>of</strong> expert advisor, the Millennium 

Campaign’s political mobilization efforts help prepare the ground for the financing and 

implementation <strong>of</strong> plans to meet the MDGs. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> sees the Campaign’s 

work as a key component <strong>of</strong> its operational framework for achievement <strong>of</strong> the Hunger MDG, 

and is actively working to support the Campaign’s mobilization efforts to develop the political 

support for implementing and financing plans to meet the MDGs. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s work is 

thus intended to complement that <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Campaign at the international and 

national levels. 

The Gap Between Intentions and Actions 

“We pledge our political will and our common and national commitment to achieving food 

security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate 

view to reducing the number <strong>of</strong> undernourished people to half their present level no later than 

2015.” – The Plan <strong>of</strong> Action <strong>of</strong> the World Food Summit <strong>of</strong> 1996 

The commitment <strong>of</strong> international leaders at the World Food Summit <strong>of</strong> 1996 (above) is 

reflected in the specific, time-bound, and measurable goal <strong>of</strong> that summit and <strong>of</strong> the Hunger 

MDG. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> believes that the world can achieve the Hunger MDG if it 

chooses to do so; hunger alleviation can be financed without harming either prosperity or 

growth and can be achieved with proven strategies and methods. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

emphasizes that level and rate <strong>of</strong> progress required to meet the Hunger MDG will not be 

achieved on a “business-as-usual” basis. While many global promises and action plans have 

been made, the actual reduction in the numbers <strong>of</strong> hungry has been minor, while 

investments in hunger alleviation efforts have actually declined. To close this gap between 

intention and results, the global community must translate the promises made on the 

international stage into policy change and resource mobilization at both national and 

international levels. 

The common denominator in the many failures to achieve the global promise <strong>of</strong> hunger 

reduction can be branded as a lack <strong>of</strong> political will. In all too many quarters, political leaders 

have failed to assume the fundamental responsibility for eliminating hunger – and with it, the 

risks and sacrifices. This is an issue that must be addressed through targeted advocacy in 

each country. Political actions that form the targets for national advocacy efforts include, but 

are not limited to: 

1. Increasing budgets specifically for hunger alleviation; 

2. Building national capacity and accountability for hunger-reduction actions; 

3. Raising hunger alleviation relative to other political aims; 

4. Including hunger determinants in growth and poverty reduction strategies; 

5. Eliminating policies that exacerbate hunger and harm the poor; 

6. Empowering the vulnerable groups most at risk; 

7. Increasing investment in marginalized areas; and 

8. Increasing coordination and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> development agencies. 

90

The appropriate political actions for hunger will differ widely from nation to nation, but are 

likely to include many <strong>of</strong> the priorities listed above. It is critically important that these are 

always stated in quantifiable terms within specific time frames. 

The striking contrast between the promises made in international summits and the 

persistence <strong>of</strong> hunger leads the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to conclude that specific plans and 

funding to produce political actions for hunger alleviation are as critical to achieve the Hunger 

MDG as plans to finance and implement specific technical actions for nutritional assistance, 

rural development, and income growth. 

6.2 Assessing the Current Level <strong>of</strong> Political Action for the MDG 

In order to plan for creating political change, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will assess the current 

level <strong>of</strong> political commitment to achieve the Hunger MDG and current efforts to create that 

political commitment. Comparing government expenditures on agriculture, hunger, and 

nutrition relative to other national priorities is one way to assess levels <strong>of</strong> political 

commitment. An example is shown in Table Table 6-1, which shows defense spending as a 

share <strong>of</strong> total government budgets; The data show that highly food-insecure countries 

spend two to three times as much on defense as on agriculture, with investments in 

agriculture declining further over the past decade. In countries where 20-35% <strong>of</strong> the 

population is defined as food insecure, agricultural spending averaged 7.6% in 1992 

and 5.2% in 1998. For countries with more than 35% food insecure, agricultural 

spending in 1992 was 6.8% and declined to 4.9% in 1996, the last year for which data 

are available. To compound this problem, development assistance to agriculture has 

suffered a significant decline in real terms from the early 1980s to the early 1990s 

(FAO, State <strong>of</strong> Food and Agriculture 2003). From 1993 to 2000, external assistance to 

agriculture has fluctuated around levels close to half <strong>of</strong> those recorded over the 

period 1982-86. There is a close connection between agriculture and the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> 

poor rural people – who make up the majority <strong>of</strong> food insecure people, despite 

growing urban food insecurity (IFAD, Rural Poverty <strong>Report</strong> 2001). Given that reality, 

the declining investments in agriculture – coupled with rising military expenditures -- 

are a worrisome indicator <strong>of</strong> political priorities among national governments and 

development donors. Such priorities may contribute to both food insecurity and 


Table 6-2 which shows that national-level investment in agriculture is significantly lower. 

Table 6-1: Percentage Share <strong>of</strong> Defense in Government Budgets 

Region 1992 2001 

World 11.5 11.0 

Low income 14.4 12.9 

Middle income 15.8 11.7 

Lower middle income 19.8 14.8 

Upper middle income 13.1 10.2 

Low & middle income 15.6 12.6 

East Asia & Pacific 23.7 16.4 

91

Europe & Central Asia 15.2 9.6 

Latin America & Caribbean 6.2 6.9 

Middle East & N. Africa .. .. 

South Asia 16.8 14.7 

Sub-Saharan Africa 8.4 .. 

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003. 

The data show that highly food-insecure countries spend two to three times as much on 

defense as on agriculture, with investments in agriculture declining further over the past 

decade. In countries where 20-35% <strong>of</strong> the population is defined as food insecure, agricultural 

spending averaged 7.6% in 1992 and 5.2% in 1998. For countries with more than 35% food 

insecure, agricultural spending in 1992 was 6.8% and declined to 4.9% in 1996, the last year 

for which data are available. To compound this problem, development assistance to 

agriculture has suffered a significant decline in real terms from the early 1980s to the early 

1990s (FAO, State <strong>of</strong> Food and Agriculture 2003). From 1993 to 2000, external assistance to 

agriculture has fluctuated around levels close to half <strong>of</strong> those recorded over the period 1982- 

86. There is a close connection between agriculture and the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> poor rural people – 

who make up the majority <strong>of</strong> food insecure people, despite growing urban food insecurity 

(IFAD, Rural Poverty <strong>Report</strong> 2001). Given that reality, the declining investments in agriculture 

– coupled with rising military expenditures -- are a worrisome indicator <strong>of</strong> political priorities 

among national governments and development donors. Such priorities may contribute to 

both food insecurity and conflict. 

Table 6-2: Share <strong>of</strong> Agriculture in Total Government. Spending (FAO, “Mobilizing the 

Resources to End Hunger,” 2001) 

Region 1992 1998 

Latin America and Caribbean 3.9 1.9 

Middle East/North Africa 3.7 1.1 

Sub-Saharan Africa 6.6 3.9 

East & Southeast Asia 5.9 5.2 

South Asia 10.4 5.4 

On average, developing countries invest just 0.6 percent <strong>of</strong> agricultural GDP in public 

agricultural research, compared to 2.6 percent for developed countries. The average annual 

growth rates <strong>of</strong> public agricultural research expenditures in developing countries in the first 

half <strong>of</strong> the 1990s were significantly below those <strong>of</strong> the late 1970s, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, 

the rate turned negative. Aid donors’ contributions to international agricultural research have 

stagnated over the past dozen years (P.G. Pardey and N. Beintema, “Slow Magic,” IFPRI 

Food Policy <strong>Report</strong>, 2001). Given the potential <strong>of</strong> agricultural research to contribute to 

poverty reduction and food security (Ruth Meinzen-Dick et al., “Impacts <strong>of</strong> Agricultural 

Research on Poverty,” IFPRI 2003), the trends in agricultural research expenditure and 

donor support thereto are indicators <strong>of</strong> political commitment to hunger and poverty reduction. 

92

1. Civil society expenditures on anti-hunger advocacy as an indicator 

The annual budgets <strong>of</strong> civil society anti-hunger advocacy groups may be an indicator <strong>of</strong> 

existing efforts to create political actions for hunger alleviation and may be used to estimate 

the return on investment in hunger advocacy efforts. 

6.3 Potential Constraints to Political Action 

Below is a preliminary description <strong>of</strong> constraints to political actions for hunger alleviation that 

the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> hypothesizes are critical to overcome to achieve the Hunger MDG. 

In 2004, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will seek evidence for these constraints as well as the best 

practices to surmount such barriers. 

6.3.1 Creating Political Action in Poor vs. Rich Countries 

The gap between intentions and actions is not universal. Indeed the last several decades 

and even the last five years have seen striking examples <strong>of</strong> successful commitment, 

implementation and hunger-reduction actions. As the Millennium Project looks to assist 

priority countries to achieve the MDG’s, the special political circumstances <strong>of</strong> those countries 

must be considered, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The politics <strong>of</strong> hunger and what is 

politically possible may vary between rich and poor countries, but as outlined in the 

Millennium Compact, there is a shared responsibility between all countries to meet the 

Hunger MDG. To build political momentum at the international level, it is important to target 

powerful nations, particularly the United States, that can strengthen and help lead broader 

multilateral efforts. 

6.3.2 Lack <strong>of</strong> Political Power <strong>of</strong> the Poor and Hungry 

The strongest advocates for hunger alleviation, the hungry themselves, are disenfranchised 

and marginalized not only for reasons such as age, gender, and ethnicity, but by the very 

struggle for survival. To effectively address this problem, one must first answer the following 

questions: what is the political power <strong>of</strong> vulnerable groups? Why are they disenfranchised? 

What is the awareness and sensitivity <strong>of</strong> political groups to the hungry and vulnerable? The 

answers to these questions can help identify the constraints upon direct political action <strong>of</strong> the 

hungry, and may also suggest strategies for the empowerment <strong>of</strong> hungry people. However, 

the onus for advocacy may still fall upon those privileged enough to be free <strong>of</strong> hunger. 

6.3.3 Lack <strong>of</strong> money and incentives for commitment-building activities 

Governmental and intergovernmental institutions have provided much <strong>of</strong> the financing and 

intellectual guidance for hunger and poverty reduction in poor countries, but such institutions 

are inherently constrained in their ability to fund political activities. There is a lack <strong>of</strong> money 

for activities designed to build political commitment and guide political actions. 

Governmental and inter-governmental institutions may not be aware <strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong> 

commitment-building activities and may have poor knowledge <strong>of</strong> how to assist those 

activities. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and the Millennium Campaign aim to bring the importance 

<strong>of</strong> commitment-building work to the attention <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> international and national actors. 

6.3.4 Institutional barriers to political activities, including information asymmetries 

93

Those most likely to immediately benefit from anti-hunger actions <strong>of</strong>ten have the lowest 

levels <strong>of</strong> participation in agenda setting, prioritization and decision making. Their weak 

participation results in little internal pressure on governments, even in democracies (such as 

Bangladesh). 

6.3.5 Weak commitment-building institutions 

When political commitments are made and carried out, it is usually in response to institutions 

(civil society or governmental) that are pushing for change. One major constraint to effective 

advocacy efforts is that institutions advocating for solutions to hunger and poverty are, by 

and large, scattered and weak. The reasons vary from limited funding to outright prohibition 

<strong>of</strong> their work. 

6.3.6 Lack <strong>of</strong> Public and Media Awareness 

Through its initial outreach efforts among public and private-sector leaders, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> has found startlingly low levels <strong>of</strong> awareness about the MDGs in general, and ways 

toward achieving them in particular. On an anecdotal level, <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> members report that 

many leading figures -- including media pr<strong>of</strong>essionals – have never heard <strong>of</strong> the MDGs; have 

little recognition <strong>of</strong> the impact <strong>of</strong> the Green Revolution on global hunger alleviation; and are 

unaware <strong>of</strong> leading agricultural institutions such as the Consultative Group on International 

Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 

6.3.7 More Powerful Competing Political Interests 

In most countries, urgent issues <strong>of</strong> public welfare, health, and safety are <strong>of</strong> higher budgetary, 

programmatic, and political priority than hunger alleviation. Other priorities may be 

education, sanitation, medical care, pensions and retirement security as well as expenditures 

on police and the judicial system and military spending. Such priorities represent the difficult 

choices and trade<strong>of</strong>fs that face society and any political electorate. However, there may also 

be powerful minority interests that are able to exert disproportionate influence on policy 

processes, directly or indirectly exacerbate hunger through enactment <strong>of</strong> their priorities. One 

example is the trade and agricultural interests in rich countries that distort markets through 

obtaining export subsidies to developing countries and barriers to poor country imports. 

6.4 The Keys to Building Political Support for Hunger Alleviation Actions 

The keys to building political support for hunger-reduction actions are the creation <strong>of</strong> political 

coalitions The keys to building political support for hunger-reduction actions are the creation 

<strong>of</strong> political coalitions and partnerships, evidence for the costs <strong>of</strong> hunger and the costs and 

benefits <strong>of</strong> action, clarity <strong>of</strong> roles, comparison to other priorities, and resonance with personal 

values and beliefs. These are also, therefore, the components <strong>of</strong> a successful campaign 

strategy. These keys, derived from qualitative and preliminary analysis, are listed in outline 

form below. 

1) Powerful coalitions advocate for hunger-reduction 

a) Local concerns are addressed in plans and budgets 

b) Aligned with national political objectives 

94

c) Aligned with current national budget priorities 

d) Synergy with multiple political objectives and development objectives 

e) No negative association with specific powers, political views, actors, or failures 

f) Culturally acceptable to all actors 

g) Aligned with private sector interests 

2) Clear and compelling evidence supports investments 

a) Contributes to economic growth and socioeconomic and political stability 

b) Defined economic costs and value. 

c) The case is made that hunger is a cause and an effect <strong>of</strong> poverty and is linked to 

economic development. 

d) Past evidence <strong>of</strong> success (or lack <strong>of</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> failure) 

e) Proven “technology” 

f) No evidence <strong>of</strong> negative impact 

3) Clarity <strong>of</strong> actions and <strong>of</strong> defined roles and responsibilities 

a) Simple in concept 

b) Transferable 

c) Clearly defined roles for powerful actors including politicians, donors, NGOs, other 

d) Mobilizes existing national and local capacity 

e) Clear balance with national political and financial objectives that compete with antihunger 

initiatives 

4) Connection to personal interests, beliefs, and survival 

a) Key political figures personally commit to well defined, time-bound, and measurable 

goals. 

b) Hunger is communicated and understood in compelling moral terms. 

5) Low costs to competing interests and priorities 

a) In order to stimulate political hunger-reduction actions, a compelling case must be 

made that doing so serves powerful interests and concerns that may feel more 

immediate to both civil society and to political interests. Unlike other issues, there is 

no strong lobby that is “pro-hunger” or “anti-nutrition,” however there are strong 

lobbies that compete for the same pool <strong>of</strong> national resources. Plans to mobilize 

political hunger-reduction actions face three stark choices: 1) advocate to increase 

the total pool <strong>of</strong> resources, 2) compete, or 3) align with other interests whose actions 

or outcomes are synergistic with hunger-reduction actions or outcomes. 

6.5 Structures and Processes for Creating Political Actions 

Structures and process for creating political actions will vary by country. The basic 

components remain the same across most countries, but the individual actions that should 

be taken, their sequence, and their relative weight will depend on a range <strong>of</strong> institutional, 

historical, social, economic, and political factors. Campaign strategies at the local, national, 

regional, and international levels must be context-specific. Below is a preliminary list and 

notes on common structures and processes for creating political actions. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> 

95

<strong>Force</strong> believes that these modalities may be specifically planned, financed, and implemented 

to foster political actions to reduce hunger. 

6.5.1 Individual leadership and charisma 

National leaders are especially important for initiating hunger-reduction plans at significant 

scale. Examples include the U.S. Presidential leadership for the Marshall Plan, the Point 

Four Program, and 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Presidential impacts upon hunger 

alleviation programs in Brazil, Kenya, Uganda, and Botswana are notable. Nongovernmental 

leaders such as SG K<strong>of</strong>i Annan, Norman Borlaug, and the rock star known as 

Bono also serve to influence the relative importance <strong>of</strong> hunger on the international and 

national agenda. 

As important as the role <strong>of</strong> enlightened leadership that addresses hunger is the role <strong>of</strong> 

‘rogue’ leaders on national development, such as Mengistu Haile Mariam; Robert Mugabe, 

President <strong>of</strong> Zimbabwe; Idi Amin <strong>of</strong> Uganda; Mobutu Sese Seko <strong>of</strong> Zaire; and Kim Song-Il <strong>of</strong> 

Korea. The lack <strong>of</strong> participatory accountability in these countries and rule by force allows the 

national leader to choose to ignore hunger or exacerbate hunger as a political and military 

weapon. 

6.5.2 Knowledge and Information 

Credible national and international institutions are important sources <strong>of</strong> information on 

hunger alleviation’s benefits and costs. New information and knowledge, conveyed in 

powerful terms by trusted institutions, can generate media attention, public awareness and 

political debate that strengthens advocacy, improves policy design, and catalyzes political 

action. Targeting this information to motivate specific audiences is essential in building an 

effective communications strategy. 

Political leaders have failed to take action to eradicate hunger because, in part, the public 

has not demanded that they do so. Building political will requires leveraging a groundswell <strong>of</strong> 

popular support at the grassroots level, which can only be accomplished with a message that 

is compelling in both emotional and pragmatic terms. Media experts have advised the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> that to build broad public support, messages about the complex policy dynamics <strong>of</strong> 

hunger should be humanized and placed in a context that families and individuals can relate 

to. The Millennium Campaign is working to identify the most compelling messages for 

different target audiences around the world 

6.5.3 Democratic debate and advocacy campaigns 

Grassroots mobilization <strong>of</strong> existing and potential constituencies for anti-hunger advocacy 

such as religious organizations, service NGOs, and others may be among the mostimportant 

approaches to creating political action. Accountability and transparency tactics 

that reveal government corruption, program inefficiencies, and expenditures that are 

inconsistent with public declarations are powerful tools in the hands <strong>of</strong> advocacy 

organizations. The use <strong>of</strong> media to communicate anti-hunger messages and to generate 

public support for policy initiatives is a major target for advocacy campaigns. Celebrity 

advocates such as the program <strong>of</strong> FAO goodwill ambassadors can attract grassroots support 

for anti-hunger programs. 

96

6.5.4 Cross-sector partnerships 

A key mechanism to achieve broad political commitments to the goal on hunger is to develop 

cross-sector partnerships both vertically (i.e. from community to national and international 

levels) and horizontally (i.e. within a given level). In this regard NGO’s are important 

facilitators. In recent years the major food agencies – WFP, FAO and IFAD – have endorsed 

and successfully implemented partnership strategies with NGOs. Currently WFP works with 

more than 1,100 NGO’s to complement its food aid with technical and non-food inputs. 

These partnerships draw on grassroots linkages, local knowledge and a wealth <strong>of</strong> field-based 

experiences. By coordinating action at a vertical level, it is possible to attain synergistic 

outcomes. Such an inclusive process mobilizes actors and creates political commitments to 

hunger alleviation. 

Partnerships at the local level are also essential to create political action in priority countries. 

At the local level, NGO’s develop strong relationships with community organizations, local 

NGO’s and state organizations that have a common interest in assisting with development 

efforts. By promoting long-term social capital and effective horizontal linkages these 

partnerships extend ownership <strong>of</strong> the development process to the local community. 

6.5.5 Consensus-building activities 

Consensus-building activities at all levels may generate powerful coalitions to advocate for 

change as well as clear messages and powerful plans for hunger reduction. Projects with 

the United Nations development system that create consensus among experts and inform 

expert opinion are one such activity. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> itself can be seen as a process 

that creates political commitment though the influence <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> members in their 

institutions and as advisors to governments and other agencies. 

6.5.6 High level summits and international agreements 

High level summits assume that collective agreement on priorities can strengthen individual 

commitments to goals and strengthen the partnerships necessary to achieve those goals. 

However, the ability <strong>of</strong> national leaders to affect change depends on their standing and 

power at home, the capacity <strong>of</strong> national institutions to implement hunger reduction policies, 

the availability <strong>of</strong> feasible solutions, and the support <strong>of</strong> those who responsible for the action. 12 

Summits also create an arena for public attention and communication. Unfortunately, the 

lack <strong>of</strong> follow-through on these commitments has damaged the credibility <strong>of</strong> the summit 

system and their sponsoring agencies. 

6.5.7 Pressures and Incentives Related to Development Financing 

Decision processes linked to donor assistance and financing may have considerable 

influence upon political leadership in countries that receive <strong>of</strong>ficial development assistance. 

When such development assistance is aligned with benefits to the private sector and 

powerful financial institutions, political action becomes even more likely. This is not a cynical 

view; well-designed development financing provides real political alternatives to corrupt and 

12 Mobilizing the political will and resources to banish world hunger, Technical background documents 

to WFS:fyl, FAO, http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/Y1780e/Y1780e00.HTM 

97

cash-generating activities that may siphon public and international resources from effective 

hunger-reduction programs. 

6.5.8 Institutionalized decision-making processes 

Among the most critical processes relating to the level <strong>of</strong> investment in hunger-reduction <strong>of</strong> 

those political processes within the OECD member countries that determine the levels and 

target <strong>of</strong> Official Development Assistance (ODA). In the United States, the U.S. Congress is 

the appropriator <strong>of</strong> funds for development assistance, but it is the executive branch 

leadership that establishes the major priorities and configurations <strong>of</strong> foreign aid. Targeted 

advocacy directed at the legislative and executive branches has been shown to have high 

returns when the costs <strong>of</strong> the campaign are compared to budget allocations for the targeted 

program. 

6.5.9 Legal Instruments 

Legal instruments to secure the right to food as a legal right as well as international legal and 

treaty instruments create new leverage points to force political actions for hunger reduction. 

6.6 Mapping <strong>of</strong> Current Efforts to Build Political Commitment 

6.6.1 Preliminary Overview <strong>of</strong> Efforts 

There are many organizations and coalitions <strong>of</strong> organizations working around the world to 

build the political commitment to ending hunger and to achieve the first MDG to eradicate 

poverty and hunger. The Millennium Campaign as well as the advisory and advocacy voice 

<strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may encourage greater coordination among these efforts and 

support their plans. Today it is mainly religious and humanitarian organizations and 

campaigns that advocate on issues <strong>of</strong> world hunger. In addition, institutions within the <strong>of</strong>ficial 

international development assistance system that are focused on agriculture or nutrition, 

such as the U.N. food agencies (the three in Rome and IFPRI) and the relevant departments 

<strong>of</strong> the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies also create political commitment to hunger 

reduction goals. 

Within national governments, there are general institutions focused on agriculture and 

nutrition that represent these issues to national governments. Charitable foundations such 

as the UN, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Rockefeller, Ford Foundations are major 

supporters <strong>of</strong> the international hunger alleviation efforts. Corporations from all sectors 

sometimes provide financial support and services for anti-hunger efforts as an element <strong>of</strong> 

corporate philanthropy and social responsibility strategies. Below we highlight some 

additional efforts: 

2. Advocacy Coalitions 

The U.S. Alliance To End Hunger is a recent alliance <strong>of</strong> diverse U.S. institutions that are 

working to strengthen political will to end hunger in the United States itself and worldwide. It 

includes advocacy organizations, charities, religious bodies, foundations, think tanks, 

universities, business corporations, unions, civil rights organizations, farm organizations and 

individuals. The Alliance helps its partner institutions deepen their work on the politics <strong>of</strong> 

98

hunger, partly by suggesting collaborative possibilities. The Alliance has conducted studies 

on how Americans think about hunger and is engaged in efforts to get candidates for U.S. 

president to propose actions to reduce hunger domestically and worldwide. 

3. European NGO Networks 

In Europe, NGO networks such as Euronaid and Eurostep have been instrumental in 

generating political commitment within the EU for hunger alleviation. Euronaid is a network <strong>of</strong> 

38 major NGO’s involved in the area <strong>of</strong> food aid and food security. Euronaid interacts closely 

with the European Commission and to this end has been successful in initiating 

improvements in European food aid and in lobbying for food security. Similarly Eurostep is 

another network, comprising <strong>of</strong> 19 major NGO’s, and active in influencing development cooperation 

with emphasis on the European Union. Such networks are a possible entry point 

in efforts to create political commitments for hunger alleviation in Europe. In the European 

Union non-state actors are becoming key partners in the community’s development program 

as recognized for example by the Cotonou Agreement (2000). Other European NGO 

networks include Concord – the new European NGO Confederation for Relief and 

Development – and Alliance 2015. Sustained government funding for international 

development education has helped to build public support for development assistance in a 

number <strong>of</strong> European countries.” 

4. International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH) 

In June 2002, the Declaration <strong>of</strong> the World Food Summit: Five Years Later created the 

International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH), with the overarching purpose <strong>of</strong> ensuring that 

the problem <strong>of</strong> hunger remains high on the international agenda. The aim <strong>of</strong> the IAAH is to 

facilitate initiatives that enable the poor and hungry to achieve food security on a sustainable 

basis and to encourage alliances that aim to: 

• strengthen national and international commitment and action to end hunger; 

• provide a forum for dialogue on the most effective measures to be taken to reduce 

hunger; 

• amplify and add value to the contributions and capacities <strong>of</strong> alliance members; and 

• promote the emergence <strong>of</strong> mutually supportive action involving governments and 

other stakeholders in the fight against hunger. 

The Rome-based food and agriculture organizations - FAO, the International Fund for 

Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) 

and the World Food Programme (WFP), together with international NGOs - are networking to 

make the IAAH goals a reality. The Rome food agencies have also helped spawn a new 

coalition <strong>of</strong> NGOs from around the world that are committed to building political commitment 

to cutting hunger and poverty in half by 2015, with a focus on more and better development 

assistance for agriculture, food and rural development. This coalition is called the More and 

Better Coalition. Members from the industrialized countries and developing countries are 

working together to increase investment in agricultural development and nutrition and to 

promote civil-society participation in programs.” 

6.7 Creating an Operational Framework for Political Action 

99

The Final <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will detail the operational priorities, organizational 

means <strong>of</strong> implementation, and financing structures necessary for creating political 

commitment and action to achieve the Hunger MDG. Our analytic work has just begun in 

this important strategic arena. We aim to consider the political dimensions <strong>of</strong> anti-hunger 

efforts such as the World Food Summit <strong>of</strong> 1996 (WFS) and the WFD Five Years Later 

(WFS:fyl). Of additional interest will be political aspects <strong>of</strong> diverse initiatives that may be 

examined as cases such as the Global Hunger Alliance, the Monterrey Bridge Coalition, the 

International Alliance Against Hunger, and support <strong>of</strong> the World Food Programme. The 

Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to work in close partnership with the Millennium Campaign and 

anti-hunger coalitions to continue and broaden their work to build political commitment to 

ending hunger. 

6.7.1 Lessons from Other Efforts 

We will also seek to study related international efforts that may be instructive examples such 

as the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, the effort to relieve the debt <strong>of</strong> highly indebted poor 

countries. The partial success <strong>of</strong> that campaign (approximately 15% <strong>of</strong> debt has been 

relieved) has been ascribed to 1) Clear, simple, relentlessly reiterated, time-bound goal, 2) 

Tight, symbolic deadline, 3) appeal to shared sense <strong>of</strong> justice, 4) coalition <strong>of</strong> highly 

networked civil society groups, 5) maximum use <strong>of</strong> communication technology and traditional 

means to mobilize public support, 6) high-quality research and monitoring, 7) targeting <strong>of</strong> key 

leaders and assurance <strong>of</strong> political support, and 8) focus on decision making events and the 

accountability <strong>of</strong> individual leaders (FAO, Technical Background Documents from WFS:fyl). 

6.7.2 Examination <strong>of</strong> Best Practices at the National Level 

What are the best practices <strong>of</strong> donor nations in the organization and implementation <strong>of</strong> 

political commitment? Extension <strong>of</strong> findings about the U.S. effort to meet its commitment 

made at the World Food Summit to other nations suggests that donor nations must engage 

in a high policy decision making process to assess to what degree hunger alleviation is <strong>of</strong> 

economic interest, national security interest, or a humanitarian issue and then to place this 

objective in the context <strong>of</strong> other national priorities. For rich nations with a small proportion <strong>of</strong> 

the world’s hungry, national goals more specific than the Hunger MDG must be established 

and measured for extra-national food security investments and actions. Hunger alleviation 

commitments must be accompanied by a resource plan and a long-term budget commitment 

that reflects the importance <strong>of</strong> the goal to national interests and the specific plan <strong>of</strong> action. 

Authority, responsibility, accountability, and management <strong>of</strong> the national commitment to 

hunger alleviation goals must assigned operationally and for accountability with a single, 

stable, and high-level minister/secretary (Taylor and Tick, 2001). 

There are many national success stories from which we may derive replicable political 

strategies, including efforts in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 

Ghana, Peru, Chile, and China. More specific successes in hunger alleviation may also hold 

valuable lessons such as successful initiatives to supplement at large scale with Vitamin A 

and Iodine or to spread exclusive breastfeeding. Of interest, too, is a differential diagnosis <strong>of</strong> 

these successes with notable failures such as those recently in Pakistan, Ethiopia, 

Zimbabwe, and North Korea and lack <strong>of</strong> progress on tackling anemia and the low birth weight 

problem. 

100

6.7.3 Roles and responsibilities in creating the political commitment to the hunger MDG 

A component <strong>of</strong> operational plans and priorities must be clear assignment <strong>of</strong> roles and 

responsibilities to create political will among rich country governments, regional institutions 

such as the European Union, African, Union, and NEPAD, donor agencies, the United 

Nations agencies, poor country governments, civil society in rich and poor countries, the 

private sector, media, and the research community. 

As governments appreciate how important commitment-building is, there are things they can 

do; they can give civil society groups access to governmental decision-making and provide 

funding for certain kinds <strong>of</strong> education and organizing. Aid donor agencies can provide 

funding for NGOs, which the NGOs then channel to advocacy and empowerment work in 

poor countries. But NGOs, foundations, political parties and individual donors have crucial 

roles to play in increasing funding for commitment-building work. 

6.8 Candidate Priority Actions 

Political action does not arise de novo, but through planned advocacy, communication and 

political work. In the face <strong>of</strong> inaction, advocacy requires confronting the status quo through 

understanding the dominant values, beliefs, and interests <strong>of</strong> those with power. Advocacy 

requires an understanding <strong>of</strong> the political economy <strong>of</strong> hunger and the leverage points for 

policy change. 13 The action plan for creating political commitment must be derived from the 

diagnosis <strong>of</strong> the political power <strong>of</strong> the hungry, the current level <strong>of</strong> political commitment to 

hunger alleviation, and the competing interests for political action and investment. We have 

not yet completed such a diagnosis but <strong>of</strong>fer some very preliminary candidate actions in this 

arena. 

• We commend the initial efforts <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Campaign to increase commitment to 

the Millennium Development Goals, especially in the United States. 

• We recommend that the Millennium Project provide analysis to support that political will is 

the binding constraint on achieving the MDG’s, provide analysis and <strong>of</strong> how to build 

political will, and include commitment-building activities in its cost estimates. 

• The international community should support the new International Alliance Against 

Hunger, the national alliances against hunger that have been identified or initiated in 

some countries, the More and Better Campaign, and the proposed Consultative Group on 

Hunger. The International Alliance Against Hunger should disseminate information from 

and among all these emergent efforts to build commitment to overcoming hunger. 

• Stronger commitment-building institutions are needed. As more money becomes 

available, we also need to build stronger institutions that will push – not just for a couple 

years, but for decades, for effective action at the international, national, and local levels 

to reduce hunger. 

• The <strong>of</strong>ficial international development agencies should work together to build the 

International Alliance Against Hunger. The International Alliance should come to include 

the parallel “More and Better” NGO coalition and the proposed Hunger Consultative 

Group, and the Alliance should be linked into the broader Millennium Campaign. 

13 Combating Malnutrition: Time to Act, Gillespie, S. et. al. (eds), The World Bank, 2003. 

101

• Create a Hunger Consultative Group, which would bring together the major <strong>of</strong>ficial and 

NGO donor agencies in agriculture and nutrition. This could draw additional resources to 

agriculture and nutrition and promote the sharing <strong>of</strong> best practices, just as the 

Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest has done in the area <strong>of</strong> micro-enterprise 

development. The Hunger Consultative Group should indeed be launched and should 

also be featured in the information sharing work that the International Alliance Against 

Hunger will do. Many people and organizations are especially motivated by one <strong>of</strong> the 

MDGS – hunger, AIDS, education or whatever – and strong commitment-building efforts 

around hunger and the other specific goals will contribute to strong political actions to 

achieve the MDG’s in general. 

• New institutions that represent vulnerable groups and marginal areas. Representation is 

important and necessary but not sufficient; representation and participation do not 

necessarily translate into influence without specific empowerment at the policy and 

leadership level. 

• Advocacy Campaign: Amongst our priorities is our perspective that this effort must be 

well funded and viewed as a sustained political campaign fought with the intensity and 

commitment <strong>of</strong> a race for a major political <strong>of</strong>fice. It must be multifaceted with an 

emphasis on tactics running the full gamut from political lobbying to an internet strategy 

as sophisticated as those utilized by leading corporations and cutting edge political 

campaigns. 

6.9 More to come… 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to undertake significantly more work on the subject <strong>of</strong> building 

political commitment during the remainder <strong>of</strong> its term. It will: 

• Stress that the binding constraint on progress against hunger and the other MDG’s is 

weak political actions, and that catalyzing political actions is itself a project that calls for 

research, systematic work, and the investment <strong>of</strong> resources. 

• Study how political commitment has or has not been mobilized to deal with the hunger 

hot spots, summarize whatever academic literature exists on the politics <strong>of</strong> poverty and 

hunger and do some case studies on commitment-building organizations and country 

success stories. 

• The constraints analysis in the subset hunger hot spots will focus on capacity and 

political commitment. 

• Develop its own international, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia communication 

and political mobilization strategy 

• Map the political context <strong>of</strong> the hungry 

• Consider expanding membership <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to incorporate greater expertise in 

political change. 

• Analyze cases <strong>of</strong> political-commitment building to discover best practices, major strategic 

modalities, and effective tactics. 

• Analyze cases <strong>of</strong> successes and failures at the national level to create sustainable antihunger 

policy initiatives 

102

7 ALIGN CRITICAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT HUNGER 

ALLEVIATION OBJECTIVES 

In order to bear fruit, a commitment to end hunger must be expressed and implemented 

through policy change. It is recognized that policy change is a very broad umbrella: it 

includes policies that create an enabling environment for hunger-reduction actions in addition 

to policies that, in themselves, directly contribute to alleviating hunger. Regardless <strong>of</strong> the 

mechanism by which a policy may influence hunger, all policies must be aligned to support 

(or be at least neutral to) hunger-reduction actions. To this end, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

builds upon the prior work <strong>of</strong> other similar initiatives to emphasize that policy reform is critical 

to achievement <strong>of</strong> the Hunger MDG. Mechanisms for alleviating causes <strong>of</strong> hunger are also 

disparate, including intellectual property rights, agricultural research priorities, micronutrient 

fortification, or human rights. Policy change also occurs at local, sub-national, regional, and 

international scales. 

The scope for policy change exists at sub-national, national, and international levels. And it 

must be borne in mind that policy formulation, implementation, and impact interact intimately 

with the prevailing context, which differs between as well as within countries. 

7.1 Overall Framework 

Empirical evidence indicates that an appropriate overall macroeconomic and sectoral policy 

is essential to economic growth and hunger reduction. This requires the deepening <strong>of</strong> policy 

and institutional reforms that foster both public and private investments in rural areas and 

encourage the implementation <strong>of</strong> those proven hunger-reduction actions that improve the 

physical, social, economic and physiological access to food. The role <strong>of</strong> the state is central to 

hunger alleviation and, at a minimum, eight policy priorities, with appropriate sequencing, 

must be in place for hunger reduction. These, not necessarily in order <strong>of</strong> impact upon 

hunger, include: 

1. Make agricultural and rural investment a priority. Agriculture is the foundation <strong>of</strong> 

economic growth in poor countries, and has a larger impact on hunger reduction than 

industry and services. A well-designed agriculture and rural development policy can 

significantly enhance agricultural productivity and economic growth. Governments 

should promote policies that reduce direct and indirect agricultural taxation; stimulate 

labor-intensive agricultural production and support public investments in rural areas 

and in agriculture that increase rural incomes and employment. 

2. Enhance capacity for policy implementation, particularly <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionals and 

technicians working on agriculture, nutrition and markets. The emphasis should be on 

broad-scale on-the-job training <strong>of</strong> government, NGOs, private sector and rural 

communities on specific interventions that will help meet the Hunger MDG. Such 

massive training will create the absorptive and implementation capacity for largerscale 

investments. 

103

3. Build and upgrade rural infrastructure and market institutions. Governments 

need to develop or repair road, railroads, energy, communications (including 

information technology), school facilities, and health posts in areas where such 

infrastructure is absent or has deteriorated. Governments should also promote the 

building <strong>of</strong> market institutions and basic physical infrastructures that link markets 

efficiently. They should also create the legal framework and institutional environment 

conducive to the development and functioning <strong>of</strong> markets, business enterprises, and 

farms. 

4. Empower women and the vulnerable groups and invest in girls. Public policies 

need to explicitly recognize and promote the equality <strong>of</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> women and other 

groups that might face disadvantage—while encouraging participation in the process 

<strong>of</strong> governance. Transparency, wide representation, and effective public resource 

management are key pillars <strong>of</strong> good governance. Policy audits should be undertaken 

to ensure extant policies do not disfavor these groups. An element <strong>of</strong> such policies 

may also be rights to food policy that guarantee the rights to food for all individuals. 

5. Strengthen social safety nets that reduce risks and help the hungry to manage 

food crises. Safety nets should aim to minimize vulnerability, and reduce the risk 

within the environment in which people pursue livelihoods and raise children. For 

some types <strong>of</strong> individuals these policies will be to minimize temporary vulnerability 

(e.g., food-for-work programs in lean seasons or after losing a job). In that case, 

safety nets help them devise a livelihood strategy that can bear some risk. For other 

individuals who are unable to work, the policies will be more assistance-oriented in 

the form <strong>of</strong> pensions, disability transfers or child support grants. For the latter 

individuals safety nets may be the only thing between them and hunger. Whatever 

the objective <strong>of</strong> the public assistance, whether in cash or kind, it require effective 

targeting and governance mechanisms to minimize leakages and misappropriation. 

6. Promote natural resources policies that enhance food security. As countries 

develop the policy framework for sustainable management <strong>of</strong> biodiversity, including 

soils, water, forests, grassland and fisheries, explicit attention should be paid to 

protecting, restoring and improving access to natural resources that are critical for 

food security <strong>of</strong> the poor. Ecoagriculture practices recommended below can minimize 

trade<strong>of</strong>fs between the needs to increase agricultural production (crops, livestock, 

forestry and fisheries) and the preservation and enhance <strong>of</strong> the natural resource 

base. 

7. Extend and strengthen land and forest ownership and access rights <strong>of</strong> the 

poor. Land and forest tenure policies should be reviewed and improved to increase 

access to land, forests and other resources by the poor, especially in countries where 

land is very unequally distributed, and to improve tenure security. Land ownership 

and tenure policies should promote efficient land markets by facilitating transactions 

(sale, renting, mortgaging and leasing <strong>of</strong> land property) as well as by establishing 

mechanisms for resolving land disputes. 

8. Maintain a stable macroeconomic and trade policy that supports hunger and 

poverty reduction, and levels the playing field for all. Such policies include 

maintaining undistorted exchange rates and trade and taxation policies that do not 

discriminate against the agricultural sector. In particular, national policy that 

104

addresses issues related to subsidies on inputs and their equity effects must be 

supportive <strong>of</strong> the hungry. Attention should also be paid to subsidies in OECD 

countries and their impact on the global agricultural trade system and upon foodinsecure 

farmers. 

Each <strong>of</strong> these policies is discussed in more detail in the sections below. 

7.2 Agricultural and Rural Development Policy 

7.2.1 Rationale for Emphasis on Agriculture and Rural Development in Hunger and Poverty 


Making agricultural and rural development a policy priority in countries and sub-regions with 

high rates <strong>of</strong> poverty and hunger: 

* To serve as the prime engine <strong>of</strong> economic growth and employment generation. The 

experience <strong>of</strong> the past 25 years has shown the folly <strong>of</strong> neglecting agriculture. Witness the 

negative consequences <strong>of</strong> taxing agriculture via domestic policies – including overvalued 

exchange rates, <strong>of</strong> allowing other rural development agendas to take the focus away from 

the fundamental task <strong>of</strong> enhancing productivity, and <strong>of</strong> withdrawing government too quickly 

from agriculture under adjustment. Quite simply, no other sector stepped in to promote 

growth -- agriculture remains the major game in town. Hunger reduction in sub-Saharan 

Africa and countries elsewhere whose economies are still largely agriculture-dependent can 

only occur with substantial increases in the productivity <strong>of</strong> land and labor involved in 

smallholder agriculture. Smallholder agriculture is not only the main source <strong>of</strong> food 

availability in rural areas, it is also the main income generating occupation, employing more 

people than any other productive sector in most poor countries. A thriving agricultural sector 

will support the rural non-farm economy through increased demand for products, and this will 

in turn generate increased demand for farm products. A thriving farm economy can increase 

the disposable income <strong>of</strong> all net food consumers, including urban households, by reducing 

the price they pay for their food products, while maintaining farm pr<strong>of</strong>itability through lower 

production costs. 

Few countries have achieved high levels <strong>of</strong> hunger reduction without first undergoing a 

sustained period <strong>of</strong> agricultural growth. In most low-income countries, the agricultural sector 

is the primary engine <strong>of</strong> overall economic growth, due to its size and its important growth 

linkages to the rest <strong>of</strong> the economy. In most low-income countries agriculture is by far the 

largest sector, providing some 60% <strong>of</strong> the labor force and 25% <strong>of</strong> GDP, and these figures are 

even higher for the least-developed countries. Overall, the effects <strong>of</strong> agricultural growth on 

hunger reduction are <strong>of</strong> course, specific to the local context. Empirical evidence suggests 

that agricultural growth has had substantial impacts on poverty and hunger reduction where: 

(a) agriculture is important to the incomes <strong>of</strong> rural poor; (b) the agro-ecological base 

(inherent or as a result <strong>of</strong> resource-enhancing investments) allows significant potential for 

productivity growth; (c) land distribution is relatively equitable; and (d) the poor consume nontradable 

food staples. These “win-win” preconditions are not likely to occur without supportive 

agricultural policies. 

Agricultural policy must address three distinct, but complementary and overlapping 

challenges in countries with high rates <strong>of</strong> hunger and poverty: 

* To supply burgeoning domestic food and agricultural product demand as incomes and 

105

populations growth. 

Demand for food is anticipated to increase dramatically over the next few decades in many 

low-income developing countries, as a result <strong>of</strong> increased population and income increases. 

It is highly unlikely that more than 10 to 20% <strong>of</strong> this increase will come from imports. Thus 

meeting domestic food demand is the central supply challenge in developing countries. 

* To reduce hunger among the large number <strong>of</strong> food-insecure farm households who rely 

significantly on their own production. The prevalence <strong>of</strong> hunger is especially high among 

smallholder farmers, herders, fishers and forest-dependent people who must rely significantly 

upon their own food production and the harvest <strong>of</strong> wild foods. This situation is especially 

common in areas with poor physical access to markets, constraints to production <strong>of</strong> surplus 

food (degraded resources, inadequate investment resources, frequent harvest failures), or 

where households are chronically unable to maintain adequate stores throughout the year. 

For producer households who cannot rely upon markets or <strong>of</strong>f-farm employment to ensure 

food security, any yield increases they obtain will increase household stores and smooth 

consumption through the year. For those who are integrated into market systems, increased 

productivity can result in greater surplus for sale and potentials to grow higher-value products 

so that adequate food can be purchased. 

