New York Supreme Court

another is impermissible and a construction rendering statutory language
superfluous is to be avoided.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and
modifications omitted)). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that DHS is correct that
the Procedure merely implements the State Regulation and Administrative
Directives and that DHS exercised “only minor, if any, … discretion in interpreting
such mandates or standards,” Charter § 1043(d)(4)(iv), the Procedure would still be
a “rule” under CAPA and subject to all of the notice and comment requirements set
forth in Charter § 1043. See Matter of Home Care Ass’n of New York State, Inc.
v. Dowling, 218 A.D.2d 126, 129 (3d Dep’t 1996) (holding that an agency
directive issued pursuant to a legal mandate still had “legal effect” and was subject
to rulemaking procedure).
DHS fails to identify even a single case in which a court holds that a City
agency was exempt from CAPA because it acted pursuant to State law or rule, let
alone an administrative directive. Such a holding would not only be unprecedented
and contrary to the plain language of CAPA, but would also contravene the
objective of providing “a central place where anyone may examine in that one
place what the law or rule is that affects his particular interest.” Matter of Jones v.
Smith, 64 N.Y.2d at 1006 (citing People v. Cull, 10 N.Y.2d 123, 126 (1961);
Matter of New York State Coalition of Public Employers v. New York State Dep’t
of Labor, 60 N.Y.2d 789, 791 (1983)).
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