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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN<br />

RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND<br />

RESOURCE CONFLICT:<br />

NEPALESE EXPERIENCES<br />

Bishnu Raj Upreti<br />

1. Introduction<br />

In this paper I am attempting to highlight the relationship <strong>between</strong> <strong>resource</strong><br />

<strong>governance</strong>, <strong>resource</strong> scarcity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> in Nepal. The notion of <strong>resource</strong><br />

<strong>governance</strong> is discussed to address environmental problems such as scarcity of<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong> environmental services. Environmental <strong>governance</strong>, in this<br />

paper, refers to a principle, process <strong>and</strong> practices of mainstreaming environmental<br />

<strong>and</strong> ecological issues <strong>and</strong> concerns in policies, plans, laws <strong>and</strong> regulations,<br />

strategies, decisions <strong>and</strong> actual actions at different levels (Including the national<br />

level) within a good <strong>governance</strong> framework. This framework is consensus<br />

oriented, participatory, guided by the rule of law, effective <strong>and</strong> efficient,<br />

accountable <strong>and</strong> transparent, responsive, equitable <strong>and</strong> inclusive.<br />

Conflict in this paper refers to observable differences in opinion,<br />

misunderst<strong>and</strong>ings, clashes of interest, disagreements, complaints in public,<br />

protests by argument <strong>and</strong> physical assault, antipathy, <strong>and</strong> filing of cases with the<br />

local administration, police <strong>and</strong> courts (Upreti 2002). When the latitude of<br />

tolerance crosses the bottom line then <strong>conflict</strong> occurs. Feelings of unfairness,<br />

suspicion, injustice, mistrust <strong>and</strong> suchlike ultimately lead to <strong>conflict</strong>. Resource<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>s produce both positive <strong>and</strong> negative consequences <strong>and</strong> alter existing social<br />

relations (Buckels 1999). They induce change in <strong>resource</strong> management <strong>and</strong><br />

utilisation, policy process, livelihood strategies, l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> agriculture, gender<br />

© Bishnu Raj Upreti – 2004<br />

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RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND RESOURCE CONFLICT IN NEPAL<br />

Bishnu Raj Upreti<br />

____________________________________________________________________<br />

relations, power structures, <strong>and</strong> individual <strong>and</strong> collective behaviour. In most cases<br />

the combined effect of some or many of such factors can either escalate or resolve<br />

a <strong>conflict</strong> (Upreti 1999).<br />

The study of <strong>resource</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> involves investigating almost all aspects of human<br />

activity <strong>and</strong> interactivity ranging from the behaviour of individuals to group<br />

characteristics concerning <strong>governance</strong> of environmental services. Dominant<br />

thinking in <strong>conflict</strong> paradigms treats ‘environmental <strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>conflict</strong>’ as a<br />

particular event in a particular point of time that needs to be resolved through legal<br />

<strong>and</strong> regulatory interventions. However, I perceive <strong>conflict</strong> as an inevitable process<br />

that can be used as a constructive means for social transformation <strong>and</strong> agrarian<br />

change. I prefer to use the term ‘<strong>conflict</strong> management’ instead of <strong>conflict</strong><br />

resolution. Conflict management is making progress. On aspect of improving a<br />

<strong>conflict</strong> situation, progress may be developed in mutual gains, learning, achieving<br />

agreements, laying foundations for further negotiation or fully resolving <strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

Progress is a way of thinking about a <strong>conflict</strong> situation that recognises that <strong>conflict</strong><br />

is inevitable <strong>and</strong> ongoing, <strong>and</strong> that management of the <strong>conflict</strong> comes from<br />

continual improvement in areas of substance <strong>and</strong> <strong>relationships</strong> (Daniels <strong>and</strong> Walker<br />

1997). It is not always possible to fully resolve all environmental <strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>s but it is possible to manage them. Conflict resolution implies that <strong>conflict</strong><br />

is totally resolved.<br />

Conflict management basically focuses on negotiations about the use of <strong>resource</strong>s.<br />

Conflict is also a source of learning 1 how to create opportunities for social change<br />

in society. When there is <strong>conflict</strong> it gives people opportunities to think, underst<strong>and</strong><br />

the causes of the problems, <strong>and</strong> look for solutions. Natural <strong>resource</strong>-<strong>conflict</strong> needs<br />

to be viewed in the wider context of historical, political, cultural, economic,<br />

institutional, organisational <strong>and</strong> technological dimensions that provide the basis for<br />

the creation, escalation, stalemate or management of <strong>conflict</strong>s. Therefore, <strong>resource</strong><br />

<strong>conflict</strong> is interconnected with broader socio-political issues <strong>and</strong> their implications<br />

for environment, society <strong>and</strong> processes of agrarian change.<br />

L<strong>and</strong>, forest <strong>and</strong> water are the most important <strong>resource</strong>s for the economic<br />

1 Learning is a complex activity, which manifests itself in a change in people’s<br />

behaviour. It is rooted in the human capacity to improve their underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong><br />

skills on the basis of day-to-day experiences (Engel <strong>and</strong> Salomon 1997), external<br />

knowledge <strong>and</strong> surrounding environment.<br />

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JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM<br />

2004 – nr. 50<br />

development of Nepal. Conflict is common in the use <strong>and</strong> management of these<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s. Therefore, management of <strong>conflict</strong> is crucial to achieve sustainable use<br />

<strong>and</strong> management of natural <strong>resource</strong>s (Upreti 1999, 2001).<br />

Box 1<br />

Positive <strong>and</strong> Negative Outcomes of Conflict<br />

Positive: Conflict can –<br />

• motivate people to try harder – to win<br />

• increase commitment, enhance group loyalty <strong>and</strong> spirit<br />

• increase clarity about the problem <strong>and</strong> raise awareness<br />

• lead to innovative breakthroughs <strong>and</strong> new approaches<br />

• clarify underlying problems <strong>and</strong> facilitate change<br />

• focus attention on basic issues <strong>and</strong> lead to solutions<br />

• increase energy level, making visible key values<br />

• sharpen approaches to agrarian reform <strong>and</strong> social change<br />

Negative: Conflict can –<br />

• lead to anger, avoidance, sniping, shouting, frustration, fear of failure,<br />

sense of personal inadequacy<br />

• suppress critical information<br />

• lower productivity by diverting effort to wasteful <strong>conflict</strong><br />

• sidetrack careers, ruin <strong>relationships</strong><br />

• disrupt patterns of work<br />

• consume money <strong>and</strong> time<br />

• escalate to violence, destroy social harmony, <strong>and</strong> lead to the collapse of<br />

society<br />

In the context of natural <strong>resource</strong>s the perceived inconsistencies in the allocation<br />

<strong>between</strong> people of acquired rights <strong>and</strong> incurred obligations, or contradictions<br />

<strong>between</strong> two or more jurisdictions lead to <strong>conflict</strong>. In the legal sense <strong>conflict</strong><br />

management is the application of the laws <strong>and</strong> regulations to ensure rights <strong>and</strong><br />

provide remedies that reconcile the inconsistencies <strong>and</strong> decide which systems are<br />

to govern particular cases (Oli, 1998).<br />

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RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND RESOURCE CONFLICT IN NEPAL<br />

Bishnu Raj Upreti<br />

____________________________________________________________________<br />

2. Resource Scarcity as a Source of Present <strong>and</strong> Future Conflict<br />

A Report of the Johns Hopkins Population Information Programme (JHPIP)<br />

highlights that nearly half a billion people worldwide are currently facing water<br />

shortages (JHPIP 1998). By 2025 one in every three people will live in countries<br />

short of water. At present 31 countries are facing water stress or water scarcity<br />

<strong>and</strong> by 2025 the number will have exploded fivefold. The World Water Forum<br />

(2000) also stresses that more than one billion people in the world have no access<br />

to water of sufficient quantity <strong>and</strong> quality to meet even a minimum level of health,<br />

income, safety <strong>and</strong> freedom from drudgery. The World's projected total of 8<br />

billion people in 2025 will enormously increase pressure on natural <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />

environmental services <strong>and</strong> may cause a catastrophe. The competition <strong>between</strong><br />

industrial, urban, <strong>and</strong> agricultural use for natural <strong>resource</strong>s is mounting <strong>and</strong> the<br />

per capita consumption of natural <strong>resource</strong>s is increasing (JHPIP 1998). Regional<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>s over natural <strong>resource</strong>s are brewing <strong>and</strong> could turn violent as shortages<br />

grow. In all continents <strong>and</strong> countries, people are already bickering over access to<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong> competition for their use can be fiercer in the future. For<br />

example, serious <strong>conflict</strong>s are developing concerning large dams such as the<br />

Lesotho Highl<strong>and</strong>s Water Project in the Malibamatso <strong>and</strong> Little Orange Rivers in<br />