7.2.2 Designing Rural Development Strategies 

Interventions must be shaped to meet the needs <strong>of</strong> many different “agricultural contexts”. 

Error! Reference source not found. presents a crude typology <strong>of</strong> 16 different contexts for 

smallholder poverty reduction. For example, where markets are not liberalized or 

infrastructure is poor, people have to rely on local staple crop production for food security. 

The production <strong>of</strong> high-value crops for poverty reduction makes most sense in areas with 

good infrastructure and liberalized markets. Where labor is in surplus, the emphasis should 

be on labor-intensive methods; when it is scarce, the emphasis is on raising labor 

productivity. Where infrastructure is good, external inputs can be used intensively, where it 

is not, external inputs have to be used more sparingly. The shaded cells designate priority or 

emphasis suggested by the authors. These will be re-visited when after the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

completes its hunger hotspot analyses. 

7.3 Market Infrastructure and Institutions 

Increasing household access or purchasing power for food products is one <strong>of</strong> the pillars <strong>of</strong> 

food security. In fact, households access to well-functioning markets for agricultural products 

and inputs do enhance food security and hunger reduction. Experience show that if citizens 

are lifted out <strong>of</strong> poverty, they will be able to purchase food needs, even if they do not grow it 

themselves in sufficient quantities. However, when poverty persists, the use <strong>of</strong> cash transfer 

programs can improve food access. Cash transfer or targeted subsidy programs that rely on 

retail markets are more efficient than direct food distribution as they do not undermine 

marketing chains. In addition, cash transfers or the provision <strong>of</strong> vouchers will allow the 

recipients to purchase the food they require using normal market channels, although in a few 

cases, mainly famine situations in Africa, it may be necessary for outside agencies to 

transport food to remote areas. For an aggressive anti-hunger program, supporting policies 

that promote market infrastructure and institutions are critical. It should be noted that in 

some African contexts, food is controlled by women and cash transfers are received by men, 

106

making gender-sensitive reforms a possible prerequisite to ensuring cash transfers act to 

alleviate hunger. These have to be supported by effective legal systems. 

Strengthening farmer-to-market linkages is one <strong>of</strong> the crucial ways <strong>of</strong> promoting agriculture 

and hunger reduction. In implementing this objective, governments should focus their 

interventions in ways that maximize public-private partnership for maximum impact on 

hunger reduction by: 

• improving conditions for investments that support the functioning <strong>of</strong> markets and 

helping overcome market failures; 

• improving the performance <strong>of</strong> agencies providing key public goods and services that 

underpin the productivity <strong>of</strong> agriculture, with a focus on cost-effectiveness, clientresponsiveness, 

and sustainability; 

• promoting market solutions for service delivery, including co-financing and cost 

recovery mechanisms, where they are efficient and effective for hunger alleviation; 

• empowering the poor, especially women, through collective action to pr<strong>of</strong>itably 

participate in markets, manage their risks, and access public services; 

• and promoting supply chain management as a means to secure market linkage, 

quality control, and reduction <strong>of</strong> logistic costs. 

These are discussed in detail in Chapter 10:Raise the productivity <strong>of</strong> smallholder farmers in 

more- and less-favored lands . It should be realized, however, that in the short run there 

could be large adjustment costs associated with reform <strong>of</strong> domestic markets. The pay<strong>of</strong>f, <strong>of</strong> 

course, occurs in the longer term when improved competition fosters the development <strong>of</strong> 

efficient markets. Nonetheless, where reforms are likely to have immediate negative effects, 

choosing an appropriate sequencing and speed <strong>of</strong> reforms may mitigate the impact on the 

poor and allow time to design compensatory policies to safeguard the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> the poor 

during the transition period. Careful sequencing <strong>of</strong> subsidy removal and liberalization is 

therefore a key issue for a successful market reform process. 

107

Table 7-1Priorities for agricultural development by regional and national characteristics 

Regional characteristics 

Good infrastructure 

Poor infrastructure 

Surplus labor Scarce labor Surplus labor Scarce labor 

AGRICULTURAL PRIORITY 

Low 

High 

Low 

High 

Low 

High 

Low 

High 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

Markets liberalized 

1. Staple food production 

2. High-value crops, trees and livestock 

3. Employment intensive growth 

4. Increased labor productivity 

5. Low external-input farming; 

6. High external-input farming; 

Markets not liberalized 







Source: Adapted from Hazell and Haddad 2001 

108

Figure 7-1 Food System Strategies for Reducing Poverty and Hunger: Sub-Saharan Africa 

Weights 

given to 

each 

strategy, 

Delphi 

method 

Dixon et. al. 2001 

Sparse Agriculture (Arid) 

Urban Based 

Coastal Artisanal Fishing 

Pastoral 

Highland Temperate Mixed 

Highland Perennial 

Rice-Tree Crop 

Agro-Pastoral Millet/Sorghum 

Large Commercial and Smallholder 

Maize Mixed 

Root Crop 

Forest Based 

Cereal-Root Crop Mixed 

Irrigated 

Tree Crop 

Intensification Diversification Increased Farm Size 

Increased <strong>of</strong>f-farm Income Exit from Agriculture 

Livelihood and rural development strategies need to consider agro-climatic conditions, 

population density and the existing quality <strong>of</strong> infrastructure. Broad options include: (1) 

intensification (raising the productivity <strong>of</strong> labor and land), (2) diversification <strong>of</strong> production 

(including market-oriented, value-added and post-harvest activities), (3) increasing farm size, 

(4) increased <strong>of</strong>f-farm income to supplement or replace farming activities, and (5) exit from 

agriculture within the farming system, <strong>of</strong>ten involving migration from rural areas. Figure 

7-1summarizes the priorities assigned by Dixon et. al. (2001) major types <strong>of</strong> farming systems 

in sub-Saharan Africa. It is likely that this analysis is overly pessimistic, however, given (1) 

the large numbers <strong>of</strong> hungry people living in the less-favored lands (from the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s 

hot spot analysis), (2) the groundswell <strong>of</strong> support by governments in the region to strengthen 

markets for the poor, improve infrastructure and increase spending on agricultural research 

(e.g. NEPAD), (3) the low carrying capacity <strong>of</strong> urban areas for those exiting from agriculture 

in the sense that they are already home to large numbers <strong>of</strong> hungry people (from the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong>’s hot spot analysis) and (4) new technologies and resource management practices for 

less-favored areas. 

7.3.1 Specific policies for agriculture and rural development 

A supportive policy environment is critical to encourage broad-based pro-poor agriculture 

and rural growth in ways that are ecologically and socially sustainable. This will require 

coordination between several government ministries, and may well be outside <strong>of</strong> the 

mandate <strong>of</strong> the ministry <strong>of</strong> agriculture alone. The policy agenda for moving toward this ideal 

environment should encompass following, paying adequate attention to sequencing: 

• Strengthen institutions to support increased smallholder agricultural productivity. Low- 

109

income, agricultural regions and countries must re-build their public and catalyze 

expansion <strong>of</strong> private institutions to support smallholder producers raise their productivity. 

This will include extension and research organizations, as well as credit and seed 

distribution systems. Specific interventions are discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 

• Reduce indirect and direct agricultural taxation. Developing countries <strong>of</strong>ten directly tax 

the agriculture sector (in part because it is the biggest sector and thus a major source <strong>of</strong> 

public funding) through taxes on exports or controlled food prices. Many <strong>of</strong> these direct 

measures have depressed the prices received by agricultural producers below levels that 

would otherwise prevail. Commodity and input markets have been characterized by 

heavy government interventions through centralized procurement measures (government 

parastatals and marketing boards), input subsidies, quotas on exports <strong>of</strong> agricultural 

commodities, direct taxation <strong>of</strong> such exports, and various regulatory rules and decrees. 

There are fiscal constraints to rapid change in this domain but, given the inertia in such 

systems, change directions need to be clarified as early as possible to guide investors. 

Overall, agricultural taxes should not be higher than those for other sectors, and should 

be integrated with general value-added, pr<strong>of</strong>it, income, and wealth taxes (not input and 

output taxes). Taxation instruments need to be made explicit 

• Intervene directly in food shortages. Food policy should enables the government to 

effectively intervene to protect the hungry in times <strong>of</strong> food shortages and other food 

crises. As the overall agenda is implemented, some countries are likely to be exposed to 

international prices and global forces that leave them vulnerable to national food 

shortages, and thus food policy must provide the necessary contingency measures 

should risks related to these changes eventuate. This policy must provide for effective 

targeting to those who are most in need, and must be carefully implemented so as not to 

undermine the development <strong>of</strong> local agricultural seed, output, and food markets. 

• Stimulate labor-intensive agricultural exports. Rapidly expanding export markets may 

provide a new source <strong>of</strong> rural growth, especially for middle-income countries and more 

commercially oriented farmers. High-value products such as fresh fruit, vegetables, fish 

and flowers have created an opportunity for developing-world farmers to compete for a 

share in export markets. Diversification to high-value export commodities <strong>of</strong>fers farmers 

new opportunities to increase incomes without increasing farm area. It also <strong>of</strong>fers them 

wage employment in processing and packing sites. As a result, international trade in 

high-value agricultural products is growing by some 7% annually compared to 2% 

annually for staple commodities. This expanding international market provides 

possibilities for export, but it also forces farmers to compete with the world’s most 

efficient producers. In Latin America and Southeast Asia, for example, suppliers <strong>of</strong> 

commodities to local markets have to compete with globally sourced commodities. To 

achieve such gains from diversification requires adequate infrastructure and investment 

in research and extension. This will involve policies that enable the emergence <strong>of</strong> 

coordinated supply chains, enable the poor to participate (e.g., legal policy that fosters 

contract enforceability and thus provides incentives for the private sector to negotiate 

supply arrangements with larger downstream processors), and capacity building <strong>of</strong> 

private sector businesses and entrepreneurs (through the likes <strong>of</strong> support for business 

development services, raising the skills <strong>of</strong> the labor force to enable wider participation in 

expanded (and <strong>of</strong>ten more skilled and remunerative) employment opportunities from 

110

intensive production and processing systems. Policies to promote market-based export 

agriculture must be aligned with policies for national food security. 

7.4 Greatly Enhance Capacity for Policy Implementation 

Greatly enhancing capacity for policy implementation is a priority for investment. Capacity 

improvements are essential to create changes that are sustainable and self-administering on 

the local and national levels, as the poorest economies emerge from dependence on donor 

assistance to achieve the MDG’s. Capacity building includes (1) training in skills to achieve 

the Hunger MDG for pr<strong>of</strong>essionals and technicians working on nutritional assistance, 

agricultural productivity, and improvement <strong>of</strong> market institutions, (2) training in the public and 

private sectors and at community level, and (3) the building <strong>of</strong> non-corrupt government 

institutions. 

One possible action for Sub-Saharan Africa would be a major investment in training about 

100,000 pr<strong>of</strong>essionals and para-pr<strong>of</strong>essionals in agricultural extension and nutrition, in a 

similar way the World Health organization is proposing training a similar number for fighting 

HIV-AIDS in the region. 

7.5 Build and Upgrade Rural Infrastructure 

Both farms and households need a minimum bundle <strong>of</strong> infrastructure services to function 

efficiently. Despite widespread recognition <strong>of</strong> the potential positive impact <strong>of</strong> rural 

investments, such as rural infrastructure that improves the availability <strong>of</strong> transport, energy, 

water supply, sanitation, telecommunications, education, and health services to hunger 

reduction, these investments in rural areas remain limited. The public sector typically favors 

investment in urban areas because <strong>of</strong> lower costs per person <strong>of</strong> providing such services. 

* Social infrastructure. Lack <strong>of</strong> safe drinking water is a major contributor to diarrhea, a 

frequent cause <strong>of</strong> death among children in rural areas and a common cause <strong>of</strong> reduced labor 

productivity in agriculture. A lack <strong>of</strong> health services also contributes to illness and reduced 

productivity <strong>of</strong> the rural workforce. 

* Cost-effective infrastructure provision. In order to improve the availability, quality, and 

affordability <strong>of</strong> infrastructure services to rural households and enterprises, public policy must 

promote direct investment or the partnering with or contraction out to the private sector. 

Important aspects <strong>of</strong> such policy include; built-in mechanisms to enhance the sustainability <strong>of</strong> 

investment programs; decentralized arrangements for providing local infrastructure; 

advocacy <strong>of</strong> participatory, gender-inclusive, and demand-driven approaches; facilitation <strong>of</strong> 

private sector involvement in the production and financing <strong>of</strong> infrastructure; ensuring 

accountability to users in rural infrastructure projects; and encouraging adequate cost 

recovery and upfront contributions from users. The important feature <strong>of</strong> listening to 

stakeholders is that it is their priorities rather than those <strong>of</strong> MDG goal-setters that drive the 

politics and implementation <strong>of</strong> sustainable local investments. 

Investment in infrastructure is particularly important in reducing the high costs <strong>of</strong> marketing 

for small producers. Transport and trade are initially the most important drivers for the rural 

economy. With improved transport services, markets develop and farmers and other rural 

households have the opportunity to produce surplus for sale, to specialize in producing those 

goods in which they are most productive, and to diversify for distant markets. Increased 

111

mobility through transport and information also increases participation <strong>of</strong> rural labor in 

income-generating activities that can add significantly to rural growth and poverty reduction. 

Strengthening farmer-to-market linkages is one <strong>of</strong> the crucial ways <strong>of</strong> promoting agriculture 

and hunger reduction. In implementing this objective, governments should focus their 

interventions in ways that maximize public-private partnership for maximum impact on 

hunger reduction by: 

• Improving conditions for investments that support the functioning <strong>of</strong> markets and 

helping overcome market failures; 

• Improving the performance <strong>of</strong> agencies providing key public goods and services that 

underpin the productivity <strong>of</strong> agriculture, with a focus on cost-effectiveness, clientresponsiveness, 

and sustainability; 

• Promoting market solutions for service delivery, including co-financing and cost 

recovery mechanisms, where they are efficient and effective for hunger alleviation; 

• Empowering the poor, especially women, through collective action to pr<strong>of</strong>itably 

participate in markets, manage their risks, and access public services; 

• Promoting supply chain management as a means to secure market linkage, quality 

control, and reduction <strong>of</strong> logistic costs. 

These are discussed in detail in the markets chapter. It should be realized, however, that in 

the short run there could be large adjustment costs associated with reform <strong>of</strong> domestic 

markets. The pay<strong>of</strong>f, <strong>of</strong> course, occurs in the longer term when improved competition fosters 

the development <strong>of</strong> efficient markets. Nonetheless, where reforms are likely to have 

immediate negative effects, choosing an appropriate sequencing and speed <strong>of</strong> reforms may 

mitigate the impact on the poor and allow time to design compensatory policies to safeguard 

the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> the poor during the transition period. Careful sequencing <strong>of</strong> subsidy 

removal and liberalization is therefore a key issue for a successful market reform process. 

7.6 Empower Women and Vulnerable Groups and Invest in Girls 

7.6.1 Women are primary producers and providers <strong>of</strong> food, nutrition and care 

Women have significant productive roles in developing countries. In much <strong>of</strong> rural Sub- 

Saharan Africa, women are subsistence farmers. Yet they are <strong>of</strong>ten given small and 

marginalized plots <strong>of</strong> land; they have less access to credit, extension services, and 

technological inputs than do men, setting them at a disadvantage in terms <strong>of</strong> food production. 

Despite the perception that women farmers were less efficient than men, a review <strong>of</strong> gender 

differences in agricultural productivity found that there were no significant technical efficiency 

differences between men and women farmers, once individual characteristics and input 

levels are controlled for (Quisumbing 1996). Only one study, in Burkina Faso, estimated that 

women were less efficient than men farmers (Udry 1996). In this case, however, lower inputs 

into” women’s” crops (which brought lower yields) resulted from highly asymmetric roles and 

household obligations. The review suggests that there could be significant productivity gains 

by equalizing men’s and women’s education, physical capital, and cash inputs. Simulations 

based on coefficients estimated from a study <strong>of</strong> maize farmers in the Vihiga District <strong>of</strong> Kenya 

in the 1970s (Moock 1976) suggest that giving women at least a year <strong>of</strong> primary education 

can raise women farmers’ yields by 24 percent. Simulations using another study in Kenya 

(Saito, Mekonnen, and Spurling 1994) suggest a 22 percent increase in women’s yields from 

maize, bean, and cowpea plots if women farmers are given the human capital and input 

112

levels <strong>of</strong> male farmers. However, these simulations did not take into account how input levels 

could actually be increased. Moreover, none <strong>of</strong> the studies (with the exception <strong>of</strong> the Burkina 

Faso study) paid explicit attention to the possibility that a different, non-unitary model <strong>of</strong> 

household behavior may be driving farm decision making. 

In many developing countries women are over-represented in the informal wage sectors, 

such as agricultural wage labor. Gender gaps in employment opportunities and wages imply 

that in net terms women work fewer days than men and earn significantly less than men. Yet 

their relatively smaller contribution to the household is spent almost exclusively on the 

household and children; while men earn more, they contribute significantly less to the 

household (Mencher). : There is a great deal <strong>of</strong> research showing that the greater the 

percent <strong>of</strong> household income earned by women, the greater the food security <strong>of</strong> the 

household at a given level <strong>of</strong> overall income. (e.g., Engle; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). Low 

wages and poor work conditions leave women with few adequate child care options; studies 

show that malnutrition is significantly more likely among young children when their mothers 

have to work under such conditions (Abbi et al, Kishor & Parasuraman). 

Families <strong>of</strong>ten decide when and whom a girl should marry, when and how many children she 

should have, and when and whether a child needs to receive health care. Women’s low 

social status, lack <strong>of</strong> decision-making power, and lack <strong>of</strong> control over income have a 

significant adverse effect on health-seeking behaviors and child health and nutrition 

outcomes (Doan and Bisharat, Castle, Smith et al, Merchant and Udipi). Addressing these 

issues is particularly important for the prevention <strong>of</strong> low birth weight, identified as one <strong>of</strong> the 

key actions recommended by the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. 

Four critical elements must be in place in order to achieve policy changes that empower 

women: 

• There must be political will and commitment to change policies that can engender 

gender equity and promote the creation <strong>of</strong> an enabling environment in which women 

can become empowered. 

• Such political commitment may be rooted in understanding <strong>of</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> 

promoting gender equality in poverty reduction. 

• Capacity created through organization <strong>of</strong> civil society actors and activists for policy 

change. 

• An evidence-based advocacy strategy is needed to make a powerful case for public 

and political support <strong>of</strong> these changes. 

7.6.2 Specific Over-arching Policies to Empower Women and Girls 

* Policies that invest in Capabilities. Key elements include free, compulsory universal primary 

education, and opportunities and legislative framework for secondary education for girls. Also 

needed is a legislative and policy framework for women and adolescent girls’ reproductive 

rights and choices including: Greater contraceptive choices, family planning and reproductive 

health services, legalized abortion, and an advocacy strategy to raise the age <strong>of</strong> marriage 

and/or delay first pregnancies beyond adolescence 

* Policies to increase access to resources and opportunities. These include property and 

inheritance rights for women and girls, and development <strong>of</strong> a legislative and policy framework 

to address discrimination in employment including: gender gaps in earnings, occupational 

113

segregation, women’s over-representation in the informal sector, social protection, and 

improving wage and work conditions, improving women’s access to credit. Affirmative action 

and relevant legislative framework are <strong>of</strong>ten needed to promote women’s political 

participation. 

* Policies to Increase Physical Security- It is important to adopt and enforce legislation to end 

physical and sexual violence against women and children. 

7.6.3 Gender-sensitive Policy Agenda for Agricultural Productivity, Market Improvements 

and Income Generation, and Health Status. 

Macro-economic food policies that regulate the prices <strong>of</strong> staples is important to integrate 

gender sensitivity into relevant sectoral policies. Policies those are gender-sensitive in 

targeting basic, financial, technological inputs and agricultural extension services for women 

and other vulnerable groups. Investment in gender-sensitive infrastructure for health, water, 

sanitation, energy, and transportation that are critical to reducing women’s burdens in 

collecting water, fuel wood, and accessing health care. Macro-economic policies aimed at 

promoting employment intensive growth and social protection that can give women 

employment opportunities outside the informal sector. Adopting a policy framework that 

ensures health equity for women and girls (e.g. health insurance in women’s names). 

7.6.4 Public policy to improve the nutritional status <strong>of</strong> women 

Table 7-2 seeks to describe -- not to recommend -- public policy for consideration in our future 

work plan within a framework <strong>of</strong> determinants <strong>of</strong> the nutrition status <strong>of</strong> women rather than the 

earlier section that deals primarily with a broader view <strong>of</strong> empowerment, rights, and gendersensitive 

policy. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recognizes that empowerment <strong>of</strong> women, like 

hunger reduction, entails multiple strategies–some that address immediate needs and those 

that long-term societal changes such as secondary education for girls. Some <strong>of</strong> the shortterm 

strategies involving subsidies and cash-transfers listed to “promote catch-up in women’s 

status” may be deemed impractical, expensive, prone to corruption, or promotional <strong>of</strong> 

dependency. This will be a future area <strong>of</strong> analysis for the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and one <strong>of</strong> 

integration with the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s on Gender and Education. Ending hunger and malnutrition 

can be achieved more quickly if attention is paid to women's empowerment. 

Table 7-2 Public policies to Improve the Nutrition Status <strong>of</strong> Women 

Determinants 

<strong>of</strong> nutrition 

status 

Basic 

(political, 

economic, 

natural 

resource 

base) 

Eradicate discrimination 

• Reform legislation to equalize rights: 

civil, political, economic, social and 

cultural 

• Voting 

• Land inheritance and ownership 

• Employment, unemployment, benefits 

laws 

• Membership in savings and credit 

organizations 

• mobility to promote social capital 

Promote catch-up in women’s status 

• Monitoring efforts to review the genderbias 

in public policy 

• Target access to new resources to women 

• credit programs to poor women 

• affirmative action programs to actively 

recruit women in formal employment 

• Ensure women’s equal representation in 

formal and informal institutions 

114

Underlying 

(food 

security, 

care, health 

environment) 

Immediate 

(diet and 

infection) 

• Reform service delivery 

• equal access to education (quantity 

and quality) 

• Equal access to agricultural extension 

services 

• Equal access to water and sanitation 

services 

• Easy availability <strong>of</strong> family-planning 

information 

• HIV/AIDS prevention programs 

• Reform health service delivery 

• Equalize immunization rates 

• Equalize access to preventative and 

curative health care 

• Introduce legislation to enforce the 

international code on breast milk 

substitutes 

• Introduce flexible working hours and 

crèches for working mothers; maternity 

benefits paid by state 

• Food or Cash transfers that promote the 

entry <strong>of</strong> girls into education and health 

care systems, e.g. higher education 

stipends for girls, compared to boys 

• e.g. higher transfers to mothers for female 

birth deliveries at health clinics 

• Introduce labor-saving technologies when 

investing in new water and fuel technology 

(saves women’s time and energy in water 

and firewood collection) 

• Subsidies to encourage the promotion <strong>of</strong> 

child-care crèches to allow working 

women to provide their children with good 

child-care substitute 

• Child benefits targeted to women 

• Nutrition programs to improve the nutrition 

status <strong>of</strong> adolescent girls and young 

women 

7.6.5 Rights-based approach to food 

Provisions in the Universal Declaration <strong>of</strong> Human Rights (UDHR) <strong>of</strong> 1948 and the two 

International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (CPR) and on Economic, Social and 

Cultural Rights (CESCR) <strong>of</strong> 1966 as well as the 1989 international Convention on the Rights 

<strong>of</strong> the Child (CRC), have formed the normative basis for considering nutrition in development 

issues in the light <strong>of</strong> human rights principles and procedures. A milestone achievement was 

to get the recognition <strong>of</strong> the universal right to adequate food adopted by the 1996 World 

Food Summit. The Summit requested that both the concept and steps to implement the right 

should be better clarified. Under the coordination <strong>of</strong> the UN High Commissioner for Human 

Rights this request was met through the joint efforts <strong>of</strong> human rights and development 

experts including food and nutrition policy analysts, international organizations, 

representatives <strong>of</strong> interested governments and civil society. The process culminated in the 

issuing <strong>of</strong> the General Comment No. 12 on the right to food 14 in 1999 which for the first time 

<strong>of</strong>fers a comprehensive and authoritative interpretation <strong>of</strong> the human right to adequate food, 

as laid down in very general terms in UDHR (article 25) and the CESCR (Article 11) and also 

in more nutritional terms in the CRC (Articles 24 and 27). 

These provisions are beginning to gain traction on the ground. On April 16, 2001, the 

People’s Union for Civil Liberties in India (PUCL) submitted a “writ petition” to the Supreme 

Court <strong>of</strong> India asking three questions (PUCL Bulletin, July 2001): (a) does the right to life 

mean that people who are starving and too poor to buy food can get free access to 

government stockpiles? (b) Does the right to life under Article 21 <strong>of</strong> the Constitution <strong>of</strong> India 

14 The right to adequate food (Art.11) : 12/05/99. E/C.12/1999/5, CESCR General comment 12. 

(General Comments). Internet address: 

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/3d02758c707031d58025677f003b73b9?Opendocument 

115

include the right to food? and (c) does not the right to food, which has been upheld by the 

Supreme Court, imply that the State has a duty to provide food especially in situations <strong>of</strong> 

drought to people who are drought affected and are not in a position to purchase food? The 

Court ruled in favor <strong>of</strong> the PUCL. While the battle continues in the courts as the States 

contest their obligations and their ability to meet them, the issue is guaranteed to put 

pressure on State governments to place a higher priority on nutrition issues. 

The EU has been an important actor in the drive to realize the right to adequate food in the 

context <strong>of</strong> national food security. The EU has been supportive <strong>of</strong> the Intergovernmental 

Working Group (IGWG) <strong>of</strong> the FAO in efforts to establish voluntary guidelines to support 

national efforts in this regard. It’s important to note that these guidelines are only voluntary 

and this is unlikely to change. Even in the EU there is debate on the appropriateness <strong>of</strong> 

voluntary guidelines for the right to food. It is chiefly promoted by Germany, the UK, Sweden 

and Ireland. The US has not supported efforts to formalize the right to food. During the next 

EU Presidency, it is likely that the IGWG will meet two more times to agree on voluntary 

guidelines. There is a lot <strong>of</strong> debate in this regard. The EU countries place a lot <strong>of</strong> emphasis 

on what developing countries should be doing to secure adequate rights to food. Certain 

developing countries (mainly in Latin America – Argentina, Brazil) are pushing more strongly 

for an international dimension to these guidelines, with Brazil and Argentina pushing for trade 

and agriculture inclusions. Making the right to food into an operational concept is a 

challenge and questions remain <strong>of</strong> how to specifically create and enforce this right. 

7.7 Strengthen Social Safety Nets that Reduce Risk and Assist the Hungry to 

Manage Food Crises 

What mechanisms are essential to reduce risks and safeguard against shocks in order to 

increase the return on investment <strong>of</strong> actions in the major areas <strong>of</strong> life-cycle nutritional 

interventions, market improvements, and increasing agricultural productivity? While the 

enhancement <strong>of</strong> a livelihood typically involves raised productivity/output and reduced 

dependency on only a few sources <strong>of</strong> income, the enhancement <strong>of</strong> resiliency also requires 

that income and assets and their related systems be protected in the face <strong>of</strong> shocks. 

When poverty persists, the use <strong>of</strong> cash transfer programs can improve food access. Cash 

transfer or targeted subsidy programs that rely on retail markets are more efficient than direct 

food distribution as they do not undermine marketing chains. In addition, cash transfers or 

the provision <strong>of</strong> vouchers will allow the recipients to purchase the food they require using 

normal market channels, although in a few cases, mainly famine situations in Africa, it may 

be necessary for outside agencies to transport food to remote areas. It should be noted that 

in some African contexts, food is controlled by women and cash transfers are received by 

men, making gender-sensitive reforms a possible prerequisite to ensuring cash transfers act 

to alleviate hunger. These have to be supported by effective legal systems. 

Income source diversification has been shown to be positively associated not only with 

wealth accumulation but also with an increased ability to withstand exogenous shocks, at 

least in terms <strong>of</strong> partial consumption smoothing (Barrett et. al. 2001). Recent work on 

diversification serves as a useful bridge between work on agricultural intensification and 

poverty alleviation, on the one hand, and risks, shocks, and vulnerability, on the other. The 

intensification literature generally focuses on potential multipliers between agricultural 

productivity and the rest <strong>of</strong> the rural economy since a vibrant non-farm rural sector allows for 

116

greater farm specialization as well as higher demand for farm products. By contrast, the 

livelihoods literature focuses on the importance <strong>of</strong> spreading risk through covariate insurance 

strategies where households seek to protect themselves against the vagaries <strong>of</strong> climate and 

shocks. 

This dual characteristic <strong>of</strong> livelihood diversification—generator <strong>of</strong> wealth as well as smoother 

<strong>of</strong> consumption—has led a spectrum <strong>of</strong> development agencies, governments and nongovernmental 

organizations to promote income and asset diversification as a key strategy for 

countries facing repeated income and consumption shocks (Barrett et. al. 2001). Of course, 

the commitment to diversification as an objective within livelihood development strategies 

assumes not only that diversification will reduce vulnerability and improve levels <strong>of</strong> 

consumption, but that food insecure households in risky environments can in fact diversify. 

Such is not always the case. There are real entry barriers to more diverse, higher-earning 

rural activities; these relate to a lack <strong>of</strong> capital, lack <strong>of</strong> access to credit for those without 

collateral, lack <strong>of</strong> information, lack <strong>of</strong> expertise, and high opportunity costs <strong>of</strong> participation in 

any new (therefore uncertain) endeavor with unknown returns. This means that interventions 

that overcome at least some <strong>of</strong> these constraints are critical if vulnerable households are to 

acquire the financial or physical capital that they need. 

In this regard, public works can be important in reducing opportunity costs <strong>of</strong> time while 

enhancing private, as well as public, assets that are essential to enhanced agricultural 

productivity—road infrastructure, watershed management, micro-dam construction, water 

management systems. Micro-finance schemes can support training, start-up capital and 

initial assets required in new income generating activities, as well as support for rural 

processing, cottage, and local transport service industries. It should be underlined that 

raising the productivity <strong>of</strong> agriculture is not simply about raising yields per area <strong>of</strong> land 

cultivated. Reducing costs, increasing labor (<strong>of</strong>ten hired) demand, enhancing stability in total 

output, resistance to weeds, pests and diseases, and the promotion <strong>of</strong> ‘new’ crops alongside 

traditional ones can all stimulate local services, market activity, and demand. Recent 

successes have included reducing costs through new technologies and lowered post-harvest 

losses, introduction <strong>of</strong> livestock and egg marketing, encouragement <strong>of</strong> diet diversity via home 

gardens, and diversification into cash crops where market outlets allowed. In all cases 

success has to be measured not simply in terms <strong>of</strong> ‘more’ production, but also ‘how 

diversified’, and can it be continued. 

7.7.1 Social Safety-nets 

Markets alone will not overcome current hunger in the developing world, since the poor and 

hungry are too marginalized from the formal economy. Robust economic growth in the 

developing world is essential to meeting the MDG’s, but it is not sufficient. Expanded and 

more effective government action is also required. Additional safety nets are needed to 

reach some <strong>of</strong> the most marginalized especially to protect against disasters. 

The impact <strong>of</strong> a disaster, e.g. drought, can have disastrous short-, medium-, and long-term 

affects on the capacity <strong>of</strong> households to feed themselves. In the absence <strong>of</strong> external 

assistance household coping mechanisms can be exhausted and unsustainable survival 

strategies employed. For example, households <strong>of</strong>ten sacrifice their physical assets in times 

<strong>of</strong> food insecurity, e.g. selling livestock, farming equipment and land holding. While this 

occurs at a high opportunity cost, the long-term effects are worse. As assets are depleted, 

117

future earning streams are lost and livelihoods jeopardized. A supply <strong>of</strong> productive assets is 

therefore crucial for sustainable development and food security. In the medium to long term 

the inherent link between nutrition and asset protection cannot be overlooked. Selfsufficiency 

and productivity are fundamental to a successful livelihoods strategy in the future 

(Lautze, 1997). 

Doing a better job <strong>of</strong> managing shocks, volatile consumption and uncertain productivity 

requires attention to links across investments aimed at ‘development’, emergency relief, 

post-crisis reconstruction and future preparedness. According to Christoplos et. al. (2001), 

“a concern for risk, and with it a motivation to improve disaster …preparedness, has tended 

to fall between the cracks <strong>of</strong> the conceptual frameworks that have driven development cooperation 

and humanitarian assistance.” While great strides have been made in enhancing 

the way relief is conducted, building risk-awareness into development, such that food 

insecure households are better managers <strong>of</strong> uncertainty, is still lagging (Wodon and Morris 

2001; IFRCRCS 2001). 

Some countries have established reasonably efficient nutrition surveillance systems 

(Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand); some private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have made 

strides towards developing community-based early warning systems (Sudan, Ethiopia); 

numerous agencies have progressed in the elaboration <strong>of</strong> more global warning systems 

(FEWS, FIVIMS, GIEWS, VAM, etc). However, good warnings are not invariably coincident 

with good operational responses. Similarly, effective relief is not invariably followed by 

effective transition into reconstruction and development. Part <strong>of</strong> the disconnect is due to a 

lack <strong>of</strong> attention to contingency planning, and to a continuing lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge on best 

practice regarding ‘when and how’ to transition from relief to development. A greater 

investment is needed in reviewing recent experience with a view to establishing the 

appropriateness <strong>of</strong> food supported interventions at various points in a transition process and 

the best approaches to managing that process such that local resiliency is enhanced (Webb 

and Rogers 2003). 

Governments have an opportunity to exploit positive synergies between safety net programs 

to help the most food-insecurity and to ensure adequate nutrition for good health <strong>of</strong> mothers 

and development <strong>of</strong> market economies. Maximum synergies will be achieved when these 

sorts <strong>of</strong> food aid programs are supplied, to the greatest extent possible, from local and 

national agricultural production. International development food aid, except when necessary 

for victims <strong>of</strong> extreme events, should be sourced in the developing countries, not imported 

from OECD countries. In the case <strong>of</strong> extreme emergency events, speed-<strong>of</strong>-delivery <strong>of</strong> very 

large food quantities is <strong>of</strong> paramount importance and may preclude in-country sourcing or 

other limits. 

7.7.2 Disaster response 

Effective management <strong>of</strong> risks requires specific understanding <strong>of</strong> the local nature <strong>of</strong> risks and 

resiliencies. Much greater use should be made in development programming <strong>of</strong> the 

sophisticated techniques <strong>of</strong> vulnerability mapping widely used in famine early warning and 

contingency planning. Only through detailed contextual analysis will programs be able to 

identify both the potentials and limits <strong>of</strong> emergency responses. The assessment <strong>of</strong> 

vulnerability is not something to be done during an emergency—it needs to be done prior to 

disaster since degrees <strong>of</strong> vulnerability depend on underlying, prior conditions (Webb and 

118

Haranarayan 1999). The most important challenge is not the choice <strong>of</strong> technique or 

technology to be used in combining data on climate, crop assessments, market prices or 

migration patterns, but the ability to translate a measured ‘need’ into committed development 

investments that reduce the risks identified. All marginalized communities should benefit 

from development investments that have a ‘risk dimension’ embedded in them. In practice, 

most vulnerable communities around the world have barely begun to tap intended benefits <strong>of</strong> 

development; emergency rations may be the first form <strong>of</strong> external assistance many people 

have ever seen. As a result, emergency responses should seek as soon as possible to 

define not exit strategies but ‘asset strategies’. 

Without the following prevention and preparedness activities the most recent experiences <strong>of</strong> 

famine in Ethiopia would have been considerably graver. These activities were initiated 

under The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). Prevention 

activities are conducted to tackle root causes <strong>of</strong> vulnerability to disasters and to promote food 

security. Employment Generation Schemes are the mechanisms through which relief is 

provided to able-bodied disaster victims in exchange for work. EGS help build assets and 

reduce vulnerability <strong>of</strong> the affected populations to disasters. Preparedness activities build up 

<strong>of</strong> capabilities to mitigate the negative effects <strong>of</strong> disasters. Two successful examples from 

Ethiopia: 

• Early Warning Systems: This is a complex management information system that uses 

data from and provides information to a large number <strong>of</strong> government and NGO’s. The 

main objective <strong>of</strong> the EWS is “to provide timely and accurate early warning 

information on impending and actual emergencies, so that swift, appropriate and 

effective measures can be taken to avoid suffering”. NGO’s are particularly active 

collecting early warning data from agricultural programs, nutritional surveillance, 

market trends and migration patterns. 

• Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR): The EFSR is an innovative preparedness 

method that could be adopted more widely in priority countries. The EFSR provides 

adequate capacity to prevent disasters through provision <strong>of</strong> loans <strong>of</strong> food and nonfood 

emergency items to agencies that are engaged in relief activities. The EFSR is 

particularly beneficial in short-circuiting the lag between the period when food aid is 

committed and when it arrives. The food stock has an optimum capacity <strong>of</strong> 400,000 

MT. 

7.7.3 Responding to HIV/AIDS 

HIV and AIDS have dramatically altered the landscape in which agriculture has to operate in 

southern and eastern sub-Saharan Africa (see Annex Table xx which indicates that over 15 

percent <strong>of</strong> adults in Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Namibia, Zambia, South 

Africa, Malawi, and Kenya are living with HIV/AIDS). Technology development and 

dissemination and natural resource management practices need to quickly adapt to the 

HIV/AIDS legacy <strong>of</strong> lower labor to land ratios, disrupted knowledge transmission, diminished 

capacity for collective action and weaker property rights. 

A number <strong>of</strong> responses can be employed to break the food insecurity and HIV/Aids link. 

• First it is critical to recognize that the problem is a complex situation <strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> all 

forms <strong>of</strong> access to food. 

119

• Filter the problem <strong>of</strong> food security through HIV/AIDS. This can help people in the 

agricultural sector choose livelihood strategies that minimize risk and mitigate impact. 

This is a fresh approach. The ways in which livelihoods could be adopted and 

adapted to ensure that families avoid the virus have only been recently appreciated. 

• Along with responding to HIV/AIDS crisis it is important to look at program 

sustainability and long-term vulnerability e.g. what crops are nutritious enough to 

replace labor intensively raise crops (IFPRI, 2002). 

• Include nutrition as a core component <strong>of</strong> HIV care. Too <strong>of</strong>ten care and treatment <strong>of</strong> 

people with HIV/AIDS is reduced to the issue <strong>of</strong> anti-retroviral drug prices. This 

reduces the debate and fails to recognize the synergies possible by advancing the 

care agenda simultaneously on multiple forms (IFPRI, 2002). 

• Give HIV infected women options to protect and feed infants (IFPRI, 2002). 

• The commercial agricultural sector could serve as a conduit for information and 

training on prevention, and might also provide opportunities for youth to learn 

essential agricultural skills (IFPRI, 2002). 

7.8 Promote Natural Resources Policies that Enhance Food Security 

Sustainable natural resource management is essential to provide fundamental ecosystem 

functions, to conserve resources for future generations, mitigate global climate change and 

to conserve nationally and globally important biodiversity. But resource management is also 

critical to food security and hunger reduction. These include: 

• Resources that are essential inputs for food production. Soils are the foundations <strong>of</strong> 

agriculture, forests help to protect water sources and provide income for more than 

1.6 billion people, and water is essential for human life and agriculture. Biodiversity is 

the basis for protecting and improving all domestic plant and animal varieties and 

safeguards food security Other natural resources critical to crop, livestock and 

agr<strong>of</strong>orestry production include grass or tree fodder, forest products for stakes or 

fencing, and compost, or protection from wind damage and erosion. 

• Resources that are directly harvested for food and for income used for buying food. 

Examples include forest foods, wild plants, fuelwood for cooking, natural fisheries, 

wild game, timber and non-timber forest products. Roughly 60 million herders, 30 

million fishers and several hundred forest-dependent (non-farm) households rely 

primarily on natural resources for their food. In most countries are among the poorest 

populations. Poor farm households also depend disproportionately on these sources 

<strong>of</strong> food to smooth consumption and as “environmental safety nets” in times <strong>of</strong> food 

crisis. 

• Resources that maintain well-functioning agricultural ecosystems. Agroecosystem 

stability required good vegetative cover <strong>of</strong> watersheds, habitat for pollinators, 

moderators <strong>of</strong> pest-disease-predator populations, waste decomposition, and 

vegetation that services to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Inappropriate use <strong>of</strong> 

resources threatens rural livelihoods and creates formidable new challenges, such as 

global warming and new diseases. 

The degradation <strong>of</strong> the natural resource base affects the poor more than others, as they 

120

tend to rely on more fragile natural resources for their livelihoods. Sustainable natural 

resource management and agriculture are generally quite compatible. Decisions on the 

use <strong>of</strong> natural resources are not made by governments or international organizations, but 

are made daily by millions <strong>of</strong> farmers and rural inhabitants. In particular, women’s 

indigenous knowledge <strong>of</strong> seed selection and preservation, medicinal and other special 

use <strong>of</strong> plants as well as genetic resources for food and agriculture make them essential 

to the process <strong>of</strong> conserving agro-biodiversity. Policies that do not consider the roles <strong>of</strong> 

women and indigenous groups in NRM can result in inefficiencies and non-compliance in 

policy implementation. 

The objectives <strong>of</strong> agricultural growth and hunger reduction can be met by adopting policies 

with an integrated natural resources management approach that optimizes the use <strong>of</strong> the 

natural resource base to meet agricultural productivity goals, protects the long-term 

productivity and resilience <strong>of</strong> natural resources, and meets communities’ goals (Izac and 

Sanchez, 1999). These goals would include the welfare <strong>of</strong> future generations, poverty 

reduction and environmental conservation. Work with communities for landscape-scale 

management that integrated production and natural areas. 

This approach avoids dealing with strategies that address the principal resources 

individually; rather it will focus on interactions between soil, water, solar energy, and plant 

and animal germplasm. For example, bad forestry practices will have an adverse effect on 

water supply and lead to land degradation. Land conversion from agriculture to urban use 

puts greater stress on marginal zones that in turn leads to conversion <strong>of</strong> forests to agriculture 

and further erosion. Also, there is a confirmed relationship between female illiteracy and 

population growth, the latter being a significant driver <strong>of</strong> rapid deforestation throughout 

various eco-regions. All <strong>of</strong> these, in turn, have adverse impacts on biodiversity. However, at 

the operational level, natural resource management strategies will be broken down into 

manageable investment, institution building and policy programs/projects, <strong>of</strong>ten at the singlesector 

level (for example, forestry or water supply, fisheries, energy, or environmental 

protection projects). 

If rural poverty and hunger are to be reduced and if worldwide food demand is to be met, 

increased outputs will have to come mainly from intensified and more efficient use <strong>of</strong> these 

limited means <strong>of</strong> production. At the same time, action must be taken to arrest the destruction 

and degradation <strong>of</strong> the natural resource base, because this is increasingly becoming the 

barrier to increasing productivity. Achieving these tasks requires investments to develop and 

deploy practices that improve technical production efficiency and develop practices and 

foster sustainable and intensified food production. The needs are institutional as much as 

technical. To promote the maintenance and restoration <strong>of</strong> natural assets in rural areas, 

countries should develop strategies that give overall guidance for approaching rural natural 

resource management issues and that set the framework for linking rural, and especially 

agricultural, development with natural resource management. This will involve promoting 

policies that support alternative ways <strong>of</strong> maintaining soil quality that rely less on the use <strong>of</strong> 

externally purchased inputs. It will also involve improving the state <strong>of</strong> knowledge on land 

degradation status, impacts and causes. 

