Kansas Supreme Court - 99536 â Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth

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a. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law on the KUTSA claim Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motions for judgment as a matter of law, both during and after trial, because there was no trial evidence KUTSA was violated by the actual theft of trade secrets. Citing Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 770 A.2d 97 (Me. 2001), defendants first specifically contend that four of the eight alleged trade secrets could not meet the KUTSA definition of a trade secret because "they were easily discoverable through reverse engineering." They next claim that even though the remaining four items could be considered trade secrets because they were allegedly stolen, there was no direct evidence that Duckworth stole from Wolfe Electric those tangible items: customer list, vendor list, CAD drawings, and bill of materials. Wolfe Electric simply responds that there was "substantial record evidence" that its trade secrets were misappropriated. We recently stated our standard of review in National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Surety, Co., 290 Kan. 247, 267, 225 P.3d 707 (2010): "Appellate courts apply the same standard as trial courts when considering a motion for directed verdict, now known as a judgment as a matter of law under K.S.A. 60-250. See Smith v. Kansas Gas Service Co., 285 Kan. 33, 40, 169 P.3d 1052 (2007). "'"'When ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. Where reasonable minds could reach different conclusions based on the evidence, the motion must be denied. A similar analysis must be applied by an appellate court when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for directed verdict.'"' [Citations omitted.]" 285 Kan. at 40. 38
"Stated another way, the inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); See, e.g., Smith, 285 Kan. at 40 ('In other words, a motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied when evidence exists upon which a jury could properly find a verdict for the nonmoving party.')." However, the case is being reversed and remanded to the trial court due to a multitude of erroneous jury instructions and other error, i.e., failure to acknowledge KUTSA's preemption of Wolfe Electric's tort claims that request recovery for damage to trade secrets. Consequently, we do not reach the appellate issues that require us to consider the quantity and quality of the evidence at the first trial. These issues include the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law that essentially assert reasonable minds could not reach different conclusions based on the trial evidence. See Smith v. Kansas Gas Service Co., 285 Kan. 33, 40, 169 P.3d 1052 (2007). We do not reach them because the evidence may be different at a new trial, i.e., whether Duckworth stole the four items from Wolfe Electric that defendants agree "could" be considered trade secrets and whether all items alleged as trade secrets at a new trial could be reverse engineered. See Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 116 Nev. 598, 606, 5 P.3d 1043 (2000) ("Whether a conversion has occurred is generally a question of fact for the jury."); Chisler v. Byers, 124 Kan. 200, 205, 257 P. 929 (1927) ("Whether or not there had been a conversion . . . was a question of fact to be determined by the jury under proper instructions."); Harvey Barnett v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Trade-secret status is a question of fact."). Moreover, Bernier, 770 A.2d 97, fails to support defendants' argument that reasonable minds could not reach different conclusions based on the trial evidence. That case did not involve a motion for judgment as a matter of law or its equivalent. Rather, the judge acted as the finder of fact in the bench trial, determining on mixed evidence there was 39
Page 1 and 2: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O
Page 3 and 4: 9. As a general rule, issues not ra
Page 5 and 6: —which otherwise would perhaps al
Page 7 and 8: The circumstances surrounding Duckw
Page 9 and 10: Duckworth counterclaimed against Wo
Page 11 and 12: While nothing in the record on appe
Page 13 and 14: together and read as a whole, and w
Page 15 and 16: secrets, not of any confidential in
Page 17 and 18: "Plaintiff may recover damages from
Page 19 and 20: Duckworth additionally argues that
Page 21 and 22: the period prohibited by the restri
Page 23 and 24: Like with the KUTSA instructional e
Page 25 and 26: fairly compensate plaintiff for dam
Page 27 and 28: the XLT [Wolfe Electric's oven], se
Page 29 and 30: We conclude that even when construi
Page 31 and 32: allocation were made for lost profi
Page 33 and 34: Despite Wolfe Electric's concession
Page 35 and 36: "2) using or attempting to use Wolf
Page 37: opportunity to fully brief and argu
Page 41 and 42: that they actually stole any trade
Page 43 and 44: "So now that we have those [specifi
Page 45 and 46: testimony of an expert witness of W
Page 47 and 48: Similarly, the trial court's posttr

Kansas Supreme Court - 99536 â Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth

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Kansas Supreme Court - 99536 â Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth