1942 FREYBERG Nz-Div-in-Cyreniaca - Societa italiana di storia ...

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Tke New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica
and
Lessons of the Campaign
b~structors leaing 4i; D~
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Narrative and Less 1ns
PART I I.
Naps and Diagrams
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UNCLASSIFIED
Tke New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica
and
lessons of tie :Campaign
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PART I.
Narrative and Lessons
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FOREWORD
The following short account covering the operations of the New Zealand
Division in the Second Libyan Offensive has been written with the intention
of giving a general picture of the battle. In such a report it is not possible
to record fully the part played by single units in the battles, nor is it possible
to give an accurate account of the gallantry of the troops who fought alongside
us. !Both the Report and maps have been checked as carefully as the
information at present-available permits, but it will be appreciated that at
this early date, when complete records are not to hand, mistakes as to facts
may le found, especially with regard to other formations.
I wish all Commanding Officers to study this phase of the Campaign
in Cyrenaica in which the New Zealand Division took part, and explain it to
their officers, N.C.Os. and men. I want all unit and sub-unit commanders
to pay special attention to the Lessons given at the end of this account
during the collective training about to begin.
HMeadquarters,
New Zealand Division,
In the Field.
4th January, 1942.
B. C. Freyberg,
Maj or-General,
G.O.C., 2nd N.Z.E.F.
UNICLASSIFI

The New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica
and Lessons of tke Campaign
INTRODUCTION
The New Zealand Division has now been withdrawn after taking part
in the campaign in Cyrenaica. Fighting took place over a wide area, but
the main operations in which we were engaged were the battles fought near
Tobruk. In those battles a smaller mixed Imperial Force met a well-equipped
German force in a series of open warfare engagements which can be studied
by us with advantage. The run of the battle demonstrated not only the
German strength and weakness but also our own.
in
The camipaign illustrates the German conception of an active defence
Which the counter-attack was.employed -upon every possible occasion,
showing a 1oldness we would (10 well to study, both from the.larger.aspect
of (lefence as well as from the point of view of the tactical employment of
various arms. We saw the.latest: German tactics in attack and the German
methods of using the tank. : It will be noted that throughout the whole
campaign there was little 'variation in their general technique.
The outstanding lessons for us in this campaign will be found at, the
end of this Report. In the day to day narrative attention is drawn to the way
the German commanders used their tanks. There is no doubt that it has
become their batsic weapon.- The enemy tactics are different.from ours and
it is quite clear we have much.to learn. No doubt the relative merits of
our Armoured Division and the Geriman Panzer Division and the performances
of our own tanks and guns compared with- those of the enemy will
be considered in light of experience in Libya. Those questions cannot be
lealt with here. j.ut the need of an armoured component to support. an
infantry: division is. established. It is interestisi3g to record the view of a
German pajooprisoner of war belonging to a lorried infantry. regiment who
criticised General Rommel very bitterly for temporarily separating the tank
regiments from the infantry.
There is no doubt that the German comnmandei s have had a great
dleal more experience in actual fighting than' we have. Their high Conmand
are resourceful and, in some cases, ruthless in committing troops to a
forlorn hope. Although At the commencement their action was offensive
and they were ready to move and strike with boldness, it. is equally true
Sthat when opposed and fought with determination they showed' a'
"tendency to panic, especially if'they were left without the immediate support
of tanks. The report we. had of, General Boetteher's calls for help when the
Afrika Division was left in the Tobruk sector, without. armoured support
during General Rommel's turning movement is an example of this.
It is .fair to say, that as the Campaign progressed the" morale of the
German infantry fell. It is certain that it is not proof against heavy. pressure.
and it has again been ;denionstrated that although -the.: .German is a hard
fighter he is. not a tough one. The German Army, however, is always'
formidable. Its army organisation and equipment are good and the fighting
soldier, even though his -morale may deteriorate, will do.what he is told. IJ
do not, know if the troops we met, the 13th and. 21st :Panzer .Divisions and
the Afrika Korps. are fair samples of the German Field Army. If they are,
then I. am sure that although success with their tank tactics has made them
most proficient in mechanised warfare, it'has hada very'; adverse effect
upon the training and efficiency of their army.as a whole. Their infantry'
appeartoh a ve deera.teditotank-fllwLezs T. I ji nk the German in antry
so mer~i has lost his old skill with his personal weas, and te he enem
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UNLASsIFIIp
Those of us who are old enough to remember fighting upon the Sommc
know that the German infantry deteriorated from the moment they got the
((Deep Dugout Habit.) .jOnce we. perfected the creeping barrage and rushed
the dugout entrances, the Germans surrendered without further resistance.
The dugout habit played a large part in the disintegration of the German
infantry soldier I believe a similar condition exists today. They depend
entirely on the tank.. Knock out the tank and we have gone a long way to
achieving success. All efforts now'should be exerted to get tank superiority.
The test for tIp sis whether the can take it and fight back. For
the first time in this war the odds were about even and we had a chance to
(fight back.)) We know now that we can both (( take it and (( fight back.))
Nobody, I hope, doubted it. This is the acid test of war and it is a test the
Germans have yet to pass through. An interesting phase has been reached
in the war for history appears to be repeating itself. The last war was an
artillery war. Then, as now, -the Germans had a long start, and during the
earlier years they hammered us unmercifully. Later on, when we had the
guns and ammunition, the Germans became the receivers and they sought
cover underground like rabbits. They could not (( take it.)) This time it is
a tank war in which again they have had a big lead in the equipment race.
But the timeis coming when the tide will turn. When it does, the Germans
will have: to show they can ((take it.)) The experience of this Campaign
makes me feel certain they can't.
PREPARATIONS
Fully conscious of the fact that the Division had been associated with
reverses in Greece and Crete, we set out early in September to take part in our
third campaign. By the 13th, the New Zealand Division, fully ecluipped and
completely mobile, had concentrated at Bagush to train for a role in the
Second Libyan Offensive. There were six weeks in which to train for the
specialised type of fighting that has developed in desert warfare. We trained
for the most difficult operation in which we were likely to take part. An
attack on a heavily defended fortress covered by wire and mines seemed to
present the greatest difficulties. Two dummy fortresses, ( Sidi Clif and
Bir Stella,) based on air photographs of Sidi and Libyan Omars were
prepared, wired, and covered by live minefields. A series of exercises was
then carried out to capture them. Each Infantry Brigade, supported by the
full Divisional Artillery and a ( mock up battalion of In Tanks, did the
attack.
An approach march of about 30 miles was carried out without any
vehicle lights by night. The element of surprise was always sought. The
attacking force deployed by dark and attacked as soon as possible after the
artillery had registered at first light. 'Infantry in buses supported by tanks
advanced under cover of a barrage of high explosive and smoke. A point of
entry was secured, sappers clearing a lane through the minefields with mine
detectors; tanks exploited it'and infantry, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft
artillery followed rapidly to consolidate and prepare for the counter-attack.
While we were busy with our training plans and running in our new
equipment, detailed preparations for the operations were being dealt with by
Corps and Army Headquarters. By the 6th October plans were made. The
Army Commander held a conference and gave Divisional Commanders
details of the outline plan. Briefly, Eighth Army were to take Cyrenaica.
the immediate object being the destruction of the enemy's armoured forces
by our own armoured forces. We.were estimated to have a numerical
superiority -in tanks of five to four. The plan was that our Armoured
Division should threaten the enemy investing Tobruk and force them to fight
a decisive_ battle :on terms that favoured us. Plans for the relief of Tobruk
depended on success in the armoured encounter. The Eighth Army was
divided into three groups, 30th Corps, 13th Corps, and the Oasis Group. 30th
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Corps consisted of 7th Armoured Division, 22nd Armoured Brigade,
22nd Guards Brigade, 1st South African Division (less one brigade), three
regiments of artillery and one anti-tank regiment. Its role. was to defeat
,the German armoured forces as already mentioned and relieve Tobruk.
13th Corps, which comprised 4th Indian Division, New Zealand Division,
1st Army Tank Brigade, one extra field regiment, and one anti-tank
regiment, was to advance North and isolate the enemy's forward fortress line
and later mop it up from the West. 13th Corps was not to be committed,
however, until the armoured forces came level with it on an East to West axis.
22nd Armoured Brigade, detached -from the Armoured Division, had a dual
role, viz., to protect the left flank of 13th Corps from armoured attack and ,
also to intervene if there was a general tank battle. The Oasis Group was a
composite column which , was to deceive the enemy by moving from
Giarabub on D-1.
The Royal Air Force plan for the period up to the beginning of the
offensive was to restrict enemy reconnaissance, and to interfere with the
enemy supply system on land and sea. After the battle started, they
employed strong fighter sweeps to protect advancing columns and escort.
our bombers in their role of bombing the enemysupply system and
communications as well as participating directly in support of the land
forces.
By the beginning of November, our preparations were as complete as
we could make them. As many officers as possible had been forward to'see
the country.we were to move and fight across, and a large-scale model of
Cyrenaica from the wire to Tobruk had been made full use of to give all
officers as vivid a picture as possible of the country.in which we were likely
to operate. Detailed Intelligence Reports had been circulated. Air Support
Control exercises had been carried out. The very difficult problems of supply
had been carefully provided for. Nothing appeared to have been left to
chance in the preparations for the Second Battle of Cyrenaica.
It was considered certain that General Rommel would fight for
Tobruk but there was considerable doubt as to where he would fight.
There were two courses open to the enenmy. They might withdraw
from the fortress line Bardia-Halfaya-Sidi Omar to a strong position based on
El Adem covering Tobruk or they might elect to hold the fortress line on the,
preparation of which they had lavished, so. much care, concentrating their
armoured forces behind for a counter-attack. General Rommel was not, of
course, -an unknown quantity. Every, bit of information about his record.
had been studied and we were quite ready for a war of rapid movment and
bold tactics. Summing up the situation on the 10th November there was still
little evidence of any intention to withdraw from the frontier.
On the 9th November orders were received from Corps and New
Zealand Division, Operation Instruction No. 2 was issued. Briefly, our role
was to move across the frontier South of the Omars, which were to be masked
by 4th Indian Division, and advance North to .cut off the fortress line from
the West.
DI was fixed as 18th November-. Tasks were.set out in the Operation
Instruction for our Brigade Groups on the following days, but as far as New
Zealand Division was concerned they were described as ((anticipatory)) only.
Divisional' Cavalry was to cover our move North.
5th Brigade Group was to advance to the Trigh Capuzo and sever that
line of communication with the West, at the same time sending a patrol to.-
cut thie Bardia-Capuzzo water pipe line.
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4th Brigade Group was to advance on to the esca pmnent West of
Bardia, block movement on the main Bardia-Tobruk Road and contain any
enemy forces in the coastal area some miles further West by blocking tracks
to the South across the steep escarpment.
6th Brigade Group was in reserve to be ready to move to Gambut and
later to come under command 30th Corps should they be needed to assist in
the Tobruk Battle.
DIVISION MOVES
(MAP 1a)
The move of the Division to its assembly area at Bir Kanavis
commenced on Armistice Day and was carried out as an exercise.' No mention
was yet made of an attack. I do not think that this deceived anybody. Each
Brigade Group column, at 16 vehicles to the mile, was about 100 miles long
and took, at 15 ni.h., about seven hours to pass a given point. On the 14th,
in the assembly area, we let everybody know the plan. I held a conference of
officers down to company commanders and gave them a talk on the campaign
just opening and the role we would probably have to fill.
The Division rested on the 14th and on the 15th moved forward in daylight
about 45 miles. The entire Division moved in desert formation, with
200 yards between vehicles. It was a clear, windless day. Dust was slight
and this enormous mass of transport, tanks, guns, and carriers, covering the
whole panorama of the desert plain, was a most impressive spectacle. Speed
was kept to 7 m.i.h. as the going was mostly stony or humpy scrub country
and our tvre situation was. causing concern.
On the 16th the latest Intelligence Reports were received, including the
tank, air, and anti-tank gun strengths of the enemy. The total nn.iber of
enemy tanks in 15th and 21st Armoured Divisions was estimated at approximately
250, plus a doubtful number of reconditioned ((I)> r ank. There was
also Ariete Division with about 130 tanks. The presence of between 80,aind 100
50-millimetre anti-tank guns was confirmed. A captured gun had been tested
and its performance was impressive-the armour of British cruiser and
American-tanks could be pierced at 400 yards and the once invulne'rable
plate of the I Tank was reported to be penetrable at 60 yards. Reports of
our air support were reserved but there was no doublt that enemy air activity
was not comparable to ours. Finally, it was clear from repor'ts that General
Rommel's forces were deployed forward.
INTO LIBYA .
We remained halted on the 16th and on each of the follow in( three
nights advanced distances between 25 and 30 miles without vehicle lights. On
the third night, l8th/l19th November, we moved through the frontier wire
and went into a defensive position 8 miles'South of Libyan Shieferzen, where
we were to await the result of the armoured battle. There was still no
sign of the enemy air force but we had the satisfaction of watching our own
fighter sweeps and bomber squadrons passing backwards and forwards.
From what we have since learnt it is clear that German Intelligence
was strangely lacking and it is doubtful if they had any idea at this stage
that the offensive had begun. It is now known that General Romnmel was
away in Athens or Rome celebrating his fiftieth birthday when the battle
started. On the other hand our own Intelligence of enemy dispositions and
movements was proving accurate and extremely useful.
On the morning of the 18th we had received a report that the
Armoured Division had commenced their advance. North at 0600 hours. We
visuazlised the azdvnce of the Ahroured ~rigdes behind the light armoured
squadrons of the K.D.Gs., 1th H., and the South Africans w-ith their 200