Policies that promote efficiency <strong>of</strong> water use in agriculture and improving irrigation system 

performance in a sustainable manner are essential for agricultural development. The 

potential for construction <strong>of</strong> new irrigation systems is limited and water policies should 

121

therefore provide for secure water rights for users and encourage increasing irrigated 

agricultural production by improving water productivity for the food produced per unit <strong>of</strong> water 

consumed. Such policies should encourage efficiency gains through a combination <strong>of</strong> both 

technical and managerial means by ensuring the integrity <strong>of</strong> existing infrastructure that is 

economically viable. They should also provide incentives for cost-effective management and 

maintenance <strong>of</strong> irrigation systems, including water-pricing system that discourages wastage, 

and adequate funding for system maintenance. 

To reduce biodiversity loss, emphasis should be given to identifying synergies between the 

conservation <strong>of</strong> the genetic variation within the species <strong>of</strong> crops and livestock and to 

increasing agricultural productivity and then designing institutional and technical means <strong>of</strong> 

promoting these. Examples here include promotion and implementation <strong>of</strong> the Convention on 

Biological Diversity and the also the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, which 

calls for improved access and benefit sharing from the conservation <strong>of</strong> plant genetic 

resources. Involving local communities in biodiversity conservation and providing 

mechanisms whereby they can benefit from this is another important area for action. Finally, 

investments into the development <strong>of</strong> agricultural technologies that reduce pressures on 

forested areas and implementing these within an enabling policy framework is another 

important measure leading to enhanced biodiversity conservation and protection. 

Forests are important source <strong>of</strong> income and food, especially for indigenous peoples. 

Ensuring sustainable use <strong>of</strong> forests is an important policy thrust for food security in a number 

<strong>of</strong> low-income countries. An important forest policy thrust should be the promotion <strong>of</strong> 

alternative livelihood opportunities for food-insecure forest-dependent communities to benefit 

from access to forest resources. Where possible, policy reforms that foster greater 

transparency and accountability in areas <strong>of</strong> procedures in logging contracting, biodiversity, 

carbon sequestration, and watershed protection should be promoted (Scherr, White and 

Kaimowitz 2003). 

7.9 Extend and Strengthen Land and Forest Ownership and Access Rights <strong>of</strong> 

the Poor 

Especially in countries where land is very unequally distributed, land and forest tenure policy 

should address both tenure security and distribution. 

7.9.1 Agricultural Land Tenure 

Land is <strong>of</strong>ten the main asset <strong>of</strong> most households in developing countries and is a key 

determinant <strong>of</strong> household welfare. Most land is used for agricultural production, which 

provides the basis <strong>of</strong> economic sustenance. It is important to recognize that even small plots 

<strong>of</strong> land can be influential in improving nutritional quality (garden plots) and the fact that 

access to land for production can, where other markets (including inter-temporal ones) are 

highly imperfect, make a huge difference in nutritional, and by consequence social, outcomes 

as illustrated by comparing China with India (Robin Burgess, LSE). 

The key aspect <strong>of</strong> tenure security is that many poor and hungry people have extremely 

insecure access to land, which limits their ability to make effective use <strong>of</strong> this asset 

(especially in terms <strong>of</strong> dealing with hunger at the individual level) and, via the investment 

disincentive effect, is also bad for the economy as a whole (reducing the government’s ability 

122

to put in place effective anti-hunger programs, e.g., food for work in crises). So, 

strengthening tenure security--not necessarily through formal title--is key to increase the 

asset base <strong>of</strong> poor people (e.g., Hernando de Soto). 

Access to land plays an important role in improving agricultural productivity, achieving 

sustainable poverty reduction, and creating broader economic development. The security, 

duration, and enforceability <strong>of</strong> property rights can have major impacts on land investment 

incentives, land market operations, and the development and functioning <strong>of</strong> financial 

markets. Systems to ensure tenure security need to combine legality or backing by formal 

law with social legitimacy, and be accessible to the local population and accountable to them. 

In fact, the negative economic and social impact <strong>of</strong> conflict over land (as illustrated in 

Uganda by Deininger and Mpupa 2003: http://www.iaaeagecon.org/conf/durban_papers/papers/011.pdf) 

in situations where populations and/or land 

values change rapidly increases the urgency <strong>of</strong> improving tenure security even in situations 

where full formal title may not be feasible for fiscal and other reasons. In some cases, 

particularly in the Former Soviet sphere, systematic titling and registration <strong>of</strong>fers equity and 

cost advantages when implemented under supportive policy, legal, and institutional 

frameworks. 

Improving land assets <strong>of</strong> the poor people through land reform can be an effective way <strong>of</strong> 

reducing poverty, facilitating broader economic growth through enhanced agricultural 

productivity, and producing greater social harmony. Community-based land reform relies on 

grants and/or loans to help beneficiaries purchase land through voluntary sales. In some 

circumstances, this provides an attractive model for land reform. Additional support typically 

includes production credit and technical assistance as these increase the land’s productivity 

and sustainability <strong>of</strong> farming operations. This support can be provided with the same funding 

as for land acquisition, or through parallel programs. Producer and community organizations 

are key implementing agencies in this model for efficient and equity-enhancing redistribution 

<strong>of</strong> assets. 

For historical reasons a number <strong>of</strong> countries have a legacy <strong>of</strong> high inequality <strong>of</strong> land 

ownership and resulting violence and social strife that undermines the scope for investment 

and economic advancement at the individual (tenants are being rotated for fear <strong>of</strong> gaining 

ownership--and thus can not make any investment in high value crops or perennials--which 

makes them more vulnerable to hunger) and the national level (high inequality is associated 

with social strife that discourages investment). An approach that combines market and nonmarket 

mechanisms and tries to complement markets rather than substituting for them is 

likely to be most promising. 

While functioning <strong>of</strong> land markets requires well-defined property rights, once these are in 

place, liberalizing land markets can have a positive impact (e.g., Mexico's ejido reforms and 

in Eastern Europe, where the same has been happening). It is, <strong>of</strong> course, important to guard 

against dangers <strong>of</strong> distress sales through markets in an environment with high covariate risk 

and imperfect insurance markets. The significant benefits that come from transferability <strong>of</strong> 

land (e.g., Deininger et al. 2003 on Ethiopia: 

http://econ.worldbank.org/files/24760_wps2991.pdf) suggest that the losses associated with 

outlawing such markets are high (quite apart from the fact that, if in need, the poor will have 

to sell anyway, though at much reduced prices) and other mechanisms to reduce variability 

123

<strong>of</strong> consumption (e.g., food for work programs) may be more effective. 

7.9.2 Forest and Tree Tenure 

A major means to increase the assets <strong>of</strong> poor communities and households is through an 

aggressive strategy to accelerate the devolution to them <strong>of</strong> productive natural forests from 

national government ownership and control. Government ownership is commonly a relic <strong>of</strong> 

colonial rule and elite resource capture and has widely failed to protect forests or to harness 

exploitation <strong>of</strong> forest to poverty reduction. Over the last 15 years, diverse countries like 

Brazil, India, Nepal, Tanzania, Gambia and Cameroon have set aside public lands for use or 

co-management by indigenous and local communities. Legal reforms have strengthened 

community forest tenure in countries like Bolivia and the Philippines, while China and 

Vietnam have allocated public forest land to individual households. The recognition <strong>of</strong> 

indigenous rights and community ownership present an historic opportunity for countries to 

dramatically improve the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> million <strong>of</strong> forest inhabitants. Critical investments will 

be required to facilitate this transition, to assess claims, map tenure, delimit property, reform 

legal frameworks and establish new regulations and enforcement (White and Martin 2002). 

7.10 Maintain a Stable Macroeconomic and Trade Policy That Supports Hunger 

and Poverty Reduction 

Underlying all policy change, there is a need to adopt policies that do not discriminate 

against the agricultural sector, which provides livelihood to most <strong>of</strong> the world’s hungry. Such 

policies should promote stable macroeconomic and trade regimes, including undistorted 

exchange rates and taxation system that are not biased against agriculture and the rural 

economy. Trade policy on both the national and international levels should be integrally 

linked through multiple channels to the goals <strong>of</strong> improving food security and alleviating 

hunger. Given that a key cause <strong>of</strong> structural food insecurity is inadequate purchasing power 

(poor economic access), the most important connection on both levels is through the 

contribution that appropriate trade policy can make to raise incomes <strong>of</strong> the poor to allow 

them to purchase adequate supplies <strong>of</strong> food. An outward looking trade regime can also have 

important effects on raising incomes <strong>of</strong> poor farmers by allowing them access to imported 

technology. National trade policy is sometimes used to promote food self-sufficiency by 

restricting imported food products. Such policies are counterproductive in the long run, since 

they create incentives for domestic farmers to grow low-valued crops instead <strong>of</strong> those that 

have the greatest potential for improving their lives. They also raise the cost <strong>of</strong> food for poor 

consumers. 

7.10.1 Trade policy in the International Arena 

Increased integration in the world economy has been a powerful lever for poverty reduction 

in countries such as China and Mexico. In fact, an open, rules-based trading system with 

market access for developing countries is a recognized Millennium Development Goal. 15 But 

15 This is associated with indicators 38-41: Developed country imports from developing countries 

admitted free <strong>of</strong> duty; Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products, textiles 

and clothing from developing countries; Support to domestic agriculture by developed countries; and 

ODA to build trade capacity. 

124

the current international trading system suffers from the highly distorted nature <strong>of</strong> world 

agricultural markets mainly arising from protection and subsidies that developed countries 

provide to their agricultural sector. This has two adverse impacts on developing countries. 

For food-exporting developing countries, access to markets is limited, and the prices <strong>of</strong> their 

products in international markets are depressed by unfair competition from developedcountry 

export practices. At the same time, developing countries that are not food exporters 

face international price signals that undervalue their internal production and may provide 

serious disincentives for necessary investment in their agricultural development. Moreover, 

such international policies aggravate the effects <strong>of</strong> flawed policies in developing countries 

that tax, rather than support, their agricultural sectors. 

Agricultural support policies <strong>of</strong> the industrialized world take the form <strong>of</strong> market access 

barriers, domestic support payments, and export subsidies. Average agricultural tariffs in 

industrial countries, when they can be measured, are 2 to 4 times higher than manufacturing 

tariffs. In addition, tariff rate quotas protect about 28 percent <strong>of</strong> domestic production in 

OECD. Specific duties make it difficult to calculate average tariffs and obscure actual levels 

<strong>of</strong> protection. More than 40 percent <strong>of</strong> the tariff lines in the EU and US have specific duties. 

Tariff peaks reaching as high as 500 percent commonly confront imports from developing 

countries. The tariffs also increase by degree <strong>of</strong> processing, creating a highly escalating tariff 

structure, limiting access for processed food exports. Since there is good evidence that the 

URAA did not have as large an impact in disciplining the use <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> these policies as 

intended, one result <strong>of</strong> successful Doha Round negotiations must be to create much stricter 

disciplines on their use, thereby improving income-earning opportunities in rural areas in the 

developing countries. 

Transfers to farmers in OECD countries from consumers and taxpayers have averaged 

around $330 billion per year in recent years, compared to around $50 billion in <strong>of</strong>ficial 

development assistance. Domestic support <strong>of</strong> this magnitude has a significant effect on 

increasing production in OECD countries, which drives down world prices <strong>of</strong> these products 

and displaces markets that could otherwise be filled by developing-country producers. 

Reforms to reduce the level <strong>of</strong> agricultural subsidies in OECD countries are therefore 

urgently needed. 

7.10.2 National trade policy. 

National trade policy also plays a crucial role in hunger and poverty alleviation by creating 

the appropriate incentive framework for private-sector-led growth. Trade and agricultural 

policy should aim for neutrality between import substitutes (mainly food) and export crops. 

Unfortunately, trade policy as it relates to food security in many developing countries has 

imposed high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports <strong>of</strong> food products in order to encourage 

their local production in the name <strong>of</strong> self-sufficiency. This policy is counterproductive. 

Policies <strong>of</strong> many countries discriminate against their own agricultural sectors through indirect 

taxation in the form <strong>of</strong> trade barriers and macroeconomic policies that support an overvalued 

exchange rate (discussed below), turned the internal terms <strong>of</strong> trade against agriculture, and 

kept the prices <strong>of</strong> agricultural inputs high. These indirect policies have affected production 

incentives by making agriculture relatively less attractive than other sectors <strong>of</strong> the economy. 

This tends to draw resources away from the agricultural sector towards the manufacturing 

sector, thereby diverting resources away from the sector that enjoys comparative advantage. 

125

Average tariff on agricultural products remain high and continue to create barriers to greater 

South-South trade in agricultural products, which has the potential to improve productive 

efficiency based on comparative advantage. The policy agenda must involve redressing the 

policy bias against agriculture including: elimination <strong>of</strong> export taxes; reform <strong>of</strong> inefficient 

state-owned marketing enterprises for key agricultural exports; setting in place an 

undistorted exchange rate policy, and elimination <strong>of</strong> implicit taxation from currency 

overvaluation and high tariff and non-tariff barriers. 

First, domestic consumers pay a consistently higher price for food, undermining the food 

security <strong>of</strong> the poor by reducing their purchasing power. In fact, this acts as a regressive tax, 

since the portion <strong>of</strong> income spent on food is inversely related to income, so the poorer 

consumers tend to be those hardest hit by the higher prices. This is especially troubling in 

light <strong>of</strong> the high poverty rates in many urban areas, and the fact that the poorest <strong>of</strong> the poor 

in rural areas are landless laborers. 

Second, even many members <strong>of</strong> the farming community may be hurt or, at best, not benefit 

from such protectionist measures. The poorest farmers in the developing world are 

subsistence farmers, and these by definition have no marketable surplus and therefore do 

not benefit from higher prices. Farmers in the commercial sector who are in a position to 

grow the staples may benefit in the short run. But even they, in the long run, may lose out 

from the protection <strong>of</strong> these crops because <strong>of</strong> the disincentives it creates against diversifying 

into nontraditional exports, which may <strong>of</strong>fer a better road out from poverty (Christiansen et 

al.; Kherallah et al). Diversion <strong>of</strong> resources away from export production also reduces the 

long-term foreign exchange earning capacity <strong>of</strong> the country and thereby undermines its 

structural capacity to import food and other products. Finally, there are more efficient ways <strong>of</strong> 

supporting agricultural sector: simulations done at the International Food Policy Research 

Institute (IFPRI) (Diaz-Bonilla, Diao, and Robinson 2002) indicate that an explicit tax on 

consumption (equal in value to the implicit tax imposed by tariffs) that finances agricultural 

research is more beneficial in increasing employment, income, and consumption, particularly, 

food consumption. 

Moreover, a neutral trade policy does not necessarily mean that food production will suffer. In 

fact increased production <strong>of</strong> cash crops for export is likely enable small farmers to make cash 

purchases <strong>of</strong> modern inputs in food production as well, thereby raising its productivity. There 

is therefore a likely strong positive correlation between cash crop income and food 

production. This relationship is stronger in poorer countries where the <strong>of</strong>f farm income is 

more limited. Figure 7-2 shows the relationship for a group <strong>of</strong> low-income countries over the 

past two decades. 

An outward looking trade policy without regulatory barriers to importation <strong>of</strong> inputs also 

improves income-earning capacity <strong>of</strong> farmers. When governments have reduced barriers to 

private sector imports <strong>of</strong> seeds, fertilizers, machinery, and other agricultural inputs, 

companies and farmers have responded by introducing and adopting new and better 

technology and expanding input production, trade, and use, bringing higher yields and 

incomes (Gisselquist et al., 2002). 

126

7.11 Sequencing <strong>of</strong> Policy Changes 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> aims to develop specific plans <strong>of</strong> action for creating policy change 

and implementation <strong>of</strong> policy. These plans will also include the sequencing <strong>of</strong> specific 

policies. It is important to note that the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has not yet begun to analyze the 

appropriate sequencing <strong>of</strong> policy changes. It should not be inferred from the above 

discussion that the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is recognizing immediate or sudden market liberalization, 

privatization <strong>of</strong> services, or other changes without appropriate mechanisms in place to 

protect poor people and farmers. 

7.12 More to come… 

The work plan <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> in the area <strong>of</strong> critical policies is foremost (1) to 

develop country-specific in analysis and recommendations, (2) to develop implementation 

plans that address mechanisms by which policy is formulated and implemented, (3) to 

develop guidelines to establish priorities, (4) to integrate with other Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong>s, (5) to plan for the sequencing <strong>of</strong> actions, and (6) to develop more specific definitions 

<strong>of</strong> capacity associated with specific policies. 

• In addition there are specific subjects that bear greater attention such as the stabilization 

<strong>of</strong> consumer and producer prices, incentives for market development, development <strong>of</strong> 

market institutions, donor coordination, human capacity development in rural areas, and 

internal barriers to trade. 

• The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has also considered the idea <strong>of</strong> developing an indicator or 

scorecard <strong>of</strong> how favorable the policy environment is for hunger reduction by country and 

by international institution. 

• Additional work on the efficacy <strong>of</strong> land tenure and its correlation to agricultural growth is 

needed to address rank this in terms <strong>of</strong> priority and to consider the difficult political 

feasibility <strong>of</strong> land policy reform and how it must be structured. Land is not the only 

productive resource for which access and rights are an issue and our expanded work on 

the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger among fishers, forest-dependent people, and pastoralists may also 

include rights to water, fisheries, and forests. 

• We wish to consider the degree to which nations may wish to protect markets in the 

hunger hotspots from unfair competition – or even ‘fair’ competition that might prevent the 

development <strong>of</strong> very tenuous markets for the rural poor. 

• We will also consider national policy case studies in a sub-set <strong>of</strong> the countries <strong>of</strong> the 

African hunger hotspots: Ghana. Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 

Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Madagascar. 

127

8 IMPROVE NUTRITION OF MOTHERS AND CHILDREN 

Political commitment and a policy environment that favors hunger reduction create the 

context for technical actions that deliver the calories, nutrients, knowledge, and income to the 

hungry. This chapter describes one <strong>of</strong> three arenas for synergistic action -- that <strong>of</strong> ensuring 

that children, adolescents girls, and mothers receive adequate food and care for nutrition and 

growth. Providing immediate assistance through woman-centered and life-cycle oriented 

nutrition programs will address chronic and acute hunger and ensure that those groups can 

benefit from hunger-reduction strategies that are based on income generation (Chapter 

9:Raise the productivity <strong>of</strong> smallholder farmers in more- and less-favored lands) and increasing 

agricultural productivity (Chapter 10: Improve markets to benefit poor consumers and food 

producers) 

Recent research shows that trends in malnutrition and mortality are closely linked, and that 

malnutrition underlies over 50% <strong>of</strong> childhood mortality (Black, Morris and Bryce, 1993). 

Nearly 57% <strong>of</strong> malaria deaths are attributable to malnutrition; furthermore, malnutrition is 

closely interlinked with HIV and tuberculosis. Research also shows a clear link between 

malnutrition and cognitive function. Iodine deficient children have been shown to have, on 

average, 13 IQ points lower than iodine-sufficient children. The links between anemia, 

cognitive function, and school performance are becoming increasingly evident. Improving 

nutrition is, therefore, key to achieving not only the Hunger MDG, but to nearly six <strong>of</strong> the 

eight Millennium Development Goals. Improving children’s nutrition is therefore a goal that 

will be shared widely among partners working towards achieving the MDGs. 

Clearly, increasing agricultural production will be critical to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. 

However, it is unlikely that production by itself will be sufficient to solve the problem <strong>of</strong> 

hunger. In fact, the linkages between the two have been shown to be weak. Agriculturalists 

<strong>of</strong>ten stop at the food harvest stage, and nutritionists <strong>of</strong>ten focus on food supplementation as 

a near-term strategy, assuming that achieving increased and diversified food production is a 

distant prospect. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> seeks to reconcile these two points <strong>of</strong> view. 

Though agricultural production is <strong>of</strong>ten perceived as a prerequisite for improving human 

nutrition, it is only one variable within a larger framework that can mediate improvement. The 

International Conference on Nutrition (ICN) framework for nutrition (Figure 8-1) identifies 

household food security, health services/healthy environment, and care for women and 

young children as the three underlying determinants <strong>of</strong> malnutrition. While no one <strong>of</strong> these is 

sufficient by itself, all three are necessary for improving nutrition outcomes. 

In theory, favorable agricultural policies should lead to increased production (IFPRI, 2000). 

Production should increase household incomes, and/or food availability – in the simplest 

terms. But poor families in rural families <strong>of</strong> poor countries are net buyers <strong>of</strong> food, and their 

ability to buy food is closely linked to food prices and their income (Chavas et al., 1999). At 

the community level, gains in nutrition as a result <strong>of</strong> increased income per capita have been 

shown to be small (Alderman, 1992); the findings for aggregate income growth are consistent 

128

with these findings, and further suggest that improvements dependent on income growth 

alone will be slow (Haddad et al., 2002). 

A recent analysis <strong>of</strong> survey data from Bangladesh finds that fluctuations in rice prices from 

1992-2000 parallel trends in underweight prevalence in children under-five (Torlesse et al., 

2003). Over time the quantity <strong>of</strong> rice consumed by households did not change much, 

however, their purchasing power to buy non-rice foods (such as animal products, fruits and 

vegetables) did. If the price <strong>of</strong> rice and other staples are kept constant, families will have 

more income available to buy other nutrient dense foods and increase their diet diversity. In 

Bangladesh, indeed this seems to have had an impact on reducing underweight prevalence 

in children. Macroeconomic food policies that regulate the price <strong>of</strong> staples can have a 

positive impact in making households food secure and increase their diet diversity. 

Similarly, food availability does not imply that families can afford to purchase foods, or the 

variety needed for adequate nutritional status (macro and micronutrient), or that all members 

<strong>of</strong> the household will get a share proportionate to their needs; in fact women and children 

<strong>of</strong>ten get the least (Bouis 1997). Women are particularly important actors in improving 

nutrition outcome, because they are the primary care providers for children and families. 

Moreover, women’s income and their control over family income is extremely important for 

improving nutrition outcomes in their children (Engle, 1993). Data clearly show that when 

women are involved in household decision-making, they are better able to care for 

themselves and their children in terms <strong>of</strong> nutrition and health (HKI/IPHN, 2001). 

Figure 8-1. International Conference on Nutrition (ICN) Framework for Nutrition 

Child malnutrition, death & disability 

Outcomes 

Inadequate 

dietary intake 

Disease 

Immediate 

causes 

Insufficient 

Access to Food 

Inadequate 

maternal and child 

care practices 

Inadequate health 

services and poor 

water sanitation 

Underlying causes 

at household and 

family level 

Quantity & quality <strong>of</strong> actual resources (human, 

economic, organizational) and their control 

Potential Resources: 

environment, technology, people 

Basic causes at 

societal level 

Source: UNICEF (1990) Strategy for Improved Nutrition <strong>of</strong> Children and Women in Developing 

Countries. New York: UNICEF. 

The life cycle <strong>of</strong> malnutrition to a degree reflects the extent to which gender bias is prevalent. 

Many low-income women have been malnourished from childhood, and as malnourished 

adults, they are married early and have their first child in adolescence. Early and frequent 

129

irths increase the risk <strong>of</strong> low birth weight, and the risk <strong>of</strong> infant and maternal mortality and 

morbidity. Childhood malnutrition is, in part, the outcome <strong>of</strong> low birth weight. However, 

many children with low or normal birth weights become malnourished in infancy for a variety 

<strong>of</strong> reasons. 

Figure 8-2 shows data for Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Shrimpton et al., 2001). Indicating 

that the children rapidly become malnourished in infancy between the ages <strong>of</strong> 4 and 12 

months. The critical issue is that the damage occurs early, and that it is virtually irreversible, 

as noted by the leveling <strong>of</strong>f in the graph. After this early insult, a child may grow at a normal 

pace, but will still remain small for age. Interventions after the age <strong>of</strong> two are therefore, 

already too late relative to these significant early growth deficits. Clearly, direct interventions 

in nutrition that begin before this time are needed to prevent the cycle <strong>of</strong> malnutrition from 

repeating itself. 

Figure 8-2. Age when growth falters in infancy (Meera Shekar, personal communication). 

Weight for age Z-score (NCHS) 

0.5 

0.25 

0 

-0.25 

-0.5 

-0.75 

-1 

-1.25 

-1.5 

-1.75 

-2 

0 3 6 9 1215182124273033363942454851545760 

Age (months ) 

Africa Latin America and Caribbean Asia 

Figure 8-3 shows underweight prevalence in relation to under-five mortality in children for all 

countries in the developing world. The countries that fall above the 20% underweight 

prevalence cut-<strong>of</strong>f on this graph and represent 84% <strong>of</strong> the malnutrition in the world are those 

for which the potential actions outlined in the attached matrix are most relevant. UNICEF 

estimates suggest that 141 million children under-five are malnourished in developing 

countries. The percentages shown in each quadrant <strong>of</strong> the graph in Figure 8-3 are a break 

down <strong>of</strong> the total malnourished under-five population (a proportion <strong>of</strong> 141 million). 

130

Figure 8-3. Underweight prevalence vs. under-five mortality rate 

70 

Underweight prevalence %, 1995-2001 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

9% 

13% 

3% 

75% 

0 

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 

Under-five mortality rate per 1000, estimates for 2000 

Source: data from UN/UNICEF databases 

Infant and maternal underweight is the leading risk factor in terms <strong>of</strong> its contribution to the 

global burden <strong>of</strong> disease (Figure 8-4). Malnourished girls tend to become malnourished 

mothers and give birth to low birth-weight babies that fail to thrive as infants. Once past 18 

to24 months, the opportunities for children to catch up are greatly diminished. The one-time 

loss in physical and cognitive development becomes permanent, a burden that is carried 

throughout the individual’s life. 

Figure 8-4 Leading Global Risk Factors and Contributions to Global Burden <strong>of</strong> Disease (GBD): 

% DALYs, World 2000 (Ezzati, et. al., 2002) 

infant and maternal underweight 

9.5 

unsafe sex 

6.3 

high blood pressure 

tobacco 

alcohol 

unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene 

4.4 

4.1 

4 

3.7 

high cholesterol 

indoor smoke from solid fuels 


high bmi 

zinc deficiency 

low fruit and veg intake 

vitamin A deficiency 

2.8 

2.7 

2.4 

2.3 

1.9 

1.8 

1.8 

131

Children born with low birth weight face increased risk <strong>of</strong> mortality and morbidity. They are 

more likely to become malnourished in childhood and have adverse development outcomes. 

Some studies suggest that low birth weight has adverse effects on immunity and may 

increase the risk <strong>of</strong> experiencing chronic diseases in adulthood. For this reason, the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> gives priority to improving the weight <strong>of</strong> girls pre-pregnancy, the weight <strong>of</strong> women 

during pregnancy, and the growth <strong>of</strong> infants from birth to 2 years <strong>of</strong> age. 

8.1 Candidate Actions 

We aim to (1) Increase food intake and diet diversity <strong>of</strong> adolescent girls, women <strong>of</strong> 

reproductive age and pregnant women, and (2) Improve infant feeding practices. The 

portfolio <strong>of</strong> actions that are under consideration for analysis and recommendation are 

presented Table 8-1. 

Table 8-1. Priority Candidate Actions to Improve the Nutritional Status <strong>of</strong> Women and Children 

WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE 

Life-Cycle 

Stage and 

Goals 

General 

Nutritional 

status <strong>of</strong> 

women <strong>of</strong> 

reproductive 

age 

Adolescents 

before first 

pregnancy 

Direct Nutrition Actions 

• Increase food intake in pre-pregnancy to 

improve weight 

• Increase micronutrient intake and diversify 

diet 

• Increase supply, distribution and 

consumption <strong>of</strong> Iron-folate supplements 

• Promote intake <strong>of</strong> vitamin A-rich foods and 

supplements 

• Improve adolescent nutrition 

• Undertake programmatic efforts to reach 

unmarried & newly married adolescent girls 

to improve nutritional status 

• Increase food intake and diet diversity 

• Promote intake <strong>of</strong> iron-folate & vitamin A 

supplements 

• Prevent and treat malaria and helminth 

infections 

Synergistic and Supporting Actions 

• Expand contraceptive choices 

• Encourage and promote birth spacing 

• Introduce labor-saving technologies to reduce 

workload <strong>of</strong> women 

• Improve intra-household food distribution 

patterns 

• Promote primary and secondary education for 

girls and keep girls in school 

• Expand employment opportunities for young 

women, and promote equal pay 

• Implement legal frameworks for protection <strong>of</strong> 

women against violence, screen for abuse, 

educate and campaign against domestic 

violence 

• Keep girls in school 

• Delay early marriage 

• Delay first pregnancy 

• Provide contraceptive choices 

• Provide greater choice <strong>of</strong> temporary 

contraceptive methods to encourage birth 

spacing and delay early pregnancies 

• Improve access to contraceptives and 

counseling about their use 

132

Life-Cycle 

Stage and 

Goals 

Pregnancy & 

Antenatal 

care 

Goal: 

Prevent low 

birth weight 

Goal: 

Prevent 

Micronutrient 

Deficiencies 


• Increase food quantity and quality during 

pregnancy, particularly protein and vitaminrich 

foods 

• Increase the use <strong>of</strong> iron/folate and other 

micronutrient supplements such as lowdose 

vitamin A capsules, multiple 

micronutrients 

• Improve pre-pregnancy weight and iron 

status, especially <strong>of</strong> adolescent girls 

• Improve weight gain during pregnancy 


• Introduce labor-saving technologies to reduce 

workload 

• Promote rest during pregnancy 

• Increase and improve the quantity and quality <strong>of</strong> 

antenatal care 

• Promote exclusive breastfeeding - benefits to 

delay fertility 

• Expand coverage <strong>of</strong> tetanus toxin immunizations 

• Reduce workload 

• Prevent and treat sexually-transmitted diseases 

and malaria 

• Presumptively treat for malaria in endemic 

regions 

• Iodine deficiency disorders • Ensure iodized salt is accessible and affordable 

for pregnant women 

• Target iodine supplementation as needed to 

high risk areas 

• Vitamin A deficiency • Eat more vegetables and fruits high in Vitamin A 

• Screen for and treat night blindness in 

pregnancy 

• Promote intake <strong>of</strong> low-dose vitamin A 

supplements among women 

• Assess and monitor biochemical indices <strong>of</strong> 

vitamin A deficiency 

• Iron-deficiency anemia • Eat more meat products and vegetables that are 

high in iron 

• Prevent and treat anemia before pregnancy and 

conception 

• Prevent and treat anemia during childhood and 

adolescence 

• Expand coverage and improve supply and 

distribution <strong>of</strong> high quality supplements before 

and during pregnancy 

• Fortify common foods with iron 

133

INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD 

Life-Cycle 

Stage and 

Goals 

Promote 

Good Infant 

feeding 

practices 

Prevent 

Infections in 

early 

childhood 


• Promote exclusive breastfeeding for 6 

months 

• Promote the use <strong>of</strong> food supplements by 

lactating women to facilitate exclusive 

breastfeeding for 6 months 

• Supplement mothers with iron/folate, 

vitamin A and other micronutrients 

• Develop appropriate community-based 

strategies to promote exclusive 

breastfeeding (e.g. Peer-counseling 

programs, community support groups for 

breastfeeding) 

• Promote age-appropriate, and fortified, 

local complementary foods from 6-24 

months with continued breastfeeding 

• Promote nutrient-dense foods, frequent 

feedings, various textures, increased diet 

variety, active feeding, and continued 

breastfeeding 

• Promote good infant feeding practices 

• Promote active feeding during illness 


• Foster child growth, development and care 

• Promote care, mother-child interaction, 

stimulation and play 

• Track growth and development milestones 

• Stimulate children so they attain development 

milestones and improve nutritional status 

• Implement outreach programs to reach 

vulnerable children 

• Expand coverage <strong>of</strong> immunization programs 

• Expand Integrated management <strong>of</strong> childhood 

illnesses (IMCI) programs with special emphasis 

on preventive actions within the community-IMCI 

umbrella 

• Prevent and treat diarrheal diseases early 

• Improve hygiene and sanitation 

• Increase knowledge <strong>of</strong> hygiene and sanitation 

• Prevent and treat respiratory infections early 

• Prevent and treat malaria 

• Prevent and treat helminth infections 

134

Life-Cycle 

Stage and 

Goals 

Goal: 

Prevent 


Deficiencies 



• Iodine deficiency disorders • Promote salt iodization programs 

• Monitor proportion <strong>of</strong> households using 

adequately iodized salt 

• Target supplementation as needed to children in 

remote endemic areas who may not have 

access to iodized salt 

• Vitamin A deficiency • Increase intake <strong>of</strong> vitamin A-rich foods 

• Expand and increase coverage <strong>of</strong> vitamin A 

supplementation programs (which provide two 

doses per year for at least 80% <strong>of</strong> children 

under-five) 

• Increase availability and affordability <strong>of</strong> vitamin 

A-fortified foods 

Iron-deficiency anemia • Treat maternal anemia in pre-pregnancy, 

pregnancy and lactation 

• Supplement under-five children, including 

infants, with iron-folate 

• Prevent and treat malaria and helminth 

infections 

• Prevent and treat vitamin A deficiency 

• Identify food-based strategies and diversify diets 

• Fortify complementary foods 

• Endorse and implement the policy framework for 

food fortification; fortify common foods 

SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN 

General 

Status <strong>of</strong> 

School-aged 

children 

• Promote a balance diet that provides 

calories, protein, fats, fiber, vitamins and 

minerals 

• Promote school meals 

• Promote intake <strong>of</strong> iron supplements 

• Promote intake <strong>of</strong> vitamin A supplements 

• Target those at risk for iodine deficiency. In 

remote areas with iodized salt 

supplementation 

• Target enrolled and non-enrolled school-aged 

children 

• Promote children going to school 

• Promote and implement de-worming 

135

Life-Cycle 

Stage and 

Goals 

Schoolfeeding 

Food-based 

strategies for 

reducing 

malnutrition & 

food 

fortification 


• Target incentives or food rations to improve 

enrolment and attendance rates 

• Target school breakfast and lunch 

programs to reduce short-term hunger 

• Identify, implement and expand livestock 

and food-based programs for women to 

increase availability <strong>of</strong> iron and vitamin A- 

rich sources (e.g. oranges, sweet potatoes) 

• Target subsidies to make nutrient dense 

foods available to vulnerable groups 

• Adopt a multi-faceted approach that 

includes dietary diversification strategies, 

fortification, and supplementation – 

particularly for iodine and Vitamin A 

• Implement and expand Universal Salt 

Iodization; Monitor the quality <strong>of</strong> the salt 

produced, and ensure that everyone has 

access to and can afford iodized salt. 

• Expand, endorse and implement 

fortification policies, legislation and 

programs 


• School meals will increase learning, enrollment 

and if locally sourced, increase the demand for 

agricultural production. 

• Facilitate health, sanitation and environmental 

education in schools 

• Implement pro-poor macroeconomic food 

policies that stabilize/regulate food prices (such 

as for staples) 

• Re-examine agricultural policies and practices to 

ensure that women are served by the sector 

• Expand agriculture extension and technology 

services especially for the poor and women 

• Expand credit services to women and men 

farmers 

• Invest in institutional linkages among the 

agriculture, nutrition, health and education 

sector 

• Create and support an enabling environment for 

women’s small enterprises to produce and 

distribute local foods (e.g. Within school-feeding 

programs, complementary feeding foods) 

• Improve and ensure women’s rights to inherit, 

own & transfer land & other property 

The nutritional interventions listed here target hunger across all farming systems, all 

livelihood categories, and across vulnerable groups. The specific delivery may differ with 

context. The essential underlying factor behind low birth weight is the malnutrition <strong>of</strong> the 

woman as a mother and as an adolescent. This may be due to some combination <strong>of</strong> general 

food insecurity (quantity and quality), intra-household resource food and care allocation 

skewed away from women, feeding behaviors during pregnancy (eating less, either due to 

cultural factors or in response to lack <strong>of</strong> adequate birthing facilities—smaller babies are 

easier to deliver without complications), and a lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge about the importance <strong>of</strong> 

promoting the nutrition status <strong>of</strong> adolescent girls. Exclusive breastfeeding is inhibited due to 

lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> its importance, poor nutrition status <strong>of</strong> the mother, and a lack <strong>of</strong> time or 

opportunity. Foods that are rich in protein and micronutrients (meat, milk, vegetables and 

fruits) are <strong>of</strong>ten scarce in subsistence-based households afflicted by chronic hunger. Fortified 

infant foods may not be available or affordable. 

There are a number <strong>of</strong> modalities to improve the food intake <strong>of</strong> children and adults in terms 

<strong>of</strong> both quantity and quality; many <strong>of</strong> these are community-based interventions that may work 

through: 

136

• Health clinics, 

• Community youth groups, and 

• School-based programs for feeding or take-home food. 

The modalities for improved infant feeding practices center on growth promotion activities at 

local health clinics, but should increasingly be community-based using village volunteers 

supported by a network <strong>of</strong> supervisors. Improved infant feeding includes: 

• Promoting exclusive breastfeeding up to 6 months; 

• Providing nutritional support to lactating women to enable exclusive breastfeeding for 

6 months; 

• Supplementing mothers with vitamin A, iron, folate, and other micronutrients; 

• Providing age-appropriate, and fortified, local complementary foods from 6-24 months 

with continued breastfeeding; and 

• Promoting nutrient-dense foods, frequent feedings, various textures, increased diet 

variety, and active feeding. 

An excellent example is Community-based Therapeutic Care (CTC), shown in the Table 

8-2below. 

Table 8-2: Innovative strategies to alleviate malnutrition: Community Based Therapeutic Care 

(CTC) 

The approach, called Community-based Therapeutic Care (CTC) aims to increase coverage rates 

over those obtained using traditional center based approaches, utilize and build on existing capacities 

in the community, equip communities to deal more effectively with future periods <strong>of</strong> extreme 

vulnerability and increase the use <strong>of</strong> locally produced food. Crucially, the CTC approach aims to treat 

the majority <strong>of</strong> people suffering from acute malnutrition in their homes, not in therapeutic feeding 

centers, which are <strong>of</strong>ten slow, costly and difficult to establish, do not achieve an adequate coverage <strong>of</strong> 

the target population and undermine the coping capacity <strong>of</strong> the surrounding community. CTC 

combines the provision <strong>of</strong> a newly designed “ready to use therapeutic food” for the outpatient 

treatment <strong>of</strong> severe malnutrition with techniques <strong>of</strong> population mobilization and education drawn from 

development thinking. Initial findings from research period have been encouraging. Concern 

Worldwide and Valid International have used the approach in Malawi and Ethiopia and have 

successfully achieved coverage rates <strong>of</strong> up to 75 per cent where under a more traditional therapeutic 

feeding program coverage rates <strong>of</strong> 15-20 per cent would be considered good. The program in Malawi 

has also shown that it is possible to threat uncomplicated severe malnutrition (no edema or underlying 

infections) in an out patient environment. In addition it has been found that the CTC approach is faster 

to set up thereby increasing the chances <strong>of</strong> catching malnourished children before their malnutrition 

becomes severe. 

8.2 Potential Impact 

The potential impacts on hunger and malnutrition <strong>of</strong> effective nutrition interventions are 

significant in both the near term and the long run. Better-nourished infants grow up to be 

better-nourished adults, who are better equipped to protect their own families from hunger 

and malnutrition. Reliable and internationally comparable data on low birth weight and 

malnutrition in adolescent girls is hard to find. On average, the rates are close to 20% for 

137

oth Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia as a whole, although in South Asia the rates approach 

30%. Sub-Saharan Africa (where rates are increasing) is forecast to overtake Asia (where 

rates are decreasing) in prevalence <strong>of</strong> infant malnutrition in 2005 with rates <strong>of</strong> stunting <strong>of</strong> 

33.8% and underweight <strong>of</strong> 29.1% (SCN 2000, Webb and Rogers, 2003). Figure 8.3 

highlights the long run income impact <strong>of</strong> positive and negative shocks on childhood nutrition. 

Two separate data sets used within a rigorous econometric framework document the longterm 

consequences <strong>of</strong> both negative shocks (civil war and drought in Zimbabwe) and positive 

shocks (a nutrition supplementation intervention) on subsequent human development 

outcomes. The impacts are large and persistent. 

Figure 8-5: Long Term Consequences <strong>of</strong> Early Childhood Nutrition Shocks: Zimbabwe and 

Guatemala 

Zimbabwe 

This study isolates the impacts in 2000 <strong>of</strong> exposure to the 1982-84 drought on 665 children. The 

drought resulted in a loss <strong>of</strong> stature <strong>of</strong> 2.3 centimeters, 0.4 grades <strong>of</strong> schooling, and a delay in 

starting school <strong>of</strong> 3.7 months. Had the median pre-school child in this sample had the stature <strong>of</strong> a 

median child in a developed country, by adolescence, she would be 4.6 centimeters taller, would 

have completed an additional 0.7 grades <strong>of</strong> schooling and would have started school seven months 

earlier. The authors estimate that this loss <strong>of</strong> stature, schooling and potential work experience 

results in a loss <strong>of</strong> lifetime earnings <strong>of</strong> 7 – 12 percent and note that such estimates are likely to be 

lower bounds <strong>of</strong> the true losses. Source: Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2002). 

Guatemala 

This study considers the impact <strong>of</strong> a 1970s community-level experimental nutritional intervention in 

rural Guatemala on several different measures related to education over the life cycle. For each <strong>of</strong> 

these measures the paper estimates the impacts <strong>of</strong> a nutritional intervention (a high protein-energy 

drink, atole) during the critical period when individuals were six months (roughly when 

complementary feeding was introduced) through 24 months <strong>of</strong> age. 

The preliminary results indicate significantly positive and fairly substantial effects <strong>of</strong> the Atole 

nutritional intervention on many educational and cognitive outcomes: 

• Probability <strong>of</strong> attending school and <strong>of</strong> passing the first grade 

• Grade attained by age 13 (through a combination <strong>of</strong> increasing the probability <strong>of</strong> ever 

enrolling, reducing the age <strong>of</strong> enrolling, 

• Grade completion rate per year in schooling, 

• Highest grade completed 

• Adult Raven's test scores and 

• Adult cognitive achievement scores. 

Thus there are important education-related effects that appear to persist well into adulthood. These 

education effects will result in lifetime income losses, the magnitude <strong>of</strong> which depends on how the 

Guatemalan and migrant labor markets reward these attributes. Source: Behrman et al. 2003 

138

8.3 Evidence Base 

8.1.1 Prenatal Diet Improvement (Allen and Gillespie, 2001) 

The following points summarize conclusions that can be drawn from randomized, controlled 

efficacy trials <strong>of</strong> prenatal supplementary feeding. 

• Priority should be given to improving the quality as well as increasing the quantity <strong>of</strong> 

food consumed during pregnancy. 

• Only supplements that provide much more energy cause a significant improvement in 

birth weight. 

• Maternal supplementation can also increase maternal weight gain, infant head 

circumference, and, when there is a serious energy shortage, the length <strong>of</strong> the 

newborn infant. 

• Undernourished women or those who have a low body weight (

• Exclusive breastfeeding is strongly recommended for the first 6 months <strong>of</strong> life. 

Breastfeeding should be continued when other foods are added to the infant's diet. In 

general, the quality <strong>of</strong> complementary foods is poor compared to breast milk. 

• There is arguably no advantage to the infant <strong>of</strong> introducing complementary foods 

prior to 6 months, especially where the quantity and quality <strong>of</strong> such foods is 

inadequate. 

• The energy density <strong>of</strong> much gruel, soups, broths, and other watery foods fed to 

infants is <strong>of</strong>ten below the recommended 0.6 kilocalories/gram. Reducing the water 

added to foods where possible, and/or providing additional feedings can increase 

energy intake. At present there is insufficient evidence to promote the use <strong>of</strong> 

amylases to lower the viscosity <strong>of</strong> cereals. Adding extra energy in the form <strong>of</strong> oil or 

sugar can adversely affect the density <strong>of</strong> protein and micronutrients in the diet. 

• Targeting animal products to young children can also improve micronutrient intake. 

The consumption <strong>of</strong> higher amounts <strong>of</strong> animal products was associated with better 

growth and micronutrient status in several studies. 

