Discourse Structure and the Structure of Context - Multiple Choices

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utterance as one of their parts. One of the reasons for this is that it
enables us to make formal sense of such intensional notions such as the
proposition expressed by a given utterance or the property denoted by
a predicate expression, etc (See Van Genabith et al.)
Neither KDis nor KUtt contain the often large amounts of information
that are available at the beginning of a discourse. This information
derives on the one hand from the usually extensive parallel experiences
of the discourse participants and on the other (in cases of face-to-face
communciation) from their shared current access to elements of the
environment in which the communication takes place.
Information of the first provenance can be usefully subdivided into two
kinds according to content and form. This division corresponds
roughly to the distinction between A-box and T-box in certain
approaches to knowledge representation within Artificial Intelligence
[references!)]. The T-box is assumed to contain generalisations and
laws, while the A-box functions as repository of knowledge concerning
particular objects, events or situations. I will refer to the corresponding
components of the context as KGen and KEnc, respectively. Here "Gen"
stands for "general knowledge" and "Enc" for ''encyclopaedic
knowledge".
The fifth context component I will distinguish is called KEnv. This
component represents information derived from the immediate
environment. The distinction between this component and KUtt may
seem surprising, especially to someone familiar with Kaplan's
''Demonstratives'', in which the term ''demonstrative” is applied both to
indeixical words like I or now and to demonstrative and to
demonstrative phrases in the more narrowly conceived sense current
within linguistics, according to which the singular demonstratives of
English are noun phrases beginning with this orthat , either occurring
just on their own or else followed by some common noun phrase N'. In
spite of the semantic and pragmatic similarities between indexicals and
demonstratives which Kaplan was right to stress, there are important
differences as well. In part these differenes are related to the different
ways in which the referents of indexicals and demonstratives are
accessible and represented.
It is with these latter differences in view that I have decided to assign
these representations to distinct context components. I hasten to add,