ppp
Marmon Harringtons, on their way to the Trigh El Abd as a first bound
and Trigh Capuzzo as a second. On the success of this sweep depended the
next step in the campaign.
The Corps Comd. will consider sending New Zealand Division or
the leading Irigade up to the general line of the Trigh El Abd when
he hears 7th Indian Infantry Brigade have taken Bu Deheua.,
On the morning of the 19th the following message came from
Corps:'-
In
QCorps,-
the early afternoon we received the following message from
4th Indian Division occupied Bu Deheua without opposition. Corps
Commander would like New Zealand Division to move to the general
line of Trigh El Abd leading elements not to cross that line without
further orders from Corps. To move as soon as possible this afternoon.
No particular position lut move on general line of advance.))
Orders were given to move at 1500 hours on to the line of the Trigh El
Alb,:d. u distarnce of 14 miles, passing just out of- range of the guns at Sidi
Qniar. The -move of the whole -Division at short notice revealed the difficulties
of getting into motion in desert formation. As a result of delays we
reached our dlestination in the dark and were not in a good defensive
position on the first occasion we had been in close proximity to enemy
tanks.
Corps ha d indicated that we would move on the 20th (D3) and
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MNrC LzIStIE9~A
battle were many and varied anl the real situation was by no Ieans clear.
The following extract from our own Intelligence SwulnPiVV dated 1000 hours,
21st November, gives the picture we had:-
" Our arnioured forces on 20th November extedlel our left flank to
the outskirts of the enemy positions around Tobruk by a raid of.7th
Armoured Division to Sidi Rezegh.
)
Early on the morning of the 21st we received orders to move to Sidi
Azeiz as the first step in the original plan. Verbal orders to be confirmiie(
in writing were given by telephone. At 1030 hours the code word
ADVANCE TO CUT OFF FORTRESS LINE
(MAPS I1'and IV)
Divisional Headquarters and 4th Infantry Brigade moved ai t 1:300
hours on the 21st, following 5th Brigade, 6th Brigade bringing up the rear. -
Our advance went according to plan. Divisional Cavalry pushed forwa i r(1-
from bound to bound, reporting (

the Bardia-Tobruk Road and brought their field regiment into action on the
escarpment against wonderful targets. They cut all telegraph wires and
gathered up a large number of vehicles and many prisoners. The move
effected another complete surprise and was carried out with very light
casualties. The value of these moves was very great as they drove a wedge
between the forward elements and greatly handicapped General Rommel in
his plans. How great a nuisance it was can be estimated by the number of
times our positions were counter-attacked.
6th BRIGADE GROUP MOVES WEST
(MAP V)
Meanwhile the expected order that 6th Brigade was to move Westwards
and pass to command 30th Corps was received in the evening. 6th
Brigade Group accordingly moved 10 miles to the West of Sidi Azeiz on the
Trigh Capuzzo ready to move on Gambut. The Brigade Group was complete
in every way as a mobile striking force. Full administrative arrangements
had been made at Bagush for supply and maintenance of the Group as a
separate formation. They had a complete field ambulance and a separate
supply column. In addition to a field regiment, anti-tank artillery, and antiaircraft
artillery, a squadron of Valentine « I Tanks (42nd R.T.R.) was
sent to join them. In their move they encountered very muddy going but
no opposition. They captured. a bewildered German Light Aid Detachment
en route which had no knowledge of our presence.
By dawn, 22nd November, we had accomplished our first mission
and, due to the rapid surprise night moves, it had been carried out with
great ease.
Both the 4th and 5th Brigades were ordered to test the defences of
Bardia with patrols. They patrolled to within 200 yards of the Bardia
defences where enemy outposts were observed at intervals of two chains.
The defences appeared to be strongly held and artillery was very active.
21st Battalion prepared to attack Bir Ghirba in support of 4th Indian
Division. Patrols found it strongly held.
The Divisional Cavalry had been moved West at daylight to hold the
approaches over the escarpment from the North about 13 miles to the
West of 4th Brigade. Their presence was resented by the Germans and
they were attacked from the North. It was decided that one battalion of
4th Brigade and tanks should move to support the Cavalry.
At 1025 hours 20th Battalion was counter-attacked by enemy motorised
infantry supported by armoured cars, tanks, and artillery from the North-
West. The attack was dispersed and the enemy force pinned to the
ground by fire. Until this opposition was cleared up it was impossible to
go on and attack Bardia. Early in the afternoon, two companies of 20th
Battalion, a squadron of «

( The 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade passed through the 5th
Brigade at Sidi Azeiz and arrived. at the top of. the escarpment in
the early hours of the morning. There they caught the Germans
in their, tented canip. I -feel that although a great number of the
forward -elements have got away fron the' Iardia-Tobr'ulk Road.-
there are still technical *troops, a considerable amotnt of motor
transport, and. possibly part of the lorried infantry regiment in the
area North of IeIenastir and possibly Mersa'Lucch.
Strong battle patrols have been sent in-to -the-East and South of
Bardia defences and these have. disclosed, the fact that I3ardia .
appears to be strongly ,held in 'so far as artillery is concerned. The
patrols were eavily engaged by enemy field -artillery, many grans
being active. Enemy infantry posts were. reportel along the wire
every two chains. There were no patrols forard of the wire. I
should say that Bardia defences are garrisoned;.andl firmly held. II
cannot at this- stage. say what the situation, is on the Halfava-Sidi
Omar front. The. 5th. ,Brigade report' -a good deal of activity on
their front. I should be in a better position later in the day to say
to what extent I consider the, area Sidi Omiar-Halfava is held.
I feel certain that the situation.with regard to Halfava- and .I3rdlia
is well known to you. I should, .however, like to point out the weaklc
ammunition situation and the great shortage of bomb11)ardient and
barrage guns avilable. I feel we. should start 'on -a :definite policy
of dumping ammunition as soon 'as any offensive operations are
contemplated.
H.Q., N.Z. Division,
22nd Nov., 1941. 1415 hrs.
At this stage things began to develop quickly. At 1400 lours I
received a telegram from :Corps as follows:---.
. Leave "minimuml trops to observe enemy.iardia and send rcllaindec r
your troops to clear up North Bardia-Tobruk Road.))
The result of this of-der would be further to split up the-)ivision. Tent a-
tive arrangements were made but the Liaison Officer to Corps was instructed
to explain.that it would mean that we should be very weak in the Bard i'a
area where a counter-attack was possileC. This was confirmed b). the
following telegram to Corps:-
The 6th Infantry Brigade have now passed to 30th Corps. lPreswii
you. do not wish to take all troops other than. those guarding
Bardia. Propose to leave milininuil guarding Western exits front
Bardia:and send two battalions and two squadrons of (( I ))Tanks
and Divisional Cavalry to clear up area around GanIbut andl North
Bardia-Tobruk Road West to 46 gril line. Will you say if this
meets Corps order. Enemy troops on present Divisional 'front 'are
active. Do nt recommend 'x eakening tile block..South of 'Bardia at.
present. Reply "ini mcdi ate.
DISQUIETING
(MAP VI)
REPORTS
Later in 'the afternoon we : got our first real news concerning the
armoured battle in the.West. Liaison Officers fromt 30 Corps and from
General Gott-arrived with the' news that all , was not well. They rep~orted1
that the Support "Group and.. General Gott himself were surrounded at Sidi
Rezegh. Further, they camle with the urgent request tha.t the nsmve of 6th
Brigade to relieye the Suport Group should be acceleratei. As aL resullt of
these representations I sent a cipher mnessage by W/T and also byp iaison
1i-c 8