Southern Africa funded by the World Bank. For such projects the World Bank is<br />

facing an onslaught of criticism not only over its support for big dams, but also for<br />

creating severe <strong>conflict</strong> in the host countries. As world water scarcity bites deeper<br />

into economies dependent on cheap water supplies, there is <strong>conflict</strong> over river<br />

catchments <strong>and</strong> lakes. Dams such as the Three Gorges Dam in China have become<br />

symbols of official tyranny, with whole cities being flooded <strong>and</strong> engineers being<br />

given free reign to resettle populations who are inconveniently living in river<br />

valleys (Ohlsson 1995). Because of the competition for available natural <strong>resource</strong>s<br />

by an over-growing population, <strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong> capture by certain powerful people,<br />

the vital ecosystems on which humans <strong>and</strong> other species depend are severely<br />

threatened (World Water Forum 2000). The earth has lost 15% of its topsoil over<br />

the last 20 years through inappropriate agricultural practices. Water logging,<br />

salination <strong>and</strong> alkalisation affect another 1.5 million hectares of mostly irrigated<br />

agricultural l<strong>and</strong>. Desertification <strong>and</strong> drought are severely limiting the production<br />

potential of the global agricultural system <strong>and</strong> posing several ecological challenges 2<br />

(Röling 2000).<br />

2 See Beck et al., (1994) for details about future risks, problems <strong>and</strong> challenges to<br />

modern societies. Also see Lubchenco (1998) for challenges to science to achieve<br />

sustainable future environmental management.<br />

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JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM<br />

2004 – nr. 50<br />

Conflict <strong>between</strong> Egypt, Ethiopia <strong>and</strong> Sudan about the Nile with respect to<br />

flooding <strong>and</strong> water flow diversion, <strong>between</strong> Belgium <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s about the<br />

Maas <strong>and</strong> the Schelde with respect to salination <strong>and</strong> industrial pollution, <strong>between</strong><br />

France, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, Germany <strong>and</strong> Switzerl<strong>and</strong> about the Rhine with respect to<br />

industrial pollution, <strong>between</strong> India <strong>and</strong> Bangladesh about the Brahmaputra <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Ganges with respect to siltation, flooding <strong>and</strong> water flow diversion, <strong>between</strong><br />

Mexico <strong>and</strong> the USA about the Rio Gr<strong>and</strong>e <strong>and</strong> Colorado rivers with respect to<br />

salination, water flow <strong>and</strong> agrochemical pollution (Ohlsson 1995) are some<br />

examples to mention. Similarly, the <strong>conflict</strong>s such as those over the Amazonian,<br />

Borneo <strong>and</strong> Sumatran forests, the Massai forest, the Yellowstone National Parks,<br />

<strong>and</strong> also l<strong>and</strong> disputes, 3 are all derived from political, economic or environmental<br />

motives. Internationally <strong>and</strong> domestically, the political wrangling <strong>and</strong> strife over<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong>s are predicted to be one of the fundamental issues of the new<br />

millennium.<br />

Globalisation is increasingly posing new challenges <strong>and</strong> creating new <strong>conflict</strong>s in<br />

Nepal. For example, the <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> Article 27.3b of the Trade Related<br />

Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organisation<br />

(WTO) <strong>and</strong> the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), increasing bio-piracy,<br />

uncertainties <strong>and</strong> threats caused by genetically modified organisms <strong>and</strong> terminator<br />

technology in the agricultural sector are all creating <strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

If there is scarcity of <strong>resource</strong>s, there is competition, so natural <strong>resource</strong>s will be a<br />

continuous source of future <strong>conflict</strong>. In this context a few sentences of the speech<br />

delivered by Fidel Castro on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the World<br />

Health Organisation is worth mentioning.<br />

The weather is changing, the seas <strong>and</strong> the atmosphere are heating<br />

up, the air <strong>and</strong> the water are polluted, the soil is eroding, the<br />

deserts are growing, the forest is disappearing, water is getting<br />

scarce. Who will save our species? The blind <strong>and</strong> uncontrollable<br />

3 The dispute <strong>between</strong> Israel <strong>and</strong> Palestine, the Kashmir l<strong>and</strong> disputes, the grazing<br />

l<strong>and</strong> dispute <strong>between</strong> the Tibetan autonomous region of China <strong>and</strong> Nepal, the<br />

Kalapani l<strong>and</strong> dispute <strong>between</strong> Nepal <strong>and</strong> India, <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> ethnic<br />

people <strong>and</strong> the white minority in Zimbabwe are just a few examples of l<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>conflict</strong>s.<br />

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RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND RESOURCE CONFLICT IN NEPAL<br />

Bishnu Raj Upreti<br />

____________________________________________________________________<br />

laws of the market? Neo-liberal globalisation? .... (Idris, 1998:<br />

5).<br />

3. Governance of Nepalese Natural Resources <strong>and</strong> Conflict<br />

Population pressure, poverty, inequitable distribution <strong>and</strong> control, <strong>and</strong> bad<br />

<strong>governance</strong> are some of the root causes of <strong>conflict</strong> over natural <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />

environment in Nepal. L<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> forest <strong>resource</strong>s are over-exploited because of<br />

heavy dependence of the ever-growing population (both human <strong>and</strong> animals).<br />

Resource scarcity is therefore directly linked with <strong>governance</strong>, accountability <strong>and</strong><br />

transparency <strong>and</strong> a historically power-skewed socio-cultural legacy.<br />

Water is one of the most important natural <strong>resource</strong>s of Nepal. It is estimated that<br />

there are a total of 6000 rivers (CBS 1995). Despite the vast amount of water<br />

available, drinking water is scarce in many parts of the country. Industrial use of<br />

water in urban centres has created competition <strong>and</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> in inter- <strong>and</strong> intrasectoral<br />

water use. Irrigation in mountain <strong>and</strong> hill regions, which constitute 83%<br />

of the Nepal’s total area, is difficult because of steep slopes <strong>and</strong> the fragile<br />

geography, which causes recurring l<strong>and</strong>slides <strong>and</strong> soil erosion. The growing<br />

population requires more food <strong>and</strong> growing more food requires more water.<br />

Physiographic characteristics <strong>and</strong> climatic factors affect such consumptive use of<br />

water but they vary spatially <strong>and</strong> seasonally. This leads to an unequal distribution.<br />

Nepalese water <strong>resource</strong> management is therefore characterised by an unjust <strong>and</strong><br />

insufficient use of water, by contradiction <strong>and</strong> by <strong>conflict</strong>s. Water scarcity,<br />

competition <strong>and</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> are common features of social, economic, political <strong>and</strong><br />

legal issues in Nepal (Upreti 2002).<br />

Growing population, factories <strong>and</strong> farms all need more water <strong>and</strong> other natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s. Competition <strong>between</strong> domestic consumption, industries, <strong>and</strong> farms is<br />

increasing <strong>and</strong> turning into disputes. Water pollution is another issue of <strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

We can see examples in Kathm<strong>and</strong>u Valley where the river systems are almost<br />

collapsing because the river-water is no longer useable. Conflict <strong>between</strong> the needs<br />

of populations living upstream of river basins <strong>and</strong> those dwelling downstream is<br />

mounting. Irrigation, a principal sector of water use in Nepal, intended to<br />

minimise the water scarcity in the field of agriculture, is creating its own <strong>conflict</strong>s<br />

<strong>and</strong> competition (Pradhan et al. 2000).<br />

Forests are another important natural <strong>resource</strong> for economic <strong>and</strong> social<br />

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JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM<br />

2004 – nr. 50<br />

development. Forest <strong>resource</strong>s are one of the major <strong>resource</strong>s directly contributing<br />

to the survival of rural people in Nepal. Forest <strong>resource</strong>s directly fulfil forestrelated<br />

subsistence needs of women, poor <strong>and</strong> backward people as well as<br />

commercial needs of well-off people. They provide inputs for agriculture <strong>and</strong><br />

livestock, <strong>and</strong> supply medicinal herbs, timber <strong>and</strong> non-timber forest products.<br />

Forests also support irrigation, conserve watersheds, improve the condition of the<br />

soil, provide recreation for tourists through forest-based ecotourism <strong>and</strong> national<br />

parks <strong>and</strong> wildlife reserves, provide a habitat for flora <strong>and</strong> fauna <strong>and</strong> provide raw<br />

materials for the forest-based industries (Upreti 1999). Many of the agricultural<br />

production systems of the country are based directly or indirectly on forest<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s. However, the Nepalese forests are severely threatened by political <strong>and</strong><br />

commercial interests. In 1964 forests covered more than 45% of the total area of<br />

the country, <strong>and</strong> this had declined to 29% by 1998. It is reported that the forest<br />

area of Terai is being destroyed at the rate of 1.3% per year (NPC 1998: 290).<br />

Smuggling of forest products is posing another serious challenge. The productivity<br />

of the forest sector is decreasing due to uncontrolled migration <strong>and</strong> encroachment,<br />

smuggling, illegal hunting, grazing, forest fires, lack of scientific forest<br />

management, <strong>and</strong> poor political commitments <strong>and</strong> bureaucratic performance.<br />

Deforestation is resulting in an increasing loss of habitats for birds, wild animals<br />

<strong>and</strong> reptiles. IUCN has reported that 24 species of mammals, 9 species of reptiles,<br />

27 species of birds, 2 species of insects <strong>and</strong> 13 species of plants have become<br />

endangered in Nepal (NPC 1998: 219).<br />

The l<strong>and</strong> use systems in Nepal are rapidly changing because of increased<br />

environmental consumerism through the information revolution, technological<br />

advancement, market intervention <strong>and</strong> globalisation processes. As a consequence,<br />

over-exploitation of natural <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong> environmental services is becoming<br />

harsh reality. The lack of strong environmental <strong>governance</strong>, weak institutional<br />

arrangements <strong>and</strong> rapid globalisation are exerting enormous pressures on natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s. Well-planned l<strong>and</strong> use is one of the most important aspects of<br />

environmental <strong>governance</strong> to achieve economic <strong>and</strong> social development. If l<strong>and</strong> is<br />

managed <strong>and</strong> used properly, according to its quality, type, capacity <strong>and</strong><br />

physiographic characteristics, not only the agricultural productivity <strong>and</strong> other<br />

social <strong>and</strong> economic benefits can be increased but also environmental risks can be<br />

minimised (Upreti 2003).<br />

L<strong>and</strong> is a crucial <strong>resource</strong> for the livelihood of Nepalese farmers. It is also a basis<br />

of feudalistic wealth <strong>and</strong> power. Due to the increasing human population <strong>and</strong><br />

increasing numbers of unproductive livestock extreme pressure is being exerted on<br />

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RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND RESOURCE CONFLICT IN NEPAL<br />

Bishnu Raj Upreti<br />

____________________________________________________________________<br />

l<strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s (NPC 1998). Soil erosion, fertility decline, sedimentation <strong>and</strong><br />

floods have degraded <strong>and</strong> continue to degrade the l<strong>and</strong>. Causative factors of soil<br />

loss are steep slope cultivation, use of marginal l<strong>and</strong>, overgrazing, forest fires, <strong>and</strong><br />

population pressure.<br />

Internal migration is rapidly increasing the population in urban centres <strong>and</strong> putting<br />

additional pressure on the urban environment. More than 90% of urban centres are<br />

located in the fertile agricultural areas. Huge quantities of l<strong>and</strong> are used annually<br />

in building construction by government, semi-government, nongovernment <strong>and</strong> the<br />

private sectors (NPC 1998). The increasing pace of rural to urban migration is<br />

reducing the productivity of l<strong>and</strong> in both rural <strong>and</strong> urban areas (HMG/N 1992).<br />

The government is not able to develop mutual links <strong>between</strong> rural <strong>and</strong> urban areas<br />

nor to provide equal opportunities in the rural areas. The regional imbalance, lack<br />

of infrastructure <strong>and</strong> employment opportunities <strong>and</strong> the unavailability of basic<br />

service facilities are the triggering factors for migration from rural to urban areas<br />

(NPC 1998). L<strong>and</strong> encroachment <strong>and</strong> unplanned settlements are the result of such<br />

migration whereby an imbalanced situation develops <strong>between</strong> men <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>resource</strong>s.<br />

Skewed l<strong>and</strong> distribution <strong>and</strong> gross disparities in l<strong>and</strong> ownership are one of the<br />

major causes of poverty, injustice <strong>and</strong> social discrimination (Upreti 2000a).<br />

Because of such disparity, a large number of people have no access to productive<br />

l<strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s. More than 70% of farmers have less than one hectare of l<strong>and</strong><br />

(NPC 1998). Substantial regional variations in the distribution of agricultural l<strong>and</strong>s<br />

exist in Nepal. The Terai Region occupies 17% of the total l<strong>and</strong> area comprising<br />

49% of the total agricultural l<strong>and</strong> whereas the Hill Region covers 63% of the total<br />

l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> accounts for 40% of agricultural l<strong>and</strong>. Mountain Region occupies 20% of<br />

the total l<strong>and</strong> with 11% of agricultural l<strong>and</strong>. The Human Development Report-<br />

Nepal 1998 shows that the bottom 40% of agricultural households use only 9% of<br />

the total agricultural l<strong>and</strong> owning on average less than 0.5 ha. The top 6%<br />

occupies more than 33% of the total. These inequalities are manifested in the<br />

higher incidence of poverty <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>lessness. Smallholders are marginalised <strong>and</strong><br />

transformed into l<strong>and</strong>less people (Shrestha 1997). This means that a few l<strong>and</strong>lords<br />

control a huge fraction of the country’s l<strong>and</strong>. The Nepalese l<strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong> is<br />

besieged by multifarious problems such as duel ownership in l<strong>and</strong> tenure,<br />

fragmentation, unequal distribution, institutional obstacles <strong>and</strong> unfocused<br />

government policies. Dual ownership is severely limiting productivity because<br />

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JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM<br />

2004 – nr. 50<br />

neither owner nor tenants invest in the l<strong>and</strong>. 4<br />

Legal measures to implement l<strong>and</strong> reform, to prevent l<strong>and</strong> fragmentation, <strong>and</strong> to<br />

promote l<strong>and</strong> consolidation are ineffective (Ghimire 1992; New Era 1988).<br />

Because of a lack of effective l<strong>and</strong>-use planning, the agricultural sector is not able<br />

to reach its potential through specialisation <strong>and</strong> diversification. Erosion, l<strong>and</strong>slides<br />

<strong>and</strong> floods in the Hill areas have seriously affected the river banks, the lower<br />

slopes of the Hills <strong>and</strong> the fertile l<strong>and</strong> of the Terai region, <strong>and</strong> have had a negative<br />

impact on agriculture, irrigation, hydro-electricity, forest, bio-diversity, the<br />

environment, road systems, transport <strong>and</strong> tourism.<br />

L<strong>and</strong> management practices in Nepal are still insensitive to the negative effects on<br />

the wider environment, <strong>and</strong> become a source of <strong>conflict</strong>. For example, cultivation<br />

on the steep-slope l<strong>and</strong> in the foothills of the Himalayas in Nepal is contributing to<br />

floods in the delta areas of Bangladesh (Tear Fund 1999). Buildings are rapidly<br />

covering highly fertile l<strong>and</strong>s of the Terai region <strong>and</strong> urban centres as city centres<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>. The l<strong>and</strong> reform campaign, although initiated in 1951, has so far been<br />

merely a political slogan rather than significantly contributing to its reform. All<br />

major political parties have highlighted the l<strong>and</strong> reform agenda in their election<br />

manifestos, but none of them are fulfilling their commitments.<br />

Despite the fact that the government, donors <strong>and</strong> local communities are investing<br />

much more effort, time <strong>and</strong> money in natural <strong>resource</strong> management, <strong>and</strong> despite<br />

the fact that several natural <strong>resource</strong> related offices have been established in all<br />

districts, environmental scarcity <strong>and</strong> <strong>conflict</strong>s are growing (Upreti 2004). My<br />

previous research findings show that <strong>conflict</strong>s are increasing through the<br />

intervention of external development organisations without a proper underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

of local systems, lack of user participation in natural <strong>resource</strong> management <strong>and</strong><br />

defective policies (Upreti 2000a, b, c, 2002). Therefore it is time to rethink the<br />

dominant natural <strong>resource</strong> management approach in Nepal. Evidence is<br />

accumulating that, despite the efforts of the government, donors <strong>and</strong> NGOs,<br />

environmental problems <strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong> scarcity are mounting <strong>and</strong> leading to <strong>conflict</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> violence.<br />

Perhaps nobody would disagree that bad environmental <strong>governance</strong> has created<br />

4<br />

The Rural Credit Survey of Nepal Rastra Bank (1994) has indicated that<br />

investment in l<strong>and</strong> improvement in Nepal is less than 3% of household income.<br />

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<strong>resource</strong>s scarcity leading to <strong>conflict</strong>. Resource degradation, <strong>conflict</strong> about access,<br />

rights <strong>and</strong> obligations, fair distribution, maintenance <strong>and</strong> benefit sharing were<br />

basically under-emphasised in <strong>governance</strong> practices in Nepal. Various endogenous<br />