• Even where breast milk intake is relatively low, in most situations the amount <strong>of</strong> 

protein in complementary foods will be more than adequate; adding protein alone or 

improving protein quality will not improve growth. 

• Randomized controlled trials <strong>of</strong> the effects <strong>of</strong> processed complementary foods have 

shown a mixed impact on growth. Of nine trials, most included infants aged 6 to 12 

months 

• Intervention after age 12 months was less effective than between 6 and 12 months. 

However, there was an increased risk <strong>of</strong> displacement <strong>of</strong> breast milk when intakes <strong>of</strong> 

complementary foods were high, especially before 6 months <strong>of</strong> age. 

• In most developing countries and even in wealthier regions, the micronutrient content 

<strong>of</strong> unfortified complementary foods is inadequate to meet infant requirements. It is 

particularly difficult for infants to consume enough iron, zinc, or calcium; and vitamin 

A, rib<strong>of</strong>lavin, thiamin, and vitamin B6 intakes are <strong>of</strong>ten low. 

• Micronutrient fortification <strong>of</strong> cereal staples is especially important where these are 

major constituents <strong>of</strong> complementary foods. 

8.4 Synergies 

The potential for synergy between nutrition actions and actions to stimulate domestic food 

demand is strong. This untapped synergy is frequently the rationale for many food 

production-based interventions such small-scale livestock production and homestead 

gardening. Two potential areas for synergies that could be exploited are: 

• The production <strong>of</strong> animal source foods rich in iron, zinc and calcium, and fruits and 

vegetables rich in retinol as a way <strong>of</strong> generating income and improved access to 

nutritious foods for adolescent girls, women <strong>of</strong> reproductive age and infants, and 

• School-based feeding using domestically produced foods for school age children, 

improving their diet and keeping girls in school to delay age at first marriage. 

However, the literature indicates that in most situations the realization <strong>of</strong> the potential 

synergies has either not occurred or have occurred but have not been documented. 

140

Experiences with food production -based interventions (Ruel and Levin 2000; Allen 2003) 

make it clear that the production technologies combined with behavioral change have the 

potential to address many <strong>of</strong> the concerns about both the intake and the bio-availability <strong>of</strong> 

vitamin A and iron among adolescent girls, mothers and infants. The review also makes it 

clear that enormous information gaps still exist in relation to both the efficacy and the 

effectiveness <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> the strategies reviewed—in terms <strong>of</strong> nutrition and production—even 

for approaches as popular as small-scale livestock production and home gardening. In 

Ethiopia, the country with the worst hunger in Africa, the potential for developing small-scale 

livestock to meet the growing demand <strong>of</strong> those whose income is increasing, to strengthen the 

livelihoods <strong>of</strong> producers and improve the animal source food consumption <strong>of</strong> girls, women 

and infants would appear enormous. Yet, the constraints to production remain complex and 

strong. Brown (2003) emphasizes the need to take a farming systems approach—taking into 

account the multiple uses <strong>of</strong> livestock and the complexity <strong>of</strong> nutrient flows into and out <strong>of</strong> the 

system—if potential synergies between production, sustainability, income generation and 

nutrition status are to be exploited. 

Experience with school-based feeding is long on education and dietary impacts (Levinger 

1996) but very short on the potential stimulus to domestic production. The World Food 

Programme (WFP 2002; 2003) describes the phase-out experiences <strong>of</strong> school feeding 

programs in eight countries when external assistance ends. A summary <strong>of</strong> the Namibian 

case study states that “school feeding continues in Namibia today. Only minor changes have 

been made to its original structure. After WFP commodities were not longer available, 

several adjustments were made to the ration that enabled the Government to cut costs and 

purchase almost all <strong>of</strong> the needed commodities either locally or regionally” (WFP 2003, p. 

56). 

Data are needed on the impact on local and regional production and the cost to the 

government <strong>of</strong> such phase-outs. School-feeding programs may <strong>of</strong>fer an attractive synergy 

between educational achievement, nutrition, market development and local/regional 

production. The absence <strong>of</strong> a strong evidence base at this point, the potential for synergies 

and the strong interest arising from <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s presentations suggest that school lunches 

with locally produced food be tried as one <strong>of</strong> the first interventions. Further analysis should 

take place, including modeling exercises, but the case for action on this particular 

intervention is compelling. 

8.5 The Case for Political Commitment 

It is relatively difficult to build political commitment for actions to improve the nutrition status 

<strong>of</strong> girls, women and infants. Malnutrition is a silent killer. Often parents, community leaders, 

the media, donors, and government at all levels do not recognize the extent <strong>of</strong> the problem, 

which can be so widespread in some areas that adults lose perspective on the dimensions <strong>of</strong> 

a well-nourished child. Unlike HIV/AIDS, it is difficult to cite clear numbers <strong>of</strong> deaths resulting 

from malnutrition that can be used to mobilize action. If the extent <strong>of</strong> the malnutrition problem 

is realized, the morbidity and mortality consequences are not recognized, because 

malnutrition paves the ground for the other causes <strong>of</strong> death and is not necessarily listed as 

the cause <strong>of</strong> death. Malnutrition is also silent, because those who are most vulnerable to it in 

a biological sense—infants, girls and women--are also those most vulnerable to deprivation 

from social processes. These individuals have the least voice within society to press their 

141

claims to be free from malnutrition. If the consequences <strong>of</strong> malnutrition are easily silenced, 

the benefits <strong>of</strong> reducing it are long-term and not easily reaped by the prevailing political 

class. Again, unlike HIV/AIDS it is also difficult for families in rich countries to understand 

and relate to malnutrition in poor countries, at least at a personal level. Malnutrition in rich 

countries is found in hospital wards, and is not a part <strong>of</strong> the lives <strong>of</strong> one third to one half <strong>of</strong> 

the population. 

How can these barriers be overcome? One needs to stress the contributions <strong>of</strong> improved 

nutrition status to the attainment <strong>of</strong> the MDG’s (Chapter 2: The Human and Economic Costs 

<strong>of</strong> Hunger). In terms <strong>of</strong> the poverty goal, for example, improvements in nutrition status during 

the crucial first 2 years <strong>of</strong> life to boost the lifetime well-being <strong>of</strong> an individual and help break 

the intergenerational cycle <strong>of</strong> poverty. In an operational context, nutrition perspectives can 

bring lifecycle, intergenerational and multi-sectoral perspectives to the PRS process. Efforts 

to build political commitment also should draw from other successful commitment building 

efforts. Those pressing for more resources for HIV/AIDS prevention, care and mitigation 

were successful in energizing NGOs and in engaging with the private sector. 

8.6 Capacity and Roles 

The capacity requirements that are necessary to implement these actions and the various 

roles and responsibilities that need to be taken on by different actors are outlined below: 

• The role <strong>of</strong> men is crucial. If these actions are to be framed as actions for women, 

lobbied for by women, and enacted by women, they will be doomed to fail. The most 

successful fertility reduction initiatives enlisted men as allies and as partners. Without 

the buy-in <strong>of</strong> men as to the need for these interventions and for their active 

participation in creating the choices for women and time to act on those choices, the 

responsibility on women will become a counterproductive burden. 

• Coordination among government agencies is essential, because nutrition is 

everyone’s business and no-one’s responsibility. Exactly how to create incentives for 

different government agencies to work together is not a problem confined to poor 

countries—witness the US’s problems in coordinating its response to its commitment 

to the World Food Summit goals —but it strains already weak incentives to innovate, 

build partnerships and generally overcome transactions costs (Taylor and Tick, 2001). 

This problem may or may not be enhanced by initiatives that attempt to build in 

synergies from the beginning. 

• The community nutrition promoter is an essential part <strong>of</strong> the success <strong>of</strong> actions to 

improve the nutrition status <strong>of</strong> girls, women and infants. As important for child growth 

as agricultural extension agents are for yield growth, their job is arguably even more 

difficult due to the number <strong>of</strong> ways in which a child’s growth can be compromised and 

the number <strong>of</strong> different behaviors that need to be worked through and, if necessary, 

influenced. Where nutrition actions have been successful, the ratio <strong>of</strong> households to 

promoters has been low (around 20-50 as in Thailand and Tamil Nadu) and where 

less successful the ratio has been above 100 (e.g. India outside <strong>of</strong> Tamil Nadu). 

• The private sector has to be a part <strong>of</strong> the solution. The nutrition community has 

historically avoided partnership with the private sector, largely due to the negative 

experiences relating to the undermining <strong>of</strong> exclusive breastfeeding. However, there 

142

may be some roles, responsibilities and contexts in which the private sector has a 

comparative advantage and incentives. Recent experiences from Madagascar and 

Senegal with the private contracting <strong>of</strong> preventative nutrition services directed to 

infants, adolescent girls and women (Marek et. al. 1999) have proven promising in 

terms <strong>of</strong> sustainability and impact on nutrition status. 

• Private sector companies should encourage the participation <strong>of</strong> food producers as 

stockholders-- not stakeholders. This is an area that requires further work by the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong>. 

8.7 Policy Change 

For these nutrition actions to be most effective, or perhaps effective at all, they need to 

operate in a supportive policy context. In essence, this means a political class that is 

supportive <strong>of</strong> improving the status <strong>of</strong> women. Women who cannot access the information, 

education, assets, and time necessary to improve their nutrition and that <strong>of</strong> their children will 

be unable to influence decisions that affect their lives. They will not be able to press their 

claims for animal source foods, for care such as antenatal clinics, and for health services 

such as birth delivery attendants. The inability to make these claims and to engage with men 

in jointly delivering them will diminish the chances <strong>of</strong> any nutrition action from being 

successful. In Chapter 7, Error! Reference source not found. outlines some policy options 

for strengthening the status <strong>of</strong> women, relating the actions to the determinants <strong>of</strong> nutrition 

status. 

This policy focus will require support from a variety <strong>of</strong> sectors. Education policy, specifically 

keeping girls and boys in school as long as possible will delay the age at marriage and first 

birth and will reduce the likelihood <strong>of</strong> low birth weight babies. Health policy has to be 

focused on a preventative, proactive mode, recognizing the mediating role <strong>of</strong> nutrition status 

in the inhibiting disease. Agricultural policy has to have more <strong>of</strong> a nutrition focus, given the 

importance <strong>of</strong> animal source foods and fruits and vegetables for the survival <strong>of</strong> infants. 

Finally, there has to be an internalization <strong>of</strong> two facts: (a) income growth alone will not 

reduce malnutrition rapidly enough and (b) improved nutrition status is a foundation for future 

income growth. 

8.8 Costs and Resources 

A recent review by Alderman and Behrman (2003) on the economics <strong>of</strong> low birth-weight 

children in poor countries provides the most up to date and realistic estimates <strong>of</strong> the benefits 

<strong>of</strong> reducing LBW and the costs associated with the various ways <strong>of</strong> doing so. Alderman and 

Behrman (2003) conclude that the benefits <strong>of</strong> moving an infant from the LBW to non-LBW 

category– discounted back to their present value at 5% – amount to $580. This figure is 

driven by benefits 1-7 listed in Table 8.3. 

143

Table 8-3. Base Estimates <strong>of</strong> Present Discounted Values (PDV) <strong>of</strong> Seven Major Classes <strong>of</strong> 

Benefits <strong>of</strong> Shifting one low-birth weight (LBW) Infant to non-LBW Status, with 5% Discount 

Rate. (Alderman and Behrman, 2003). 

Benefits PDV % <strong>of</strong> Total 

1. Reduced infant mortality $92.86 16% 

2. Reduced neonatal care $41.80 7% 

3. Reduced costs <strong>of</strong> infant/child illness $38.10 7% 

4. Productivity gain from reduced stunting $99.34 17% 

5. Productivity gain from increased ability $239.31 41% 

6. Reduction in costs <strong>of</strong> chronic diseases $23.29 4% 

7. Intergenerational benefits 45.12 8% 

Sum <strong>of</strong> PDV <strong>of</strong> seven benefits $579.82 100% 

Source: Alderman and Behrman 2003. 

On the cost side, the authors find scant evidence in the literature—a problem common to 

most development projects. What they do find, however, lets them conduct a sensitivity 

analysis that show only under very conservative assumptions does the benefit-cost ratio fall 

below 1. For example, at their preferred discount rate <strong>of</strong> 5%, the benefit-cost ratio varies 

from 20.7 to 0.58, the latter being the only estimate <strong>of</strong> 9 that falls below 1. 

The Nutrition Working Group <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has made some preliminary cost 

estimates for the following interventions: 

• School lunch programs. A meal plus snacks (comprised <strong>of</strong> cereal, oil, sugar, and 

legume) involves costs for food, transport, energy, water, and administration. The 

World Food Programme estimates that for Ghana, school lunches costs $0.25 

child/day when the food is sourced locally (totaling $50/child/year), or $0.19/child/day 

if sourced from food aid. Assuming that families have an average <strong>of</strong> two children 

attending primary school, the cost per household will be $100/year. With time and 

increasing scale, school programs should cost much less; the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to 

model future costs and impacts <strong>of</strong> such programs. 

• Supplementation: The cost <strong>of</strong> a Vitamin A capsule is $0.02/child/year, plus 

transportation, distribution, administrative costs. Iodine supplementation costs 

approximately $0.50 per household/year. 

Table 8-4shows some <strong>of</strong> the nutrition interventions, and their relative returns on investments. 

144

Table 8-4 Return on Nutrition Investments 

For each dollar spent on a program, this much is returned in increased lifelong wages 

and decreased disability (discounted to the present) 

Returns to program dollars 

(in wages) 

Food supplements 1.4 

Nutrition Education 32.3 

Nutrition as part <strong>of</strong> primary health care 2.6 

Food subsidies 0.9 

School Feeding 2.8 

Supplementation <strong>of</strong> pregnant women with iron tablets 24.7 

Iron fortification <strong>of</strong> flour 84.1 

Iodine supplementation for women <strong>of</strong> reproductive age 13.8 

Iodized salt 28.0 

Vitamin A supplementation for all children under 5 50.0 

Vitamin A fortification <strong>of</strong> sugar 16.0 

Source: To nourish a nation: investing in nutrition with World Bank Assistance 

8.9 Issues for Further Investigation 

In the year ahead, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will refine estimates <strong>of</strong> the capacity, costs and resources 

that must be mobilized to specific hunger-reduction actions to improve the nutrition <strong>of</strong> 

mothers and children. 

Through a modeling exercise, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will estimate the value <strong>of</strong> synergies generated 

by increasing local demand for food though various feeding programs with increasing 

agricultural productivity and improving market function. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will also examine the potential <strong>of</strong> private sector alliances by companies that 

operate though the food chain (from soil to mouth) in ways that encourage the participation <strong>of</strong> 

food producers as stockholders-- not stakeholders. 

145

9 IMPROVE MARKETS TO BENEFIT POOR CONSUMERS AND 

FOOD PRODUCERS 

In many hungry countries markets do not work effectively for the rural poor. Crop prices 

crash when there is a bumper harvest, depriving farmers <strong>of</strong> their income, while other parts <strong>of</strong> 

the country are go hungry. Meeting the Hunger MDG involves addressing at least two key 

market-related tasks: 

Small rural farmers must have access to key productivity-enhancing technologies for crops 

and other products that can be sold. 

• Those among the hungry who do not have the means to produce sufficient food to 

feed themselves must be able to engage in occupations that provide them the 

necessary income to procure food they need. This second task requires not only that 

the poor find employment, but also that food is available for purchase at affordable 

prices. 

The accomplishment <strong>of</strong> these tasks requires coordinated transactions between a myriad <strong>of</strong> 

agents: between different types <strong>of</strong> service providers and service receivers, between sellers 

and buyers <strong>of</strong> agricultural inputs, between sellers and buyers <strong>of</strong> agricultural outputs, and 

between job seekers and potential employers. The efficiency with which these transactions 

are conducted is important. High transaction costs hurt both buyers and sellers and 

decrease the level <strong>of</strong> mutually beneficial market interactions. 

Experience has shown that attempts to manage these transactions using centralized, statemanaged 

command and control mechanisms are futile, even counterproductive. Experience 

has also shown that markets, when well functioning and competitive, coordinate and facilitate 

these transactions in a remarkably efficient and equitable way. Competitive markets also 

spur innovation and act as effective vehicles for diffusing innovations, leading to all-round 

productivity gains. 

But efficient and equitable markets do not grow in a social vacuum. It is important that policy 

makers recognize this point. Ironic as it may sound, the state, through responsible 

governance, has the primary responsibility for the development <strong>of</strong> market systems that are 

efficient and equitable. There are several reasons for this. 

• Incentives rooted in private accumulation <strong>of</strong> wealth are the key drivers <strong>of</strong> markets. 

Without the full enforcement <strong>of</strong> the rules <strong>of</strong> the game that confers clear, transferable 

private property rights, markets will fail to materialize. Establishing a social system 

based on transferable private property rights requires government action that gives 

legal currency to such rights. 

• Private property rights are necessary but not sufficient to make markets work for the 

poor. Market development will falter if it is not supported by well-enforced social 

contracts that bind market actors to their obligations. Only governments have the 

mandate and the power to legally bind market actors to market-based contracts. 

146

• Markets function well only when they are competitive. Government polices play a key 

role in determining the level <strong>of</strong> competition in any given market. When requisite 

oversight is absent, or when government polices limit competition, markets can 

become monopolistic or oligopolistic with detrimental effects on both efficiency and 

equity. 

• Markets do not snap into place overnight, and it is usually the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the 

state to perform an important nurturing function. The sequencing <strong>of</strong> market reform 

polices will have an important role in the initial stages <strong>of</strong> market development and 

reforms. Also, in the initial stages, markets may not function properly due to lack <strong>of</strong> 

physical infrastructure or gaps in information flows. In some <strong>of</strong> these situations, the 

state may well be called in to provide services selectively or temporarily. 

The following table (Table 9-1) summarizes the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommendations 

Table 9-1 Summary Table <strong>of</strong> Recommendations 

Actions for Overarching 

market 

improvement 

Actions for Agriculture 

and Food markets 

Actions to Increase 

non-Farm Income 

• Build key physical infrastructure that facilitate market development 

• Take immediate steps to assign clear property rights on 

agricultural land 

• Step up efforts to rationalize agricultural inputs markets 

• Expedite introduction <strong>of</strong> new contracting systems beneficial to 

poor farmers 

• Take steps to promote cooperatives and farmers’ organizations 

• Institute dispute settlement mechanisms and legal reforms 

• Prepare institutional plans to cope with external shocks 

• Nurture development <strong>of</strong> a sustainable rural financial system 

• Promote cultivation <strong>of</strong> cash crops 

• Dismantle internal barriers to trade (e.g. inter-province movement 

<strong>of</strong> grains) 

• Put in place a credible market information system that tracks and 

disseminates information on production and prices in key markets. 

• Develop and <strong>of</strong>ficial system <strong>of</strong> grades and standards 

• Make special food distribution arrangements for the poor in remote 

areas – seek “local” sources. 

• Promote local, national, as well as international markets 

• Promote value-added chain in agricultural products 

• Set up export market intelligence and trade promotion services. 

• Pursue rural electrification 

• Strengthen financial and other ancillary services for small scale 

enterprises 

• Decentralize Policy Implementation 

147

9.1 Description <strong>of</strong> Actions: Over-arching market improvement 

9.1.1 Build key physical infrastructure that facilitate market development. 

Weak or non-existent transportation and communication infrastructure (primarily road, 

railways, and ports) make the cost <strong>of</strong> moving goods and services prohibitively expensive. As 

a result, poor households in remote locations fail to be connected to service providers or 

other market actors with whom they would otherwise have a mutually beneficial exchange. 

Lack <strong>of</strong> transport and communication infrastructure also results in small, segmented markets 

where monopolistic powers emerge, usually to the detriment <strong>of</strong> the small producers. 

Because transport infrastructure is largely a public good, the primary responsibility for 

building and maintaining it lies primarily with the government. While national trunk roads 

may have to be financed entirely out <strong>of</strong> central government budgets, significant community 

participation and cost sharing is feasible in building smaller feeder roads that connect small 

towns and villages to bigger regional centers. In general, decisions on where and how to 

build must be based on estimated overall impact <strong>of</strong> investments on poverty reduction. Within 

the time horizon <strong>of</strong> 2015, it will make more sense to prioritize maintenance and upgrading <strong>of</strong> 

existing roads than to build new ones. 

9.1.2 Rationalize agricultural inputs markets. 

In many areas <strong>of</strong> Sub-Saharan Africa quick increases in agricultural production can be 

achieved by increased application <strong>of</strong> fertilizer, especially if fertilizer is used in combination 

with high yielding varieties and water. Since maize is the principal crop for which fertilizer is 

used, the challenge is to deliver fertilizers in a timely manner, in step with the cycle <strong>of</strong> maize 

production, and at price levels that make it worthwhile for the farmers to apply them. 

Fertilizers at the farm gate in Africa generally cost 2-6 times what farmers pay in OECD 

countries, Asia and Latin America. The main reason for these high prices is added 

transaction costs <strong>of</strong> transporting the fertilizer on poor roads and buying it in the context <strong>of</strong> 

inefficient market mechanisms. Rationalizing input markets is a complex task, requiring 

efficient synchronization <strong>of</strong> imports, storage, in-land transportation, and final retail-level 

delivery to farmers. Greater impact can be assured if fertilizer distribution is complemented 

by agricultural extension services that educate farmers on the best ways to combine organic 

inputs with mineral fertilizers, and financial services that allow cash-strapped farmers to 

purchase inputs – synergy between market improvement and knowledge transfer. 

In the past, government action was based on the premise that markets cannot be relied upon 

to perform such wide-ranging tasks. In addition it was thought that in order for farmers to use 

fertilizer, fertilizer prices had to be subsidized. This notion resulted in government policy that 

preempted market-based responses: state agencies receiving generous government 

subsidies took over most <strong>of</strong> the marketing and distribution functions while private markets 

remained underdeveloped. Recent years have seen moves across Africa to reverse this 

policy and place greater reliance on market forces to deliver fertilizers to farmers, mostly 

because state agencies turned out to be high-cost operators that were unable to provide 

effective access to small farmers, and subsidies were approaching unsustainable 

proportions. Since this has not worked either, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is searching for new 

options. 

While greater reliance on private markets is a step in the right direction, mere withdrawal by 

148

the state from fertilizer trade will be insufficient to ensure that smallholders have effective 

access to fertilizer. At least four other conditions must be met. 

• First, the fertilizer sector must be imbued with a sufficient level <strong>of</strong> competition such that 

fertilizer prices are kept low. To this end, the governments need not only to ensure that 

importers have sufficient incentives to procure from the lowest-priced source in 

international markets, but also that domestic entrepreneurs and traders have easy entry 

into the domestic fertilizer distribution business. The scenario to be avoided by all means 

is the simple replacement <strong>of</strong> government monopoly by private monopoly. 

• Second, even under competitive market conditions, it is likely that in areas not adequately 

served by transportation infrastructure, fertilizer prices will remain high simply because <strong>of</strong> 

high transportation costs and lack <strong>of</strong> competition. In addition, retailing fertilizer to small 

farmers necessarily involves transacting in small quantities, pushing per unit costs even 

higher. Hence, private traders, even under fairly competitive conditions, are likely to keep 

out <strong>of</strong> areas where high cost service delivery eliminates the pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> high demand. 

These circumstances require more innovative approaches for marketing fertilizers in 

remote areas where many <strong>of</strong> the poor and hungry live. One option is to provide financial 

incentives and technical support to the web <strong>of</strong> small traders that already provide basic 

marketing services in these areas to encourage them to integrate fertilizer distribution into 

their activities. In the early stages <strong>of</strong> this market development, partnership with nongovernmental 

organizations and extension services may defray costs in remote areas 

where the very poor live. 

• Third, it must not be assumed that private sector operations will expand in a way that 

matches reductions in public sector operations. A learning period when potential traders 

will assess risks and pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> operations is normal. In addition, traders are likely to 

scale up their operations gradually, <strong>of</strong>ten haphazardly. Consequently, two important 

government initiatives are needed to assure a smooth transition. First, potential market 

entrants must become familiar with the business <strong>of</strong> fertilizer procurement and distribution, 

including training in financial transactions and technical knowledge about the products 

and how they should be used by the farmers in order to secure maximum economic 

benefit. This may require that government establish business extension programs. 

Second, the scaling down <strong>of</strong> state operations in fertilizers should itself be gradual so as 

not create a temporary vacuum in market operations, as these will create uncertainties 

that undermine the reform process. 

Finally, market reform policy must recognize the possibility that fertilizer subsidies may serve 

well under special circumstances. For example, initial subsidies to small risk-averse farmers 

may be necessary to encourage adoption <strong>of</strong> new technology. Distribution <strong>of</strong> seeds and 

fertilizer to small farmers may be more cost-effective and less incentive-distorting than 

providing direct food aid. When credible evidence points to such circumstances, some level 

<strong>of</strong> government intervention may coexist productively with market-based distribution. But any 

such subsidy policy needs to be strictly time-bound in order to be fiscally sustainable. 

Decisions on subsidies should also take into account the availability <strong>of</strong> complementary 

inputs, such as irrigation that increases the pay<strong>of</strong>f from fertilizer use. In many cases, 

subsidies that finance irrigation may do better for adoption <strong>of</strong> newer agricultural technology 

than will fertilizer price subsidy. Also, when fertilizer subsidies are used as a social safety 

net device, as in the case <strong>of</strong> the Starter Pack scheme in Malawi, it is important that they be 

149

well targeted in order to avoid subsidizing fertilizer use by larger, non-poor cultivators. 

Another option is to consider fertilizers and organic inputs—such as agr<strong>of</strong>orestry nitrogen 

fixing trees—as investments in natural resource capital (soil nutrients). 

9.1.3 New contracting systems beneficial to poor farmers 

Contractual arrangements that assist smallholders to take advantage <strong>of</strong> new markets and 

opportunities quickly must be recognized and encouraged. One such arrangement is 

“contract” farming whereby traders or exporters provide inputs, extension services, and credit 

to farmers at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the crop season and deduct input costs, loans and interest 

from the value <strong>of</strong> purchased output at the end <strong>of</strong> the season. Production contracts are 

already prevalent in many African countries covering high-value products ranging from fresh 

and processed vegetables to dairy and cotton. Of course, contractual arrangements may run 

into problems from difficulty <strong>of</strong> enforcing contracts with farmers, unequal bargaining power 

between producers and traders, and trader behavior. Governments should take on the 

responsibility to monitor anti-competitive behavior and encourage farmers to organize into 

groups to increase their bargaining power. 

9.1.4 Promote cooperatives and farmers’ organizations 

Cooperatives and farmers’ associations are institutional arrangements that can potentially 

reduce the transactional costs <strong>of</strong> accessing input and output markets, as well as improving 

the negotiating power <strong>of</strong> small farmers vis-à-vis large buyers and or sellers. For this reason, 

their importance has reemerged in Africa in the wake <strong>of</strong> agricultural market liberalization. 

Further, such organizations can also foster the development <strong>of</strong> group lending schemes that 

facilitate small farmers’ access to credit. 

In many countries, cooperatives and farmers’ associations have existed in the past. 

However, in most cases, they existed only in name, and not in function. Such organizations, 

if still in existence, are best dismantled. New cooperatives and farmers’ association should 

be promoted, and physical infrastructure (storage and other buildings) built in the past 

transferred to these new organizations. Voluntary associations, autonomous selection <strong>of</strong> 

leaders, and the capability to <strong>of</strong>fer real services and benefits to members is central to the 

success <strong>of</strong> these cooperatives. Such associations are also important conduits for knowledge 

regarding agricultural production methods—another important action area recommended by 

the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. 

9.1.5 Institute dispute settlement mechanisms and legal reforms 

In the short run, while the judicial and court systems gain credibility and effectiveness in 

Africa, the government should go ahead and develop a simple and effective dispute 

settlement mechanism (such as small claims courts) to reduce exchange risks and settle 

commercial disputes for both farmers and traders. Such mechanisms could be established 

at the local district level, where elected representatives could act as arbitrators <strong>of</strong> disputes 

between farmers and traders or other market participants. 

9.1.6 Prepare institutional plans to cope with external shocks 

External shocks – whether from natural disasters such as droughts, or from unexpected price 

fluctuations in domestic and international markets can lead to the collapse <strong>of</strong> agricultural 

150

commodity markets. In the initial stages <strong>of</strong> reform, this can create an environment <strong>of</strong> market 

pessimism, which can abort market reform plans. Therefore, clear-cut plans must be 

established to address worst-case scenarios. Measures should include maintaining 

emergency food stocks and the establishment <strong>of</strong> a food price stabilization program. Also 

important is the establishment <strong>of</strong> a social safety net system that provides timely relief to 

those affected most by crisis. 

9.1.7 Nurture <strong>of</strong> development <strong>of</strong> a sustainable financial system 

Producers and traders require convenient access to financial services in order to manage 

and expand their businesses. Poor consumers also frequently need means to finance food 

expenses during times when cash runs low. Finance in agricultural production is especially 

important because <strong>of</strong> its seasonal nature: inputs must be purchased and consumed before 

crops can be harvested and sold. However, providing financial services to the poor has been 

a contentious issue—especially for agricultural production. High transaction costs and levels 

<strong>of</strong> perceived risk have discouraged commercial banks from servicing dispersed rural farmers 

and the poor in general. Performance <strong>of</strong> government-managed credit and saving institutions 

set up to do business with the poor has been far from satisfactory, especially for longer-term 

agricultural production loans in which repayment is strongly correlated with weather and 

market conditions. 

New methods <strong>of</strong> providing sustainable financial services to the poor have been developed in 

many countries by non-pr<strong>of</strong>it institutions. To date, most have focused on micro-enterprise 

credit for post-production and commerce-related activities rather than farming. Supplying 

financial services to smallholder food producers at the national scale will require alignment 

with mainstream banking and insurance institutions that are in a position to consolidate risks 

and provide safe savings services. To this end, governments must take firm steps to steer 

private sector banks into pr<strong>of</strong>itable ventures in the rural areas. Links must also be developed 

between banks and non-pr<strong>of</strong>it micro-finance institutions so that the latter can make pr<strong>of</strong>itable 

use <strong>of</strong> mainstream banking services in expanding rural and pro-poor outreach in a 

sustainable manner. 

9.1.8 Assign clear property rights on agricultural land 

Agricultural land is by far the most common asset possessed by the hungry. In many 

countries in sub-Saharan Africa, land possession does not easily translate into secured 

ownership. In such cases, assignment <strong>of</strong> ownership rights that leads to security <strong>of</strong> tenure will 

significantly improve incentives for farming families to invest in augmenting the productivity <strong>of</strong> 

their land. This is not a trivial point. The unprecedented increase in agricultural productivity 

in China, for example, is significantly credited to greater tenure security. 

The task <strong>of</strong> assigning clearly measured parcels <strong>of</strong> land to households can be a complicated 

task. Community-based approaches hold promise in achieving this in a credible and costeffective 

manner. Steps should also be taken to make land property transferable through 

sale or other market transactions. Establishing transferability <strong>of</strong> ownership will not only let 

poor families trade in land properties in a manner that complements their skills and other 

assets (efficient agricultural producers can buy land while less-efficient producers may sell 

land to establish other businesses), but will also allow them to leverage external capital to 

expand business by using land as collateral. 

151

9.1.9 Price supports 

There are several serious problems associated with price supports. First, price supports are 

inherently supply driven and can lead to surpluses <strong>of</strong> commodities for which there is 

inadequate demand. This can lead to the accumulation <strong>of</strong> large stocks without an obvious 

market outlet. Once government warehouses and silos are full, disposal can become a 

major problem. In addition, post-harvest losses to insects, pests, and diseases combined 

with the possibility that subsequent release <strong>of</strong> stocks can depress prices in future years 

make price supports an unnecessarily high-risk option. 

Very short-term interventions in the market place to shore up prices at harvest time (when 

they generally are prone to decline) can help to smooth out price fluctuations, and thus 

achieve greater stability. However, this tactic only works for very short-term price volatility. 

Stocks that are held too long, or allowed to accumulate too significantly, can cause serious 

consequences. 

If the intention <strong>of</strong> price supports is to stimulate market demand and the adoption <strong>of</strong> 

productivity-enhancing technology by farmers, then new markets must be developed to 

dispose <strong>of</strong> the government-held supply. 

Government support for school feeding, and food-for-work rural infrastructure and ecoconservation 

programs are examples <strong>of</strong> governments becoming long-term investors in the 

marketplace in ways that permanently shift the demand curve higher. In this way, price 

stabilization is wedded to expanded demand, which has strong stimulatory effects. 

The present lack <strong>of</strong> incentives for small farmers to make money must be addressed with 

renewed policy interventions. The collapse <strong>of</strong> cash crop prices in the past (tobacco, cotton, 

c<strong>of</strong>fee, sugar, etc.) draws attention to the idea <strong>of</strong> treating regular food crops such as grain in 

the same manner as cash crops. 

The Governments <strong>of</strong> Sub Saharan Africa must be encouraged to introduce a minimum price 

on grain and to reintroduce strategic grain reserves related to a certain degree <strong>of</strong> the annual 

consumption. This will also support the African Union desire to establish regional food 

reserve systems, including food stocks linked to Africa’s own production. 

Statements such as “countries that pursue liberal trade policies and liberalize their domestic 

markets typically grow faster than other countries which contributes to greater long-term 

reduction in poverty” are common. However, such a statement is not correct when referring 

to the African experience. Those countries in Africa with tiny economic structures that were 

forced to follow the World Bank policy <strong>of</strong> uncalibrated trade liberalization have suffered 

severely. 

9.2 . Agricultural and Food Markets 

9.2.1 Promote cultivation <strong>of</strong> cash crops 

It is unlikely that the Millennium Development Goals can be reached solely on the basis <strong>of</strong> 

increasing production <strong>of</strong> traditional food crops. For example, maize, despite its importance 

as a food staple, is a low-value agricultural commodity that is only important commercially, 

from a producer standpoint, when the farmer has considerable land area and employs highyield 

technology. Where climate and soils are favorable, the cultivation <strong>of</strong> high value 

agricultural crops—food and non-food—must be promoted, not only to generate income for 

152

individual farmers but also to drive rural economies. 

There are two key tasks to be accomplished in this regard. First, small subsistence farmers 

must be taught the knowledge and skills to grow new crops. Some know how to grow certain 

crops. In Western Kenya, for example, many farmers understand the production <strong>of</strong> kale, 

onions and tomato. Second, producers must be connected with a market chain that assures 

them remunerative returns. It is very important that both production and market risks are 

reduced to low levels. Introduction <strong>of</strong> cash cropping should proceed with a clear 

understanding <strong>of</strong> market potential, risks, and agronomic constraints. Areas close to large 

urban centers are in an especially advantageous position in this regard, as higher urban 

demand can support a wide range <strong>of</strong> horticultural and livestock products the production <strong>of</strong> 

which is already familiar to farmers. 

9.2.2 Dismantle internal barriers to trade 

Markets perform the important function <strong>of</strong> moving food to relatively food-scarce locations 

from locations that are relatively less food scarce, with the effect that intra-country food 

prices are more equalized. However, in practice, this function <strong>of</strong>ten fails to operate 

according to theory. Grain traders generally have little interest in food-deficit or marginal 

lands, since economic demand for foodstuffs is slight and infrastructure is especially weak. 

In the past, governments placed barriers to the internal movement <strong>of</strong> food from traditional 

food-surplus areas to facilitate cheap procurement by government, or in deference to 

provincial interests in the food surplus areas to hold down food prices. However, restricting 

internal movement <strong>of</strong> food, apart from preventing relief to people in food-scarce areas, 

mainly serves to weaken incentives for food surplus farmers to grow more food, leading to 

higher overall prices, lower production, and lower employment. While many governments 

have now withdrawn policies banning inter-province movement <strong>of</strong> food, regulatory hurdles 

such clearance permits and assorted assessment taxes still serve to disrupt the smooth flow 

<strong>of</strong> food from food surplus to food deficit areas or to export markets. While it is beneficial to 

monitor internal flows <strong>of</strong> food supplies, it is equally important that steps are taken to maintain 

quick flows <strong>of</strong> food to the most food scarce areas. 

9.2.3 Established a credible market information system that tacks and disseminates 

information on production and prices in key markets. 

Correct and timely information on prices are essential for the efficient functioning <strong>of</strong> markets. 

An information-clearinghouse service for food and other major agricultural markets will 

improve resource allocation decisions and the general level <strong>of</strong> market competition. There is 

little incentive for private traders to provide this “public good”. Rather, governments should 

be encouraged to set up a market information system that provides quick and accurate price 

information in key markets. Such a system would also help check market manipulation by 

powerful traders and provide fewer incentives for hoarding and price gouging. 

9.2.4 Develop an <strong>of</strong>ficial system <strong>of</strong> grades and standards 

Because <strong>of</strong> the absence <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficial grades and standards system, many traders in Africa 

spend a lot <strong>of</strong> time and money to inspect merchandise before buying or selling. This 

contributes to higher marketing costs and reduces the efficiency <strong>of</strong> markets. The 

153

development <strong>of</strong> a well-enforced grades and standards system, especially for major grains 

such as maize and rice, is a must for reducing transaction costs. 

9.2.5 Make special food distribution arrangements for the poor in remote areas—seek 

“local” sources. 

Markets cannot be totally relied upon to make available affordable food to the very poor, 

especially in very remote areas. This is because grain traders generally have little interest in 

food-deficit marginal lands because low economic demand for foodstuffs and weak 

infrastructure make transport costs extremely high. In such cases, special arrangements are 

required to make food available. In many cases, food distribution in these and other foodinsecure 

areas has tended to be handled by food relief agencies that use school feeding and 

food for work programs to make food accessible to the poor. These agencies <strong>of</strong>ten depend 

upon imported food commodities. Reliance on imports makes sense if local production costs 

are very high. However, in cases where supplies can be competitively sourced internally, 

food should be purchased locally. Purchasing food locally would provide a strong impetus 

for national and local grain traders to increase their presence and investments in chronically 

food-insecure areas. This, in turn, would help to provide the needed infrastructure to supply 

more vibrant, commercially-oriented agriculture in what were formerly abandoned market 

areas. Sourcing from “local” producers is a matter <strong>of</strong> definition and context—local may mean 

the immediate region, the country, or neighboring developing countries. The definition, 

priorities, and potential trade-<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> seeking local sources is an area <strong>of</strong> future consideration 

for the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. 

9.3 Non-farm income 

Market-based initiatives to trigger and support growth in non-farm incomes have to 

accomplish three key functions. First, local product niche (comparative advantage) and final 

market destinations must be identified. Second, efficient arrangements must be made for 

sourcing and delivering intermediate goods required to produce final products. Third, 

products are sold at market destinations at competitive prices. 

Overarching trade policy and market reforms are critical to providing producers, traders, 

exporters, and importers the necessary incentives to pursue activities that accomplish these 

three functions. The extent to which the poor in particular can benefit from non-farm 

production depends on investment in rural infrastructure that reduces transportation costs as 

well as reforms in domestic and international trade policy that make it possible for small 

entrepreneurs or producers to compete effectively in domestic as well as international 

markets. 

In many cases, however, pre-existing skills among the poor will be lacking, especially when 

non-farm production involves new products or unfamiliar technology. When knowledge is 

lacking, the poor are unable to take advantage <strong>of</strong> market reforms, however well designed or 

implemented the reforms may be. Therefore, institutional arrangements must be in place so 

that the poor can acquire requisite skills in a timely and affordable manner. Most important is 

access to basic education, as this a prerequisite for learning other, more specialized skills. 

The central role <strong>of</strong> the government in providing basic education to the poor cannot therefore 

be overemphasized. The following actions are also recommended: 

154

9.3.1 Promote local, national, as well as international markets. 

Demand for non-farm goods and services originate in local, national, and international 

markets. Market-based initiatives should take advantage <strong>of</strong> all three market destinations. As 

local agricultural economies grow, so does demand for non-food products in which local 

producers have a cost advantage. For example, services <strong>of</strong> artisans, carpenters, masons, 

retailers, etc. increase as portions <strong>of</strong> increased agricultural incomes are spent on nonagricultural 

goods and services. Markets policy should therefore recognize the synergy 

between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Simultaneously, the growth <strong>of</strong> urban 

centers generates a demand for a spectrum <strong>of</strong> goods and services in which the urban poor 

as well as the rural poor living in well-connected areas have comparative advantage. Finally, 

with increased openness and globalization, new and unconventional markets for laborintensive 

exports become more accessible. It is important that policy action takes place in 

full cognizance <strong>of</strong> all types <strong>of</strong> markets. 

9.3.2 Promote value-added chain in agricultural products. 

Since most <strong>of</strong> the poor are already engaged in agricultural production, and, as a result, 

already have specific skills in that sector, promising opportunities exist in activities that add 

further value to traded agricultural products. They encompass activities as simple as 

cleaning, grading, and bagging various agricultural products to fairly complex agro-industries 

that process and distribute fruits, vegetables, and livestock products. Even when owned and 

operated by outside entrepreneurs or investors, agro-industry that uses labor-intensive 

techniques in poor rural areas provides important employment and incomes to the poor. 

Furthermore, agro-industries increase demand—and therefore the prices—for agricultural 

products that the poor produce. 

9.3.3 Set up export market intelligence and trade promotion services. 

Exporters in many poor countries lack resources to invest in identifying and assessing 

international market potentials for unskilled-labor intensive products that provide employment 

to the poor. They also lack knowledge about international export and import regulations and 

frequently do not fully understand the fairly complex contracting processes involved. It is 

recommended that governments invest resources in setting up trade promotion centers that 

provide market intelligence and business advisory services to domestic entrepreneurs 

involved or interested in manufacturing or exporting. Likewise, governments should also play 

an important role in disseminating country-related business information to foreign investors 

or importers. 

9.3.4 Pursue rural electrification. 

The non-farm manufacturing sector relies on electrical power much more than the 

agricultural sector. Access to electricity is therefore pivotal in spurring a viable and growing 

non-farm sector. Establishing a rural electric infrastructure not only requires a large amount 

<strong>of</strong> resources, but is also heavily capital intensive. Whenever feasible, community-managed 

small power units should be considered. 

9.3.5 Strengthen financial and other ancillary services for small scale enterprises. 

155

Successful expansion <strong>of</strong> the non-farm sector will rest significantly on small or microentrepreneurs’ 

ability to access financial services that finance initial investments as well as 

recurring working capital. While commercial banks may have the incentives to provide 

services to medium- and small-scale enterprises, this may not be the case for microentrepreneurs 

whose transactions are typically very small in size. For this reason, as in the 

agricultural sector, it is important that the government ensures an environment that is 

conducive for micro-finance institutions to service micro-enterprises. Several micro-finance 

institutions in Asia and Africa such as the Grameen Bank and the affiliates <strong>of</strong> Women’s World 

Banking have demonstrated that provision <strong>of</strong> financial services to micro-entrepreneurs can 

be made at a relatively efficient level. Grameen’s experience in Bangladesh has also shown 

that the introduction <strong>of</strong> non-traditional products such as cell phone-based businesses in rural 

areas can be successful if business plans are drawn up realistically and innovatively, and 

micro-entrepreneurs receive some training in the management <strong>of</strong> the business. Also in 

Bangladesh, provision <strong>of</strong> marketing facilities such as those provided by the not-for-pr<strong>of</strong>it 

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) can spur the growth <strong>of</strong> non-farm 

enterprises in poor and rural areas. 

9.3.6 Decentralize Policy Implementation 

By nature, the non-farm sector is highly heterogeneous, encompassing a great variety <strong>of</strong> 

products and services. Product niche depends on location, availability <strong>of</strong> complementary 

inputs, and nearness to final markets. Therefore, a variety <strong>of</strong> interventions will be required to 

promote the non-farm sector, each tailored to specific local conditions (Lanjouw 1999). 