Officers to Commander 6th Brigade who was by this time on the way, telling
h1im1 to press on to Sidi Rezegh, start fighting, and get in touch with
Gaeneral Gott. Although I had an instinctive feeling all was not well I did
no)t know, the true facts. I was not aware of the 6th Brigade situation at
this time 1)ut I-have since learnt that during their move along the Trigh
( t apuzzo on the 22nd the Brigade Commander was asked to detach his
tanks to go to the immediate assistance of the Support Group at Sidi Rezegh.
In view of the urgency of the request the Brigade Commander agreed but
the- Group was already marching at 8 m.i.h. and the Tank Commander said'
le -couli not better this speed. My cipher message and further requests by
iasison Officers tade it quite clear to Commander 6th Brigade that speed:
\as vital. Opposition at Gasr El Arid was disposed of and the column did
not halt until 2000 hours for a much- needed rest and'meal. Orders were
givc to advance .again at 0300 hours next morning.
WE
OVE ON TOBRUiK
(MAP Vi)
l)epite the optimistic reports regarding the destruction of enemy
tanks I felt uneasy about splitting up my force more than I could help. I
\V I S convinced that the Division should press on to Tobruk. A success there
\-()111(l be (lecisive. The wedge in the Bardia-Halfaya-Sidi Omar fortress line
in iiiVy opinion had also to be held. The speed and suddenness of our
o11slaughlt had disorganised the enemy. That. was obvious. If, however, he
xeis given time he wold recover and concentrate. He would then be able
to attack our. widely spread Groups, defeating them in detail. Time was of
th Ii eence. This being the situation I put forward the following plan to
dhe Corps Comanl llder in a letter which I ser t that evening:-
Cc rj) 'Ciilllllilnder, CS
I have seen a Liaison Officer from 30th Corps and also a personal
one from General Gott, 7th Arioured Division.
I amd taking Musaid and clearing the enemy out of the area
1 apuzzo-Musaid-Salum. This should. be done at dawn to-morrow.
In view: of the gelieral situation I suggest that I rearrange my forces
rouind Bardia as follows:-
20th Battalion andl one squadron tanks astride the road Bardia-
Tobruk and on the escarpment.
One battalion of infantry at Musaid:
Two companies of infantry at Capuzzo with squadron of I
Tanks.
Remaining two companies in Brigade Reserve at Sidi Azeiz.
Although this would leave thegarrisons very weak, I could, if
necessary, take the -remaining two battalions under Brigadier
Hargest -aid get him to join forces with Brigadier Inglis who has
two Iattalions of 4th Infantry Brigade, two squadrons of " I "
Tanks and one squadron Divisional Cavalry. I suggest that this
force could march on Tobruk along the escarpment to break through
the Bologna Division, or give such other help as is necessary. I feel
I could do this starting early in the morning (23rd).
If this is done it would be necessary to get the 4th Indian
'Division to extend their boundary up to Capuzzo.
P'.S.-I have as you know despatched the 6th New Zealand
Infantry Brigade with all haste, complete with Valentines,
to relieve the Support Group. I know they will do well.))
Pla~ns were worked out during the night of the 22nd to takre aay the
maximumun number of tiroops wctithout weazkening he osition near ]Bardia
9,.. .

unduly. All my staff weighed in heavily against breaking existing
organisation in staff and signals.
By dawn on the morning of the 23rd Musaid had been occupied by
23rd Battalion without opposition and 28th Battalion had captured Salumn
Barracks, taking prisoners and material. These successes clarified the
situation and I sent the G2 to Corps to explain alterations in our plans.
The following notes of my instructions to the G2 explain
the position:-
((See Corps Commander and say:
(1) We think we have cleaned up all round Bardia.
(2) There is a considerable force of enemy in Bardia. As long as
he is surrounded there is no chance of his trying to get out.
(3) We also think we. have cleaned up and occupied Musaid and
Salum.
(4) 4th Brigade have cleaned up the wadis immediately West of
Bardia halfway to the sea. I am going to relieve Kippenberger
(20th Battalion, 4th Brigade) now on Bardia-Tobruk
Road with one battalion of 5th Brigade and I am gding to send
Kippenberger with attached troops to join Inglis' 4th Brigade.
(5) I suggest Divisional Headquarters should move to Gambut area
and then we should advance to 6th Brigade and get the Division
on a two-brigade front opposite Tobruk. I suggest my Headquarters
should move immediately and hand over the situation
here on the Bardia Front to Hargest.
(6) Messervey might take over command of our 5th Brigade.
(7) Administration: We can.carry on as we are at the moment. We
have three days' water, petrol, oil, food and ammunition in hand.
We could either transfer to 30 Corps or go on as we are if they
put in another link.
(8) We shall take Gambut today.
(9) Corps Commander could release Hargest's 5th Brigade by relieving
them by 4th Indian Division. I could bring him to Gambut
and we could go on pushing on as a complete Division at the side
of the Armoured Division. Our dispositions tonight will lie:-
(a) We will leave 5th Brigade at Bardia.
(b) 4th Brigade Group will be in Gambut this afternoon.
(c) 6th Brigade Group will interpose on the flank of the Armnoured
Brigade opposite Tobruk.
Position Summarised:-
1st Phase: Move with all troops available, join with the 6th New
Zealand Infantry Brigade and march on Tobruk. 5th Brigade to
come under command of Indian Division.
2nd Phase: To relieve 5th Infantry Brigade which could come forward to
join us.))
Preparations for our move were continued. I called off the attacki of
21st Battalion on Bir Ghirba which had made progress during the nigt
but required further artillery support, and ordered them into Divisional
Reserve. We finally receivedl a message at aout 1000 hours to carry- out
the first phase as suggested. The G2 then returned and reported more fully.
joa F~~I1 i"

Now4
The Corps Comnmander's reply was:- 7
P hase 1. Agreed. Commander New Zealand'. Division, to. push-on as
fast as possible and linkup with 6th Brigade.
IPhase 2. Impossible for 4th Indian Division to relieve:.5th New Zealand
Infantry Brigade until more troops available.-,- These cannot be
brought up at present owing to administrative difficulties and lack
of transport.
It will be thus some days before 5th Infantry Brigade can be released
from their present srole.
The G2 also broughta, letter from the Corps"Commander. The
following is an extract which, suiriarises the situation:-'
H.Q., 13th: Corps,
23rd Nov., 1941.
Tfhe Army Commander has arranged that-probably. with effect
fom 24th November.-- 13th Corps take over the operations lfor the relief
of Tobruk. Troops under command13th Corps will be -.your Division,-
4th Indian Division. and at least one Infantry Brigade Group of 1st
south African Division.
The general situation seems to he, that the enemy has still some 100
tanks, location not definitelv known; that he appears to -be' organising a
North and South position -somewhere West of Bir el Gubi; that..the Sidi-
Reze~rh situation is and will remain critical until your 6th Infantry
Blrigade Group ariive;'andl that the Tobruk sortie is making slow progress
\\hlich \vill be accelerated by the arrival of your 6th aid 4th Brigades.
Your Liaison Officer has just, coec-and I have sent you a message
nppllroving 'of your proposals for'Phase 1. You will, I hope, realise from
the above thaiti the. urgency of clearing the area North of .the main road
Blardia-Tobruk is less than. that of relieving the situation in the area Sidi
leze('hyl-TOI)uk. So I have asked you not.to get committed North of the
iai n road. But look after your right flank in view of enemy tanks. Lack '
oft third line for 4th Indian Division and lack also of troops will prevent
themI from taking over Capuzzo until'24th November andI doubt
Whether they could take over Dany distance Northwards for the, present.)
uir move and the plans were confirmed in
senit to 13th Corps:-
the following' telegram
( Have little informiation. enemy troops on line our advance :from
Last. Position 6th Infantry 'Brigade: will be South Trigh 'Capuzzo
mnoving on .Point 175;. 4th Infantry ::Brigade is moving Gamnbut. ;XAs
Indian Division' will' not take' up to -Capuzzo today I amt. forced leave
th1ree .Battalions 5th Brigade to mask area Salumn-Musaid-Capuzzo-BCardia
with orders to thin out as soon as Indian Division-arrive.. Battalions to
le under command 5th Brigade with Headquarters -Sidi Azeiz '.Hope to.
hand reduced garrison over.to.4th Indian Division later.. Divisional .
Headquarters -marching to just East Track Junction as soon as possible.
Understand enemy still.holding Bir Chleta. My object is to concentrate
whole Division less 5th Brigade Group North of and in touch'. with. 6th'
Brigade Group. Will move as soon as I can by dylight and consider
further advance by night.)
It will be noted that on the 23rd NexV Zealand. Division less 5th Brigade
Group was divided into five detachmnents over an area meatsuring 50 miles bry
20 w-ith large forces of the enemy all round them. At 07i30 hours th Brigde
Group (less 20th Battalion) headed by one squd~ron of Divisional Cavalry
11"' 3""~

g~9li~s;
:~a~.lIWA
and onc squadron of ((I>> Tanks moved West to take Gamnbut. 20th Battalion
did not join 4th Brigade dluring the 23rd as intended as they wvere n t
relieved -!.itil the afternoon.
The attack on Gambhut was carried out at 1500 hours. 'There was heavy
shell fire hut little infantry resistance andl the aerodrome was captured with
a considerable quantity of material and ab.)out 130 prlsoners. Enemy pressuire
from the higher ground' to the South was contained by a column of 19th
Battalion and 40th Battery, so enabling the main attack to proceed.
TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE
The first problem was to concentrate the 4th and 6th Brigades and only
to accept battle to achieve that object. News from the Tobruk front was not
good as it was reported that Sidi Rezegh had been retaken 1y the enemy. 7th
Armoured Division had withdrawn behind 1st South African )ivision. who
vere responsible for the sector. Later. it was reportedl that an attack on 5th
South African Brigade was continuing. It was clear that to get into posit ion
on a two-brigade front ready to attack the Germans at Tolrulk woull b)e iiore
difficult as time went on. Our aim was to be there before (lawn on the 24th
while the enemy were disorganised. After concentration our plan was to
attack the Germans before they had time to attack us.
Time, as will be seen, was always of the essence. By ;attacking and
keeping on attacking we had a larger enemy force in our area at a cisadvantage
but we had to keep at him. Surprise and the bayonet were our means
and speed was the vital factor. We had the legs of the enemy a ndl. in my
opinion, would keel the initiative so long as wve (li(l not get tied1 to the
ground.
The plan for the rest of the force moving on lroF1)rtuk was that two)
columns (21st Battalion with Divisional Headquarters anl attached t rooa p s
and 20th Battalion) should move independently along the TI'righ Capuzzo an(l
link up with 4th Brigade at Bir Chleta. The move of 21st Battalion to an arIea,
near Sidi Azeiz was carried out by 1400 hours. Iivisional Headquarters ecut
ready to move from Bir Tabel and by 1500 hours was on the way. Brigadier
Hargest, commanding 5th New Zealand Brigade, took .over the Bardia area
at that hour.
into the enemy with
tanks, guns and lorried infantry covered by a minefield. As 21st Battalion
In the late afternoon. 21st Battalion bumnIped
was without tanks, the column was held up until 20th Battalion arrived1 n ld
vent into the lead with « I Tanks on the flank. As dlusk approached, we
avoided the enemy opposite us by moving quickly South of the Trioh. 'Ind
without any further opposition we reached Bir Chleta at 0130 hours on the
24th. It was a hard move with the vehicles pressel to the limit over soimie
rough, humpy going. Verey lights and gun flashes were constantly to be seen
ahead and on our flanks. The moon had set by. the time we reachedl Bir
Chleta but the navigation was accurateand wve were able to mnake (lisposit ions
in the dark. We were in communication with 4th Brigade by R/rl )lt ()sir
patrols did not gain touch owing to the presence of the enemy force wino' h
had been in contact with 19th Battalion earlier in the (lay. 4th Brigade could
not detail a sufficient force to deal with this as there was in addition a large
German force to the North and West near the Bardia-Tobruk Road. The
enemy here, however, were in an area which we commandedl from excellent
artillery positions on the escarpment South of the road.
All day on the 23rd we had been out of touch with 6th Brigale. The
last we had heard was that they had struck opposition, infantry and artillery
with tanks at Gasr el Arid on the 22nd and as far as we knew they were on the
way to Sidi Rezegh. There were also reports that they had ibumped into
opposition at .Bir Chleta. This, we learnt later. was quite a fierce encounter
12-
";i~~~
E

just lbefOre dawn on the 23rd. 6th Brigade had intended to sidetrack Bir
Cheta and.press on, but by a mistake in navigation they ran straight into
the headquarters of the German Afrika Korps. It was a fortunate error as
they captured quite a number of the staff and a valuable collection of
documents.
Gt BRIGADE TAKE POINT 175
(MAP VII)
Disengaging from an enemy counter-attack from the Gambut direction,
6th Brigade pressed on and attacked Point 175 at 1200 hours on the 23rd
November. The objective was taken but at great cost. The Valentines were
some distance ahead of the infantry and, on reaching their objective, could
not neutralise the posts. This was largely responsible for the heavy losses to
both tanks and infantry. Only 4 out of the entire squadron of tanks reached
the rallying point and 25th Battalion suffered very. heavy casualties. It
proved how necessary it is to have actual exercises with «(I ) Tanks and also
demonstrated the effectiveness of German anti-tank guns.
Meanwhile, 26th Battalion with a battery of field artillery and a troop
of anti-tank guns had moved South-West and at 1245 hours reported that they
had made contact with 5th South African Brigade and at 1545 hours reported
a heavy attack on 5th South African Brigade by tanks and lorried infantry.
5th South African Brigade was over-run and our 26th Battalion was then
attacked in its isolated position some 6 miles to the South of the rest of the
Brigade. The anti-tank guns and field artillery firing point blank held up
the enemy tanks. The battalion held its ground successfully and was withdrawn
at nightfall. On Point 175 6th Brigade was under heavy shell fire,
threatened from the West and North as well as the South.
4th AND 6th BRIGADES COME INTO LINE
(MAP
On the morning of the 24th the enemy lodgment between 4th Brigade
and Bir Chleta was attacked by 20th Battalion supported by tanks and
artillery and was cleared up by mid-day. Prisoners and guns of various types
were captured. The escarpment was thus cleared and 20th Battalion rejoined
4th Brigade, 21st Battalion remaining in Divisional Reserve. Divisional
Headquarters and 21st Battalion joined up with 4th Brigade and no time was
lost in getting up in line with 6th Brigade. As soon as possible I got in the two
Brigadiers to discuss our further advance. 6th Brigade's tank losses were
serious, especially as we had only sufficient artillery ammunition for
counter-battery work and anti-tank defence. Further, Commander 6th
Brigade had been warned by 30th Corps to be ready for an attack
by a large concentration of tanks. Later it was reported that 30th
Corps Headquarters had been attacked by tanks. This column we now know
was the force General Rommel was marshalling for his counter stroke.
6th Brigade held the crest of Point 175 but the enemy was holding in
strength the ravines and a blockhouse on the escarpment to the West. In
the circumstances, it was decided that the advance along the escarpment
must be done silently at night with the bayonet and it was arranged that both
4th and 6th Brigades should push forward, 6th Brigade clearing up the wadis
to the West of Point 175 while 4th Brigade advanced up to the high ground,
Point 149, Zaafran. As a matter of fact, even if there had been sufficient
ammunition we should have chosen a night attack.
These attacks were a complete success and we captured some 450
German prisoners without many casualties. 4th Brigade, with a squadron of
Divisional Cavalry and tanks leading, began a general offensive at first light
VII)

and by 0700 hours had secured their objective. The «I>> Tanks of 4th Brigade,
however, suffered severely from 50 and 88 millimetre anti-tank guns -. one
squadron having 50% casualties. Meanwhile, 26th Battalion on 6th Brigade's
left, reached the edge of Sidi Rezegh aerodrone and 24th Battalion, after overcoming
stiff resistance at the Blockhouse, caie into line at 0920 hours. This
position was consolidated and the 6th Brigade front was made more secure
later in the day by sending 2lst 3attalion to'hold the high ground. 1Point. 8.
on the Southern flank.
Counter-attacks on the 4th Brigade front were repulsed. At 0935 lours
enemy ,infantry attacking 20th Battalion on the left -wei'e dispersed by
artillery fire of 4th Field Regiment and a little later the. guns were switched on
to tanks approaching along the'Trigh Capuzzo with similar effect. The
artillery were employed throughout the (lay (dispersing enemy concentrations.
Many targets were gunners' dreams but We had no ammiunition to spare. 4th
Brigade asked for air 'support, but it was not available. We learnt later that
the Air Force was engaged on harassing Roinmel's columun. In the early afternoon
4th Brigade area was bombed and later Divisional Headquarters was
attacked. 4th Brigade had no. casualties or damage, but Divisional Heaclquarters-had
a few vehicles set on fire and some casualties to. per'sonncl.
OPENING THIE CORRIDOR
(MAPS VII and IX)
The next move was to open the way to Tobruk. Convoys were
not coming through to us' and the supply situation was really serious. We
were short of 25 pounder ammunition, our supply being reduced to 60' rounds
per gun with no more in sight.' Emergency arrangements had b~een male
to drop supplies from the air but it was clear that the corridor would have
to be opened. Not only did we need supplies but we required somewhere
to send our many hundreds of wounded, our nass. of.'surplus transport. andl
almost a'thousand German prisoners.
The fighting had by this time developed into a 'battle for the three
escarpments South-East of Tobruk terraced back from the sea to the main
desert plateau 16 miles inland. These three escarpments were like steps
ascending from North to South, three to four miles apart, and 'rising from 140
metres to 170 and the most Southerly to 190 metres. Although ' the escarpments
were not tank proof they were a strong deterrent to tanks. Their
main strength lay in their value as infantry strong points in the deep wadis
and, of course,-for their artillery observation.
According to our Intelligence Reports the Axis force' in the South-
Eastern sector of Tobruk was composed largely of Germans. It wa's estimated
that there were 7 or 8 Gernman and 2 Bersaglieri battalions disposed inthe
area Sidi Rezegh-Belhamed as distinct from the Italians on the perimneer
of Tobruk. The above total included some of the infantry battalions of the
15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. One battalion, and possibly two. were
-reported to be' machine gun battalions. The positional infantry dlivision was
known as the ZBV Division (Special Purposes Division). It is interesting to
note that 361st Afrika Regiment of, the formation 'was formed from German
members of the French Foreign Legion. The enemy were estimated to have 119
guns in the sector, 83 Italian 75 millimetre, 24 German 105s, and 12 German
150s. In addition there were estimated to. be over 100 anti-tank guns, chiefly
50 millimetre, and 'a few heavy naval guns. This force;.as was' proved by
captured documents when the Tobruk.garrison made its sortie on. 21st
November, had been concentrated for'an attack on the fortress planned to
take place on the 23rd November. The enemy strength and dispositions
were, of course; different 'by the 25th November. They had been heavily
engaged in the fighting round Tobruk, at Sidi R'ezegh -andPoinlt 17~, and they.
had been much weakened by the departure 'of Gene~al Romnmel with bothl
rmued Divisions.

-aim
SIDI REZEGH AND BELIHAMED
(MAP VIII ABC)
Orders were issued on the afternnoon of the 25th for a general advance,
4th Brigade (18th and 20th Battalions) to capture Beihaned and 6th Brigade
(24th and 25th Battalions) to take Sidi Rezegh, while 21st and 26t.
Battalions were to go on too Ed Duda. The Tobruk garrison were to break.
out and join us there at daylight or earlier on the morning of the 26th. The
advance was to be by night with the bayonet, the(( I >) Tanks following as a
support. Our conference was at 1700 hours andZero was set for 2200 hours.
This left very little time for 6th Brigade but as already pointed out, it was
essential to open the road to Tobruk.
18th and 20th Battalions advanced on foot at 2100 hours and went,
through three lines of enemy resistance in silence using only the bayonet.
It had been urged that as it was moonlight the attackers should be preceded
by

