SPINOZA'S VIRTUOUS PASSIONS

772 MATTHEW J. KISNER
This solution can be generalized to the case of bodies as well. As
in the mental case, being affected by bodies can involve our own activity
as well. Even when we are passively affected by external bodies
the changes in our bodies are brought about partially through the
power of our own bodies. Remember the example of the sandcastle:
one cannot mold the sandcastle without assistance from the power of
the sand to maintain its shape. The same is true for the case of the antivenom:
the antivenom is only effective because of my bodily mechanisms
by which I process and circulate the antivenom to all of my tissues.
If the ranger had come too late, I would not have the power to
assist him in this way. Indeed, if I were purely passive and relied entirely
on the power of the antivenom, the ranger’s efforts would be no
more effective than pumping antivenom into a corpse. Furthermore,
to the extent that the effect is brought about through my power, the
effect better expresses my conatus and is to my benefit. It is not hard
to imagine that my contribution to the effect involves sufficient activity
that I actually become more active by being passively affected by
the antivenom.
One might object that this solution has not really shown that the
passions can be advantageous after all: according to the solution, passive
pleasure only increases our power to the extent that the affect is
active; the general idea is that the adequacy and activity of the idea
overpowers its passivity and inadequacy. Consequently, the objection
goes, we cannot really conclude that one’s passivity increases one’s
power; rather, the increase comes from one’s activity. 35 The objection
is correct in one sense: at the mental level, an inadequate idea is
passive to the extent that it does not represent some aspect of a true
idea. Clearly it does not make sense to say that our activity and
power is increased by not representing something. However, there is
a sense in which passivity itself increases one’s power: being passive
35
This is Hoffman’s reason for thinking that passive pleasure ultimately
cannot be explained in Spinoza’s system. “While it [Hoffman’s best proposed
solution] may succeed in explaining how increasing the ways in which we
can be affected by external objects increases our power of acting, and so
succeeds in explaining how being affected by something external can be
pleasurable, it does not succeed in making room for passive joy. Insofar as
we are affected by something external that increases our power of acting, we
are active, not passive.” “Three Dualist Theories of the Passions,” 179.