Decentralized decision-making is therefore necessary so that local bottlenecks are relieved 

and specific niches exploited. Large scale policies such as education and large-scale 

infrastructure are not easily decentralized, however there is a clear rationale for pursuing 

decentralized policy design and implementation wherever possible. 

9.4 Types <strong>of</strong> Hundred Addressed 

Policies that improve market performance increase opportunities for trade and exchange, 

and reduce the cost <strong>of</strong> doing business. As a result, both access to and availability <strong>of</strong> food 

improve. For the farmer who cannot produce enough food for family consumption, better 

markets are likely to improve her access to modern agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, 

enabling her to produce more food. Also, as markets develop for non-food products, 

opportunities emerge for her to supplement income from food production with income from 

cash cropping or non-agricultural production. New income earning opportunities—including 

increased demand for wage labor—are especially important for those who have little or no 

land. 

Efficient and well-integrated markets <strong>of</strong>fer better prices to farmers that can produce a surplus 

over their own needs. This provides incentives for them to produce more food, and has the 

effect <strong>of</strong> lowering food prices in food-deficit areas to where the surplus is shipped. Of 

course, poor net-buyers in the immediate area <strong>of</strong> surplus production may well face higher 

prices <strong>of</strong> food as a result. However, it is as likely that increased agricultural production spurs 

greater demand for labor and for other non-farm products produced by the poor. This would 

increase incomes and thus their purchasing power for food. In any case, whenever the poor 

are unable to take advantage <strong>of</strong> improved market conditions, special programs may be called 

156

for to provide special foods transfer to the poor. This is a more efficient policy than one that 

places barriers on trade to lower the local price <strong>of</strong> food. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> notes that 

our advocacy <strong>of</strong> well-functioning markets is not presented as a substitute for non-market 

based public interventions and strong systems <strong>of</strong> social protection for income and health. 

Our future work will address market improvements for specific vulnerable groups and 

livelihood types among the hungry. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recognizes that market improvements in the priority countries for 

achievement <strong>of</strong> the MDGs is a daunting challenge. A sampling <strong>of</strong> indicators in the countries 

<strong>of</strong> the African Hunger Hotspots (Table 9-2) reflects that these are among the very poorest 

countries and are moderately or highly corrupt, as well. 

Table 9-2 Basic market indicators in the Countries <strong>of</strong> the African Hunger Hotspots 

Hotspot Country 

Population living Corruptions 

below $1 a day Perception Index 

(%) a 1990-2001 b Rank (1 least – 100 

most corrupt) c 

Human Development 

Index Rank (1 

highest – 175 

lowest) d 

Benin -- -- 159 

Burkina 61.2 -- 173 

Ethiopia 81.9 59 169 

Ghana 44.8 50 129 

Kenya 23.0 96 146 

Madagascar 49.1 98 149 

Malawi 41.7 68 162 

Mozambique 37.9 -- 170 

Niger 61.4 174 

Nigeria 70.2 101 152 

Tanzania 19.9 71 160 

Togo -- 141 

Uganda 82.2 93 147 

a. Poverty line is equivalent $1.08 per day (1993 PPP US$). 

b. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. 

c. from: http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html 

d. Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2003. 

9.5 Evidence Base <strong>of</strong> Potential Impacts <strong>of</strong> Market Improvements 

The pace <strong>of</strong> market reforms has not been uniform across Africa. Table 9-3 shows the scope 

<strong>of</strong> agricultural reforms in 10 selected countries highlighting the extent <strong>of</strong> state intervention in 

food markets before and after reform was pronounced, for both locally produced and 

imported food. Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi, all maize producers, continue to 

impose restriction on purchase and sale <strong>of</strong> maize. Madagascar has liberalized its rice 

market, and so have Ethiopia (for teff, maize and wheat), Madagascar (for rice), Mali (for 

157

millet and sorghum) and Tanzania (for maize). Benin and Ghana, with no dominant crop, 

were relatively more open before the reforms and continue to be so. 

Table 9-3. Scope <strong>of</strong> Food Marketing Reform in Selected Countries 

Output Market Wheat imports Rice Imports 

Country Crop Before After Before After Before After 

Benin tubers A C E E E E 

Ethiopia teff; maize; wheat A C D E D E 

Ghana tubers C C D D E E 

Kenya maize A A D D D E 

Madagascar rice A C D D -- E 

Malawi maize A B E E E E 

Mali millet; sorghum A C D E D E 

Tanzania maize A C D E D E 

Zambia maize A B -- -- -- -- 

Zimbabwe maize A A D D D E 

Source: Kherallah et. al. 2002 

Notes: A Major restrictions on purchases and sales. B Limited intervention by state buying agency. C No 

intervention except food security stocks. D State monopoly. E No monopoly. -- Data not available. 

Table 9-4 provides a summary <strong>of</strong> specific types <strong>of</strong> controls imposed on the country’s main 

agricultural products. Whereas seven <strong>of</strong> the case-study countries have eliminated <strong>of</strong>ficial 

pricing <strong>of</strong> food-grains, price controls are still in place in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 

With the exception <strong>of</strong> Madagascar, marketing boards continue to exist in all countries, 

although with a modified role. Movement restrictions have been lifted in Ethiopia, Kenya, 

Malawi, and Mali. While most countries require licenses to trade and impose import taxes, 

few actually ban trade. 

158

Table 9-4: Current Status <strong>of</strong> Food Market Reforms in Study Countries 

Country/ 

Reform year 

Benin 

1990 

Ethiopia 

1990 

Ghana 

1983 

Kenya 

1988-pres. 

Madagascar 

1986 

Malawi 

1987 

Mali 

1981-87 

Tanzania 

1984 

Zambia 

1985-94 

Zimbabwe 

1986-pres. 

Crop 

Pricing 

Policies 

Marketing 

Board 

Movement 

Restriction 

s 

Licenses 

Import 

Taxes 

tubers no yes 1 yes no yes yes 

teff, 

Maize 

wheat 

no yes no yes yes no 

tubers no yes yes yes na. no 

Trade 

Bans 

maize no yes no na. yes yes/no 

rice no no yes yes yes yes 

maize yes yes no yes no yes 

millet; 

sorghum 

Kherallah et. al. 2002 

no yes no yes na. na. 

maize yes yes yes na. na. no 

maize no yes no na. yes na. 

maize yes yes no yes -- yes 

The likely impact <strong>of</strong> market reforms on producer pr<strong>of</strong>it, consumer price, and marketing costs 

will differ with the nature <strong>of</strong> the crop (whether it is an importable or a non-tradable), as well as 

the type <strong>of</strong> intervention itself. Table 9-5 summarizes some <strong>of</strong> the likely effects. It should be 

noted, however, that the effect <strong>of</strong> price reform on producer pr<strong>of</strong>its and consumer prices is 

<strong>of</strong>ten difficult to separate from that <strong>of</strong> concomitant reform measures such as input price 

deregulation and exchange rate depreciation. They are also difficult to separate from other 

policy changes, related or unrelated to structural adjustment, or from changes in the external 

environment. 

159

Table 9-5 Effects <strong>of</strong> liberalization measures (I – importable crop, II- competitive crop, III- nontradable 

crop) 

Reform measure 

Producer pr<strong>of</strong>it Consumer price Marketing costs 

I II III I II III I II III 

Domestic price 

deregulation 

- ↑↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ - ↓ ↓ 

Input price deregulation a - ↓ ↓ - ↑ ↑ - - - 

Reduced food security - ↑ - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ 

intervention b 

Liberalized food import - ↓ → ↓ ↓ → ↓ ↓ → 

Exchange rate 

depreciation 

- ↑ → ↑ ↑ → - - - 

Source: Seppala, 1997 

Notes: I – importable crop, II- competitive crop, III- non-tradable crop. 

a 

Input price deregulation is the end <strong>of</strong> subsidized input prices. 

b 

Reduced food security interventions imply less food aid at concessionary prices and stricter criteria for food 

security interventions. 

9.6 Evidence Base <strong>of</strong> Potential Impacts <strong>of</strong> Market Improvements 

9.6.1 Synergies among market improvements 

Synergies occur at several levels. First, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between 

agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. When improved markets increase agricultural 

incomes, farmers spend a part <strong>of</strong> that increase on non-agricultural products and services. 

This spurs demand for a host <strong>of</strong> non-farm products and services typically produced by the 

poor and hungry: labor services <strong>of</strong> different types, handicrafts and cottage industry products, 

artisan services, and so on. Therefore, livelihoods <strong>of</strong> the poor outside the agricultural sector 

are positively affected. Improved market performance in the non-agricultural sectors has 

similar synergistic effects on the agricultural sectors. 

Second, as agricultural incomes increase, “push” factors to migrate to cities diminish, 

relieving congestion and all its negative side effects (unemployment, crime, etc.) in the cities. 

Also, better market links between urban and rural centers will result in lower food prices in 

the cities. Market reforms that trigger expansion in non-agricultural sectors in the urban areas 

lead to beneficial effects for the agricultural sectors. When non-agricultural sectors expand, 

demand for food and food varieties increases which creates incentives for increased food, 

fruit, and vegetable production, and therefore incomes, especially in rural areas near urban 

centers. 

Third, if market reforms are successful, information flows improve. As information flows 

improve, they serve as a conduit <strong>of</strong> new ideas and exchange beyond the immediate lines <strong>of</strong> 

160

particular businesses. They serve to import new management techniques and new principles 

<strong>of</strong> organization, and sow the seeds <strong>of</strong> social capital across myriad market participants 

engaging in mutually beneficial transactions. By facilitating the spread <strong>of</strong> a vast array <strong>of</strong> 

mutually beneficial transactions, fair and competitive markets also have the effect <strong>of</strong> reducing 

the likelihood <strong>of</strong> conflict situations. 

9.6.2 Synergies among other recommendations 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> intends its recommended actions for policy reform, increasing 

smallholder farmer agricultural productivity, and direct nutritional assistance to mothers and 

children to act in synergy with market improvements. The infrastructure and institutions <strong>of</strong> 

markets are a key conduit for delivering knowledge and inputs to farmers and transferring 

food for nutritional safety nets. The specific ways in which to link these interventions is a 

focus <strong>of</strong> future <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> work. 

9.7 Political Commitment 

Two key sets <strong>of</strong> factors affect the level <strong>of</strong> political commitment to undertake market reforms. 

First, as with any policy action, changes in market-related policy create both winners and 

losers in the initial stages, even if a win-win is guaranteed in the longer run. Lifting barriers to 

trade or withdrawing price controls or subsidies will hurt those who stand to benefit from such 

controls – at least until they fully adjust to the new policy environment. Whenever key 

constituencies (regional, sectoral, ethnic etc.) in the political system stand to lose from 

change, political commitment for change tends to fizzle out quickly. In some cases, a key 

constituency constitutes the poor themselves. Lifting bans on inter-province movement <strong>of</strong> 

food, for example, will result in food price increases in the “exporting” province, immediately 

affecting the poor who are net-purchasers <strong>of</strong> food. Lacking short-term adjustment 

mechanisms, governments can easily stall reforms on account <strong>of</strong> this. For this reason, shortterm 

adjustment support is <strong>of</strong>ten critical in order to muster a critical level <strong>of</strong> political 

commitment. 

Second, in many countries, government corruption takes the form <strong>of</strong> conferring market power 

and privilege – through licensing procedures and other policies that limit competition - to 

favored businesses. In such cases, there is little incentive for governments to pursue reforms 

whenever they require negating corruption-induced contracts. Anti-corruption measures are, 

therefore, very <strong>of</strong>ten necessary to build up necessary commitment for reforms. 

9.8 Sequencing and Timing 

Sequencing is a very important issue in this context. A concerted process to create and 

implement reforms to improve market function could have the following elements and 

sequential order. 

• Work with national governments to establish the legal basis for securing private 

property rights and transactions. Draw up legislation governing business contracts, 

bankruptcy laws etc. as well as establishing clear plans for their implementation. 

• Work with national governments to assess country-specific market constraints and 

policy shortcomings. 

161

• Undertake consultations with governments, donors, civil organizations, and various 

citizens’ groups to explore the scale and scope <strong>of</strong> market reforms needed, the 

timeline <strong>of</strong> expected impacts on various groups, and the adjustment mechanisms 

necessary to cushion social disruptions, if any. 

• Find ways to identify and establish market and non-market institutions and 

organizations essential for facilitating smooth policy change. These institutions would 

provide key social safety net services to those that are likely to be displaced by the 

planned policy changes. 

• Find ways to announce and legislate policy change that provides an optimal timeline 

for adjustment. Undertake advocacy work to garner support for reform. 

• Monitor impacts closely and make policy adjustments if necessary. 


Political commitment needs to be supplemented by a commensurate level <strong>of</strong> financial, 

regulatory, and administrative capacity for policy change to be genuinely implemented. 

9.9.1 Capacity to finance investments. 

Committing finance to build and maintain transportation infrastructure critical for market 

integration will prove to be a challenge in most countries. While dependence on external 

finance is almost unavoidable in the initial stages for most countries, eventual success in 

increasing and maintaining capital and social infrastructure hinges on effective domestic 

resource mobilization. Reforms in tax administration and revenue collection will therefore 

play a critical role. 

9.9.2 Regulatory and administrative capacity. 

Overseeing price, trade, and commercial policies and providing regulatory oversight and 

enforcement requires a pro-active and enlightened government bureaucracy. Building this 

bureaucracy, in turn, requires a combination <strong>of</strong> training, realignment <strong>of</strong> incentives within 

public service entities, and strong and credible anti-corruption measures. 

9.9.3 Capacity to finance investments. 

Committing finance to build and maintain transportation infrastructure critical for market 

integration will prove to be a challenge in most countries. While dependence on external 

finance is almost unavoidable in the initial stages for most countries, eventual success in 

increasing and maintaining capital and social infrastructure hinges on effective domestic 

resource mobilization. Reforms in tax administration and revenue collection will therefore 

play a critical role. 

9.9.4 Regulatory and administrative capacity. 

Overseeing price, trade, and commercial policies and providing regulatory oversight and 

enforcement requires a proactive and enlightened government bureaucracy. Building this 

bureaucracy, in turn, requires a combination <strong>of</strong> training, realignment <strong>of</strong> incentives within 

public service entities, and strong and credible anti-corruption measures.. 

162

10 RAISE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 

IN MORE- AND LESS-FAVORED LANDS 

10.1 Overview <strong>of</strong> Strategies to Raise Agricultural Productivity, 

Sustainability and Diversification <strong>of</strong> Smallholders Farming Systems 

A majority <strong>of</strong> the poor and hungry are concentrated in rural areas still rural and will 

continue to be until 2015, though urban poverty is growing rapidly. Statistics show that 

increased per capita food production is clearly associated with reduced undernutrition 

rates. Between 1990-92 and 1997-99, per capita food production grew only 0.4% per 

year in countries where the number <strong>of</strong> undernourished increased significantly, while 

production growth was 3.8% in those countries where the number <strong>of</strong> undernourished 

decreased significantly (FAO 2001). The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends that 

governments in countries with high rates <strong>of</strong> rural poverty and undernutrition greatly 

increase the level <strong>of</strong> public investment in agricultural and rural development. In Africa, 

for example, most countries have invested less than 5 percent <strong>of</strong> their annual budget in 

any kind <strong>of</strong> agricultural development, even though up to75 percent <strong>of</strong> their citizens still 

depend on farming (Paarlberg 2002), and in many countries with higher rates <strong>of</strong> 

investment, nearly all goes to a minority <strong>of</strong> farmers in favored regions <strong>of</strong> “higher 

potential.” Between now and 2015, agricultural investments should be concentrated in 

the regions where poverty and hunger are most concentrated. Investments should aim 

for broad-based sustainable production increases among farmers currently producing 

less than 1 ton per hectare, and that enhance ecosystem management. Good 

governance and policy that recognizes the priority <strong>of</strong> agricultural and poor farmers in 

public investment is essential (Cleaver 2002). 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s “Hunger Hotspot” analysis <strong>of</strong> diverse farming systems in sub- 

Saharan Africa shows especially high rates <strong>of</strong> underweight in rice-tree crop systems, 

pastoral systems and highland temperate mixed farming systems (Figure 10-1). Most 

smallholder systems here and in many hungry rural areas around the world are 

characterized by production levels that are chronically low (grain yields under one ton 

per hectare) and in some cases declining. Raising agricultural productivity <strong>of</strong> these 

producers will reduce hunger and poverty in three ways: 

• Directly increase food access for food-insecure producer households and 

communities; 

• Increase the supply <strong>of</strong> food for non-producers at a reasonable cost, with reduced 

need for imports or food aid; and, 

• Generate backward and forward linkages with the non-farm sector, thus promoting 

economic diversification. 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends a smallholder-led agricultural and rural 

development strategy to achieve all three, together with an unprecedented scale <strong>of</strong> 

163

investment in producers located in higher-risk physical environments and with more 

limited market access. 

Figure 10-1 Priorities for agricultural development by regional and national characteristics 

Regional characteristics 

Good infrastructure 

Poor infrastructure 

Surplus labor Scarce labor Surplus labor Scarce labor 

AGRICULTURAL PRIORITY 

Low 

High 

Low 

High 

Low 

High 

Low 

High 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

potential 

Markets liberalized 







Markets not liberalized 







Source: Adapted from Hazell and Haddad 2001 

10.1.1 Centrality <strong>of</strong> Smallholder Agriculture for Poverty and Hunger Reduction 

If there is one broad lesson that can be learned from five decades <strong>of</strong> development policy 

experience, it is that no country has successfully ended mass poverty and hunger 

without strong economic growth that emphasizes agricultural development. A strong 

evidence base supports the assertion that known technologies can do much to raise the 

productivity <strong>of</strong> smallholder technology. Smallholder-led growth can supply food, reduce 

hunger, stimulate the non-farm economy and slow urban migration to manageable rates. 

* Supply food. Because <strong>of</strong> limitations on the expansion <strong>of</strong> irrigation, and greater water 

scarcity, rainfed agriculture must account for a much higher proportion <strong>of</strong> increases in 

food production in the 21 st century, but this will only happen if there is much greater 

efficiency in water harvesting and water utilization (Rosegrant, Cai, Cline and Nakagawa 

2002). 

* Reduce hunger. International evidence demonstrates that both chronic hunger and 

hidden hunger can be addressed by improvements in agricultural productivity (Kerr and 

Kolavalli 2000: Thirtle et. al. 2001; Lipton; Fan--Uganda and Tanzania). Increased 

164

agricultural productivity addresses the physical and economic access components <strong>of</strong> the 

causes <strong>of</strong> hunger—it helps to assure that sufficient food is grown to meet local needs 

and it helps to generate income and employment, lowering the price <strong>of</strong> food for net 

consumers. When women have equal access to inputs, productivity will be enhanced 

even further and greater female control <strong>of</strong> income is strongly associated with improved 

food access for women and children, addressing some <strong>of</strong> the social access causes <strong>of</strong> 

hunger. Increases in disposable income through a lower staple price allow households 

to buy more <strong>of</strong> the staple, <strong>of</strong>ten switching into more preferred forms. It also allows them 

to diversify diets. The diversity <strong>of</strong> diet can be further enhanced if there are opportunities 

for smallholders to produce high value crops that are also high nutrition value, fruits and 

vegetables, fish and small-scale livestock. Together with improvements in women’s 

relative status, women’s education and health, overall increase in per capita national 

food availability contributed significantly in South and East Asia to reduction child 

malnutrition, but not yet in Africa, as per capita food availability has been stagnant 

(Figure 10-2). 

Figure 10-2 Relative Contributions to Reduction in Child Malnutrition, 1970-95: Selected 

Regions (Smith and Haddad, 2000) 

20% 

0% 

-20% 

-40% 

-60% 

-80% 

-100% 

All SSA S. Asia E. Asia 

Per capita 

national food 

availability 

Women's 

relative status 

Women's 

education 

Health 

Environment 

Reduce poverty. . There is strong evidence that investments in agriculture can reduce 

poverty significantly, as illustrated with data from China, India, Uganda and Tanzania in 

Table 10-1. 

Table 10-1 The Poverty Pay<strong>of</strong>f from Investing in Agricultural Research and Development 

Country 

Numbers <strong>of</strong> poor reduced per million dollars <strong>of</strong> 

government expenditure on agricultural R&D 

China 5649 

India 2666 

Uganda 68,830 

Tanzania 11,520 

165

Note: Figures for India are calculated for 1993, while those for China are calculated for 

1997. The numbers for Uganda are for 1999 and those for Tanzania are for 2000 and 

are for “all agricultural spending” and are preliminary. Note the much higher numbers in 

Sub-Saharan Africa. 

* Stimulate the non-farm economy. Agriculture generally accounts for about 25% <strong>of</strong> 

GDP in developing countries. Since agricultural GDP cannot possibly grow faster than 

3% to 4% p.a. over the long-term, an exclusive focus on agriculture implies painfully 

slow growth in GDP per-capita if population growth is 2% p.a. The smallholder-led 

strategy is key to generate the forward and backward linkages that a healthy agricultural 

sector can promote, as well as the links with non-farm activities generating greater value 

added. Rural non-farm (RNF) activities, especially services, are easy to enter for the 

rural poor. But their growth is constrained if agricultural incomes are not growing, or are 

growing but income is being spent outside the rural economy (e.g. by wealthy 

landowners if land ownership in concentrated in a few hands). 

* Slow urban migration. Hunger is a good deal harder to reduce once people live in the 

city, because food is more expensive and there are no natural areas there where people 

can search or hunt for forest or savannah products. Moreover, it requires an investment 

<strong>of</strong> anywhere from US $ 2,000 to US $ 10,000 to create one full-time job in industry, 

depending on the source. These figures would undoubtedly be much less in the case <strong>of</strong> 

maquilas, but robotization may soon destroy many <strong>of</strong> the jobs those factories have 

created up until now. Service-sector jobs require lower investment, but still generally not 

as low as in rural areas, where a new job can be created for under $ 800, and 

sometimes for much less. 

10.1.2 Invest more in producers located in higher-risk environments and with limited 

market access 

Where investments in higher potential areas can be targeted to ensure that smallholder 

farmers are the prime beneficiaries, this will typically be good for both poverty reduction 

and economic growth. Such growth can also generate multiplier benefits for many other 

poor and food insecure people in the country, and these linkages can be strengthened 

by investing in housing and human capital to increase opportunities for rural-rural and 

rural-urban migration and non-farm employment, and by building better infrastructure to 

connect poorer regions to markets. For this reason, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> strongly 

encourages continued and increasing investment in such areas. 

However, we propose special attention and investment for areas in less favored 

environments and market conditions—a reversal <strong>of</strong> chronic under-investment in the past. 

Historically, it was assumed that dryer, less fertile, more steeply sloping, more remote 

areas would never realistically provide opportunities for producers to achieve dignified 

livelihoods, so that the only future for people affected by these conditions was relocation 

to cities or other regions. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has concluded, however, that focusing 

only on growth in the better areas and relying on trickle-down benefits will not be enough 

to slash poverty and hunger in the next decade or so, given the large scale and 

geographic spread <strong>of</strong> poverty and hunger problems today and continuing rapid 

population growth. It will also be necessary to invest in targeted growth in many <strong>of</strong> the 

poorer regions and to maintain adequate safety nets throughout the country. Such 

166

targeting is needed to exploit unrecognized economic potentials, prevent rates <strong>of</strong> ruralurban 

migration that could overwhelm urban areas, reduce the vulnerability <strong>of</strong> 

smallholders to climatic and market risks, and prevent further decline <strong>of</strong> the natural 

resource base. 

* Unrecognized economic potential <strong>of</strong> marginal lands. Through adequate 

investment, less favored areas may be able to accumulate enough wealth to attract 

service industries, and as people begin to move out to the cities, they will be sufficiently 

healthy and well educated to be an asset to the cities rather than a burden (as was the 

case in San Diego, Mexico City, New Delhi and Perth, all flourishing cities based on 

“marginal” activities in the past). The idea that increasing population density, even in socalled 

marginal lands, inevitably leads to land degradation and poverty has been 

comprehensively explored by observations in East and West Africa. The condition <strong>of</strong> 

land and people has much to do with governance and rights, and less to do with 

environment. As population densities increase, the value <strong>of</strong> scarce land increases as 

long as people have the necessary rights to use the land and have access to markets for 

their produce. Under these circumstances even drylands become valued. While making 

development work in more marginal areas is clearly more challenging than in high 

potential areas, evidence from developed and developing countries shows that 

development <strong>of</strong> marginal areas is perfectly possible. To ignore marginal lands would 

consign millions to poverty and abandon vast areas with genuine potential. 

Decreasing soil fertility is a major problem in Africa, but is not restricted to marginal 

areas. Many “high potential” areas are becoming degraded because soil will be 

managed properly only when the required system <strong>of</strong> rights (access to land, water, 

markets etc.) is in place. Such is the case in much <strong>of</strong> subhumid tropical Africa. Evidence 

from Burkina Faso and elsewhere points to improving soil conditions in semiarid tropical 

Africa when people are given the appropriate incentives in terms <strong>of</strong> rights to use land 

and opportunities to sell their produce. 

Drought is a reality in much <strong>of</strong> Africa, both subhumid and semiarid. With the expected 

effects <strong>of</strong> climate change, drought might become even more significant, particularly in 

Southern Africa. But droughts are widespread around the word. In most places, they are 

not disastrous because societies have the diversity <strong>of</strong> sources <strong>of</strong> income and the 

accumulated assets to withstand them. Drought has been identified as the most serious 

natural disaster in the U.S.A., but the society is well equipped to deal with it. Even very 

poor societies vary in their abilities to deal with drought. Drought, therefore, should be 

regarded not as an inevitable disaster, but as a common phenomenon that can be 

managed. 

Even mobile pastoralism has been shown to have greater economic potential under 

modern conditions than has been assumed in the past. Transhumance is the basis <strong>of</strong> 

very successful livelihood strategies in countries as wide apart as Switzerland and 

Australia. Pastoralists are experts in maximizing the benefit that the land brings and 

minimizing the environmental damage that they cause. For example, Mongolia has 

maintained literacy rates <strong>of</strong> over 95% with 75% <strong>of</strong> the population being nomadic. The 

principal threats to pastoralism come from incursions <strong>of</strong> farmers, usually supported by 

national legislation that favors sedentary agriculture. 

167

* Migration. Over the next few decades, the rural hunger problem is likely to continue 

concentrating in areas <strong>of</strong> higher-risk agriculture, especially those marginal and remote 

areas poorly integrated into markets. Nearly two thirds <strong>of</strong> the population in Asia and 

Africa presently live in rural areas, and rural population growth rates, while expected to 

decline 2000-2030, will still be positive in many sub-regions, significantly so (around 1 % 

or more per year) in much <strong>of</strong> Africa. While urbanization is important, rural-rural migration 

exceeds rural-urban migration in 11 <strong>of</strong> 14 countries, including India, Pakistan and Brazil 

(Bilsborrow 2002). The World Development <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> 2002 concluded that the scale <strong>of</strong> 

rural to urban migration that characterized the period <strong>of</strong> industrialization in Europe and 

North America will almost certainly not be repeated in most low-income countries today, 

because <strong>of</strong> the closed borders to international migration and the much higher population 

levels and growth rates (World Bank 2002). 

Thus, while migration from poor areas to cities is a reality, and will not necessarily 

decrease if rural livelihoods improve, accelerating migration should not be seen as a 

solution to poverty and hunger. Indeed, migration will increase as people trade their 

improved incomes for better prospects in the cities. At present many migrating farm 

workers are illiterate and inexperienced. Migration can be turned into a positive action if 

the people who are moving are politically protected and bring useful skills. People in 

marginal areas will play their full role in mass migration only if they are properly 

educated and experienced. Ironically, while the danger <strong>of</strong> migration to the big cities <strong>of</strong> 

the world is becoming recognized, the pattern <strong>of</strong> urban growth in Africa is changing and 

accelerating. Urban centers are growing where none existed before, and previously 

remote rural areas are now finding demand for their produce on their doorsteps. Rather 

than thinking in terms <strong>of</strong> destitute people in marginal areas fleeing the countryside, 

decision-makers should begin to understand the complex interactions between urban 

centers and rural areas, with the rural areas being important suppliers <strong>of</strong> crops, meat 

and labor. 

* Attractive returns to public investment. Results from India and China suggest that 

government agricultural investments in the less favored areas have greater poverty 

reducing effects as well as greater productivity effects than in more favored areas. The 

thinking is that this win-win result reflects the over-investment in the more favored areas 

in these two countries, leaving plenty <strong>of</strong> hitherto-neglected investment opportunities to 

realize. In the two sub-Saharan African countries studied so far, a different pattern <strong>of</strong> 

results is generated. In these countries, investment in more favored lands results in the 

larger productivity gains, while investment in the less-favored lands results in a larger 

poverty reduction. In this case, the investment decisions will be guided by whether 

decision makers favor longer term growth over immediate poverty reduction (Figure 

10-3). 

168

Figure 10-3 Ratio <strong>of</strong> number <strong>of</strong> poor reduced per million dollars <strong>of</strong> government 

expenditure on agricultural R&D: Less-favored rural areas compared to all rural areas. 

3.2 

2.5 

3 

2.6 

China India Uganda Tanzania 

Fan, S. various papers as cited in references. Note India is low potential rainfed compared 

to high potential rainfed. Note results from Tanzania are on “all agricultural spending and 

are preliminary. 

Off-farm employment. For farmers well integrated with markets, <strong>of</strong>f-farm employment 

will be an increasingly important strategy to ensure access to food via the market. But for 

those more remote from markets (and present projections <strong>of</strong> infrastructure development 

imply that hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions will remain so), hunger reduction will depend upon 

strategies to raise food production and increase its stability and diversity. As global 

economic growth continues, such areas are likely to fall further behind, thus 

concentrating poverty in such areas, especially where populations are dense and rapidly 

growing as in Western Kenya, for example. 

* Threats to natural resources. Vulnerability to hunger in these less-favored areas 

could increase as land and water become scarcer. Climate change will further 

exacerbate the risks to agriculture in many <strong>of</strong> these farming areas, by increasing the 

frequency <strong>of</strong> extreme climatic events. Areas <strong>of</strong> predicted lower rainfall are southern 

Africa, semiarid South Asia, the Middle East, Central America and parts <strong>of</strong> Latin 

America. Most already moist areas will get wetter, <strong>of</strong>ten resulting in catastrophic flooding 

in eastern Africa. Thermal stress could increase grain sterility and decrease crop yields 

significantly. Moreover, over the longer run, the shortfall in food production caused by 

climate change could be 400 to 600 million metric tons by the 2080s—potentially 

increasing the number <strong>of</strong> people at risk <strong>of</strong> hunger (Parry 2002). 

* Hunger reduction impacts even without good markets. Agricultural development 

based on market transactions is clearly limited in areas without good roads and market 

infrastructure. Such areas need to focus on strategies that meet most household and 

community consumption needs and reduce consumption risks. Relevant strategies 

include the diversification <strong>of</strong> production and diet at the household or community scale; 

ensuring household consumption security through community-based production and 

storage in “bad” years as well as good; and minimizing the use <strong>of</strong> purchased inputs in 

the process <strong>of</strong> intensification, especially for non-marketed food crops. Strategic inputs to 

169

improve the productivity <strong>of</strong> the soil and other farm and community assets (for example, 

one-time inputs <strong>of</strong> phosphorus in phosphorus-deficient soils, or establishing fruit trees in 

homesteads) may make more sense than a strategy requiring regular access to large 

volumes <strong>of</strong> externally purchased inputs, whose costs cannot be recouped in the event <strong>of</strong> 

crop or market failure. Many <strong>of</strong> these farmers are presently producing enough food 

(beyond forced sales at harvest) to feed their families for 4 to 8 months. Therefore they 

can <strong>of</strong>ten double their present yields, without having to enter the market or incur 

marketing costs, so long as they need not recoup cash costs. To benefit from available 

market access, livestock can consume excesses first, transforming them into highly 

nutritious products, followed by crop diversification with high-value, low volume products, 

such as vegetable crops, fruits and some tree products. 

10.1.3 Proposed Strategies 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> strongly recommends that raising productivity, sustainability and 

diversification <strong>of</strong> small-scale agricultural producers—in both favored and less favored 

areas--is one <strong>of</strong> the three core sets <strong>of</strong> interventions essential to reduce hunger and 

poverty. To achieve this will require strong policy support (as described in Chapter 7: 

Align critical policies to support hunger alleviation objectives), investment developing 

market infrastructure, institutions and post-harvest processing that will relieve market 

constraints for food-insecure producers and consumers (as discussed in Chapter 8: 

Error! Reference source not found.), and specific investments for and with agricultural 

producers who are presently food-insecure due to low or declining farm or resource 

productivity. There are four basic components to this latter strategy: 

• Invest in natural capital <strong>of</strong> poor farms and communities whose capacity to raise 

productivity is sharply limited by biological constraints or resource degradation. 

Strategic (system-specific) “entry points” are: improving soil fertility through 

organic amendments and strategic application <strong>of</strong> inorganic fertilizers; improving 

water availability through water harvesting and small-scale irrigation, and 

supporting communities to rehabilitate degraded forests, grazing lands, and 

fisheries; 

• Increase availability and use <strong>of</strong> high-quality seed and livestock breeds; 

• Develop systems to provide technical assistance for improved farm and resource 

management, through farmer learning networks, community-based extension 

and financial services; 

• Target research and technology development to raise low productivity <strong>of</strong> smallscale 

producers. 

These strategies can be pursued in ways that provide positive synergies with nutritional 

interventions to reduce hunger, and with environmental and health interventions 

recommended by other <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s. 

10.2 Investment in Natural Capital <strong>of</strong> Farmers and Communities 

For farms and communities with low or degraded land quality, strategies to increase food 

security must emphasize building or restoring the quality <strong>of</strong> natural assets (soils, water, 

farm trees, forests and grazing lands), and mobilizing human, social and financial capital 

170

to do so. Increasing the underlying productivity and resilience <strong>of</strong> the resource base 

provides a platform for transition to higher-productivity systems. By increasing the 

quality <strong>of</strong> natural assets, farmers can diversify local diets and the range <strong>of</strong> commercial 

products, create conditions for a high return on application <strong>of</strong> agricultural inputs, reduce 

risks <strong>of</strong> crop or livestock loss, and restore critical watersheds, natural habitats for wild 

game and medicines—the “ecological infrastructure” (Scherr 1999). This approach can 

lead to long-term and sustainable increases in productivity regardless <strong>of</strong> specific crops 

grown, and can reduce vulnerability to crop failure. Where inputs markets function 

poorly, the approach enables farmers to increase the productivity <strong>of</strong> their land through 

converting labor resources, which <strong>of</strong>ten have low opportunity cost in the <strong>of</strong>f-season into 

productive assets. While focused on rural producers, this approach will have multiplier 

effects benefiting the landless farm workers and non-agricultural rural populations as 

well. 

Our recommendation focuses on four strategic entry points—soil fertility, water 

management, perennial gardens and forest, rangeland and fisheries rehabilitation. All 

have been associated with a doubling or tripling <strong>of</strong> product yields or farm income (from a 

low base), and improved food security. 

10.2.1 Soil fertility 

A central challenges <strong>of</strong> many low-productivity farming systems are poor or depleted soil 

fertility, which make intensification uneconomic, and provides inadequate access to soil 

nutrients to sustain higher harvest levels. 

* Enhancing low or depleted soil fertility: Annual crop-based systems in many socalled 

“marginal” areas <strong>of</strong> Latin America, Asia and especially Africa have infertile or loworganic 

matter soils, with poor physical structure and ability to hold water. For 

intensification to be sustainable and cost-effective, soil fertility must be improved as a 

foundation for external input use or diversification. Soil fertility improvement will <strong>of</strong>ten 

require increasing soil organic matter and soil biological activity through the use <strong>of</strong> green 

manures/cover crops; protecting the soil by low-cost soil conservation methods including 

soil cover throughout the year, no-till or conservation tillage, field leveling, and passive 

terracing (Palm 2001; Pretty 1999; Pretty and Hine 2000; Sanchez, 2002). The use <strong>of</strong> 

herbaceous green manures and cover crops to manage tropical soils focuses on 

maximizing biomass production for recycling and fertilizing subsequent crops and 

promotes minimize tillage. Over 145 different systems <strong>of</strong> improved fallows and cover 

crops have been identified, which have been adopted with few or no subsidies (Bunch 

2002). 

With these methods, farmers even in previously very poor land (or wastelands) are 

getting grain yields <strong>of</strong> 3 to 4 t/ha within three or four years <strong>of</strong> initiation <strong>of</strong> the process, as 

opposed to traditional yields <strong>of</strong> less than a ton obtained with open field, ploughed 

systems. The land can be planted every year, again more than doubling annual 

production. The total production <strong>of</strong> the systems is increased six or eight times that <strong>of</strong> the 

traditional systems. Improved fallow systems, which are both economically improved (by 

the insertion <strong>of</strong> economically valuable species in the fallow) and ecologically improved 

(the fallow is shortened by adding or using entirely leguminous and other soil-improving 

species) have been widely adopted, with some systems having elements <strong>of</strong> both forms 

171

<strong>of</strong> improvement (see Box 9.1). Other systems that improve soil fertility without any 

fallowing at all including intercropped green manure and cover crops, and green 

manures used to recuperate wastelands are also used by hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> 

small-holder farmers. Conservation tillage, zero tillage, and the accompanying mulching 

systems, green manures and cover crops, have spread across southern South America 

to about 2 million adopters in the last decade, including large- and small-scale 

farmers. As a result <strong>of</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> these plants, yields <strong>of</strong> food crops have increased from 

50 to 200%, with moderate added expense. These technologies also drastically reduce 

erosion, improve overall soil quality, increase soil organic matter content, and reduce the 

amount <strong>of</strong> fertilizer needed per unit <strong>of</strong> yield. Even herbicide use can be reduced if green 

manure and cover crops are used (Bunch 2002). 

* Providing adequate soil nutrients for high productivity: To maintain adequate soil 

nutrition under more intensive production systems, the core inputs required are soil 

nutrient inputs, combining inorganic and organic fertilizers. In nutrient-depleted soils that 

have good soil physical structure, additional <strong>of</strong> small amounts <strong>of</strong> inorganic fertilizer <strong>of</strong> 

appropriate combination can significantly increase crop yields, and the two are largely 

substitutes (Omamo, et al. 2002). Decisions as to whether farmers in any specific 

situation should use chemical fertilizer or agro-forestry/green manure/animal manure 

systems will depend on the relative cost <strong>of</strong> each intervention to the farmers. In many, if 

not most, cases, using both kinds <strong>of</strong> technologies will be most cost-effective. 

Mineral fertilizer has already been widely promoted but is insufficiently used in Africa and 

in some other areas <strong>of</strong> chronic low productivity. Three factors are responsible: fertilizer 

prices in present markets are extraordinarily high in Africa, violent swings in product 

prices make its use risky, and its impact on yields in some deteriorated soils is limited. 

To expand the use <strong>of</strong> fertilizers will require market interventions discussed in Chapter 9: 

Improve markets to benefit poor consumers and food producers. Purchased inorganic fertilizer 

will be used principally for crops that will be sold for cash (when short-term credit is 

made available); local sources <strong>of</strong> organic nutrients can be collected or produced at little 

or no cash cost. 

Medium levels <strong>of</strong> fertilizer inputs combined with organic matter are a proven strategy for 

the sandy soils <strong>of</strong> the Sahel. These soils respond very well to phosphorus and the 

drought risk is low. They will accumulate phosphorus and there is a significant carryover 

effect for several years. They also respond well to nitrogen, but it is risky if drought 

occurs (Bationo; Jomini in Ag Systems; Shapiro et al. 1993 -- Ag Systems). Sandy soils 

will not accumulate nitrogen due to their sandy nature, which makes increasing organic 

matter very difficult. The Sahel and semi-arid areas in general have more potential than 

is usually assumed, and the soil fertility strategy combined with a market-oriented 

cropping strategy can raise incomes significantly without adding to risk (Sanders, 

Shapiro, and Ramaswamy, 1996 -- Johns Hopkins Univ. Press). 

10.2.2 Building Cropland Soil Fertility in Africa 

Mineral fertilizers. The traditional way to overcome nutrient depletion is the use <strong>of</strong> 

mineral fertilizers. But fertilizers cost from 2 - 6 times more at the farm gate in Africa than 

in Europe, North America or Asia. This is a major market distortion that must be tackled 

as a priority issue by the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. Since the plant does not care whether the nitrate 

172

and phosphate ions it absorbs come from a fertilizer bag or a decomposing leaf, the 

principal issue is to replenish plant nutrients in sufficient quantities. Whether this is done 

by mineral fertilizers or organic inputs is principally a question <strong>of</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> nutrients at the 

farm gate. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> advocates the combined use <strong>of</strong> both nutrient sources in 

agronomically sound ways. The Sasakawa Global 2000 network and many other 

organizations have shown in thousands <strong>of</strong> farms throughout Africa that mineral fertilizers 

can double to quadruple yields <strong>of</strong> basic food crops (Quiñones et al, 1997). 

”Fertilizer trees” (Nitrogen-fixing tree fallows). Leguminous trees <strong>of</strong> the genera Sesbania, 

Tephrosia, Crotalaria, Glyricidia and Cajanus are interplanted into a young maize crop 

and allowed to grow as fallows during dry seasons, accumulating 100 - 200 kg N ha -1 in 

6 months to 2 years in subhumid regions <strong>of</strong> East and Southern Africa. The quantities <strong>of</strong> 

nitrogen captured are similar to those applied by commercial farmers as fertilizers to 

grow maize in developed countries. After harvesting the wood from the tree fallows, 

nitrogen-rich leaves, pods and green branches are hoed into the soil prior to planting 

maize at the start <strong>of</strong> a subsequent rainy season. This above-ground litter plus the tree 

roots decompose, releasing nitrogen and other nutrients to the soil. Yields <strong>of</strong> maize, the 

staple food in this region, increase 2 - 4 times as nitrogen deficiency is overcome. 

Farmers are now establishing tree fallow–crop rotations -- one year <strong>of</strong> trees followed by 

one crop <strong>of</strong> maize in bimodal rainfall areas <strong>of</strong> East Africa, and two years <strong>of</strong> trees 

followed by 2- 3 maize crops in unimodal rainfall areas <strong>of</strong> Southern Africa. These 

fallows are economically and ecologically sound and fit well with farmer customs and 

work calendars, in part since the technology was developed together with farmers 

(Sanchez, 2002). Similar results have been obtained using herbaceous green manures 

and cover crops (Bunch 2000). 

Indigenous rock phosphate. Phosphorus deficiency cannot be overcome by organic 

inputs alone, because <strong>of</strong> the small quantity <strong>of</strong> phosphorus they contain (Palm et al 

1997). While nitrogen deficiency is practically universal in farmed fields, phosphorus 

deficiency is found in parts <strong>of</strong> East Africa, the Sahel and some highland regions <strong>of</strong> Asia 

and Latin America. Indigenous rock phosphate deposits provide an alternative to 

imported superphosphates. The mild acidity <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> these soils (pH 5 - 6) helps 

dissolve high-quality rock phosphates at a rate that can supply phosphorus to crops for 

several years. Under such conditions, their direct application doubles or triples maize 

yields 90% as efficiently as superphosphates, which are more costly (Sanchez and 

Jama, 2002). 

Biomass transfer <strong>of</strong> leaves <strong>of</strong> nutrient-accumulating shrubs. Transfer <strong>of</strong> leaf 

biomass <strong>of</strong> the nutrient-accumulating shrub Tithonia diversifolia from roadsides and 

hedges into cropped fields adds nutrients and routinely doubles maize yields at rates 

used by farmers, without fertilizer additions. This organic source <strong>of</strong> nutrients is more 

effective than urea when applied at the same nitrogen rate, because tithonia also adds 

other plant nutrients, particularly potassium and micronutrients (Gachengo et al, 1999). 