IW 'W 40
rIail"
14
It It 0
Few prisoners were taken but great execution was done and in the morning
550 prisoners were captured in the adjacent area.
The 6th Brigade attack to consolidate on Sidi Rezeghi carried out by
weary troops was delivered with the greatest dash and determination
against superior numbers. Sidi Rezegh was a bloody battlefield. Losses
were again heavy but success complete. It is interesting to note the report
that the Bersaglieri, who opposed us here as well as Germans, held out longer
than the Germans, and that they fought their machine guns to the last.
On the morning of the 27th we were securely in possession of Sidi
Rezegh and except for some slight enemy movement in the West, which was
shelled, no enemy was to be seen. The organisation of a defensive position
was only difficult because of the small number left. Neither 24th nor 26th
Battalions could be considered as of greater fighting strength than a normal
company. The day, however, for the tired men on Sidi Rezegh was quiet
apart from a last point of resistance about a mile East of Sidi Rezegh. This
was heavily shelled and patrols operated against it during the day, but without
success.
4th Brigade (18th and 20th Battalions) were in action throughout the
27th. The Germans used a flag of truce to gain time to replenish and
reinforce for a counter-attack on 18th Battalion. This unit was held up
throughout the afternoon in an exposed position between Belhamed and Sidi
Rezegh, while 20th Battalion was also heavily engaged. The return of the
I Tanks from Ed Duda, however, eased the situation as they cleared up
enemy pockets on the way.
The Corps planas given to-us on the 27th was to establish our
positions on Sidi Rezegh, Belhamed. and Ed Duda and once these positions
were secure/continue the advance Westwards along the escarpment to the
general line Tobruk-El Adem-Bir El Gubi track. But it was made quite
clear :that until the threat of counter-attack had passed, New Zealand
Division was to hold what had been won while Tobruk Force' would be
responsible for establishing the corridor and holding it open.
THE PANZER DIVISIONS RETURN
(MAP IX)
The 28th November was a day of extreme ups and downs. The only
reserve we possessed was a weak squadron of " I , Tanks and these were
being moved like a stage army from our rear to the Southern flank, according
to the direction the enemy happened to be threatening us from. No
sooner had they gone in one direction than reports came in that enemy tank
columns were approaching from a new quarter.
It was reported from a reliable source that the German Commander
opposite us, General Boettcher, thought he was surrounded by armoured
forces and was continually asking, Where are our Panzer Divisions ? n
We really were in a'difficult position. During the morning we heard
that 1st South African Brigade would not arrive until the next day, the
29th. Corps moved up to be close to the Division, as they were being
attacked by enemy patrols from time to time. Both Corps and Divisional
Headquarters had very meagre defences.
Commander 4th Brigade planned an attack to clear out the enemy
pockets which existed between Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. As all his
infantry were committed the attack had to be carried out by a company- of
the 18th Battalion. It was a most 'successful attack executed. with one
squadron of I. Tanks in echelon of five, two carrier troops from the
Divisional Cavalry squadron, and one company of 18th Battalion, supported
b- two artillery regiments which fired two timed concentrations ahead of
16
o~oAS5IFIF

IC
the adlvancing troops. Vickers machine guns from Belhamed Spur. were
used to cover the tanks' advance. The advance went to a depth of 10,000
yards. This attack was an example of the skilful use of « I , Tanks, the
squadron being brilliantly commanded. They inflicted hundreds of casualties
and destroyed anti-tank guns, mortars and machine guns, while our casualties
were three killed and ten wounded. After entering the Ed Duda position they
returned slightly East, rolling up the area Northwards to Belhamed where
(500 prisoners were rounded up. At 1615 hours the enemy staged an assault
on Blelhamled from the North with. 7 tanks and 500 infantry, but 10 tanks
from Tobruk intervened with the result that another 400 prisoners were
c Iptured.
4th Brigade attack coincided with German attacks on Sidi Rezegh and
Blelhamed, the latter push being caught on the way.
On the 6th Brigade fronton thee 28th the German pocket which had
caused a lot of trouble was cleaned up. It turned out to be a miniature
fortress with a nest of machine guns and anti-tank guns and a garrison of
157 men. Seventy prisoners were taken and 23 of our own men recaptured.
The general situation on Sidi Rezegh in the.afternoon, however, to the East,
South and West.. was disquieting; enemy concentrations of transport,
infantry and tanks were being-reported and shelling was becoming more
intense. The artillery of 6th Field Regiment was being used to support the
4th lBrigade attack, but at 1500 hours they had to be switched over to deal
with the.serious local situation. The Valentines, after dealing very satisfactorily
with the attack from the South, ran into enemy anti-tank guns and
-er-e unable to help the infantry. On hearing a report from Commander 6th
Brigade, the Divisional Reserve of 9 «I Tanks was sent to help but they failed
to reach their objective before darkness. In the meantime the forward
companies of 24th Battalion had been over-run and the attack had just been
held by the reserve companies. The position at nightfall was precarious. The
eneniv was in close touch and overlooked our depleted units, but the orders
were to keep the corridor open and Sidi- Rezegh had to be held. 1st South
African Brigade was approaching from the South. While 6th Brigade were
reorganising their defence a Bren Carrier of 21st Battalion captured Major-
General Von Ravenstein, Commander of 21st Armoured Division, out on a
somewhat daring reconnaissance. His marked maps gave us the whole
Gaerimian lln to destroy us. It was clear that the lorried infantry regiments
of 21st Armoured Division would attack from the East and 15th Armoured
)ivision from the South-East while the tanks of 21st Armoured Division
came down the Gambut-Tobruk Road to attack Belhamed from the North.
At dusk on the 28th an unfortunate thing happened. 22nd Armoured
Brigade, which was protecting our Southern flank, had become involved in
ain armoured battle and enemy lorried infantry with some armoured cars
cane along the escarpment from our rear on to our Main Dressing Station
and Prisoner of War Cage. They captured both and set about 1,200
prisoners free. The loss of the wounded was a severe blow and we could
do nothing about it since any attempt Rat recapture would have turned it into
a lattle ground.
That evening Corps Headquarters decided to go into Tobruk.
This made for better.' co-ordination 'with Tobruk Force, but it also
meant that our own communications with Corps were very much worse.
Wireless at night proved most uncertain. Our Administration Group
followed Corps Headquarters into Tobruk.
The situation was most difficult. Our supplies, and in particular our
25 pounder ammunition 'supplies, were-very low; Sidi Rezegh could not be
hl(1 if 1st Southr African Brigade did not arrive; and, finally, General Von
17 p):

MkLASSLr IE
Ravenstein's maps gave us a clear picture of the scale of attack we would
have to meet. During the night Divisional Headquarters moved closer to
4th Brigade and everything possible, was (done to meet the coming attack.
WE LOSE POINT 175
(MAP X)
The event of the morning on the 29th was the arrival of a convoy
headed by Colonel Clifton, until recently C.R.E., New Zealand Division, and
now C.E., 30th Corps. He arrived with tank escort and about 280 vehicles.
carrying rations, water, petrol, and, alove all, ammunition. The same morning
a convoy came out of Tobruk with 25 pounder ammunition so that the
situation from the supply point of view was much better.
During the morning there was enemy movement in several directions
on 6th Brigade front, which was engaged by artillery whenever it came within
range. 21st Battalion on Point 175 repulsed an attack from. the East and
were then attacked from the South. Our Valentines were, roughly handled
by an anti-tank gun which was apparently manhandled forward, only one
out of the 6 tanks- being mobile after this engagement.
There was no attack
on Sidi Rezegh in the morning, possibly because of a tank battle which was
in progress South and South-West of Ed Duda. A South African Armoured
Car with wireless link to 1st South African Brigade got through -to Divisional
headquarters, thereafter playig an imtant tp in oeffortstoi up
with the South Africans.
The enemy also advanced from the East below the. escarpment and
shelled the Divisional Headquarters area. They showed little inclination,
however, to press on against our rearguard strengthened by the return to
Divisional.Reserve of the, I Tanks of 44th Royal Tank Regiment. The
enemy shelling was never impressive, a good proportion of shells were duds,
and fragmentation was poor. Casualties to personnel and vehicles from shellfire
were therefore slight.
On 4th Brigade front the 29th was a comparatively quiet day, enemy
movements being dealt with by the artillery.
The Royal Air Force were very active. 6th Brigade reported two heavy
and effective raids and there were three raids on enemy transport and a tank
park North of Belhamed and on concentrations North of the main road.
During tie afternoon the first of a 'series of reverses came. The enemy
advanced with tanks from the South and took Point 175. The 21st Battalion
were caught napping by a ruse. Tanks came forward with men wearing
berets standing up in them, and our forward troops, who were expecting
the South Africans, were surprised completely. not realising their mistake
until the tanks were into our lines.
Our position in the rear was now overlooked and the German artillery
made conditions most difficult. Further, enemy troops were moving in on all
sides. By evening, enemy pressure on Ed Duda made it doubtful whether the
corridor was open. The situation at this stage was precarious in the extreme
but could still be remedied by the arrival of 1st South African Brigade, who
were due at any time. I reported to 13th Corps that we were virtually
surrounded. It was obvious that the enemy were trying to drive a wedge
between the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk garrison. Commander-
6th Brigade had given me a clear picture of the difficulties on his front.
Shortly after midnight on the 29th, the following information came in
from Corps by a message timed 1940 hours. 7th Armoured Brigade were
reported operating successfully South and West of Bir Chleta. 4th and 22nd
Armoured Brigades were attacking Sidi Rezegh. 1st South African Brigade
was adacntiy and reach Sidi Rezegh during the night of the 29th.
C
18ASIb~

The message ended, -.«'- corridor will be kept open at all costs.)) 13th Corps
also sent a" message to the Armoured Division urging them to create a diversion
ly attacking to our West as soon as possible on the 30th.
ROMMEL'S ATTACK DEVELOPS
(MAPS X and Xa)
Dawn, Sunday, 30th November, showed a very large and congested
concentration of transport with tanks on a skyline on the escarpment East
of Point 175. It was the most perfect artillery target, of all time. We could
not shoot at it because we were expecting the South Africans. Reconnaissance,
however, proved it to be Ariete Division. After finishing a
bombardment programme our Divisional Artillery brought their guns into
action against them'and once more the Italians made off as a disorganised
mob.
Throughout the morning the area occupied by Divisional Headquarters
and 4th Field Regiment was under fairly heavy shellfire, seven
guns of 25th Battery being put out of action by enemy 105 millimetre guns
on the:Southern escarpment.. There were also a number of casualties. 4th
Field Regiment had considerable success, disabling two tanks on Point 175,
destroying another, and blowing up an ammunition. dump.: Infantry attacks
from the East and West were broken up. by artillery fire.
From Tobruk came the news that the Ed Duda position had been
consolidated.
During the afternoon, the G.S.O. 2, 13th Corps, came out from Tobruk
with orders that the coirridor was to be held at all costs.
Reports from 6th Brigade made it clear that: the enemy were massing
to the South and West for an attack and that we were outnumbered, quite
apart from tanks, of which we now had only two on that front.
6th Brigade fighting strength at this time was:-
Battalion Officers' Other Ranks
24th 4 159
25,, 10.. 1 .. 2 35
26,, .. 10 . 260
21st . 1 91
At 1600 hours 51 tanks (and there was no doubt as to the accuracy of
the counting) were reported approaching fast from the West.- This was
followed by an attack coming in from the South. Shortly after 1700 hours,
the anti-tank guns havingbeen destroyed, 24th Battalion was over-run,
quickly followed by 26th Battalion. Our -hard won position on Sidi Rezegh
wvas 'lost to an overwhelming force, and only the approach of night prevented
the attack from going further.
I.sent a message at 1945 hours to Corps, 6th Infantry Brigade have
been overwhelmed-and enemy has SidiRezegh."
The wireless having failed owing to atmospheric conditions, at 2115
hours I sent two Divisional Cavalry officers to get in touch with the South
Africans and explain our position.
That night I sent all available- and unnecessary transport through to
Tobruk. and all secret papers. At 2000 hours I sent Brigadier Miles to see the
Corps Commander and give him the picture. I had several conversations
with the Brigadiers about the situation and it was decided that as all the
guns would be under direct observation at dawn they must be brought back
to the Eat. t the same time Divisional BIattle eadquartes, wohich had
b.een hen :vilv shelled fromi uns South of the escarpment, moed~West.
r 6':" :~ :

