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chapter 2 stance adverbs qualifying a standpoint - LOT publications

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58<br />

CHAPTER 2<br />

A: Clearly, Paul lost the election.<br />

B: ?You are not right / That is not true, I think this is not so clear.<br />

A: Perhaps, Paul lost the election.<br />

B: ?You are not right / That is not true, I think this is not so<br />

probable.<br />

In the above constructed dialogues, B‟s expression of disagreement cannot be<br />

taken to concern the epistemic adverb alone. In the case of clearly, B‟s reaction<br />

is understood as concerning the proposition „John lost the election‟. It could<br />

stand as a reaction expressing disagreement even if clearly were missing from A‟s<br />

utterance. The same observations apply in the case of perhaps. Furthermore, in<br />

utterances with an epistemic/modal adverb the hearer cannot concede to the<br />

truth of the embedded proposition and at the same time disagree with the<br />

choice of the adverb, as the following examples show:<br />

A: Clearly, John lost the elections.<br />

B: *That is true [= that John lost the elections] but it is not clear.<br />

A: Probably, John lost the elections.<br />

B: *That is true [= that John lost the elections] but it is not probable.<br />

It is this latter feature that presumably makes scholars like Jayez and Rossari<br />

(2004) argue that the hearer‟s assenting or dissenting reaction includes the<br />

modal adverb. But even with this interpretation, the examples above would still<br />

be unacceptable since language user B would appear contradicting himself as<br />

the following examples illustrate:<br />

A: Clearly, John lost the elections.<br />

B: *That is true [= that it is clear that John lost the elections] but it is<br />

not clear.<br />

A: Probably, John lost the elections.<br />

B: *That is true [= that is it probable that John lost the elections] but<br />

it is not probable.<br />

The above utterances may be used, as Jayez and Rossari make use of them, in<br />

order to illustrate in semantic terms that modal <strong>adverbs</strong> are part of the truthevaluable<br />

propositional content of the utterance and to contrast them to<br />

evaluative <strong>adverbs</strong>. 40 However, in pragmatic terms the implications of the<br />

assent or dissent of the hearer cannot be interpreted as endorsing /challenging the modal,<br />

contrary to Jayez and Rossari‟s interpretation.<br />

40 Contrary to Jayez and Rossari (2004), Papafragou (2006, p. 1697) concludes that the<br />

assent/dissent test “does not constitute evidence for the truth-conditional nature of (subjective)<br />

epistemic modality”. A similar observation is made by Nuyts (1993). Interestingly, Papafragou,

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