<strong>and</strong> exogenous factors such as population growth, globalisation of markets, <strong>and</strong><br />

environmental <strong>and</strong> technological changes are imposing new <strong>conflict</strong> on the natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s sector. Many large <strong>and</strong> small natural <strong>resource</strong> management projects<br />

implemented by different agencies are introducing new <strong>conflict</strong>s as well as having<br />

various negative impacts on society. For example, ignorance of the importance of<br />

indigenous knowledge in planning <strong>and</strong> designing new systems, extortion, alteration<br />

of local rights <strong>and</strong> regulations, the replacement of old institutions by new ones,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the imposition of technocratic solutions are some of the immediate<br />

implications of the new interventions. These interventions have their own firmly<br />

fixed <strong>and</strong> uniform policy <strong>and</strong> a rigid procedure based on reductionist-positivist<br />

orientation. They are technocratic in nature <strong>and</strong> generally do not acknowledge<br />

local diversities. This is becoming one of the major causes of <strong>conflict</strong> in natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong> management.<br />

Conflict arises if the new natural <strong>resource</strong> management policy of the government<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>s with local cultural practice. The economic motive of people to acquire<br />

more from the existing natural <strong>resource</strong>s on a competitive basis also leads to<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>. Conflict is also growing as a result of the contradiction <strong>between</strong><br />

environmental <strong>and</strong> economic interests. Changes in historical use patterns of natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong> use can bring <strong>conflict</strong> into a community. Similarly, contradictions<br />

<strong>between</strong> legal arrangements <strong>and</strong> customary practices have promoted several<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>s.<br />

The social dimension of natural <strong>resource</strong> management is crucial in natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>-related <strong>conflict</strong>s. The social dimension refers to the more human-related<br />

aspects of negotiations, such as knowledge, institutions of technology, <strong>and</strong> forums<br />

(platforms) (Röling 2000). In the study of <strong>conflict</strong> it is important to underst<strong>and</strong> the<br />

role of the human dimension in respect of natural <strong>resource</strong>s (Röling 1997). In the<br />

contemporary development discourse natural <strong>resource</strong>s are usually perceived as<br />

hard, 5 objectively fixed, bio-physical facts (e.g., soil, crops, livestock, disease <strong>and</strong><br />

5 Röling (1997) illustrates the notion of soft <strong>and</strong> hard science in natural <strong>resource</strong><br />

management in his commonly used term “Soft Side of L<strong>and</strong> Perspective’. It is<br />

important to look beyond the common categorisation of social science as soft<br />

science <strong>and</strong> technical science (biophysical) as hard science. It implies that positivist<br />

<strong>and</strong> constructivist thinking exists within both sciences. For example, even within<br />

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pests, water, yields, erosion, caring capacity, bio-diversity, physical properties)<br />

Such factors as human goals, organisation <strong>and</strong> technological aspects (Röling 2000)<br />

are usually ignored. But <strong>conflict</strong> concerning natural <strong>resource</strong>s is the outcome of<br />

societal arrangement, human intention <strong>and</strong> behaviour (Röling 1997) framed within<br />

those biophysical properties. Therefore, both of these dimensions of natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s are essential for a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>conflict</strong>s in natural <strong>resource</strong><br />

management. Resource management decisions <strong>and</strong> the activities of <strong>resource</strong> users,<br />

the performance of bureaucracy, the functioning of user groups <strong>and</strong> associations,<br />

access to <strong>and</strong> control over <strong>resource</strong>s, customary practices <strong>and</strong> state<br />

laws/regulations, livelihood requirements <strong>and</strong> the welfare of people are therefore<br />

important issues to be addressed in any study of <strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

In Nepal the dominant development paradigm still treats technology as a ‘black<br />

box’ <strong>and</strong> gives little attention to human intentions <strong>and</strong> behaviour in managing<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong>s. Responsive institutions, collective learning, negotiation <strong>and</strong><br />

concerted actions in my opinion are vital but neglected components in natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong> management discourses <strong>and</strong> practices. Several researchers <strong>and</strong> academics<br />

(for example, Röling 1997; Pradhan et al. 2000; Uphoff 2000, Chambers 1988)<br />

have shown that natural <strong>resource</strong> management is not only a technical domain, but<br />

that it is more importantly a social discourse, shaped <strong>and</strong> influenced by social<br />

processes <strong>and</strong> intentional human activities. A plural legal situation can create<br />

several <strong>conflict</strong>s because of its uncertain <strong>and</strong> manipulative nature. Most of the<br />

legal reforms related to natural <strong>resource</strong>s have yet to be translated into real<br />

practices. If <strong>and</strong> when they are practised, power brokers manipulate them <strong>and</strong> the<br />

weaker section of society still feels uncertain <strong>and</strong> insecure.<br />

During my twenty-five years of practical experience in the rural development,<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong> management <strong>and</strong> environmental sectors, I have increasingly<br />

realised that a government’s policies <strong>and</strong> a donor’s strategies are more focused on<br />

management <strong>and</strong> control of natural <strong>resource</strong>s through prescriptive technical<br />

solutions than through a meaningful participation of people. This leads to <strong>conflict</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> disturbance in the self-regulated use of ecological systems. We are now<br />

entering the twenty-first century, where <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> economic objectives <strong>and</strong><br />

the social sciences there are both positivist thinking, such as the resolution of<br />

<strong>conflict</strong> by enforcing acts <strong>and</strong> regulations <strong>and</strong> use of the courts <strong>and</strong> police, <strong>and</strong><br />

constructivist thinking such as the resolution of <strong>conflict</strong> through learning,<br />

negotiation <strong>and</strong> collaboration.<br />

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sustainable ecological use of natural <strong>resource</strong>s is accelerating. Obviously the<br />

increasing problems such as the lack of pure drinking water, loss of bio-diversity,<br />

climate change, environment pollution <strong>and</strong> other ecological challenges are the<br />

product of increasingly developed consumerism, population pressure, economic<br />

motives <strong>and</strong> <strong>governance</strong> failure. These problems are not only disrupting selfsustaining<br />

NR systems but also creating severe <strong>conflict</strong>s in society. Therefore, an<br />

economically guided focus for these problems is in itself a source of further<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

3.1 Case one: mis-<strong>governance</strong> in a donor-funded irrigation system<br />

In 1982 a local leader requested the Department of Irrigation (DOI) to construct an<br />

irrigation canal. The DOI conducted a survey but did not proceed any further. This<br />

project came into the light again when a District Irrigation Office (DIO) was<br />

established in Dolakha district in 1989. An active local political worker<br />

(hereinafter referred as the initiator), who was also a professional contractor, by<br />

using his ‘relation of special intimacy’ 6 (Wade 1982) with engineers initiated this<br />

project. The DIO Engineer approved the project within the provisions of the Asian<br />

Development Bank (ADB) funded Irrigation Sector Support Project (ISSP).<br />

Difficulties started when the local people discovered that the proposed alignment<br />

of the canal had been changed. 7 A Water Users Committee (WUC) was formed<br />

without informing villagers <strong>and</strong> they elected chairmen of the two Village<br />

Development Committees (VDCs) of the comm<strong>and</strong> area of the canal. So the<br />

<strong>conflict</strong> became more serious <strong>and</strong> the public started to oppose the activities of the<br />

WUC. Users of the canals downstream raised the issue of water scarcity. As a<br />

consequence, the disgruntled people lodged a complaint to the District<br />

Administration Office to stop the construction. The Chief District Officer<br />

organised meetings with both groups <strong>and</strong> an agreement was reached with the<br />

following provisions:<br />

(a)<br />

sharing of water with downstream canals,<br />

6 Bargaining for a bribe <strong>between</strong> contractor <strong>and</strong> engineer is more direct <strong>and</strong><br />

surreptitious in the developed relation of special intimacy (Wade 1982).<br />

7 According to the respondents the motive for the change of alignment of the canal<br />

was to increase the total cost of the project.<br />

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(b)<br />

(c)<br />

sharing of power by reorganising the existing WUC of the<br />

project, <strong>and</strong><br />

sharing of construction work <strong>and</strong> budget by users.<br />

Accordingly, the existing 11-member WUC was exp<strong>and</strong>ed to 19 members. The<br />

newly exp<strong>and</strong>ed WUC divided the total construction work into 35 sections <strong>and</strong><br />

allocated these to WUC members <strong>and</strong> their supporters. However, 85% of the<br />

people that obtained construction contracts were not beneficiaries of the project.<br />

Therefore they were not much interested in constructing a canal of good quality,<br />

<strong>and</strong> did not use the proper ratio of cement to concrete, nor quality construction<br />

materials, seeking to save money on the ground. Most of the people who got<br />

contracts were either WUC members themselves or their close relatives <strong>and</strong><br />

supporters.<br />

The technology used in the project was expensive <strong>and</strong> complicated. The irrigation<br />

technicians, in consultation with the WUC used cemented structures, masonry,<br />

gabion wire etc. to raise the cost of the project, as this gave ample scope to get<br />

commissions while purchasing, <strong>and</strong> they could save a huge amount out of the<br />

transportation cost of the construction materials. The quality of work was poor<br />

because they were not using construction materials according to the st<strong>and</strong>ard norm,<br />

in order to save money (Upreti 2001), doing what Wade (1982) describes as<br />

‘saving in the ground’ <strong>and</strong> Thapa (2002) <strong>and</strong> P<strong>and</strong>ay (2001) describe as<br />

‘corruption’. In this way, full of <strong>conflict</strong>s <strong>and</strong> tension the project was officially<br />

completed in 1996. Today only the canal track remains <strong>and</strong> the WUC is<br />

completely dysfunctional. The villagers filed a case for corruption against the<br />

WUC in 1995. This was dismissed by a Special Police Investigation in the same<br />

year. Local people blamed that the alleged offer by the WUC of a bribe to dismiss<br />

the case (Upreti 2001). This type of manipulation <strong>and</strong> corruption is not new in the<br />

development programme in Nepal (P<strong>and</strong>ay 2001; Thapa 2002). In this context,<br />

Hari Bahadur Thapa has made a thorough analysis of Nepalese corruption in his<br />

recent book entitled Anatomy of Corruption. He writes:<br />

Corruption has flourished because of lack of strong political will<br />

to control it. Nepal's political leadership has been more<br />

concerned with its own party political interests than the welfare<br />

of the nation (Thapa 2002: iv).<br />

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3.2 Case two: <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> the farmers of an irrigation system<br />

A deep <strong>conflict</strong> was observed over an irrigation system when the government<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>ed the existing canal in Pawoti village of Dolakha District. In consequence<br />

of this work the existing rules <strong>and</strong> regulations were replaced, water scarcity was<br />

observed <strong>and</strong> tension <strong>between</strong> different farmers <strong>and</strong> <strong>between</strong> the farmers <strong>and</strong> the<br />

irrigation authority mounted. Before the external intervention irrigation <strong>conflict</strong>s<br />

had been resolved by users themselves using locally developed rules <strong>and</strong><br />

procedures. Water sharing <strong>and</strong> maintenance of the canal was effective. Afterwards<br />

people were unhappy with the misuse of money received from the government <strong>and</strong><br />

stopped contributing their volunteer labour to maintain the canal. The <strong>conflict</strong><br />

became very serious <strong>and</strong> generally tail-end farmers were not allowed to take water.<br />

These farmers approached the local authority, district irrigation offices, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

district administration but the <strong>conflict</strong> was not resolved because the government<br />

authority was not willing to solve the problem. Instead, the <strong>conflict</strong> became<br />

increasingly politicised, the canal became dysfunctional <strong>and</strong> the villagers fell in to<br />

deep <strong>conflict</strong>. The main causes of this <strong>conflict</strong> were ignorance of the rules<br />

developed <strong>and</strong> enforced by the community, <strong>and</strong> of the voice of local people, <strong>and</strong><br />

the ineffective role of the government organisations responsible for addressing<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

3.3 Case three: <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> the village elite <strong>and</strong> the local people in a<br />

pasturel<strong>and</strong><br />

Access <strong>and</strong> control of the pasturel<strong>and</strong> located in Ward 7 of the Pawoti VDC was<br />

the main cause of this <strong>conflict</strong>. Local elite <strong>and</strong> powerbrokers started to terrace the<br />

centuries-old communally managed public pasturel<strong>and</strong>. Being powerful politicians<br />

of high economic status <strong>and</strong> with strong network connections with bureaucrats, the<br />

pasturel<strong>and</strong> invaders seriously undermined the symbolic <strong>and</strong> economic attachment<br />

of the local community to this l<strong>and</strong>. When the users started to protest against the<br />

invasion the <strong>conflict</strong> escalated. Local efforts over several years failed to resolve<br />

the <strong>conflict</strong>. Ultimately, the case reached the senior government administrator. The<br />

administrator decided in favour of the community but the invaders did not leave<br />

the invaded l<strong>and</strong>. The community members appealed for the execution of the<br />

earlier decision, but the power <strong>and</strong> influence of the powerbrokers prevented an<br />

effective enforcement of the decision <strong>and</strong> the appeal was dismissed. The legal<br />

procedure was too complicated <strong>and</strong> expensive for the community. Therefore, they<br />

did not go for further legal remedies. The <strong>conflict</strong> continues <strong>and</strong> the society is<br />

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divided.<br />

3.4 Case four: <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> two communities over a spring water source<br />

A serious <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> two communities over the sharing of water from a<br />

spring was observed in Pawoti VDC. The existing water users were not prepared<br />

to share this water source. They claimed that there would be a problem of scarcity<br />

of water to irrigate their fields if they shared the source with another community.<br />

The case went to the government’s district office but was not settled. It was<br />

politicised by the district politicians influencing the government bureaucrats. So<br />

the <strong>conflict</strong> remained unsettled for several years. Later, with the help of a local<br />

priest, a women’s leader <strong>and</strong> a local NGO, the <strong>conflict</strong> was resolved with the<br />

following provisions:<br />

1. the new users should construct a reservoir tank close to<br />

the source <strong>and</strong> collect water at night time;<br />

2. in case of water shortage during rice transplanting, water<br />

should not be collected in the reservoir tank during that<br />

time;<br />

3. the new users should take responsibility for the<br />

conservation of the source;<br />

4. the existing users should inform the new users before<br />

letting the water flow out for rice transplanting;<br />

5. both groups should apologise for past accusations <strong>and</strong><br />

misunderst<strong>and</strong>ings; <strong>and</strong><br />

6. if problems emerged, the users would have to call a<br />

meeting to find ways to resolve them.<br />

This proposal was thoroughly discussed in successive meetings with the existing<br />

users, staff of the NGO, other villagers <strong>and</strong> the new users. They used their past<br />

experiences, learnt from their mistakes, <strong>and</strong> worked collectively to settle the<br />

<strong>conflict</strong>. In this way the serious <strong>conflict</strong>, which could not be solved by the<br />

government agency, was solved at local level with win-win outcome.<br />

3.5 Case five: <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> the l<strong>and</strong>lords <strong>and</strong> the tenants in agricultural l<strong>and</strong>s<br />

A deep-seated <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> the 123 tenant households <strong>and</strong> 50 l<strong>and</strong>lords of the<br />

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Deurali village of the Pawoti VDC was resolved after 39 years through several<br />

efforts at different levels. The l<strong>and</strong>lords had been a rich <strong>and</strong> powerful ruling elite<br />

in the village for several generations. So they were not ready to accept the<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>s for tenants’ rights from their tenants. The tenant farmers made all<br />

possible local efforts to establish their rights over the l<strong>and</strong>. They mobilised local<br />

priests, relatives of l<strong>and</strong>lords, <strong>and</strong> themselves approached the l<strong>and</strong>owners to<br />

engage in negotiation, but these efforts did not work. They also paid the price of<br />

the l<strong>and</strong> to the l<strong>and</strong>owners to induce them to transfer the l<strong>and</strong>. But the l<strong>and</strong>lords<br />

did not transfer the l<strong>and</strong> ownership. Because of the complicated nature of the legal<br />

procedure, high fees <strong>and</strong> the potential fear that the decision would go against them<br />

because of the influence of power <strong>and</strong> money, the tenants did not opt for a legal<br />

battle. Instead they stopped paying the rent. Then the l<strong>and</strong>lords filed a case against<br />

them. The governmental organisations responsible for dealing with l<strong>and</strong> <strong>conflict</strong>s<br />

gave a verdict in favour of the l<strong>and</strong>lords. The tenants did not accept the decision<br />

<strong>and</strong> continued with their claim. The tenants were strongly organised, learnt from<br />

past mistakes while dealing with l<strong>and</strong>owners, discussed their problems with other<br />

people in the village, <strong>and</strong> won the support of all villagers. The determination <strong>and</strong><br />

concerted actions of the tenants forced the l<strong>and</strong>owners to rethink the issue. The<br />

l<strong>and</strong>lords realised that the solution of evicting them from the l<strong>and</strong> would not work.<br />

If the tenants were evicted they would be l<strong>and</strong>less <strong>and</strong> create severe problems <strong>and</strong><br />

even pose a risk of physical insecurity to the l<strong>and</strong>lords. Finally the l<strong>and</strong>owners<br />

transferred the ownership rights to the tenants <strong>and</strong> the tenants paid 100,000 rupees<br />

in return. Then the <strong>conflict</strong> was resolved locally in a win-win situation.<br />

4. A Framework for Resource Governance <strong>and</strong> its Legal Dimensions<br />

I define <strong>resource</strong> <strong>governance</strong> as a set of policies, laws <strong>and</strong> regulations, institutions,<br />

technologies <strong>and</strong> cognitive aspects like values, perceptions, underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong><br />

actions, through which people manage (conserve <strong>and</strong> utilise) natural <strong>resource</strong>s in a<br />

transparent, accountable, participatory <strong>and</strong> equitable manner. Generally <strong>resource</strong><br />

<strong>governance</strong> covers:<br />

• setting broad objectives,<br />

• planning for specific targets, <strong>and</strong> framing policies to<br />

attain those targets,<br />

• selecting specific policy instruments,<br />

• establishing institutional mechanisms to implement them,<br />

<strong>and</strong><br />

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• adopting appropriate approaches for involvement <strong>and</strong><br />

empowerment of stakeholders.<br />

All these elements give rise to <strong>conflict</strong> if not h<strong>and</strong>led properly. This dimension is<br />

discussed in detail in this section. Conflicts in Nepal over l<strong>and</strong>s, water <strong>and</strong> forests<br />

are given an analysis in this section based on the concept of <strong>resource</strong> <strong>governance</strong><br />

systems.<br />

Figure 1. Interrelationship <strong>between</strong> components of environmental <strong>governance</strong><br />

Though weak in their implementation, several international efforts have been made<br />

in environmental <strong>governance</strong>. Nepal is a signatory of more than 22 Multilateral<br />

Environmental Agreements (MEAs) (Silwal <strong>and</strong> Prasad 2002) <strong>and</strong> works within<br />

international guiding principles <strong>and</strong> frameworks.<br />

His Majesty’s Government of Nepal uses general policy documents like Periodic<br />

Five Year Plans, the National Conservation Strategy (NCS) 1988, the EIA<br />

Guidelines 1993/1997, the Nepal Environmental Policy <strong>and</strong> Action Plan (NEPAP I<br />

1995 <strong>and</strong> II 1996), the Sustainable Development Agenda of Nepal (SDAN) 2002,<br />

<strong>and</strong> sectoral policy documents like the Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP), the<br />

Hydropower Development Policy 1992/2002, the Forestry Policy 1992, the<br />

Industrial Policy 1992, Nepal Environmental Health Initiatives (NEHI) 1997, <strong>and</strong><br />

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the Cleaner Production Policy 2001 (Silwal <strong>and</strong> Prasad 2002) to facilitate<br />

environmental <strong>governance</strong> practice.<br />

In Part 4, Article 26 (State Policies) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal,<br />

1990 stipulates:<br />

(3) The State shall pursue a policy of mobilizing the natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong> heritage of the country in manner, which might be<br />

useful <strong>and</strong> beneficial to the interest of the nation;<br />

(4) The State shall give priority to the protection of the<br />

environment <strong>and</strong> also to the prevention of its further damage due<br />

to physical development activities by increasing the awareness of<br />

the general public about environmental cleanliness, <strong>and</strong> the State<br />

shall also make arrangements for the special protection of the<br />

rare wildlife, the forest <strong>and</strong> the vegetation.<br />

To meet the constitutional requirement there are two specific enactments, i.e., the<br />

Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1997 <strong>and</strong> the Environmental Protection<br />

Regulations (EPR) 1998. These two provisions govern access to environmental<br />

services. In addition to that there are other acts supporting environmental<br />

<strong>governance</strong> (Box 2).<br />

In addition to these provisions there are also some other important provisions such<br />

as the Parliamentary Council for Conservation of Natural & Cultural Resources<br />

(CCNCR), the Environment Conservation Council, the Parliament, National<br />

Planning Commission (NPC), Environment Protection Council (EPC), Water <strong>and</strong><br />

Energy Commission (WEC), etc. (Silwal <strong>and</strong> Prasad, 2002).<br />

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Box 2<br />

Acts <strong>and</strong> Laws<br />

Agriculture related: Pesticide Act<br />

1992/Rules 1994; Livestock Health<br />

<strong>and</strong> Service Act, 1998 /Rules 1999;<br />

Seed Act, 1989/ Rules, 1996; Food<br />

Act, 1967; Aquatic Animals<br />

Protection Act, 1961.<br />

L<strong>and</strong> related: L<strong>and</strong> Act, 1964; L<strong>and</strong><br />

(Measurement) Act, 1963; L<strong>and</strong><br />

Revenue Act, 1979; L<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Watershed Protection Act, 1983; Soil<br />

<strong>and</strong> Water Conservation Act, 1992.<br />

Air related: Vehicular <strong>and</strong><br />

Transport Management Act, 1992.<br />

Forest related: Forest Act, 1993.<br />

Water related: Water Resources Act,<br />

1992; Electricity Act, 1992.<br />

Industry related: Industrial<br />

Management Act, 1992; Industrial<br />

Enterprise Act, 1992; Labor Act, 1991.<br />

Local Self Governance Act (LSGA), 1999. The LSGA provides more<br />

autonomy to Village Development Committees (VDCs), District Development<br />

Committees (DDCs) <strong>and</strong> Municipalities by empowering the local authorities to<br />

manage natural <strong>resource</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> guides them to integrate environmental <strong>resource</strong>s<br />

<strong>and</strong> environmental planning (Part V, 5.3). Some of the highlights that pertain to<br />

environmental <strong>governance</strong> are:<br />

wards are required to help in the protection of the environment through<br />

plantations (Section 25[e]);<br />

rights <strong>and</strong> duties of the VDCs are stipulated (Section 28)<br />

VDCs are empowered to levy taxes on utilization of natural <strong>resource</strong>s<br />

(Section 55);<br />

property of VDCs, i.e. natural <strong>resource</strong>s, are listed (Section 68)<br />

powers are provided to formulate <strong>and</strong> implement plans for the conservation<br />

of forest, vegetation, biological diversity <strong>and</strong> soil (Section 189);<br />

power is given to formulate bylaws in the area of management of all the<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong>s i.e. air, water, l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> forest.<br />

Source: Silwal <strong>and</strong> Prasad 2002.<br />

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5. Political Economy of Natural Resources in Nepal<br />

Political economy refers to the public power or decision-making over access to <strong>and</strong><br />

control over <strong>resource</strong>s. The basic questions are, who gains, who loses, who has<br />

control, <strong>and</strong> how? In discussing the political economy of natural <strong>resource</strong>s it is<br />

important to examine how politics function in a particular social setting. In the<br />

agrarian society of Nepal people use the l<strong>and</strong>, but the true owner is the state <strong>and</strong> a<br />

feudalistic mode of production exists. Society is not a mere sum of individual acts,<br />

but rather a complex totality of interacting individuals tied up with specific social<br />

<strong>and</strong> economic <strong>relationships</strong> <strong>and</strong> interdependent structures. Individuals in society<br />

are embedded in particular class <strong>relationships</strong> <strong>and</strong> class interests. Political life is an<br />

expression of dependency <strong>and</strong> state domination. The elite, particularly the formal<br />

power holders, have an interest in maintaining such a dependent structure so as to<br />

gain the most advantage from the system for themselves. This is truly reflected in<br />

Nepalese rural societies where there are hierarchies of chains of <strong>relationships</strong>,<br />

which have an exploitative structure. There is a formal power structure that is<br />

represented by the elite at different levels. At the political level there are the top<br />

civil servants, businessmen, religious leaders, etc. At the local level these elites<br />

advance their interests through power. They share certain common ideologies <strong>and</strong><br />

political positions, values <strong>and</strong> perspectives <strong>and</strong> act accordingly to maintain the<br />

existing mode of <strong>resource</strong> management <strong>and</strong> utilisation. Investment of <strong>resource</strong>s in<br />

development is organised accordingly.<br />

The history of the Nepalese political economy of natural <strong>resource</strong>s shows that prior<br />

to 1734, when the present-day Nepal was a fragmented groups of petty states,<br />

people were deliberately encouraged to cultivate as much forest <strong>and</strong> pasture l<strong>and</strong> as<br />

possible. This ensured them a good living <strong>and</strong> increased the productivity of the<br />

l<strong>and</strong>. They then paid a certain portion of their returns to the state (Regmi 1978).<br />

Until 1950 it was common for the state to grant tax-free l<strong>and</strong> to officials, religious<br />

organisations <strong>and</strong> individual favourites of the kings or rulers. Traditionally l<strong>and</strong><br />

was considered as the property of the state [state l<strong>and</strong>lordism] <strong>and</strong> this l<strong>and</strong> is<br />

called Raikar 8 . Only the state had the right to alienate l<strong>and</strong> through sale, mortgage<br />

8 M.C. Regmi argues that there were mainly two types of l<strong>and</strong> tenure system in<br />

Nepal, i.e., Raikar <strong>and</strong> Kipat. All other tenured forms of l<strong>and</strong> were derived from<br />

Raikar (Regmi 1976, 1978). The meaning of Raikar l<strong>and</strong> has changed since 1951,<br />

from crown l<strong>and</strong> to l<strong>and</strong> owned by individuals. Raikar-l<strong>and</strong> ownership denotes an<br />