Despite these moves, we knew there would be no place where we would not
be under direct observation. We got a few hours' rest, and at 0330 hours on
1st December, Brigadier Miles arrived back with the orders from Corps to say
that the corridor must be held. 1st South African Brigade was in action on
the escarpment, and Corps had sent a message to 30th Corps. as follows:-
((Enemy captured Sidi Rezegh and has been attacking New Zealand
Division on West and East with tanks. Consider it absolutely essential
7th Armoured Division concentrates every effort to destroy
enemy tanks East and West New Zealand Division position.))
ENEMY RECAPTURE BELHAMED
(MAP X)
Soon after daylight on the 1st December, a heavy enemy attack by
tanks, supported by artillery, began to develop in a North-East direction from
Sidi Rezegh against Belhamed Spur. The tanks came forward under cover
of dust and smoke. Machine guns were carried forward on the tanks and
these shot up the field artillery and anti-tank guns. War-battered German
infantry, whose morale at this time was low, were shepherded forward.
Their co-operation enabled the tanks to avoid casualties and push forward.
It appeared as if the remnants of 6th Brigade would be destroyed. At this
moment, however, a force of British tanks with field artillery in support
appeared, the mere sight of them causing the enemy to waver. Commander
6th Brigade considered the enemy would give way to counter-attack and
offered to support it with what was left of his force. This was the last
chance of stabilising our position, but the Tank Battalion Commander's
instructions were to cover our withdrawal, and a possible opportunity passed.
Belhamed Ridge was in enemy hands and all artillery support was gone. There
was therefore no other course open for the remnants of 6th Brigade but to
withdraw behind the 7:th Brigade position near Zaafran.
Owing to the fact that we had so few troops there was no question of
counter-attack at Belhamed, but the situation there was stabilised by the
squadron of «< I Tanks in reserve, now down to 5 in number, moving to a
hull-down position and stopping the enemy thrust. 20th Battalion was overrun,
however, and the much-talked of corridor, which, at this stage, was
really of no use to our cause, was therefore severed.
The New Zealand Division was now in an unenviable position. A
wedge had been driven in between the units of 4th Brigade, leaving the
Brigadier with two companies of 19th Battalion, 6th Field Company, a
machine gun company, 90 South Africans from 5th South African Brigade,
and the remaining «I Tanks, occupying a weak defensive position.
At 0745 hours the following message went to 13th Corps:-
((Decision taken out of our hands being heavily attacked from South and
West. 1st South African Brigade failed to take Point 175 last night,
but are going to try again this morning. Am in touch with Norrie.
At 1155 hours we reported again to Corps:-
((Enemy now have Belhamed.
In the attack on Belhamed, 51 German tanks were employed, of which
at least 11 were destroyed. Later in the morning, we learnt that 18th
Battalion was intact and with 19th Battalion companies on Ed Duda, was in
touch with the Tobruk garrison. When 20th Battalion was over=run, 18th
Battalion was able to withdraw under heavy fire to below the escarpment.
They then took up a new position on the escarpment West of Belhamed,
where they remained until the enemy withdrawal a few days later.
Attacks continued from all sides against the remainder of our
surrounded force during the day, but these attacks were not seriously
20

pressed. At sunset, the enemy again attacked with tanks. The assaults were
repulsed by field artillery, anti-tank guns, and"the last of our remaining (( I
ranks. The two batteries of 8th Field Regiment, under Command 1st Army
Tank Brigade, and our own 4th Field Regiment, did excellent work during
this difficult day, and an impressive Royal Air Force blitz on the South of
-- JBelharned no doubt upset the 'enemy preparations for the evening attack.
We were in communication with 13th Corps and General Norrie, commianding
30th Corps, by R/T.. During the morning we intercepted an order
from 13th Corps to the South Africans to retire South, which made it clear
that Corps realised our position. Our.chances of 'retiring on Tobruk at this
stage were not good. After a conference with my Brigadiers, it was decided
that we would move East and South with the remnants of our force instead
of trying to go West through the corridor. I asked General Norrie to patrol
the ground and give us armoured protection on the flank. This was done.
They also sent heavy tanks to chase away 14 tanks of Ariete Division which
were blocking our way. In the late afternoon, I sent the following message
to Corps:-
"Remnants New Zealand Division concentrated at Zaafran and after dark
will attempt break out in direction Bir Bu Deheua. If unsuccessful
will attempt break out West. Have made contact with Norrie, who
is helping)
NEW ZEALAND DIVISION WITHDRAWS
(MAP Xa)
All guns, transport, and equipment which could be moved were brought
away. The columns assembled East of Zaafran, with 4th Brigade in the lead,
followed by the skeleton Divisional Headquarters and then 6th Brigade,
covered by a rearguard of our remaining I Tanks. Despite the decided
pressure of the evening attacks the units disengaged and in the dusk our
withdrawal began, first to the East and then South on to the escarpment,
The intervening area had been patrolled by elements of'the Armoured
Brigade. General Norrie awaited us on the escarpment, giving us final directions
before moving.off to cover our further withdrawal. In the early hours
of the morning we reached Bir Gibni, the whole move having been
accomplished with an uncanny ease no less remarkable than the withdrawals
in Greece.
The following extract of an Eighth Army Situation' Report, dated 1st
December, gives the general situation at the moment the. New Zealand
Division (less 5th Brigade Group) withdrew from the line:-
"Very.heavy fighting all, day in the Belhamed-Zaafran-Sidi Rezegh
area has resulted in the splitting of the junction of our forces with
Tobruk and the withdrawal Southwards of 4th Armoured Brigade.
We still hold Ed Duda, but Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh are in enemy
hands.))
So ended the New Zealand part of the battle-to keep the Tobruk
Corridor open. This battle in the Western Desert was not primarily however a
battle to hold positions, but a battle to destroy the German forces. I believe we
went some distance towards achieving this in our attacks at Sidi Rezegh,
Belhamed, and Ed Duda. I think the German Afrika Korps will bear me
out in this!
211

5Uf BRIGADE GROUP. (Dolacod)
In the §foregoing narrative the part played by the 5th Brigade Group
from =the 23rd November ; onwards is not touched: on. The following is a
report'on their operations in the Bardia sector: ,and the part they playedin
the battles :between Acroma: and Gazala.
BARDIA
(MAP V1)
RON
At- 1500 hours-on. 23rd December, 5th Brigade Group came under command
of 4th:Indian Division'with the role of cutting off Bardia and Halfaya
from the: West and generally'harassing the enemy. Divisional Headquarters
were :not in wireless touch from:the 23rd onwards and-were not aware-of the
capture of 5th'Brigade Headquarters on the.27th. until we withdrew from
the line on the. 2nd-December. On the 25th, Commander 5th Brigade had
reported by' Liaison Officer that -all was well.: On the 24th 'patrols- of
the 23rd and 28th Battalions had gone along the escarpment to within 1 1/2
miles of Halfaya without opposition. The village of Salum itself had notbeen
taken as it was withinrange of all' the guns of Halfaya which opened
up as soon as the Maoris entered 'the vlae., In the North, 22nd Battalion
had.-carried out a patrol'covering 36 miles' without" meeting opposition. On
the 24th, 5th Brigade came under command of 13th Corps.
It was very clear-f"ign rigadier Hargest's letter on the 25th that 5th
Brigade were itching to join the Division in the Tobruk sector. No news would
have been more welcome than.that they were on the way, but we had to be
content with the promise that they would come as soon as they couk& be
relieved. They had had few casualties at this stage and were completely
mobile-their- presence' at Sidi Rezegh and-Belhamed would have changed
the.: whole complexion of the battle. On the other hand the wedge driven into
the fortress line had to be held.
Brigadier Hargest, in his letter to me, had reported the presence of a
strong force -of.enemy tanks at- Halfaya, which he expected would attack
Capuzzo- and Musaid. This. :was part'of General Rommel's armoured force
which, according to reports, had split into:two columns in the region of the
Omars. On. column .:attacked the Field Supply Depot, the (( I Tank repair .
depots, and the Indian Division at Sidi Omar. It then moved on to Halfaya.
The. other column, with Ariete -keeping its distance in the rear, moved
towards Sidi Azeiz. There, was a great amount of enemy activity throughout
the entire area.. At midday on the 26th, thirty tanks passed 2,000 yards
from Brigade headquarters, shepherding an enormous convoy on the way to
3ardia: from' the South East. There was also a -large movement of transport
from Halfaya area towards ]3ardia. ' Unfortunately, 5th Brigade had no tanks.
The Air Force, although advised of the targets, were unable to take advantage
of 'themowing to other tasks. At 1630 hours the enemy attacked under cover
of a bombardment from Halfaya, Point 207 and the escarpment. A column of
tanks, artillery and lorried infantry came forward and divided into
three, -one going towards' Musaid, one towards Capuzzo and the third towards
: Sou,".:' The enemy was held at all points and suffered heavy casualties.
Many vehicles were destroyed and between :7 and 100 dead were buried-next
dlayAmongst the equipment captured were two, 50 millimetre anti-tank
guns in, perfect condition. The. action 'in the evening ceased as the last of
the motorised infantry and guns passed through the Musaid-Salum gap on
its way North to join up with the other part of General Rommel's forces.
Early the following morning it would appear from reports so far
teceived that Brigade Hea quarterfs was heavily shelled and over-run by a
fborce of about 35 tanks and som ~amoured crs. In i~s attack infantry
were brought up on the backr of tanks, two or three ~to~~. aGakfter a sort
, 4~m~i~h22-