In a poor but market-oriented area in Western Kenya additions <strong>of</strong> tithonia biomass were 

not pr<strong>of</strong>itable to maize, but when applied to high-value vegetables they showed high 

economic returns (Jama et al; 1999). Tithonia diversifolia grows in roadsides <strong>of</strong> 

subhumid tropical Africa and is native <strong>of</strong> Mesoamerica. Its use, as well as the fallows, 

provides all the essential elements to crops, including micronutrients with important 

human nutrition implications. 

173

Limitations. This soil fertility replenishment approach has several limitations. The high 

cost <strong>of</strong> mineral fertilizers requires an efficient marketing system so that farmers can pay 

<strong>of</strong>f their loans and avoid getting into a debt trap. Improved tree fallows have yet to prove 

their worth in the semiarid tropics <strong>of</strong> Africa because the much longer dry season limits 

their growth and nitrogen fixation potential. Fallows also do not perform well in shallow or 

poorly drained soils, and in frost-prone areas. The availability <strong>of</strong> high-reactivity rock 

phosphate is limited by insufficient market development, but demand is growing. Many 

<strong>of</strong> the rock phosphate deposits in Africa are <strong>of</strong> low reactivity and have limited potential 

for direct application. A nutrient-accumulating analog <strong>of</strong> Tithonia diversifolia is yet to be 

found for the semiarid tropics. In spite <strong>of</strong> the above limitations, the current adoption 

domain <strong>of</strong> this approach is large and defined by the most widespread 'red' soils <strong>of</strong> the 

subhumid tropics, where the bulk <strong>of</strong> rural people in Africa live. 

Over 150, 000 <strong>of</strong> farm families in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe 

and Mozambique are using various combinations <strong>of</strong> fallows, phosphorus, and biomass 

transfers with good and consistent results. Adoption is taking place through farmer-t<strong>of</strong>armer 

and village-to-village knowledge transfers, by community-based organizations, 

and by a multitude <strong>of</strong> national research and extension institutes, universities, nongovernmental 

organizations and development projects. The challenge now is to 

accelerate the adoption rate to reach tens <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> farm families. The main 

obstacles are the insufficient supply <strong>of</strong> quality tree germplasm (seeds and seedlings), 

availability <strong>of</strong> rock phosphate and insufficient awareness and knowledge <strong>of</strong> the 

technology components. Together with similar successes with nitrogen fixing cover 

crops in poor areas <strong>of</strong> Latin America <strong>of</strong>ten with steep slopes, and policy reform to bring 

the African fertilizer prices in line with the rest <strong>of</strong> the world, there is a major opportunity 

to drastically and sustainably increase food production in the first typology <strong>of</strong> hunger, in 

a way that enhances the natural resource base. 

10.2.3 Water harvesting and small-scale irrigation 

Development planners around the world are realizing more and more the importance to 

small farmers <strong>of</strong> adequate small-scale water management. With increased deforestation 

and the advent <strong>of</strong> global warming, the situation <strong>of</strong> irregular or inadequate rainfall is due 

to become a good deal worse during the next couple <strong>of</strong> decades. And improved water 

management is <strong>of</strong>ten the greatest felt need among farmers. Small-scale water 

management greatly improves food security because it <strong>of</strong>ten allows for harvests year 

round, and lets farmers plant a wider variety <strong>of</strong> crops, including much higher value crops. 

Furthermore, water management is one <strong>of</strong> the agricultural technologies that most 

interests women, because they are <strong>of</strong>ten responsible for the provision <strong>of</strong> water, whether 

it be for drinking, domestic use, or the watering <strong>of</strong> animals. Water harvesting systems at 

plot, farm and community scales can help increase crop and fodder yields, and establish 

homegardens, tree nurseries, dry-season livestock watering (FAO/World Bank 2002). In 

some dry areas, there may be potential to utilize salty waste resources by growing salttolerant 

species and varieties. 

Many <strong>of</strong> the African “hunger hot spots” are located in areas <strong>of</strong> irregular or inadequate 

rainfall, which is a limiting factor for farming systems. Improved small-scale water 

management has the potential to increase yields more than any other single intervention 

in such areas. Field experience suggests that it is most cost-effective to work with those 

174

farmers and communities who have easily accessible water sources. Staff training will 

have to be almost universal (and farmer extensionists will have to be used widely), as 

virtually no universities have <strong>of</strong>fered up-to-date courses on this subject. Small-scale 

water management technologies can be simple to understand and inexpensive to adopt. 

The choice <strong>of</strong> technologies will vary totally depending on whether the land is generally 

flat or hilly .On hillsides, the technology <strong>of</strong> choice by hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> small 

farmers in Latin America is that <strong>of</strong> polyurethane hoses to bring the water from a stream, 

and then a sprinkler (commercial or homemade) to distribute the water. The total cost <strong>of</strong> 

such a system varies depending on the distance <strong>of</strong> the water source, but if the source is 

less than 0.5 km from the field, the total cost will be less than $50. On flat land with 

either rivers or a fairly shallow water table, treadle pumps are used by tens <strong>of</strong> thousands 

<strong>of</strong> farmers in Asia. Such a pump plus a little hose or a ditch will be all a farmer needs to 

irrigate approximately half a hectare, and the total cost, once again, is usually less than 

$50. Upon achieving success with these technologies, simple household water 

harvesting and grey-water filtering might also be introduced. Using only these 

technologies, the programs could easily double the value <strong>of</strong> farmers’ crops and greatly 

reduce their risks, and do so at less than $ 200/farmer in total program cost. 

Small-scale water management will not only improve agricultural productivity, it will make 

more water available to the family (quantity <strong>of</strong> water is <strong>of</strong>ten as important as its quality in 

terms <strong>of</strong> preventive health). It also improves incomes dramatically (taking people out <strong>of</strong> 

poverty), and decreases disease. Lastly, it can decrease run-<strong>of</strong>f during extreme events, 

thereby reducing vulnerability, and thereby also improve the environment. Within the 

field <strong>of</strong> agriculture, better small-scale water management can make virtually every other 

operation on a farm more productive and less risky. In some communities in India, for 

example, rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> degraded lands and water harvesting together helped to boost 

farmer income by over 600 percent (FAO 2002). 

Farmers will need to be trained in the management and maintenance <strong>of</strong> small-scale 

water management systems. Ideally farmers would also learn to grow one or two 

promising species <strong>of</strong> higher-value crops, or to grow their subsistence crops out <strong>of</strong> 

season, so at least part <strong>of</strong> the irrigation water translates into significantly higher incomes. 

In countries where polyurethane hose costs more than US $0.05 per meter, the 

programs would probably have to import hose, and then eventually, as the demand 

increases in the area, ensure that store owners in nearby towns are selling it at 

reasonable prices. 

10.2.4 Perennial home and community gardens 

Soil, tree, livestock, and water investments can be integrated in into small but diverse, 

high-productivity household and community gardens. They provide supplemental staple 

foods and fallback food provision during seasonal lean periods, increase vegetable and 

fruit consumption needed to provide adequate micronutrients, reduce cash outlays for 

food and provide an opportunity for cash income from sale <strong>of</strong> garden products (Marsh 

1996). Local people can be encouraged to transplant into homegardens locallyconsumed 

types and varieties <strong>of</strong> wild plants, and programs to disseminate high-quality 

seed and seedlings <strong>of</strong> commonly consumed high-calorie perennial and semi-perennial 

crops (plantains, bananas, avocados, sugar cane, cassava or taro), fruit trees and 

vegetables. Homegardens can provide significant quantity and diversity <strong>of</strong> products, 

175

especially on sites that are enriched with farmyard and kitchen wastes. Gardens can 

benefit even the rural and urban poor who own or control no more than the homestead 

<strong>of</strong> their house. For those with not even this space, or who do not have the knowledge, 

seed, time, or security to protect their own homegardens, community gardens have been 

successful. These require allocation <strong>of</strong> public (or private) lands for garden use and some 

governance system for allocation <strong>of</strong> individual plots or distribution <strong>of</strong> products from 

communal plots. Homegardens are a key component <strong>of</strong> urban agriculture (Funes). 

10.2.5 Forest, range and fisheries rehabilitation 

For many poor people dependent directly on natural resources for their livelihoods, 

claims on their resource base are precarious and difficult to defend from encroachment 

from outside interests. Many are chronically food-insecure, particularly where the 

natural resource base per capita has been declining sharply, from natural population 

growth, or from the extensive destruction, degradation or appropriation <strong>of</strong> the natural 

resources on which their food security depends. For example, pastoralists’ livelihoods 

are threatened by agricultural encroachment, even in areas poorly suited for crop 

production. Key elements for stability are capacity to manage herds, to ensure adequate 

access, plus protection <strong>of</strong> emergency fodder supplies, such as riverine resources. 

Traditional nomadic herding is robust and an excellent management <strong>of</strong> semiarid and arid 

lands, but this way <strong>of</strong> life is endangered by policies favoring crop farmers and restrictions 

on access to critical grazing and water resources. 

The greatest threat to forest-dependent people has been loss <strong>of</strong> rights to manage and 

utilize forests, as these were claimed by the state, or conferred to private or public 

logging concessions for plantation or industrial development. Forest resources are also 

threatened by encroachment <strong>of</strong> migrant farmers, uncontrolled use <strong>of</strong> fire for agriculture, 

and over-exploitation <strong>of</strong> economically important wild species. 

Factors that contribute to the vulnerability <strong>of</strong> fishers include poor fisheries management; 

lack <strong>of</strong> investment capital and consequent low return on labor. There is high seasonal 

variation in income and food availability. Artisanal ocean fishers compete with tourism 

and nature reserves for access to beach front and near-shore waters, while inland 

freshwater fishers compete for access with farmers and urban development. High levels 

<strong>of</strong> freshwater pollution are destroying fisheries and contaminating fish and amphibious 

catch (WRI 2000; FAO 2000 State <strong>of</strong> World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture). A key 

mechanism <strong>of</strong> marginalization is the process <strong>of</strong> privatizing communal resources, with 

large-scale commercial fishing and aquaculture operations encroaching on traditional 

fishing grounds and fishing at unsustainable levels (Oxfam 2000). 

Poor farmers or communities in many farming, pastoral, forest or fisheries systems will 

benefit from investing in improved governance <strong>of</strong> resources, including protection and 

restoration <strong>of</strong> natural vegetation for production <strong>of</strong> fuel, fodder, medicines, aquatic 

species, wild foods and commercial products, and for ecosystem services. Such 

resources commonly play an important role as food and income “safety nets” for the 

poorest, as well as providing critical micronutrients in the diet. Major initiatives have 

successfully reduced poverty and enhanced local ecosystems by restoring productive 

forests (Scherr, White and Kaimowitz 2003), rangelands (Sidahmed 2003) or fisheries 

(FAO 2003). 

176

Box 10.1 Impacts <strong>of</strong> Enhancing Natural Capital in China 

Numerous highly successful programs aimed at enhancing natural capital have been 

documented. In China, the government has rehabilitated 5 million ha <strong>of</strong> low- and medium yielding 

land since 1996. Soil fertility has been improved through better farming practices, expanded 

irrigation facilities and increased use <strong>of</strong> organic fertilizers. Crop yields increased by 2200 kg/ha on 

average. China has also expanded animal raising and fish farming in barren hills, grasslands and 

coastal areas suited to grazing and aquaculture. Livestock and aquaculture production increased 

by almost 20% between 1996 and 1998, significantly improving the diversity <strong>of</strong> both diets and 

incomes. 

10.3 Investment in Natural Capital <strong>of</strong> Farmers and Communities 

An integrated genetic and natural resource management approach is required to 

increase harvests in low-productivity areas. Reducing the poverty <strong>of</strong> the rural poor will 

require improved germplasm that can respond to moderate levels <strong>of</strong> inputs. This 

germplasm has to be created by modern science with the active participation <strong>of</strong> poor 

farmers, processors, and consumers in jointly identifying the traits that need to be 

improved. Traits desired by poor farmers (drought tolerance, for example) have to be 

reconciled with the traits that are required by the market (i.e., for processing into higher 

value products that consumers want). High-value crops, trees and livestock are the 

most important options for agricultural diversification available to poor smallholder 

farmers. Many <strong>of</strong> these provide opportunities even in areas <strong>of</strong> poor infrastructure, which 

are otherwise low-potential staple food crop production zones, such as in semi-arid 

areas. For example, improved small ruminant and cow-calf operations can take place in 

remote semi-arid areas far from markets, and the same is true for some non-perishable 

high value tree crops. 

10.3.1 Crops 

Improved seeds bred for specific environmental conditions and levels <strong>of</strong> external inputs 

can raise yields, reduce the length <strong>of</strong> time to harvest, improve germination, reduce labor, 

reduce diseases, and improve cooking, processing and storage qualities (FAO 2001). 

More emphasis needs to be placed on crops, trees and livestock with traits that benefit 

poor farmers and contribute to food security. For example, poor farmers in areas with 

high and rising land scarcity typically need to shift to higher-calorie per hectare crops, 

such as from grains to root crops, and thus demand different cultivars. Customized crop 

and grass varieties can be developed suitable to diverse production conditions. 

Maintaining a fairly high level <strong>of</strong> agricultural genetic and crop diversity is an important 

strategy for poor farmers and communities with insecure access to markets, 

heterogeneous ecological conditions on their farmers, and variable climate. 

“Appropriate” seeds refers not just to potential yield and adaptability to various farmers’ 

conditions, but to the ability <strong>of</strong> the germplasm to perform in ways desired by poor 

farmers, and includes such issues as the presence in the germplasm or seed container 

<strong>of</strong> weed seeds, pests and diseases. Improved seeds could be developed for the longer- 

177

term program. Priority would be given to seeds that would be particularly useful to 

hungry farmers in marginal areas. These would primarily be seeds <strong>of</strong> widely grown 

basic grain and tuber crops that have been developed for their pest-, disease- and 

drought-resistance. For droughty areas, short-duration crops, such as sorghum, maize, 

and cowpeas, would also be <strong>of</strong> great value. Also <strong>of</strong> major importance for poorer farmers 

in Africa are millet, pigeon peas, bananas, sweet potato and cassava. ICRISAT and 

INTSORMIL work in semiarid areas shows that farmers need a mix <strong>of</strong> varieties with 

differing maturity to respond to prevailing weather conditions. They need longer-cycle 

varieties for better rainfall years, since these respond more to inputs and raise 

production and productivity. With market and institutional development (e.g. farmer 

organizations with sufficient incentives built in for farmer participation) higher input levels 

are possible and can significantly improve the livelihoods <strong>of</strong> the poor. 

Where well-adapted germplasm exists, better systems are needed to produce and 

distribute high-quality seeds to large numbers <strong>of</strong> poor farmers at low cost (Box 9.2). 

Strategies include community and district nurseries, networks <strong>of</strong> on-farm seed producers 

(including commercial enterprises developed by local farmers). Public seed programs 

and farmer entrepreneur systems are useful to get seed markets functioning, but then 

the private sector can begin to play a more and more significant role that benefits poor 

farmers (who are getting richer) and themselves. 

10.3.2 Farm trees 

For diverse farming systems, especially in humid and sub-humid regions, establishment 

<strong>of</strong> farm trees enhances the natural assets <strong>of</strong> poor farmers. Trees may be established for 

diverse purposes: soil fertility and conservation, fencing animals or gardens, 

homegarden development with fruit trees, shrubs and palms for food security; riparian 

revegetation for protection <strong>of</strong> water sources; timber species to be sold for future 

investments, such as children’s education. There is great scope to domesticate tree 

species previously growing wild that produce high and known benefits, for planting in 

farm fields, pastures, homegardens and woodlots, as well as to improve productivity, 

time to first harvest, and seasonality <strong>of</strong> production, <strong>of</strong> species already being planted by 

farmers. Even restoration <strong>of</strong> degraded areas can be done with high value, marketoriented 

crops such as to produce gum Arabic. Yet there is presently a critical shortage 

<strong>of</strong> tree seed in most poor rural areas, as there is <strong>of</strong> locally-adapted seed. 

10.3.3 Livestock 

For mixed crop-livestock and pastoral systems, and for the semi-landless, significant 

gains can be obtained – especially for vulnerable household members -- through 

improvements in livestock herd size and quality; small intensive production systems with 

dairy, eggs, and poultry for income (Heifer Project International 2001). Similarly, 

livestock can be bred for hardiness, high milk or meat yields, better reproduction, and 

genetic resistance to disease. Programs modeled on Heifer International have 

successfully disseminated high-quality livestock to poor farmers and communities by 

having recipients <strong>of</strong> stock repay the program with the <strong>of</strong>fspring <strong>of</strong> the initial animal. 

178

Box 10.2 Scaling up distribution <strong>of</strong> improved seeds 

Highly successful models for distribution <strong>of</strong> improved seed to low-income farmers have been 

developed. For example, in Zambia, CARE’s Livingstone Food Security Project introduced droughttolerant 

crops through a community-based seed bulking and distribution scheme, piloted in 1994-95. 

The crops covered initially were maize, sorghum and cowpea. Related agronomic information, seed 

handling and post-harvest storage were included in the extension messages shared with farmers. 

Seed groups were formed in each village, which federated to form a Village Management Committee. 

By 1997-98, over 200 Village Management Committee participated, involving more than 12,000 

farmers. Each farmer received enough seed to sow about 0.25 ha (either 5 kg <strong>of</strong> maize, 4 kg <strong>of</strong> 

sorghum or 3 kg <strong>of</strong> cowpea). The rate <strong>of</strong> repayment was a sufficient quantity <strong>of</strong> seed for each 

remaining member in the group to plant an equivalent area the following season, in addition to one 

portion <strong>of</strong> seed entrusted to CARE for allocation to a farmer in a new group. The schemes’ rapid 

expansion was aided by the high priority farmers attach to drought-tolerant crop varieties and the 

strategy <strong>of</strong> using community-based organizations (FAO 1999b). This approach could be scaled up 

widely in drought-prone areas <strong>of</strong> Africa and expanded to include seeds for cash crop and trees. 

10.4 Provide Technical Assistance for Improved Farm and Resource 

Management 

The other element <strong>of</strong> increasing long-term agricultural productivity besides investment in 

natural and capital and better seed is improved management practices. These are essential 

for farming systems in more marginal regions that have intensified significantly over the past 

generation, with population and market pressures. Traditional management practices are 

inadequate when regular fallowing is not possible and cropland is limited. 

10.4.1 Need for Technical support for Improved Management 

A recent analysis by FAO and the World Bank identified “pro-poor” agricultural technologies, 

which are characterized by: increased long-term sustainable productivity, labor intensity, 

suitability for women, adapted to seasonality, stability and resilience, compatibility with 

integrated and diversified systems, low capital input, low external input requirements, ease <strong>of</strong> 

adoptability, and neutral or declining returns to scale. Promising management approaches 

include: biological nitrogen fixation, integrated plant nutrient management, integrated pest 

management (IPM), water use efficiency, integrated soil and water management, 

conservation agriculture, agr<strong>of</strong>orestry and permaculture, integrated intensive farming 

systems, integrated pest management, and gender selection in animals (FAO/WB 2002). 

Technologies and components need to be flexible so farmers can make their own 

combinations and modifications. 

There is promising evidence that initiatives to promote and support farming communities to 

use and adapt these types <strong>of</strong> systems and system components can be successful, such as 

the well-documented case <strong>of</strong> conservation farming in Zambia where as many as 60,000 

farmers were using elements <strong>of</strong> the practice just a few years after its formal promotion 

(Haggblade and Tembo 2002). A study in 17 African countries estimated that 730,000 lowincome 

households participating in 45 projects <strong>of</strong> initiatives were practicing “sustainable 

agriculture,” defined to include intensification <strong>of</strong> land use, diversification <strong>of</strong> crops and animals 

raised, better use <strong>of</strong> both renewable and nonrenewable resources and other social criteria 

(Pretty 1999). In eight Asian countries, a recent survey <strong>of</strong> organizations found that some 2.86 

179

million low-income households have increased food production on 4.93 million hectares 

using sustainable agriculture approaches (Pretty and Hine 2000). 

To achieve the MDG on Hunger, such programs must now be scaled up to the tens <strong>of</strong> 

millions. The strategies to do so require strengthening community-based farmer learning 

networks, providing technical support to community groups, and financing asset-building 

investments. 

10.4.2 Strengthen community-based farmer learning networks 

Developing technologies with farmers, observing their own adaptations and exchanging 

experiences with them is a key element <strong>of</strong> successful adoption rates for new agr<strong>of</strong>orestry, 

organic matter management, water management and other new techniques. Initiatives to 

promote improved management systems need to emphasize the “self-reliance” model, 

whereby farmers, once empowered with the knowledge and convinced <strong>of</strong> the benefits <strong>of</strong> 

farming and resource innovations, are major movers and champions for its adoption (ILEIA 

1989). Farmers and rural community associations and cooperatives need support and 

training to take the lead in jointly identifying strategic interventions <strong>of</strong> high local interest, and 

strategic sites in the community landscape for their implementation. Groups can also 

organize for micro-financing, where that is needed, or for the joint development <strong>of</strong> community 

tree nurseries, group labor, or cooperative marketing or input purchase. Community 

organizations can federate or otherwise cooperate, leading to mass movements such as the 

use <strong>of</strong> zero tillage in southern Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. 

Programs should employ a limited number <strong>of</strong> technologies. The agricultural development 

programs around the world that have successfully scaled up, from FAO’s Farmer Field 

Schools in IPM to the green manure/cover crops and zero tillage work in South America to 

the Green Revolution itself, have all limited the number <strong>of</strong> technologies with which they 

worked. 

10.4.3 Provide technical support to community groups 

Facilitators and intermediaries from NGOs and public who have a proven track record as 

partners in participatory community processes <strong>of</strong> farm and ecosystem improvement can 

provide support to such efforts. Successful models that could be scaled up or replicated 

include Landcare Association groups in the Philippines, or Soil and Water Conservation 

Groups in Kenya. Facilitators should be trained in agroecological and landscape 

management principles appropriate for the ecosystems where they work, and selected for 

their competence, commitment and the “fire in their bellies.” Groups with impressive track 

records include FAO’s IPM team in Southeast Asia, which now has 2.4 million graduates who 

have cut pesticide use in half with no decrease in yield. The list is numerous and the groups 

vary between regions. Extension services should focus on a few strategic and very cheap 

innovations that require no financial subsidies or minimal access to cash inputs or external 

credit. Programs should be rigorously monitored with very simple and transparent methods, 

such as aerial photographs <strong>of</strong> changing land use and cover (Bunch 2002). There has been a 

highly successful collaboration <strong>of</strong> EPAGR, EMBRAPA, INTA and GTZ in spreading zero 

tillage systems in southern Latin America. CIDICCO, World Neighbors and COSECHA have 

promoted green manures through community groups around the world. The FAO’s Farmer 

Field Schools have been widely successful in promoting integrated pest management in 

180

many areas <strong>of</strong> the tropics. Expanded programs are needed to address the technical support 

needs <strong>of</strong> herders, fishers and community forest managers. These will ideally be coordinated 

with agricultural support efforts. 

The information revolution presents promising potential for bringing benefits <strong>of</strong> information, 

education, market intelligence, etc. to poor farm producers in rural areas (Narayana and 

Gulati 2002), but so far the “digital divide” is simply widening (WRI 2002). Low-cost 

computers could make management <strong>of</strong> food storage and distribution much more efficient, 

while low-cost environmental monitoring systems could improve drought early-warning 

systems and reduce costs <strong>of</strong> resource management. Community village television and radio 

programming, and networks <strong>of</strong> computer-based rural information centers could be important 

tools to provide technical information to producers. 

10.4.4 Provide financing for asset-building investments 

The reversal <strong>of</strong> the dramatic decline in agricultural sector lending by the development banks 

will be essential in the promotion <strong>of</strong> such agricultural innovations. Over the past 15 years, 

new financial institutions based on micro-credit have grown rapidly, and their experience 

confirms that even the very poor are creditworthy-- the challenge is institutional, due to high 

transaction costs. Farmer groups and NGOs, many with public, private or donor financial 

subsidies, have devised diverse micr<strong>of</strong>inance schemes can reduce food insecurity by 

allowing expanded production that will generate income; allowing more risk-efficient “asset 

portfolios” (such as animals, land, materials, natural resources); and smoothing consumption 

patterns (tiding a family over a drought, seasonal scarcity, crop failure, illness and so on). 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommends that a Fund for Community Farm and Resource Investment be 

established with international financing. Funds will be made available to organized 

communities who contribute to required resources and could be modeled after programs 

such as GEF Small Grants Program, IFAD community grants, Equator Initiative. Programs 

can build on lessons from successful informal finance for the poor: provide credible long-term 

partnerships with clients, tailor financial services to specific demand patterns, take advantage 

<strong>of</strong> local knowledge in local decision-making, credible contract enforcement, benefits <strong>of</strong> groupbased 

transactions, provision <strong>of</strong> savings as well as credit services, and personal knowledge 

<strong>of</strong> clients (Zeller and Sharma 1998). In regions with high labor migration, micro credit could 

be capitalized through local remittances (Dobie 2002). This initiative could be linked to 

programs <strong>of</strong> the Convention to Combat Desertification for the drylands <strong>of</strong> Africa. 

In many countries, there are presently large subsidies to farmers in some <strong>of</strong> the more 

favored regions -- subsidies that are <strong>of</strong>ten unnecessary for pr<strong>of</strong>itability, and that encourage 

wasteful use <strong>of</strong> resources and environmental degradation. National support to farmer 

networks could be partially financed by redirecting these subsidies to investment by smallscale 

farmers in the higher-risk environments. 

10.5 Target Research and Technology Development to Raise Low Productivity 

<strong>of</strong> Small-Scale Producers 

Extensive evidence confirms that one <strong>of</strong> the most productive public goods investments is 

investment in agricultural research. However, at this time there is gross under-investment 

globally in agricultural research for the tropics, particularly for small-scale farmers who are 

trapped in lower-productivity systems. There should also be more focus on increasing 

181

productivity <strong>of</strong> non-cereal crops to enable diversification and subject highly erodible soils to 

less cultivation. 

10.5.1 Rebuild national research systems 

In 1995, IFPRI advised low-income developing countries to set an immediate minimum target 

for spending on agricultural research equal to 1 percent <strong>of</strong> the value <strong>of</strong> total agricultural 

output, with a longer-term (5-10 year) target level <strong>of</strong> 2 percent. Unfortunately, most 

governments in this group have spent only about 0.5 % <strong>of</strong> agricultural GDP on agricultural 

research. A few middle-income countries such as Malaysia and Thailand have spent 0.6-0.7 

percent, with other less wealthy countries, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, spending 

only about 0.2%. The donor community has contributed; since 1981 the World Bank has lent 

$3.8 billion for agricultural research purposes in developing countries, either through 

specialized loans or broader loans with an agricultural research component (Paarlberg 

2002). There has been minimal continuity, high levels <strong>of</strong> “fungibility,” and in many countries 

budgetary collapse between international donor tranches. With these low levels <strong>of</strong> spending, 

nearly all national research is focused on higher-quality lands and commercial (<strong>of</strong>ten export) 

crops. There has been little integration with research on natural resource management. And 

low-income farmers still have little or no voice in setting research priorities or directing 

accessing research resources. 

A great deal has been learned about how to target and implement agricultural research to 

benefit low-income producers in high-risk environments (Adato and Meinzen-Dick 2002; 

Franzel and Scherr 2001); including work on multi-crop systems, ecoagriculture, earlymaturing 

varieties, and low-cost soil-building methods. Decentralized research and 

development systems with active local innovation and adaptive research, supported by 

research institutions that also work on key problems identified in the field are particularly 

effective. There are special challenges that must be addressed when working on complex 

natural resource management challenges, with multiple stakeholders. Many institutions are 

making significant progress through adaptive collaborative management approaches. 

New methods for on-site research are freeing the innovation and adaptive research functions 

from the research centre, to be led by farmers and community resource users (Franzel and 

Scherr 2002; Buck et al. 2002). This brings together local knowledge and science in a 

synergistic fashion. Farmers have always experimented, but pressures on farmers today are 

much higher, due to rapid market and ecological changes. The participatory technology 

development movement encourages more systematic farmer experimentation and adds 

scientific processes to these. Following such support, farmers have been shown to continue 

experimenting and have made valuable technological discoveries and innovations (ILEIA 

1999). 

10.5.2 Integrate research approaches and disciplines 

The past two decades have brought diverse approaches to the development <strong>of</strong> sustainable 

agricultural systems. New research initiatives will need to explicitly integrate these 

approaches in their work. Important examples are agricultural ecology, ecoagriculture and 

biotechnology. 

* Agricultural ecology. Ecology, microbiology and biochemistry advances have also made 

possible rigorous ecological analysis to understand and manage soil nutrient and water 

182

flows, nitrogen fixation, and wildlife behavior in agricultural landscapes, and to understand 

pest-predator interactions in ways that <strong>of</strong>fer revolutionary new approaches to pest control. 

The capacity for micro-management <strong>of</strong> fields allows more ecologically sensitive management 

and high-performing polycultures, allowing a move away from monocultures. Major advances 

in the use <strong>of</strong> biological nitrogen fixation by herbaceous (green manure and cover crops) and 

tree legumes in improved fallow systems (Buresh and Cooper, 1999) as well as conservation 

tillage are already making big difference increasing crop yields and sustainability in marginal 

areas <strong>of</strong> Latin America and Africa. 

* Ecoagriculture. Diverse innovations from agricultural ecology, agricultural production 

technology, landscape ecology, and wildlife biology are making it possible to increase 

agricultural production while also enhancing biodiversity, watershed and other ecosystem 

services (McNeely and Scherr 2003; CGIAR 2002a,b). New methods <strong>of</strong> remote sensing will 

be able to assess soil nutrient deficiencies and identify soil erosion “hotspots,” as well as 

monitor land use cover and management (Shepherd and Walsh 2002), enabling more 

effective planning and interventions. These innovations could help to reduce hunger by 

reducing the trade<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> farming, gathering <strong>of</strong> wild foods and products, and ecosystem 

services in rural areas. 

* Biotechnology. Biotechnology has opened up new opportunities to improve conventional 

crop breeding, through genetic fingerprinting, molecular marker-assisted selection processes 

and tissue culture (Pingali 2002). Biotechnology <strong>of</strong>fers new tools to accelerate the process <strong>of</strong> 

germplasm improvement for crops, trees and livestock. While presently controversial, 

genetically modified crops may <strong>of</strong>fer solutions for overcoming some key barriers to 

conventional breeding. However biotechnology has to build on a base <strong>of</strong> strong conventional 

breeding resources, well-analyzed germplasm collections, scientific facilities, etc., and its 

benefits can be realized mainly where other key barriers—such as soil fertility, water 

management, etc—have been resolved. For many tree species, biotechnology has made 

possible accelerated selection and breeding for the first time. If concerns about economic 

control, biosafety and public acceptance can be resolved, genetic modification <strong>of</strong> crop plants 

and associated species will improve food quality and will increase nutrient efficiency, drought 

and salt tolerance, and pest resistance. Priority should be given to developing traits directly 

beneficial to the poor, such as drought tolerance in maize, or disease tolerance in cooking 

bananas. Given the capital intensity and expense <strong>of</strong> these innovations, it is unclear how to 

ensure that significant benefits will accrue to low-income farmers or the environment without 

reliance on public sector research. The benefits <strong>of</strong> biotechnology are most likely to accrue to 

countries and farming systems where conventional agricultural research and crop genetic 

resources are well studied, and where other production and market constraints are already 

well managed. We do know that they could give birth to major new industries <strong>of</strong> 

pharmaceuticals and, biomass energy systems, new processing technology, crop 

substitutes, etc. There are now 40 crops in 15 countries in public sector biotechnology 

(Luijben and Cohen 2000), and new “green agrotechnology” is on the horizon (Horsch, pers. 

comm. January 2003). 

10.6 Synergies 

Initiatives to raise agricultural productivity for chronically food-insecure households and 

communities can be implemented in a way that creates positive synergies with other 

183

nutritional interventions, environmental conservation and health interventions to meet other 

MDG’s. 

10.6.1 Agricultural Productivity and Nutrition 

The potential synergy between increases in agricultural productivity, reductions in hunger 

and reductions in malnutrition is strong and is summarized in Table 10-2. However, these 

synergies will require cross-sectoral planning if they are to be realized. A recent review <strong>of</strong> 

the institutional constraints in Uganda, Nigeria and Mozambique (Benson et. al. 2003) that 

prevent fuller cooperation between government departments dealing with agriculture and 

nutrition stresses the need to take these into account when lobbying, designing, 

implementing and evaluating potentially synergistic actions. 

Table 10-2 Synergies between Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition 

Agricultural action 

Productivity increases lead to lower food 

prices. 

Consumption <strong>of</strong> own agricultural production: 

<strong>Force</strong>d: If markets not integrated, difficult to sell 

food now and buy later 

: Homestead gardening 

Bio-fortification 

Selection <strong>of</strong> seed creates potential to self-fortify 

crops with micronutrients 

Time allocation: Some types <strong>of</strong> smallholder 

farming (e.g. close to home) may be more 

consistent with childcare than others. 

Production <strong>of</strong> fuelwood on the farm with 

improved fallows is one example. 

Choice <strong>of</strong> crop may affect decision making 

ability <strong>of</strong> child care-taker 

Energy expenditures: some farming systems 

require higher labor input than others 

Impacts on health environment <strong>of</strong> different 

agriculture choices 

Synergy with Nutrition 

Increases ability to purchase more quantity and 

quality in diet 

Nutrition impact depends on what is being 

produced 

Potentially more pr<strong>of</strong>itable than fortification with 

more micronutrients supplies 

For child caretaker, impacts on ability to 

breastfeed and provide care to infants and 

children 

Increased female access to farm inputs leads 

to higher productivity and increased attention to 

food security and nutrition 

Need to take into account arduousness <strong>of</strong> tasks 

important for young women to gain body weight 

to prevent low birth weight babies; important 

where heavy AIDS burdens 

Need to minimize fertilizer run<strong>of</strong>f, standing 

water build up (malaria, schistosomiasis) 

10.6.2 Agricultural productivity, environmental conservation and water 

A central challenge <strong>of</strong> the 21 st century, will be for farmers to develop systems that both meet 

essential food production needs and also provide critical ecosystem services, like biodiversity 

conservation and watershed management. 

* Dependence <strong>of</strong> the poor on healthy ecosystems. Many <strong>of</strong> the farming areas critical to 

livelihoods <strong>of</strong> very poor people must also play critical roles in watershed and biodiversity 

184

conservation. Moreover, the poor are the most vulnerable to the impacts <strong>of</strong> ecosystem 

degradation, including loss <strong>of</strong> wild food and medicine species, wood fuel, clean and secure 

water supplies for people, livestock and farming. Healthy ecosystem function is essential to 

ensure continuing food production, especially watershed management for irrigation and flood 

control, soils, vegetation patterns in the landscape, and predator-pest balances. Low-income 

rural people are especially vulnerable to ecosystem deterioration, as they depend on local 

water sources for domestic use, and rely much more on wild foods to supplement their diets, 

especially in drought years (McNeely and Scherr 2002). 

In promoting agricultural intensification, it is thus essential to fully recognize and reconcile 

these multiple roles. This implies agricultural development strategies considered at 

ecosystem or landscape scales that promote landscape mosaics mixing diverse land uses. 

Such approaches can directly contribute to poverty reduction and improved food security 

(Rietbergen, Bishop and Mainka 2002). Because this has not been the conventional strategy 

for either conservation or agricultural development, however, proactive steps are needed at 

the international level and in on the ground initiatives to achieve joint poverty reduction, 

conservation and agricultural development objectives. 

* Dominance <strong>of</strong> agriculture in global land and water use. Evidence from satellite images 

indicates that by the late 1990s crops and planted pastures were the dominant mode <strong>of</strong> land 

use (accounting for over 60 percent <strong>of</strong> total area) in 10 percent <strong>of</strong> the land area outside 

Antarctica, and were an important part <strong>of</strong> the landscape mosaic (30-60% <strong>of</strong> area) in another 

17 percent <strong>of</strong> land area. These figures exclude bush and forest areas that are part <strong>of</strong> fallow 

systems, and many tree crops. Another 10-20% <strong>of</strong> land is under extensive grazing systems 

(Wood, et al. 2000). Outside the minimally populated areas <strong>of</strong> the northern tundra and Arctic 

regions, deserts, and parts <strong>of</strong> the Amazon and Congo rainforests, agriculture is the principal 

land use, pr<strong>of</strong>oundly influencing watershed function and wildlife habitat (Sanderson, et al. 

2002). 

Irrigation for agriculture accounts for 70 percent <strong>of</strong> total freshwater withdrawals globally and 

87% <strong>of</strong> those in low-income countries (Postel 1999). Ecological impacts <strong>of</strong> many crop, 

livestock, forest and fisheries production systems include agrochemical pollution <strong>of</strong> water and 

soils, soil erosion ad nutrient depletion, rangeland degradation, loss <strong>of</strong> perennial soil cover 

and loss <strong>of</strong> critical wildlife habits founding within farming areas. Watershed functions have 

deteriorated, reducing water quality and dry season water flows and increasing run<strong>of</strong>f and 

flooding. Over the next fifty years—without changes in agricultural systems—another 1 billion 

hectares <strong>of</strong> natural ecosystems could be converted to agriculture, accompanied by a 2.4 to 

2.7-fold increase in nitrogen- and phosphorus-driven eutrophication and pesticide use 

(Tilman et al. 2001). 

* Potential positive impacts <strong>of</strong> agricultural management on ecosystems. Investments in 

perennial vegetation and water management will <strong>of</strong>ten have positive environmental effects. 

Most systems that maintain or improve soil organic matter and agr<strong>of</strong>orestry systems can 

sequester 1-3 metric tons <strong>of</strong> C ha -1 per year in the tree biomass and soils, this level is 5 to 10 

times more than that realized in most other agricultural practices (Watson et al, 2000). Onfarm 

trees also provide firewood and reduce encroachment onto nearby forests and 

woodlands, helping preserve their remaining biodiversity. The diversity <strong>of</strong> plant species 

grown in these farms mitigates the effects <strong>of</strong> pest attacks and market price fluctuations. 

Agr<strong>of</strong>orestry systems are also robust, suffering less crop production decreases when 

185

droughts hit, because <strong>of</strong> the higher porosity and water-holding capacity <strong>of</strong> the soils. Since 

Africa is considered the most vulnerable region to the effects <strong>of</strong> global warming, increasing 

the adaptive capacity <strong>of</strong> its farmers will be increasingly important. 

Recognition by urban elites, governments and businesspeople <strong>of</strong> the central role <strong>of</strong> rural 

farmers, fishers, herders and foresters in ecosystem management could encourage 

investments and payments to improve agricultural systems. Diverse payment schemes are 

already underway and increasing; a recent review found 72 cases <strong>of</strong> payments for 

biodiversity, 75 cases for carbon emission <strong>of</strong>fsets, and 61 for diverse types <strong>of</strong> watershed 

services (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). Opportunities are arising for such payments to be 

directed to low-income farmers and communities, but these require proactive efforts to 

design new market instruments to respect their needs (de los Angeles 2002; Rosa et al. 

2002). The Clean Development Mechanism <strong>of</strong> the Kyoto Protocol and other instruments 

could potentially fund the transfer <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars from industries in 

developed countries to farmers in the tropics for ecosystem restoration and establishment <strong>of</strong> 

sustainable farming systems with high proportion <strong>of</strong> perennials, for biomass energy, and 

eventually for re-building soil organic matter (Smith and Scherr 2002). Other international 

environmental conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and Convention 

to Combat Desertification, can be strengthened to work much more effectively with farmers. 

* New partnerships. The Millennium Project proposes that initiatives to achieve the Hunger 

MDG seek to build on new partnerships between farmers, conservationists and 

agriculturalists (e.g., Box 9.4.) An example is the partnership developed between CARE and 

WWF, which have committed to a policy <strong>of</strong> achieving livelihoods benefits in all conservation 

projects and conservation benefits in all livelihood projects (WWF/CARE 2002). Recent 

innovations from science and local communities have illustrated the potential for developing 

such systems (McNeely and Scherr 2003), and these have been demonstrated on the 

ground by projects recognized by the Equator Initiative and others 

(www.equatorinitiative.org). Ecoagriculture Partners has recently formed to accelerate the 

development <strong>of</strong> farming systems that also benefit biodiversity conservation and other 

ecosystem services, through networking and partnerships between farmer, agricultural, 

conservation and research groups that have not historically worked closely together 

(www.ecoagriculturepartners.org). 

Box 10.4 Establishing strong agricultural partnerships in biodiversity conservation initiatives 

A number <strong>of</strong> important, relatively well-funded initiatives by private conservation organizations are 

underway with government support to conserve biodiversity and habitat value across geographically 

large ecoregions. In some <strong>of</strong> these areas <strong>of</strong> high biodiversity value, millions <strong>of</strong> low-income people earn 

their livelihoods through farming. In some <strong>of</strong> these areas there are also strong international agricultural 

research programs with strong natural resource management components (for example, ICRAF in the 

highlands <strong>of</strong> Uganda Mindanao, Philippines; CIAT/CIMMYT in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor). 

Partnerships should be developed between these groups to achieve joint improvements in agricultural 

productivity, farm incomes and biodiversity conservation. 

186

10.6.3 Agricultural productivity and health, including AIDS 

HIV and AIDS have dramatically altered the landscape in which agriculture has to operate in 

southern and eastern sub-Saharan Africa. Research indicates that over 15 percent <strong>of</strong> adults 

in Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Namibia, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi, and 

Kenya are living with HIV/AIDS. Technology development and dissemination and natural 

resource management practices need to quickly adapt to the HIV/AIDS legacy <strong>of</strong> lower labor 

to land ratios, disrupted knowledge transmission, diminished capacity for collective action 

and weaker property rights. 

Conservation tillage technology could be important where HIV/AIDS has reduced the number 

<strong>of</strong> working-age adults. The two heaviest operations in agriculture are soil preparation and 

weeding. Cover crops or herbicides can control weeds, while zero tillage eliminates the need 

for soil preparation. By using conservation tillage practices, even older orphaned children 

could do the work needed to feed themselves and any reduction in weeding will greatly 

reduce the workload <strong>of</strong> women. Infectious disease interactions and control efforts (for 

human, livestock and crop disease) can be more actively coordinated. 

10.7 Political Commitment 

Developing-country agriculture appears back on the development agendas <strong>of</strong> most donor 

institutions and donor donations. Many institutions have revitalized their efforts on 

agriculture. Examples include the governments <strong>of</strong> Africa through NEPAD. 

There are several factors for this welcome re-emergence. They can be classified as (a) 

politically related, (b) problem related and (c) solution related. The political issues included 

the attention brought to the WTO and the current Doha round by the NGOs, led by Oxfam, 

on the link between rich country support to its own agriculture and the costs <strong>of</strong> that to poor 

farmers in the developing world and the furor over bio-engineered crops. These two mediafavorable 

topics focused the world’s attention -- perhaps unwittingly -- on the plight <strong>of</strong> 

smallholder farmers in the poor countries, whereas the tragic (and familiar) stories <strong>of</strong> drought 

focused more on the consequences. The stories, <strong>of</strong>ten focusing on poor country farmers as 

the principals, documented the difficulties they faced in competing with rich country 

agribusiness and the extent to which biotechnology had passed them by. Problem-related 

events included drought, but they had a new focus: AIDS. AIDS had a direct connection to 

people in rich countries, and claimed the lives <strong>of</strong> adult farm workers, reminding the world how 

important agriculture was to Africa’s current and future well-being. 

The drumbeat <strong>of</strong> several high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile efforts to stress the key role <strong>of</strong> agriculture in 

development (World Food Summit and Five Years Later, IFAD Poverty <strong>Report</strong>, World Bank 

Rural Strategy, IFPRI 2020 etc.) helped to keep the problem pot boiling. The solution pot 

also was kept simmering by a series <strong>of</strong> influential and important pieces <strong>of</strong> research that 

began to document—in ways that policymakers could relate to—the contributions <strong>of</strong> 

agriculture as an engine <strong>of</strong> growth and poverty reduction, vis-à-vis other potential engines. 