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or bequest (Regmi 1976). Using this right of alienation the state granted cultivated<br />

or uncultivated state-owned Raikar l<strong>and</strong>s to individuals in the form of Jagir, Birta,<br />

Rakam, Sera <strong>and</strong> Rajya, <strong>and</strong> charitable or religious organisations in the form of<br />

Guthi (Regmi 1976). 9 The Guthi l<strong>and</strong> tenure system also included the endowment<br />

of private l<strong>and</strong>s (obtained from the state) by individual l<strong>and</strong>lords for religious<br />

ultimate state ownership over those l<strong>and</strong>s, which were actually cultivated by<br />

individuals as direct tenants of the state. The tenancy of Rraikar l<strong>and</strong> has two<br />

categories, the actual tenant-cultivators <strong>and</strong> the tenant owners. The latter category<br />

of tenants are those who pay rent to the state, but who can sell or bequeath their<br />

Raikar l<strong>and</strong>, whereas the former category (the tenant cultivators) have no right to<br />

sell sublet or otherwise alienate the l<strong>and</strong> which has been allotted to them. The<br />

usufructuary assignment of Raikar l<strong>and</strong> to individuals <strong>and</strong> institutions is a<br />

deliberate means of rewarding them <strong>and</strong> ensuring their loyalty, paying them for<br />

services rendered <strong>and</strong> promoting social <strong>and</strong> religious activities. The Raikar l<strong>and</strong><br />

grant was practised in several forms viz.: Birta, Jagir <strong>and</strong> Guthi, Rakam, Rajya,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Sera.<br />

9 A Birta grant was given to a noble as a reward for a service rendered to the state.<br />

It had no time limits <strong>and</strong> it could be rented out or inherited until confiscated or<br />

recalled by the state. Birta owners usually had full rights to possess, occupy, sell,<br />

lease, subdivide <strong>and</strong> bequeath their l<strong>and</strong>s. Most Birta l<strong>and</strong>s were not taxable. They<br />

have become the foundation of the modern, private l<strong>and</strong>ed property arrangement.<br />

Jagir l<strong>and</strong> holding was more conditional <strong>and</strong> subtle <strong>and</strong> often granted to<br />

government servants rather than to members of the ruling elite. A Jagir assessment<br />

was usually an assignment of the income from Raikar l<strong>and</strong>s in lieu of a salary <strong>and</strong><br />

it could not be assigned or sold. Jagir rights lapsed on the cesser of employment,<br />

or at the discretion of the government. The Birta <strong>and</strong> Jagir forms were abolished<br />

in 1959, with the enactment of the Birta Abolition Act <strong>and</strong> were converted to<br />

Raikar l<strong>and</strong> (New Era 1988: 28-31). Sera was a form of l<strong>and</strong> tenure explicitly used<br />

by the royal palace to meet the food-grain <strong>and</strong> other l<strong>and</strong>-related requirements.<br />

Rakam is another form of l<strong>and</strong> tenure where cultivators have to compulsorily<br />

provide unpaid labourers to the government as carpenters, masons, <strong>and</strong> postmen.<br />

Rajya was another modified form of l<strong>and</strong> tenure granted as the princely state<br />

award for members <strong>and</strong> relatives of Royal families. This l<strong>and</strong>-granting practice<br />

was common, up until the Rana regime. Rulers granted large portion of l<strong>and</strong>s to<br />

soldiers as Jagir to keep them under their control. Rana rulers confined the l<strong>and</strong>grant<br />

practices to their relatives <strong>and</strong> key officials.<br />

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purposes. Kipat 10 was another communal l<strong>and</strong>-tenure system whereby individuals<br />

derived l<strong>and</strong> rights from their association with particular ethnic groups, located in<br />

a particular area. Regmi states that “individuals who cultivated l<strong>and</strong> in their<br />

capacity as a member of a Kipat-owing ethnic group owed allegiance primarily to<br />

the community, not to the state” (Regmi 1972: 27).<br />

Almost one-third of agricultural <strong>and</strong> forest l<strong>and</strong> of the nation was granted to<br />

private individuals by 1950 <strong>and</strong> the remainder belongs to Rana (members of the<br />

ruling clan) themselves (Regmi 1978). Local functionaries, all favourites of Rana,<br />

implemented the l<strong>and</strong>-grant policy in the villages <strong>and</strong> were able to assure most<br />

benefit for themselves. They obtained a great deal of l<strong>and</strong> from the state through<br />

Jagir <strong>and</strong> Birta grants <strong>and</strong> rented these l<strong>and</strong>s to peasant farmers under tenancy<br />

arrangements. In this way local functionaries turned into l<strong>and</strong>lords. Peasant<br />

farmers had to pay half of their crop yield as rent to the local l<strong>and</strong>lords. Gradually,<br />

to ensure their rent, l<strong>and</strong>lords introduced the kut (contract) system where only<br />

those tenants who were able to pay high rents could get a contract. Irrespective of<br />

the performance of their crops, even if the crops failed, farmers had to pay rent as<br />

Kut. Eventually these peasant farmers effectively turned into slave labourers of the<br />

Jagir <strong>and</strong> Birta holders (Regmi 1978). After 1951 the government nationalised all<br />

the forest in Nepal so as to release l<strong>and</strong> from the grip of Birta holders, especially<br />

from Rana families. However, this did not function well in practice. Historically<br />

l<strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s in Nepal played a crucial role in socio-economic <strong>and</strong> political<br />

change <strong>and</strong> were used by principalities <strong>and</strong> national governments for their political<br />

goals.<br />

Large portions of all these forms of l<strong>and</strong> tenure were cultivated under tenancy<br />

arrangements, in the form of sharecropping. Some l<strong>and</strong>lords were entrusted by the<br />

government as Mukhiya in the Hill regions <strong>and</strong> Chaudhari <strong>and</strong> Jimidar in Terai<br />

regions to work on l<strong>and</strong> administration (Pradhan et al. 2000). They had the<br />

authority to establish settlements in new areas, <strong>and</strong> to collect tax <strong>and</strong> pay part of it<br />

to government (Regmi 1976). The emergence of a unified nation was the outcome<br />

of the consolidation of small kingdoms, fiefdoms <strong>and</strong> principalities. The state<br />

began to regulate the available natural <strong>resource</strong>s to generate government revenue.<br />

10 This was an ancient type of communal l<strong>and</strong> tenure where an ethnic community<br />

was granted l<strong>and</strong> by their king in recognition of a traditional communal tenure.<br />

Headmen had the authority to grant individuals the right to cultivate certain areas<br />

<strong>and</strong> to collect forest products from other areas (Regmi 1978)<br />

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This led to the establishment of control mechanisms: different departments <strong>and</strong><br />

regional offices, policies, acts, rules <strong>and</strong> regulations to control systematically the<br />

available natural <strong>resource</strong>s. It can be seen from the above brief history of l<strong>and</strong><br />

tenure systems in Nepal that the rulers used l<strong>and</strong> as a means of maintaining<br />

functionaries for the consolidation of power <strong>and</strong> maintaining good relations with<br />

family members, close allies, members of the nobility, military personnel, civil<br />

employees, royal courtiers <strong>and</strong> potential foes. The mode of production in <strong>and</strong><br />

distribution of natural <strong>resource</strong>s was very much feudalistic in nature.<br />

In the history of Nepalese development (especially <strong>between</strong> 1951 <strong>and</strong> 2000),<br />

development intervention as a means of agrarian change has had three<br />

complementary objectives: (i) to raise production <strong>and</strong> productivity, (ii) to raise<br />

livelihood, 11 <strong>and</strong> (iii) to sustain the existing natural <strong>resource</strong> base. The emphasis<br />

given in national policies <strong>and</strong> planning (in, for example, the Ninth Five Year Plan<br />

(NFYP), <strong>and</strong> the Nepal Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP)) was to increase<br />

production, achieve a trade balance <strong>and</strong> increase employment opportunities in the<br />

natural <strong>resource</strong> sector; <strong>and</strong> enhance national economic growth by effectively<br />

utilising the available natural <strong>resource</strong>s. However, the performance level of such<br />

intervention in alleviating poverty in Nepal has not yet reached expectations. There<br />

is evidence that productivity-oriented achievements are not fully able to address<br />

problems such as the widening gap <strong>between</strong> rich <strong>and</strong> poor, unemployment, <strong>and</strong><br />

degradation of the natural <strong>resource</strong> base. These problems are not only creating<br />

inequality but are also creating fundamental <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>between</strong> the rich <strong>and</strong> the poor.<br />

The growing Maoist movement in Nepal is an example of such <strong>conflict</strong>. The<br />

implications of such <strong>conflict</strong>s are long term <strong>and</strong> are dividing society, <strong>and</strong><br />

disrupting social harmony <strong>and</strong> cohesion. In this context Chambers explains that<br />