IJNCLA~SSI Ilr
uinequal";' fi ght the lefences were rushed and Headquarters wasi captured
inclt(ling Regimental Headquarters of 5th Field Regiment and 27th
(Machine-Cn) Battalion, and the aInti-tank and anti-aircraft battery headqllarters..
This was a very serious loss. At this stage the Bardia sector was
domniinatted lby Romiiniel.s force andl colunins were passing freely, in and out
()f the town. In the afternoon of the 27th. 23rd Battalion was again attacked
an1(l the enemynN penetrated to the transport lines. A spirited counter-attack with
the i )avonet, however, 1 all available personnel restored the situation. The
eneinmv were (iriven off at all. points and preparations were made -for 'a further
attack by a concentration of enemy in the Hafid Ridge area. There was no.
further attack at Catpuzzo, but « B Echelon, '28th Battalion, was attacked
in the evening by an enemiy column supported by tanks and captured after a
fight. The situation in *which the battalions of 5th :Brigade were placed was
most. critical. but their stand had saved them, for we now know that General
Roiiiiiel dlecidedl in view of the situation near Tobruk that 15th Armoured
Di\ision should return at once to assist in the battle there, while_21st
\rmurn1ed I ivision was ordered* to move along the Trigh Capuzzo against
New Zealand Division's rear. The result in the Bardia sector was that the
threat to our lbattalions was removed and they were able to reorganise. On
the .2,h N\ovemlber a Liaison Officer from, Divisional Cavalry-reached HeadqurrRa
ters. 22nd Battalion, and Colonel Andrewlr, having learnt the position of
the rest of the Br13igade, withdrew his battalion that night to join 23rd and
28th B3attfilions near Capuzzo. Orders were later received from 4th Indian
l)ivision for Colonel Andrew to assume temporary command of 5th Brigade
Gro1u1p and hold the line Capuzz6-,Musaid-Salum Barracks.
On 1st December, 5th Brigade Group were relieved by 5th Indian
Infantr- Brigade and our Brilgade and Divisional Cavalry moved back to
MIenastir without incilent, their role being to prevent movement in front- of
Bardlia and to patrol Westward astride the Bardiai-Tobruk Road. The area
to the North and, as far West as 470'grid wass cleared, some prisoners being
taken, and vehicles andl .dumps destroyed. The main coast roatd and all
subsidiary tracks were. completely blocked.
KNABE COLUMN BEATEN OFF
(MAP XI)
On the 3rd December, a large ernemy column estimated at a battalion
alvanced from the West, supported by artillery. As a result of excellent
r econnaissance 1 Divisional Cavalry. 28th Battalion had ample ;warning
(of the enemy's approach. Fire was held until the enemy were within sixty
yards of our positions and then every weapon came into action. The attack
war~s broken up with great loss. .250 killed were counted, 73 prisoners and 4
guns were captured, and 20 vehicles were destroyed. The enemy force was
)art of Knabe column, -which comprised 104.Lorried Infantry and other
forces of 15th Arnoured Division. The rough handling they received was
sufficient to discourage any further efforts to'link up with the garrison of
Bardia.
On the night of 3rd December, 5th Brigade Group wasagain moved to
take over the Capuzzo-Salum area and relieve 5th IndianInfantry Brigade
which was moving West for further. operations in the,.Tobruk sectoir. For
the next few days our 5th Brigade, with Divisional Cavalry and C.I.H. under
conmmand., donlinated the road between Halfava and Bardia and severed
all communications. 5th Brigade at this stage was under command 2nd
South African Division. Divisional Cavalry despite the need for a rest for
vehicle mlaintenance," continued from the 6th December to work in close cooperattion
with 2ndl South African Division mbil~e columns W~est of Menastir in
halrassing~ tim ~nemv. This unit has been in actidn almost continuously since
.the eatrly s;i 'es, of th2e campaign and pyed an import~at part, representing
the Dlivisioo l at th-e successful attack~ on BRndia.
UI~kWOEB~i% 23 --

Sth BRIGADE GROUP MOVES WEST
(MAP XII)
On the 8th December, Brigadier Wilder arrived and took over
command of 5th Brigade with a skeleton staff. The same evening orders
were received that the Brigade would be in Corps Reserve to be ready to
take part in operations West of Tobruk. The Brigade moved by the coast
road, arriving at Sidi Bu Amud on the 9th, where it came temporarily under
command 70th Division, reverting to 13th Corps on the 10th. The enemy at
this stage were withdrawing Westwards towards Gazala. In the early hours
of the morning of the 11th the Brigade advanced in column from Bu Amud
through El Adem to Acroma. 23rd Battalion then advanced along the main
Derna Road, while the remainder of the Brigade moved astride the track
running West from Acrona. Orders were to gain touch with the enemy
and reconnoitre the Gazala Box. Opposition from Italian units was
encountered. 23rd Battalion supported by most accurate fire of the Chestnut
Troop, 1st R.H.A., captured the ridge Mengar el iosci, repulsed a counterattack,
and took 497 prisoners. The- Maori Battalion took Mgherreb in a
spirited attack. They pressed on in their buses. despite heavy shell fire, to
within 100 yards of the enemy positions, debussed and fixed bayonets, and
charged over the ridge. The Italians threw down their arms and 1,123
prisoners were taken, our losses being 5 killed-and 11 wounded. These were
strong positions, which had held up the advance for some time.
On the 12th the advance West continued. Our advancing troops were
again shelled, but there was no infantry opposition. There was considerable
enemy air activity, which, however, caused little damage. At no time during
the operations did the German dive-bombers intervene with success,
although they were much more active than they had been East of Tobruk.
In one attack on ((B )) Echelon, our Bofors guns shot down 3 Stukas and
the Royal Air Force accounted for others above our lines.
It was clear that the enemy position known as the Gazala Box was
still held by a considerable force of Italians on the general line Gazala-
Carmuset er Regem-Bir Naghia. The position had not been completed but it
was already. strong. It had been- efficiently planned and was well
camouflaged. Trenches were for preference sited in slight depressions and
were generally without parapets. Camouflage was done with wire netting.
scrim, and natural vegetation which blended in well. Machine guns and
anti-tank guns, and even 75s, were dug right in and were most difficult to
see.
The position on the evening of the 12th was:-
22nd Battalion on the left flank at Bu Allusc, 23rd Battalion on the
right dominating the Gazala landing grounds and coastal area, and the Maori
Battalion in the centre on the escarpment, about two miles forward of-
Mgherreb, at Point 182. On our left flank was 4th Indian Division, with
whom we were not really in touch. They were masking Hamza, which was
held by the Germans. To the South, 7th Armoured Division was making a
wide encircling movement to come round and cut off the enemy's retreat.
The role of the Polish Brigade Twas to carry out an attack coming in on our
left flank. See Map XII.
On the morning of the 13th,.22nd Battalion captured an enemy strong
point in co-operation with (( I >) Tanks and artillery. They took 100 prisoners
and captured 4 guns. The next important objective of 28th Battalion was
a well-sited strong point-Point 181. On the 13th they attacked it by daylight,
but were held up by artillery fire. That night they patrolled the ground
and attacked again under an artillery barrage on the following day,
capturing it at the point of the bayonet. 380 prisoners wvere takren.
-lEti~L~kimnr
jD;
24~B~~$~

. :y iy i
1iUCYA"
'It
On the 15th, plans were co-ordinated for the attack by two battalions
of the Polish Brigade, supported' by our 5th Brigade.. The attack commnenced
too late for the whole plan to be put into operation, but the Poles
made some progress and 28th Battalion captured their objectives. An
attempt.by the Maoris to take Point 137 on the escarpment at first light
on the 16th was held up by heavy fire after they had gone 1,200 yards. The
Poles carried out two successful attacks capturing Carmuset er Regem and
Bir en ;Naghia.. In the South, the Indian Division repulsed a counter-attack
by tanks, which seemed to be the enemy's final effort to stabilise his position.
These; successes and continuous pressure proved decisive and by the morning
of the 17th it was clear the enemy was in full retreat from the Gazala
area.
5th Brigade-was withdrawn at this stage to join the rest of the Division
in Egypt, having played a very important part in breaking the resistance of
the three Italian Divisions defending the Gazala position.
-T 77 i;c-
25
_ ,"_O
gSE

LESSONS
FOR NEW ZEALAND DIVISION
We can learn a num her of o.itstan( in lessons fromi the Libyan
Campaign. There are general lessons which will apply to any tfighting
against the Germans, lessons wvhich prove and give added force to wvellknown
principles of war. Sone of the lessons apply )articularl to desert
warfare, and we must be careful to renelinber the effect that topography
has on tactics. Our next campaign miay be in closer country,. where our
methods will be different and where the infantry soldier and the field gunner
will have more imlportant roles than has been the case in the (lesert fighting.
We must not become obsessed with 'desert wva;rfare.
FITNESS,
EFFICIENCY AND THE WILL TO WIN
The degree of success a unit or formiation. achieves in battle lelpendls
alove all else upon the will to win. There is a time in all b)attles when the
amen on both sides are exhausted. It is the man \vho can hold on longest and.
who fights with the greatest determination who will winl. The will to wvin
requires constant attention. It is made up of many factors, two of the most
imlortant being Physical Fitness and Confidence in the Armns we use. In
both of these we are superior at present to the German infantry.
Physical fitness is difficult to achieve. I can see no substitute for long
marches and digging. Motorisation is the enemy of llhysical fitness and the
more we become motorised the- mVore neel there is for march training. A11
ranks must be trained to the standarl \ havee al\ays set of 40 miles in 24
hours.
During the recent operations the rifle and machine gun were relegated
to a secondary role by the gun and the tank. Iln our next camp)aign we
may be fighting in mountainous or close country. The tank ilay, as in
Greece, be seriously handicapped by the country: the rifle and machine gill
as well as the field artillery, will then ,have added importance.
Wherever we may be destined to fight our training shouldI be based ton
these two fundamental principles:
PHYSICAL FITNESS OF ALL RANKS.
PROFICIENCY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE USE 01F WEAPO()N S.
SURPRISE AND TRAINING
Surprise is still the outstanding factor in achieving success. This fact
was proved on many occasions dturing the operations.
In Libya we startedl the campaign \vell aware of the manoeuvrability
of a mobile division and knowing that we could move thir-ty-five miles in
the dark without lights, hit a given spot. leploy, shoot in our field guns. an(
two andcl a half hours after first light stage a co-ordinated attack with I
Tanks under a full artillery Jrogrammne.
In Crete we had already learnt l)y explerience that provided there were
no wire entanglements the enemy could be turned out of any position at
night by attacking with the bayonet.
This knowledge that we could move long distances and fight at night
proved to be of the greatest assistance in all our planning and gave us a
great feeling of confidence when carrying out ouir operations.
In the move North to cut off the fortress line and in the b)attles round
T'obruk, wherever we usedi ou.r pace comblrined w\ith1 mov\eent, t night; we
always caught the enemy unp~eared. S~ccss wa-s imlneliate and casa~lties
ofte-n extremely light.
Ji~C~L
*.. .1
26 6
":B~: _
eC~sC.

