10.05.2014 Views

P:\CLEPUB\Books\Disciplinary Board Reporter ... - Oregon State Bar

P:\CLEPUB\Books\Disciplinary Board Reporter ... - Oregon State Bar

P:\CLEPUB\Books\Disciplinary Board Reporter ... - Oregon State Bar

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Cite as In re Goyak, 19 DB Rptr 179 (2005)<br />

he was writing nonsufficient fund checks to others on a regular basis. While the <strong>Bar</strong><br />

did not charge the Accused for this additional misconduct, the trial panel views it as<br />

an aggravating factor for purposes of determining a sanction. 3<br />

The Accused’s violation of DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(C) was negligent. He<br />

should have known that he was not permitted to deposit his own funds into his client<br />

trust account or to use it for his personal business. The Accused claims that he did<br />

not know this, but does not deny that he should have. He also admits that his<br />

banking practices with respect to his trust account were negligent and that he did not<br />

maintain the records required of him.<br />

D. Extent of Actual or Potential Injury<br />

The Standards define “injury” as harm to the client, the public, the legal<br />

system, or the profession that results from the lawyer’s conduct. “Potential injury”<br />

is harm to the client, the public, the legal system, or the profession that is reasonably<br />

foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s conduct and which, but for some intervening<br />

factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer’s misconduct.<br />

Standards, at 7. An injury does not need to be actual, but only potential, to support<br />

the imposition of sanctions. In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 840 P2d 1280 (1992).<br />

The Accused caused actual injury to the <strong>Bar</strong> in failing to cooperate with its<br />

investigation. In re Bourcier, 325 Or 429, 424, 939 P2d 604 (1997). The City of<br />

Portland suffered actual injury from the Accused’s conduct in that its receipt of funds<br />

legitimately owed by the Accused was delayed for up to two years, and it was<br />

required to expend time and resources in attempts to collect those funds.<br />

E. Preliminary Sanction<br />

Standards § 7.2 suggests that suspension is generally appropriate when a<br />

lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the<br />

profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal<br />

system.<br />

Standards § 5.12 suggests that suspension is generally appropriate when a<br />

lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain elements listed<br />

3<br />

According to Defendant’s Exhibit 14, during the period April 1, 1998, to April 30,<br />

1998, he was charged twice for returned checks; during the period October 31, 1998, to<br />

November 30, 1998, he was charged six times for returned checks; during the period<br />

December 1, 1998, to December 31, 1998, he was charged eleven times for returned checks;<br />

during the period January 1, 1999, to January 29, 1999, he was charged seven times for<br />

returned checks; during the period May 29, 1999, to June 30, 1999, he was charged twice<br />

for returned checks; during the period July 1, 1999, to July 30, 1999, he was charged once<br />

for a returned check. All of the foregoing checks were drawn on the Accused’s business<br />

account. During the period May 22, 1998, to June 19, 1998, he was charged four times for<br />

returned checks on his personal account.<br />

189

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!