Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned? - School of Political ...

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED?
Shannon Tow
addressed. In order to provide the
degree of integration that a more
successful PSO entails, a supranational
response is required from an
intergovernmental coalition.
For these reasons, some analysts have
suggested creating a UN standing
army (United Nations General
Assembly 1996). Yet issues of political
will coupled with some member states’
continued refusal to pay their UN debt,
decrease the likelihood that any such
force could be formed. One alternative
might be conducting a number of joint
peacekeeping training exercises under
UN and regional auspices. Such
measures would facilitate greater
interoperability and common views on
what tasks peacekeeping should
actually entail. Initiatives that promote
practical collaboration between the
military and national NGOs might also
provide for a more integrated future
peacekeeping force. PSOs can make a
difference only if such measures that
seriously address these issues of
political will are pursued.
1
The term ‘consent’, in the peacekeeping context, implies the approval of the relevant local
political authorities to peacekeeping activities.
2 The term ‘peacekeeping actors’ is used in reference to both the military peacekeeping force
itself, humanitarian agencies and troop contributing countries in a multinational force. The
importance of the conflicting parties political will in realising a sustainable peace is also an
important factor that affects the operational efficacy of PSOs. Due to reasons of space,
however, this paper assumes this variable to be constant.
3 The United Nations Protection Force was the principle peacekeeping force that operated in
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995.
4 Intervention Force East Timor was conducted from 1999 to 2001, in the aftermath of the
East Timor referendum for independence and ensuing militia violence.
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