_____
_CLSSF
As surprise is the most important element of success, we must consider
how it is to be obtained in. all our training schemes. There are many welltried
methods of achieving, surprise. Night attacks, and 'night advances
often, offer the best' chances. It is also true that night operations Tequire
most careful training.
TRAINING, .THEREFORE,
SURPRISE.
IS THE-FIRST STEP TO.ACHIEVING
ATTACK
The following are some of the lessons of the attack in desert warfare:-
1. Once again .it was shown that the attack against a properly
organised resistancemust have either the cover of darkness or an adequate
artillery support. This' applies whether tanks areused or .not. In every
case where tanks or infantry were committed in daylight without sufficient
covering fire, they had very heavy casualties. On the other hand the moonlight
attacks on Belhamed, Sidi Rezegh and Ed -Duda were, all successful
against superior enemy forces. The daylight attack in the 'area between
Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh was also successful as it was possible to cover
the attack with 25 pounder and machine gun concentrations. fired ahead of
'.the leading tanks..
2. In an attack where an enemy counter-attack with tanks may be
.expected.our anti-tank guns must be brought well forward, manhandled if
necessary, to protect our tanks during all stages of the attack. The Germans
were.skilful at this.
3. Full use must be made of smoke to blind the enemy anti-tank
guns in depth.
4. The Germans on at least one 'occasion attacked with tanks on a
,different axis from their infantry. Although this type of attack is more
difficult to mount and is:therefore somewhat deprecated in the textbooks,
it' is much more difficult for the defenders to deal with and is worth
studying.
5. Motorised infantry can and should use the speed of their vehicles
to the full in attack to gain surprise. An extreme example occurred on the
Gazala front against Italians where our infantry came up to within a
hundred yards of the strong enemy position and captured it with slight
casualties.
DEFENCE
One of the lessons of our battles was that where the holding of ground
was not important the best defence was undoubtedly to attack. Being tied
to the ground in a fortress seems to have a paralysing'effect upon the
occupants. In Bardia and Halfaya 14,000 of the enemy were kept upon the
defensive. for a fortnight by three battalions of infantry and two batteries of
artillery. Mobility and the power to attack are the best form of defence.
AIR
The Libyan Campaign was our first experience of Air and Armoured
Support on an adequate scale. With the former we need not concern
ourselves here except to note that the impressive superiority of the Royal
Air Force in Libya must be borne in mind when considering the lessons
of~ te campaign. Our understanding of Air Support has, as a result of
the experiences in Liba, -:avanced~ onsiderably and improvements
in communication ll _~eable' irl :-suport -to be speeded up.
27i

TANKS
The tank is the German Army's primary weapon. With. it they are
formidable, without it they are lost. In the recent fighting it wars only, by
clever handling of their tanks that they escaped complete defeat. We must
study methods of overcoming their tanks. We have much to learn from
the Germans in handling tanks in battle and also from :the German methods
of co-ordination of tanks with artillery, anti-tank guns.and infantry.
Depending as they do on the tank, their policy aims at producing the largest
number of effective tanks at the decisive moment in a campaign. They
have produced a satisfactory tank from the mechanical point of view and
they understand the value of gun-power. They have a most efficient
organisation for maintenance and quick recovery of tank casualties.
Finally, they appear to avoid action unless the conditions are favourable,
thus keeping their casualties much. lower than ours.
We had many examples of the German use of tanks. They will not attack
without close support of artillery, anti-tank guns, machine guns and infantry.
In both attack and defence they have a very high proportion.of anti-tank
guns round which the tanks manoeuvre. Even 88 mm. anti-tank guns are
brought forward by tractors with. tanks. The whole tempo of the German
tank attack is slow, the tanks moving'from one hull-down position to
another. The difficulties. of our gunners were further added to by tie
direction of attack which was almost always with the sun behind the
tanks. The enemy also took advantage of smoke and dust raised by
artillery bombardments. In some cases anti-tank-guns and machine guns
were taken forward with the first wave to give close support. --We can use
these German tactics in our training. The following are some of the points
which have arisen from our experience:-
(1) We must always give the maximum supporting fire to -armoured
fighting vehicles in attack.
(2) If, during an attack, anti-tank fire is very heavy the tanks should
if possible occupy hull-down positions and the infantry should be prepared
tp go through the tanks to shoot up the anti-tank guns.
(3) In the desert tanks can and should be used in attacks at night,
especially during moonlight nights. They were used most successfully in
the moonlight-attack on Ed Duda. The Commander who loses tanks lby bad
tank tactics may capture the objective, but lose the whole battle for want
of tanks later to repel enemy counter-attacks.
(4) It will often be necessary to give active cover to the
tank recovery personnel on the battlefield.
(5) New Zealand Division was very inexperienced in the .actual
capabilities and handling of the Army tank as we had not been able to yet
tanks during the training exercises. Before any further operations. -are
carried out tanks and infantry should train together. It would appear that the
teaching of the Training Manuals on co-operation"of «I> Tanks with infantry
requires drastic revision.
RESERVES
In desert warfare the demand to hold all the ground considered
necessary for the security of a force frequently extends that force to the
utmost, but one of the lessons of our fighting in the Sidi Rezegh-Belhamned
area is that a commander must maintain an adequate reserve even at the
expense of giving up ground which it is thought desirable to hold. I)uing
the critical days: of that fighting the only Divisional Reserve :fi was onre
squadron of Army tanks and one squadron Divisinal Cavallry.
U
3 i1*~b ~rr-~~L~~
a~rt apr; I~b:; W CL S 328~
~~~F
:
iASF

Al,
MOVE OF BRIGADE GROUP
For plan of Brigade Group moving in desert formation see diagram
with maps.
DISPERSION
During training prior to the campaign the question of dispersion
was discussed. Against air attack dispersion to 200 yards between vehicles
was laid down as normal. Such a degree of dispersion produces a frontage
in desert formation which cannot be- adequately protected against tank
attack. The two conflicting requirements of dispersion against air attack
and concentration against tank attack must therefore be weighed up at all
times, the decision depending upon the relative danger from each type of
attack. During the approach march to the frontier a dispersion of 200
yards was maintained although no air attacks actually took place. Once
the frontier was crossed distance was reduced to 100 yards as the enemy
air force had been inactive and there was a possibility of tank attack. This
degree of dispersion proved in part to be satisfactory against the only air
bombing attack which took place.
While in defence in the Sidi Rezegh-Belhamed area distances between
vehicles were still further redticed owing to the small amount of cover
available and it was found that vehicles at 50 to 60 yards interval did not
suffer undue casualties during artillery bombardment. No enemy air attacks
took place during that period.
NIGHT MOVES
The three night moves during the approach to the frontier were all
successfully carried out using green lights at intervals of about 1,000 yards.
Lights were placed by Provost Company in daylight the line being
reconnoitred and fixed by a small Sapper party. It was found during the
later operational moves that navigation by compass at night was carried out
very accurately without vehicle lights of any description even when there
were two or three changes of direction as in the move of 20th and 21st
Battalions and Divisional Headuarters to Bir Chleta and the last move of
the Division of over 40 miles to Bir Gibni. It is advisable, however, for the
leader to have a light at the back of his car which can be seen.
ANTI-TANK RIFLE
Although the anti-tank rifle still has its uses, it is no longer effective
for the purpose for which it was designed and no case occurred of an antitank
bullet putting out of action a German tank. It is essential that infantry
should have a weapon of their own capable of penetrating modern tank
armour at some distance (at least 500 yards). The weapon must be both
mobile and inconspicuous and should be included in the battalion. No
reduction should be made in the number of guns in the Anti-Tank
Regiment. The number of infantry anti-tank guns required will depend to
some extent on the performances of the weapon produced, but it is
considered that a minimum of eight is required in each battalion.
ANTI-TANK GUN
The 2 pounder anti-tank gun is outranged by the German tank gun
and has not the penetration necessary to take on the German tank at
distances over 800 yards. Two pounders which opened fire prematurely
29

disclosed their positions and were often put out of action by the enemy
tanks. A weapon of higher performance than the two pounder is required
for the Anti-Tank Regiment.
There was a tendency for guns to be left portee under conditions
when they should have been dismounted for ground action. Two pounders
should be fired from the lorry only under the following circumstances:-
threat.
(1) When protecting mobile columns on the move.
(2) In. withdrawals.
thet As reserve guns in a Brigade or Divisional area moved to counter a
Two pounders were on some occasions used successfully as a close
support weapon- to infantry in attacking machine gun and light miachine
gun posts.
THE 25 POUNDER
The 25 pounder is an excellent weapon and much superior in shell,
power to the German and Italian field guns encountered during 'the
campaign. On occasions when troops were attacked by small :groups of
tanks, fire was withheld down to ranges of 800 to 1200 yards and very
good results were achieved. Until we are provided with proper anti-tank
guns we must speed up ammunition supply to our field regiments.
DIVISIONAL CAVALRY
Lightly equipped as our Divisional Cavalry was, it proved to be
invaluable. Given the right equipment, e.g., armoured cars and American
type tanks with a good tank gun, it would have been even more useful.
There appears to be no place for a Divisional Reconnaissance Unit.
INFORMATION
Within the Division the flow of information both upwards and
downwards .has greatly improved and it was found satisfactory, even
under the worst conditions. During the battle period information regarding
troops on our flanks was.only satisfactory on the rare occasions when
we were actually in touch with them.
CODES
The very elaborate and unwieldy code system, produced before the
campaign, broke down partly under its own weight and partly because it
was frequently compromised by capture. The two essentials appear tobe
the time code and the map reference code and the latter could be simplified
by using only the daily adder. Apart from these two codes it'is considered
that messages within the Division should be either in cipher or in clear.
CONCLUSION
To sum up: This campaign has shown again that the well-established
principles of War still apply. Of all the factors which contribute towards
success, surprise is still the most important. To achieve surprise we must be
highly trained. We must train to reach the highest standard of efficiency in
mlovement, :in the use of weapons, and in co-operation with other armTTs.
Training now is more necessary than ever. Success- depends on the ~ill to
win of a full-trained_ force at the highest pitch of physical fitness.

L ,
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5 j a-.f" 1.
'
U/L 1 :VR
The New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica
and
Lessons of the
Campaign
PART
1.
N arrative and Lessons
PART 11.
Naps and Diagrams
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TYPICAL NZ INF BDE GROUP
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FOeAf4T/O4/
Fo DAYL/ONT /ddfl- AND FOR
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