CounterinsurgenCy in helmand - Institute for the Study of War

afghanistan report 8 | COUNTERINSURGENCY in helmand | j. dressler | January 2011
insurgency in southern and central Helmand
will have a significant impact on the efficacy of
their continually weakening operations against
Marines, Afghan security forces, and Afghan
government officials.
Operation Moshtarak: Dismantling the Enemy’s Sanctuary
in Central Helmand
In the months following the July 2009 Operation
Strike of the Sword in the central and southern
Helmand River, the insurgency increasingly
consolidated in the town of Marjah in southern
Nad Ali district just miles west of the provincial
capital of Lashkar Gah. Marjah had been the
Taliban’s stronghold for years. Marines could not
even fly over the town for fear of being targeted
by Taliban anti-aircraft munitions. 53 The assault
on Marjah, the main objective of Operation
Moshtarak, commenced just hours before dawn
on February 13, 2010. More than sixty helicopters
inserted thousands of US and Afghan combat
troops into the town and surrounding farmland. 54
Contemporaneous with the Marines air assault
into Marjah, UK forces to the northern end of
the district in Nad Ali district mounted a similarly
large-scale operation to clear Taliban support and
attack zones to the east of the municipal center. 55
In tandem, these mutually reinforcing operations
were largely effective in denying insurgents
ground to operate and preventing an immediate
counteroffensive. For a more detailed description
of the planning and conduct of the operation,
see “Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding
Marjah,” a backgrounder published by the
Institute for the Study of War earlier this year.
Marjah was not only a safe haven for the
insurgency, it was an operational support zone for
insurgent attacks in Nad Ali to the north, Lashkar
Gah, and Nawa to the east. It was also the center
of the narcotics trade in Helmand, generating
millions of dollars in revenue for the Taliban
and narcotics traffickers every year. 56 Within
months of the formation of the Nawa Community
Council in October 2009, Taliban fighters from
Marjah assassinated three members, including
the chairman. 57 It took months before the
remaining members felt safe enough to once again
www.Understandingwar.org
MAP 6 | NAD ALI, LASHKAR GAH, NAWA & MARJAH
represent their community. 58 Marjah’s central
location and proximity to key population centers
in central Helmand was the primary reason why
US Marines, UK and Afghan forces launched
Operation Moshtarak in February 2010. 59
The two Marine battalions who spearheaded
Operation Moshtarak were the first of the
“surge” forces to arrive in Afghanistan since
the President’s announcement in December
2009. The Marines first seized the town’s two
main bazaars and consolidated their positions
to begin slow, detailed clearing operations in
the surrounding villages. 60 Through the spring
and early summer of 2010, Taliban fighters were
able to re-infiltrate the district, mostly at night,
to conduct a targeted intimidation campaign
designed to deter Afghans from cooperating
with ISAF or government personnel. 61 Despite
the increase in coalition forces, the permanent
presence of two Marine battalions in Marjah,
and assistance from the ANSF, the difficult
terrain, innumerable IEDs, and sporadic enemy
resistance complicated the clearing operations.
There were firefights almost daily and insurgents
could operate in the area during the nighttime
hours with relative ease. 62 The enemy continued
to intimidate residents through a campaign of
night letters and targeted killings which were
effective in preventing their cooperation with
17