These studies have been mentioned above. The fact that credible statements about how 

“one dollar invested in agriculture would reduce poverty by x percent” could be made, was 

tremendously important. The initiatives listed above bear witness to the coming together <strong>of</strong> 

the three streams <strong>of</strong> thought — related to politics, problems, and solutions -- in the late 

1990s and early 2000s. 

187


As indicated above, many <strong>of</strong> the actions described in this section have been well known for 

many years. One <strong>of</strong> the key differences in making them more effective today is the shift in 

thinking about “how” they are best implemented. The past 25 years has seen a shift in 

development paradigms from top-down to a portfolio <strong>of</strong> bottom-up and top-down approaches. 

Examples <strong>of</strong> bottom-up approaches include the emergence <strong>of</strong> institutions that promote the 

collective management <strong>of</strong> natural resources such as land, water and forests; the recognition 

that farmers must be involved in the development <strong>of</strong> technologies that are designed to serve 

their needs, both in terms <strong>of</strong> understanding their needs and drawing upon their expert 

knowledge <strong>of</strong> local conditions and practices; and the recognition by governments <strong>of</strong> 

traditional local property rights. 

In addition, thinking around the roles and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> different actors is becoming 

clearer: rich country governments must open their markets to developing country competition 

and end the dumping <strong>of</strong> subsidized production onto world markets. The poor countries must 

reduce inter-country trade barriers, and create a policy environment that provides incentives 

for the private sector (e.g. seed marketing) and for community based organizations (e.g. 

promoting market linkage) to get involved in the revitalization <strong>of</strong> small-scale agriculture. Poor 

country governments must provide public goods such as extension services in a transparent 

and accountable manner, and they must form partnerships with other actors such as NGOs 

to exploit synergies in service delivery and research product definition and the private sector 

in developing improved germplasm. The donor agencies must commit to increase 

investments in the “rural space” and be prepared to stay the course, because increasing the 

aggregate supply response <strong>of</strong> agriculture—a powerful driver <strong>of</strong> overall growth--will take time. 

The key policy changes that will enable this revitalization <strong>of</strong> the smallholder sector, whether 

in less or more favored areas are: (a) reduce indirect agricultural taxation through an 

overvalued exchange rate making exports (most agricultural) more expensive and making 

capital intensive farming more tractable, (b) increase pro-poor public investments in rural 

areas, either to diversify into high value crops or to produce food staples, and (c) lobby to 

reduce OECD agricultural subsidies and increase competitive access for OECD markets. 

Land reform that results in a more equitable distribution <strong>of</strong> plots <strong>of</strong> workable size will also 

increase the productivity <strong>of</strong> land and labor and will create incentives for further investment in 

land quality. 

188

11 EARLY ACTIONS FOR AFRICA 

At the request <strong>of</strong> the United Nations Secretary-General, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has 

developed an approach to dramatically increase agricultural productivity and reduce 

malnutrition through environmentally sustainable methods in Sub-Saharan Africa—a “doubly 

green revolution.” It is “doubly-green” in promoting increased agricultural productivity (green 

crops) that is grown using environmentally-friendly, “green” methods (Conway 1987). 

11.1 Developing Plans to Halve Hunger by 2015 in Select Hunger Hotspots 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposes to implement this strategy by establishing partnerships with 

governments and other stakeholders in Sub-Saharan Africa, then working closely with them 

to design Early Action programs targeting hunger hotspots. For each partnership, the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> will conduct a thorough analysis <strong>of</strong> the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger in targeted regions, as well as 

the constraints to progress. <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> members and consultants will work with stakeholders 

to augment existing country-action plans -- or develop new ones – to reduce hunger in the 

target region over a 10-15 year timeframe. The policy planning process will emphasize 

building participation and ownership at the country level. It will also help mobilize political 

commitment at both local and international levels for implementation <strong>of</strong> the hunger-reduction 

plans. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposes to complete four <strong>of</strong> these plans by mid-2005. It has initiated 

preliminary discussions with political leaders in several Sub-Saharan African countries, with a 

goal <strong>of</strong> establishing partnerships and launching implementation <strong>of</strong> Early Action programs 

starting in 2004. To facilitate close partnership with stakeholders in Sub-Saharan Africa who 

will form the initial focus <strong>of</strong> the Early Action efforts, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposes to hire a senior 

manager to coordinate these efforts from a base in Nairobi, Kenya. 

The expected output <strong>of</strong> the partnerships will be operational and investment plans for 

reaching the hunger MDG in approximately four hotspot regions. These efforts will help 

catalyze the political will and public investment needed for effective implementation <strong>of</strong> the 

plans, and can also serve as models and case studies for broader action. Early Action 

partnerships will focus on Sub-Saharan Africa in the initial phase, with potential to be 

expanded to South Asia and other areas <strong>of</strong> high hunger intensity. An example <strong>of</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

collaboration is its relationship with NEPAD, described below. 

189

Figure 11-1 NEPAD Consultancy: How the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Works 

An example <strong>of</strong> how The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will provide technical assistance in 2004 is the close 

relationship forged with the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) Secretariat. Agriculture 

is one <strong>of</strong> the top NEPAD priorities for immediate implementation. A Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 

Development Plan (CAADP) has been formulated, with more than 30 programs and projects built 

around four pillars: 1) Land and water reclamation and management, 2) Infrastructure and markets, 3) 

Food production and hunger reduction, and 5) Institutional capacity building, especially in research 

and extension. The CAADP calls for upwards <strong>of</strong> US$ 300 billion in agricultural and rural development 

investments over a 15-year period, with African governments increasing national contributions to the 

overall development budgets from 35 to 55 percent (i.e., by 50 percent). 

NEPAD itself has no implementation authority but serves to focus, coordinate, and mobilize resources 

between individual member African states and regional economic communities for a comprehensive 

Africa agricultural development plan. During 2003, the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> contributed technical 

assistance to the NEPAD Secretariat in strengthening the content <strong>of</strong> the CAADP. Assistance was 

provided to develop Model Project Proposals in four subjects: 1) Soil fertility restoration and 

management, 2) Banana tissue culture production, 3) Maize production and promotion, and 4) 

Domestically-sourced school feeding programs. <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> advisors developed rough cost estimates 

on a national level for these four “flagship projects.” During the remainder <strong>of</strong> its term, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

plans to provide the NEPAD Secretariat with additional assistance. From January – March 2004, it will 

work to complete “flagship project” proposals that will directly affect hunger reduction in NEPAD 

member states. 

11.2 Research and Analysis in the Targeted Hotspot Area 

The initial phase <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s Early Action partnerships will focus on a thorough 

analysis <strong>of</strong> the extent, causes and nature <strong>of</strong> hunger in each hotspot; an evaluation <strong>of</strong> existing 

and past anti-hunger initiatives in the region and their results; and characterization <strong>of</strong> the 

political economy <strong>of</strong> hunger in the target area. The characterization <strong>of</strong> the extent and nature 

<strong>of</strong> hunger in each hotspot will include the following: 

• Identify and characterize vulnerable groups (demographics, location, livelihoods, 

etc.). 

• Characterize the nature <strong>of</strong> their hunger (caloric, protein, micronutrient deficiencies). 

• Diagnose the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger (lack <strong>of</strong> food availability, lack <strong>of</strong> access, instability in 

availability or access, low biological utilization). 

• Characterize other causal factors (e.g. low production, inefficient markets, low 

incomes, lack <strong>of</strong> clean water, poor care behavior, limited access to medical services, 

etc.). 

The partnership will then conduct a critical analysis <strong>of</strong> past efforts to reduce food and 

nutritional insecurity in the hotspot area, seeking to address the following questions: 

• Which problems have been addressed, which haven’t and why? 

• What has worked, where and why? 

190

• What have been the main constraints to increasing the scale <strong>of</strong> actions? 

• What has been tried but hasn’t worked, and why? What were the main constraints? 

Can these constraints be resolved, and if so how? 

• What are the main gaps in past efforts that could be filled with approaches that have 

proved successful in analogous areas? 

• What problem-solving research is needed to fill critical knowledge gaps? 

The partnership team will also seek to characterize the political economy <strong>of</strong> hunger in the 

hotspot region. This may contribute additional perspectives on the nature <strong>of</strong> hunger in the 

region and the results <strong>of</strong> past efforts to address it, and will help lay the groundwork for the 

plan’s strategy for building political commitment. The analysis <strong>of</strong> political economy will 

address the following: 

• What is the political pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> vulnerable groups? Are they disenfranchised due to 

gender, ethnicity, or other socio-institutional factors? 

• What is the level <strong>of</strong> awareness and the attitude <strong>of</strong> national and local political groups 

to hunger? How do they view vulnerable groups? 

• What priority do national and local governments give to programs to reduce hunger? 

Why? 

11.3 Stake Holder Consultation and Partnership 

The partnership process will be based on active stakeholder consultation and partnership. 

Local data and perspectives will be essential to the initial analysis <strong>of</strong> the hotspot region. To 

facilitate that, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will partner with local organizations and researchers, and invite 

local input and dialogue through regional meetings. Strong participation by key actors will be 

central to the process <strong>of</strong> developing effective hunger-reduction plans and defining a workable 

strategy for their implementation. 

11.4 Development <strong>of</strong> an Action Plan 

Based on the above diagnosis, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> and its partners will work to develop an action 

plan to halve hunger in the targeted region by 2015. The plan will cover a wide spectrum <strong>of</strong> 

possible interventions, including direct interventions, policy reform, and raising political 

awareness and commitment. It will prioritize and define the sequence, scale and 

approximate costs <strong>of</strong> priority actions; identify responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the main actors; and identify 

actions that are synergistic and/or competitive the objectives <strong>of</strong> other <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s. It will 

include specific cost estimates as well as priorities for investments and program 

implementation. The plan will also include a strategy for building the national and 

international political commitment required to implement the recommended reforms and 

investments. 

Early Action plans will draw upon the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s emerging recommendations, adapted to 

the local context. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s central strategy is the scaling up <strong>of</strong> simultaneous 

integrated interventions in increased agricultural productivity, market development and 

nutritional support at the community level, complemented by policy and institutional reforms 

plus targeted public-sector investment strategies at the national and international scale. 

191

11.5 Possible Synergistic Interventions 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has identified three synergistic entry points that governments in Sub- 

Saharan Africa may want to include in their anti-hunger plans. As described below, these 

are: school feeding with locally-produced foods, making markets work for the poor, and 

drastically increasing agricultural production. 

11.5.1 School Feeding with Locally Produced Foods 

A prominent feature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s Early Action Plan for Africa is the provision <strong>of</strong> meals 

through primary schools, made as much as possible from locally produced food. These will 

address adolescent and pre-adolescent children’s nutritional needs while stimulating local 

agricultural production and markets. The meals will seek to provide a balanced diet <strong>of</strong> macro 

and micronutrients, using culturally acceptable local products for the carbohydrate base, oils, 

meat and milk, vegetables and fruits. Foods will be fortified with vitamin A, iodine, iron and 

zinc, if locally produced foods cannot supply these micronutrients in sufficient amounts. 

Take-home rations, provided as part <strong>of</strong> the program, will assist vulnerable children (such as 

child laborers and adolescent girls) to attend and stay in school. Specific take-home rations 

for children less than 2 years old will also be included. Therefore, the proposed intervention 

uses school feeding as the entry point, but also addresses the nutritional needs <strong>of</strong> the most 

vulnerable group, children less than 2 year olds and their mothers. 

In addition to improving children’s nutritional status, school feeding programs have been 

shown to stimulate enrollment and retention (particularly for girls), improve students’ ability to 

learn, and provide economic benefits to other family members by <strong>of</strong>fsetting food costs, and 

also through multiplier effects on food and non-food demand. Schools could serve as a focus 

for other key nutritional interventions aimed at pregnant women and children under two (with 

fortified foods, nutrition information, etc), and also to reach adolescent girls before they 

become pregnant with iron supplementation, de-worming, breastfeeding information, 

environmental awareness and hygiene. 

Such “home-grown” school feeding programs will directly stimulate local agricultural 

production by a very significant amount. Early estimates indicate that if such a program is 

implemented throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, it will raise demand for food by 10 million tons 

per year, compared with the current total annual production <strong>of</strong> 71 million tons - a major 

potential stimulus to African agriculture. 

11.5.2 Making Markets Work for the Rural Poor 

Many African farmers in hunger hotspot regions are currently not part <strong>of</strong> the market 

economy, and those who are face major constraints when bringing additional production to 

rural markets. To improve agricultural market infrastructure in the selected hotspots, the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> has identified the following interventions: 

• Develop storage facilities at the community level and in district collection points. 

• Develop or improve feeder roads, minimizing environmental impacts wherever 

possible. 

• Develop and support the emergence <strong>of</strong> efficient and transparent farmer marketing 

associations at community and district levels. 

192

• Develop and provide technical support and capacity building for input dealers. 

• Develop internet-based and other market information systems. 

• Extend micr<strong>of</strong>inance services to agricultural investments. 

• Promote value-added processing facilities at the local level. 

• Develop guaranteed minimum prices for specific farm products, and for smallholder 

farmers. 

The absence <strong>of</strong> such guaranteed floor prices (which are common in rich countries), 

combined with the high cost <strong>of</strong> fertilizers, have decimated small farm pr<strong>of</strong>itability in Sub- 

Saharan Africa. Offering farmers a pre-arranged contract for their produce creates a 

guaranteed market for output during the initial project period for locally-sourced school lunch 

programs. Targeting certain groups <strong>of</strong> farmers (such as women) to supply these programs is 

also an option. Food for work programs (also using locally produced foods) can be used for 

construction <strong>of</strong> feeder roads, local infrastructure, soil conservation and tree planting 

activities. 

11.5.3 Drastically Increase Agricultural Productivity by Smallholder Farmers. 

The Early Action Plan for Africa calls for drastically increasing the productivity <strong>of</strong> small-scale 

farms in less-favored areas that were largely bypassed by the Green Revolution. It starts with 

tackling two key entry points that allow smallholder farmers to increase yields <strong>of</strong> staple crops 

by 2 to 4 times and generate marketable surpluses. The entry points are the proven 

strategies for restoring soil fertility using both organic and mineral fertilizers, and installing 

small-scale water storage and irrigation facilities at the farm level, plus micro-watershed 

management. 

The key factor in soil fertility interventions is for smallholder farmers to access nitrogen and 

phosphorus at the lowest possible cost. There are agr<strong>of</strong>orestry technologies that use 

“fertilizer trees” and green manures to fix nitrogen and bring nutrients from the subsoil. They 

are in use by hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> African farmers in subhumid areas with consistently 

high maize yields and deliver important additional benefits like fuelwood production on site, 

weed control and increased water holding capacity <strong>of</strong> the soil. The judicious use <strong>of</strong> mineral 

fertilizers, both for nitrogen and phosphorus, has also been successful in areas where 

fertilizer prices are reasonable and farmers can repay the costs with by selling crops in the 

market. As such, both approaches are recommended. In cases where soil erosion is a 

serious concern, contour hedges and other soil conservation interventions are needed to 

make sure the nutrients are not lost. 

Smallholder farmers can significantly increase their water resources by simple, wellestablished 

water harvesting and small-scale irrigation techniques. They include techniques 

locally known as diguettes, zai holes, stone and biological terraces, simple reservoirs, treadle 

pumps and drip irrigation. 

When the soil and water bottlenecks are sufficiently overcome, other key agricultural 

technologies can be brought to bear: improved varieties <strong>of</strong> crops, livestock and trees; 

integrated pest management, conservation tillage, aquaculture and many others. Major 

gains can be made with improved crop varieties, tissue culture bananas and improved 

livestock breeds. Hybrid maize in southern Africa and improved varieties <strong>of</strong> rice, sorghum 

and soybeans in West Africa are examples <strong>of</strong> crop varieties that can bring significant gains, 

193

when market conditions permit sale <strong>of</strong> surpluses. Most improved crop varieties in Africa 

today are more robust and better adapted to difficult conditions – they are <strong>of</strong> shorter duration 

to escape end <strong>of</strong> season drought, drought tolerant, more weed competitive, and tolerant or 

resistant to pests and diseases. 

Through the production <strong>of</strong> staple crops, farmers will achieve food security while using part <strong>of</strong> 

their land to diversify with higher-value products such as vegetables, fruits, trees and 

livestock products for income generation. Strengthening research and reinventing extension 

services will be necessary to ensure effective utilization <strong>of</strong> these strategies. Investments in 

research and extension must at least double, from the present 0.5% <strong>of</strong> the agricultural GDP 

to at least 1%. 

11.5.4 Complementary Policy Recommendations at the National Level 

Action plans developed through the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s Early Action Partnerships will address 

broader policy changes that will complement they community-based actions. These are likely 

to include increased investment in rural development -- particularly infrastructure, health 

services and agricultural development; empowerment <strong>of</strong> women; and improvement <strong>of</strong> 

national and international economic policies to reduce risk and improve pr<strong>of</strong>itability in the 

agricultural sector. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans will address the following: 

• Building capacity for policy change and implementation. 

• Recommended policies for hunger alleviation, along with their priorities and 

sequencing. 

• Requisite policy changes to facilitate implementation <strong>of</strong> specific community-based 

hunger reduction actions. 

11.6 Building Political Commitment for the Early Actions 

Working with local partners, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will develop a strategy for building the political 

commitment required to implement each Early Action hunger-reduction plan. The process <strong>of</strong> 

developing the specific plans will present valuable opportunities to lay the groundwork for 

political commitment at national, regional and international levels. At the national level, the 

process <strong>of</strong> stakeholder input and participation to the development <strong>of</strong> each hunger reduction 

plan will provide significant opportunities to initiate dialogue among political leaders and build 

their commitment into the fabric <strong>of</strong> each plan. Similarly, the process will create opportunities 

for input and buy-in from political leaders in donor nations as well as leading donor 


At the invitation <strong>of</strong> the Government <strong>of</strong> Ethiopia, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will take part in organizing 

and presenting a day-long seminar on “Innovative Approaches to Meeting the Hunger MDG” 

for African heads <strong>of</strong> state, senior ministers and senior members <strong>of</strong> the international donor 

community, immediately prior to the July 2004 meeting <strong>of</strong> the African Union. The United 

Nations Secretary-General has indicated his support for this initiative. This event will form an 

important step toward establishing partnerships and building political commitment to ending 

hunger at the regional and worldwide levels. 

Early Action partnerships will serve to demonstrate real commitment toward achieving the 

Hunger MDG, based on partnership among developing-country governments, communities, 

NGOs, the private sector and donors. On a policy level, the partnerships can serve as case 

194

studies for broader efforts to achieve the MDG’s. Successful partnerships can serve as 

investment models for political leaders and donors. 

This approach will be closely linked to efforts by the Millennium Project as a whole to expand 

its involvement in country-level advisory work during 2004, and will be closely coordinated 

with the work and expertise <strong>of</strong> UN Country Teams. 

195

12 WORK PLAN FOR 2004 

12.1 Overview 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to continue and finish its work through a combination <strong>of</strong> further 

research and analysis; and by taking an innovative role in catalyzing and building capacity for 

implementation. Research will include the development <strong>of</strong> more specific recommendations 

for hungry areas <strong>of</strong> Asia and Latin America; research and investigation <strong>of</strong> a wide array <strong>of</strong> 

unresolved and emerging issues; and the sequencing and costing <strong>of</strong> local and global plans 

for hunger alleviation. To build capacity for implementation, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will partner with 

interested Sub-Saharan African governments to act in an advisory capacity to the 

development <strong>of</strong> action plans for Hunger Hotspots; and will support national campaigns to 

build political will for implementing anti-hunger plans. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will build upon a thorough analysis <strong>of</strong> the driving factors behind hunger and 

constraints to its eradication in developing the operational framework to meet the Hunger 

MDG that will be presented in the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s Final <strong>Report</strong>. This will be accomplished 

through: 

• Analysis <strong>of</strong> selected “hunger hotspots” on three continents and the preparation <strong>of</strong> 

sample plans for achieving the Hunger MDG in selected hotspot areas; 

• Commissioned research on select topics to close knowledge gaps identified in this 

<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> in order to inform the recommendations at the international, regional, 

and national levels; 

• Systematic development <strong>of</strong> the operational framework to be recommended in the 

Final <strong>Report</strong> including consultation with stakeholders and regional experts; and 

• Work with other <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s to develop integrated recommendations for meeting 

multiple MDG’s through addressing cross-cutting issues. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will act to advise governments on launching implementation <strong>of</strong> anti-hunger 

action plans by working in an advisory partnership with stakeholders: 

Through its Early Action Partnerships, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will work directly with national 

governments and other stakeholders to develop action plans for hunger alleviation. This will 

provide opportunities to refine the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s emerging recommendations, build 

consensus and political commitment, and develop models for action that will be presented in 

the Final <strong>Report</strong> and can be replicated in other settings. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will undertake outreach activities to build public awareness and political 

commitment to hunger alleviation on both national and international levels. These efforts will 

be intended to complement the Millennium Campaign in building the political will required to 

enact the reforms and allocate the financing required for hunger alleviation, in rich and poor 

countries alike. <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> outreach will focus on stimulating both near-term progress and 

long-term commitment to meeting the Hunger MDG. 

196

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will accomplish this work through meetings and group work, as well as 

contributions and input from consultants and numerous partner organizations. The <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> 

the Tropical Agriculture Program <strong>of</strong> the Earth Institute at Columbia University will continue to 

function as the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Secretariat, with support from <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> members and their 

organizations around the world. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is working to raise additional funds to 

support the hiring <strong>of</strong> a Senior Manager based in Nairobi to coordinate its Early Action 

Partnerships, coordination with NEPAD, and other outreach activities in Africa. Additional 

funds are also being sought to fund expanded research, outreach and staffing. 

12.2 Research, Analysis, and Development <strong>of</strong> Policy Recommendations 

12.2.1 Hotspots Analysis, Characterization, and Planning 

12.2.1.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: 

Based on the 81 “hunger hotspots” it has already identified, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will conduct indepth 

characterization and analysis <strong>of</strong> 8 prioritized hotspot areas. These will include areas 

targeted for Early Action planning. The Sub-Saharan Africa hotspot characterization will be 

completed by end <strong>of</strong> April, 2004. 

12.2.1.2 South Asia and Latin America: 

Unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, which faces an overwhelming challenge <strong>of</strong> insufficient food 

production, patterns <strong>of</strong> hunger differ in countries that produce enough food in the aggregate, 

such as India and Brazil. Over the next year, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will focus its attention on 

developing more specific recommendations for such areas, particularly on issues facing the 

landless rural and the urban hungry that are more directly related to <strong>of</strong>f-farm income 

generation and nutritional interventions. In addition, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will examine areas in 

these regions where low food production by marginal smallholder farmers is also a major 

constraint, such as parts <strong>of</strong> Central America, the Andes, the Caribbean, and mountainous 

and dryland regions <strong>of</strong> Asia, where Africa-type approaches may be relevant. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will work with partner organizations to conduct a geo-referenced analysis 

and identify hotspots, based on criteria similar to that used in its Sub-Saharan Africa 

analysis. It will then select prioritized hotspots for analysis in coordination with local partners. 

The hotspot identification for South Asia will be completed by end <strong>of</strong> February, 2004, and indepth 

analysis <strong>of</strong> the hotspots will be completed by June 2004. 

12.2.2 Issues for Further Research and Analysis 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> is conducting commissioned research on a select group <strong>of</strong> topics, to 

investigate, test and strengthen <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recommendations. Papers completed to date 

have addressed candidate actions for nutrition interventions; increasing donor effectiveness; 

and an evaluation <strong>of</strong> strategies for building political will. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Interim</strong> report has 

identified other gaps in knowledge that reflect the evolving scope and nature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> recommendations. The preliminary list <strong>of</strong> commissioned research studies that we aim 

to complete by the end <strong>of</strong> April, 2004, includes: 

197

• Spatial analysis and in-depth characterization <strong>of</strong> Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 

hotspots, including studies <strong>of</strong> the primary constraints to implementing anti-hunger 

solutions in hotspot areas; 

• A modeling exercise to project potential increases in demand for agricultural products 

from locally-sourced school feeding programs, as well as the projected synergies 

between school feeding, increased agricultural productivity, and improving market 

function. 

• Development <strong>of</strong> cost estimates for hunger alleviation interventions; 

• Strategies for rural market development, including infrastructure investments and 

farmer capacity building; 

• Proposed policy reforms and investments to empower women as key partners in 

hunger alleviation efforts; 

• The impacts <strong>of</strong> trade policy on the hungry; 

• Practical overviews <strong>of</strong> small-scale water management strategies and soil quality 

restoration strategies; and 

• Reinventing agricultural extension in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

In the coming year, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will further investigate a series <strong>of</strong> unresolved questions 

and emerging issues that require further analysis, consultation and resolution. Examples <strong>of</strong> 

such issues include: 

• Urban hunger (including urban agriculture); 

• The role <strong>of</strong> livestock and fisheries; 

• The role <strong>of</strong> irrigated agriculture; 

• Environmentally sustainable alternative energy sources (such as biomass). 

• The potential participation <strong>of</strong> food producers as stockholders in private-sector 

alliances -- not stakeholders. 

• The projected impact <strong>of</strong> climate change on agriculture, particularly on food production 

and marginal lands. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will also address several analytical questions, including: 

• Linking typologies <strong>of</strong> livelihoods with political commitments, policy changes and 

synergistic hunger reduction actions. 

• Identifying trade<strong>of</strong>fs, dependencies and synergies with the recommendations <strong>of</strong> other 

task forces. 

Lastly, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will consider questions <strong>of</strong> policy design, such as: 

• Investigating the relative importance <strong>of</strong> targeting hungry smallholder farmers in 

favored lands. 

• Evaluating whether to invest and subsidize more on the input side (increasing 

agricultural productivity), or on the output side. 

• Options for generating more <strong>of</strong>f-farm income in rural areas. 

• Designing and mobilizing safety nets and related insurance policies, and relating 

them to our proposed synergistic actions 

198

• The two-way linkages between conflict and hunger, including potential synergies for 

reducing both simultaneously. 

• Strategies for increasing and channeling donor funds to agriculture and hunger 


12.2.3 Development <strong>of</strong> the Final <strong>Report</strong> 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s Hunger Hotspot analyses, Early Action partnerships, and commissioned 

research will all form part <strong>of</strong> its Final <strong>Report</strong>, to be completed by December 15, 2004. In that 

<strong>Report</strong>, The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will present a global action plan that includes recommended 

strategies, operational priorities and implementation plans needed to achieve the Hunger 

MDG, including: 

• Institutional reform, capacity-building, and the mobilization <strong>of</strong> political will — at 

international, national, and local levels. 

• National and international policy reforms. 

• A recommended portfolio <strong>of</strong> hunger-reduction actions in the areas <strong>of</strong> nutritional 

assistance, agricultural productivity, and market development. 

• Priorities for public investments and cost analysis <strong>of</strong> hunger-reduction strategies at 

different scales <strong>of</strong> implementation. 

• A portfolio <strong>of</strong> national-level action plans, presented in a replicable format for use as 

models. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will consult with stakeholders through its Early Action planning efforts to gain 

input, review and refinement <strong>of</strong> its draft recommendations. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will also work to address costing, sequencing and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> who 

should do what. Through commissioned research and consultation, these issues will be 

addressed in the final report. Examples <strong>of</strong> questions to address include: What are the costs 

<strong>of</strong> our proposed actions and their likely benefits? How do we develop cost models that can 

be replicated on a national level and aggregated to international estimates? What is the 

sequencing <strong>of</strong> political commitments, policy changes, and hunger-reduction actions in the 

general case and in specific cases? How do we move from our general policy arguments to 

country-specific analysis and recommendations? What are the capacities needed for 

political action, policy change, and specific hunger-reduction actions in specific places? 

12.2.4 Integrating Recommendations with other Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s 

The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will actively participate in “virtual work groups” with other Millennium 

Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s to develop integrated recommendations on cross-cutting issues that 

affect numerous Millennium Project <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> issue areas. The work groups will identify 

areas <strong>of</strong> potential synergy, conflict, and overlap between <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> priorities and 

recommendations. They will then work to analyze and resolve these dynamics to develop an 

integrated set <strong>of</strong> recommendations addressing each work group topic, together with action 

plans and cost estimates. These recommendations will form part <strong>of</strong> the Millennium Project 

<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Report</strong> (to be completed in June 2004) and the Project’s Final <strong>Report</strong> and 

Recommendations to the Secretary-General in June 2005. 

199

12.3 Catalyze and Facilitate Implementation Efforts 

12.3.1 Early Action Partnerships 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to establish partnerships with country governments whose territory 

includes priority hunger hotspots, in order to develop action plans for hunger alleviation. The 

<strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will likely complete four such partnership projects in Sub-Saharan Africa by June 

2005, coordinated by a Senior Manager based in Nairobi. 

Through its Early Action Partnerships, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will act in an advisory capacity to key 

stakeholders in targeted hotspot regions. It will assist in the development <strong>of</strong> action plans for 

hunger alleviation, based on sound analysis and extensive consultation with and participation 

<strong>of</strong> stakeholders. Partnership workplans will include: 

• In-depth analysis <strong>of</strong> targeted hotspots, including the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger, the nature & 

outcome <strong>of</strong> past hunger alleviation efforts, and characterization <strong>of</strong> the current political 

economy <strong>of</strong> hunger in the target area. 

• Consultation with stakeholders, political leaders and donors to gain input into 

emerging recommendations. 

• Development <strong>of</strong> an action plan built on the above diagnosis. This may include a wide 

array <strong>of</strong> strategies including public investments, policy and institutional reform, 

sectoral development strategies, and community-based action. 

• Assistance with outreach and resource mobilization to launch implementation <strong>of</strong> the 

action plan. 

This policy planning process will emphasize capacity building and ownership at the country 

level. The expected output will be a business plan to achieve the hunger MDG in that 

particular country, or significant improvements <strong>of</strong> existing plans. This will give the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 

a realistic way <strong>of</strong> assessing the needs <strong>of</strong> what is necessary to achieve the Hunger MDG in 

given areas; estimating the costs <strong>of</strong> implementing it; and planning the sequencing <strong>of</strong> events – 

all crucial elements <strong>of</strong> a business plan. The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will evaluate the partnership process 

on an ongoing basis to test its applicability to broader-scale implementation efforts to meet 

the Hunger MDG. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has initiated preliminary discussions with political leaders in Ethiopia, Kenya, 

Uganda, Ghana and other countries to initiate such assessments starting in 2004. During 

recent discussions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> proposals, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles deemed them 

potentially “transformational” and invited further collaboration. 

The Early Action planning efforts will be coordinated with that <strong>of</strong> other <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s, in ways 

that contribute to a comprehensive plan for meeting the MDGs. 

12.3.2 Mobilizing Public Awareness and Political Will 

Stakeholder Consultation 

<strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> members will conduct extensive consultation and outreach activities among: 

• Stakeholders and policymakers within hotspot regions (including elected <strong>of</strong>ficials; 

community groups and NGOs; farmers’ and other trade associations; the private 

sector; universities and international research organizations) 

200

• The international donor community (including international financial institutions; 

bilateral aid agencies; and major private donors including foundations, corporations 

and individuals); 

• Political leaders in hungry countries and donor nations; 

The group is planning two meetings in designated hotspot areas – one in Sub-Saharan 

Africa, and one in South Asia – that will involve extensive stakeholder consultation. One is 

the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> meeting in India during February, 2004. The other is a special Seminar on 

“Innovative Approaches for Meeting the Hunger MDG,” to be co-sponsored by the <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> and the Government <strong>of</strong> Ethiopia immediately prior to the African Union Summit in July 

2004 in Addis Ababa. 

National Campaigns 

In addition, the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will participate as appropriate in advising national campaigns 

aimed at building public awareness and political commitment to meeting the Hunger MDG. 

The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> plans to undertake most <strong>of</strong> this work in coordination with the Millennium 

Campaign. For example, the Millennium Campaign is in the early stages <strong>of</strong> planning a 

campaign for public awareness <strong>of</strong> the MDG’s in the United States, together with NGOs, 

media, and other organizations that are well-positioned to communicate to the public and 

policymakers. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has been invited to participate in the design and 

execution <strong>of</strong> that campaign. 

201

ANNEX 1: MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ANTI-HUNGER INITIATIVES 

Annex 2 describes major international anti-hunger initiatives and plans sponsored by major 

international organizations and compares each to the Background <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> 

<strong>Force</strong> (Scherr and the Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2003). These organizations are the Food and 

Agriculture Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations, World Bank Group, World Food Programme, 

New Economic Partnership for African Development, Asian Development Bank, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the 

International Food Policy Research Institute. The Hunger <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> recognizes that there are 

other initiatives to survey and to learn from that are designed and implemented by nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) around the world such as OXFAM, Save the Children, 

CARE, Concern Worldwide, Bread for the World, and research institutions such as the 

Overseas Development Institute and others. 

See tables below. 

202

DEVELOP- 

MENT 

POLICIES & 

PRACTICES 

FAO’S WORLD 

FOOD SUMMIT PLAN 

OF ACTION, 1996 

• Intensify and 

diversify food 

production 

through 

sustainable 

means. 

• Implement 

integrated rural 

development 

strategies that 

promote rural 

employment; 

enhance human 

capacity; 

strengthen rural 

infrastructure and 

government; and 

reinforce the local 

productive 

capacity <strong>of</strong> 

farmers and 

others involved in 

the food sector. 

WORLD BANK’S 

‘REACHING THE 

RURAL POOR” 2002 

• Foster broadbased 

growth. 

• Agriculture is 

main engine <strong>of</strong> 

rural economic 

growth - enhance 

agricultural 

productivity and 

competitiveness 

• Catalyze nonfarm 

economic 

growth. 

• Help poor 

improve their 

social well-being, 

manage risk, and 

reduce 

vulnerability 

• Enhance 

sustainable 

management <strong>of</strong> 

natural resources. 

WORLD FOOD 

PROGRAMME’S 

STRATEGIC PLAN 

(2004-2007), 2003 

• Protect livelihoods 

in crisis situations 

and enhance 

resilience to 

shocks. 

NEPAD’S 

COMPREHENSIVE 

AFRICA 

AGRICULTURE 

DEVELOPMENT 

PROGRAMME, 2002 

• Within countries, 

successful action 

requires 

partnerships 

among 

communities, 

governments, and 

the private sector. 

• Support to 

agricultural 

research, 

technology 

dissemination, 

and adoption to 

achieve 

accelerated gains 

in productivity. 

• Implement 

mechanisms that 

reduce the costs 

and risks <strong>of</strong> 

adopting new 

technologies. 

ASIAN 

DEVELOPMENT 

BANK’S POVERTY 

REDUCTION 

STRATEGY, 1999 

• Develop human 

and social capital 

to increase 

political stability, 

raise productivity, 

and enhance 

international 

competitiveness. 

• Rural finance - 

institutional 

reform and 

policies that 

support 

sustainable and 

accessible 

financial 

institutions, 

particularly for 

non-farm 

enterprises. 

• Rural 

infrastructure 

development – 

transport, energy, 

communications. 

USAID’S 

AGRICULTURAL 

INITIATIVE TO END 

HUNGER IN AFRICA 

(IEHA), 2002 

• Focus on 

harnessing 

science and 

technology and 

unleashing 

market forces to 

increase 

smallholder 

agricultural 

productivity. 

• Link with other 

sectors, including 

education, health, 

macroeconomic 

reform, and 


improvement. 

IFAD: RURAL 

POVERTY 

REDUCTION IN 

EASTERN AND 

SOUTHERN AFRICA, 

2002 

• Increase assets 

and incomes that 

are in the hands 

<strong>of</strong> the poor 

themselves. 

• Smallholder 

agriculture is 

current basis <strong>of</strong> 

livelihoods. Its 

improvement 

represents most 

immediate 

opportunity to 

reduce rural 

poverty and 

stimulate broadbased 

growth 

processes. 

• Smallholder 

agriculture must 

itself become a 

priority growth 

area. 

“REACHING 

SUSTAINABLE FOOD 

SECURITY FOR ALL 

BY 2020” IFPRI”S 

2020 VISION 

INITIATIVE, 2002 

• Objective is a 

world where every 

person has 

access to 

sufficient food to 

sustain a healthy 

and productive 

life, where 

malnutrition is 

absent, and 

where food 

originates from 

efficient, effective, 

and low-cost food 

systems that are 

compatible with 

sustainable use <strong>of</strong> 

natural resources. 

“HALVING GLOBAL 

HUNGER” HUNGER 

TASK FORCE 

BACKGROUND 

PAPER, 2003 

• Broad approach 

focuses on: 

• Creating assets 

for the poor, 

• Establishing 

claims by the 

vulnerable, 

• Facilitating 

access <strong>of</strong> the 

poor to lowercost 

food, 

• Increasing diet 

diversity, 

• Enhancing both 

rural and urban 

safety nets, and 

• Improving food 

marketing 

systems. 

203

ENABLING 

POLITICAL, 

SOCIAL, AND 

ECONOMIC 

ENVIRONMEN 

T 

FAO’S WORLD 



• Resolve conflict 

through a stable 

political 


based on 

democracy, good 

governance, and 

respect for all 

human rights. 

• Full and equal 

participation <strong>of</strong> 

women and men. 

• Equal opportunity 

for all in social, 

economic, and 

political life, 

especially 

vulnerable 

groups. 




• Appropriate 


policy and 

supportive 

institutions 

essential for 

success in the 

rural sector. 

• Introduce sound 

food and 

agricultural 

policies; support 

development <strong>of</strong> 

effective markets 

for agricultural 

inputs, outputs, 

and services; 

remove obstacles 

to effective 

market 

operations. 

• Effective rural 

financial services 

need to be in 

place. 

WORLD FOOD 

PROGRAMME’S 


(2004-2007), 2003 

• Foster a 

collaborative 

focus on hungeralleviation 

through 

the Poverty 


Strategy Process. 

• Supports 

government 

advocacy and 

policy changes in 

favor <strong>of</strong> hungerreduction. 

NEPAD’S 

COMPREHENSIVE 

AFRICA 

AGRICULTURE 

DEVELOPMENT 


• Sound macroeconomic 

policy 

framework and an 

open economy. 

• Strong financial 

sector to facilitate 

savings 

mobilization. 

• Remove 

obstacles to 

cross-border 

trade and 

investment. 

• Enhance 

entrepreneurial, 

managerial, and 

technical 

capacities <strong>of</strong> 

private sector. 

ASIAN 

DEVELOPMENT 


REDUCTION 


• Good governance 

– participation, 

accountability, 

sound 

management, 

transparency, rule 

<strong>of</strong> law, effective 

regulation, anticorruption. 

• Government’s 

role shifts from 

owner and 

producer to 

facilitator and 

regulator. 

• Promote 

competition, 

enforce fair 

practices and 

standards, and 

ensure essential 

services reach 

poor. 

USAID’S 

AGRICULTURAL 



(IEHA), 2002 

• Good policies and 

good governance 

needed to create 

an environment 

conducive to the 

investments 

foreseen. 

• African leaders 

who put 

agriculture at the 

center <strong>of</strong> 

programs 

targeting 

economic growth 

and poverty 


IFAD: RURAL 

POVERTY 

REDUCTION IN 

EASTERN AND 


2002 

• Those with 

political power 

determine the 


'answers' on 

resource 

allocation 

questions. 

Smallholders 

rarely have an 

organized voice in 

these 

deliberations. Aim 

will be to put 

smallholders into 

these debates, to 

ensure their 

needs contribute 

to defining policy, 

and to support 

practical, costeffective 

technical 

solutions. 

“REACHING 




2020 VISION 


• Rapid economic 

growth essential 

for achieving 

sustainable food 

security for all by 

2020. Challenge 

is to achieve that 

growth in a way 

that benefits the 

poor, empowering 

them. 

• Commitment to 

long-term 


stability. 

• Good governance 

- rule <strong>of</strong> law, 

transparency, 

elimination <strong>of</strong> 

corruption, sound 

public 

administration, 

and respect and 

protection for 

human rights. 



TASK FORCE 


PAPER, 2003 

• Internal peace; 

rule <strong>of</strong> law; public 

investment in 

rural infrastructure 

and agricultural 

research; reduced 

subsidy, tax and 

regulatory barriers 

to food production 

and marketing by 

poor people; 

improved disaster 

management. 

• Integrate hunger 

goals in national 

policies. 

• Promote 

employmentgenerating 

and 

poverty- reducing 


development. 

204

REDUCE 

POVERTY, 

FACILITATE 

PHYSICAL 

AND 

ECONOMIC 

ACCESS TO 

FOOD 

FAO’S WORLD 



• Establish policies 

to promote secure 

employment and 

equitable access 

to productive 

resources. 

• Assist food 

insecure 

households. 

• Ensure a safe, 

nutritious, 

adequate, and 

accessible food 

supply. 

• Strengthen 

capacity for selfreliance 

through 

building basic 

human 

capabilities. 

• Strengthen and 

broaden scientific 

training and 

cooperation. 




• Holistic pro-poor 

rural development 

that enhances 

returns to labor 

and land. 

• Income growth 

while necessary is 

not always 

sufficient to 

address food 

insecurity. Need 

to put in place 

instruments that 

address 

malnutrition, risk, 

and vulnerability 

within the 

framework <strong>of</strong> 

poverty reduction. 

WORLD FOOD 

PROGRAMME’S 


(2004-2007), 2003 

• Support income 

growth and asset 

holdings among 

the poorest 

households in 

food insecure 

countries. 

• Contribute to 

poverty reduction 

through enhanced 

access to food. 

• Assist 

governments 

establish and 

manage national 

food-assistance 

programs 

NEPAD’S 

COMPREHENSIVE 

AFRICA 

AGRICULTURE 

DEVELOPMENT 


• Key is increasing 

food supply and 

reducing hunger. 

• Extend area 

under sustainable 

land management 

and water control. 

• Immediate impact 

on livelihoods <strong>of</strong> 

the rural poor is 

through raising 

their own 

production. 

• Improved 

technology to 

increase food 

availability, raise 

rural incomes, 

expand 

employment, and 

contribute to 

export growth. 

ASIAN 

DEVELOPMENT 


REDUCTION 


• Reduction <strong>of</strong> 

poverty is 

overarching goal. 

• Three pillars: 

• Pro-poor, 

sustainable 


growth. 

• Social 

development. 

• Good 

governance, 

sound macroeconomic 

policy. 

USAID’S 

AGRICULTURAL 



(IEHA), 2002 

• Rapidly and 

sustainably 

increase 

agricultural 

growth and rural 

incomes in sub- 

Saharan Africa. 

• Enhance access 

<strong>of</strong> African farmers 

to technology and 

markets. 

IFAD: RURAL 

POVERTY 

REDUCTION IN 

EASTERN AND 


2002 

• Assist poor 

establish 

adequate access 

to national 

resources, and to 

develop the 

capacity to build 

and sustain new 

development 

paths. 

• Four strategic 

areas: 

• Promote 

efficient and 

equitable market 

linkages. 

• Develop rural 

financial 

systems. 

• Improve access 

to and 

management <strong>of</strong> 

land and water 

• Enhance 

knowledge, 

information, and 

technology 

systems. 

“REACHING 




2020 VISION 


• Improve access <strong>of</strong> 

poor to productive 

resources and 

remunerative 

employment. 

• More productive 

agriculture to 

boost incomes <strong>of</strong> 

rural people and 

benefit poor 

consumers. 

• Improved 

technologies, 

credit, and secure 

access to land. 

• Intensify 

agriculture to 

improve natural 

resource 

management. 

• Gender equality 

to enhance food 

security. 



TASK FORCE 


PAPER, 2003 

• Enhance food 

security & 

resilience <strong>of</strong> 

ecosystems in 

higher-risk lands. 

• Invest in natural 

capital. 

• Develop farmerbased 

extension 

systems. 

• Integrate food 

production in 

environmental 

strategies. 

• Invest in 

technology 

research for these 

production 

systems. 

• Extend access 

rights to 

productive natural 

assets for the 

poor. 

• Promote urban 

agriculture. 

205

FACILITATE 

TRADE 

ENCOURAGE 

INVESTMENT 

FAO’S WORLD 



• Benefit from 

opportunities and 

challenges within 

international trade 

framework. 

• Meet essential 

food import needs 

in all countries, 

particularly 

considering the 

needs <strong>of</strong> 

vulnerable 

groups. 

• Support Uruguay 

Round Agreement 

global trade 

reform process. 

• Create policy 

framework and 

conditions for 

optimal public and 

private 

investment. 

• Mobilize technical 

and financial 

resources to raise 

investment in 

activities related 

to sustainable 

food production in 

developing 

countries. 




• Further the 

interests <strong>of</strong> 

developing 

countries in the 

WTO process. 

Ensure access to 

technology, 

particularly that 

suited to poor 

farmers and rural 

businesses. 

• Diversification, 

and access to 

global markets to 

catalyze rural 

employment 

creation in both 

the farm and nonfarm 

sectors. 

• All elements <strong>of</strong> 

the strategy are to 

seek to create an 

investment 

climate conducive 

to rural growth. 

WORLD FOOD 

PROGRAMME’S 


(2004-2007), 2003 

• Local 

procurement <strong>of</strong> 

food within 

developing 

countries and 

redistribution from 

surplus to deficit 

regions. 

• Contracting <strong>of</strong> 

national private 

sector 

transportation, 

warehousing and 

logistics capacity. 

• Promote 

investment in 

logistical 


(port facilities, 

harbor and river 

dredging, road 

and bridge 

infrastructure). 

NEPAD’S 

COMPREHENSIVE 

AFRICA 

AGRICULTURE 

DEVELOPMENT 


ASIAN 

DEVELOPMENT 


REDUCTION 


• Improve rural • Address 

infrastructure and 

trade-related 

capacities for 

better market 

access. 

• Raise 

competitive-ness 

<strong>of</strong> local production 

vis-à-vis imports 

and in export 

markets. 

Strengthen smallscale 

industries 

through technical 

support, capital. 

• Improve 

participation <strong>of</strong> 

countries in trade 

negotiations and 

their ability to 

meet quality 

requirements <strong>of</strong> 

world trade. 

• Raising output <strong>of</strong> 

small farmer 

sector depends 

on decisions <strong>of</strong> 

millions <strong>of</strong> African 

households. Role 

<strong>of</strong> government 

should be to 

provide a policy 

and incentive 

framework 

conducive to 

agricultural 

growth. With this, 

much investment 

in raising 

production will be 

made by farmers 

themselves. 

inefficiencies 

resulting from 

inappropriate 

subsidies, market 

distortions, and 

the conflicting 

signals <strong>of</strong>ten 

given to farmers 

and rural 

enterprises. 

• Greater emphasis 

to development <strong>of</strong> 

agroclimatic areas 

that have been 

bypassed by 

green revolution 

technology. 

USAID’S 

AGRICULTURAL 



(IEHA), 2002 

• Reduce tradedistorting 

tariffs 

• Assist 

and harmonize 

grades and 

standards to 

facilitate interregional 

trade. 

• Expand resources 

for local 

infrastructure in 

transportation, 

marketing, and 

communications. 

• More effective 

market systems 

will create a 

climate and 

infrastructure that 

attracts private 

and foreign 

investment to 

Africa agricultural 

businesses. 

IFAD: RURAL 

POVERTY 

REDUCTION IN 

EASTERN AND 


2002 

smallholders 

relate more 

effectively and on 

a more equal 

footing with 


• Help private 

sector provide 

competitive and 

efficient services 

to smallholders. 

• Finance provision 

<strong>of</strong> essential 


• Generate policy, 

institutional, and 

legal context 

required for 

enhanced market 

linkages. 

• Support 

development <strong>of</strong> 

sustainable 

financial 

institutions, rather 

than the provision 

<strong>of</strong> specific 

financial products. 

“REACHING 




2020 VISION 


• Markets must be 

in the hands <strong>of</strong> a 

competitive 


• Yet, competent 

public 

administration 

remains essential 

to assure 

contracts are 

enforced and 

grading and 

quality standards 

maintained. 

• Eliminate trading 

conditions that 

harm poor people 

–subsidies, price 

distortions, 

barriers to labor 

movement, import 

barriers. 

• Trade alone 

cannot raise 

developing 

countries out <strong>of</strong> 

poverty. Aid to 

agriculture and 

education are 

especially 

important to food 

security. 

• Public agricultural 

research essential 

to achieve 

sustainable yield 

increases on 

existing land. 



TASK FORCE 


PAPER, 2003 

• Improve 

agricultural 

markets so that 

they benefit the 

poor. 

• Remove barriers 

to agricultural 

market 

development – 

fair pricing, 

deregulation, level 

playing field for 

market 

participation. 

• Invest in rural 

market 

infrastructure – 

market risk 

reduction, 

information 

services, physical, 

etc. 

• Promote 

agricultural 

businesses <strong>of</strong> 

low- income 

producers. 

• External funding 

is absolutely 

essential for those 

countries that 

have a large 

proportion <strong>of</strong> 

hungry people. 

206

IMPROVE 

SOCIAL 

WELFARE, 

REDUCE 

VULNERABILI 

TY 

RESPONSE 

TO FOOD 

SECURITY 

CRISES 

FAO’S WORLD 



• No specific 

attention given 

• Prevent and 

resolve manmade 

emergencies, 

particularly 


• Identify vulnerable 

regions and 

establish 

prevention & 

preparedness 

strategies. 

• Ensure transition 

from relief to 

development. 




• Improve access to 

nutrition and 

health. 

• Increase 

availability and 

quality <strong>of</strong> rural 

education. 

• Reduce food 

insecurity, other 

risks faced by 

rural poor. 

• Remove 

constraints 

women face in 

carrying out their 

household food 

security 

responsibilities. 

• For most 

vulnerable, 

targeted transfers 

are necessary. 

• Collaborate with 

partners in 

disaster situations 

where direct food 

transfers may be 

a component <strong>of</strong> 

broader disaster 

relief aimed at the 

most vulnerable. 

• Any food 

assistance should 

be a part <strong>of</strong> a 

comprehensive 

nutrition program. 

WORLD FOOD 

PROGRAMME’S 


(2004-2007), 2003 

• Support improved 

nutrition and 

health status <strong>of</strong> 

children, mothers, 

and other 

nutritionally 

vulnerable people 

through support <strong>of</strong> 

maternal and 

child nutrition 

interventions. 

• Support access to 

education and 

reduce gender 

disparity in 

access to 

education and 

skills training 

through food-foreducation. 

• Save lives in 

crisis situations. 

• WFP’s principal 

focus. 

• Actively engaged 

in efforts to 

identify and target 

vulnerable 

regions and 

households. 

NEPAD’S 

COMPREHENSIVE 

AFRICA 

AGRICULTURE 

DEVELOPMENT 


• Productionrelated 

investments must 

be complemented 

by targeted safety 

nets – direct 

assistance to the 

most food 

insecure. 

• Failure to attend 

to unpredictable 

needs can derail 

development. 

• Effective 

implementation <strong>of</strong> 

rapid 

humanitarian 

interventions 

followed by 

rehabilitation. 

ASIAN 

DEVELOPMENT 


REDUCTION 


• Poor individuals 

and societies tend 

to remain so if 

they are not 

empowered to 

participate in 

making the 

decisions that 

shape their lives. 

• Particular 

attention will be 

given to 


because <strong>of</strong> its 

pervasiveness 

and significance 

in perpetuating 

poverty 

• Sustain the 

supply <strong>of</strong> basic 

services to the 

poor during 

crises. 

• Social protection 

programs, safety 

nets 

USAID’S 

AGRICULTURAL 



(IEHA), 2002 

IFAD: RURAL 

POVERTY 

REDUCTION IN 

EASTERN AND 


2002 

• Help the • No specific 

chronically poor attention given 

and hungry in 

rural Africa find 

viable paths out <strong>of</strong> 

poverty by 

accumulating 

assets. 

• Reduce the 

vulnerability <strong>of</strong> 

poor people to 

weather, market, 

and conflictinduced 

shocks. 

• Enhance the 

capacity <strong>of</strong> 

countries to 

manage shocks. 

• Post-crisis 

investments will 

immediately 

support poor 

people in 

acquiring the 

assets they need 

to start producing 

- and to 

eventually reenter 

normal 


relations. They 

will also 

strengthen 


“REACHING 




2020 VISION 


• Invest in human 

resources – 

healthy, wellnourished, 

literate 

citizens are 

essential precondition 

for propoor 


growth. 

• Safety nets for 

vulnerable groups 

need to be 

provided by public 

sector. 

• No specific 

attention given 



TASK FORCE 


PAPER, 2003 

• Directly enhance 

nutrition for 

vulnerable 

groups. 

• Community 

lifecycle nutrition 

programs. 

• Safety nets 

(food banks, 

ration shops). 

• Public works 

programs for 

infrastructure & 

ecosystem 

restoration. 

• Fortify staple 

foods with 

nutrients. 

• Improve famine 

prevention and 

response. 

• Reduce 

vulnerability to 

famine. 

• Extend best 

practices in 

disaster 

preparedness and 

response. 

207

IMPLEMENT- 

ATION 

FAO’S WORLD 



• Draw up national 

strategies and 

programs. 

• Improve 

international and 

regional 

cooperation 

systems. 

• Monitor 


• Clarify the content 

<strong>of</strong> rights to 

adequate food 

and freedom from 

hunger. 




• Detailed action 

program for 

implementation at 

global, regional, 

and country 

levels. 

• National and 

regional diversity 

will guide 


Policy instruments 

determined by 

progress in policy 

reform, size and 

state <strong>of</strong> the rural 

economy, and 

access to external 

markets and 

finance. 

WORLD FOOD 

PROGRAMME’S 


(2004-2007), 2003 

• 90 percent <strong>of</strong> 

WFP’s undirected 

multilateral 

development 

resources to be 

allocated to 

countries that are 

least developed 

and where 

widespread 

chronic 

malnutrition is 

found. 

NEPAD’S 

COMPREHENSIVE 

AFRICA 

AGRICULTURE 

DEVELOPMENT 


• To increase food 

supply and 

reduce hunger for 

100 million people 

by 2015 will 

require $7.5 

billion. 

• Commit to 

allocating at least 

10% <strong>of</strong> national 

budgetary 

resources to 

agricultural 

development. 

ASIAN 

DEVELOPMENT 


REDUCTION 


• ADB resources 

will be used to 

support efforts <strong>of</strong> 

governments to 

develop policies 

and institutions 

that will more 

rapidly reduce 

poverty. 

• All assistance will 

be expected to 

contribute to the 

reduction <strong>of</strong> 

poverty. 

USAID’S 

AGRICULTURAL 



(IEHA), 2002 

• Build a broadbased 

political 

and financial 

commitment 

among public and 

private 

development 

partners, both in 

Africa and 

internationally, to 

cut hunger in half 

by 2015. 

IFAD: RURAL 

POVERTY 

REDUCTION IN 

EASTERN AND 


2002 

• Three principles 


implementation: 

• Targeting to 

those areas 

where the poor 

are in numbers 

– the medium to 

high-potential 

areas. 

• Invest in the 

empowerment <strong>of</strong> 

the rural poor to 

strengthen their 

own productivity 

and increase 

their assets. 

• Democratic 

accountability <strong>of</strong> 

government to 

the local 

demands <strong>of</strong> the 

poor. 

“REACHING 




2020 VISION 


• Requires 

participation from 

the public sector, 

the private sector, 

and from NGOs. 

• However, special 

role for 

governments to 

play, as they are 

responsible for 

the provision <strong>of</strong> 

necessary public 

goods needed to 

foster food 

security for all - 

peace, rule <strong>of</strong> law, 

affordable access 

to clean water 

and power, public 

health, public 

research, rural 

transportation 




TASK FORCE 


PAPER, 2003 

• Begin action 

immediately in 

“hunger hotspots,” 

with an emphasis 

on Africa. 

• Scale up 

programs welldocumented 

to be 

successful in 

reducing hunger. 

• Expand school 

feeding programs. 

• Invest in 

improving soil 

quality, seed, and 

micro-scale water 

management. 

• More effectively 

link low-income 

agricultural 

producers with 

existing local and 

national markets. 

208

ANNEX 2: MEASURING HUNGER 

Choice <strong>of</strong> Indicators 

The terms hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition are <strong>of</strong>ten used interchangeably. The concepts do exhibit a significant amount <strong>of</strong> 

overlap, but is it only partial. Moreover, the areas <strong>of</strong> non-overlap generate important insights into the causes <strong>of</strong> hunger. The 

Millennium Development Goal <strong>of</strong> reducing hunger by half by 2015 uses two indicators: infant underweight (a form <strong>of</strong> malnutrition) and 

FAO’s indicator <strong>of</strong> undernourishment. Neither indicator is ideal from a food security perspective. The former brings in non-food 

factors too forcefully while the latter does not sufficiently encompass access and utilization issues. 

Table 1: Comparison <strong>of</strong> five methods for assessing hunger and malnutrition 

Method 

Main 

indicator(s) 

Level at which 

indicator 

applies 

Period to which 

indicator applies 

Daily Energy Supply 

(FAO/DES) 

Household Income 

and Expenditure 

Surveys (e.g. National 

Statistical Offices) 

Food Consumption 

Surveys; Food 

Frequency 

Qualitative Measures 

<strong>of</strong> Food Security 

% with low kcals 

(interpreted as 

inadequate). 

Household kcal 

intake. 

Individual (or 

household) intake, 

related to 

requirement, hence 

adequacy. 

% reporting 

experience <strong>of</strong> food 

insecurity and 

h 

National only. (Not 

sub-national) 

Population subgroups, 

national if 

national sample. 

Households and 

averaged to 

Individuals, 

population subgroups, 

not usually 

national. 

Individual, subgroups, 

national. 

Relation to hunger 

1 year average. Aims to be estimate <strong>of</strong> 

% with food 

inadequacy. 

Usually a few days; 

sometimes repeated 

to give estimates <strong>of</strong> 

fluctuation (e.g. 

seasonal) or trends. 

24-hr recall to a few 

days; may be 

repeated. 

Usually monthly, 

then repeated to 

give annual 

ti t 

Kcal intakes; if related 

to household 

requirements (not 

usually) gives % with 

food inadequacy 

Most direct estimate 

from measuring 

intake. 

Direct estimate <strong>of</strong> 

reported experience, 

and related behavior. 

Relation to 

diet quality 

and micronutrients 

Could be 

assessed like 

kcals. 

Can be 

estimated; less 

common than 

kcals. 

Usually 

estimated and 

related to 

requirement. 

Not readily 

assessed in 

quantitative 

t 

Applicability to 

evaluation 

Limited: possibly for 

national long-term 

policies. 

Suitable for tracking 

consumption over 

time if use 

comparable 

methodologies 

Suitable for small 

sample research into 

causality including 

impact evaluation. 

Suitable for largescale 

evaluation, with 

qualitative outcome 

209

Anthropometry (e.g. 

WHO child malnutrition 

database, DHS from 

USAID, MICS from 

UNICEF) 

hunger. estimate. terms. measure. 

% underweight or 

stunted (children); 

thin (low BMI) 

adults. 

Source: adapted from Mason 2001 

National, 

population subgroups; 

measures 

effects <strong>of</strong> 

inadequate food, 

not hunger itself. 

Point estimate В 

stunting reflects 

some months or 

years, underweight 

and thinness less 

time. 

Not specific to food 

inadequacy, but trends 

similar and levels may 

give some bounds to 

hunger estimates. 

Related, directly 

and through birth 

weight; still 

research area. 

Suitable for 

evaluation, using 

measure <strong>of</strong> physical 

effects on growth and 

health. 

Table 2: Indicators for the Millennium Development Goal for Hunger 

The Hunger MDG is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion <strong>of</strong> people who suffer from hunger as measured by the 

prevalence <strong>of</strong> underweight children under five years <strong>of</strong> age and the proportion <strong>of</strong> population below minimum level <strong>of</strong> dietary energy 

consumption. 

Hunger Indicator 

Weight-for-Height 

(W/H) 

“Wasting” 

Weight-for-Age 

(W/A) 

“Underweight” 

Height-for-Age 

(H/A) 

“Stunting” 

Sources <strong>of</strong> 

Data 

DHS, 

MICS, 

ANDI, WFP 

DHS, 

MICS, 

ANDI, 

WHO 

DHS, 

MICS, 

ANDI, 

WHO, WFP 

Availability <strong>of</strong> Data 

Mainly relates to 

humanitarian 

emergencies 

Relevance to 

MDG 

monitoring 

Limited for 

Hunger MDG 

High for Child 

Mortality MDG 

Strengths/Weakness 

• Measures acute malnutrition–more useful in emergency 

situations where short-term progress is being monitored. 

• Indicative <strong>of</strong> short-term fluctuations in nutrition 

• Useful indicator in acute/emergency situations 

High Medium • Indicator most commonly used, but increasingly challenged 

since it measures a combination <strong>of</strong> chronic and acute 


• Hard to interpret, less responsive indicator 

• Subject to seasonal variations 

Baseline data does 

not exist for most 

countries, but 

numbers are growing. 

High 

• Indicative <strong>of</strong> long-term changes (chronic malnutrition) 

• Most responsive indicator based on research to-date 

• Less influenced by seasonal variations 

• Best measure for health during early age. 

• High response to improved nutrition during pregnancy and 

age 2-3 years. Should be applied to monitoring and evaluation 

efforts in hunger hotspots. 

210

Hunger Indicator 

% Population 


Other surveybased 

indicators? 

Maternal BMI = 

weight/height 

squared 


Status 

Sources <strong>of</strong> 

Data 

Availability <strong>of</strong> Data 

Relevance to 

MDG 

monitoring 

Strengths/Weakness 

FAO FAO High • Derived from agricultural productivity data, so responsive to 

changes in national productivity. 

HKI, MI, 

UNICEF 

Limited 

XX for Hunger 

MDG 

High for 

Maternal and 

child mortality 

MDG 

• The following DHS Surveys have anthropometry BMI data on 

either mothers, women or ever-married women: Turkey, 

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, CAR, Egypt, 

Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Zimbabwe, Comoros, Namibia, 

Zambia, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, Tanzania, Kazakhstan 

• Difficult to collect on a large scale. 

• Not explicitly recognized in MDG’s 

211

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Adato, Michelle, and R. Meinzen-Dick. 2002. Assessing the impact <strong>of</strong> agricultural 

research on poverty using the sustainable livelihoods framework. ETPD Discussion 

Paper No. 89. FCND Discussion Paper No. 128. 

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington D.C. 

Africa Nutrition Database Initiative (ANDI):United Nations. 2002. Africa Nutrition Database 

Initiative Website. (Available online through http://www.africanutrition.net/). 

Alderman H, Garcia M. Food security and health security: explaining levels <strong>of</strong> nutrition in 

Pakistan. WFS 865. 1992. 1-48. 

Alderman, H. and J. Behrman. 2003. The returns to the avoidance <strong>of</strong> low birth weight. World 

Bank mimeo. Washington D.C. 

Allen, LH and Gillespie SR (2001) What Works? A Review <strong>of</strong> the Efficacy and Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> 

Nutrition Interventions. United Nations Sub-Committee on Nutrition and Asian Development 

Bank, ADB, Manila (www.adb.org), September 2001. 

Barnett T. & A. Whiteside (2002). Aids in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization. 

New Palgrave 

Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. 2001. The political economy <strong>of</strong> government 

responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. Department <strong>of</strong> Economics, London School <strong>of</strong> 

Economics, London. Photocopy. 

Bilsborrow, Richard E. 2002. Migration, Population change and the rural environment. ECSP 

<strong>Report</strong>, Issue 8, Summer: 69-94. 

Black RE, Morris SS, Bryce J. Where and why are 10 million children dying every year? Lancet 

2003; 361: 2226-34. 

Bouis HE, Novenario-Reese MJG. The determinants <strong>of</strong> demand for micronutrients: an analysis 

<strong>of</strong> rural households in Bangladesh. FCND Discussion paper no. 32. 1-84. 1997. 

Buck, L.E., C.C. Geisler, J. Schelhas, E. Wollenberg, eds. 2001. Biological Diversity: Balancing 

Interests through Adaptive Collaborative Management. CRC Publishers, Chelasea, Michigan. 

Buresh, R. J., P. A. Sanchez and F. J. Calhoun (eds.) 1997. Soil fertility replenishment in Africa. 

SSSA Special Publication No. 51. Soil Science Society <strong>of</strong> America, Madison, Wisconsin. 272p. 

Buresh, R.J. and P.J.M. Cooper. 1999. The Science and Practice <strong>of</strong> Short-Term Improved 

Fallows: Symposium Synthesis and Recommendations. Agr<strong>of</strong>orestry Systems. 

47(1-3):305-321 

Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN). 2003. Gridded Population 

<strong>of</strong> the World, version 3 (beta). (More information on GPW is available through 

http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/plue/gpw/) 

212

Chattopadhyay, R. and Duffo, E. 2003 Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from an India-Wide 

Randomised Policy Experiment, draft 

Chavas JP, Roth M, Uriarte A. Agricultural policy, employment and resource access: micro 

foundations for sustainable nutrition improvements. 1999. 1-29. 

Cleaver, Kevin. 2002. Reducing poverty in developing countries: the agriculture factor. Draft, 

December 2002. 

Collier, Paul 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Posted at 

http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/CivilWarPRR/text-26671/. 

Consultive Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 2002. Agenda item 6. CGIAR 

and the sustainable development: 2002 summits. Annual General Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 

October 30-31. 

CGIAR, Future Harvest. 2002. Combating deforestation. Agenda 21 and the Future Harvest 

Centres. CGIAR and Future Harvest. 

CGIAR, Future Harvest. 2002. Conservation <strong>of</strong> biological diversity. Agenda 21 and the Future 

Harvest Centres. CGIAR and Future Harvest. 

CGIAR, Future Harvest. 2002. Protecting and managing fresh water. Agenda 21 and the Future 

Harvest Centres. CGIAR and Future Harvest. 

CGIAR, Future Harvest. 2002. The CGIAR and sustainable development. Agenda 21 and the 

Future Harvest Centres. CGIAR and Future Harvest. 

DeLong, B. 2003. Estimating World GDP, One Million B.C.-Present. Department <strong>of</strong> Economics, 

UC Berkeley. www.j-bradford-delong.net. Last accessed on Nov 26, 2003. 

de Onis M, Blössner M. The World Health Organization Global Database on Child Growth and 

Malnutrition: methodology and applications. Int J Epidemiol 2003;32:518-26 

(www.who.int/nutgrowthdb) 

Deininger, Klaus, Songqing Jin, Berhanu Adenew, Samuel Gebre-Selassie, Berhanu Nega. 

2003. Tenure Security and Land Related Investment. World Bank, Washington DC. Available 

online at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/24760_wps2991.pdf 

Dixon, John and Aidan Gulliver with David Gibbon. 2001. Farming Systems and Poverty: 

Improving Farmers’ Livelihoods in a Changing World. FAO and World Bank: Rome and 

Washington, D.C. 

Engle, P.L. Influences <strong>of</strong> mothers' and fathers' income on children's nutritional status <strong>of</strong> 

Guatemala. Social Science and Medicine 1993;37:1303-12. 

Engle, Patricia L. 2000. Urban women: balancing work and childcare. Achieving Urban Food 

and Nutrition Security in the Developing World. Brief 8. IFPRI, Washington DC. 

Esty, D.C., J. Goldstone, T.R. Gurr, P. Surko, and A. Unger. 1995. Working Papers: State 

Failure <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Report</strong>. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation. 

Esty, D.C., J.A. Goldstone, T.R. Gurr, B. Harff, M. Levy, G. Dabelko, P. Surko, and A.N. Unger. 

1998. State Failure <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> <strong>Report</strong>: Phase II Findings. McLean, VA: Science Applications 

International Corporation. 

Ezzati, M., Lopez, A., Rodgers, A, Vander Hoorn, S., Murray, C. and the Comparative Risk 

Assessment Collaborating Group. 2002 Selected major risk factors and global and regional 

burden <strong>of</strong> disease. The Lancet, 360 (9343), 1-14. 

213

FAO. 1996. World Food Summit, pp. 37 November 1996, Rome. 

FAO. 1999b. FARMESA: A Case Study on Community-Based Seed Supply Systems. 

(gcp/raf/334/swe) By G. Mitti. FAO, Rome. 

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations). 2000. The State <strong>of</strong> Food and 

Agriculture 2000. Rome: FAO. 

FAO. 2000. State <strong>of</strong> the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture. FAO, Rome. 

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations). 2000. The State <strong>of</strong> 

Food and Agriculture 2000. Rome: FAO. 

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations). 2001. The State <strong>of</strong> Food 

Insecurity in the World 2001. Rome. 

FAO. 2001. World Food Summit: Five Years Later. High Level Panel on Resources Mobilization 

for food security and for Agricultural and Rural Development. 26-27 June 2001. FAO, Rome. 

FAO. 2001. The state <strong>of</strong> food insecurity in the world: 2001. FAO, Rome. 

FAO. 2001. World Food Summit: five years later. High-Level Panel on Resources Mobilization 

for Food Security and for Agricultural and Rural Development. 26-27 June 2001. FAO, Rome. 

FAO. 2002. The state <strong>of</strong> food insecurity in the world: 2002. FAO, Rome. 

FAO.2002. Anti-Hunger Programme: Reducing Hunger through Sustainable Agricultural and 

Rural Development and Wider Access to Food. Second Draft. FAO, Rome. July. 

Fan, S. and Peter Hazell. 1999. Are Returns to Public Investment Lower in Less-Favored Rural 

Areas? An Empirical Analysis <strong>of</strong> India. EPTD Discussion Paper 43. 

Fan, S. Linxiu Zhang, and Xiaobo Zhang. 2000. Growth & Poverty in Rural China: the Role <strong>of</strong> 

Public Investments. EPTD Discussion Paper 66. IFPRI. 

Fan, S., X. Zhang, and N. Rao. 2002. Public Expenditure, Growth and Poverty Reduction in 

Rural Uganda. IFPRI mimeo. 

Fan, S., X. Zhang, and N. Rao. 2003. Public Expenditure, Growth and Poverty Reduction in 

Rural Tanzania. IFPRI mimeo. 

Food and Agriculture Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations (FAO). 1999. The state <strong>of</strong> food 

insecurity in the world: 1999. FAO, Rome. 

Franzel, S. and Sara J. Scherr, eds. 2002. Trees on the farm: Assessing the Adoption 

Potential <strong>of</strong> Agr<strong>of</strong>orestry Practices in Africa. Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau International: 

Wallingford. 

Gachengo, C.N., C.A. Palm, B. Jama, and C. Othieno. 1999. Tithonia and senna green 

manures and inorganic fertilizers as phosphorus sources for maize in Western Kenya. 

Agr<strong>of</strong>orestry Systems 44:21-36. 

Gillespie, S., M. McLachlan, and R. Shrimpton, eds. 2003. Combating malnutrition. Time to 

act. Washington, D.C. and New York, NY: The World Bank and UNICEF 

Gleditsch, N.P. 1998. “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A critique <strong>of</strong> the Literature.” Journal 

<strong>of</strong> Peace Research 35(3): 381-400. 

Haddad, L. 2001. Deepening the Analysis <strong>of</strong> the Factors Behind Progress Towards WFS 

214

Targets. ODI Discussion Paper. Overseas Development Institute. London. 

Haddad L, Alderman H, Appleton S, Song L, Yohannes Y. Reducing child undernutrition: how 

far does income growth take us? IFPRI FCND Discussion paper no. 137. 2002. 1-36. 

Haggblade, Steven, and G. Tembo. 2002. Conservation farming in Zambia. Paper prepared for 

the IFPRI Workshop on “Successes in African Agriculture,” Lusaka, June 10-12. 

Hazell, Peter and L. Haddad. 2001. Agricultural research and poverty reduction. Food, 

Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper No. 34. IFPRI, Washington DC. 

HKI/IPHN. When the decision-maker is a woman: does it make a difference to the nutritional 

status <strong>of</strong> mothers and children? Nutritional Surveillance Project Bulletin No. 8. Helen Keller 

Worldwide, 2001. 

Homer-Dixon, T. 1999. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University 

Press. 

ILEIA. 1989. Participatory Technology Development in Sustainable Agriculture. Institute for Low- 

External Input Agriculture. Leusden, Netherlands. 

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 1966. The right to 

adequate food (Art.11) : 12/05/99. E/C.12/1999/5, CESCR General comment 12. (General 

Comments). Internet address: 

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/3d02758c707031d58025677f003b73b9?Opendocum 

ent 

International Disaster Database. International Disaster Database/2001 IFRC World Disaster 

<strong>Report</strong>. Table 16. 

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2001. Rural Poverty <strong>Report</strong> 2001: The 

Challenge <strong>of</strong> Ending Rural Poverty. Oxford University Press, New York. 

Izac, A.-M.N., and P.A. Sanchez. 2001. Towards a natural resource management paradigm for 

international agriculture: the example <strong>of</strong> agr<strong>of</strong>orestry research. Agricultural Systems 69:5-25. 

Jama, B., R.A. Swinkels, and R.J. Buresh. 1997. Agronomic and Economic Evaluation <strong>of</strong> 

Organic and Inorganic Sources <strong>of</strong> Phosphorus in Western Kenya. Agronomy Journal 89:597- 

604. 

Jama, B., C.A. Palm, R.J. Buresh, A. Niang, C. Gachengo, G. Nziguheba, and B. Amadalo. 

2000. Tithonia diversifolia as a green manure for soil fertility improvement in western Kenya: a 

review. Agr<strong>of</strong>orestry Systems 49:201-221. 

Kerr, John. 2000. Development strategies for semiarid South Asia. Promoting Sustainable 

Development in Less-Favored Areas. Brief 6. IFPRI, Washington D.C. 

Kherallah M, Delgado C, Gabre-Madhin E, Minot N, Johnson M. The road half traveled: 

Agricultural market reform in Africa. Food Policy <strong>Report</strong>. IFPRI 2000. 1-25. 

Kherallah, Mylene, C. Delgado, E. Gabre-Madhin, N. Minot, and M. Johnson. 2002. The road 

half-traveled: agricultural market reform in sub-saharan Africa. Food Policy <strong>Report</strong>. IFPRI, 

Washington D.C. 

Landell-Mills, N. Bishop, J. and Porras, I. 2002 Silver bullet or fools’ gold? Markets for 

forest environmental services and the poor: Emerging issues. International 

Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London. 

Lautze, Sue. 1997. "Saving Lives and Livelihoods: The Fundamentals <strong>of</strong> a Livelihoods 

215

Strategy," Feinstein International Famine Centre, Tufts University. 

Marek T, Diallo I, Ndiaye B & Rakotosalama J (1999) Successful contracting <strong>of</strong> prevention 

services: Fighting malnutrition in Senegal and Madagascar. Health Policy and Planning 14:382- 

390 

Marsh, Robin. 1996. Household Gardening and Food Security: A Critical Review <strong>of</strong> the 

Literature. Presentation given at the Sub-Regional Round Table Meeting on Household 

Horticulture and Family Nutrition Programmes. 3-5 December 1996, Hanoi, Vietnam. Food and 

Nutrition Division <strong>of</strong> the FAO, Rome, Italy. 

Marshall, M. and T.R. Gurr. 2003. Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey <strong>of</strong> Armed 

Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy. College Park: University <strong>of</strong> Maryland 

Center for International Development and Conflict Management. 

Mason, J. 2001. Measuring Hunger and Malnutrition. Paper prepared for FAO. Tulane School 

<strong>of</strong> Public Health and Tropical Medicine. Tulane University, New Orleans. 

McNeely, Jeffrey A., and S.J. Scherr. 2003. Ecoagriculture: Strategies to Feed the World and 

Save Biodiversity. Island Press, Washington D.C. 

Messer, E., M.J. Cohen, and J. D’Costa. 1998. “Food From Peace: Breaking the Links Between 

Conflict and Hunger.” 2020 Vision Food Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper No. 

24. Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute. 

Messer, E., M.J. Cohen, and T. Marchione. 2001, “Conflict: A Cause and Effect <strong>of</strong> Hunger.” 

Environmental Change and Security Project <strong>Report</strong> No. 7. Washington: Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution. Pp. 1-16. 

Moock, P. 1976. The efficiency <strong>of</strong> women as farm managers: Kenya. American Journal <strong>of</strong> 

Agricultural Economics 58 (5): 831-835. 

Nafziger, E. Wayne and Juha Auvinen. 2000. “The Economic Causes <strong>of</strong> Humanitarian 

Emergencies.” in E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, and Raimo Väyrynen, eds. 2000. War, 

Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins <strong>of</strong> Humanitarian Emergencies, Vol. I Oxford: Oxford 

University Press for the World Institute <strong>of</strong> Development Economics, U.N. University. 

Narayanan, Sudha, and A. Gulati. 2002. Globalization and the smallholders: a review <strong>of</strong> issues, 

approaches, and implications. MSSD Discussion Paper No. 50. IFPRI, Washington D.C. 

Omamo, S.W., J. Williams, G. Obare, and N. Ndiwa. 2002. Soil fertility management on small 

farms in Africa: evidence from Nakuru District, Kenya. Food Policy 27(2002): 159-170. 

Paarlberg, R. 2000. “The Weak Link Between World Food Markets and World Food Security.” 

Food Policy 25 (3): 317-335. 

Paarlberg, Robert L. 2002. Governance and food security in an age <strong>of</strong> globalization. Food, 

Agriculture and the Environment Discussion Paper 36. International Food Policy Research 

Institute, Washington D.C. 

Palm, C.A., R.J.K. Myers and S.M. Nandwa. 1997. Combined use <strong>of</strong> organic and inorganic 

nutrient sources for soil fertility maintenance and replenishment. In R.J. Buresh and P.A. 

Sanchez, eds. Replenishing Soil Fertility in Africa. SSSA Special Publication. Soil Science 

Soceity <strong>of</strong> America and American Society <strong>of</strong> Agronomy, Madison, Wisconsin, pp. 193-217. 

Palm, C. A., K. E. Giller, P. L. Mafongoya, M. J. Swift. 2001. Management <strong>of</strong> organic 

matter in the tropics: Translating theory into practice. Nutrient Cycling in 

216

Agroecosystems 61: 63-75. 

Pardey, P.G. and N. Beintema, “Slow Magic,” IFPRI Food Policy <strong>Report</strong>, 2001 

Parry, Martin L. 2002. Keynote: Turning up the Heat: How Will Agriculture Weather Global 

Climate Change. In IFPRI, op.cit, pp. 116-123. 

Pelletier DL, Frongillo EA, Habicht JP. Epidemiologic evidence for a potentiating effect <strong>of</strong> 

malnutrition on child mortality. American Journal <strong>of</strong> Public Health 1993; 83: 1130-33. 

Piot, Peter, P. Pinstrup-Anderson, S. Gillespie & L. Haddad 2002. Aids and Food Security. 

IFPRI. 

Postel, Sandra. 1999. Pillar <strong>of</strong> Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last? W.W. Norton, New York. 

Pretty, Jules N. 1999. Can sustainable agriculture feed Africa? New evidence on progress, 

process and impact. Environment, Development and Sustainability 1:253-274. 

Pretty, Jules N. and R. Hine 2000. The promising spread <strong>of</strong> sustainable agriculture in Asia. 

Natural Resources Forum 24: 107-121. 

Quinones, M.A., N. E. Borlaug and C. R. Dowswell. 1997. A fertilizer-based green revolutionfor 

Africa, p. 81 - 96, In P. A. S. a. F. C. R. J. Buresh, ed. Replenishing soil fertility in Africa, Vol. 

Speciqal Publication 51. Soil Science Society <strong>of</strong> America, Madison, WI. 

Quisumbing, Agnes R., L.R. Brown, H.S. Feldstein, L. Haddad, and C. Pena. 1995. Women: the 

key to food security. IFPRI, Washington DC. 

Quisumbing, A. R. 1996. Male-female differences in agricultural productivity: Methodological 

issues and empirical evidence. World Development 24 (10): 1579-1595. 

Rietbergen, Simon, J. Bishop, and S. Mainka. 2002. Ecosystem conservation – a neglected tool 

for poverty reduction. International Institute for Environment and Development, in preparation for 

the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg. 

Rome Declaration on World Food Security, 13-17 November, 1996, Rome, Italy, 

http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm. 

Rosegrant, Mark W., X. Cai, S.A. Cline, and N. Nakagawa. 2002. The role <strong>of</strong> rainfed agriculture 

in the future <strong>of</strong> global food production. EPTD Discussion Paper No. 90. IFPRI, Washington D.C. 

Ruel, M., L. Haddad., and J. Garrett. 1999. The Urban Facts <strong>of</strong> Life: Implications for Food and 

Nutrition Policy. World Development. 27(11):1917-1939. 

Sahn, D. and Stifel, D. 2002 Progress Toward the Millennium Development Goals in Africa, 

World Development 31 (1), 23-52. 

Saito, K., H. Mekonnen, and D. Spurling. 1994. Raising the productivity <strong>of</strong> women farmers in 

Sub-Saharan Africa. Discussion Paper 230. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 

Sanchez, P. A. and B. A. Jama. 2002. Soil fertility replenishment takes <strong>of</strong>f in East and Southern 

Africa. In Integrated nutrient management in sub-Saharan Africa (B. Vanlauwe, J. Diels, N. 

Sanginga and R. Merckx, (eds.) pp. 23 – 45. CABI Publishing, Wallingford, UK. 

Sanchez, P.A., K.D. Shepherd, M.J. Soule, F.M. Place, R.J. Buresh, A.M.N. Izac, A.U. 

Mokwunye, F.R. Kwesiga, C.G. Ndiritu, and P.L. Woomer. 1997. Soil fertility replenishment in 

Africa: an investment in natural resource capital., p. 1-46, In R. J. S. Buresh, P. A.; Calhoun, F., 

ed. Replenishing soil fertility in Africa., Vol. SSSA Special Publication 51. Soil Science Society 

<strong>of</strong> America, Madison, WI. 

Sanchez, Pedro A., and C.A. Palm. 2002. Properties and management <strong>of</strong> soils in the tropics. 

217

Draft, June 9. 

Sanderson, S., M. Jaiteh, M.A. Levy, K.H. Redford, A.V. Wannebo and G. Woolmer. 2002. The 

human footprint and the last <strong>of</strong> the wild. BioScience 52(10):891-904. 

Scherr, S.J. 1999. Poverty-Environment Interactions in Agriculture: Key Factors and 

Policy Implications. 3, Poverty and Environment Initiative. New York: United Nations 

Development Program and the European Economic Commission. 

Scherr, S.J. 1999. Soil degradation: A threat to developing country food security 

in 2020? Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper No. 27. 

Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. February. 

Scherr, S. Background Paper <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Task</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 2 on Hunger: Halving Global Hunger. 4-18- 

2003. 

Scherr, Sara J., A. White, and D. Kaimowitz. 2002. Making markets work for forest communities. 

Policy Brief. Forest Trends and Center for International Forestry Research, Washington D.C. 

Shepherd, K.D. and M.G. Walsh. 2003. An overview <strong>of</strong> advances in rapid assessment <strong>of</strong> 

soil quality and their application to large area assessment <strong>of</strong> soil degradation. 

Briefing Note. World Agr<strong>of</strong>orestry Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, February. 

Shrimpton, R. Victora, C.G. Onis M, Lima, R, Blossner, M Clugston G. 2001. The worldwide 

timing <strong>of</strong> growth faltering: implications for nutritional interventions. Pediatrics 107(5) e75. 

Smaling, E.M.A. 1993. An agro-ecological framework for integrated nutrient management with 

special reference to Kenya. Wageningen Agricultural University, Wageningen, Netherlands. 

Smith, Joyotee and Sara J. Scherr. 2002. Forest Carbon and Local Livelihoods: Assessment <strong>of</strong> 

Opportunities and Policy Recommendations. Occasional Paper #37. Centre for International 

Forestry Research and Forest Trends, Bogor, Indonesia. 

Smith, L. and L. Haddad. 2000. Explaining child malnutrition in developing countries: a crosscountry 

analysis. IFPRI, Washington, DC. 

Smith, L., U. Ramakrishnan, L. Haddad, and R. Martorell. 2003. Women’s status and child 

nutrition in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: New evidence on the Asian enigma. Research 

<strong>Report</strong>. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C. 

SOFI 2002. FAO. The State <strong>of</strong> Food Insecurity in the World 2002. Food and Agriculture 

Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations. Rome. 

SOFI 2003. FAO. The State <strong>of</strong> Food Insecurity in the World 2003. Food and Agriculture 

Organization <strong>of</strong> the United Nations. Rome. 

Taylor, Michael R. and Jody S. Tick. “Fulfilling the Promise: A governance analysis <strong>of</strong> the U.S. 

response to the World Food Summit Goal <strong>of</strong> Cutting Hunger in Half by 2015” Resources for the 

Future, Washington, DC. September 2001 

Tilman, D., J. Fargione, B. Wolff, C. D’Antonio, A. Dobsin, R. Howarth, D. Schindler, 

W.H Schlesinger, D. Simberl<strong>of</strong>f, and D. Swackhamer. 2001. Forecasting 

agriculturally driven global environmental change. 

Torlesse H, Kiess L, Bloem MW. Association <strong>of</strong> household rice expenditure with child nutritional 

status indicates a role for macroeconomic policy in combating malnutrition. J. Nutr. 133: 1320- 

1325, 2003. 

218

Udry, C., J. Hoddinott, H. Alderman, and L. Haddad. 1995. Gender differentials in farm 

productivity: Implications for household efficiency and agricultural policy. Food Policy 20 (5): 

407-423. 

Udry, C. 1996. Gender, agricultural production, and the theory <strong>of</strong> the household. Journal <strong>of</strong> 

Political Economy 104 (5): 1010-1046. 

United Nations. 2002. Africa Nutrition Database Initiative Website. (Available online through 

http://www.africanutrition.net/) 

UNDP. 2003. Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A compact 

among nations to end human poverty. Oxford University Press for UNDP. Available online at: 

http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_MDC.pdf 

UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision 

United Nations Population Division. 2002. World Population Prospects: 2002 Revision. New 

York: United Nations Press. (Available online through http://esa.un.org/unpp/) 

Watson, R.T., Noble, I.R., Bolin, B., Ravindranath, N.H., Verardo, D.J. and Doken, D.J. 

(eds.). 2000. Land use, land-use change, and forestry. Intergovernmental Panel on 

Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 

Webb, P. and A. Harinarayan, 1999. A measure <strong>of</strong> uncertainty: The nature <strong>of</strong> vulnerability and 

its relationship to malnutrition. Disasters. 23 (4), pp 292-305. 

Wood, S., K. Sebastian and S.J. Scherr. 2000. Pilot Assessment <strong>of</strong> Global Ecosystems: 

Agroecosystems. International Food Policy Research Institute and World Resources Institute, 

Washington, D.C. 

World Bank. 2003. World Development <strong>Report</strong> 2003. Sustainable Development in a Dynamic 

World: Transforming Institutions, Growth, and Quality <strong>of</strong> Life. Oxford University Press, New 

York. 

World Food Programme (WFP) 2002. School feeding works for girls’ education. World Food 

Programme, Rome. 

WWF and CARE. 2002. Rural Poverty Eradication and the Conservation <strong>of</strong> Natural Resources. 

World Wildlife Fund and CARE International, Washington, D.C. 

Zeller, Manfred, and M. Sharma. 1998. Rural Finance and Poverty Alleviation. Food Policy 

<strong>Report</strong>. IFPRI, Washington D.C. 

219

Interim Report of Task Force 2 on Hunger - UN Millennium Project

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?