“the problem of poverty in South Asia at least is not now a problem of production,<br />

or of food availability: it is a problem of who produces the food <strong>and</strong> of who has<br />

power to obtain it” (Chambers 1988:7).<br />

11 Chambers (1988) explained the first <strong>and</strong> second objectives in detail in the<br />

context of South Asia. According to him livelihood thinking “is assessed in terms<br />

of the adequate <strong>and</strong> secured livelihoods it generates <strong>and</strong> sustains, putting<br />

antipoverty efforts, <strong>and</strong> people, before production per se”( Chambers 1988: 7).<br />

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Box 3<br />

Impacts of Development Intervention in Conflict<br />

Mohan Mainali has severely questioned the contribution <strong>and</strong> effectiveness of donor<br />

funded development intervention to address the root causes of the <strong>conflict</strong>. He<br />

writes:<br />

… What we say of the USAID implemented Rapti Zone Rural<br />

Area Dec Project, <strong>and</strong> its second incarnation, the Rapti<br />

Development Project, aimed to fulfil the basic needs of the poor<br />

majority, the farmers of the mid hills. The Programme spent<br />

about US$ 50m in “improving household food production <strong>and</strong><br />

consumption, improving income generating opportunities for<br />

poor farmers, l<strong>and</strong>less labourers, occupational castes <strong>and</strong><br />

women”. In short, the project’s overall goal was to increase the<br />

well-being of people. The Americans thought they’d need 15<br />

years to achieve their objectives. And, going by their reports,<br />

they worked ‘hard’ for those 15 years. The project started in<br />

1980 <strong>and</strong> ended in 1995, just a month <strong>and</strong> a half before the<br />

Maoists began their armed movement…. The government <strong>and</strong><br />

donors both say development packages will help eliminate the<br />

Maoists. If that were true, why was Rapti Zone so favourable for<br />

the development of Maoist movement? If that is what you get<br />

after 15 years of American funded development, we were<br />

perhaps better without it. (Mainali 2003: 125-126)<br />

6. The Denial Psyche in Nepalese Conflict:<br />

The denial psyche is a unique characteristic of Nepalese society. Nobody is ready<br />

to acknowledge their own weaknesses in addressing the current <strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

Parliamentary parties are not ready to accept their failure as one of the main causes<br />

of the <strong>conflict</strong>. The government is not ready to accept the fact did not take correct<br />

approach to address this <strong>conflict</strong>; the rebels are not ready to accept that the general<br />

public want peace <strong>and</strong> not the violence. They are all denying that all of them are<br />

equally responsible for the escalation of this <strong>conflict</strong>. Bureaucracy denies its<br />

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failure, the NGO sector denies its malpractices in the name of development. The<br />

business community denies the very fact that businessmen are among the top<br />

promoters of corruption in this country. The donor community denies their failure<br />

to support development in this country. Professionals deny their professional<br />

failure. So all major actors deny the reality <strong>and</strong> their own weakness <strong>and</strong> put the<br />

blame on others <strong>and</strong> shift the responsibilities onto others.<br />

Box 4<br />

Paradox of Conflict<br />

Paradoxically empowerment led to <strong>conflict</strong> in Nepal. A plausible explanation of<br />

the emergence of the Maoist <strong>conflict</strong> in a particular time is the growing awareness<br />

<strong>and</strong> empowerment of the Nepalese people during the initial years of multiparty<br />

democracy. People have become more aware of poverty, inequality,<br />

discrimination, corruption <strong>and</strong> lack of employment opportunities. They are<br />

empowered to raise their voices against injustice, poverty <strong>and</strong> social exclusion.<br />

Therefore, paradoxically the current crisis is not only the syndrome of system<br />

failure but also an indicator of social awareness <strong>and</strong> people’s empowerment.<br />

Multiparty democracy gave ample opportunities for different categories of people<br />

to organise, to form organisations to fight for their rights, <strong>and</strong> these helped<br />

tremendously to empower people.<br />

The individual <strong>and</strong> collective political psyche has so far preferred to ignore reality<br />

rather than to face challenges that are threatening Nepali democracy. A powerful<br />

defence mechanism, used by politicians <strong>and</strong> power centres alike, is denial. They<br />

deny the seriousness of the current situation, afraid to admit that their prevailing<br />

attitudes <strong>and</strong> practices are inappropriate <strong>and</strong> causing problems. They feel even<br />

more obstinately defensive when Nepali people confront them with evidence that<br />

their actions need to change. In Nepal denial is rooted in the individual <strong>and</strong><br />

institutional level in politics, in political parties, in government departments, <strong>and</strong><br />

in other power centres. The difficulty of overcoming this magnitude of denial by<br />

democratic reform should not be underestimated. It is necessary to replace the<br />

ideas, values, greed <strong>and</strong> orthodoxy that underlie formidable <strong>and</strong> complex obstacles<br />

with a new set of ideas <strong>and</strong> values. If this paradigm shift is accepted as inevitable,<br />

the current <strong>conflict</strong> may be a great opportunity for fundamental reform of Nepali<br />

society.<br />

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Box 5<br />

The Nepalese Crisis is a Complex Mix of Everything<br />

Acute inequalities, absolute poverty, lack of access to <strong>resource</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the failure of<br />

political structures to address these issues, have made Nepali society extremely<br />

vulnerable to <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>and</strong> mass movements like the Maoists’ ‘people’s war’.<br />

Several examples from Peru, Chile, Mozambique, India, Nicaragua, Tanzania,<br />

Senegal <strong>and</strong> Columbia show that resistance from below is obvious <strong>and</strong> predictable<br />

if the state is not responsive to basic concerns of the rural poor. Deep rooted social<br />

cleavages in terms of caste, ethnicity, gender <strong>and</strong> regional, cultural, linguistic <strong>and</strong><br />

religious forms of discrimination provided fertile ground for <strong>conflict</strong> to escalate.<br />

The Maoists successfully capitalised on the highly unsatisfactory democratic<br />

transition of 1990. The people of Nepal are deeply disillusioned by the poor<br />

performance of current political structures <strong>and</strong> processes. The dominance of<br />

certain groups in all social, political <strong>and</strong> economic sectors has bred strong feelings<br />

of injustice <strong>and</strong> revenge, as the socially marginalised people strongly believe that<br />

they have been excluded from opportunities <strong>and</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s. The Maoists have<br />

tactically exploited this resentment. The emergence of ethnic interest groups, <strong>and</strong><br />

increased awareness of social exclusion <strong>and</strong> ethnic inequalities <strong>and</strong> <strong>governance</strong><br />

failure further fuelled the <strong>conflict</strong>.<br />

7. Conclusion<br />

The raising of productivity 12 still dominates thinking in Nepal. Environmental<br />

<strong>governance</strong> is not getting the required attention in the broader national <strong>governance</strong><br />

system. Resource use <strong>and</strong> environmental services are taken for granted. The severe<br />

implications of <strong>resource</strong> scarcity <strong>and</strong> disruption of fundamental ecological<br />

processes are either not internalised or deliberately ignored in a realm of growing<br />

consumerism <strong>and</strong> the economically driven profit-making motive. Natural <strong>resource</strong>s<br />

12 Both the Ninth Five-Year Plan <strong>and</strong> the Agriculture Perspective Plan focused<br />

exclusively on economic growth of the agricultural sector through effective natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong> management.<br />

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have strong <strong>and</strong> diverse impacts on different categories of people such as l<strong>and</strong>less<br />

farmers, wage labourers, tenant farmers, women, l<strong>and</strong>lords <strong>and</strong> powerful elites.<br />

The sustainable contribution of natural <strong>resource</strong> management in reducing the<br />

vulnerability of impoverished people, sustaining ecological services from natural<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s, stabilising social mobility <strong>and</strong> improving the quality of life of the rural<br />

poor is yet to materialise. Conflict mitigation <strong>and</strong> the addressing of environmental<br />

scarcity are beyond the dominant development paradigm. Sustainable use <strong>and</strong><br />

management of natural <strong>resource</strong>s can only take place through a strong political<br />

commitment, clear vision, fair <strong>and</strong> responsive administration, protection from<br />

malpractice such as rent-seeking (Wade 1982), expansion of institutional<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing (Ostrom 1990), <strong>and</strong> the embrace of collective learning <strong>and</strong><br />

concerted action (Röling <strong>and</strong> Wagemakers 1998). These crucial elements of<br />

environmental <strong>governance</strong> are severely lacking at present. The economic<br />

transformation of the more than 49%of Nepalese people who are below the<br />

poverty line is still more wishful thinking than a reality. In contemporary Nepal<br />

ethics <strong>and</strong> responsibility (providing basic livelihoods to the burgeoning population)<br />

do not drive natural <strong>resource</strong> management objectives, but rather they are driven by<br />

the drive towards the accumulation of wealth <strong>and</strong> power.<br />

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